

MUNICIPAL GOLF FACILITIES AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
GOLF: DOES GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

by

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Acknowledgements

Writing a dissertation is similar to playing a round of competitive golf. It is exclusive and time consuming. The costs to participate are realized in the present as well as in the missed opportunities. Although the challenge is guided through thoughtfully designed structures, the path one takes is never precise and is always determined by hazards and conditions encountered along the journey. Through preparation, patience, and repetition, the journey will lead to appreciation for what has just been accomplished and the power of perseverance.

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when you were going to sleep. I look forward to making that time up by reading this study to you as your newest, most favorite, bedtime story. Hopefully you'll like it...

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Abstract

MUNICIPAL GOLF FACILITIES AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF GOLF: DOES GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

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The game of golf has a tumultuous history that includes long bouts with classism, racism and sexism. From its arrival to the United States more than 200 years ago, golf has found itself as a barometer for democracy. The symbolism for elitism demonstrated through the demographic makeup of its participants is evident and remained practically unchanged during this time. However, within public administration, there is a massive void in research related to municipal golf policy.

This study provides a comprehensive review of municipal golf policy in cities and towns where golf facilities are located in order to determine whether the form of local government is related to the number and variation of publically owned golf facilities within its jurisdiction. In addition to form and function of government, this study includes research that highlights the complex history of

golf in America. Many authors have argued both the negative and positive benefits of both the council-manager and non-council manager forms of government. This study identifies several areas in administration and provision of golf where the council-manager form of government distinguishes itself from other government forms.

Data was collected from 7,419 cities and towns across all 50 states. These cities and towns represent a comprehensive account of all jurisdictions that have golf facilities located within their limits. Cities and towns with the council-manager form of government were identified in 3,521 of these jurisdictions. Non-council-manager cities and towns were found in 3,898 jurisdictions. Demographic data of the jurisdiction and the characteristics of any municipal golf facilities were assessed using statistical testing in the form of independent t-tests and multiple regression methods of analysis. The results from this study reinforce golf's historical recollections as well as studies on form of government in its conclusion that non-council-manager forms of government deliver municipal golf in a more democratic manner than council-manager forms of government.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The game of golf has a tumultuous history that includes long bouts with classism, racism and sexism. Research across multiple disciplines has addressed various issues related to golf ranging from basic concepts of the golf swing to more obscure topics, such as research into the introduction of the game to the US Supreme Court Justices (Davies, 2010). However, there is a massive void in research in the area of municipal golf policy and access to golf facilities.

This study provides a comprehensive review of municipal golf policy in cities and towns where golf facilities are located in order to determine whether the form of local government is related to the number and variation of publically owned golf facilities within its jurisdiction. Have municipal golf facilities helped democratize access to golf?

Background

From its arrival to the United States more than 200 years ago, golf has found itself as a barometer for democracy. The symbolism for elitism demonstrated through the demographic makeup of its participants is evident and remained practically unchanged during this time. First it was wealthy, white landowners during the 1800's who sought to curtail slaves from playing in manicured fields that would become country clubs (still used today); it was wealthy, white landowners who pushed for construction of segregated courses

with public monies during the middle of the twentieth century, then they created semi-private, daily-fee courses in suburban retreats during the 1960's and 1970's, and, from the 1980's and into today the same wealthy, white landowner is pushing to privatize the remaining municipal courses (Moss, *American Country Club*, 17-19; *New York Times*, 21 April 1896; Martin, *Fifty Years of American Golf*, 222-223). From court cases to on course protests, minorities have taken steps to fight for equality and municipal golf courses have often been the catalyst for change. Yet we find ourselves still experiencing golf as a sport played by wealthy, white, landowners (NGF, 2012).

Research Problem

In the early 1900's the reform movement in Public Administration led to practitioners and scholars recommending several institutional changes in local government in effort to promote the good of the community. Recommendations were mainly concerned with separating policy and administration and one way to do this was through the council-manager form of government. This Public Administration dichotomy has helped guide (and define) the field for nearly a century, and the council-manager form of government has now become the most dominant structure for municipalities with populations over 50,000. Much of the current research in Public Administration is focused on the ever-changing roles and responsibilities for local government actors; or evaluating the impact of government form on service and delivery at the local level (Booms, 1966; Barr

and Davis, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Clark, 1968; Farnham, 1986; Wish, 1986; Deno and Mehay, 1987; Rubin, 1988; Kearney and Sinha, 1988; Hayes and Chang, 1990; Nunn, 1996; Stumm and Corrigan, 1998; Rodriguez, 1999).

The council-manager structure challenges the PA dichotomy because managers are no longer limited to administrative responsibilities however, some may argue that the policy and administration separation is for the purpose of assigning administrative roles to the city manager and policy roles to the council. In any case, managers have expanding and powerful roles serving as policy researchers, developers, and implementers. This study will examine various actions elected and non-elected public officials have taken in regards to golf, specifically, municipal golf. In addition, data such as demographics, form of government, and characteristics of golf facilities nationwide will be analyzed in an effort to better understand the role of publically-owned golf facilities in the democratization of golf.

Previous Studies on the Research Problem

Structure of government is one of several aspects of the reform movement that have been studied. Council-manager structures have been examined on everything from the description of the average city manager, to the demographic aspects of municipalities. Existing research suggests that geographic region, population size, ethnic composition, and various economic characteristics of a community are related to form of government (Sherbenau, 1961; Kessell, 1962;

Schnore and Alford, 1963; Alford and Scoble, 1965; Dye and MacManus, 1976; Sanders, 1979; Farham and Bryant, 1985).

Cities with less ethnic diversity have been shown to prefer the council-manager form of government, while research also shows that with more diversity, preference flips to mayor-council preferences (Wolfinger and Field, 1966). Customs, private demands and economic interests all play significant roles in deciding what services are offered and how they are delivered (Key, 1950). Drawing from research on form of government, specifically council-manager forms, this research has found many of these same significant variables reflected in literature documenting the historic fight for access to golf facilities.

Significance of the Study

Most of the existing research into forms of government are reduced to case studies, specific population size, or certain regions or states. This study is the first of any discipline to directly address issues pertaining to municipal golf policy. As such, this dissertation will not only add substantially to the existing research within the sport of golf, but due to the scope of the examination (7,419 local governments), the benefits to Public Administration research would be significant.

Research on recreational sports has found they offer many benefits to society. These benefits include overall improvements in psychological and physical well-being, the reduction of life pressures, fulfilling the need for social

satisfaction, help form a sense of belonging in the community, elevate the quality of a participant's life, as well as help to correct juvenile behavioral issues (McLean, Bannon, & Gray, 1999; Manfreda, Driver, & Tarrant, 1996; Bammel & Burrus, 1996; Jackson & Burtun, 1999).

Few analyses examine provision of a service, or structures of government, on a nationwide scale. There is also a lack of research evaluating the relationship between the form of government and distribution of golf facilities, and, as mentioned above, zero studies specific to the provision of municipally owned facilities. Research that does exist suggests there is a unique combination of benefits from participation in golf. Golf is distinctive in offering a social and business environment that is not found in any other sport. This environment has been found to foster personal skill development as well as engagement and interaction.

Playing golf has come to be an important means to network with other people for social relationships or business discussions. On a worldwide scale, golf was found to be the most valuable sport used as a tool for developing and establishing connections in the business world. "Golf is clearly the major sport in terms of socioeconomic impact" (Stoddart, 1990). Others, like Thorstein Veblen (1999), found golf to be the perfect specimen of conspicuous consumption; "its reputability lies in its element of waste." In general, golf has historically been as much about conferred social status as it has about sand traps and putting greens.

Elites gravitated to the links precisely because they had the wherewithal to do so. Now, after nearly a hundred years of publically funded golf, this still seems to be the case. History suggests municipalities with managers will offer fewer municipally-owned golf facilities due to less diverse populations, differences in responsiveness to public demands, and differences in preferred methods of delivering public goods and services. Therefore, as the foundational research within Public Administration on issues related to municipal golf facilities, this study investigates whether there is an influential relationship between the form of a local government and its provision of municipal golf facilities?

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of council-manager form of government on municipalities with golf facilities in an effort to determine whether the form distinguishes itself from non-council manager jurisdictions in provision of municipal golf. Municipal golf courses were intended to further democratization of the game. The question remains whether democratization has taken place or if municipal golf courses are in a policy class of their own.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The complexity of this research requires a unique approach to conducting a literature review. This study will provide a dual literature review. The review

starts with the history and development of golf in the US followed by a parallel stream of research on form of government.

Golf

Any investigation into the role of municipal golf courses in the democratization of golf should be based on an understanding of the history of the game itself. The game has a history of carrying social values and norms of its time, good and bad. And, more often than not we see it fight with any attempt to change this culture. Golf has a history filled with examples of racism, classism, and exclusion as it sought to preserve the power and influence it has within business and personal networks.

A familiar theme within golf's history is the parallel and contradicting recollection of its arrival in the United States by whites in the one hand, and African Americans in the other. White, upper-class recollections of the history of golf predominate. However, we find African Americans held in slavery also participated and enjoyed the game, creating their own history. Although these histories diverge at the very arrival of the sport in the United States, we should consider African American accounts just as valuable and accurate as the predominant white recollections.

Golf Arrives in The New World

The South Carolina coast of Colonial America was an active and thriving commercial establishment and there is evidence to suggest Scottish merchants

brought the game to the New World (Sinnette, 1998). However, upon arriving to a land where slavery was so pervasive, we cannot ignore the instrumental role blacks played in establishing golf. In fact, black slaves were used in both the construction and day-to-day operations of the South Carolina Golf Club in Charleston in 1786 (recognized as the first golf club in the United States). For other historians, most references to golf's arrival point to 1888, 98 years later with the establishment of the country's first club, Saint Andrews Golf Club in Yonkers, New York. Regardless of when golf came to shore in America, slaves and subjugation fit nicely within the culture of a game restricted to those of royalty and the upper class.

In 1796, Savannah Golf Club was using slaves as "finders" to determine the position of the hole. The slaves would find and mark the hole with a suitable object so that an upcoming player would know its location. The second important responsibility was to yell, "Fore" to inform other users of an approaching shot. After the round, slaves were undoubtedly given clubs to clean, polish and store while their owner rested and enjoyed relaxation. When provided the opportunity, slaves began experimenting with the clubs and secretly playing the game of golf (Sinnette, 1998).

The number of golf courses built between 1888 and 1920 soared. By 1915, more than 100 new private courses were constructed around the United States and the reliance on country clubs reinforced the sport's connection to upper-class

privilege. Lavish clubhouses and manicured grounds symbolized the social exclusivity of American upper-class life. New members could not simply pay dues and join, they were nominated or sponsored by current members, virtually guaranteeing that club members would be culturally and socially homogenous (McCullough, *So Much to Remember*, 24-25; Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen*, 361-362).

Once members were ‘in’, they faced another set of social and financial pressures. On top of the built-in initiation fees and annual dues, members were expected to pay for or otherwise support a number of activities and rituals designed to reinforce the club’s social status. Attendance to multiple seasonal galas, weekend dinners, and various balls and dances was expected of members. American country clubs soon realized golf was a means rather than an end. Businessmen perceived private golf clubs as tools required to enhance their careers. Golf was secondary to the social and cultural exclusivity the private clubs offered.

The impact country club golf was having on American business was documented as early as 1899 by Horace Hutchinson in his book *The Book of Golf and Golfers*, “Already golf has revolutionized the whole life of business men in America. The American business-man golfer works in the city for part of the day in the summer and spends the rest of his time at the country club”. In fact, two years later in 1901, one of the most significant mergers in the history of American

business occurred on the links, the creation of United States Steel. After a vigorous round of golf at St. Andrews, Andrew Carnegie conceded to selling his control of Carnegie Steel to J.P. Morgan through his designated associate, Charles Schwab. Golf in America was exclusively for the social and economic elite, just as it was upon its arrival a century earlier (Hutchinson, 1899; Wall, *Carnegie*, 787-788).

Country clubs also offered 'therapeutic' relief from the modern issues of race, ethnicity and class. One of the most popular winter retreats for wealthy northerners featured this 'therapeutic' approach in the advertising of their resort. With images of black caddies serving happy, affluent white visitors, Pinehurst Country Club in North Carolina offered guests the opportunity to return to the 'natural order.' For many whites, exclusivity was not a goal viewed as separate from health but rather integral to it. "In the view of the affluent, Anglo-Saxon, American Protestants, the last quarter of the 19th century, with its influx of immigrants, had fundamentally disrupted the natural order" (Moss, 1999). As Pinehurst developed, and African Americans were hard pressed to find jobs, they found themselves occupying a subordinate position from which they offered labor and entertainment to the villagers. The white property owners and the steady flow of visitors proudly flaunted their financial and social success, and assumed it granted them paternal dominance over the black workers of the resort (Moss, 1999).

Visitors often took trips to “visit the primitives homes of the people” and participated in one of the most popular events of the season: “The Baby Show” (Moss, 1999). The baby show was organized by an ad-hoc committee of white, property owning, resort residents and the event featured 15 black mothers presenting their infants to a panel of guests of Pinehurst. The account was described as, “the first opportunity that many of our guests have had to inspect little pickaninnies at short range, and all seemed anxious to improve the occasion”.

The prizes, cakes and cash offered were a pittance to the resort guests, but must have seemed like riches to the black contestants. One of the most offensive examples of the use of wealth to symbolize and entrench white dominance and black subservience was a tradition established by northern businessmen in the winter of 1905. At the end of each visit, the president of the group drove a golf ball off a \$5 gold piece. The black caddy who could outrun and out fight all his fellow caddies and retrieve the ball was given the gold piece (Martin, 1930).

All property deeds contained a covenant restricting owners from allowing “Jews or Negroes” from occupying any property in Pinehurst. Such covenants remained standard for decades. Even as late as 1962, Pinehurst screened both prospective property owners and guests, excluding all but “white gentiles” (Brown, 1962). Currently, Pinehurst is one of the top rated golf courses in the country and has hosted more than a dozen professional golf tournaments,

including eight major championships. And, although not restricted to blacks and fist fighting for a \$5 gold piece, caddy races still occur at multiple P.G.A. tour stops every year. For more than a century, golf has provided a setting that harnessed, fostered and cherished traditions based in classism and racism— often values rejected in society outside of the homogenous country club setting.

Introduction of Public Golf

In addition to the land, courses required services of skilled architects, construction workers and maintenance crews. Private country clubs were able to access capital through membership initiations and dues in order to cover these outlays but as the standards in design and construction rose, so did the cost. Although sufficient leisure time and disposable income were required to participate in the game of golf, public parks helped address one of the most prohibitive obstacles to broader public access: the acquisition of land. The country's first public golf course opened in the summer of 1895 in the Bronx, New York. The outcome of efforts from a group of self-interested, politically influential businessmen that successfully lobbied the New York Park Commission to renovate a park. They had searched nearby suburbs for a suitable plot of ground at a modest rental, and decided upon the park as a last resort (New York Sun, 1922).

The commission chose a large tract of land within an existing city park, Van Cortlandt Park in the Bronx. This facility would come to set the example for

nearly every public course constructed in the following two decades. The nine-hole course shared many characteristics with the first wave of municipal golf courses. It was located within commuting distance for the city's golfers and occupied a relatively small amount of space. With a limited number of hazards, and lightly maintained fairways and greens, the design was not only cost conscious but less discouraging to inexperienced players.

Because municipal golf courses were publicly visible projects, proposals often triggered protests. Opponents would argue that landscaped parks were not intended to be a substitute as country clubs for wealthy residents. Supporters felt there was no harm in renovating the park because it kept with the "natural landscaping", park managers welcomed the arraignment since it relieved them of maintaining sections of parks and city officials found it politically advantageous to approve renovations. Municipalities began renovations and course construction in an attempt to make the game more accessible to golfers of ordinary means, but it also meant public courses were vulnerable to social and political conflicts (Rosenzweig and Blackmar, 1992).

In 1916, the United States Golf Association (USGA) estimated that 50,000 new golfers tried the game that year. Between 1900 and 1912, it was estimated that the total number of golfers grew from 50,000 to 350,000. And, ten years later, the USGA estimated the number of golfers in the United States had risen to 2,000,000. Data on the numbers of municipal golf courses is limited, but a survey

published in American City magazine in 1924 identified 140 municipal courses nationwide. In contrast, that same year there were over 2800 private courses in operation. However, the National Golf Foundation reported that during any given year in the 1920's, more than half of all rounds of golf were being played at municipal facilities (which accounted for only 5 percent of courses nationwide). The reliance on municipal golf courses would continue into the 1950's and 1960's, even as they faced competition from semi-private clubs entering the marketplace. By 1955, 40 percent of all golfers were playing on municipal courses, which only accounted for 15% of total golf courses in the U.S at the time. (USGA, 1921; American City, 1924; National Golf Foundation, 2015).

The personal and professional benefits of the game, as well as its rapid growth in number of participants left many researchers intrigued. In 1916, University of Chicago sociologist Charles Zueblin in the revised edition of American Municipal Progress wrote one of the first articles published in regards to municipal golf courses. In the article, he praises golf's draw of ordinary citizens to the parks, stating, "one of the most helpful aspects of park development in America is the increased patronage following the multiplication of activities permitted or encouraged in parks." Together with his colleague, Dr. W. I. Thomas, Zueblin was able to convince a skeptical Chicago parks department to construct four public golf courses. Quoted by the New York Times, Dr. Thomas characterized public golf as revolutionary and an "example of the

penetration of culture,” not unlike that which occurred with the Model T. “The automobile a possibility for everybody; it has become the same with golf.” Skilled workers were particularly likely to benefit: “Workmen are coming into the social scheme as never before. They make more money than the clerk class. And they are playing golf” (*New York Times*, 8 July 1923; Bozeman Bulger quoted in Moss, *American Country Club*, 105).

The Various Cranks, Freaks and Ordinary Human Beings

During the great golf boom at the turn of the century, minority golfers faced hurdle after hurdle. As the game began to become available to the non-country club member, the pressure for expanded access increased. For the upper-class elite, the purity of golf was under threat as the middle-class entered the game. Public commentary and efforts designed to recalibrate measures of exclusion appear on a more regular basis. As early as 1910, commentary regarding the stark differences between country club golf and municipal golf began to appear. A writer for the *New York Times* noted that the Van Cortlandt golf course was an ideal vantage point to observe “the various cranks, freaks, and ordinary human beings” drawn to the game (*New York Times*, 1910).

Public links were required to accommodate “players of all ages, of all occupations, of all conditions of servitude— players who come on foot, players who arrive by trolley, players who drive up in the plebeian Elizabeth, and those who come in the extravagant closed cars... In all the bedlam of players there must

be conflicts.” The media portrayal and the overall image of a golfer began to evolve from one of country club members traditionally sporting coats and ties, to images of municipal golfers frequently shown golfing in work clothes. For those intent on displaying their “aristocratic tendencies” through symbols other than knickers and golf’s “unfailing sign of elaborate costume,” they could hire caddies to bolster their image of prestige. As the New York Times summed in 1899, the use of caddies “at once carries the assumption that the player could join a golf club just as easily as not if he only wanted to.” Predominately African American, caddies offered the aura of prestige to any golfer employing them, while simultaneously harnessing, fostering and promoting the symbolism of racism and social exclusion (New York Times, 1899).

During the 1920’s golf commentators often complained that municipal golf courses were without protocol or discipline due to the increase in participants. Accustomed to having the public links to themselves, and with course culture transforming due to the demographics of the new player “ruining the game”, upper-class golfers began to mobilize against the increase in participation.

Recalibration of Exclusionary Measures- Public, but Private

Many of the first municipal courses were often implicitly or explicitly intended for the benefit of social elites or influential constituents, and as such were frequented by local country club members. These club members brought a

culture, a fraternal exclusivity that allowed them to built special relationships with representatives on city council. Relationships led to partnerships in which municipalities often relied on the local private country club to handle the daily operations of the city course. As a result, the elite decided who was allowed to play.

The City of Pittsburgh was utilizing one of these ‘special relationships’ until 1906 when several citizens filed complaints that local country club members were exercising undo influence over the day-to-day operations of the Schenley municipal golf course. The city council initiated an investigation and found residents were required to be approved by the club and once approved, they were to pay membership dues in order to play. The council had little choice but to take over administration of the course and drafted an ordinance “providing for the rules and regulation of the proposed public links.” As part of the new arrangement, memberships were eliminated and any resident who could afford the modest greens fee was allowed to play. The transition to public management took six years but the city found it worth the effort (*Pittsburgh Gazette*, 17 June 1906; *Annual Report of the City of Pittsburgh 1912* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1913), 713; *Annual Report of the City of Pittsburgh 1913* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1914), 822).

African American Accounts

If it was difficult to find a course to play as a middle class white male, for an African American it was near impossible. Even as golf’s popularity and

participation grew through the first twenty years of the 1900's, African Americans remained largely excluded from the game and as a result, documents and accounts related to the early experiences of golf in America rarely feature an African American's perspective. In fact, as historian Calvin Sinnette found in 1993 while researching the topic, of the 19 million plus books held by the Library of Congress (the world's largest library), only two books detailed African American participation in golf. While academic records may be limited, the African American popular press covered the topic extensively. These newspapers have proven to be extremely valuable in tracing the history of African American golf. Not only do the newspapers provide information on what took place, they also "defined the social and cultural contours of the event" (Sinnette, 1993).

Photographs of black caddies taken during the early 1900's suggest many of them could not have been more than eight or nine years old (Sinnette, 1993). The caddie was frequently expected to walk as much as 15 miles a day carrying two bags of 20 to 50 pounds each and at the end of day, if they were interested in receiving an assignment in the future, the caddie was expected to return a portion of their earnings to the caddiemaster.

For caddies, the reward for the effort was not found in the small amount of pay they were able to keep, the reward was the opportunity to play golf. For African Americans, playing golf on a private golf course was unfathomable, for caddies it was possible. Private courses were often closed on Mondays and many

offered the mornings as an opportunity for employees and caddies to play. The caddies took advantage of every Monday they could. After working day after day on the same course, measuring the same distances, aware of all potential hazards, and after hours of downtime spent practicing, many of the most competitive caddies began holding ad-hoc matches and gambling against one other.

It was not uncommon for the best-playing caddie to shoot sub-par rounds during these Monday matches— some even set course records (Sinnette, 1998). Using hand-me-down, incomplete sets of clubs, and unable to play freely, some caddies were still able to score lower than the best member of the club. As word spread, it became common for members to show up on Mondays to wager with one another on the outcome of the matches between caddies. During golf's first years in the New World, African American slaves were limited to sneaking around and experimenting with their owner's clubs. Although required to experience the game within a highly restrictive and segregated environment, the early 1900's offered African American's their first opportunity to enjoy the game.

African American Access

Increasing numbers of southern African Americans were migrating north and bringing their golf expertise with them. One of these southern, ex-caddies became a key figure in the history of African American golf. A decade after migrating from Louisiana to Chicago Illinois, and five years following a lawsuit against the Chicago Parks Department for not allowing blacks to enter the city's

municipal golf tournament, Walter Speedy realized the need for a national organization that would address needs and concerns of the African American golfing community. Support for his fight seeking equal access to municipal golf courses grew and as a result, Walter Speedy and Robert Hawkins founded the United States Colored Golf Association in 1925. It would later grow to become a permanent, national organization, the United Golfers Association (UGA). Without advocates in within the existing golf institutions, minorities began creating and relying upon their own institutions to fight on their behalf.

Parallel Structures

Sociology professor Marvin Dawkins argues that enforced segregation fostered the formation of a separate and distinct African American world of golf (Dawkins and Kinloch, 2000). Dawkins and Kinloch (2000) draw from concepts espoused by fellow scholar J.E. Blackwell, when they argue that after exclusion from white organizations black golfers had only one alternative— develop separate organizations. Quietly and mostly outside of historical accounts, African Americans even founded their own private country clubs.

In September of 1921, the first African American country club was purchased. Shady Rest Golf & Country Club in Scotch Plains New Jersey was originally a white country club founded in 1900 but later the course was surrounded by a large African American community. After members decided expansion of the existing 9-hole course was not feasible, they voted to relocate. A

prominent group of African American investors purchased the property and the club quickly turned into the African American hotspot for the social set of the East Coast. It also was welcoming for the community. As one reporter from the Pittsburgh Courier remarked in 1923, “The fact that Saturdays are given to visitors at a 75 cents admission is in itself an indication that the club is inclined to democratic policies...” Dr. Jeffrey Sammons, a history professor at New York University supports this observation and contends that white country clubs were (and still are) more isolated from their local communities, while Shady Rest fulfilled a community function that comparable white country clubs were unwilling to assume.

Public Golf Confronted

The white fight for access was very different from the fight African Americans faced. White golfers were not banned through slavery or racial segregation, they were not required to stay in the shadows and form parallel structures in order to enjoy the game. For whites the fight was mostly related to whether the city would build a course or not. As the 1920’s came around park officials had become more liberal minded about setting aside land for recreation. Municipal golf was also proving its financial worth and courses were generating more than enough revenue to cover the high cost of construction.

The USGA also pushed for construction of more municipal golf courses. In 1921, they created a new Public Links section that would promote golf on

public and municipal courses. As USGA president J. Frederic Byers promised, “any possible assistance to municipalities interested in the great army of persons playing on these courses.” Within three years, the section reported contact with 22 different cities which had expressed interest in starting public golf programs. As the section Chairman Robert Standish concluded, “the time was not far off when every city of consequence would have golf courses for those of its residents who are unable to afford to belong to private clubs” (USGA, 1921).

During this same period, African Americans began filing lawsuits seeking an opportunity to use public facilities. Often overlooked is the role golf played in the legal challenges for equal civil rights, the rise of the municipal golf course provided African Americans with another avenue to challenge segregation through the courts. In 1920, more than twenty-five years before the bus boycott in Alabama and what many consider the beginning of the civil rights era, Walter Speedy was being arrested for attempting to play on public golf courses. Memorable moments in the civil rights era are commonly associated with the 1950’s and 1960’s, however, the evidence shows that beginning in the early 1920’s and increasingly throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s, African Americans were fighting for equality on the golf course.

Country Clubs for a Day

With record numbers of golfers looking for a place to play, private individuals and corporations began to construct courses and open them to the

general public on a fee to play basis. “Daily-fee” courses would offer a balance to the two existing options available to golfers. They offered the openness of municipal golf, as well as the benefit of avoiding high initiation fees or any membership requirements. And, because most of these courses were built outside of city limits, they were typically less congested than their public or private counterparts. However, for many low or middle-class workers, these courses were still either too expensive or too inaccessible as compared to municipal courses.

Originally built to attract these middle-class golfers whom private clubs could not or would not accommodate, daily-fee courses were still capital intensive business ventures which relied on income generated by green fees. Privately financed, they were more vulnerable to market forces than their municipal peers and there was a discernible difference in higher costs of green fees. Even while the construction of municipal courses grew at record rates during the mid to late 1920’s, daily-fee course construction quickly outpaced municipal course construction. Prior to the mid 1920’s, there were so few privately owned, public courses that the USGA did not keep statistics on them, by 1930 there were close to 700 semi-public courses across the country (USGA, 1931).

Not everyone was benefiting from this growth in private, commercial golf courses. African American golfers often found semi-private, daily-fee courses to be more unwelcoming than the municipal courses because as a private business, segregation was a ‘right’ available to the owner. Through this arrangement, the

once impotent middle-class whites that couldn't afford the private country club crown of bigotry, could now proudly join the upper-class brethren in the act of excluding African Americans from the game.

The Great Depression and the Golden Age of Municipal Golf

Public golf course construction enjoyed steady growth through the first two decades of the century but in just seven years between 1920 and 1927, the USGA conservatively reported the number of municipal courses had risen from 90 to 200 nationwide, noting, “The list, no doubt, is incomplete as hardly a week passes without an announcement of an additional course being planned or constructed.” The demand for public golf continued through the economic crisis of the Great Depression.

A subsequent USGA report from 1930, analyzed the period following the collapse in October, 1929, and found the number of municipal golf courses under construction was actually on the rise. At the same time, increasing numbers of private country clubs were unable to withstand the loss of wealth within their membership and as a result had to cancel proposed projects or close the club altogether. For the first time in American history, municipal golf course construction outpaced private course construction and by 1931 the total number of municipal golf courses had increased to 543 nationwide, although almost half of them were located in a handful of Midwest states (USGA, 1931).

In fact, one of the first major unemployment relief programs in response to the Great Depression was dedicated to refurbishing the nation's park system and also improving the recreational facilities within the parks. This Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) would be joined in the mid 1930's by other New Deal agencies such as the Civilian Works Agency (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Combined, these agencies would be responsible for building tens of thousands of swimming pools, and tennis courts, golf courses and playing grounds and hundreds of municipal parks (WPA, *Accomplishments of the Works Progress Administration in Pennsylvania, July 1, 1935 - June 30, 1936*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: 1936), 8; WPA, *Results of the WPA*, 19). Public recreation received a proportionally large share of attention within several of these New Deal agencies and WPA officials were well aware of the potential impact of the size of the programs. The construction of New Deal golf courses were a direct attempt to redistribute the country's historically disproportionate leisure dividend and deliver the greatest good to the greatest number of people.

Golf and Equality in America

The Great Depression changed the game of golf in America. The federal investment into these parks provided work and pay for those in need while simultaneously introducing the game to an entirely new demographic. From its arrival in America, golf has maintained its white elitist image through physically and socially removing the game from the life experiences of most African

Americans. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, secluded golf courses and homogeneous country club atmospheres meant caddies were responsible for introducing the sport to black communities.

Through African American media coverage, and largely driven by increased numbers of players and regional shifts in populations, the 1930's saw the emergence of "stars" within the African American golf scene (McDaniel, 2000). Either through personally caddying at white country clubs, or learning from mentors that had, black southern golfers found themselves standard bearers for the game. Through implementation of the "separate but equal" doctrine during the 1940's and 1950's whites were able to restrict African American golfer's access to public courses. After the Brown decision in 1954, whites began seeking a different avenue to avoid integration-- court-approved sales of city courses to private operators. History shows whites have evolved their tactics when it comes to golf and integration. Blacks have systemically faced exclusion, restricted access, unequal facilities, and absorbed discriminatory treatment by golf courses controlled and operated by whites.

Structure of Government

A unit of local government is defined as an entity that meets a specific set of criteria developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Maddox and Fuquay, 1975). Classified as County, Municipalities (cities), Towns or Townships, Special Districts, or School Districts. These five types of local government each have

unique characteristics and individual histories. The question of how to best organize a public entity that serves a community has driven much of the research and debate throughout the past century (Buchanan and Tullock, 1967; Zimmerman, 1970; Liebert, 1974; Ostrom and Bish, 1977; DeSantis and Renner, 1996). However, at the turn of the last century the debates around local government structure were focused more on who filled those positions, and what responsibilities should they have within their role.

Form of Government Arrives in the New World

Arriving from England, three forms of government were primarily featured in early America. The town system, the county system and the county-township system. The town system was predominately found in the New England colonies due to the compact communities. Residents of the community would choose a committee of citizens to exercise general supervision over the affairs of the town but major policy decisions were made through town meetings (Blair, 1964). The county system of government was predominately found in the southern colonies. Located on farms rather than community settlements, the opportunity for engaging in political activity was severely limited. Due to the dispersion over great distance, the county emerged better suited for governing civil affairs activities of the parish members. Counties would often contain several parishes with administration functions ranging from tax collection to ferry regulation. And, the county form of government also included specialized and

powerful positions such as sheriff, coroner, and county lieutenant, each of which appointed by the Governor of the Colony (Blair, 1964). The colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware featured the county-township form of government. This hybrid structure allowed colonies with larger populations to divide local government duties between the county and the townships. In 1703, the New York colonial assembly passed a law creating the county-township form of government. The law mandated the formation of a county board of supervisors to be responsible for non-judicial functions, and it would consist of one supervisor from each township within the county (Blair, 1964).

Changes in Local Government

Following the Revolutionary War, states assumed control over governments at the local level. Councils were still determined through the election process, while Governors were now responsible for the appointment of mayors. However, in 1821, the city of New York changed the mayor selection process from appointment to election by city council. By 1840 almost all mayors were elected through popular vote (Adrian, 1988).

The mayor-council form of government is the oldest form of city government in the United States. Council can vary in membership number from three to fifty, and individuals are elected through wards or at large to terms as short as two years, or as long as four years. The mayor-council form of

government has the power to establish tax and fee rates, adopt annual budgets, provide municipal services, and create public policies (Humes and Martin, 1961). With the strength or weakness of their powers determined by law, the role of the mayor is to preside over council. In strong mayor forms, the executive powers are significant. The mayor has a greater responsibility in the planning, formation, and procurement of municipal policies. Supporters of strong mayor forms believe the concentration of power leads to increased responsibility, while opponents highlight the fact that when elected by popular vote party affiliations may interfere (Kneier, 1947). The strength of executive power and responsibilities at the local level is well debated and somewhat contentious, yet, public policies driven by the values of the community are expected. For municipal golf policies, these community values potentially determine who has access to facilities.

Public Administration Dichotomy

Functions of local government during the turn of the century were focused on the essential requirements of residents. As cities grew they began to realize the need for additional police, fire and education employees to provide these services. Council members began to appoint administrators to oversee different functions of the government. The historic practice of political party patronage in the appointment of officials led to the call for individuals in local government to possess both leadership, as well as, administrative skills. Public administration scholars began to promote the concept of a neutral, non-policy making

bureaucracy through a dichotomy of policy and administration. Recognizing the role of politics on administrative decisions, reformers like Woodrow Wilson (1887), and Frank Goodnow (1914) sought new ways to curtail its influence on future government actions. The reform movement demanded professionally competent leadership, ideally businesslike.

Impact of Council-Manager Form of Government

In 1908, Staunton, Virginia hired the nation's first general manager to supervise its daily functions (ICMA, 1999). In 1915, the Model City Charter was created and it provided guidelines for adopting council-manager structures. The recommendations included: non-partisan elections of council members; unification of powers allowing the council to take complete control over municipal functions (including the right to hire or fire the manager at will); and, the concentration of administrative powers to an individual able to exercise discretion in policy administration (Nolting, 1969). Steadily increasing in adoption throughout the twentieth century, particularly through the suburbanization following World War II, the council-manager form of government has led to councils very willing to turn public works projects and intergovernmental relations over to individuals considered specialists in these areas (Stillman, 1974). By the end of the century, the International City/ County Management Association recognized more than 3,000 cities and counties with council-manager forms of government (ICMA, 1999).

Goals of increasing efficiency and lessening corruption within government has led many researchers to investigate the use of mayor-council, council-manager, and commission forms of government (Sherbenau, 1961; Kessel, 1962; Schnore and Alford, 1963; Alford and Scoble, 1965; Dye and MacManus, 1976; Sanders, 1979; Farnham and Bryant, 1985). Research examining the impact of managers and various forms of government on the types, level and costs of services at the local level (Booms, 1966; Nunn, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Clark, 1968; Cole, 1971; Liebert, 1974; Lyons and Morgan, 1977; Meier, 1980; Wish, 1986; Morgan and Pelissero, 1980; Deno and Mehay, 1987; Rubin, 1988; DeSantis and Renner, 1994; Morgan and Watson, 1995; Rodriguez, 1999; French, 2001).

Mayor-Council Versus Council-Manager in Research

Substantial research on the strengths and weaknesses of the different forms of government occurred throughout the twentieth century, specifically within Public Administration. However, many of the early debates around improved efficiency and professionalism remain unsettled due to a lack of empirical evidence supporting one form over another. The reformed, council-manager structure has been argued to be more advantageous along a number of factors: benefits from centralizing power, increased competency due to technical expertise, decreased taxes, elimination of waste, a reduction of overall costs, as

well as offering a more responsive and representative municipal government (Childs, 1965; Nolting, 1969; Stillman, 1974).

The Progressive movement promoted two main themes, grassroots control and rationally administered government by neutral experts. The council-manager form of government would ideally combine the two and lead to the benefits historically advertised. Yet, there remains no empirical evidence to support whether one structure is more or less advantageous than another (Stillman, 1974). However, Kearney and Sinha (1988) note that professionalism in government increases accountability and helps induce more democracy into public bureaucracies by stressing equal treatment of all citizens in similar circumstances (Kearney and Sinha, 1988).

Svara (1989) contends that the PA dichotomy still exists due to the relationship that exists between the elected officials and administrators under the council-manager form of government (Svara, 1989). However, Nalbandian (1991) suggests philosophical foundations for professionalism in local government have not adapted to changes in practice which has led to a conflict between the traditional view of city management and the actual management of the government.

Public Administration has evolved from the initial need for a professional administrator to a complex profession subject to demands concerning environmental, economic and social issues. After more than one hundred years of

debate and research concerning government at the local level, many scholars and practitioners realize that politics and administration cannot be separated from one another.

Coincidentally, golf and its exclusionary history cannot be separated from one another either. Recollections, documentations and images highlight the parallel structures found in American golf, particularly in its conflict with the country's push for inclusion and equality. The social, cultural and historical baggage the game carries adds to the importance of understanding and ensuring the role of the public option. The ideal role of the municipal facility has evolved, yet we still don't know whether they have helped to democratize the game.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Over the past seventy-five years, several studies have examined the influence of demographic factors on the form and function of municipal government. Many authors have argued both the negative and positive benefits of both the council-manager and non-council manager forms of government. In addition to the literature focused on form and function of government, this review will include research that highlights the complex history of golf in America. This analysis examines various aspects of form, function, and delivery in municipalities that have golf facilities, strengthening the knowledge of

demographic influences on form of government as well as the influence forms of government have on golf facilities.

Introduction

During the early 1900's the reform movement in public administration was primarily focused on promoting a more efficient and less corrupt government through institutional changes. However, actions taken to erect barriers to participation illustrate the operation of institutionalized racism: restricted access, unequal resources under segregation, and differential activities by race (exclusion from professional tournaments), and stereotypes rationalizing such discrimination (low numbers of black players, lack of interest in black community). Black golfers have often been underemphasized, neglected, misrepresented, or outright ignored in historical reality (Kinloch, 1974). Following decades of significant government involvement, including federal, county and local investments; and after dozens of landmark court cases siding with the minority plaintiffs, the past century has demonstrated one constant: the white majority elite has managed to continue to dominate service provision to minorities. By methodically adapting policies that present their racial rationales in more 'socially' acceptable terms, they have managed to maintain the status quo for more than a century.

The driving motivation behind the reform movement has been based around the concept of specialization and professionalization of public administration. What does this mean when the specialization and

professionalization comes from an industry with a profound history of exclusion? This study evaluates whether we are still within an environment that continues to incubate the acceptability of racist rationales.

Municipal golf facilities started largely to redress exclusionary tactics based on class. As income inequality began to tighten, public facilities and the number of golfers grew. Following World War II, and into the civil rights era, we find golf growing in separate but parallel paths. And, as suburbanization, desegregation, and rising income drove new golfers to new golf courses, the historical culture and social norms within the game found themselves at a new crossroads. Municipal golf facilities were forced to address the centuries old exclusionary culture of golf. From lawsuits for equal access to public facilities, to construction of separate but (un)equal facilities, government entry into the golf market initiated profound confrontations to golf's existing norms. However, for the non-country club upper-class, white male, affected by this public policy, another avenue was sought. The privately owned, yet public, daily-fee golf course was the ideal solution. Not outwardly segregated; if golfers can afford the cost to play, they are 'welcome'.

Throughout the history of the United States, racism constricted democratic imagination. Not only has this led to limited notions of political community and citizenship as Schattschneider (1942) suggests, it has also resulted in exclusion or restricted access to the game of golf. Aside from imagination and "states of

mind”, democracy has been thought of as a structure, concept, institution, or act that is argued to be inclusionary of all citizens. Therefore, within democratic forms of government no group would be consigned to the position of a permanent minority.

One hundred years earlier, Tocqueville (1835) argued that the core principle of democratic regimes is the condition of equality. Equality dissolves social and political ties, as a result local institutions (including governments) can transform self-interested individuals into citizens whose first consideration is the public good. Those individuals, argued Montesquieu in 1748, almost a century before Tocqueville, had a core set of underlying values that not only contribute to a personal set of beliefs, attitudes and opinions but within a culture, these individual values become shared, and a set of societal values begins to emerge.

Thus values are important, and Welbom (1971) argues that community values make up a crucial part of the city manager’s environment. However, the values of residents living in a city or town are not adequately represented in the electoral processes of municipalities mainly due to the fact that many residents, especially those of lower economic status, often do not participate. Welbom (1971) contends the city manager has a professional obligation to serve the best interests of the whole community; however, his or her democratic responsibility is often to an elected council that may have narrower interests.

In addition, a community's shared values can result in differences in approach to municipal golf policy, provision and distribution. Equality in public policy can be defined as sameness or uniformity of distribution, and equity can be defined as fairness of distribution (Stone, 2002). This study focuses on the conflict between two core characteristics of democratic theory: equality and equity. It examines through a nationwide analysis whether municipal golf and municipal golf facilities are democratically distributed and whether the local form of government in which they are located advances the equitable access to the facilities. Does one form of government provide golf in a more democratic manner?

The growth in the council-manager form of government seems to fit well with the growth of the commercial, daily-fee golf courses. The lack of concern for equitable municipal golf facilities became a new tool to keep others out based largely on income and class. The 'others' could once again play somewhere else other than with the 'real' golfers - the participants who represented the cultural and social norms of the game. For the citizens concerned with improving access to public golf facilities, the movement toward city managers often resulted one less advocate. During the past thirty or forty years, the owners of daily-fee commercial facilities became recognized as the experts in the field and, as specialists in golf facility management, the push for including their approach and philosophies found their way into municipal golf policy and administration.

Throughout the second half of twentieth century, government entrance into the market allowed many of the social and historical exclusionary tendencies to be reduced until the 1980's when theories of New Public Management pushed federal, state and local governments to turn to markets to deliver as many public goods or services as possible. The push toward market delivery and contracting with 'expert' operators grew rapidly. For-profit, private operators continue to take over management of thousands of municipal golf courses around the country often reversing progress made by decades of public policy directed at providing quality, affordable, and inclusive public golf facilities. From contracts for existing courses, to partnerships constructing new, high-end, public golf courses, the number of municipally managed and operated courses continues to dwindle, and the impact on the overall health of the game has suffered. Economic and social inequalities continue to restrict minorities from joining private country clubs, and with ever-increasing green fees at municipal or public daily-fee courses, "golf accentuates the interactive effects of both race and class on integration of this particular social arena" (Kinloch, 2000).

Municipal golf courses may appear as vehicles of democracy, but as they become increasingly "professionalized" from the structure of local government, or as pressure to privatize grows and they gradually fall into hands of private enterprise, will municipal golf facilities merely represent another adaptation within golf's exclusionary character? After more than a hundred years in the

public sphere, and more than sixty-plus years following desegregation, the question still remains, have municipal golf facilities helped to democratize the game?

Hypotheses

This study evaluates the council-manager and non-council manager forms of governments in municipalities that feature golf facilities. The following hypotheses are tested to determine whether or not the council-manager form of government is statistically different from the non-council-manager form of government with respect to the specific variables cited in this proposal:

Hypothesis 1- The number of golf facilities offered by municipalities with the council-manager form of government will be greater than the number of golf facilities offered by municipalities with the non-council-manager form.

Hypothesis 2- The number of municipal golf facilities in council-manager cities will be higher than the number of municipal golf facilities available in non-council-manager cities.

Hypotheses one and two theorize that the number of golf facilities and the number of municipal golf facilities can be directly related to whether the locality has the council-manager or non-council-manager form of government. Based in large part on existing studies on structure of government and levels of local service provision, the number of municipal golf facilities and the form of the local government will be closely related.

Hypothesis 3- Council-manager cities will have a higher percentage of 18-hole municipal golf facilities than the percentage available in non-council-manager cities.

Hypothesis 4- Council-manager cities will have a higher percentage of 27-hole or greater municipal golf facilities than the percentage available in non-council-manager cities.

Hypothesis 5- Council-manager cities will have a higher percentage of regulation length municipal golf facilities than the percentage available in non-council-manager cities.

The existing literature related to the demographic aspects of the community on form of government and responsiveness to policy demands as well as the literature related to demographics of golf participation, suggests that the distribution of municipal golf facilities will differ significantly between council-manager and non-council-manager forms of local government.

Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 explore the relationship between the distribution of municipal golf facilities by size (number of holes per facility) and length (structure and length of holes). Municipal golf facilities with the largest selection of holes available (18, 27+) and those of greater lengths reflect existing research suggesting race, region, and history can explain variations in public policies when considered by themselves (Sharkansky, 1968).

Research also suggests that managers in the council-manager form of government are often unwilling participants in social policy change (Huntley and MacDonald, 1975). Furthermore, cities and towns that are more homogenous and of higher affluence are more likely to employ a professional manager (Giles, et. al. 1980). This study evaluates whether demographic and socioeconomic factors will be consistent with prior studies and demonstrate that council-manager forms of government will have higher percentages of 18 and 27-hole municipal golf facilities as well as a higher percentage of regulation length municipal golf facilities than non-council-manager forms of government.

Hypothesis 6- Non-council-manager cities will have a higher percentage of 9-hole municipal golf facilities than the percentage available in council-manager cities.

Hypothesis 7- Non-council-manager cities will have a higher percentage of par-3 length municipal golf facilities than the percentage available in council-manager cities.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 evaluate whether similar demographic and socioeconomic indicators are significant in distribution of municipal golf facility size and length within non-council-manager forms of government. Reflected in the documented history of fights for equal access to municipal facilities, as well as past research suggesting non-council-manager forms of government are preferred by lower-income, more diverse communities, and non-council-manager forms are significant to the size and length of municipal golf facilities.

Hypothesis 8- The per capita municipal golf facilities of non-council-manager cities are significantly higher than the per capita municipal golf facilities of council-manager cities. The per-capita figure will help expand existing research on local service delivery, levels of service provision and studies on structures of government.

The per-capita measure will also offer an unprecedented analysis of municipal golf facilities nation-wide, assessing levels of access to golf facilities in delivery (municipal, daily-fee, or country club), size (9, 18 or 27-hole facilities) and length (regulation or smaller). In addition, the per-capita figure will provide a foundation for future reanalysis of the municipal golf facility and its role in the democratization of golf.

Data Sources

This analysis will utilize data generated from The Professional Golfers Association of America (PGA); the United States Golfer Association (USGA) as well as data purchased from the National Golf Foundation (NGF). Form of government data will be produced from the International City Management Association (ICMA). In addition to form of government, demographic data on each municipality will be obtained from the United States Census Bureau.

Unit of Analysis

This study will compare and contrast the council-manager and non-council manager forms of governments in municipalities that feature golf facilities. All

forms of government having any variation of an elected official who is responsible for the administrative functions of the municipality are classified as non-council manager forms. This research study will generate data on 7,419 municipalities in the United States with golf facilities. Variables will be derived and utilized to present information concerning city demographics and form of government. Variables will also be developed to reflect golf's role in the community. Seven dependent variables and one independent variable will be utilized for the cases to test the usefulness of the hypotheses.

Operationalization of Variables

The hypotheses will test the value of form of government as a predictor of municipal golf offered by a municipality; the types of facilities; the number of holes available at a facility; and the length (or challenge) of holes available; and per capita municipal golf holes. The following independent variables will also be evaluated in addition to the form of government through the use of multiple regression equations.

Form of Government is defined as the actual form of government present in each municipality with a golf facility, either council-manager (CM) or non-council-manager (NCM). For statistical analysis, the form of government variable will be coded as: 0 for Non-Council-Manager forms and 1 for Council-Manager forms.

Region is defined as the geographic region of the United States in which the government jurisdiction is located. Coded as: 1= Northeast; 2 = South; 3 = Midwest; 4 = West

Total Population is defined as total residents residing within the jurisdiction in which a golf facility is located. Number- no coding necessary.

Percent of Non-white Population is calculated by dividing the total population by the number of non-white residents residing within the jurisdiction in which a golf facility is located. Number- no coding necessary.

Median Household Income of the Municipality is defined as the median household income for the jurisdiction in which a golf facility is located. Number- no coding necessary.

Commercial Daily-Fee Facility is defined as a facility within the jurisdiction that is a publically accessible golf facility that is owned, and or operated by private enterprise. For statistical analysis, the Commercial Daily-Fee Facility will be coded as: 0 for Zero Commercial Daily-Fee Facilities located in the municipality and 1 for confirmation of at least one Commercial Daily-Fee Facility located within the municipality

Private Country Club is defined as a facility within the jurisdiction that is privately owned and operated and restricts access to members only. For statistical analysis, Private Country Club Facilities will be coded as: 0 for Zero Private

Country Club Facilities located in the municipality and 1 for confirmation of at least one Private Country Club Facility located within the municipality.

Dependent Variables

Dependent variables in this study will include the number of golf facilities offered by the municipality, the percentage of 9-hole golf facilities, the percentage of 18-hole golf facilities, the percentage of 27-hole golf facilities, the percentage of facilities that are par-3 length, the percentage of facilities that are executive length, and the percentage of facilities that offer regulation length holes, and the per capita municipal golf available.

Total Municipal golf facilities- publically accessible golf facility owned, and or operated by local government. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of 9-hole golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's 9-hole golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of 18-hole golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's 18-hole golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of 27-hole golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's 27-hole (or greater) golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of par-3 length golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's par-3 golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of executive length golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's executive golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Percentage of regulation length golf facilities will be calculated by dividing each municipality's regulation golf facilities by the total municipal facilities. Number- no coding necessary.

Per capita municipal golf for each municipality will be calculated by dividing each municipality's total municipal golf holes by its population. Number- no coding necessary.

Independent Variables

The following terms will be used in the study and should be defined for clarity:

Council-manager government—form of government, which places administrative responsibilities of the municipality in an appointed manager and places the responsibility for policy functions with a council to whom the manager is responsible.

Non-council manager government—form of government, which features an elected official who is responsible for the administrative functions of the municipality.

Statistical Testing

Several hypotheses were presented concerning the two forms of government and municipal golf facilities. A hypothesis provides a theory concerning the relationship between two variables that are studied. A null hypothesis theorizes a relationship does not exist between the two variables. The research hypothesis predicts that some type of relationship exists and can be identified. Proof of the alternative hypothesis requires both disconfirming evidence based on deductive reasoning as well as confirming evidence based on inductive reasoning (O’Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 1995). Disconfirming evidence will demonstrate the probability of an alternative hypothesis by revealing that the null hypothesis is most likely false based on evidence shown by the data. Moreover, confirming evidence will establish relationships, eliminate alternative hypotheses, and reduce replication (O’Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 1995).

A statistical tool is required to determine whether the probability that the hypothesized relationship between the two variables is random. If the analysis determines that the relationship is not random, the null hypothesis can be rejected as false and support for the alternative hypothesis is justified. The statistical tool recommended to analyze the relationship between an interval dependent variable

and a nominal independent variable is the T-test. Determining whether the two sample groups have different means will allow the author to draw conclusions concerning whether the two forms of government have different means concerning the various dependent variables within the hypotheses (O'Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 1995).

The individual samples T-test will be utilized to determine whether the two sample populations differ significantly in regards to the variables of total facilities, number of municipal facilities, and per-capita municipal golf facilities. In order to determine whether a local government allocates municipal owned facilities differently, this same statistical tool will be used.

The relationships between selected independent variables, the dependent variables, and the form of government proposed in this study will also be examined using multiple regression analysis and correlation. The correlation coefficient will indicate the amount of variation in the dependent variable attributable to the independent variables, whereas, the regression equation will describe the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. One of the assumptions with multiple regression analysis is that both variables are interval. This study will use dichotomous data as interval measures which is acceptable when the variables are considered independent variables (O'Sullivan, Rassel & Berner, 1995). The basic regression equation for this study will be formatted as: $Y = a + bX$

Where:

a = constant or Y intercept

b = the regression coefficient or slope

Y = predicted value of the dependent variable

X = independent variable

The data for the independent and dependent variables in each hypothesis will be graphed on a scatterplot with the dependent (Y) variable on the vertical axis and the independent (X) variable on the horizontal axis. Plotting the data will identify if any linear model is present and if the plotted line can be summarized by a straight line, a regression equation will be calculated for each set of data.

Tests for goodness of fit will also be incorporated to help determine how well the linear equation describes the data. The equation provides an adequate description of the data and is a valuable predictor of Y, or the equation will provide a poor description and be an inadequate predictor of the dependent variable (Y).

However, both of the scatterplot and the correlation coefficient provide tests for goodness of fit. The measure of association between data for X and Y variables (r) will be squared to calculate the proportion of the variance in the dependent (Y) that can be associated with or explained by the independent variable (X).

Utilizing control variables will allow this study to further examine the significant relationships between form of government and the percentages of 9, 18, or 27-hole facilities, the percentages of par-3, executive and regulation length

facilities; and municipal per-capita facilities. In addition to exploring the relationship between the number of total golf facilities offered by a jurisdiction and its form of government, multiple regression will be used to evaluate the correlation between this dependent variable and other variables established through the literature and data.

Population, region, percentage of non-white population, and household income is tested as related to the number of municipal owned golf facilities. Municipalities with smaller populations are expected to have fewer facilities than larger cities or towns. Region is expected to have a role because certain regions are identified in the literature as being traditionally associated with the provision of golf facilities (Sinnette, 1998). Region has also been found to influence many cultural and political preferences (Elazar, 1999). This study assesses whether communities with higher percentages of non-white residents will have fewer municipal golf facilities. However, the study also supports a belief that cities and towns with higher median household income will provide more municipally owned golf facilities. Literature on golf and public administration suggests income largely dictates access and provision. Wealthier communities will have residents more likely to golf, as well as higher tax bases from which to draw resources.

Multiple regression analysis was utilized to examine the relationship between the number of facilities provided by the municipality and the same

variables. The study expects that city manager form of government will have higher numbers of facilities than non-council-manager forms. Due to the preferences of the north and eastern cultures, it is anticipated region should also be related to provision of municipal facilities. Just as with the number of total facilities offered, a higher level of population and median household income is anticipated to have a relationship to municipal facilities.

Multiple regression analysis is also used to evaluate the relationship between the percentages of 18 and 27-hole facilities and the same independent variables. Research suggests that the distribution of these facilities will have a relationship to race, median household income, and form of government. The study anticipated lower percentages of these facilities in low income, more diverse areas, and it also anticipates that with the use of multiple regression, the same relationships with the independent variables will be found when applied to the percentages of regulation length facilities.

Advantages and Limitations to the Study

This study features the commonly used per-capita figure for the measurement of a municipal good, service or expenditure. Previous studies have shown form of government related to many issues in public administration. There is no doubt that the extensive research has provided basis for expanding examination, debate, and theory within public administration. This study seeks to continue this expansion through determining the number of per-capita municipal

golf facilities across large and small populations, geographic region, race, income, and forms of government in an effort to answer the question: “Have municipal golf facilities helped to democratize the game?”

This study will enhance the existing literature concerning local government in cities and towns with municipal golf facilities. The research seeks to identify several areas in administration and provision of golf where the council-manager form of government distinguishes itself from other government forms. Aside from the advantage of not restricting the study to a specific population size (as with most form of government studies), the data will be examined as a complete set.

Chapter 4

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Golf Facilities in the United States

Data was collected from 7,419 cities and towns across all 50 states. These cities and towns represent a comprehensive account of all jurisdictions that have golf facilities located within their limits. Cities and towns with the council-manager form of government were identified in 3,521 of these jurisdictions. Non-council-manager cities and towns were found in 3,898 jurisdictions. Private country clubs were located in 1,008 cities or towns, and commercial daily-fee facilities were found in 4,457 jurisdictions. Municipal owned facilities are located within 1,863 towns or cities across the country.

Demographics of a Municipality with Any Type of Golf Facility

Analysis of the data reveals that over eighty-seven million citizens live within a council-manager form of government with a minimum of one golf facility (See Table 4.1). Cities and towns with a golf facility (private, commercial or municipal), only 14 percent of the total population identifies as non-white. And, council-Manager cities and towns with any type of golf facility (private, commercial, or municipal) report a median household income (HHI) of more than \$51,000 a year.

With fewer than 68 million total residents, non-council-manager cities and towns with any type of golf facility have a lower total population than their council-manager peers. However, they both have similar proportions of minorities with 14 percent identified as non-white. And, as other form of government research has found, the median household income in non-council-manager jurisdictions comes in lower than that of council-manager cities.

Table 4-1 Demographic Means of Municipalities with Golf Facilities of Any Type

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	68,745,838	87,436,717
Race (non-white)	14.11 percent	14.01 percent
HHI	\$47,989	\$51,161

The demographic aspects of municipalities with any type of golf facility in each form of government were also examined by region. Council-manager cities in the Northeast region have fewer residents than non-council-manager jurisdictions, 3.6 million to nearly 12 million respectively. Council-manager cities and towns also have a lower percentage of non-whites than non-council-manager peers. Median household income in the Northeast region is almost \$4,000 less in council-manager forms than non-council-manager structures.

Table 4.2 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities in the Northeast Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	11,958,818	3,597,012
Race (non-white)	10.63 percent	7.32 percent
HHI	\$61,431	\$57,819

The data also provides insight concerning the demographic characteristics of municipalities with golf facilities in the South region. In the South, nearly 34 million citizens populate council-manager cities and towns. Of these residents, more than 21 percent of the population identifies as non-white. Council-manager cities and towns in the South region report a median household income of \$46,000 a year.

Residents in the South region living within non-council-manager forms report lower income, have smaller populations, and higher percentages of non-whites than council-manager forms of government. With a median household income of ten percent less at just over \$41,000 and a total population of 13 million fewer residents, these non-council-manager jurisdictions of the South region are demographically different than other regions. In fact, the population of residents identified as non-white is nearly 20 percent higher at 26 percent as compared to 21 percent in council-manager cities and towns of the South region.

Table 4.3 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities in the South Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	20,826,430	33,751,012
Race (non-white)	26.97 percent	21.37 percent
HHI	\$41,487	\$46,586

The council-manager municipalities with any type of golf facility in the Mid-West region have similar demographics as those residents residing in non-council-manager jurisdictions. Council-manager cities and towns tally just over 1.5 million in population with 7.3 percent identifying as non-white. Non-council-manager cities and towns report just over 2 million residents, and just under 7 percent identifying as non-white. Citizens living within both forms reported median household income under \$50,000 annually, with council-manager residents at just under \$49,000 and non-council-manager residents at just under \$46,000.

Table 4.4 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities in the Mid-West Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	22,231,134	16,262,409
Race (non-white)	6.79 percent	7.31 percent
HHI	\$45,772	\$48,704

The council-manager municipalities in the West region have over 33 million residents located in cities or towns with golf facilities. The communities are close to 16 percent non-white with a reported median household income of more than \$58,000 annually. The non-council-manager cities and towns have near 14 million residents with just under 15.5 percent of the residents identified as non-white, and the median household income comes in at more than \$49,000 a year.

Table 4.5 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities in the West Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	13,729,456	33,826,284
Race (non-white)	15.39 percent	16.39 percent
HHI	\$49,721	\$58,188

Inter-regional comparisons of this same data offer the following observations (See Table 4.6). The total population within these regions is similar except for the Midwest, which equals close to half of the other regions' totals. In fact, each of the other regions is more than twice as populated as the council-manager cities and towns of same regions. The percent of non-white residents within council-manager forms of government in the South region is nearly three times the rate found in the Northeast and Midwest. And, the percent of non-white residents in the West region is roughly twice that of the Northeast and Midwest. Of the council-manager cities and towns with golf facilities, the West region ranked highest in median household income with the Northeast coming in close second. And, the median household income in the Midwest and South regions were close to \$10,000 lower annually than their peers in the West and Northeast.

Table 4.6 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Golf Facilities in Council-
Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Population	3,597,012	33,751,012	16,262,409	33,826,284
Race (non-white)	7.32 percent	21.37 percent	7.31 percent	16.39 percent
HHI	\$57,819	\$46,586	\$48,701	\$58,188

Table 4.7 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Golf Facilities in Non-
Council-Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Population	11,958,818	20,826,430	22,231,134	13,729,456
Percent (non-white)	10.63 percent	26.97 percent	6.79 percent	15.39 percent
HHI	\$61,431	\$41,487	\$45,772	\$49,721

An inter-regional comparison of data from municipalities with Non-Council-Manager government forms provides several opportunities to evaluate these communities (See Table 4.7). In the non-council-manager cities and towns with golf facilities the population ranges from just under 12 million in the Northeast region to more than 22 million in the Midwest. The West region has

nearly half the total population of their non-council-manager peers in the Midwest region yet the percent of the population in the West identifying as non-white is more than twice the percent in the Midwest communities. The non-council-manager cities and towns with golf facilities in the South region have more than a quarter of their residents identify as non-white. Median household income varies across each region but none more than that between the South and the Northeast regions, a \$20,000 a year difference in favor of the Northeast residents.

Municipal Golf Facilities in the United States

Data from this analysis also provides insight into the characteristics of the facilities under control of local government across all states and demographic makeup. Of the 2,453 municipal golf facilities, the majority are regulation length. 1,410 are 18-hole regulation facilities, 531 of them are 9-hole regulation facilities, and 150 of them are 27+ hole facilities. The total number of municipal owned 9-hole par three facilities totaled 79, while the 18 and 27+ hole facilities were 33 and 37 respectively.

Demographics of a Municipality with Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Analysis of the data reveals a total population of more than 83 million residents resides in cities and towns with a minimum of one municipally owned golf facility. With a combined population of just over 42 million, half of the populations live in council-manager cities and towns, and 41 million citizens live within a non-council-manager jurisdiction. Council-manager cities and towns

with a municipal-owned golf facility have a mean population identifying as non-white at 15 percent, 3 percent lower than the 18 percent reported in non-council-manager jurisdictions. Council-manager cities and towns with municipal owned golf facilities also had a combined median household income mean 10 percent higher than their non-council-manager peers. Council-manager cities and towns averaged over \$57,000 annually, as compared to the non-council-manager mean of just over \$50,000 dollars a year (See Table 4.8).

Table 4.8 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	41,056,248	42,250,967
Race (non-white)	18.23 percent	15.25 percent
HHI	\$50,637	\$57,132

The demographic aspects of municipalities with publicly owned golf facilities under each form of government were also examined by region. Council-manager cities and towns in the Northeast region had a combined population of one-seventh that of the non-council-manager cities and towns. There is a seven-fold difference in total number of residents at just over 1 million in council-manager jurisdictions and over 7 million living in non-council-manager

governments. The mean population that identifies as non-white is close to a 7 percent difference between the two forms of government. Non-council-manager cities and towns in the Northeast region that have a minimum of one municipal owned golf facility, have a mean percentage of non-white residents calculated at 17 percent. Council-manager jurisdictions with a municipal owned facility had a mean percentage calculated to be just over 10 percent. As for median household income comparisons between the two populations residing in council-manager and non-council-manager cities and towns with municipal golf facilities, the two means were calculated to be the highest in this study at \$70,000 and \$65,000 annually (See Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Facilities in the Northeast Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	7,116,869	1,208,459
Race (non-white)	17.09 percent	10.22 percent
HHI	\$65,171	\$70,282

Data also provides insight concerning the demographic characteristics of the municipalities with publicly owned facilities and the two forms of government within the South region. The population of cities and towns with the council-

manager form is slightly under 20 million while the non-council-manager total is slightly less than 13 million. The mean median household income for the cities and towns were less than ten percent different with non-council-manager calculated at just under \$42,000 and council-manager jurisdictions at just over \$45,000 annually. When compared across all four regions, the South region had the highest mean percentages of population that identified as non-white within both of the forms of government. Council-manager jurisdictions of the South, with any municipal owned golf facility, have a mean percentage of non-white residents at over 23 percent and non-council-manager cities and towns have a mean of nearly 30 percent (See Table 4.10).

Table 4.10 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Facilities in the South Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	12,599,073	19,884,182
Race (non-white)	17.09 percent	23.29 percent
HHI	\$41,674	\$45,286

Whether in the council-manager or non-council-manager form of government, the typical municipality with a publicly owned golf facility in the Mid-West region has equal means in percent of the population that identifies as

non-white (11%). However, incomes between the two populations are nearly \$10,000 different. The mean median household income for residents within non-council-manager cities and towns was calculated to be \$46,000 while citizens within council-manager jurisdictions averaged \$55,000 annually (See Table 4.11).

Table 4.11 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Facilities in The Mid-West Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	14,643,351	9,962,499
Race (non-white)	11.74 percent	11.78 percent
HHI	\$46,665	\$55,212

The demographics of the two populations are somewhat similar within the West region as well. Both forms of government have similar means of percent of non-white residents. Non-council-manager cities and towns have a calculated mean of 14.5 percent, and council-manager cities and towns non-white means are calculated at 15.7 percent of the population. The number of residents within the two forms of government does vary greatly. The total population of council-manager cities and towns with a municipal owned golf facility in the West region was calculated to be more than 11 million while the non-council-manager cities and towns totaled almost half that at just over 6.5 million residents. The median

household income for the two populations were near the top of those measured in the study, non-council-manager cities and towns in the West region had a mean of \$49,000 and residents of council-manager jurisdictions had a mean household income of almost \$58,000 annually (See Table 4.12).

Table 4.12 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities With Municipal Owned Facilities in the West Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Population	6,696,955	11,195,827
Race	14.55% Non-White	15.71% Non-White
HHI	\$49,041	\$57,750

Inter-regional comparisons of this same data was analyzed for additional insight (See Table 4.13). Demographic aspects of municipalities with municipal owned golf facilities under the council-manager form of government varied across all regions. The South region had the highest total population with almost 20 million people residing within council-manager forms of local government. At a fraction of that total, the region with the fewest residents of council-manager cities and towns was the Northeast, with just over 1 million citizens. The South region also has a substantially higher percentage of non-white residents than the Northeast region with a mean of 23 percent as compared to 10 percent. The mean median household income compared across all four regions highlights the range

of earnings, from \$45,000 in the South region to over \$70,000 in the Northeast. All four regions averaged \$57,000 annually, and the Midwest and West regions demonstrated calculated means in the line with the average, at \$55,000 and \$57,000 respectively.

Table 4.13 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in Council-Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Population	1,208,459	19,884,182	9,962,499	11,195,827
Race (non-white)	10.22 percent	23.29 percent	11.78 percent	15.71 percent
HHI	\$70,282	\$45,286	\$55,212	\$57,750

Inter-regional comparisons of data from municipalities with Non-Council-Manager government forms also provide an opportunity to evaluate these communities demographically (See Table 4.14). At 14 million residents, the total population of citizens residing in non-council-manager governments of the Midwest region has over twice the number of their peers in the West region at fewer than 7 million residents. There are variations in the mean percentages of population identifying as non-white. The non-council-manager cities and towns of the Midwest region have the lowest calculated mean at under 12 percent while the

South region once again has the highest mean of the four regions at more than 29 percent.

Table 4.14 Demographic Aspects of Municipalities with Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in Non-Council-Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Population	7,116,869	12,599,073	14,643,351	6,696,955
Race (non-white)	17.09 percent	29.54 percent	11.74 percent	14.55 percent
HHI	\$65,171	\$41,674	\$46,665	\$49,041

Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Analysis of the data from cities and towns with a minimum of one municipally owned golf facility reveals that on a national total, the council-manager form of government offers residents greater numbers of municipal golf facilities than non-council-manager forms of government (See Table 4.15). Council-manager cities and towns provide more than a 1,200 regulation length facilities while their non-council-manager peers provide less than 800. Council-manager governments also deliver three times the number of large facilities to their residents, with 27-hole (or greater) facilities totaling 169 as compared to

non-council-manager cities and towns which totaled 53 facilities of the same size. Council-manager cities and towns also deliver 18-hole facilities at almost twice the rate of non-council-manager cities, 917 as compared to 573. However, council-manager cities and towns provide only 49 additional 9-hole golf facilities than non-council-manager forms, 391 versus 342.

Table 4.15 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities by Form of Government

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
9-Hole Facilities	342	391
18-Hole Facilities	573	917
27+Hole Facilities	53	169
Par 3 Facilities	47	102
Regulation Length Facilities	752	1,232

Characteristics of municipal owned golf facilities in each form of government were also examined by each region (See Table 4.16). In the Northeast region, the non-council-manager form of government provides three times the number of 18-hole municipal golf facilities than the council-manager form, 151 versus 51. The non-council-manager form also provides more than twice the number of 9-hole facilities, 58 versus 21. And, the non-council-manager forms of

government in the Northeast deliver regulation length golf courses at near three times their peers in council-manager cities and towns, 187 versus 69. In the Northeast, the non-council-manager jurisdictions deliver greater numbers of facilities both in size and length than their council-manager counterparts.

Table 4.16 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in the Northeast
Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
9-Hole Facilities	58	21
18-Hole Facilities	151	51
27+Hole Facilities	17	11
Par 3 Facilities	12	4
Regulation Length Facilities	187	69

Data also provides insight concerning the characteristics of the municipal owned golf facilities located in the South region (See Table 4.17). The council-manager governments of the South deliver more than twice the number of regulation length courses than non-council-manager cities and town, 444 versus 216. They also deliver more than twice the number of 9-hole facilities, 130 versus 66. And, of the council-manager cities and towns in the South region with a municipal golf facility, they offer 23 facilities of par-3 length while their peers in

non-council-manager cities only offer 3. The disparity between the two forms is most present in the delivery of large, 27-hole (or greater) facilities, with council-manager jurisdictions providing more than 15 times the number of those offered in non-council-manager governments. Council-manager cities and towns in the South region have 48 of these large facilities while non-council-manager cities and towns offer 3.

Table 4.17 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in the South Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
9-Hole Facilities	66	130
18-Hole Facilities	152	334
27+Hole Facilities	3	48
Par 3 Facilities	3	23
Regulation Length Facilities	216	444

The municipalities in the Midwest region are not as lopsided in their offerings as the South region. However, council-manager cities and towns do deliver roughly twice the number of 18-hole facilities and regulation length municipal owned golf facilities than non-council-manager jurisdictions in the same region. Council-manager forms provide 313 18-hole facilities and 432

regulation length facilities, while non-council-manager cities and towns deliver 165 and 206 respectively (See Table 4.18). Non-council-manager cities and towns of the Midwest do provide three more 9-hole municipal golf facilities than their council-manager peers, 161 to 158.

Table 4.18 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in the Mid-West
Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
9-Hole Facilities	161	158
18-Hole Facilities	165	313
27+Hole Facilities	11	59
Par 3 Facilities	13	46
Regulation Length Facilities	206	432

The council-manager cities and towns in West region also deliver twice the number of 18-hole and regulation length facilities than their peers in non-council-manager forms (See Table 4.19). With 219 18-hole municipal facilities and 287 regulation length facilities, the council-manager form doubles the non-council-manager inventory of 105 and 143 respectively. Non-council-manager jurisdictions of the West region have a third less 9-hole facilities available, 57 compared to 82. And, non-council-manager cities and towns only have 22 large,

27-hole (or greater) publicly owned golf facilities while council-manager cities and towns offer 51.

Table 4.19 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in the West Region

Form of Government	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
9-Hole Facilities	57	82
18-Hole Facilities	105	219
27+Hole Facilities	22	51
Par 3 Facilities	19	29
Regulation Length Facilities	143	287

An inter-regional comparison of this same data offers the following observations (See Table 4.20). For council-manager governments, the mean number of facilities within the four regions ranged from just over 1.10 in the Northeast region, to just over 1.6 in the Midwest region. The number of 18-hole facilities ranges from 51 in the Northeast to 354 in the South region. The variation between the numbers of 9-hole municipal owned golf facilities is large, from only 21 in the Northeast region to 158 in the Midwest region. Par-3 length facilities also varied greatly in those regions, from the four facilities offered in the Northeast to 46 in the Midwest region. And, regulation length facilities were

tallied at a high of 444 in the South region, and a low of 69 regulation length municipal owned golf facilities available in the Northeast region.

Table 4.20 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in Council-Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Mean Facilities	1.13	1.49	1.67	1.32
9-Hole Facilities	21	130	158	82
18-Hole Facilities	51	334	313	219
27+Hole Facilities	11	48	59	51
Par 3 Length Facilities	4	23	46	29
Regulation Length Facilities	69	444	432	287

Inter-regional comparisons of data from municipalities with non-council-manager government forms provide an additional opportunity to evaluate these municipal owned assets (See Table 4.21). For non-council-manager forms of government, the mean number of facilities available within each municipality ranged from 1 to 1.4. The non-council-manager governments of the South and Midwest regions both had averages of one municipal facility. The West region offers the highest mean for non-council-manager forms (1.39) with less than a third of the number of 9-hole facilities as compared to those jurisdictions in the

Midwest region, 57 to 161. However, the non-council-managers of the West region offer residents 22 large, 27-hole (or greater) publicly owned golf facilities to choose from. This is the highest number of the four regions, with the non-council-managers of the cities and towns in the South region only offering three to their residents. This study analyzed the number of regulation length facilities available across the four regions and found the West region had the fewest 9-hole facilities, and they also had the lowest number of regulation length facilities available, yet they had the highest mean when compared to the non-council-manager cities and towns of the Northeast, South and Midwest regions.

Table 4.21 Characteristics of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities in Non-Council-Manager Governments

Region	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Mean Facilities	1.15	1.0	1.0	1.0
9-Hole Facilities	58	66	161	57
18-Hole Facilities	151	152	165	105
27+Hole Facilities	17	3	11	22
Par 3 Length Facilities	12	3	13	19
Regulation Length Facilities	187	216	206	143

Independent Samples T-Test

Hypothesis one anticipates the council-manager forms of government will offer a greater number of golf facility types (private, commercial, municipal) when compared to the non-council-manager forms of government. The analysis compared 3,521 cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. The minimum number of facilities offered by council-manager cities and towns is one, while the maximum number offered is three. Non-council-manager cities and towns also offer a minimum of one and a maximum of three.

The t-test evaluates the null hypothesis that these two sample means for number of facilities come from populations with equal means. The t-statistic is calculated to be 8.336 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .000 (See Table 4.22). Since this significance level is less than .05, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. There is enough evidence to suggest a significant difference in the number of golf facilities offered by council-manager and non-council-manager forms of government.

Table 4.22 Independent Samples T-Test – Number of Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	1.24	8.336	7,417	.000
Council-Manager	3,521	1.35			

Hypothesis two examines the relationship between the number of municipal owned golf facilities offered by a municipality and its form of government. This variable is defined as the total number of municipal golf facilities publically owned by the citizens of the local jurisdiction. This study expected cities and towns with the council-manager form of government to offer more municipal owned golf facilities to residents than those offered in cities and towns with non-council-manager forms of government. The analysis of 3,521 cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms demonstrate that the cities and towns with a golf facility of any type offered a municipal owned golf facility in slightly less than a third of the non-council-manager cities and towns and slightly more than a third of the council-manager jurisdictions.

The t-test evaluates the hypothesis that these two sample means for number of facilities come from populations with equal means. The t-statistic is

calculated to be 3.29 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .000 (See Table 4.23). Since this significance level is less than .05, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. There is enough evidence to suggest a significant difference in the number of golf facilities offered by council-manager and non-council-manager forms of government.

Table 4.23 Independent Samples T-Test – Number of Municipal Owned Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.30	3.29	7,417	.001
Council-Manager	3,521	.36			

In order to more accurately assess possible differences in municipal owned golf facilities between the two forms of government, data concerning the facility size and length are also compared utilizing the independent samples t-test, using all categories of the variable (See Table 4.24). Results from these analyses reveal that no significant differences exist between the two forms of government regarding the numbers of 9-hole size, or par-3 length, municipal owned golf facilities. However, there is a significant difference related to the numbers of 18-hole, 27-hole (or greater) facilities, as well as regulation length facilities. The

results indicate that council-manager cities and towns offer residents a more complete municipal golf experience than non-council-manager jurisdictions.

Council-manager forms provide a significant difference in the numbers of regulation length golf facilities compared to non-council-manager cities and towns. Council-manager forms also deliver a significant difference in the number of standard, 18-hole golf course facilities. And, council-manager jurisdictions also demonstrate significant differences in the number of extra-large, 27-hole (or greater) golf facilities available to their residents.

What may be unique to golf, the rules of the game do not dictate specific dimensions for the field of play. However, completing 18-holes of golf on a regulation length golf course is defined as a round (or game) of golf. Therefore, the 18-hole, regulation length golf course was the heart of the battle during the fight for democratic access to the municipal golf course. It was the 18-hole regulation golf courses that were constructed with the hands of slaves, and it was the 18-hole regulation length golf course that was denied during the Jim Crow Era. It was the prohibition to the municipal 18-hole, regulation facilities that led local governments to construct separate, but unequal, 9-hole golf facilities for the blacks that protested the exclusion. Throughout the history of fight to democratize golf in America, these golf courses were the measure of access to the game. Results of this analysis reveal non-council-manager forms of government offer

significantly fewer of these facilities than the number offered in council-manager jurisdictions.

Table 4.24 Results of Individual Independent Samples T-Tests for Municipal
Owned Golf Facilities

Facility	Form of Government	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-Tailed)
9-Hole	Non-Council-Manager	.08	1.71	7,417	.087
	Council-Manager	.07			
18-Hole	Non-Council-Manager	.17	3.81	7,417	.000
	Council-Manager	.21			
27+Hole	Non-Council-Manager	.01	3.26	7,417	.001
	Council-Manager	.03			
Par 3 Length	Non-Council-Manager	.00	.218	7,417	.827
	Council-Manager	.00			
Regulation Length	Non-Council-Manager	.17	.318	7,417	.000
	Council-Manager	.21			

Hypothesis three suggests that a municipality's form of government will be a significant predictor of 18-hole golf facilities within the jurisdiction. The independent samples t-test is again utilized to evaluate the relationship between form of government and municipal owned golf facilities. This study anticipated a city or town with the council-manager form of government would have a higher percentage of 18-hole facilities than those within a city or town with the non-council-manager form of government. 3,521 towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. The analysis identifies 917 18-hole facilities in council-manager cities and towns, and, 573 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities located within jurisdictions of non-council-manager form of governments. Non-council-manager cities and towns have an 18-hole municipal facility mean that measures close to 25 percent lower than the mean calculated for council-manager forms of government.

Analysis of the 18-hole data utilizing the independent samples t-test results in a t-statistic equal to 5.03 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .000 (See Table 4.25). Based on these results, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. The data demonstrate that the mean level of 18-hole municipal golf facilities in cities and towns with the council-manager form of government is significantly higher than

the mean level of 18-hole provision in jurisdictions with the non-council-manager form of government.

Table 4.25 Independent Samples T-Test – Percentage of 18-Hole Municipal Owned Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.13	5.03	7,417	.000
Council-Manager	3,521	.17			

Table 4.26 presents information concerning the percentage of facilities devoted to the Par-3, Executive, and Regulation length facilities from both forms of government. This table provides a breakdown of data by form of government and region. Discussions of the hypothesis regarding these facility allocations will follow the table.

Table 4.26 Summary of 18-Hole Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Region	Facility Length	Non-Council- Manager	Council-Manager
Northeast	Par-3	2	0
	Executive	9	2
	Regulation	140	49
South	Par-3	0	7
	Executive	1	9
	Regulation	151	318
Midwest	Par-3	3	9
	Executive	2	9
	Regulation	160	295
West	Par-3	4	8
	Executive	8	10
	Regulation	93	201
National	Par-3	9	24
	Executive	20	30
	Regulation	544	863

Hypothesis four examines the relationship between form of government and the percentage of 27+ hole municipal owned golf facilities. 27+ hole facilities

include par-3 length, executive length, and regulation length golf courses. It is anticipated that the number of 27+ hole municipal owned golf facilities will be significantly higher in council-manager forms of government than those facilities in non-council-manager cities and towns. 3,521 cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. The mean of 27+ hole facilities in non-council-manager cities and towns is greater than their council-manager peers. This difference in means is significant (.002) with a t-statistic equal to 3.06 at 7,417 degrees of freedom (See Table 4.27).

Table 4.27 Independent Samples T-Test – Percentage of Facilities Devoted to 27+ Hole Municipal Owned Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.116	3.06	7,417	.002
Council-Manager	3,521	.020			

Results are also examined from each geographic region (See Table 4.28). Municipalities in the Northeast region offer the fewest within the council-manager form of government while the West region offers the highest mean of facilities of the same size.

Table 4.28 Percentage of Facilities Devoted to 27+ Hole Municipal Owned

Facilities by Region

Region	Non-Council-Manager	Council-Manager
Northeast	08	01
South	11	05
Midwest	09	01
West	15	01
National	11%	02%

The percentage of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities is evaluated in hypothesis five. The number of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities will be significantly higher within jurisdictions of council-manager form than those in non-council-manager forms of government. The 3,521 cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. Council-manager cities and towns devote nearly a quarter of their golf course inventory to regulation length facilities, while non-council-manager cities and towns devote a fifth of their golf facilities to regulation length facilities.

The difference between these two sample means for percent of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities produces a t-statistic of 4.24 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .000 (See Table 4.29). Based on this

data, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. Analysis demonstrates that council-manager cities devote significantly greater percentages of their municipal golf facilities to regulation length courses as compared to that of non-council-manager cities and towns.

Table 4.29 Independent Samples T-Test – Percentage of Facilities Devoted to Regulation Length Municipal Owned Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.202	4.24	7,417	.000
Council-Manager	3,521	.242			

When the data is evaluated for each region, the relationship between form of government and percentage of regulation length facilities (See Table 4.30). Council-manager cities and towns in the Northeast devote 22 percent of their facilities to regulation length golf courses, while non-council-manager cities and towns devote 18 of their facilities to regulation length golf courses. In the South, council-manager cities and towns offer 26 percent of their municipal owned facilities in regulation length, while non-council-manager forms offer 18 percent of theirs in regulation length. Data from the Midwest show that council-manager

cities and towns devote an average of 23 percent of their golf facilities to regulation length courses, while in non-council-manager jurisdictions the percent of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities was calculated to be 21 percent. Results from the West region demonstrate similar provision at 25 and 26 percent respectively. When data from the four regions is evaluated with the t-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected due to the level of significance measured at .000.

Table 4.30 Percentage of Municipal Owned Facilities Devoted to Regulation Length by Region

Region	Non-Council-Manager (%)	Council-Manager (%)
Northeast	18	22
South	18	26
Midwest	21	23
West	24	25
National	20%	24%

Hypothesis six examines the relationship between form of government and the percentage of 9-hole municipal golf facilities. Hypothesis six theorizes that council-manager cities and towns will offer a lower percentage of 9-hole golf facilities than the percentage offered by their non-council-manager peers. 3,521

towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. Data for all regions shows that council-manager cities and towns devote eight percent of their municipal owned courses to the smaller, 9-hole layout, statistically equal to the provision individuals have that reside in non-council-manager cities and towns.

Analysis of the data for the percentage of municipal owned facilities devoted to 9-hole golf courses utilizing the independent samples t-test results in a t-statistic equal to .157 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .875 (See Table 4.31). Since this significance is not less than .05, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means cannot be rejected. This data reveals that the mean percentage of municipal golf facilities devoted to 9-hole golf courses in council-manager cities is equal to the percentage devoted to this same size facility in the non-council-manager forms of government. From this analysis, the study cannot conclude that provision of nine-hole municipal golf facilities are lower in council-manager forms of government than in the percent of provision of the same facilities in the non-council-manager form.

Table 4.31 Independent Samples T-Test – Percentage of Facilities Devoted to 9-Hole Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.079	.157	7,417	.875
Council-Manager	3,521	.080			

Grouped by region, council-manager cities and towns in the four regions devote equal amounts of their municipal owned facilities in 9-hole golf courses to the percentage within non-council-manager forms. In the Northeast region, council-manager cities devote seven percent to 9-hole facilities, while non-council-manager governments also offer seven percent. In the South, council-manager forms offer nine percent, while non-council-manager cities and towns deliver municipal golf through the 9-hole layout at eight percent. Data from the Midwest region demonstrates equal provision. Council-manager cities and towns devote eight percent, while non-council-manager forms also devote eight percent to 9-hole golf courses. In the West region council-manager cities and towns allocate eight percent, while the non-council-managers deliver the same eight percent of municipal owned golf facilities in the 9-hole sized facility. The relationship between form of government and the percentage of 9-hole facilities is

similar when evaluated by region. Council-manager forms provide equal percentages to their counterparts in non-council-manager cities and towns (See Table 4.32).

Table 4.32 Percentage of Municipal Owned Facilities Devoted to 9-Hole Golf Courses by Region

Region	Non-Council-Manager (%)	Council-Manager
Northeast	07	07
South	08	09
Midwest	08	08
West	08	08
National	08	08

Hypothesis seven examines the relationship between form of government and the percentage of par-3 length municipal owned golf facilities. Par-3 length facilities include 9, 18, and 27+ hole size facilities that feature shorter, less challenging golf holes. Again, the 3,521 cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. The percentage of par-3 municipal owned golf facilities will be significantly less in council-manager cities and towns than the

percentage devoted to par-3 facilities in non-council-manager forms of government.

Analysis of the data for the percentage of municipal owned facilities devoted to par-3 golf courses utilizing the independent samples t-test results in a t-statistic equal to 2.84 at 7,417 degrees of freedom with a significance of .004 (See Table 4.33). Based on these results, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. This data reveals that the mean percentage of municipal golf facilities devoted to par-3 golf courses in council-manager cities is significantly different than the percentage devoted to the same length facility in the non-council-manager forms of government.

Table 4.33 Independent Samples T-Test – Percentage of Facilities Devoted to Par-3 Municipal Owned Golf Courses

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.008	2.84	7,417	.004
Council-Manager	3,521	.014			

The final hypothesis evaluated in this study examines the relationship between form of government and per-capita municipal owned golf facilities. The per-capita municipal owned golf facilities was expected to be significantly higher

in non-council-manager than the per-capita measure in council-manager cities and towns. Again, the 3,521 towns with the council-manager form of government and 3,898 cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms were analyzed. Analysis of the data shows the mean per-capita facilities of .0000581 in cities and towns with the council-manager form of government and .0001088 in non-council-manager forms of government.

Evaluation of the data concerning municipal per-capita facilities using the independent samples t-test results in a t-statistic equal to 2.23 at 7,415 degrees of freedom (See Table 4.34). The resulting significance of .026 is less than 0.05; therefore, the null hypothesis that the two sample means come from populations with equal means can be rejected. Data from this analysis demonstrates that a relationship does exist between per-capita municipal golf facilities and form of government. The hypothesis can be strongly supported as the cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms of government have per-capita facilities at twice the rate of facilities of jurisdictions with the council-manager forms of government.

Table 4.34 Independent Samples T-Test – Per-Capita Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Form of Government	N	Mean	T	Degrees of Freedom	Significance (2-tailed)
Non-Council-Manager	3,898	.0001	2.23	7,415	.026
Council-Manager	3,521	.00005			

Multiple Regression Analysis

Multiple regression analysis was used to evaluate the relationship between the total number of golf facilities within a jurisdiction and the independent variables of region, total population, percent of population non-white, and median household income (See Table 4.35). Regression analysis helps identify which of these variables are most effective for estimating the number of all golf facilities within a city and also assesses how much of the variation seen in the data for this dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable. The F statistic is used to test the hypothesis that the slope is 0 ($B_1 \dots B_6 = 0$). The F statistic of 1,007.66 yields a significance of .000. Since this p value is less than .05, the hypothesis that the slope of this multiple regression is 0 can be rejected. The linear relationship appears to be significant.

Table 4.35 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable (Number of Golf Facilities)

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	293.50	1	293.50	.120	1,007.66	.000
Residual	2,156.85	7,405	.291			
Total	2,450.34	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government.

Analysis of the data also results in a R square value of .120 which reveals that the independent variables tested explains 12 percent of the variation seen in the data for number of golf facilities within a municipality. The correlation results for the independent variables and number of golf facilities show mixed results (See Table 4.36). The data demonstrates that region is not significantly related to the number of golf facilities within a jurisdiction. However, population, form of government, percent of population non-white, and median house hold income are significantly related to this variable (p values < 0.05).

Table 4.36 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Number of Facilities

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	1.242	.006	N/A	192.30	.000
Form of Government	.092	.012	.080	7.390	.000
Region	.020			1.864	.062
Population	2.321	.000	.346	31.74	.000
Percent Non-White	.004		.112	10.142	.000
Median Household Income	1.555		.063	5.794	.000

The number of municipal owned golf facilities is also examined using multiple regression (See Table 4.37). The same independent variables of form of government, region, population, percent of population non-white, and median household income are evaluated to determine if these variables are related to the

number of municipal owned golf facilities provided by a local government and how much of the variation in this dependent variable can be explained by these five independent variables. Analysis of this multiple regression equation results in a F statistic equal to 2,940.44 with a level of significance of .000. Since this p value is less than 0.05, the linear relationship between the number of municipal owned golf facilities and the independent variable appears to be significant.

Table 4.37 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Number of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	1,166.39	1	1,166.39	.285	2,940.44	.000
Residual	2,937.36	7,405	.397			
Total	4,103.76	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government.

The R square value of .285 reveals that more than 28 percent of the variation seen in the data for number of municipal owned golf facilities provided by a city or town is explained by the independent variables selected (See Table 4.38). Population, percent non-white, and median household income were all significant.

Table 4.38 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Number of Municipal Owned
Golf Facilities

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.230	.008	N/A	30.57	.000
Form of Government	.017			1.776	.076
Region	.011	.042	.054	.039	.033
Population	4.627	.000	.533	54.226	.000
Percent Non-White	.003	.000	.061	6.108	.000
Median Household Income	7.764	.000	.024	2.459	.014

The third multiple regression equation in this analysis examines the value of using government form, region, population, percent of population non-white,

and median household income to predict the percentage of 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities (See Table 4.39). Analysis of the equation results in a F value equal to 228.53 with a significance of .000; therefore, a linear relationship between the percentage of 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities and the independent variable does exist. The R square value of .030 shows that 3 percent of the variation seen in the data for percentage of 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities can be explained by these six independent variables.

Table 4.39 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Percent of Municipal Owned Facilities 18-Hole

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	27.94	1	27.94	.030	228.53	.000
Residual	905.40	7,405				
Total	933.35	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government.

The data demonstrates that municipalities devote different percentages of their golf inventory in regards to 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities. The correlation coefficients for form of government, population, percent of population

non-white, and median household income are significantly correlated with the percentage of 18-hole municipal owned golf facilities (See Table 4.40).

Table 4.40 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Percentage of 18-Hole Municipal
Owned Golf Facilities

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.140	.004	N/A	33.48	.000
Form of Government	.035	.008	.049	4.29	.000
Region	.005			.429	.668
Population	6.37	.000	.173	15.11	.000
Percent Non-White	.002	.000	.100	9.12	.000
Median Household Income	1.09	.000	.071	6.26	.000

The relationship between percent of 27+ hole facilities and the independent variables of form of government, region, population, percent of population no-white, and median household income are also examined in this

study using multiple regression (See Table 4.41). Multiple regression yields a F statistic equal to 90.552 with a significance of .000. Since this p value is less than 0.05, the hypothesis that the slope of the regression equation is equal to 0 can be rejected. A linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables can be established with the data.

Table 4.41 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Percent of Municipal Owned Facilities 27+ Hole

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	1.248	1	1.248	.012	90.552	.000
Residual	102.044	7,405	.014			
Total	103.291	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government

The correlations indicate that the independent variable form of government, population, and median household income is significantly related to the percentage of municipal owned facilities 27-holes (or greater) (See Table 4.42). However, less than 1.5 percent of the variation (R square = .012) seen in this dependent variable can be explained by this multiple regression equation. The

information suggests that other factors are responsible for the variation seen in the data regarding the percentage of municipal golf facilities devoted to this size.

Table 4.42 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Percentage of Municipal Owned Golf Facilities 27+ Hole

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.012	.001	N/A	8.815	.000
Form of Government	.007	.003	.029	2.538	.011
Region	.018			1.546	.122
Population	1.514	.000	.110	9.516	.000
Percent Non-White	.001			.104	.917
Median Household Income	2.593	.000	.051	4.418	.000

The relationship between percent of municipal owned golf facilities devoted to regulation length facilities and the independent variables of form of government, region, population, percent non-white, and median household income are also examined in this study using multiple regression (See Table 4.43). Analysis of this equation results in a F value equal to 206.11 with a significance equal to .000. The data demonstrates that a linear relationship does exist between the dependent variable and the independent variables.

Table 4.43 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Percent of Municipal Owned Facilities Regulation Length

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	33.530	1	33.530	.028	206.011	.000
Residual	1,205.224	7,405	.163			
Total	1,238.754	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Region, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government

The correlations show that all five variables are significantly related to the percentage of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities (See Table 4.44). However, the R square value of .028 reveals that just under 3 percent of the variation seen in the data for this dependent variable can be explained by the

multiple regression equation. Although a significant relationship does exist among between the percentage of regulation length golf facilities and form of government, region, population, percent non-white, and median household income, it is evident there are other factors responsible for the variations seen in the data regarding the distribution of regulation facilities.

Table 4.44 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Percentage of Municipal Owned
Golf Facilities Regulation Length

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.205	.005	N/A	42.420	.000
Form of Government	.036	.009	.044	3.879	.000
Region	.014	.005	.033	2.870	.004
Population	7.846	.000	.165	14.353	.000
Percent Non-White	.002	.000	.083	7.139	.000
Median Household Income	4.682	.000	.027	2.313	.021

Once again government form, region, population, percent of population non-white, and median household income are utilized in a multiple regression equation to evaluate their usefulness as predictors for the percentage of municipal

owned facilities devoted to 9-hole golf courses (See Table 4.45). Multiple regression analysis produces a significance of .000. A significant linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is established.

Table 4.45 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Percent of Municipal Owned Facilities 9-Hole

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	1.989	1	1.989	.004	28.97	.000
Residual	508.389	7,405	.069			
Total	510.379	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Region, Population, Percent

Non-White, Form of Government

The correlations reveal that population, region, and median household income are significantly related to the dependent variable (See Table 4.46). However, the R square value underwhelms at .004, meaning that practically one hundred percent of the variations seen in the data for percent of municipal owned golf facilities devoted to 9-hole courses can be explained by other factors not included in this multiple regression equation.

Table 4.46 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Percentage of Municipal Owned
Golf Facilities 9-Hole

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.076	.003	N/A	24.204	.000
Form of Government	.005			.463	.644
Region	.012	.003	.044	3.786	.000
Population	1.911	.000	.062	5.38	.000
Percent Non-White	.021			1.79	.074
Median Household Income	3.145	.000	.028	2.39	.016

The value of form of government, region, population, percent of population non-white, and median household income as predictors of percentage of par-3 municipal owned golf facilities is also evaluated using multiple

regression (See Table 4.47). Analysis of the data reveals a F value of 81.848 with a significance of .000. Since this p value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the slope of the equation is equal to zero can be rejected; therefore, a linear relationship between the percentage of par-3 facilities and the independent variables can be established.

Table 4.47 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Percent of Municipal Owned Facilities Delivered as Par-3 Golf Courses

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	.714	1	.714	.012	81.848	.000
Residual	64.582	7,405	.009			
Total	65.296	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Region, Population, Percent Non-White, Form of Government

The correlations also reveal that form of government, region, population, percent of population identifying as non-white, as well as, median household income are significantly related to the dependent variable. The R square value of .012 reveals that less than 1.5 percent of the variation seen in this dependent variable is explained by the variables used in this multiple regression equation (See Table 4.48).

Table 4.48 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Percentage of Municipal Owned
Golf Facilities Delivered as Par-3 Golf Courses

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	.009	.001	N/A	7.905	.000
Form of Government	.029			2.491	.013
Region	.004	.001	.036	3.130	.002
Population	1.145	.000	.105	9.047	.000
Percent Non-White	.000	.000	.037	3.140	.002
Median Household Income	1.727	.000	.043	3.697	.000

Multiple regression is also utilized to evaluate the usefulness of form of government, region, population, percent of population non-white, and median household income for predicting per-capita municipal owned golf facilities (See

Table 4.49). Analysis of the data reveals a F value of 22.563 with a significance of .000. Since the p value is less than .05, the null hypothesis that the slope of the equation is equal to zero can be rejected; therefore, a linear relationship is established between per-capita facilities and the independent variables. The resulting R square value of .003 reveals that near one hundred percent of the variation seen in the data for per-capita facilities can be attributed to other factors besides the independent variables used in this multiple regression equation.

Table 4.49 Multiple Regression – Dependent Variable- Per-Capita Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Model	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	R Square	F	Significance
Regression	.000	1	.000	.003	22.563	.000
Residual	.001	7,405	.000			
Total	.001	7,406				

Predictors: (Constant), Median Household Income, Region, Population, Percent

Non-White, Form of Government

The correlations show that form of government, total population, and the percent of the population identifying as non-white, are significantly related to per-capita municipal golf facilities (See Table 4.50). Municipalities with the council-

manager form of government have half the per-capita facilities as their non-council-manager form of government peers.

Table 4.50 Coefficients – Dependent Variable – Per-Capita Municipal Owned Golf Facilities

Model	Un-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	9.056	.000	N/A	15.374	.000
Form of Government	2.843	.000	.036	3.130	.002
Region	.001			.051	.960
Population	1.124	.000	.025	2.085	.037
Percent Non-White	1.268	.000	.055	4.750	.000
Median Household Income	.012			1.021	.307

Chapter 5

Discussion of Findings

The reform movement of the early twentieth century proposed institutional changes intended to produce a more effective and efficient form of government. At the same time, the game of golf was taking root in America, transitioning from a heavily restricted pastime to a new middle-class sport. Evolving from a setting of slavery, African-American interest in golf was about more than sport. Many slaves built and maintained country clubs, they watched as white gentiles harnessed the unique social environment golf provides participants, but not caddies. They sought courses as they moved north toward freedom and they experienced new methods of exclusion. From Jim Crow laws to segregation and the Civil Right Act, they kept fighting for a chance to play step on the links equally. For African-American golfers, it was about so much more than the game. And, finally, when they had the option to show up at their local municipal golf course and play golf, they found the facilities separate and unequal in size, length and quality to those the whites were able to access.

While many studies in public administration are concerned with, and relevant to, common aspects of local government, none of the published literature addresses municipal golf provision, distribution, rates of allocation, or the democratization of golf reflected by equitable policies coming from different forms of local government. The International City Management Association

(ICMA) notes that more than 95 percent of local governments serve communities of fewer than 25,000 residents. However, as mentioned, zero analyses have been focused on municipal owned golf facilities within the 95 percent of local governments with fewer than 25,000 residents, or on municipal golf facilities located within the other five percent of local governments with more than twenty-five thousand citizens. No study has focused on this topic regardless of jurisdictions size.

This study evaluated several areas for distinction between the council-manager and non-council-manager forms of government. They have been evaluated including the number of types of facilities available (private country club, commercial daily-fee, municipal), the number of municipal owned golf facilities, the number of and provision percentage of 18-hole facilities, twenty-seven hole (or greater) facilities, regulation length golf courses, nine-hole facilities, par-3 length golf courses, as well as a municipal golf facilities per-capita measure.

The research on the effectiveness and efficiency of the council-manager form of government related to the distribution of municipal golf facilities has produced mixed results. In some study areas, significant distinctions can be seen in the data for the two forms of government. In other evaluations, the data from these two different forms of government cannot be differentiated. In contrast, this study contributes significantly to the overall knowledge of local government

administration. Non-council-manager cities and towns deliver municipal golf in numbers significantly lower than in council-manager jurisdictions; however, non-council-manager forms deliver a significantly higher per-capita measure of municipal golf facilities. The level of equality and equitability in the municipal golf that is offered is also significantly different between the two forms of government. Citizens within non-council-manager jurisdictions, have less access to standard, regulation length golf courses than residents living within council-manager cities and towns.

This study contributes to the on-going discussion within public administration that argues on behalf of democratic virtues. With the tumultuous history of racism, classism, sexism, and undemocratic provision of golf facilities, unimpeded access to public golf facilities should ideally offer an opportunity to break from that paradigm. This analysis finds evidence to support the underlying motivation for considering municipal golf policy in a class of its own.

In line with hypothesis 1, this research expected form of government to be significantly related to the number of total facilities within the municipality and the number of municipal owned golf facilities within the city or town. Specifically, cities and towns with the council-manager form were expected to offer more facilities than cities and towns with the non-council-manager forms of government. Likewise and following hypothesis 2, council-manager forms of government were hypothesized to offer a greater number of municipal owned golf

facilities as compared to non-council-manager jurisdictions. Evaluation of the results reveals that municipalities with the council-manager form of government offer greater numbers of facilities and greater number of municipal-owned facilities. A significant difference exists in the number of types of golf facilities between these two government forms.

The number of golf facilities variable was also examined utilizing multiple regression and the independent variables of form of government, population, region, percent of population non-white, and median household income. These variables explain 12 percent of the variations seen in the data for the number of types of facilities within a jurisdiction. When correlations of these independent variables were examined, only region was not significantly correlated to the dependent variable. Although a linear relationship is established between the independent and dependent variables, slight variations in the data may be attributed to other variables not included in this study.

A significant difference also exists concerning the number of municipal golf facilities and both forms of government. Results reveal that no significant differences exist between the two forms of government regarding the level of provision of 9-hole facilities or par-3 length facilities. However, there is a significant difference in the provision of 18-hole, 27+ hole, and regulation length facilities. Results from the multiple regression analysis show the highest R square of the study, with more than 28 percent of the variation seen between data from

the two forms of government, population, region, percent non-white, and median household income.

This research expected form of government to be significantly related to the number of facilities within a municipality and the number of publicly owned golf facilities provided by the local government. The data in the analysis does support Hypothesis one and Hypothesis two. A significant difference can be seen concerning the number of model of delivery as well as the number of golf facilities owned by the municipalities.

This study finds that council-manager forms of government have higher percentages of 18-hole municipal golf courses than the percentage devoted to the same sized facility in non-council-manager cities and towns (hypothesis 3). Analysis of the data demonstrates that the mean 18-hole percentage in council-manager forms of government is significantly different than that mean percentage devoted to 18-hole facilities in non-council-manager cities and towns. Multiple regression analysis demonstrates that the equation containing form of government, population, percent non-white, region, and median household income of the municipality is a significant predictor of the percentage of 18-hole municipal facilities. Although the variables only account for 3 percent of the variation seen in the data, the correlations reveal that form of government, population, percent non-white, and median household income are significantly related to the percentage of 18-hole facilities. Council-manager cities and towns

do devote a greater percentage of municipal golf facilities to the 18-hole golf course than the percentage devoted to the same sized facility in non-council-manager cities and towns.

Evaluation of the data provides substantial evidence to support Hypothesis three. Analysis of every city and town with a municipal golf facility demonstrates that the mean percent of 18-hole golf courses within council-manager forms of government is significantly more than the mean of those percentages found in non-council-manager jurisdictions.

Data from the analysis also demonstrates that significant differences between the two forms of government exist concerning the percentage of facilities devoted to the largest sized facilities, 27+ holes; the smallest sized facilities, 9-holes; and the percentage of golf facilities devoted to regulation length golf courses. The study hypothesized that the percentage of facilities council-manager jurisdictions devote to large facilities and to regulation length golf courses would be significantly greater than the percentage devoted to the same facilities within non-council-manager cities and towns. The study also hypothesized that council-manager cities and towns would offer a significantly lower percentage of 9-hole facilities than the percentage offered by cities and towns with the non-council-manager form of government.

The data in the study have shown that the council-manager city or town with municipal owned golf facilities deliver three times the total number of 27+

hole facilities than their non-council-manager peers. For council-manager cities and towns, the total 27+ hole facilities were one-hundred and sixty-nine, while non-council-manager cities and towns provide a total of only fifty-three. The results of the multiple regression analysis suggest that form of government; population and median household income were each significantly related to the percentage of municipal owned facilities twenty-seven hole (or greater).

Data also demonstrates that significant differences between the two forms of government exist concerning the percentage of regulation length facilities. Multiple regression analysis reveals that the relationship between percentage of regulation length municipal owned golf facilities and form of government, region, population, percent of population non-white, and median household income were all significant variables. A linear relationship between the dependent variable and these independent variables can be established. The data suggest the statistical correlations of the variables, however, with only 3 percent of the variations explained other unexplored factors are responsible for the differences seen in the variation of data.

Municipal owned golf facilities in the 9-hole format were found to be provided at similar rates between the two forms of government. The mean percentage for council-manager cities and towns was eight percent while the non-council-manager cities and towns devoted just under eight percent of their facilities to the same sized facilities. The independent samples t-test had a

significance of .875. However, when utilizing the multiple regression equation to evaluate the usefulness of the independent variables as predictors for the percentage, the analysis produced a significance of .000 and the correlations revealed that population, region, and median household income were each significantly related to the dependent variable. Also to be considered is the R square value, which underwhelmed at less than half of one percent. Clearly, there are other factors not included in this study that will help explain the variations in the data.

The relationship between form of government and percent of municipal owned par-3 facilities devoted to facility inventory were analyzed first using the independent samples t-test. Based on the results, the null hypothesis was rejected and the data revealed a mean percentage of municipal golf facilities devoted to par-3 golf courses in council-manager cities and towns is significantly different than the percentage devoted to the same length facility in the non-council-manager forms of government. Using multiple regression equations to test the independent variables, the percentage of par-3 facilities reveals that form of government, region, population, percent non-white, and median household income are each significantly related to the dependent variable. However, under two percent of the variations seen in the dependent variable is explained by these independent variables.

Analysis of the data supports Hypotheses four, five, and seven. Significant differences do exist in the percentage of facilities devoted to eighteen hole, twenty-seven hole, and regulation length municipal owned golf facilities. Council-manager cities and towns do devote a greater percentage of their municipal golf facilities to the most popular sized facility (18-hole), the largest facilities (27+ holes or greater), and they also devote a greater number of their facilities to the most popular length golf course (regulation). Council-manager cities and towns deliver municipal golf at levels not equal to those citizens within non-council-manager forms of government. This study demonstrates the unequal provision of access to golf in regards to both size and length of publicly owned golf facilities.

This study offers support to the literature in that golf is delivered in a consistent manner when it pertains to the factors that have always been associated with the game of golf - race and wealth. Council-manager cities and towns have higher percentages of median household income, they are communities less diverse, and feature a structure that has been more concerned with effectiveness and efficiency rather than equality and equity.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 evaluate whether similar demographic and socioeconomic indicators are significant in distribution of municipal golf facility size and length within non-council-manager forms of government. Reflected in the documented history of fights for equal access to municipal facilities, as well as

past research suggesting lower-income, more diverse communities prefer non-council-manager forms of government. Based on the literature, non-council-manager forms will be significant to the size and length of municipal golf facilities.

Analysis of per-capita facilities for each city and town with a golf facility reveals that form of government is significantly related. Analysis demonstrates per-capita facilities are not significantly related to region, or median household income. However, in addition to form of government, per-capita facilities were significantly related to percent of population non-white, and population. Council-manager cities and towns exhibit a per-capita rate of .00005 while non-council-manager cities and towns averaged a significantly higher per-capita rate of .0010. The hypothesis proves to be true, and analysis of the data in this study does confirm that a significant difference exists in the per-capita facility level of these two forms of government.

Conclusions

This study determined that traditional, regulation, golf has a significant relationship to the form of local government. The decades of reform and changes to structure have not made a consequential difference in providing golf to the groups of citizens traditionally excluded or regulated. Although this analysis found council-manager cities provide greater numbers of traditional, regulation golf, this study determined that the non-council-manager form of government

offered a more democratic provision of municipal golf to parties traditionally restricted. This analysis was also intent on providing a foundational research piece for public administration. Form of government and demographic information concerning each municipality with a private, commercial or municipal golf facility located within their jurisdiction was generated. Every municipal golf course facility within this population was categorized along facility characteristics (size of facility and length of holes) resulting in a comprehensive analysis across all states, regions, and populations.

More than 140 million residents live in jurisdictions with some type of golf facility and the demographics of these jurisdictions highlight similarities and differences both nationally and regionally when analyzed. Further, when segregated by form of government, the detail becomes more apparent. Nationally, jurisdictions with any type of golf facility had a total population difference of 20 million between the two forms of government (68 million NCM and 87 million CM); however, both forms had approximately 14 percent of residents identify as non-white; and both forms had similar median household incomes (\$48,000 NCM and \$51,000 CM).

For jurisdictions with municipal owned golf facilities, demographics demonstrate beneficial differences. In fact, the non-council-manager form of government is more likely to be utilized in jurisdictions with municipal owned golf facilities. The total population under each form of government is more

balanced than that found in the demographics of jurisdictions with any type of golf facility (41 million NCM and 42 million CM); both forms also had higher percentages of non-white residents (18 percent NCM and 15 percent CM); and, citizens living in jurisdictions with municipal owned golf facilities have a higher median household income than those cities and towns with any type of facility (\$50,637 NCM and \$57,132 CM). Regardless of government structure, the demographics of jurisdictions with municipal owned golf facilities are different than jurisdictions with any type of private, commercial or municipal golf facility.

Analysis of various characteristics of municipal owned golf facilities demonstrates that nationwide council-manager jurisdictions deliver almost twice the number of 18-hole facilities (917 vs. 573), and regulation length golf courses (1232 vs. 752) as non-council-manager cities and towns. In addition, council-manager forms of government provide more than triple the number of large, 27+ hole facilities than non-council-manager jurisdictions (169 vs. 53). When analyzed by region, the total numbers of municipal owned golf facilities are not all delivered disproportionately in favor of council-manager forms. For example, the non-council-manager form of government in the Northeast region provides more facilities within each of the five characteristic categories (9 hole, 18 hole, 27+ hole, par 3 and regulation length) compared to their council-manager peers in the same region. However, in the South region, the council-manager form delivers dramatically lower numbers of each of the same five characteristic categories

compared to non-council-manager cities and towns. The difference in allocation is most apparent in the number of large, 27+ hole facilities; only 3 of which are located in non-council-manager jurisdictions while council-manager cities and towns provide 48.

Non-council-manager forms of government have fewer facilities in size, length and total number yet they devote statistically different percentages to almost every category measured. Although counterintuitive, non-council-manager forms provide twice the per-capita facilities. The results from this study reinforces the historical literature as well as studies on form of government in concluding that non-council-manager forms of government deliver municipal golf in a more democratic manner than council-manager forms of government.

This study provides an opportunity to make a difference in municipal golf policy. The historical and cultural aspects of the game entered the field of public policy and administration when the golf course facility evolved from traditions of private restriction to one of public equality. The underlying question is whether this evolution was wanted, forced, or even whether or not it occurred? The literature suggests that most non-elite, non-whites felt unwelcome even as the golf course transitioned into a public place. For nearly a century, residents within a jurisdiction with a municipal owned golf facility have been paying their portion of taxes toward these public facilities; yet the game, the clubhouse culture, daily operation and management, the overall atmosphere of golf in general, continues to

be one modeled from traditions birthed from the private country club. This study identified many of the benefits that access to golf can provide participants, and how throughout the two centuries of golf in the United States many of these benefits have been purposefully withheld, regulated, or restricted from fellow citizens. There is no question that many of these undemocratic traits found their way into municipal golf course policy in the past, the concern is whether they are still there.

Evidence in literature points to the distribution of municipal golf facilities routinely being focused on communities of upper-income, white professionals. These decisions were made through policies created by officials often from the same population. When minorities protested over non-access during the Jim Crow era, policy responded by allocating days and times that were unattainable. When minorities sought access to separate but equal public facilities, policy responded by municipal golf policy reacted by contracting operations to private entities or constructing segregated, non-regulation length, low quality, small 9-hole facilities. When minorities finally gained civil-rights granting equal access to all public facilities, municipal golf policy delivered new municipal course construction further into the suburbs. For minorities still interested in trying to access public golf facilities, policy reacted by returning to the 'experts' and began moving toward the ideals of market and privatization, of efficiency and effectiveness.

Municipal golf policy in the United States is currently in another transition period. Courses available in the more diverse areas are often older and shorter facilities that are becoming more undesirable. These facilities are often within communities under pressure to redevelop as city center land values increase. Municipalities are already beginning to debate whether or not to renovate these aging facilities at a cost of several million dollars each for a local community largely perceived as non-golfers. Decisions on municipal golf policy, have serious implications for the growth of the game and the overall health of the golf industry.

The majority of golf facilities around the country are commercial, daily-fee facilities. However, the majority of golf played every year takes place on publicly owned facilities. Although this trend has remained steady for decades, since the late seventies municipal golf policy has been largely driven by misguided attempts to keep up with and position themselves alongside the commercial, daily-fee model. From expanding the numbers of holes available per facility, to lengthening the layout and design in effort to attract and challenge the more advanced golfer, to the country club style amenities and aesthetics, municipal golf facilities have proven to be great tools for business centric jurisdictions seeking more market oriented approaches to government services and methods of delivery. Yet, in practice, this approach has driven municipal facilities to fall into two categories, capital assets not worthy of reinvestment or

renovation; or municipal assets positioned (and priced) within the marketplace in effort to compete with commercial, daily-fee facilities.

Municipal golf policy is often justified due to specific benefits from economic development, or from the increase in property tax revenue as home values rise for communities that surround facilities. However, acknowledgement, understanding or consideration for the history, culture and motivations of those who fought for access to the game has largely been disregarded. This study offers evidence to suggest as council-manager forms of government continue to increase around the country; one of the outcomes will be less democratic access to municipal golf facilities.

This analysis has accomplished several of the goals that were outlined in the first chapter. Valuable information concerning the nationwide distribution of golf facilities, local government structures of nearly 8,000 municipalities, and the details regarding the provision of more than 2,500 municipal golf facilities. This research has provided an in-depth examination of local government in cities and towns where golf can be experienced. This study has also offered substantial evidence for the advantage of the non-council-manager form of government over the council-manager form of government to deliver golf in a more democratic manner.

Recommendations for Further Research

One of the recommendations for further research is related to the lack of opportunity this study has to compare these findings with other studies on this same topic. The truth is that there is nothing to use as comparison. Thus, a study following the same methodology is recommended at five or ten year intervals. Likewise, studies following any methodology related to the topic of golf facility provision across forms of government would be a much-welcomed contribution to the literature on this topic. Further research on local service delivery, levels of service provision, studies on structures of government and the per-capita measure, will offer an unprecedented analysis of municipal golf facilities nation-wide, assessing levels of access to golf facilities in delivery (municipal, daily-fee, or country club), size (9, 18 or 27-hole facilities) and length (regulation or smaller). This study demonstrates that the per-capita figure provides a foundation for future reanalysis of the municipal golf facility and its role in the democratization of golf.

Form of government has been studied from many different perspectives. From specific population size (Sherbenou, 1961; Hansen, 1975; Svara, 1990), responsiveness (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Karning, 1975; Dye and Garcia, 1978; Schumaker and Getter, 1983), expenditures (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1966; Booms, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Clark, 1968; Cole, 1971; Stumm and Corrigan, 1998), to studies of form of government and performance (Abney and Lauth, 1986; Dye and Garcia, 1978; Sanders, 1979; Rodriguez, 1999). Future

studies should seek to incorporate the privatization or contracting of municipal golf facilities. The municipal facilities analyzed in this study were under ownership of the local government; management status of the facilities is unknown.

Appendix A
Literature Tables

Table A.1

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT, LIMITED TO CITIES WITH GOLF FACILITIES

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUE
Blumberg (2016)	7,419 U.S. local governments with golf facilities	Relationship between form of government and municipal golf facilities

Table A.2

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT LIMITED TO CITIES WITH
GOLF FACILITIES

AUTHOR	SAMPLE
Sherbenou (1961)	49 suburban Chicago cities with populations greater than 2,500
Kessell (1962)	829 U.S. cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000
Schnore and Alford (1963)	300 U.S. cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000
Kammerer (1964)	53 council-manager cities in Florida
Alford and Scoble (1965)	All U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000
Nunn (1966)	7 cities in Indiana and 7 cities in Texas with various populations ranging from 24,000 to 933,000
Booms (1966)	36 council-manager cities and 37 mayor-council cities in Michigan and Ohio with populations between 25,000 and 100,000
Barr and Davis (1966)	64 county governments in Pennsylvania
Wolfinger and Field (1966)	309 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000
Lineberry and Fowler (1967)	200 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000
Clark (1968)	51 U.S. cities with populations between 50,000 and 750,000
Loveridge (1968)	59 cities in the San Francisco Bay region of California
Sharkansky (1968)	All 50 states
Wright (1969)	45 council-manager cities with populations greater than 100,000
Boyton and Wright (1971)	45 council-manager cities with populations greater than 100,000
Cole (1971)	All U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000
Liebert (1974)	676 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000
Stillman (1974)	245 city managers from cities and towns with populations ranging from less than 5,000 to greater than 500,000
Huntley and MacDonald (1975)	2,508 ICMA recognized cities with populations ranging from 2,500 to 1,000,000
Hansen (1975)	64 cities with populations less than 60,000
Karnig (1975)	417 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000 and at least 1,000 non-whites
Bryant (1976)	All ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations greater than 25,000

Dye and MacManus (1976)	243 SMSA's with populations greater than 50,000
Kuo (1977)	93 northern U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000 and at least 3,000 African-Americans
STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT LIMITED TO CITIES WITH GOLF FACILITIES (CONT.)	
AUTHOR	SAMPLE
Lyons and Morgan (1977)	285 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000
Salanick and Pfeffer (1977)	30 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000 over an 18 year period
Dye and Garcia (1978)	243 SMSA's and 340 suburban cities with populations greater than 10,000
MacManus (1978)	243 U.S. central cities
Lyons (1978)	285 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000
Sanders (1979)	838 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 25,000
Wikstrom (1979)	32 mayors from Virginia cities and towns with populations between 5,000 and 250,000
Giles, Gabris and Krane (1980)	65 counties in Mississippi
Meier (1980)	16 state governments that experienced executive reorganization
Morgan and Pelissero (1980)	22 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000
Schumaker and Getter (1983)	51 U.S. cities with populations between 50,000 and 750,000
Browne (1985)	114 cities villages in Michigan
Farnham and Bryant (1985)	914 U.S. cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000
Abney and Lauth (1986)	646 local department heads from cities with populations greater than 50,000
Farnham (1986)	2,500 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 10,000
Wish (1986)	65 largest SMSA's in the U.S.
Deno and Mehay (1987)	Same as Booms' (1966) study of 73 Michigan and Ohio cities with populations between 25,000 and 100,000
Farnham (1987)	633 U.S. cities and towns with populations equal or greater than 10,000
Svara (1987)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000
Ammons and Newell (1988)	418 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000

Rubin (1988)	133 Illinois cities with populations between 5,000 and 130,000
Svara (1988)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000
Hayes and Chang (1990)	191 ICMA cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000
STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT LIMITED TO CITIES WITH GOLF FACILITIES (CONT.)	
AUTHOR	SAMPLE
Welch (1990)	314 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000
Morgan and Watson (1992)	1,556 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations from less than 2,500 and 1,000,000
Renner and DeSantis (1993)	4,967 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging from less than 2,500 to 1,000,000
Clingermayer and Feiock (1995)	226 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000
Svara (1995)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000
DeSantis and Renner (1996)	3,942 ICMA recognized cities and towns
Stumm and Corrigan (1998)	149 U.S. cities with populations greater than 10,000
DeSantis and Leal (1998)	1,301 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging from less than 2,500 to 1,000,000
DeSantis (1998)	1,301 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging from 2,500 to 1,000,000
Rodriguez (1999)	544 elected and appointed officials from Florida's 67 counties
French (2001)	559 municipalities with populations between 2,500 and 25,000

Table A.3

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CITIES

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Sherbenou (1961)	49 suburban Chicago cities with populations greater than 2,500	Relationship between form of government and socioeconomic class
Kessell (1962)	829 U.S. cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000	Relationship between form of government and political environment
Schnore and Alford (1963)	300 U.S. cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000	Relationships between form of government and socioeconomic characteristics
Alford and Scoble (1965)	All U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000	Relationships between form of government and socioeconomic characteristics
Dye and MacManus (1976)	243 SMSA's with populations greater than 50,000	Relationships between form of government and characteristics of the region and population
Sanders (1979)	838 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 25,000	Relationships between form of government and income, city age, population and ethnicity
Giles, Gabris and Krane (1980)	65 counties in Mississippi	Relationships between form of government and socioeconomic indicators
Farnham and Bryant (1985)	914 U.S. cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000	Relationships between form of government and municipal demographics

Table A.4

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Dye and Garcia (1978)	243 SMSA's and 340 suburban cities with populations greater than 10,000	Relationship between form of government and functional responsibilities
Sanders (1979)	838 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 25,000	Effect of the form of government on performance outputs
Abney and Lauth (1986)	646 local department heads from cities with populations greater than 50,000	Relationship between form of government and the emphasis of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness
Rubin (1988)	133 Illinois cities with populations between 5,000 and 130,000	Relationship between form of government and the use of municipal enterprises
Hayes and Chang (1990)	191 ICMA cities and towns with populations greater than 10,000	Relationship between form of government and efficiency in service provision

Table A.5

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Sherbenou (1961)	49 suburban Chicago cities with populations greater than 2,500	Form of government and debt, levels of taxation, and per capita expenditures
Barr and Davis (1966)	64 county governments in Pennsylvania	Influence of voter preference on expenditures
Booms (1966)	36 council-manager cities and 37 mayor-council cities in Michigan and Ohio with populations between 25,000 and 100,000	Form of government and per capita expenditures
Nunn (1966)	7 cities in Indiana and 7 cities in Texas with various populations ranging from 24,000 to 933,000	Form of government and expenditure policies
Lineberry and Fowler (1967)	200 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000	Form of government and levels of taxation and expenditures
Clark (1968)	51 U.S. cities with populations between 50,000 and 750,000	Relationship between form of government and expenditures
Cole (1971)	All U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000	Relationship between form of government and policy outputs
Liebert (1974)	676 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000	Functional scope of municipality and expenditures
Lyons and Morgan (1977)	285 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000	Reform structures and municipal expenditures
Salanick and Pfeffer (1977)	30 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000 over an 18 year period	Discretionary powers of the mayor and municipal budget expenditures
Dye and Garcia (1978)	243 SMSA's and 340 suburban cities with populations greater than 10,000	Functional scope and municipal taxation and expenditures
Lyons (1978)	285 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000	Form of government and responsiveness to demands for increased spending
Meier (1980)	16 state governments that experienced executive reorganization	Effect of structural reorganization on expenditures
Morgan and Pelissero (1980)	22 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000	Government structure and levels of taxation and

		expenditures
Farnham (1986)	2,500 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 10,000	Functional responsibility and government expenditures

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES (CONT.)

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Wish (1986)	65 largest SMSA's in the U.S.	Structure of government effects on expenditures and quality of urban life
Deno and Mehay (1987)	Same as Booms' (1966) study of 73 Michigan and Ohio cities with populations between 25,000 and 100,000	Median voter framework and per capita expenditures
Farnham (1987)	633 U.S. cities and towns with populations equal or greater than 10,000	Government structure and median voter framework in expenditures
Stumm and Corrigan (1998)	149 U.S. cities with populations greater than 10,000	Form of government and revenues and expenditures
Rodriguez (1999)	544 elected and appointed officials from Florida's 67 counties	Form of government impact on service delivery preferences and expenditures
French (2001)	559 municipalities with populations between 2,500 and 25,000	Form of government and per capita expenditures

Table A.6

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Kammerer (1964)	53 council-manager cities in Florida	Evaluates managerial participation in decision-making
Loveridge (1968)	59 cities in the San Francisco Bay region of California	Examines the role of the city manager in policy processes
Sharkansky (1968)	All 50 states	Examine the relationship between demographic variables and policy activities
Boyton and Wright (1971)	45 council-manager cities with populations greater than 100,000	Policy-making and the leadership roles of mayors and managers
Huntley and MacDonald (1975)	2,508 ICMA recognized cities with populations ranging from 2,500 to 1,000,000	Examines the role of the city manager in policy processes
Bryant (1976)	All ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations greater than 25,000	Examines the effect of reformism in government upon municipal policies
Kuo (1977)	93 northern U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000 and at least 3,000 African-Americans	Evaluates mayoral influence on policy-making
Wikstrom (1979)	32 mayors from Virginia cities and towns with populations between 5,000 and 250,000	Examines mayoral roles and activities
Browne (1985)	114 cities villages in Michigan	Evaluate the policy leadership roles of managers
Svara (1987)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000	Mayoral leadership roles in administration, political and policy
Ammons and Newell (1988)	418 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000	Examine managerial, administrative and policy roles
Morgan and Watson (1992)	1,556 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations between 2,500 and 1,000,000	Examine the informal and formal powers of mayors and managers
Renner and DeSantis (1993)	4,967 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging	Evaluate administrative powers of managers and chief

	from less than 2,500 to 1,000,000	administrative officers
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STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES (CONT.)

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Clingermayer and Feiock (1995)	226 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000	Evaluate the relationship between the adoption of economic development policies and institutional arrangement
Svara (1995)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000	Examine the relationship between policy and administration in council-manager forms of government
DeSantis and Leal (1998)	1,301 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging from less than 2,500 to 1,000,000	Examine the participation of city managers in policy activities
DeSantis (1998)	1,301 ICMA recognized cities and towns with populations ranging from 2,500 to 1,000,000	Assess the informal and formal budgetary and administrative powers of mayors

Table A.7

STUDIES ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

AUTHOR	SAMPLE	RESEARCH ISSUES
Sherbenou (1961)	49 suburban Chicago cities with populations greater than 2,500	Form of government and debt, levels of taxation, and per capita expenditures
Wolfinger and Field (1966)	309 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000	Evaluate the effect of social composition on form of government and policies
Lineberry and Fowler (1967)	200 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000	Form of government and levels of taxation and expenditures
Wright (1969)	45 council-manager cities with populations greater than 100,000	Examine the form of government and partisanship
Karnig (1975)	417 U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000 and at least 1,000 non-whites	Examine the relationship between municipal reforms and policy responses to private demands
Salanick and Pfeffer (1977)	30 U.S. cities with populations equal or greater than 50,000 over an 18 year period	Assess the impact of interest groups on mayoral budgetary discretion
Dye and Garcia (1978)	243 SMSA's and 340 suburban cities with populations greater than 10,000	Examine the relationship between government structure and responsiveness
Svara (1990)	5 cities in North Carolina with populations greater than 100,000	Examines the relationship between form of government and interest group participation, representativeness and responsiveness
Welch (1990)	314 U.S. cities with populations greater than 50,000	Examines the influence of at large elections on minority representation

Table A.8

STUDIES ON RECREATIONAL SPORT

AUTHOR	RESEARCH ISSUES
McLean, Bannon, & Gray (1999)	Improvements in psychological and physical well-being; the reduction of life pressures
Manfredo, Driver, & Tarrant (1996)	Fulfilling the need for social satisfaction
Bammel & Burrus (1996)	Recreational sport has also been found to help form a sense of belonging, elevate the quality of a participants life
Jackson & Burtun (1999)	Correcting juvenile behavioral issues through sports
(Stoddart, 1990)	Golf was found to be the most valuable sport used as a tool for developing and establishing connections in the business world. "Golf is clearly the major sport in terms of socioeconomic impact"

Table A.9

STUDIES ON HISTORY OF GOLF IN THE UNITED STATES

AUTHOR	RESEARCH FINDINGS
Rosenzweig and Blackmar (1992)	Examine the traditional landscape narrative for Central Park in <i>The Park and the People: A History of Central Park</i> (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
Adams and Rooney (1985)	Regional variation in access to courses is still a function of income, population density, settlement patterns, ethnic and racial patterns, land cost, and availability of water” (p. 438)
Adams and Rooney (1985)	Once the game off the wealthy and socially elite, golf during the past three and one half decades has undergone popularization and democratization in the United States” (p. 438)
Adams and Rooney (1985)	It has important effects on contemporary lifestyles and is a noteworthy aspect of American culture” (p. 438)
Adams and Rooney (1985)	“In response to middle class demands, the number of public facilities has risen so sharply that they are more widely available than private ones. Increased costs of construction and maintenance threaten to undo recent democratization of the game. If means are not developed to counter rising costs, American golf may become again what it once was- a game for the privileged few” (. 438)
Napton and Laingen (2008)	“Wealthy travelers brought golf from Scotland to the U.S. during the 1880’s” (p. 25)
(Rosenzweig and Blackmar (1992)	Municipalities began renovations and course construction in an attempt to make the game more accessible to golfers of ordinary means, but it also meant public courses were vulnerable to social and political conflicts
Thorstein Veblen (1999)	Golf was the perfect specimen of conspicuous consumption; “its reputability lies in its element of waste.”

Table A.10

STUDIES ON GOLF AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

AUTHOR	RESEARCH TOPIC	CONCLUSION
Martin (1930)	Wealth to symbolize and entrench white dominance and black subservience	Caddie races as an example, black caddies who could outrun and out fight all his fellow caddies and retrieve the ball was given a gold piece
Brown (1962)	Restricted access to golf facilities	Property deed covenants restricting owners from allowing “Jews or Negroes” from occupying any property in Pinehurst. Even as late as 1962, Pinehurst screened both prospective property owners and guests, excluding all but “white gentiles”
Sinnette (1998)	Slaves role in first golf course construction in the first colonies	Golf arrives in the US by 1786. Establishment of the South Carolina Golf Club in Charleston assume slaves begin experimenting with golf during construction of the course. (p. 4)
Sinnette (1998)	Slaves migration north	Dramatic increases in blacks on municipal courses. Groups and associations began to form. (p. 51)
Sinnette (1998)	Post WWI growth	Parallel structures develop and African American golf ‘stars’ emerge- Country Clubs began to transition into segregated golf clubs 1880s thru 1920s. (p. 59)
Sinnette (1998)	African American demands for access	Desegregations of the military opened military courses up for play immediately. Courses on bases were seeing huge increases in black golfers. (p. 81)
Sinnette (1998)	Segregation	US Park Service continued construction of segregated courses in 1939 while African American workers were unable to play the facilities. (p. 123)
Sinnette (1998)	Quest for unrestricted access to public golf facilities	“Relying on items published on black newspapers, NAACP files on deposit in the Library of Congress, and cases published in the race relations law Reporter, 33 cases were identified by the author in which black golfers resorted to legal action between 1945 and 1966. From all indications, this figure is a fraction of the true number.” (p. 135)
Sinnette (1998)	Lawsuits	Legal challenges to public courses in 1920 (p. 121)
Moss (1999)	Historical restricted access for African American golfers	For many whites, exclusivity was not a goal viewed as separate from health but rather integral to it. “In the view of the affluent, Anglo-Saxon, American Protestants, the last quarter of the 19th century, with

		its influx of immigrants, had fundamentally disrupted the natural order”
Wells, Boone, and Buckley (2008)	Lawsuits	Historical sources to examine how access to Carroll Park was shaped by issues of race and ethnicity during the first half of the twentieth century. Baltimore public courses, Scheduled days to play, “Separate but Equal” cases, Court rulings and appeals. (p.158-163)
Wells, Boone, and Buckley (2008)	Lawsuits	Attorney for African American golfers, Dallas Nicholas, set out to prove that the facilities at Carroll Park were inferior to the other three municipal courses” (Wells, Buckley and Boone, 2008, p. 160)
Wells, Boone, and Buckley (2008)	Lawsuits	With respect to funding, of the more than \$1,000,000.00 spent on four municipal courses since their openings, only \$21,665.00 had been used for Carroll Park” (Afro-American, 1942a)
Dawkins and Kinloch (2000)	African American golfers during the Jim Crow Era	Exclusion and exploitation constituted their initial exposure to the game. (p. 7)
Dawkins and Kinloch (2000)	African American golfers during the Jim Crow Era	White resistance was particularly strong in the south. Atlanta, Greensborough, Jacksonville, Miami, Nashville, and New Orleans. Outside of the deep south, whites maintained racial segregation by building courses designed exclusively for African Americans. (p.137)
Dawkins and Kinloch (2000)	African American golfers during the Jim Crow Era	The intent of AA courses was to meet requirements for separate but equal, although the facilities were not of equal quality. “In the south, but everywhere, whites frequently allocated a day of the week for AA to play rather than construct a course.” (p.138)
McRae, (1991)	Institutional Racism	In 1943 the PGA amended constitutional Caucasian only clause, although not official until 1943 it was in place since 1916. (p. 26-29)
McDaniel (2000)	Institutional Racism	June 21, 1990 Two months before PGA championship at Shoal Creek Country Club founder Hall Thompson, “We have the right to associate or not associate with whomever we choose.” Asked if members would feel comfortable bringing black guests to the club, he replied, “No, that’s just not done in Birmingham, Alabama.” (p. 97)
McDaniel (2000)	Institutional Racism	PGA of America, USGA and PGA Tour all took steps to prevent another Shoal Creek. Private Clubs offered “token” memberships or they outright backed out of events in order to keep their own autonomy. (p. 97)

McDaniel (2000)	Institutional Racism	January of 1992 integration of USGA Executive Committee for first time in 97-year history. (p. 155)
McDaniel (2000)	African American Golf “Stars”	Early AA municipal success John Brooks Dendy – 1933 exhibition – 1,2,3,4 start Ripley’s Believe It or Not (p.53)
McDaniel (2000)	African American Golf “Stars”	Early AA municipal success Teddy Rhodes – Joe Lewis sponsored professional. He used LA municipal courses and was able or qualified for 1948 US Open at Riviera. (p.103)
McDaniel (2000)	African American Golf “Stars”	Lee Elder – Dallas – All White Tenneson Park Golf Club caddies would play six holes not visible to club house. Money games in Oak Cliff. Titanic Thompson hustle partner. First black to play in Masters 1975. (p. 113)
McDaniel (2000)	African American Golf “Stars”	William Wright – 1950 fought to play public course. 1959 First Black winner of USGA amateur public links tournament. (p. 144)
Jackie Robinson, NY Post (1956)	“Golf is the one major sport in America today in which rank and open racial prejudice is allowed to reign supreme.” “Not only should court action be considered, but I feel the issue is one for thorough investigation by the civil rights commission.” (p. 150)	

Table A.11

STUDIES ON GOLF AND INDUSTRY

AUTHOR	RESEARCH ISSUES
Wickham (1955)	Publicly owned courses were still being built in the late 1940s. Between 1931 and 1955, the number of municipal courses more than doubled, from 300 to 750. They also continued to dominate play. Although “munys” comprised only 15% of all courses, as of 1955 they accounted for 40% of all golf played. <i>Municipal Golf Course: Organizing and Operating Guide</i> (Chicago: National Golf Foundation, 1955), 4.
Napton and Laingen (2008)	Explore the changing geographical distribution of golf courses. Golf began as a sport for the socially elite, who had the first courses constructed in the suburbs of eastern, coastal population and financial centers. Predominantly private. (p. 26) “During the 1920’s golf began to move into the central and northern states” (p. 27) Post WWI “Golf demand for land and its historic association with the financially successful fit well with the upwardly mobile, suburban families that were trying to leave behind the problems of economic

	<p>depression and war” (p. 28) During the 1980’s almost 35% of new golf facilities included real estate development (p. 35) About 12% of all golf courses in the U.S. today are in master planned communities (p. 35) Property valuation research has shown that golf is second only to water as an amenity that enhances land value (p. 35)</p>
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Appendix B
Coding Tables

Table B.1

STATE AND REGIONAL CODING

STATES

STATE	=	STATE	=
Alabama	1	Montana	26
Alaska	2	Nebraska	27
Arizona	3	Nevada	28
Arkansas	4	New Hampshire	29
California	5	New Jersey	30
Colorado	6	New Mexico	31
Connecticut	7	New York	32
Delaware	8	North Carolina	33
Florida	9	North Dakota	34
Georgia	10	Ohio	35
Hawaii	11	Oklahoma	36
Idaho	12	Oregon	37
Illinois	13	Pennsylvania	38
Indiana	14	Rhode Island	39
Iowa	15	South Carolina	40
Kansas	16	South Dakota	41
Kentucky	17	Tennessee	42

Louisiana	18	Texas	43
Maine	19	Utah	44
Maryland	20	Vermont	45
Massachusetts	21	Virginia	46
Michigan	22	Washington	47
Minnesota	23	West Virginia	48
Mississippi	24	Wisconsin	49
Missouri	25	Wyoming	50

REGIONS

REGION	=
Northeast	1
South	2
Midwest	3
West	4

Table B.2

STATES BY REGION

Northeast (1)	South (2)	Midwest (3)	West (4)
Connecticut (7)	Alabama (1)	Illinois (13)	Alaska (2)
Maine (19)	Arkansas (4)	Indiana (14)	Arizona (3)
Massachusetts (21)	Delaware (8)	Iowa (15)	California (5)
New Hampshire (29)	Florida (9)	Kansas (16)	Colorado (6)
New Jersey (30)	Georgia (10)	Michigan (22)	Hawaii (11)
New York (32)	Kentucky (17)	Minnesota (23)	Idaho (12)
Pennsylvania (38)	Louisiana (18)	Missouri (25)	Montana (26)
Rhode Island (39)	Maryland (20)	Nebraska (27)	Nevada (28)
Vermont (45)	Mississippi (24)	North Dakota (34)	New Mexico (31)
	North Carolina (33)	Ohio (35)	Oregon (37)
	Oklahoma (36)	South Dakota (41)	Utah (44)
	South Carolina (40)	Wisconsin (49)	Washington (47)
	Tennessee (42)		Wyoming (50)
	Texas (43)		
	Virginia (46)		
	West Virginia (48)		

Table B.3

VARIABLE CODING TABLE

VARIABLE	CODED AS:	=
Form of Government	govform	0 = Non-Council-Manager 1 = Council-Manager
Total Population	totpop	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Population Non-white	popmino	Number (no coding necessary)
Median Household Income of the Municipality	hhinc	Number (no coding necessary)
Commercial Daily-Fee Facility in Municipality	totdfee	0 = No Commercial Daily-Fee Facility 1 = Yes Commercial Daily-Fee Facility
Private Country Club Facility in Municipality	totcc	0 = No Private Country Club Facility 1 = Yes Private Country Club Facility
Total Municipal Facilities	totmuni	Number (no coding necessary)

Total Municipal Facilities 9 Hole	tmuninhf	Number (no coding necessary)
Total Municipal Facilities 18 Hole	tmuniefh	Number (no coding necessary)
Total Municipal Facilities 27 Holes or Greater	tmunitsf	Number (no coding necessary)
Total Municipal Facilities Par 3 Length	tmunipt	Number (no coding necessary)
Total Municipal Facilities Executive Length	tmuniex	Number (no coding necessary)
Total Municipal Facilities Regulation Length	tmunireg	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Municipal Facilities 9 hole	perc9in	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Municipal Facilities 18 hole	perc18t	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Municipal Facilities 27 holes or greater	perc27t	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Municipal Facilities Par 3 Courses	perc3pt	Number (no coding necessary)

Percent of Municipal Facilities Executive Courses	percex	Number (no coding necessary)
Percent of Municipal Facilities Regulation Courses	percereg	Number (no coding necessary)
Per Capita Municipal Golf Facilities	pcapmuni	Number (no coding necessary)

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Biographical Information

After earning dual Masters degrees from the University of Texas at Arlington, one in Public Administration, and another in Urban Affairs, further research into municipal golf policy were warranted. With research interests in capital asset management, public-private partnerships, and public contracting, following graduation from the Public and Urban Administration doctoral program, I anticipate pursuing a career in academia and consulting local governments in municipal golf policy.