

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT

by

BONITA B. SHARMA

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ABSTRACT

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Bonita B. Sharma, MSSW

The University of Texas at Arlington, 2009

Supervising Professor: Vijayan K. Pillai

Conflict and violence have displaced many people around the world. Therefore, this paper explores the broader underlying risk factors that bring population to a vulnerable state of conflict related internal displacement. The possible root causes of conflict explored here are sustenance, degree of democracy, and global economic power status of countries. This methodology follows quantitative studies with dataset that comprises of the countries with conflict-induced internal displacement for 2007. The results of this analysis show that all three indicators are not appropriate measures to predict Internally Displaced Persons and that the global economic power status of the country is closer in significance than sustenance organization and the degree of democracy that may cause Internally Displaced Persons. Finally, this study recommends local level studies to better indicate the causes to Internally Displaced Persons.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Social Problem

According to the Internally Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC), internally displaced persons (IDPs) are those people that have been forced to flee their homes because their lives were in danger; however, unlike refugees they have not crossed across an international border (2007). IDPs often face difficulties as they become trapped in an ongoing internal conflict and their government may regard them as the enemies. Therefore, many IDPs become exposed to violence, hunger, and diseases during the course of their displacement and become subjected to human rights violations (IDMC, 2007).

The total number of conflict related IDPS are estimated at about 26 million, in 52 countries worldwide (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2007). The current trends clearly point out that IDPs outnumber refugees, yet they receive far less legal protection from international communities. While refugees are entitled to seek international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the international community is not under the same legal obligation to protect internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2007a). Although national governments should carry the primary responsibility for the security and well-being of every citizen in their territory, including the displaced people, too often they are unable or unwilling to honor the obligation as defined by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (a set of relevant international standards) (IDMC, 2007). There is no specific international legal policy covering the internally displaced persons and general agreements such as the Geneva Conventions on human rights are regarded as usually difficult to apply (UNHCR, 2007b). Furthermore, at times, international communities hesitate to intervene in internal conflicts or to offer sustained assistance (IDMC, 2007).

Internationally, concerns for the difficulty faced by internally displaced persons has peaked to a high degree of urgency in recent years as larger number of people are uprooted by internal conflict and violence (Icelandic Human Rights Center, 2008). On Global Overview 2006 on Trends and Developments, it has been pointed out that “if the global numbers of IDPs are taken as the key indicator of the effectiveness of the international response, it has to be concluded that, on the whole, the international community has failed – both in preventing new crises that cause displacement and in contributing to the creation of environments conducive to return and other durable solutions” (IDMC, 2007). Furthermore, increasing number of internally displaced persons worldwide in constant danger of their physical safety questions the success of international interventions, so far, in pacifying conflicts. In fact, very few research studies have been conducted in evaluating issues related to the underlying risk factors that initiate the internal displacement process and to address it prior to the risk of displacement. Hence, the question here is what are the causes related to forced migrations around the world? What underlying factors forces people to move? It has been pointed out that a broader theoretical explanation of the structural causes of forced migration and the structural determinants of the patterns of forced migration may help to explain why forced migration has increased in the recent years (Castles, 2003).

1.2 Literature Review

According to Bhattarai (2006), the beginning of a conflict, where one group or a person disagrees with the other and if not managed, largely, lead to further development of conflict and in some cases take the form of mass exodus if it finds the fertile breeding ground, supported either by poverty, social, religious, ethnic or political ideological exclusion. There can be different stages of conflicts and the focus, here, is on the pre-conflict aspect that provide potential early warning signs to conflict and state failure that indicate internal displacement.

On Global Forum on Migration and Developments, in 2007, Geneva, Switzerland, UNHCR emphasized that the international community needs “to recognize the important linkages that exist between forced migration and the development process, and to ensure that such linkages are fully

addressed in the effort to establish coherent and constructive approaches to the issue of migration and developments.” It encouraged to take due account of the way in which failed and flawed development processes give rise to situations in which people are forced to abandon their homes. Additionally, UNHCR considers it essential to interpret development in broader rights-based manner, than just for increased productivity, output and economic growth (UNHCR, 2007c). Additionally, according to the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, “the right to development is an inalienable human right, by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1986). When these human rights and fundamental freedoms are not realized, many people have felt obligated to seek protection outside of their homes (UNHCR, 2007).

Hence, in order to understand and address problems of forced displacement, the connections between different types of uprooting and their consequences need to be addressed. Any study of displacement throughout the history, in state-making, and in creating national identities makes clear that the ability to control its citizen through selective uprooting, removal, resettlement, and containment is pivotal in maintaining state power (McDowell, 2005). McDowell points out that if anything, the recourse to forced displacement is becoming more rather than less commonplace in the current world, as competition for resources intensifies and demand increases, as states feel both threatened and powerful, and as new development and security agendas encourage states to control population movement (2005).

There are a number of studies that explore the subject of forced displacement in response to conflict and most studies focus on the experiences of the people after they have been displaced and the challenges associated with aiding such populations. One of the explanations for only few analysis studies is the belief that the relationship between conflict and migration is simpler (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, & Taylor, 1993) than that between pre-existing conditions, such as

sustenance, rights, and global status. However, some have looked into the causal factors of the process in theoretically informed comparative studies in generalized aspects of forced migration (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997; Apodaca, 1998; Wallenstein & Oberg, 1998; Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003) and only a handful of studies have used empirical research designs, multivariate analysis, and modern statistical techniques (Schmeidl, 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2002a, 2002b; Davenport et. al., 2003; Melander & Oberg, 2003). Furthermore, many studies have linked refugees' decisions to flee as driven, at least partially, by conditions of poverty (Wood 1994; Zolberg et al. 1989, Schmeidl 1997, Zottarelli 1999). Indeed, some take for granted a linkage between poverty and displacements, and advocate to better the economic conditions as a way of dealing with the problem (Weiner and Munz 1997). This argument is most strongly associated with the root causes approach of Aga Khan (1981). Also, poor governance, weak social structures, overpopulation, massive unemployment, conflicts for the control and distribution of resources, economic mismanagement and poverty, as well as ethnic, religious, and cultural antagonisms have been identified as some causes of root causes (Anderson 1992, Gilbert 1993, Richmond 1993).

However, Zolberg et al. (1989), among others, are critical of the causes approach and clearly addresses these as an ambitious undertaking of the multidimensional nature of migration that relate with various issues of trade and development, human rights, and democracy, demographic and labor market needs, and foreign and security policy. Zetter (1988) argued that using the root causes method to analyze forced migration and using it as a basis for policy making tools provides imprecision and is misleading due to economic complexity involved. Moreover, Collinson (1993) pointed out that using root causes method to prevent migration is impossible, due to the competing interests that lie at the heart of these matters, as well as the complexity and unpredictability of migratory pressures and situations causing displacement.

Schmeidl (1995) argued that a central construct to have early warning of conflict and forced migration is a way to avoid human suffering, as well as to decrease the economic burden on the international community. As Schmeidl observes, although almost everyone accepts the need of

logical and reliable early warning system in place, there are many complications in constructing such system due to methodological problems and political sensitivities. Accordingly, it's almost impossible to generate a comprehensive set of propositions that is applicable during times of crisis for the purposes of fore-warning of forced displacement and refugee movement. This is due to many complex factors that makes every conflict or social phenomenon unique and therefore, is difficult to construct predictive indicators, (Schmeidl, 1995). Additionally, complexities and challenges arise when political sensitivities due to interferences into internal affairs of a state in terms of monitoring indicators and in terms of publicly warning of imminent catastrophe (Schmeidl, 1995). Yet, Schmeidl (1995) emphasizes that flexible contingencies can be prepared and early warning analysis can be used to head off incoming displacement in times of crisis, including the closing of borders, but this does not guarantee the human rights or needs of displaced people. However, Stanley (1987) and Schmeidl (1997) failed to find support for the proposition that economic conditions affect displacement. In study done by Schmeidl focused on 109 countries from 1971 to 1990 that produce migration flows, as well as those that do not, and she conducted a multivariate analysis that considers both pull and push factors and found that generalized violence, civil wars with foreign military interventions, and ethnic rebellion to be a greater predictor of refugee migration than human rights and economy (1997: 284).

However, Schmeidl's operational measures of forced displacement as the result of conflict and violence were considered less than optimal (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003). The use of such "early warning" forecasting studies to predict humanitarian emergencies has not been taken seriously, except for some instances where it has been done successfully (Schmeidl, 1995; Gurr, 1993; Fein 1993; Clark 1983, 1989). Despite the success, the use of these models to predict the failure of state due to lack of economy, democracy, or other development factors by social scientists is rare. Harff and Gurr (1998) pointed out that early warning preventative studies hardly use any of the forecasting models for civil conflicts or humanitarian emergencies in a policy setting. According to Howard (2006), environmental and political crises that have been identified by the international community as relevant episodes require policy and aid responses and while there is a comprehensive early warning system

in place to address environmental crisis, it is not the same for political crisis. Therefore, Howard (2006) suggested that a more practical framework for understanding state failure and the causes of forced migration relies upon forced migration patterns and to identify the point at which a nation deteriorates to the point of conflict. A greater understanding of what causes conflict and the relationship between the nature of the state and forced migration will allow for better prediction, anticipation, and prevention of failure and subsequent forced migration (Krain, 1997).

Furthermore, research clearly suggests that humanitarian emergencies can be anticipated (Melson, 1992; Fein, 1993; Gurr, 1994; Jenkins & Schmeidl, 1995; Rummel 1994). In response to this, Harff and Gurr acknowledges that it is not practical to rely on the general models alone to anticipate the types of crisis that generate a certain magnitude of humanitarian consequences are likely to occur. This requires more complex modeling of the causes and dynamics of specific types of state failure (1998). Therefore, a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict and forced migration requires a more complex modeling process.

Absence of democracy has also been looked at as an indicator of risk for conflict and state failure (Howard, 2006). Aga Khan (1991) and Moore and Shellman (2004; 2006) point out that state repression of its citizens may be one of the causes that forces people to migrate. Carnegie Commission on *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997) emphasized that assuming that extreme violation of human rights within states are potential aggressors on the international scene, it is sensible to prevent deadly conflict before it happens, thus ensuring the safety of civilians in the state ensures international order. Therefore, in order to effectively prevent conflict and its effects on human rights, three broad aims of preventive action were identified and those are: liberal democracy must be encouraged as the political system of choice in order to prevent the emergence of violent conflict; ongoing conflicts must be settled or prevented from spreading by ensuring steady and solid political intervention, economic sustenance, and military presence within and between states; and finally, the reemergence of conflict must be prevented by achieving just and effective peace settlements in the aftermath of conflicts (CPDC, 1997). Furthermore, it has been stressed that the link between human

rights and conflict resolution lies in providing greater knowledge of the causes of conflict (Bhavani & Backer, 2000).

Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Surko, & Unger (1995) argue that a declining democracy is correlated with state failure and that partial democracies are indeed far more vulnerable to state failure types of crises than are either full democracies or full autocracies. However, Rotberg (2004) disputes that finding by identifying partial democracies as relatively strong when compared to full autocracies that are also failed states. From both of the above studies, clearly, states that are ruled by autocratic governments are far more likely to fail than stable democracies; yet whether or not strong autocracies are far more stable than partial democracies has not been clarified (Rotberg, 2004). Nevertheless, this analysis makes the argument that any type of democracy is always preferable to an autocracy to ensure the rights of the people. Furthermore, it has been emphasized that the poor microeconomic policies can lead to the failure of the state until the state ceases to provide virtually any public goods, and state agents become entirely predatory through rent seeking and corruption (Rotberg, 2004). This conclusion is based upon the argument that in the past several decades civil war has been caused by economic factors (Collier, 2000). These findings indicate that levels of income, the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, population density, and the proportion of primary commodity exports all provide insight into the occurrence and duration of civil wars (Collier, 2000).

Further, Howard (2006) looked at political instability as an indicator for conflict and represents any type of action aimed at the government that is classified as dissident behavior but does not succeed in displacing the current regime. This includes any strikes, protests, riots, assassinations, etc. It relied upon the concept that political instability is a precursor of conflict in a nation and is an indicator of state failure and concluded that the factors that cause state failure also contribute to forced migration.

Other studies have also looked at human rights and personal integrity as indicators of displacement. Davenport, Moore, & Poe, (2003), contend that individuals will tend to flee when the integrity of their person is threatened and that they will flee toward countries where they expect conditions to be better. They conducted statistical analyses using fixed effects least squares, on a

pooled cross-sectional time-series data set with data from 129 countries for the twenty-five years period of 1964 to 1989. Their findings supported that threats to personal integrity and security are of primary indicators in displacement and measures of state threats to personal integrity, dissident threats to personal integrity, and joint state–dissident threats each are significant in effects on migrant production (Davenport et. al., 2003). They also suggest that countries in the earlier phase of democracy tend to have greater number of forced migrants, once other factors are considered. All these findings suggest that shifts toward democracy produce political competition and conflict (Newland 1993; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Krain and Myers 1997).

Additionally, many analysis have been done on world-systems theory and migration (Babones 2006; Chase-Dunn and Babones 2006; e.g. Denmark et al. 2000; Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005; Gills and Thompson 2006; Hall and Chase-Dunn 2006), however, only a few that relate it to displacement (Kardulias & Hall, 2005). Historically, a change in power status of a country mainly transpired through conflicts, violence, and wars and any quest for power is therefore immediately identified with some type of conflict, violence, genocide, dominion, and imperialism (Sinha, 2004). But in the modern days, what constitutes power as far as the nations of the world are concerned and how a country performs in terms of various attributes of power is more complex. Waltz (1979) pointed out that a great power is determined by population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, political stability and competence, and military strength and opinions are strongly taken into account by other nations before taking diplomatic or military action. While Sinha (2004) divided power into two general categories of hard power and soft power where hard power consists of military strengths, economic resources, and technological capacity and soft power comprises of culture, values, social cohesion, the quality of diplomacy and governance etc. He further postulates that power in the 21st century will flow from the well-run economy rather than war and aggression; therefore, the key determinant of status in the world community are related to overall stability as opposed to vulnerabilities for conflict and displacement (Sinha, 2004). Wallerstein (1974), further extrapolates this economic effect in terms of *Modern World System* with the three tier structure in the

world-economy consisting of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral groups of countries based on patterns of trade, network analysis of economic, political, and military relationships, and distributional analysis of income levels that may provide insight into the different strata of developmental status of countries.

Kardulias & Hall (2005) used the world-systems analysis defined by Wallerstein and others in their study to explain the rise of modern capitalism and adopted a macro-view which looks at human societies as continual interacting entities with constant contacts that promotes cultural transformations across great geographic distances. Therefore, they indicate that globalization and migration is not a new phenomenon, but rather an extension of ancient natural processes. Here, they appear to minimize the conflict or crisis related migration and focus on the “push-pull” factors for regular patterns of migration with push factor emerging in the third world countries (Kardulias & Hall, 2005). This is further elaborated by Sassen (1988), who pointed out that the Third World-systems theory argues that migration is a by-product of global capitalism and that current patterns of international migration trend tend to be from the periphery nations (poor nations or areas) to the core nations (richer nations or areas). This may be due to factors associated with industrial development in the First World countries which generate structural economic problems for the Third World countries where pervasive societal disruption may push nearly millions of internally displaced persons to flee their land due to political strife; hence, the refugees and the countless other economic migrants gravitate toward the advanced industrial economies, driven by deplorable economic conditions and political uncertainty in their home territories (Sassen, 1988).

Furthermore, Kalu (2004) adds to this that the countries that were founded upon revered past principle of sovereignty has been unable to transform themselves to recent global challenges. This has caused insecurity for many and created chronically fragmented and failed states with many displaced persons in Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Chad, Burundi and others countries and have left them with a fragile form and identity. This has generated declining sustenance and excessive debt in failed states and considered to promote high rate of conflicts. According to Raper (1996), when a

country or state falls under pressure from excessive debt and is unable to provide basic social services such as education and health care to its citizens, private organizations and churches take up greater role to provide such basic services. Additionally, when democratic institutions become weaker, the state becomes more sensitive to criticism globally and is likely to respond by reacting in repressive ways, especially towards the more vulnerable or minority populations (Raper, 1996). Moreover, the globalization of the world economies and governance mean that decisions affecting citizens are made at the international level, overriding the individual country's authority and if the country proves unable or unwilling to offer justice and security to its own minorities and as they become more insecure, they eject those they do not want in increasing numbers and turn away people seeking relief from conflict (Raper, 1996). Accordingly, they command less and less of their allegiance and may provide poor resources, declined rights, conflicts and displaced populations. Hence, the end of the Cold War, the international scene has become, by most accounts, less divided and polarized, bringing the countries closer to 'one global world', yet almost imperceptibly it is fragmenting it (Raper, 1996).

Additionally, Marshall (1999) analyzed conflict within the dynamic context of societal-systems development and the diffusion of insecurity through complex societal networks. According to Marshall, "Third world war" is characterized by the global system of complex technological systems and open exchange of information worldwide that plague the newly independent states of the Third World, as they struggle to establish the similar modern, central authority to guide their societies, distorted by years, decades, and, even, centuries of foreign domination through the enormous challenges and pressures of the Globalization Eras. He considers the wars in the Third World as largely domestic conflicts fought primarily by amateurs and [uprooting many in the process] (Marshall 1999). He further explores that the general measures of social disruptions, conflicts, and wars in the current global system are impossible to deny (1999). Marshall (1999), and argues that system dynamics of the global economic power play a pivotal role in the determination of violent conflicts, where violent conflicts are not randomly distributed through the world system but are clustered events

of “distinct social processes that tend to diffuse throughout societal networks, transform the instrumental relational nature of all the different societal relationships, and help to recreate the conditions that reproduce and reinforce the utility of violence (Marshall, 1999: 4).” Therefore, it is argued that system dynamics must be taken into account in the resolution of any violent conflict (Marshall, 1999).

Furthermore, Azar’s (1986) research suggests that conflict is clustered both spatially and temporally and the inference of the “protracted social conflict” concept is that conflict and violence may pervade societal systems under certain driving conditions. Gurr points out that “ethno-political conflict usually begins with limited protests and clashes and only gradually escalates into sustained violence” (Gurr, 1996: 365). These assertions are based upon two distinct conflict processes with one, emphasizing that the gradual systemic change in the world system’s, post-World War II conflict behavior and the second one looks at the transformative quality in the conflict generative process that change gradually from non-violent negotiations to violent confrontations indicating forced migration (Marshall, 1999).

The analysis presented in a new World Council of Churches (1995) document on uprooted people, classifies war, civil conflict, human rights, violations, colonial domination, and persecution for political, religious, ethnic or social reasons in every region are major causes of forced human displacement today (Raper, 1996). According to the report, the correlation between violations of human rights and situations that produce refugees is very strong; significantly, 90 per cent of countries with very high levels of human rights violations belong to a group of 36 countries that give rise to most of the worldwide displaced persons; and that severe breakdown of economic and social conditions that once provided people with the means to survive in their traditional communities and in their own countries, are accelerating the displacement of its people. It points out that the disarray within the world economic order with the capitalist system as a major cause of instability spreading its cruelest effects in poorer countries. This may be evident in African countries that are especially tied to single commodity markets and continue to slip further behind in their share of world trade (Raper, 1996). Therefore, those who chronically lack life’s basic necessities take a deeper toll to become

acutely vulnerable people and in turn, their plight increases the likelihood, size and complexity of new emergency situations (Raper, 1996).

Demographic patterns show that countries most at risk of such hardships and conflict related displacements are those with young democratic countries with growing populations and with stagnant or deteriorating economies (Raper, 1996). Rwanda is the gravest recent example evident in 1998 and 1999 as the Rwandan government and the UN recognized around 650,000 people in makeshift camps as internally displaced (IDPs) in the north-western prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. These IDPs were mostly Hutus, who were uprooted when an insurgency in the two provinces was put down by the Tutsi-dominated government in 1997-1998 (IDMC, 2007b). Attempts to explain the recurrent violence in the relations between Tutsi and Hutu include factors such as land pressure and poverty, the creation of rigid ethnic categories, and events in neighboring Burundi. Many observers therefore consider land scarcity and population pressure when attempting to understand the causes of the genocide. Some have even gone as far as to consider competition over scarce resources, especially access to land being the main root cause of the genocide. Others have argued that land scarcity and population pressure were elements that simply aggravated ethnic grievances already in existence, emphasizing the prevalence of the ethnic view of the conflict and the genocide (ACTS, 2005; Tiemessen, 2005).

According to IDMC (2007b), the worsening economic conditions, in Rwanda, regardless of ethnicity, created an increasingly receptive ground for state-sponsored hate-propaganda. This may have been initiated over a period of time when an economic crisis in the 1980s with a sharp fall in coffee prices and the effects of structural adjustment programs in 1990 and 1992 are believed to have led to increased poverty and unemployment which further aggravated by a major internal displacement situation caused by incursions of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in the 1990s (IDMC, 2007b).

Moreover, other country level studies also have looked at state level cause for forced displacement. Elmi and Barisse (2006) examined the root causes of the Somali conflict and analyzed the obstacles that have plagued peace efforts for the last fourteen years. They argue that competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime, and the colonial legacy are the main causes of the conflict. Elmi and Barisse, further point out that mere differences and politicization of the different ethnic clans is not the only factor that worsened the problem, but the availability of weapons and the presence of a large number of unemployed youth were also other factors that fueled the conflict (2006).

In Sierra-Leon, deep-rooted issues that gave rise to the war and forced displacement are considered to be culture of impunity, endemic corruption and weak rule of law, crushing poverty, and the inequitable distribution of the country's vast natural resources (Human Rights Watch, 2005). According to the Human Rights Watch (2002), elections could be held nationwide in Sierra Leone and were conducted peacefully and is considered to have entered a new, more optimistic phase after the years of conflict, destruction, and abuse; yet, the peace remains fragile, as the deep-rooted underlying issues that may have initiated the violence in the first place remains largely unaddressed. Therefore, it is emphasized that the new government, with the support of the global community must take urgent steps to tackle these problems if Sierra Leoneans so that any advancements made towards the peace process takes on the stronghold and they don't plunge into the past misery and destruction that took so many lives in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In particular, recommendations are made so that those responsible for the gross abuses of the past must be brought to justice before the new Special Court for Sierra Leone; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should expose the causes of the war and recommend safeguards against their recurrence, a fair justice system must be rebuilt to underpin the rule of law, and the process of reforming the police and army to inculcate respect for human rights must be completed (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Additionally, Human Rights Watch (2005) urged the governments of the West African region and the international community to pay strict attention to the importance of the economic sustainability of the fighters' new lives as well as the importance for parallel development of the communities into which they return. It emphasized that shortfalls in funding to train and reintegrate tens of thousands of fighters who took part in Liberia's 1999-2003 armed conflict, as well as for programs to assist civilians whose lives were torn apart by the same, must be redressed (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 1990). Furthermore, in order to prevent re-recruitment of combatants, the establishment of a grievance procedure with the power to refer cases for prosecution was recommended to address corrupt practices in the disarmament and rehabilitation process that denied many combatants of their benefits and made them more vulnerable for re-recruitment into other regional armed conflicts. According to the Human Rights Watch (2005), the regional warriors that were interviewed for the Human Rights Watch, 2005 report clearly shows that the level of economic deprivation and the continuing cycle of war crimes throughout the region as the reason for conflict in the region and for that reason, improving the severe socio-economic conditions which in large part give rise to armed conflict in the region is vital. Therefore, it has been pointed out that addressing the root causes of these worsened economic conditions and a long-term process of sustained political and economic stability with the help of state governments and the international community is critical to putting an end to the phenomenon of violence and displacement in West Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

According to KC (2003), internal displacement has been an important component of population redistribution in Nepal, in recent years. According to KC (2003), in the past, people have always been migrating from rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban areas in search of better living conditions, employment, economic, and educational opportunities. Additionally, natural disasters like floods and landslides have also forced people to give up their homes and move to other potential areas for their livelihood. As such, causes of internal migration in Nepal have been poverty, inequitable distribution of income, unemployment, difficult livelihood, food insecurity, and conflict (KC, 2003).Most

importantly, Internally Displaced Persons, due to conflict, have remained in vulnerable situations expecting urgent rescue and help, in Nepal(KC, 2003).

Furthermore, in Myanmar (Burma), while the situation of internal displacement is not by its military government and so the scale of the problem is well hidden, especially in Kachin state. Three decades of internal conflict between the various Kachin independence movements and the Burmese army has resulted in large-scale displacement of the Kachin population (Lanjouw, Mortimer, & Bamforth, 2000). Approximately 100,000 people in the Kachin state were forcibly relocated from their homes by the counter-insurgency operations between the 1960s and 1990s, while other estimates suggest that in 1994 – prior to the signing of a cease-fire – there were around 67,000 internally displaced persons (Lanjouw et. al., 2000). However, more recent estimates point to decreased conflict-related displacement, the exhausted economic conditions due to the three decades of conflict and have led to significant rural displacement (Lanjouw et. al., 2000). Resettling previously displaced groups have remained obscure and many rural populations in Kachin State have become landless and forced to seek a livelihood in the extractive natural resources (mining) sectors or in the service sector in urban areas (Lanjouw et. al., 2000). The recently negotiated cease-fire arrangements between the central government, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Kachin Democratic Army (KDA), there's continuous problems of displacement and land confiscation and displacement has resulted mainly from misguided socio-economic development initiatives (Lanjouw et. al., 2000).

All of these factors, oppressive rule, impoverishment, forced labor, and confiscated lands continue to displace many. In many cases, the abuses such as land loss, plus the prevalence of forced labor have managed to undermine the villagers' livelihoods so severely that they have been forced to migrate for better conditions either within Burma, or to a neighboring country (Human Rights Watch, 2005a). Therefore, forced labor, personal and food insecurity, loss of livelihood, and lack of access to basic services, such as education and health, are probably the most widespread and chronic causes of forced displacement in Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2005a).

Overall, Gary G. Troeller (2003) provides the social and political context for forced migration. He points out that the challenge is in the context of different and sometimes competing norms, such as globalization or violence and ideas of good governance and individual sovereignty. It mainly involves four conflicting concepts of state sovereignty, the right to national self-determination, democracy, and respect for human rights (Troeller, 2003). The inequalities in wealth between industrialized and poorer countries as a result of pervasive market, armed conflict, and displacement have all inherent in the current world. It has been shown that military and political conditions may societies that provide a potential breeding ground for discontent and political mobilization serve as triggers for the outbreak of violent conflict, but economic and social indicators are important for the structural background conditions within (Troeller, 2003).

One possible reason for the lack of implementation of effective conflict prevention plans is governmental skepticism about the causal indicators and the feasibility of conflict prevention. In addition, most government agencies do not place much faith in the ability of early warning systems to detect future conflict. Even among groups who believe that early warning systems can predict conflict, but many do not think such conflicts can be prevented. According to USAID conflict prevention conference report, (2001); both structural long-term prevention and operational short-term prevention are required in the new paradigm. More time needs to be devoted to institution building; 10-year and 15-year perspectives are necessary; and attention needs to be paid to developing better early warning systems. To be effective, these early warning systems need to be based on comprehensive analyses of the root causes of conflict.

CHAPTER 2

PROPOSED MODEL OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

After extensive review on the literature available, this paper proposes three hypotheses that may provide underlying causes of conflict and forced displacement: 1) sustenance organization, 2) degree of democracy, and 3) global economic power status of countries, listed here as Status of World Economy. These three theories may help provide for a comprehensive view of the forced displacement, especially in relations to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

2.1 Sustenance and Displacement

Some circumstances make people more vulnerable before conflict or natural disasters occur and create higher chances of forced displacement. Hence, this study proposes that sustenance theory based on Malthusian theory of population from *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) is one of the possibilities for this forced movement of people across the globe, especially in relations to internally displaced persons. This theory implies that population always outruns its sustenance exponentially and when a niche gets depleted of resources to sustain the population, people will compete for those limited resources at any level, which creates greater disadvantage to weaker population and runs them out of the niche. As a result, armed conflicts between different ethnic groups may develop or it may affect vulnerable population in that niche in greater ways than the stronger class of people. Malthusian theory on population can be summarized as follows:

Since population tends to press to the limit of available subsistence; since the power of production is beyond all comparison weaker than the power of reproduction; and since the equilibrium between population and resources can be maintained only by the constant operation of various checks, all of which are kind of either vice or

misery, then population will always grow until there is enough misery or enough vice or more likely a sufficient mixture of both to achieve equilibrium.

(Flew 1970: 47)

Furthermore, human ecologists propose that sustenance organization plays a critical role in demographic changes (Gibs & Martin, 1962; Hawley, 1978). According to Hawley, population makes changes towards equilibrium in relation to overall size of the population and the life chances available within that population (Hawley, 1978). Moreover, few studies have found that changes in sustenance organization are, in general, related to migration (Frisbie & Poston, 1978). The extent of forced migration is often the result of external events over which the populations have very little control over (Frisbie & Poston, 1978). Sustenance organization is characterized by a number of inputs needed for production of outputs, such as goods and services for consumption. In the presence of disasters and conflicts (external events), supply of input is either terminated or dramatically reduced resulting in reduced outputs for consumption and are forced to migrate. Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that employment, education, urbanization, and income (GDP) are inputs that indicates sustenance and decrease in these, promotes competition for limited resources and are the predictors of conflict.

Additionally, sustenance differentiation is also regarded as one dimension of broader ecological concept of division of labor (Frisbie & Poston, 1978). Accordingly, if the population is mostly engaged in primary sector activities, such as agricultural activities for sustenance, occurrences of disasters and conflicts may disrupt agricultural activities more than if a large proportion of the people are engaged in service related activities. Traditionally, communities depended on the land and the plentitude of hands for labor as well as the forest or water bodies which they exploit for farming, fruit collection, hunting and fishing respectively. Thus, when disasters or conflicts, for more opportunities occur in agriculturally oriented societies, the potential for migration may become far higher than when a high proportion of the population are engaged in either industrial or service oriented activities. Furthermore, the demography with greater distribution in division of labor has increased net migration than the ones with limited differences in division of labor (Frisbie & Poston,

1978). For instance, industrialization, technology, and occupational specialization have significant positive effect on sustenance productivity and functionality of a demographic population, which eventually leads to increase in population (Gibs & Martin, 1962; Frisbie & Poston, 1978). This is an important correlation for this paper because if a certain group loses these efficiencies or if a population is unable to generate varied efficiencies for itself, then it creates a deficit in sustenance capacity due to reduced resources. This may create an environment for conflict due to competition for the limited resources. Therefore, this paper predicts that the proportion of forced migrants will depend upon the extent of the population engaged in primary sector activities such as agriculture, mining etc.

2.2 Degree of Democracy and Displacement

Presence or absence of democracy greatly affects population in a geographical area. UNDP's Human Development Report (2000) asserts that democracy should base on human rights. It must allow for holding free and fair elections, which contributes to fulfillment of the right to political participation; allow free and independent media, which contributes to fulfillment of the right to freedom of expression, thought and conscience; separate powers among branches of government, which helps protect citizens from abuses of their civil and political rights; and encourage an open civil society, which contributes to fulfillment of the right to peaceful assembly and association. Therefore, democracy with an open civil society has an important participatory dimension, along with the separation of powers, for the promotion of rights (Human Development Report, 2000). This in turn represents the majority in the society and reduces the suppression and poverty which may minimize uprooting. Human Development Report (2000) further emphasizes that the process of economic policymaking for human development should honor the rights of participation and freedom of expression (Human Development Report, (2000) as part of the participatory democracy. However, this paper also considers that given the argument that human rights, freedom, peace, and stability prosper through democracy, it may still produce forced migrants. Sometimes countries that hold elections still do produce forced migrants as democracy requires more than simply holding elections.

A country that appears democratic by holding elections may in fact be profoundly undemocratic in the form of the elections held and in all other aspects of the political and state system (Larry, 2002).

Therefore, measures of democracy in a country are important to relate to production of forced migrants. Therefore, a higher measure of democracy in a country reflects all members enjoy equal opportunities, freedom, and power and indicates less IDPS.

One of the measures for democracy commonly used is the Economist Intelligence Unit's index. It is based on the view that measures of democracy based just on the state of political freedoms and civil liberties, does not encompass the wider concept of democracy. They do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is or its quality (Kekic, 2007). Kekic considers freedom to be an essential component of democracy, but not sufficient and in prior measures, the elements of political participation and functioning of government are taken into account only in a marginal way. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture (Kekic, 2007). The five categories are interrelated and form a coherent conceptual whole. This index provides a snapshot of the current state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories. This covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world's 192 independent states (27 micro-states are excluded) (Kekic, 2007). Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that decline in measure of democracy increases violence and conflict which increases IDPs.

2.3 Status of World Economy and Displacement

Structural classifications of countries based on their economy in relation to other countries around the world may also predict the internal displacements of people in a state. Immanuel Wallerstein, in 1974, classified countries (or economic blocs), based on competitive capital accumulation, as presumed in the world system theory, which serves as a predictor of conflict and displacement.

Wallerstein (1974) conceptualized a world system as a social system with 'boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimization, and coherence' (pg 347). He points that conflicting forces hold its dynamics together by tension and tore it apart as each group seeks to remold it to its advantage, continuously. Furthermore, he defines a world-system as one where there is extensive division of labor based on occupation and geography without even distribution. Additionally, economic gains are distributed to private hands while loss is absorbed by the political entities. It is also a function of state of technologies, possibilities of transport, and communications which remains in flux. Furthermore, acquiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization were reserved for higher-ranking areas (Wallerstein, 1974: 350). Wallerstein (1974) insisted that the modern world economy was, and only could be a capitalist world economy, where the bourgeoisie claimed to be the universal class and seek to organize political life to pursue their own objectives and within a world economy, state structures were relatively strong in the core areas and weaker in the periphery (Gunaratne, 2001). Accordingly, Wallerstein (1974) divided world economies in world system into three tier structure with core states, peripheral states, and semi-peripheral states.

The world system theory doesn't delineate between the nature of products and services that leads to capital accumulation (Gunaratne, 2001). Frank and Gills (1993) have described the process of capital accumulation as the main driving force of world system. Walerstein (1974) describes this success in capital accumulation through infrastructural investment, in agriculture and livestock, industry and new technology, etc., determined the core–periphery and the hegemony–rivalry structure of the world system at any given time. They further argued that the process of capital accumulation, changes in core–periphery position, as well as hegemony and rivalry within the world system, where they are cyclical and occur in tandem with each other (Gunaratne, 2001).

Thus, this paper hypothesizes that countries in the periphery are at high risk for generating conflict and IDPs. As for the application of the world system theory for internal displacement analysis, it requires the identification of the core–periphery structure of the world states at any historical juncture on the basis of multiple criteria. The obvious criteria relevant to measuring the economic

power of countries in the contemporary world are its national income, patterns of trade, network analysis of economic, political, and military relationships, and distributional analysis of income levels (Babones, 2005). According to Babones (2005), all of these analysis using multiple methods and data yield roughly similar groups of countries for each of the three structural zones in world system, in discreet time points. Therefore, Babones (2005) reported an income based benchmarks for the three zones of world-economy based on results from the Structure of the World-Economy (SWE) analytical tool that will be used to test the hypothesis here.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Variables

The dependent variable for this study is the percentage of IDPs population to the total population in a country. For each country in the dataset, the numbers of IDPs reported in 2007 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) were divided by the total population in the country in 2007, reported by the *CIA World Factbook*.

The level of IDPs in a country in the proposed model is explained by three sets of independent variables: 1) the sustenance organization and occupation distribution, 2) the Economic Intelligence Democracy Index, and 3) the Structure of the World Economy (SWE) with core and semi-periphery. The first explanation of vulnerability for IDPs is the sustenance hypothesis. Sustenance is measured by using two sets of independent variables. The first variable constitutes of percent employment, percent urbanization, GDP index, and education index labeled as Sustenance 1. As these measures use varied measurement units, these were computed into z-scores. Then the z-scores for each variable were added for a Sustenance 1. The second variable includes occupational labor distribution in percentage of agriculture, industrial, and other service related labor. The ratio between percent employed in agriculture, to industrial occupation was standardized (Z-score) and labeled Sustenance 2.

The second variable, the degree of democracy, is measured using Economic Intelligence Unit's democracy index and is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are interrelated and form a coherent conceptual whole (Kekic, 2007). These three variables were added and reported into a variable labeled as Democracy Index.

The third factor affecting the level of IDPs is whether the country is at the core, semi-periphery, or periphery in the Structure of World Economy. These were categorized with value of 1 for core countries, 2 for semi-periphery countries, and 3 for periphery countries (Babones, 2005). For those countries that are not categorized on Babones' table, the country's 2007 Gross National Product (GDP) was compared to the economic defining points of the world-economy with GDP values of less than \$8,414 as semi-periphery and GDP values less than \$1,059 as periphery (Larsen & Jenerette, 2005). Then, two dummy variables "Core" and "Semi" were created as follows: a new variable "Core" was created with a constant value of zero for all countries in the sample. If a country belonged to the core, for that country the variable "Core" was assigned a value of 1; the second variable "Semi" was created with a constant value of zero for all countries in the sample. If a country belonged to the semi-periphery, for that country the variable "Semi" was assigned a value of 1.

3.2 Data

This paper uses existing official or quasi-official data from United Nations and its corresponding agency such as UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, World Bank, Global Indexes such as World Fact Book, and other cross-national statistics. The unit of analysis in this study is the states identified by Norwegian Refugee Councils (2007) as countries with conflict-related IDPs. The data available for IDPs are provisional and subject to change during the process of writing this paper and the reporting may be politically biased. Furthermore, these data available for IDPs are collected from areas where UNHCR or other collaborative NGOs have been able to intervene and does not encompass global IDPs (IDMC, 2007). Therefore, IDMC critically assesses the reliability of the various sources and includes the most conservative figure among available estimates (Danevad & Zeender, 2003).

The primary source of number of IDPs reported is from the database of the Norwegian Refugee Councils, as mentioned earlier. It was established by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in 1998 at the request of the United Nations and is run by the NRC's Geneva-based Internal

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) that offers frequently updated and comprehensive information and analysis on all situations of conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide (IDMC, 2007). The United Nations regularly review the data they publish for reliability and validity. However, for those countries that have undetermined number of IDPs by the IDMC such as Algeria, Cyprus, Guatemala, Liberia, and Nigeria, estimated numbers provided by United Nations and the World Facts have been used for analysis by this paper. For those countries that have an estimated data between two set of numbers, UN figures are taken as the backup resource. However, for others, the average number of IDPs are taken and reported, for instance, Indonesia was reported to have 70,000 to 120,000 IDPs, so 95,000 is taken as the number of IDPs for this analysis.

As for Pakistan, Rwanda and Turkmenistan, their governments have severely restricted international involvement, insisting in the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference (IDMC, 2007). Therefore, in the case of Rwanda, since the 1994 genocide, up to two million people were displaced and fled to neighboring Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Tanzania, and Burundi (Unknown Author: ReliefWeb, 2003). Accordingly, majority of these population were forced back to Rwanda and the government moved these recently returned refugees into supervised camps and started the national villagization process of relocating the whole population from scattered housing and camps to villages (Unknown Author: ReliefWeb, 2003). Therefore, at this point, 650,000 Internally Displaced Persons in Rwandans, in December 1998, were reported (United Nations Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, 1999). According to ReliefWeb, local authorities reported that more than half of the resettled population would have preferred to go back to their original homes as security improved, but the Rwandan government has not let people go back to their former homes despite of reduced insurgencies (Unknown Author: ReliefWeb, 2003). Therefore, whether or not these relocated people are considered IDPS or not have been debated (Unknown Author: ReliefWeb, 2003, Mooney, 2003). Furthermore, in 1999 the numbers of displaced persons were reduced to only those that were directly receiving humanitarian aid to be 150,000 (UNOCHA, 1999). However, in October 2001, a multi-agency mission of UN, donors, and the Rwandan government reevaluated the conflict

related needs not fully addressed by humanitarian assistance and reported 192,000 displaced families still in inadequate shelters and insufficient basic services, in resettlement villages (UNOCHA, 1999). Hence, based on this information, this analysis has reported 192,000 as rough number of IDPS in Rwanda.

Conflict related displacements in number of regions in Pakistan have displaced more than a million people. In the North West Frontier Province's Swat Valley, due to the conflict between an armed opposition group and the army reported displacing 400,000 to 900,000 people, in 2007 (IDMC, 2008). Accordingly, many people reported to have returned as soon as possible, but some of them found their homes and property damaged. UNHCR (2009) quoted around a total of 546,994 IDPs now in the region. Furthermore, according to Pakistan Assessment (2009), the multiple conflicts across Pakistan, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have now led to the issue of large scale displacement and in Bajaur Agency alone there are more than 400,000 refugees since September 22, 2008 (Pakistan Assessment, 2009). In North Waziristan, conflict between armed opposition groups and the army resumed in October 2007 after the collapse of a ceasefire agreement and at least 80,000 people are believed to have fled their homes to avoid being caught in the bombing and crossfire (Pakistan Assessment, 2009).

Furthermore, in Balochistan, Pakistan's strategically important and resource rich land, there are tens of thousands of people have been displaced as government forces fought some regional ethnic Baloch tribes (International Crisis Group, 2007). Additionally, Pakistani army is accused of preventing people displaced from near the Line of Control dividing Pakistan and India from returning to their homes (Integrated Regional Informational Network – Asia, 2007). The IDPs had first been displaced due to shelling at the border of India and Pakistan, in 1999, during the Kargil conflict in Kashmir (IRIN Asia, 2007). Therefore, there is no information available on the exact numbers of people displaced in Pakistan today. However, conflicts have clearly displaced, and will continue to displace, civilians in urgent need of protection and humanitarian assistance; hence, this paper reports 1,000,000 IDPs for the data-analysis on Pakistani IDPs.

As for Turkmenistan, due to the state controlled media and internet access, and lack of civil society in Turkmenistan, information on internal displacement remains scarce. According to the Global IDP Project (2005), Turkmen law contains a number of provisions including forced assimilation or “Turkmenification” which explicitly allow forced relocation to be used as punishment for certain crimes committed by civilians. This law has been used as legal justification for the displacement of Uzbeks, Uzbek nationals, and Kazaks, who are considered to be the political opponents of President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov and ethnic minorities (Global IDP project, 2005). There have been unconfirmed reports of forced relocation of ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan borders and other relocations due to “a city-wide beautification project” (Global IDP Project, 2005; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2005). Therefore, as there are no estimates available for IDPs in Turkmenistan, this analysis excludes Turkmenistan. However, Norwegian Refugee Council’s list of 52 states with conflict-related IDPs includes Turkmenistan (IDMC, 2007). The other state that’s excluded from this analysis is the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Although IDMC listed this state as separate from Israel, other data used for this paper for analysis were not separately available for the Palestinian Territory. A list of all states is presented in Fig. 1.1

The independent variables used for analysis and data source for all the variables are listed on Table 1.1. A number of variables suffered from the problem of missing data for the countries. For those states with missing data, class mean imputation method was utilized from the observed value for a particular variable in relation to the continent the country was located in. This method has its advantages and disadvantages; for instance, by filling in the missing data, it allows for easy analysis and reporting with consistent results (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1982). However, these estimates may allow for bias in treating the data as actual data and underestimate the variability in the variables with missing data. Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistical values of all the variables before imputation and Table 1.3 shows these values after imputation.

Africa: 1. Algeria, 2. Angola, 3. Burundi, 4. Central African Republic, 4. Chad, 5. Congo, 6. Democratic Republic of Congo, 7. Cote D'Ivoire, 8. Eritrea, 9. Ethiopia, 10. Kenya, 11. Liberia, 12. Nigeria, 13. Rwanda, 14. Senegal, 15. Somalia, 16. Sudan, 17. Timor-Leste, 18. Togo, 19. Uganda, Zimbabwe

Asia: 1. Afghanistan, 2. Armenia, 3. Azerbaijan, 4. Bangladesh, 5. Georgia, 6. India, 7. Indonesia, 8. Iraq, 9. Israel, 10. Lebanon, 11. Myanmar, 12. Nepal, 13. Pakistan, 14. Philippines, 15. Sri Lanka, 16. Syria, 17. Turkey, 18. Uzbekistan, 19. Yemen

Europe: 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2. Croatia, 3. Cyprus, 4. Macedonia, 5. Russian Federation, 6. Serbia

South America: 1. Colombia, 2. Guatemala, 3. Mexico, 4. Peru

Figure 1.1 List of Countries Included for Analysis

Table 1.1 Variables and Data Source

| Variables | Data Source |
|--|---|
| <i>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</i> | |
| X1: Number of IDPs | Norwegian Refugee Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2007. Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| X2: World Population for IDP% | Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| <i>Sustenance</i> | Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| Y1: GDP per capita for countries | Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| Y2: Labor force by occupation | Central In Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| Y3: Percent employment | Central In Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov Central |
| Y4: Total percent of urbanization | In Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. <i>The World Fact Book</i> . http://www.cia.gov |
| Y5: Education Index | United Nations Statistical Division, 2008. <i>Human Development Reports 2007/2008</i> |
| Y6: GDP index | United Nations Statistical Division, 2008. <i>Human Development Reports 2007/2008</i> |
| <i>Democracy (DEM)</i> | Kekic, L., (2007). The Economic Intelligence Unit's index of democracy. <i>The World</i> . |
| Y7: Economic Intelligence Democracy Index | |
| <i>Structure of World Economy (SWE)</i> | Babones, S. J., (2005). The country-level income structure of the world-economy. <i>Journal of World-Systems Research</i> , XI. |
| Y8: Country status by national income(GDP) | Larsen, L. & Jenerette, G. D., (2005). Water and cities: Water footprints for the world's largest cities. University of Michigan: <i>Working Paper Series</i> . |

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Logistic regression is the method used to estimate the effects of sustenance organization, occupational labor distribution, degree of democracy, and global economic power status of a country has on the dependent variable of Internally Displaced Persons. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyze the significance of the independent variables. Out of all the predictors, the SWE measure of nations income compared to the world economy is statistically significant at less than 10 percent level ($p < .06$). The odds of obtaining a country in the semi-peripheral status with more than 2 percent of the population in the internally displaced status is about .28 times the odds of obtaining a country in the peripheral regions with more that 2 percent of the population in the “internally displaced status.” When the rest of the variables in the model namely, sustenance variables and degree of democracy variables, were introduced, the odds ratio for the Semi variable became insignificant.

Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics before Imputation

| Variables | Mean | Median | Standard Deviation | Skewness | Kurtosis |
|--|-------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) | .40 | .00 | .49 | .421 | -1.9 |
| Sustenance 1 | .84 | 1.42 | 3.01 | -.081 | -1.24 |
| Sustenance 2 | .00 | -.25 | 1.0 | 2.99 | 12.54 |
| Democracy Index | 4.53 | 4.72 | 1.81 | -.05 | -1.27 |
| Core (Dummy variable) | .18 | .00 | .39 | 1.72 | .99 |
| Semi-periphery (Dummy variable) | .36 | .00 | .48 | .602 | -1.71 |

Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics after Imputation

| Variables | Mean | Median | Standard Deviation | Skewness | Kurtosis |
|--|-------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) | .40 | .00 | .49 | .421 | -1.9 |
| Sustenance 1 | .00 | -.72 | 3.35 | .171 | -1.20 |
| Sustenance 2 | 1.16 | 1.62 | 1.4 | -1.12 | 1.53 |
| Democracy Index | 4.53 | 4.72 | 1.81 | -.05 | -1.27 |
| Core (Dummy variable) | .18 | .00 | .39 | 1.72 | .99 |
| Semi-periphery (Dummy variable) | .36 | .00 | .48 | .602 | -1.71 |




Figure 1.2 Frequency Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (Labeled Percent IDPs), when more than 2% of the Total Population of IDPs in a Country.




Figure 1.3 Frequency Distribution of Sustenance Organization Variable.




Figure 1.4 Frequency Distribution of Occupational Distribution Variable.




Figure 1.5 Frequency Distribution of Economic Intelligence Unit's Index.




Figure 1.6 Frequency Distribution of Structure of World Economy Variable, when Core, (Labeled Core) is 1.




Figure 1.7 Frequency Distribution of Structure of World Economy Variable, when Semi-periphery (Labeled Semi) is 1.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion

Previous studies have concentrated their efforts on hypothesis testing of asking when forced migrants will leave their homes, or where they will go once they've left or what will happen to them (Rubin & Moore, 2007). These questions are unlikely to help policymakers and humanitarian groups that anticipate forced migration. Therefore, we focused on the preventative measures for forced displacement and asked: what (if any) are the warning signs of an impending forced displacement event? Therefore, this model aimed to identify observables that indicate high risk that a given country experiences a forced displacement event. The results of this quantitative analysis did not support the main argument that decreases in sustenance organization, democracy, and global economic statuses are the prominent indicators of internal displacement. This may be due to the more than 50 percent of IDPs population in our dataset comprise of less than 2 percent of the population. Therefore, the country data may not represent this small part of the population. For instance, unemployment may be much lower in just IDPs population but may be significantly higher for the majority of the population in the country. Therefore, in future studies, it is important to report the localized indicators of the risk factors of conflict. Furthermore, future efforts to identify useful risk factors would do well to look at data prior to the heightened conflict and IDPs generation rather than just the year forced migration is observed. This may provide more effective indicators that lead up to the violence and forced migration.

5.2 Implications to Social Work

Although this paper did not show that the development factors are direct indicators of Internally Displaced Persons, UNHCR still identifies some of the push factors for forced migration to

be economic instability, lack of education, lack of freedom and democracy (2007). Therefore, social workers can play an important role in prevention in future forced displacements or provide assistance to those that already are. They can help in conflict resolution or management, education, economic empowerment, and advocate for political and civil rights for population at risks or already are displaced. Social workers can also advocate for firmer policies and treaties that provide humanitarian rights and assistance to those that are displaced.

As the preamble to *NASW Code of Ethics* (1996) states, “the primary mission of the social worker’s profession is to enhance human wellbeing and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. A historic and defining feature of social work is the profession’s focus on individual wellbeing in a social context and the wellbeing of society. Fundamental to social work is attention to the environmental forces that create, contribute to, and address problems in living”. Therefore, social workers have much to offer Internally Displaced Populations. Using the skills and values of caring and empowerment, they can involve themselves in many important human rights activities, here and abroad. Some of these include counseling, providing disaster relief in times of crisis, developing, managing and staffing international service-delivery programs like the UNHCR and the Red Cross, and researching international issues with a focus on improving people’s quality of life and addressing injustices. As globalization increases, it is likely that more and more social workers will be make themselves invaluable to issues here in US as well as in world affairs. Social workers’ unique skills and flexible approaches to problem-solving can help develop human potential in places, where people have been oppressed and create peaceful, mutual solutions to difficult situations.

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Bonita B. Sharma completed Bachelor's of Science in Biology and Chemistry from the University of Texas at Arlington and Master's of Science in Social Work from University of Texas at Arlington as well. International social work related to Internally Displaced Persons and other forced migrations, UN Millennium goals related issues, sustenance, and others are of research interests for Sharma. Sharma has been awarded Outstanding Student Awards, in 2009 and has been recognized with Excellence Awards by Phi Alpha Honor Society, 2009 and Phi Kappa Honor Society, 2008. Sharma currently teaches at Dallas County Community College as adjunct faculty and hopes to counsel as well as work towards PhD in Social Work.