

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN INFLUENCEABILITY AND
ANTI-INFLUENCEABILITY

by

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Abstract

Individual Differences in Influenceability and Anti-Influenceability

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Using a dispositional strategy, two studies investigated individual differences in three types of influenceability and two types of anti-influenceability. Study 1 replicated the majority of consistent results found in Robinson and Ickes (2016) of different personality traits being predictive of different forms of influenceability. Individuals who reported more instances of *self-jeopardizing influenceability* tended to (1) have an external locus of control, (2) be more other-directed, (3) have a weaker sense of self, and (4) be more prone to dispositional emotional contagion. Individuals who were prone to *susceptibility to peer pressure* tended to be (1) low in social desirability, (2) more other-directed, and (3) high self-monitors. Individuals who reported more instances of *emotional contagion behaviors* were prone to be (1) higher in dispositional emotional contagion, (2) lower in social desirability, and (3) female. Study 2 investigated dispositional determinants of two types of anti-influenceability: *independence* and *self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability*. Individuals who reported more instances of independence tended to be (1) higher in psychological reactance, (2) lower in social desirability, and (3) male. Individuals who reported higher rates of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability were more likely to (1) reject authority, (2) be prone to psychological reactance, (3) be male, and possibly be

higher in authoritarianism in certain circumstances. The author argues that extreme forms of influenceability and anti-influenceability can result in negative outcomes for the individuals who possess these qualities, and that dispositional studies can contribute to identifying these individuals. Future research can build upon the framework identified in the current studies, with the goal of intervening prior to negative long-term consequences.

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Dedication

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Individual Differences in Influenceability and Anti-Influenceability

“I am certain that there is a complex personality basis to obedience and disobedience. But I know we have not found it” (Milgram, 1974, p. 205).

The study of influenceability has largely focused on situational variables that affect change in an influence target’s beliefs or behaviors through such forms as conformity, obedience, and persuasion, among others. For instance, Solomon Asch’s (1956) conformity studies found that most people would provide an incorrect answer to conform to the majority at least some of the time. Similarly, Stanley Milgram’s (1963, 1965) research on obedience to authority revealed that many people are willing to administer painful shocks to another person if instructed. Likewise, Philip Zimbardo’s prison experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 2004, 2007) demonstrates the disturbing power that the situation can have on ordinary people, as the volunteer “guards” resorted to abusing the “prisoners” by the second day of the experiment. These profound studies in social behavior are often exhibited as unequivocal evidence that individuals are influenced by situational determinants (external; setting or context) over dispositional factors (internal; relatively stable characteristics or traits).

Although situational factors can obviously have a considerable impact on responses to social influence, it is doubtful that situation alone drives these outcomes. If this were the case, we would expect to see little to no response variability because everyone would react in the same way to the same situation. It is likely that individual differences in influenceability also affect responses to social influence. Attempts have been made to uncover individual differences in influenceability, but the results are often weak and inconsistent (Blass, 1991). The scarcity of

consistent findings for dispositional factors of influenceability led to a recent line of research with the aim of uncovering dependable personality predictors for three different forms of influenceability (Robinson & Ickes, 2016). Consequently, the first major objective of the current research is to replicate the results found by Robinson and Ickes (2016).

Investigating individual differences in influenceability and considering the type of person who *is* easily influenced led to curiosity about the type of person who is *not* easily influenced and actively resistant to social influence. A review of the literature revealed that research in anti-influenceability is severely lacking. The main reason for this deficit is that anti-influenceability is often considered the absence of influenceability or as the unidimensional polar opposite of influenceability. This gap in the knowledge led to the second major objective of this study: To explore potential individual differences in two types of anti-influenceability as distinct responses to social influence.

Therefore, the goal of the current research is two-fold: (1) to replicate the findings of Robinson and Ickes (2016) in order to determine if promising results involving several personality variables do, in fact, point to stable predictors of different forms of influenceability, and (2) to expand this line of research by exploring individual differences in two types of anti-influenceability. To achieve this goal, two studies were conducted to evaluate individual differences in influenceability and anti-influenceability.

Dispositional Strategy for the Study of Personality and Social Behavior

Both of the current studies employed a dispositional strategy, as described by Snyder and Ickes (1985), to identify relatively stable dispositions and tendencies in order to understand regularities in responses to social influence across situations. The assumption of this strategy is

that social behavior consistencies can be inferred in terms of enduring dispositions of the individuals who regularly exhibit the examined behavior. The dispositional strategy can be considered a two-step process: (1) identify the types of individuals who likely differ in their expression of behaviors indicative of the relevant domain, by developing and refining a measure to assess that domain, and (2) using the assessment to investigate the conditions and/or underlying processes pertinent to the relevant domain (for empirical precedents, see Buss & Craik, 1983, 1985; Park, Ickes, & Robinson, 2014).

Utilization of the dispositional strategy does not require a well-defined *a priori* theory. As Snyder and Ickes (1985) described:

This dispositional strategy tends, however, to be rather atheoretical almost by definition. The researcher who adopts this strategy need not start with a theory of the phenomenon of interest and then proceed to test it directly. Instead, often in a virtual admission of ignorance, the researcher may begin by simply trying to identify individuals who, by their own self-reports or the reports of others, frequently manifest the phenomenon in their own behavior. Although the researcher's successful identification and subsequent study of such individuals (and their contrasting counterparts) may indeed lead to the inductive development of a well-articulated theory regarding the phenomenon of interest, it is important to note that such theory typically is the endpoint of the application of the dispositional strategy and *not* its starting point. (p. 891)

Although a fully developed theory is not required *a priori* when using the dispositional strategy for the study of personality and social behavior, the researcher need not start from a

place of ignorance, either. Selection of potential dispositional determinants of the domain in question ought to be driven by previous research and practicality. Common sense suggests that the most suitable predictors to begin with would be the dispositions with the most “face validity” – the ones that a majority of people would agree *should* identify people who are more or less likely to demonstrate consistencies in the examined behavior. Once the pivotal predictors have been investigated, the researcher can explore peripheral attributes to gain further insights into the phenomenon being investigated.

In other words, the dispositional strategy is essentially an “Edisonian approach” of discovery through trial and error used to “zero in” on the best predictors of the outcome measure(s). This method can be valuable when there is a strong sense of relevance regarding the regularities and consistencies of a particular phenomenon, but no clear direction.

An example of this can be found with the investigation of hypnotizability, the responsiveness to suggestions under hypnosis. Various studies conducted over several decades had failed to identify consistent personality correlates of hypnotizability (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). The manner in which hypnotizability was studied became more reliable, resulting in the discovery that absorption, or an openness to self-altering experiences, was a consistent correlate of hypnotizability (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; Roche & McConkey, 1990). Implementation of the dispositional strategy resulted in a renewed interest in the dispositional determinants of hypnotizability, research that continues today (Cardena & Terhune, 2014); there is even a book titled *The Highly Hypnotizable Person* (Heap, Brown, & Oakley, 2004).

Previous research involving the dispositional determinants of influenceability has been largely weak and inconsistent, and for anti-influenceability, absent. In agreement with the

Milgram (1974) quote about obedience and disobedience, the idea that there is an undiscovered personality basis to these phenomena is too compelling not to pursue. Using a dispositional strategy, the following two studies examined individual differences in influenceability, started by Robinson and Ickes (2016), and expanded this research into anti-influenceability.

Study 1: Individual Differences in Influenceability

Situational Determinants of Influenceability

Most studies in influenceability have emphasized situational explanations for the relevant behavior. Asch's (1956) conformity studies involved individuals participating in a "perceptual task" in which they were first shown a card with a line on it and then had to identify which of three lines presented on a separate card was the same length as the first. The participants were tested in a group and were unaware that the other group members were confederates. On several trials, the other group members would unanimously choose the wrong answer. Surprisingly, a majority of participants chose with the wrong answer at least some of the time, conforming to the majority opinion even when it was clearly incorrect. The results held when some of the situational factors were varied, such as when the modality was changed from a line comparison to color comparison and the when the study was lengthened. The results also revealed that the conformity effect increased with a larger group, but decreased when the response was given privately rather than publicly.

In addition, Milgram's (1963, 1965) studies in obedience to authority also exhibited unexpected results, in which the majority of participants were willing to deliver what they thought were painful shocks to another participant in a learning task. Even when they heard the other participant (a confederate) screaming in pain, most participants were still willing to

administer increasing levels of shocks when given a wrong answer, just because the researcher told them they had to complete the study. Obedience rates only dropped significantly when the researcher gave the orders remotely.

Finally, one of the most extreme examples in psychology of the power of the situation is the Stanford prison experiment (Haney et al., 1973; Zimbardo, 2004, 2007). Male college students were recruited to volunteer in a study of simulated prison life and were randomly assigned the role of either guard or prisoner. The study had to be ended earlier than planned, because of the increasingly cruel and sadistic behavior of the “guards” and the learned helplessness of the “prisoners.” The shocking results of the prison experiment have been used as evidence that situational factors supersede the effects of personality on behavior. Because of these groundbreaking studies in influenceability, much of the research focus shifted from dispositional to situational determinants of social influence (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009).

Individual Differences in Influenceability

The above-mentioned studies in influenceability highlight the importance of situational determinants of behavior, but situation alone does not explain all of the findings. For example, 25% of the participants in Asch’s (1956) study and 35% of the participants in Milgram’s (1963) study did not conform or obey. Even the most extreme of these studies, Zimbardo’s prison experiment, has been called into question for overlooking the individual differences that characterized participants who would agree to participate in such a study in the first place. A more recent study examined the personality characteristics of people who responded to an ad like the one placed to recruit participants for the original Stanford prison experiment (Carnahan & McFarland, 2007). There were two versions of the ad: One that replicated the wording of the

original ad for “male college students needed for a psychological study of prison life,” and one that had all of the same information, but excluded the words “of prison life.” The results revealed significant differences in respondents for the prison study in that they had higher levels of aggressiveness, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, narcissism, and social dominance and lower levels of empathy and altruism. The results indicate that while there were few personality differences between the “guards” and “prisoners” in the original study, there were most likely undetected personality differences between those who chose to respond to the ad for the study and those who did not.

Furthermore, Asch (1956) found that there were distinct individual differences in the types of responses observed in his study in that (1) they varied from total independence to total conformity and (2) there was high internal consistency in responses. Individuals who conformed to the majority in the beginning of the study, continued to do so throughout the experiment, as did individuals who answered autonomously at first and those who started with a compromise. This consistency is indicative of potential dispositional effects. If the situational factors alone were driving the effects, you would expect the results to show all responses to be in the same direction towards conformity instead of seeing variability in responses. There were also noted differences between conformers and independents in confidence, awareness, doubt, and accuracy when the participants were asked how many times they had conformed to the majority. Independents were more confident, had less doubt in their responses, and were more accurate in recalling their responses.

Thomas Blass (1991) conducted a review of situational and dispositional determinants of obedience in studies using the Milgram paradigm and found that the situational effects were not

as pervasive or universal as they have been portrayed. His review provided evidence for the effects of various dispositions, such as authoritarianism, locus of control, and social desirability, among others. Blass concluded that the results for both situational and dispositional effects were far from robust and were sometimes inconsistent.

Other research investigating individual differences in influenceability has also failed to find many consistent results. An early study by Crutchfield (1955) found that individuals who had higher conformity responses in a modified Asch-like experiment had higher levels of rigid self-control and authoritarian attitudes, placed a greater emphasis on external values, and reported a greater intolerance for ambiguity; they also had lower levels of ego strength, ability to accept responsibility, self-respect, and self-insight. On the other hand, Barocas and Gorlow (1967) attempted to identify reliable personality dimensions of conformity in an Asch-like study by investigating a pool of over 500 items from various personality measures. These researchers were unable to identify any reliable personality effects, since only five total items that were correlated with conformity were cross-validated in another sample.

Studies examining particular traits, such as self-esteem and sex, have also reported conflicting results. Janis (1954) found that individuals with low self-esteem were more influenceable, but subsequent research indicated that there is a curvilinear relationship, with individuals who have a moderate level of self-esteem being more influenceable than individuals with low or high self-esteem (Gergen & Bauer, 1967; Nisbett & Gordon, 1967; Rhodes & Wood, 1992). In regards to the effect of sex on influenceability, Cooper (1979) reported that females conform more than males, yet Eagly and Carli (1981) found that sex only accounted for around 1% of the variance of influenceability, and that male researchers found much larger sex

differences than female researchers. Furthermore, other research argues that gender role is a better predictor of influenceability than is biological sex (Maslach, Santee, & Wade, 1987).

Nevertheless, Vaughan (1964) investigated whether conforming behavior could be established as a trait that is consistent across different conforming situations (specifically, responding to a self-report measure of social acquiescence, a direct command, normative pressure, and group pressure). He found that about 80% of the participants conformed in some, but not all of the situations, 10% conformed in all, and 10% were independent in all situations. He criticized personality and conformity studies that described personality correlates of one type of conformity and then generalized that trait to conformity in all situations. Moreover, Berkowitz and Lundy (1957) found that different personality traits were predictive of influenceability by peers versus authority figures; individuals low in interpersonal confidence were more susceptible to peer influence, whereas individuals higher in both interpersonal confidence and authoritarianism were more susceptible to authority influence. The results of these studies suggest that influenceability in one form is not necessarily indicative of influenceability in other forms.

The idea that influenceability may need to be examined with a more differentiated approach and that different personality traits may be related to influenceability in different ways led Robinson and Ickes (2016) to conduct a line of research in search of consistent personality predictors for different forms of influenceability.

Robinson and Ickes (2016): Are Different Personality Traits Associated with Different Forms of Influenceability?

In a “proof of concept” study, Robinson and Ickes (2016) conducted a series of online studies that investigated consistent personality correlates of three types of influenceability: *self-jeopardizing influenceability*, *susceptibility to peer influence*, and *emotional contagion behaviors*. These particular types of influenceability were selected not to be all-inclusive, but because they are distinct and could result in an assortment of potentially negative outcomes for an individual. For example, feeling the emotions that others are feeling can create stronger interpersonal bonds and usually does not result in negative consequences, however, if an individual is prone to be highly influenced by emotions, this can be used against them in a manipulative manner. Being susceptible to peer pressure can result in risky behaviors, such as binge drinking and other harmful behaviors. Self-jeopardizing influenceability is an extreme form on influenceability in which the target of influence behaves in way that is jeopardizing to his or her self-interest, such as being scammed out of money or persuaded to get involved with extreme groups. These behaviors can result in adverse outcomes such as financial instability and negative psychological effects.

A dispositional strategy was used to study the three different forms of influenceability. William Ickes developed an assessment consisting of retrospective self-reported behaviors to measure how often individuals reported engaging in instances of three distinct forms of influenceability. It was hypothesized that different personality traits would be associated with the different types of influenceability. Across three studies, different personality measures, selected

for their intuitive plausibility as potential predictors, were investigated in order to identify consistent dispositional predictors of each form of influenceability.

Focusing on the results that were replicated across studies, the findings revealed that individuals who (1) had an external locus of control, (2) were more other-directed, (3) had a weaker sense of self, and (4) were more susceptible to dispositional emotional contagion were most likely to report previous instances of *self-jeopardizing influenceability*. In contrast, individuals who were (1) male, (2) high self-monitors, (3) other-directed, and (4) low in social desirability were most likely to report *susceptibility to peer pressure*. Finally, individuals (1) low in social desirability and (2) high in dispositional emotional contagion were the most likely to report instances of *emotional contagion behaviors*.

In order to continue the investigation of personality traits associated with different forms of influenceability, the first study in this current research endeavor consists of a replication of the final study conducted in Robinson and Ickes (2016). Based on the results of Robinson and Ickes (2016), this study included the demographic and personality measures that produced consistently significant findings across studies and omits the measures that were found to be unrelated to the outcome measures.

The current study also included the personality measures that were only included in the final study of Robinson and Ickes (2016), which did not have a chance to be replicated within those studies. Specifically, the need to belong was related to reports of self-jeopardizing influenceability, preference for consistency was related to the susceptibility to peer pressure, and conformity and social individuation were related to emotional contagion behaviors. Some of the demographic variables resulted in inconsistent findings in the original studies: Age was related to

self-jeopardizing influenceability and susceptibility to peer pressure and gender was related to susceptibility to peer pressure in only two of the three samples. Therefore, these variables will be included in the current study to determine if they should be considered consistent predictors. Finally, to increase the internal reliability of the emotional contagion behaviors subscale, additional items were added to the subscale for the final round of data collection in the original study. Using the revised subscale resulted in gender becoming a significant predictor of emotional contagion behaviors. The current study will investigate if the effect of gender is replicated on the revised emotional contagion behaviors subscale.

Hypotheses

Except where noted, the research hypotheses were derived from the empirical precedents established in the studies by Robinson and Ickes (2016).

First, it was hypothesized that for the outcome measure of *self-jeopardizing influenceability*, individuals who report more previous instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability would also report a more external locus of control, more other-directedness, a weaker sense of self, higher dispositional emotion contagion, and be older. Curiously, the need to belong had a negative relationship with self-jeopardizing influenceability in the final study of Robinson and Ickes (2016); therefore, whether that relationship proves to be replicable was examined. It was therefore hypothesized that individuals who report higher instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability would report a lower need to belong.

Second, it was hypothesized that for the outcome measure of *susceptibility to peer pressure*, individuals who report more previous instances of succumbing to peer pressure situations would also report higher scores in self-monitoring, lower scores in social desirability,

more other-directedness, and be male and older. Additionally, it was hypothesized that the preference for consistency would have a negative relationship with the susceptibility to peer pressure outcome measure, based on the results of Robinson and Ickes (2016).

Third, it was hypothesized that for the outcome measure of *emotional contagion behaviors*, individuals who report more previous instances of emotional contagion behaviors would also report more dispositional emotional contagion and less social desirability. In addition, it was hypothesized that more reported instances of emotional contagion behaviors would be related to being female, lower levels of social individuation, and possibly lower levels of conformity, based on the results of Robinson and Ickes (2016).

Study 1 Methods

Participants

The respondents were 348 University of Texas at Arlington undergraduate students who were enrolled in psychology courses, of which 267 were female, 79 were male, and two declined to indicate their gender. The reported ages ranged from 16-55, with a mean age of 19.87. The racial/ethnic composition was 32.2% White/Anglo-American, 24.1% Asian, 22.7% Hispanic/Latino, 13.2% Black/African-American, 7.5% Other/Multiracial, and one person (.3%) who decline to answer the race/ethnicity question.

Procedures

Participants were able to sign up for the study through the Sona system (Fidler, 1997), which directed them to an online survey on the SurveyMonkey website. Respondents had to agree to participate via an online consent form before they could access the contents of the survey. Once they had consented to participate in the study, the respondents proceeded through

the rest of the survey, which began with a set of demographic items, followed by measures of social desirability, social individuation, a preference for consistency, the need to belong, conformity, self-monitoring, locus of control, inner-other directedness, sense of self, and influenceability.

Outcome measure. The Experience With Others Scale (EWO) is a retrospective self-report measure that measures three conceptually distinct forms of social influenceability: self-jeopardizing influenceability, susceptibility to peer pressure, and emotional contagion behaviors (Robinson & Ickes, 2016). The measure consists of 16 influenceability items where the respondents answer if and how often they have experienced the described behavior. Their response for each item can range from 1 (*No, never*) to 4 (*Yes, often*). A sample influenceability item from the self-jeopardizing influenceability subscale is, “Have you been the victim of con artist or a scam situation in which someone promised you something, took your money, and then gave you little or nothing in return?” The internal reliabilities for the three subscales in the current sample ($N = 333$) were: self-jeopardizing influenceability ($\alpha = .79$), susceptibility to peer pressure ($\alpha = .67$), and emotional contagion behaviors ($\alpha = .76$).

Demographic and personality measures. To replicate the findings from Robinson and Ickes (2016), the personality measures that were consistent predictors from the previous samples and the measures that were significant predictors of influenceability but were only included in the final sample were collected. The descriptions of the demographic and personality measures that were collected are presented below in the order they appeared in the online survey for Study 1. Please see Appendix A for the full scales and Table 1 for the descriptive statistics for each of the personality and outcome measures.

Demographic survey. The survey began with a section that included standard demographic questions about each respondent's age, gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

Shortened version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (SD). Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) created a shortened version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) that measures the propensity to respond in a socially desirable manner. The scale consists of 10 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*), with items such as, "I always try to practice what I preach." Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) reported reliability coefficients that ranged from .59 to .70. An SD score was computed as the respondent's average score on the 10 items, with a higher SD score signifying a greater tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner. The Cronbach's alpha in the current sample was .55.

Social Individuation subscale (SI). The SI subscale of the Social Orientation Scale (Ickes & Hutchison, 1998, as reported in Ickes, Hutchison, & Mashek, 2004) measures the individual's tendency to cognitively separate and distinguish self from others. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). A sample item is, "I like to maintain a clear distinction between myself and others when I interact with them." SI scores were computed as the average of the respondent's item scores, with a higher score indicating a greater tendency to individuate. The 9-item SI scale had an internal reliability of .74 in the current sample.

Preference for Consistency scale (PFC). Cialdini, Trost, and Newson's (1995) 18-item PFC measures individual differences in the preference for consistency; individuals who score

high in PFC have a stronger tendency to base their present responses on previous behavior. The 18 items used a rating scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). A sample item is, “I typically prefer to do things the same way”; a PFC score was calculated as the average of the individual item scores, with a higher score indicating a higher preference for consistency. The Cronbach’s alpha in the current study was .87.

Need to Belong scale (NTB). Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, and Schreindorfer’s (2013) 10-item NTB scale measures an individual’s need to feel accepted as part of a group. The items of this measure were rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*); a sample item is, “I want other people to accept me.” The average of the item scores was used as the NTB score, with a higher score indicating a higher need to belong. The Cronbach’s alpha was .83.

Conformity Scale (CS). The CS was developed by Mehrabian and Stefl (1995) to assess the tendency to conform to others’ behaviors, values, and ideas. The 11 items were rated on a Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). An average conformity score was calculated from the individual item scores; a higher score signifies a greater tendency to conform. A sample item is, “I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others.” The internal reliability of the CS in the current sample was .75.

Emotional Contagion scale (EC). The EC scale (Doherty, 1997) was developed to measure the propensity to synchronize with or mimic the emotions of others. A sample item is, “I tense when overhearing an angry quarrel.” The items were rated on a rating scale that ranged from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*always*), and the average of the 15 item scores were used as the respondent’s

EC score. A higher EC score reflects a greater propensity to experience emotional contagion.

The internal reliability of the scale in this sample was .85.

Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (RSMS). Lennox and Wolf's (1984) RSMS was developed as an alternative to Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale. It evaluates an individual's propensity to modify his or her self-presentation in response to situational cues. A sample item is, "In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for." The 13 RSMS items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). An average SM score was computed, with higher scores indicating higher self-monitoring. The scale had good internal reliability in this sample ($\alpha = .81$).

Internal Control Index (ICI). The 28-item ICI (Duttweiler, 1984) measures locus of control, or the tendency to believe that events in one's life are controlled either by internal or external causes. Its items were rated on a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (*rarely*) to 5 (*usually*), and the average of the items scores was used as the ICI score. Higher internal control is reflected in higher scores on the ICI. A sample item is, "I ____ like to have a say in any decisions made by any group I'm in." In the current sample, internal reliability of .84 was found for the ICI.

I-O Social Preference scale (I-O). The I-O scale was developed by Kassirjian (1962) as a comparative measure of two opposing types of social character: inner-directed and other-directed. Whereas an other-directed person looks to others to direct their behavior, an inner-directed person directs their behavior by means of their own inner standards and goals. The I-O scale is composed of 36 two-choice items presented as options A and B within each item; one choice option depicts an inner-directed response and the other an other-directed response. The

responses consisted of four alternatives: *strongly agree with A*, *agree with A*, *agree with B*, or *strongly agree with B*. An I-O score was calculated so that a higher total score indicates a greater degree of inner-directedness. A sample item is, “It is more desirable: (a.) to be popular and well-liked by everybody; (b.) to become famous in the field of one's choice or for a particular deed.” The internal reliability of the I-O in this sample was .64.

Sense of Self Scale (SOSS). Flury and Ickes’ (2007) SOSS is a measure of the strength versus weakness of one’s sense of self. This 12-item scale was rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). An average SOSS score was computed for the set of 12 items, with higher SOSS scores indicating a *weaker* sense of self. A sample item is, “It bothers me that my personality doesn't seem to be well defined.” There was a high internal reliability level for the SOSS scale ($\alpha = .86$) in the current sample.

Study 1 Results

Unless stated otherwise, all data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 for Windows.

Data Screening

The data were screened in order to assess normality, missing data, and outliers. Two variables were found to have considerable violations of normality: Age, because the majority of the sample (67.7%) was 18 or 19 years old; and Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability, because this is a rare occurrence and scores were expected to be on the lower end. Because both variables were positively skewed, a logarithmic transformation was applied to normalize the data as much as possible. The two transformed variables were then used in all subsequent analyses. There were no variables that had missing data because of nonresponse above 5% of the sample.

The data were also screened to look for univariate and multivariate outliers. Two participants were removed because of patterned response behavior (entering the same answer for the all items in multiple scales) and ten participants were removed because of a Mahalanobis distance score higher than 25 (Field, 2013).

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Experience With Others Scale

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to assess the factor structure of the Experience With Others scale (EWO) using AMOS (22) to analyze the 16 items of the EWO. A three-factor model of the subscales of Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability (SJI), Susceptibility to Peer Pressure (SPP), and Emotional Contagion Behaviors (ECB) as latent variables was hypothesized based on previous exploratory factor analysis results using this scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016). EWO items 11-16 were expected to load onto the SJI subscale, items 7-10 were expected to load onto the SPP subscale, and items 1-6 were expected to load onto the ECB subscale. The three factors were hypothesized to co-vary with each another.

Missing data were handled through listwise deletion, resulting in a sample size of 302. No participants had a Mahalanobis distance score larger than the critical value of 109.77 for 87 degrees of freedom. Because some of the data were highly positively skewed, bootstrap resampling methods were employed using maximum likelihood estimation in the models (2000 samples). One item (item 5) loaded below .40 on the ECB latent factor and was removed from the model and all subsequent analyses.

The hypothesized model was tested and the Bollen-Stine bootstrap results indicated that no samples were unused due to a singular covariance matrix or the inability to find a solution. The chi-square value for the overall model fit was significant, $\chi^2 = 201.40, p < .001$; Bollen-Stine

bootstrap $p < .001$, suggesting a lack of fit for the hypothesized model. However, because the χ^2 statistic can be significant due to larger sample sizes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), other fit indices were examined. The fit indices indicated a slightly less than acceptable model fit, with the comparative fit index (CFI) = .90, the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = .89, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07, and the non-normed fit index (NNFI) = .88.

Two post-hoc modifications were made in an attempt to improve the model based on the resulting modification indices and theoretical considerations. The model was modified by adding two parameters. The first parameter was the associations between the error terms of items 9 (“Have you been talked into doing something by a friend or acquaintance that got you into trouble?”) and 11 (“Have you been talked into signing a purchase order or a sales contract that you later decided was designed to take advantage of you?”). The second parameter was the associations between the error terms of items 12 (“Have you given in to pressure to donate more time or money to a charity or non-profit organization than you actually felt comfortable contributing?”) and 13 (“Have you given in to the implied pressure or expectation to be physically intimate with someone when you really didn’t want to?”). Both sets of items used similar wording, which may account for shared variance. The revised model indicated a better fit to the data, with the $\chi^2 = 177.97$, $p < .001$, Bollen-Stine bootstrap $p < .01$, and the comparative fit index (CFI) = .92, adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = .90, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06, and non-normed fit index (NNFI) = .90. See Figure 1 for the final model and Table 2 for the bootstrapped standardized regression weights of the items.

The 3-factor model was a much better fit to the data than a 1-factor model hypothesizing a single latent factor of Influenceability. The single-factor model was an extremely poor fit to the data, with the $\chi^2 = 617.53$, $p < .001$, the Bollen-Stine bootstrap $p < .001$, CFI = .58, AGFI = .63, RMSEA = .13, NNFI = .51.

Intercorrelations of Personality and Outcome Measures

The zero-order intercorrelations of the personality measures and the three outcome measures are displayed in Table 3. For the self-jeopardizing influenceability outcome measure, conformity ($r = .14$), dispositional emotional contagion ($r = .13$), and a weak sense of self ($r = .16$) were positive correlates, whereas self-monitoring ($r = -.12$), an internal locus of control ($r = -.27$), and inner directedness ($r = -.15$) were negative correlates. Social desirability, social individuation, the preference for consistency, and the need to belong were not significantly correlated with retrospectively reported self-jeopardizing influenceability.

For the outcome measure of susceptibility to peer pressure, the only positive correlate was dispositional emotional contagion ($r = .12$), whereas social desirability ($r = -.16$), an internal locus of control ($r = -.12$), and inner directedness ($r = -.14$) were significant negative correlates. Social individuation, the preference for consistency, the need to belong, conformity, self-monitoring, and sense of self were not significantly correlated with retrospectively reported susceptibility to peer pressure.

For the outcome measure of emotional contagion behaviors, the significant positive correlates were the preference for consistency ($r = .20$), the need to belong ($r = .34$), conformity ($r = .20$), dispositional emotional contagion ($r = .63$), self-monitoring ($r = .17$), and a weak sense of self ($r = .13$), whereas the only negative correlate was internal locus of control ($r = -.13$).

Social desirability, social individuation, and inner-other directedness were not correlated with retrospectively reported emotional contagion behaviors.

Hypothesis Testing

Self-jeopardizing influenceability. To test the first hypothesis, that age, as well as the personality correlates of locus of control, inner-other directedness, sense of self, emotional contagion, and the need to belong would be significantly associated with retrospective reports of self-jeopardizing influenceability, a multiple regression analysis was conducted.

The overall regression model was significant and the predictors accounted for 12% of the variance in reported self-jeopardizing influenceability, $F(6, 316) = 7.52, p < .001$. An external locus of control was the strongest predictor of self-jeopardizing influenceability, $b = -.07, t(316) = -3.33, p = .001, sr^2 = .03$, followed by dispositional emotional contagion, $b = .04, t(316) = 2.88, p = .004, sr^2 = .02$, and age, $b = .31, t(316) = 2.48, p = .014, sr^2 = .02$. The need to belong, which had only been included in one sample in Robinson and Ickes (2016), did not replicate as a significant predictor. Neither inner-other directedness nor sense of self were significant predictors of self-jeopardizing influenceability, which was surprising, because both of these variables had been significant predictors in all three previous samples reported in Robinson and Ickes (2016). See Table 4 for the full regression results. To test for interactions, an additional multiple regression analysis was conducted that included the predictor variables and all possible two-way and three-way interaction terms. The results revealed no significant interactions.

Because the results of the current study were an anomaly in regards to the results for inner-other directedness and sense of self, these anomalous relations were investigated further. Because locus of control accounted for the most variance of the significant predictors and was

also significantly correlated with both inner-other directedness ($r = .31$) and sense of self ($r = -.59$), a follow-up multiple regression analysis was conducted that excluded this variable. When omitting locus of control, inner-other directedness, $b = -.06$, $t(317) = -2.88$, $p = .004$, $sr^2 = .02$, and sense of self, $b = .04$, $t(317) = 3.29$, $p = .001$, $sr^2 = .03$, were again significant predictors of self-jeopardizing influenceability, see Table 5. These results are consistent with Robinson and Ickes' (2016) previous studies. The data were compared across samples and no differences could be determined to account for the larger effect of locus of control in the current sample.

As predicted, individuals with a more external locus of control, who scored higher in dispositional emotional contagion, and were older¹, were higher in self-jeopardizing influenceability. Additionally, individuals who are more other-directed and had a weaker sense of self also scored higher in self-jeopardizing influenceability (when omitting locus of control from the model). Contrary to the hypothesis, the need to belong did not replicate as a significant predictor.

Susceptibility to peer pressure. To test the second hypothesis, that individual differences in age, gender, self-monitoring, inner-other directedness, social desirability, and the preference for consistency would be significantly related to reported susceptibility to peer pressure, a multiple regression analysis was conducted.

The overall regression model was significant, indicating that 10.2% of the variance in reported susceptibility to peer pressure was accounted for by the predictors, $F(6, 314) = 5.92$, $p < .001$. Social desirability was the strongest predictor, $b = -.30$, $t(314) = -3.83$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .04$,

¹ Although older individuals report higher instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability, this is believed to be due to a restricted sample and not a generalizable result.

followed by age, $b = .1.90$, $t(314) = 3.11$, $p = .002$, $sr^2 = .03$, and other-directedness, $b = -.30$, $t(314) = -2.88$, $p = .004$, $sr^2 = .02$. Self-monitoring, $b = .16$, $t(314) = 1.96$, $p = .050$, $sr^2 = .01$, was marginally significant. Gender and the preference for consistency were not significant predictors of reported susceptibility to peer pressure. See Table 6 for the full regression results. To test for interactions, an additional multiple regression analysis was conducted that included the predictor variables and all possible two-way and three-way interaction terms. The results revealed no significant interactions.

As predicted, individuals low in social desirability², who were older³, more other-directed, and high self-monitors were more susceptible to peer pressure. Contrary to the hypothesis, gender and the preference for consistency were not significant predictors of reported susceptibility to peer pressure. The preference for consistency, which had only been included in one sample in Robinson and Ickes (2016), did not replicate as a significant predictor. In the previous studies, gender was found to be a significant predictor of susceptibility to peer pressure in only two of the three samples, suggesting that this relationship is not consistent.

Emotional contagion behaviors. To test the third hypothesis, that gender and the personality correlates of social desirability, dispositional emotional contagion, conformity, and social individuation would be significantly associated with reports of emotional contagion behaviors, a multiple regression analysis was conducted.

The overall regression model was significant, indicating that 44% of the variance in

² While seemingly counterintuitive, low social desirability may be indicative of low self-control and impulsivity, see the Study 1 Discussion section for further explanation.

³ Although older individuals report higher instances of susceptibility to peer pressure, this is believed to be a due to a restricted sample and not a generalizable result.

reported emotional contagion behaviors was accounted for by the predictors, $F(5, 317) = 49.83, p < .001$. Dispositional emotional contagion was the strongest predictor, $b = .63, t(317) = 13.06, p < .001, sr^2 = .30$, followed by gender, $b = -.14, t(317) = -2.64, p = .009, sr^2 = .01$, and social desirability, $b = -.13, t(317) = -2.28, p = .023, sr^2 = .01$. Social individuation and conformity were not significant predictors of reported emotional contagion behaviors. See Table 7 for the full regression results.

To test for interactions, an additional multiple regression analysis was conducted that included the predictor variables and all possible two-way and three-way interaction terms. The results revealed an unexpected significant three-way interaction for the gender X social desirability X conformity interaction term, $b = -.97, t(297) = -4.14, p < .001, sr^2 = .03$. A follow-up regression was conducted including the original five predictors and the three two-way and one three-way interaction terms created from gender, social desirability, and conformity. This was done in order to determine if the interaction should be pursued further or if it was significant due to chance alone. The overall regression model was significant, indicating that 46.6% of the variance in reported emotional contagion behaviors was accounted for by the predictors and interaction terms, $F(9, 313) = 30.39, p < .001$. The two-way interactions were not significant, but the three-way interaction was still significant in this reduced model, $b = -.62, t(313) = -3.60, p < .001, sr^2 = .02$, see Table 8 for the complete regression results.

In order to probe the three-way interaction, a “moderated moderation” analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), which enabled the investigation of moderation of the effect of conformity (X) on emotional contagion behaviors (Y) by gender (M) to depend on social desirability (W), while controlling for social individuation (C_1) and

dispositional emotional contagion (C_2). The overall regression model was significant, accounting for 46.6% of the variance in reported emotional contagion behavior, $F(9, 313) = 29.94, p < .001$, see Table 9 for the full model results. The results revealed that among those who reported relatively low scores in social desirability ($W = -.475$), the effect of conformity on emotional contagion behaviors was moderated by gender (found only in males), $\Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = .46, t(313) = 3.04, p = .003$. But among those who reported moderate [$W = .000, \Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = .17, t(313) = 1.55, p = .122$] or high scores in social desirability [$W = .475, \Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = -.122, t(313) = -.87, p = .385$], gender did not moderate the effect of conformity on emotional contagion behaviors. See Figure 2.

Consistent with the third hypothesis, individuals who scored higher in dispositional emotional contagion, were female, and scored lower in social desirability⁴ reported more previous instances of emotional contagion behavior. Contrary to the hypothesis, social individuation and conformity were not significant predictors of reported emotional contagion behaviors. Social individuation, which had only been included in final sample in Robinson and Ickes (2016), did not replicate as a significant predictor. In the previous studies, conformity was found to be a significant predictor of emotional contagion behaviors in only one of the two samples in which it was included, indicating that this finding is not consistent.

An unexpected three-way interaction between gender, social desirability, and conformity was discovered in which for individuals who reported relatively low scores in social desirability

⁴ While seemingly counterintuitive, low social desirability may be indicative of low emotional regulation, see the Study 1 Discussion section for further explanation.

but not moderate or high scores), the effect of conformity on emotional contagion behaviors was found only in males.

Study 1 Discussion

The aim of the Study 1 was to replicate the findings of Robinson and Ickes (2016) in which consistent personality and individual differences were found for three distinct types of influenceability: self-jeopardizing influenceability, susceptibility to peer pressure, and emotional contagion behaviors. This study included the previously replicated measures and the measures that either did not have a chance to replicate or were only partially replicated. Influenceability was measured using the same Experience With Others Scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016) that consistently factored into subscales for each type of influenceability.

The results were found to be consistent with the previously reported findings, except for the effect of gender on susceptibility to peer pressure. None of the personality measures that were included only in the final round of data in Robinson and Ickes (2016) resulted in replication in the current study: The need to belong was not predictive of self-jeopardizing influenceability, the preference for consistency was not predictive of susceptibility to peer pressure, and conformity and social individuation were not predictive of emotional contagion behaviors. However, gender was again predictive of emotional contagion behaviors using the revised subscale.

Individuals who reported higher instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability tended to have an external locus of control, score higher in dispositional emotional contagion, and be older. Additionally, individuals who were more other-directed and had a weaker sense of self also scored higher in self-jeopardizing influenceability (when omitting locus of control from the

model). These individuals may be more easily persuaded to engage in self-jeopardizing behaviors, such as falling victim to fraud or joining a cult, because they do not have a strong internal guide and therefore seek out others for direction and guidance. They may also be more likely to be emotionally manipulated, as they also tend to take their emotional cues from others.

Individuals who tended to be lower in social desirability, older, more other-directed, and high self-monitors reported higher instances of susceptibility to peer pressure, leading to more adverse incidents such as illegal behavior and excessive drinking. Contrary to the hypothesis, gender was not a significant predictor of reported susceptibility to peer pressure. The finding that males are more susceptible to peer pressure has been found in only two of the four studies, including in Robinson and Ickes (2016) and the current study, suggesting that this relationship is inconsistent.

Individuals who reported higher instances of emotional contagion behaviors tended to be higher in dispositional emotional contagion, were more likely to be female, and scored lower in social desirability. An unexpected three-way interaction between gender, social desirability, and conformity was discovered in which, for individuals who reported low scores in social desirability (but not moderate or high scores), the effect of conformity on emotional contagion behaviors was found only in males.

The negative relationship between social desirability and emotional contagion behaviors may at first seem illogical, but it has now been found in all three samples in which it has been tested (dating back to Sample 2 in Robinson & Ickes, 2016). One explanation may involve the role of emotional regulation. Mesmer-Magnus, Viswesvaran, Deshpande, and Joseph (2006) found that emotional regulation was a significant predictor of social desirability. Individuals who

were higher in social desirability may be less susceptible to engaging in emotional contagion behaviors because they are occupied with controlling their own emotions. Therefore, those who are *low* in social desirability may be more likely to not only engage in emotional contagion behaviors, but also be swayed by others' emotions (and emotional appeals) because they are not as focused on regulating their emotions or how they are being perceived.

A note on the findings involving age: The results indicate that older individuals reported more occurrences of self-jeopardizing influenceability and susceptibility to peer pressure. These findings appear to conflict with other studies reporting that influenceability decreases with age (Walker & Andrade, 1996; Bond & Smith, 1996; Pasupathi, 1999), but this may be a reflection of a mostly traditional college-aged sample. The older individuals in the sample may have just had more opportunities to engage in self-jeopardizing behaviors and peer pressure situations in the first place. Bradley & Wildman (2002) also found higher reports of reckless behavior and perceived peer pressure in older participants in their study, which was restricted to 18-25 year olds. However, the results of older individuals reporting higher instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability and susceptibility to peer pressure are most likely due to the restricted sample of almost exclusively college-aged participants (92.9% of the current sample is between 18-25 years old) and are not expected to be generalizable to a more inclusive sample of respondents.

In addition, it may seem counterintuitive that those who are lower in social desirability score higher on the susceptibility to peer pressure subscale, but not when considered more in depth. Individuals who are higher in social desirability, in their need to be perceived as "good," may not end up in the types of situations described in the subscale in the first place. Interacting with peers who go to drinking parties or engage in illegal behavior may be avoided altogether,

because of a desire to not be associated with people who engage in socially undesirable behavior. Hence, Bradburn and Sudman (1979) argue that individuals who are high in social desirability do not just report less undesirable behavior, they actually engage in less undesirable behavior in real life. In their studies, the authors provide evidence that high socially desirable people tend to drink less, tend to get less intoxicated if they do drink, and tend to participate less in social activities overall.

When the data were examined more closely, two reverse-coded items from the social desirability (SD) scale that was used in this study were driving the results. A regression was conducted with the 10 SD items on the Susceptibility to Peer Pressure subscale. Item 5 (“I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget”) and item 7 (“There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things”) were the only two significant predictors: $b = -.08$, $t(308) = -2.28$, $p = .023$, $sr^2 = .02$ and $b = -.07$, $t(308) = -2.16$, $p = .031$, $sr^2 = .01$, respectively. These items stand out from the others in that they seem as if they could be measuring impulsivity, indicating that the low social desirability respondents could be reporting higher levels of impulsivity. To investigate this hunch, data from Ickes, Park, and Robinson (2012) were analyzed, as this study had both the same SD measure along with a measure of impulsivity. Regressions were conducted with item 5 and item 7 on impulsivity, with the results supporting the idea these two items from the SD scale were predictive of impulsivity: $b = -.13$, $t(271) = -4.70$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .08$ and $b = -.06$, $t(271) = -2.19$, $p = .029$, $sr^2 = .02$, respectively. In line with these findings, Liad Uziel (2010) contends that individuals who score high in social desirability exhibit a high level of self-control, what he labels as “interpersonally oriented self-control.” When discussing the impression management (IM) aspect of social desirability, Uziel states that:

What differentiates the present framing of the construct from many early views on IM is that the emphasis here is on self-regulatory capacity as the core characteristic of the construct rather than on emphasizing impression management or a need for social approval (i.e., the emphasis is on self-control over social dependence, or more broadly, on ability over motivation). Individuals high in interpersonally oriented self-control are first and foremost successful self-regulators. They demonstrate this capacity especially in social contexts (where it is highly rewarded) by showing agreeable, conscientious, and non-impulsive behavioral patterns. Therefore, when an individual with a high IM score does the “appropriate” thing in a social context, the present perspective suggests that it stems not from a position of dependence on the approval of others, but from a self-regulatory capacity that allows him/her to do the right thing (which is often a socially desirable act). (p. 256)

Adopting this view of social desirability explains why the individuals who were low in social desirability would report higher instances of susceptibility to peer pressure. These individuals are more likely to engage in social activities and are more impulsive, making them more susceptible to peer pressure than individuals who score higher in social desirability.

In conclusion, Study 1 was able to replicate almost all of the consistent findings from the Robinson and Ickes (2016) studies, providing further support that different personality traits are associated with different forms of influenceability.

Study 2: Individual Differences in Anti-Influenceability

Anti-influenceability has been severely neglected in the social influence literature (Willis & Hollander, 1964; Hollander & Willis, 1967). One of the major reasons for this neglect is that anti-influenceability is often assumed to be the absence of influenceability. When measured behaviorally, such as through conformity, obedience, and/or persuasion, influenceability is often viewed as a single dimension. For example, conformity is often measured as total conformity at one end with deviations from conformity going up to the other end, which is typically labeled nonconformity or independence. Willis (1965) calls into question this “assumption of symmetry”:

One might be tempted to conclude that what is known about conformity also constitutes knowledge about nonconformity, but this involves an untested assumption. According to this *assumption of symmetry*, as it might be called, the two halves of the conformity/nonconformity continuum are mirror images of one another. However, it should be apparent upon reflection that if a certain set of conditions is known to lead to conformity, it does not follow that the absence of these conditions or the presence of logically opposite conditions will necessarily lead to a specifiable mode of nonconformity. The fact that there are several possible motivational bases for both conformity and nonconformity, and not necessarily the same set of bases for each, makes it reasonable to expect that nonconformity phenomena will require separate investigation. (p. 373)

To conceptualize influenceability as a unidimensional construct fails to take into consideration that there can be different types of anti-influenceability that involve different

motivations. Willis (1963, 1965) proposed that the behavioral response to social influence is not unidimensional, and instead can be assessed as a triangular model of conformity, independence, and anticonformity. Conformity can be described as behavior that consistently moves towards a recognized normative expectancy, anticonformity can be described as when behavior consistently moves away from a recognized normative expectancy, and independence can be described as when the normative expectancy is recognized, but behavior is not guided by it. Both conformity and nonconformity are dependent on the normative response, whereas independence is not. Willis and Hollander (1964) demonstrated that these three distinct response modes could be experimentally produced in the laboratory.

Previous Research

In regards to personality research, investigations into personality correlates of influenceability have also predominantly considered influenceability to be unidimensional, resulting in reported differences between “conformists and nonconformists/independents” (Crutchfield, 1955) or “obedients and disobedients” (Blass, 1991). These studies presume the assumption of symmetry, where the absence of influenceability is considered the same as the opposite of influenceability. Some researchers also use the terms *independence* and *anti-influenceability* interchangeably to mean the opposite of influenceability, which dismisses the possibility of these being separate constructs.

A few studies have attempted to discriminate between types of anti-influenceability by distinguishing between independence and anti-influenceability. Smith (1967) developed a personality measure to differentiate between what he termed *conformers*, *rebels*, and *independents*, and found individual differences in competitiveness (independents were more

cooperative; conformers and rebels more competitive), along with measures of well-being, self-control, and achievement via conformity among the three groups (independents scored highest on all three measures, rebels lowest, and conformers scored intermediately). Morris Weitman (1962, 1964) similarly looked at authoritarian orientation and found differences between pro-authoritarians, anti-authoritarians, and non-authoritarians. Differences were found in positive versus negative response sets (pro-authoritarians tended to provide agree/true answers, anti-authoritarians tended to provide disagree/false answers, and non-authoritarians had no tendency), level of prejudice (pro-authoritarians had high scores, anti-authoritarians had low to middle scores, and non-authoritarians had low to middle scores), performance on cognitive tasks (pro- and anti-authoritarians performed poorly, non-authoritarians performed well), and task avoidance (conformers avoided by not answering, rebels used direct evasion, and independents did not avoid). Note that this later study adopted descriptive terms similar to the terms used by Smith (1967): *conformists*, *independents*, and *rebels*. These studies are a step in the right direction in their recognition that there are different types of anti-influenceability.

Regrettably, there is a deficit in research into personality correlates and individual differences in anti-influenceability as a focus of study. The aim of the second study in the current research endeavor is to initiate this type of investigation using a dispositional strategy to study anti-influenceability.

Scope of Study

It is presumed that anti-influenceability is not merely the absence of influenceability and that the study of potential individual differences in anti-influenceability merits further investigation. It is also presumed that there are different types of anti-influenceability:

independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Individuals who are high in independence are expected to be resistant to social influence in a positive way: They are not pushovers, nor are they antagonistic. These individuals react with a healthy skepticism to influence attempts and are not afraid to voice their own opinions and base their behavior on their own inclinations. However, individuals who are high in self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability are the “rebels” and “troublemakers.” They are highly resistant and hostile to social influence, to the point of jeopardizing their own self-interests (such as being fired from a job) due to their refusal to respond in a way that might portray them as influenceable or normative/conforming.

As in Study 1, a dispositional strategy was implemented to study two different types of anti-influenceability: independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Anti-influenceability was measured using the Anti-Influenceability Scale, which was developed specifically for this project. The 16 items were written in a similar manner as the influenceability items on the Experience With Others Scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016). The items are intended to be a retrospective self-report measure of two forms of anti-influenceability: *independence* and *self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability*.

In order to further examine the premise that there are different types of anti-influenceability, an ancillary study will be conducted. Smith’s (1967) Nonconformity Scale will be used to compare groups of three levels of nonconformity: conformists, independents, and rebels.

Several personality constructs were selected because they are suspected to be related to anti-influenceability. The personality measures that had been selected for influenceability in the Robinson and Ickes (2016) studies focused on the receptiveness of influenceability and relying

on other people, whereas the measures selected for the current investigation of anti-influenceability focused on resistance to influenceability and the reliance on others. A brief explanation and the expected relationship for each is discussed below.

Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism, the willingness to submit to authority and display strict adherence to conventional norms, has consistently been reported as a personality correlate of influenceability. All three of the seminal studies in influenceability have been linked to authoritarianism. First, Crutchfield (1955) found a positive correlation between authoritarianism and conformity in an Asch-like paradigm. Second, Elms and Milgram (1966) found a positive correlation between authoritarianism and obedience to authority. Finally, Zimbardo (2004, 2007) found that authoritarianism was the only personality variable that had predictive value, where higher scores on authoritarianism resulted in a greater number of days that the prisoner endured the Stanford Prison Experiment.

It is expected that both types of anti-influenceability will be negatively related to authoritarianism, as measured by the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 2006) and the Authority Behavior Inventory (Rigby, 1987). Individuals who report more previous instances of independent and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceable behavior are not expected to be swayed by authority and conventional norms, because independents tend to base their behavior outside of these confines and individuals high in self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability behave in the opposite direction of the normative behavior.

Psychological Reactance. Psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) is the motivation to reassert any perceived threat to a freedom. Contrary to the opinion of the Brehms, research by Dillard and Shen (2005) found that reactance could effectively be

studied using established self-report methods. It is expected that being prone to psychological reactance, as measured by the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale, will be positively related to both independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, (Hong & Faedda, 1996).

Independents are expected to be prone to reactance because they are not easily swayed by influence attempts and because their behavior is not dependent on normative behavior. Because of the tendency to react antagonistically in response to social influence attempts, individuals who report more previous instances of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability are expected to exhibit a “boomerang effect,” in which they react in a manner opposite of the intentions of the influencer.

Cynical Distrust. Individuals who are high in cynical distrust (Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989) tend to be defensive and exceedingly suspicious of others. It is expected that cynical distrust will be positively associated with self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability in that dispositional distrust can result in the rejection of most influence attempts, even those that are innocuous or helpful. Cynical distrust is not expected to be associated with independence because, although individuals who are highly independent may be somewhat skeptical, they do not assume that most people are dishonest or distrustful.

Autonomy. Autonomy can be characterized as a preference for independence from others of one’s thoughts and actions. Laurent Auzoult (2015) reported a positive relationship between autonomy and anti-influenceability, in which higher levels of autonomy resulted in higher levels of disobedience. The Autonomy Scale (Bieling, Beck, & Brown, 2000) consists of two subscales: Independent Goal Attainment and Sensitivity to Others’ Control. It is expected that independent goal attainment will be similarly related to both independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, but that there will be a larger effect of sensitivity to others’ control on self-

jeopardizing anti-influenceability. This is expected because of those high in independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability being driven to attain their independent goals and resistant to others asserting control over them. These characteristics may be particularly true for individuals who are high in self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, because they will go against their own self-interests, if necessary, to resist influence.

Uniqueness. The need for uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) is described as a positive drive to be different from others. Imhoff and Erb (2009) found that individuals with a high need for uniqueness were more likely to resist a majority influence. It is anticipated that uniqueness will be positively associated with both independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, because individuals high in independence are not afraid to stand out against the crowd, and those high in self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability would insist on it.

Hypotheses

It is hypothesized that for the outcome measure of independence, individuals who report more previous instances of independence behaviors will score lower on measures of right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority, and score higher in psychological reactance, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), and uniqueness.

Cynical distrust is not expected to be related to independence.

It is hypothesized that for the outcome measure of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, individuals who report more previous instances of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability behavior will score lower in right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority and score higher in psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), and uniqueness.

It is hypothesized that for the outcome measure of nonconformity groups of “conformers”, “independents”, and “rebels”, there will be differences between the groups on authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority), psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others’ control), and uniqueness. Conformers are expected to score higher on authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority) and lower on psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others’ control), and uniqueness than both independents and rebels. The converse is expected for rebels, and independents are expected to score more moderately on the personality measures.

Study 2 Methods

Participants

The respondents consisted of 339 University of Texas at Arlington undergraduate students who were enrolled in psychology courses, of which 259 were female, 77 were male, and three declined to answer the question on gender. The respondents’ ages ranged from 15-56, with a mean age of 19.95. The respondents’ racial/ethnic composition was 31.5% White/Anglo-American, 24.5% Hispanic/Latino, 23.9% Asian, 13.3% Black/African-American, 6.5% Other/Multiracial, and one person (.3%) who decline to answer the race/ethnicity question.

Procedures

Participants were able to sign up for the study through the Sona system (Fidler, 1997), which directed them to an online survey on the SurveyMonkey website. Respondents had to agree to participate via an online consent form before they could access the contents of the survey. Once they had consented to participate in the study, the respondents proceeded through

the rest of the survey, which began with a set of demographic items, followed by measures of social desirability, right-wing authoritarianism, psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy, uniqueness, acceptance authority, nonconformity, and anti-influenceability.

Outcome measures. There were two outcome measures used in this study: the Anti-Influenceability Scale and the Nonconformity Scale.

Anti-Influenceability Scale (ACS). The Anti-Influenceability Scale items were developed specifically for this study. Written in a similar manner as the original influenceability items on the Experience With Others Scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016), the items were intended to be a retrospective self-report measure of two forms of anti-influenceability: *independence* and *self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability*. The ACS consists of 16 items in which the respondents indicate if and how often they have experienced the described behavior from 1 (*No, never*) to 4 (*Yes, often*). A sample anti-influenceability item from the independence subscale is, “Have you resisted well-intentioned advice because you tend to evaluate what people tell you with a dose of skepticism?”; and a sample item from the self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability subscale is, “Have you been fired from a job for violating workplace policies and procedures?”.

In order to test the assumption that the Anti-Influenceability Scale is made up of two subscales, a principal components analysis (PCA) with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) was conducted on the 16 items. An oblique rotation was selected because the two components were expected to be correlated. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure ($KMO = .91$) substantiated the sampling adequacy for the PCA, and all KMO values for the individual items were greater than .86, which is above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field, 2009). Bartlett's test of sphericity revealed that the correlations between items were large enough for PCA, $\chi^2(120) = 1737.28, p < .001$.

Two components had eigenvalues over 1 and when combined explained 48.1% of the variance. Table 10 displays the loadings after rotation. There were two items that loaded below .40 on each component (items 4 and 7), so these two items were dropped in subsequent analyses. The first component consisted of nine items that represent the Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability subscale (items 8-16) and the second component consisted of five items that represent the Independence subscale (items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6).

Self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability scores were computed by averaging the items that loaded on this component, with a higher score indicating higher reported self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability behavior. The internal reliability for the self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability subscale in the current sample was .88. Independence scores were computed by averaging the items that loaded on this component, with a higher score indicating higher reported independence behavior. The Cronbach's alpha for the independence subscale was $\alpha = .72$.

Nonconformity Scale (NCS). The NCS is a little-used scale that was designed to distinguish between “conformers” and two types of nonconformers: “independents” and “rebels” (Smith, 1967). A sample item is, “I don't care if people think I'm eccentric.” This measure has 28 items (after removing 5 filler questions from the original) that were rated on a 9-point response scale from 100% (*disagree completely*) to 100% (*agree completely*). The internal reliability in the current sample was .52. The scale was scored towards conformity in the original study, but in the current study, the scale was scored in the direction of nonconformity, with higher scores indicating higher levels of nonconformity. The average of the 28 items was calculated as the NCS score.

The original study created the nonconformity groups by taking approximately 20 of the lowest scores for the conformers, 20 of the median scores for the independents, and 20 of the highest scores for the rebels. In order to retain the majority of the participants in the current study, the nonconformity groups were created by taking the lower third, middle third, and higher third of the non-overlapping scores of all participants, resulting in 111 conformers (scale scores between 3.36 - 4.71), 113 independents (scale scores between 4.74 - 5.14), and 101 rebels (scale scores between 5.17 - 7.11).

Demographic and personality measures. To explore the potential personality correlates of anti-influenceability, the personality measures of authoritarianism, cynical distrust, autonomy, need for uniqueness, psychological reactance, and acceptance of authority were collected. The descriptions of the demographic and personality measures that were collected are presented below in the order the measure first appeared in the online study. Please see Appendix B for the full scales and Table 11 for the descriptive statistics for each of the personality and outcome measures.

Demographic survey. The survey began with a section of standard demographic questions about each respondent's age, gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

Shortened version of the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability scale (SD). In order to account for the effect that some individuals may be hesitant to report behavior that is considered socially undesirable, a brief measure of social desirability was included in the study as a possible covariate or predictor. Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) created a shortened version of the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) that measures the propensity to respond in a socially desirable manner. The scale consists of 10 items that were rated on a 5-

point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*), with items such as, “I always try to practice what I preach.” The internal reliability of the SD scale in the current sample was .57. An SD score was computed as the respondent’s average score on the 10 items, with a higher SD score signifying a greater tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA). Altemeyer’s (2006) 20-item RWA scale is intended to identify individuals who tend to be submissive to authorities, prefer tradition, and are aggressive in defense of these principles. A sample item is, “What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.” The RWA scale items were rated on scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) and an average was calculated, with higher scores indicating higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism. The Cronbach’s alpha of the RWA scale in the current sample was .93.

Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (HPRS). The revised HPRS (Hong & Faedda, 1996) is an 11-item scale measuring psychological reactance to a perceived threat to one’s freedom, rated from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The scale has four factors, but Dillard and Shen (2005) suggest using the measure unidimensionally. A sample item is, “I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted.” The item responses were averaged to create a score, in which higher scores indicate higher levels of reactance. The internal reliability of the HPRS in the current sample is .77.

Cynical Distrust scale (CD). Greenglass and Julkunen (1989) constructed a measure of cynical distrust that was based on the results of factor analysis of the Cook-Medley Hostility Scale (Cook & Medley, 1954). Nine items that focused on cynicism and distrust made up a stable factor that had high internal reliability ($\alpha = .80$ in the current sample). This 9-item scale was

measured using a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*), and the item score was averaged for a CD scale score in the direction of higher cynical distrust. A sample item from the scale is, “No one cares much what happens to you.”

Autonomy Scale (AS). The Autonomy Scale from the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale (Bieling, Beck, & Brown, 2000) consists of two subscales: Independent Goal Attainment and Sensitivity to Others’ Control. The Independent Goal Attainment subscale ($\alpha = .79$ in the current sample) is composed of 11 items, such as, “If a goal is important to me I will pursue it even if it may make other people uncomfortable.” The Sensitivity to Others’ Control subscale ($\alpha = .65$ in the current sample) has 17 items, such as, “It bothers me when people try to direct my behavior or activities.” To reduce the number of items and eliminate ambiguous items, a modified Sensitivity to Others’ Control subscale was used in this study that excluded the eight items from the subscale that loaded lower than .40 in a confirmatory factor analysis (Bieling, Beck, & Brown, 2000). This resulted in a shortened 9-item subscale. Both subscales were rated on 5-point scales that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) and the scale scores were calculated in a positive direction for each.

Need for Uniqueness scale (NU). Snyder and Fromkin (1977) developed the NU scale as a measure of individual differences in the motivation to be unique from others. The NU scale consists of 32 items that were rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*); a sample item is, “I do not always need to live by the rules and standards of society.” A scale score was computed by averaging the items, in which a higher score indicates a higher need for uniqueness. The internal reliability of the NU scale in the current sample was .81.

Authority Behavior Inventory (ABI). The ABI is a 24-item measure that assesses the frequency of behaviors that indicate one's level of acceptance of authority, for example, "Do you make fun of the police?" (Rigby, 1987). The items were rated using a frequency scale from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*very frequently*) and an average score was computed such that a higher score indicates a higher level of acceptance of authority. The Cronbach's alpha for the ABI in the current sample was .67.

Study 2 Results

Unless stated otherwise, all data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 for Windows.

Data Screening

The data were screened in order to assess normality, missing data, and outliers. Two variables were found to have considerable violations of normality: Age, because of the majority of the sample (68.5%) being 18 or 19 years old; and Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability, because this phenomenon is a rare occurrence and reported incidents are expected to be on the lower end. Because both variables were positively skewed, a logarithmic transformation was performed to normalize the data as much as possible. There were no variables that had missing data because of nonresponse above 5% of the sample.

The data were also screened to look for univariate and multivariate outliers. Eight participants were removed because of a Mahalanobis distance score higher than 25 (Field, 2013).

Demographic Variables

To determine whether any of the demographic variables were significant predictors of either of the outcome measures, three multiple regression analyses were conducted with age,

gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status regressed on independence, self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, and nonconformity. As mentioned above, the age variable was transformed in order to normalize the positively skewed data. The socioeconomic status variable was created by taking the average of the three demographic items concerning parental education level and income. As gender and race/ethnicity are categorical variables, they were re-coded to be used appropriately in a regression model. Because there were unequal numbers of cases in each category, weighted effects coding was used to re-code each variable, resulting in a re-coded gender variable and four re-coded race/ethnicity variables.

As recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the race/ethnicity variables was entered into a separate block in the regression analyses in order to assess the change in R^2 (ΔR^2). A significant change in R^2 would indicate a main effect for race/ethnicity while controlling for the effects of the other demographic variables. Please see Table 12 for the full regression results on each outcome variable.

To determine whether any of the demographic variables were predictors of independence, age, gender, and socioeconomic status were included in the first step of the regression, and the race/ethnicity variables were included in the second step. The results showed that gender was the only significant predictor of independence, $b = .14$, $t(310) = 2.17$, $p = .031$, $sr^2 = .01$, the results were driven by the female respondents. Accordingly, gender was included in subsequent analyses involving independence.

Whether any of the demographic variables were predictors of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability was investigated by including age, gender, and socioeconomic status in the first step of the regression, and the race/ethnicity variables in the second step. The results showed that

gender was the only significant predictor of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, $b = .06$, $t(310) = 4.27$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .06$, the results were driven by the male respondents. Accordingly, gender was included in subsequent analyses involving self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability.

Finally, to determine whether any of the demographic variables were predictors of nonconformity, age, gender, and socioeconomic status were entered in the first step of the regression, and the race/ethnicity variables were included in the second step. The results showed that none of the demographic variables were significant predictors of nonconformity.

Intercorrelations of Personality and Outcome Measures

The zero-order intercorrelations of the personality measures and the three outcome measures are displayed in Table 13. For independence, psychological reactance ($r = .39$), cynical distrust ($r = .24$), independent goal attainment ($r = .12$), and sensitivity to others' control ($r = .24$) were positive correlates, whereas social desirability ($r = -.22$) and acceptance of authority ($r = -.23$) were negative correlates. Right-wing authoritarianism and uniqueness were not significantly correlated with independence.

Only right-wing authoritarianism was not significantly correlated with self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Psychological reactance ($r = .40$), cynical distrust ($r = .26$), independent goal attainment ($r = .11$), sensitivity to others' control ($r = .16$), and uniqueness ($r = .27$) were positive correlates, and social desirability ($r = -.13$) and acceptance of authority ($r = -.42$) were negative correlates.

Only social desirability was not significantly correlated with nonconformity. Psychological reactance ($r = .26$), cynical distrust ($r = .16$), independent goal attainment ($r = .29$), sensitivity to others' control ($r = .21$), and uniqueness ($r = .50$) were positive correlates, and

right-wing authoritarianism ($r = -.48$) and acceptance of authority ($r = -.50$) were negative correlates of nonconformity.

Hypothesis Testing

Independence. To test the first hypothesis, that the personality correlates of authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority), psychological reactance, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), and uniqueness would be significant predictors of independence, a multiple regression was conducted. As previously explained, gender and social desirability were also included in the model. Finally, as described above, the measure of cynical distrust, which was not expected to be related to independence, was included in the model.

The overall regression model was significant, indicating that 19.5% of the variance in reported independence was accounted for by the predictors, $F(9, 309) = 8.33, p < .001$. Psychological reactance was the strongest predictor of independence, $b = .30, t(309) = 4.14, p < .001, sr^2 = .04$, followed by social desirability, $b = -.20, t(309) = -2.84, p = .005, sr^2 = .02$, and gender, $b = .13, t(309) = 2.19, p = .029, sr^2 = .01$. Right-wing authoritarianism, cynical distrust, independent goal attainment, sensitivity to others' control, uniqueness, and acceptance of authority were not significant predictors of independence. Please see Table 14 for the full regression results. To test for interactions, an additional multiple regression analysis was conducted that included the original set of predictor variables and all possible two-way and three-way interaction terms. The results revealed no significant interactions.

As predicted, individuals who scored higher in psychological reactance reported more previous incidents of independence, and cynical distrust was not a significant predictor of

independence. Though not hypothesized, low social desirability and being male were also significant predictors of independence. Contrary to the hypothesis, neither authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority), autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), nor uniqueness were significant predictors of independence.

Self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. To test the second hypothesis, that the personality correlates of authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority), psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), and uniqueness would be significant predictors of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, a multiple regression was conducted. As previously mentioned, gender and social desirability were also included in the model.

The overall regression model was significant, indicating that 32.2% of the variance in reported self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability was accounted for by the predictors, $F(9, 309) = 16.28, p < .001$. The (negative) acceptance of authority was the strongest predictor of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, $b = -.14, t(309) = -5.28, p < .001, sr^2 = .06$, followed by psychological reactance, $b = .07, t(309) = 4.6, p < .001, sr^2 = .05$, right-wing authoritarianism, $b = .04, t(309) = 3.95, p < .001, sr^2 = .03$, and gender, $b = .04, t(309) = 3.23, p = .001, sr^2 = .02$. Social desirability, independent goal attainment, sensitivity to others' control, and uniqueness, and were not significant predictors of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Please see Table 15 for the full regression results.

Because right-wing authoritarianism was not correlated with self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability ($r = .03$), but was a significant predictor [$b = .04, t(309) = 3.95, p < .001, sr^2 =$

.03], this relationship was further analyzed. A multiple regression analysis was conducted that included all of the main effect predictors and the two-way interaction terms created with right-wing authoritarianism. The interaction of right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority was the only significant interaction term, $b = -.08$, $t(302) = -2.18$, $p = .03$, $sr^2 = .01$. Moderation was tested using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to investigate the effect of right-wing authoritarianism (X) on self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability (Y) by acceptance of authority (M), while controlling for gender, social desirability, psychological reactance, cynical distrust, independent goal attainment, sensitivity to others' control, and need for uniqueness. The overall regression model was significant, accounting for 33.5% of the variance in reported self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, $F(10, 308) = 15.42$, $p < .001$, see Table 16 for the full model results. The results revealed that right-wing authoritarianism was a positive predictor of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability for individuals who report low [$M = -.336$, $\Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = .07$, $t(308) = 4.00$, $p < .001$] and average [$M = .000$, $\Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = .04$, $t(308) = 3.73$, $p < .001$] amounts of behaviors indicating an acceptance of authority, but not for individuals who report high amounts of behaviors indicating an acceptance of authority [$M = .336$, $\Theta_{XM \rightarrow Y} = .02$, $t(308) = 1.38$, $p = .167$]. See Figure 3.

Consistent with the hypothesis, authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority) and psychological reactance were significant predictors of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability (along with gender). It was expected that both right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority would be negative predictors, but the relationship with right-wing authoritarianism was positive (for those who scored low and average in acceptance of authority). Contrary to the hypothesis, neither cynical distrust, autonomy

(independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), nor uniqueness were significant predictors of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability.

Nonconformity. To test the third hypothesis, that there will be differences between “conformers”, “independents”, and “rebels” in their scores on the personality correlates of authoritarianism (right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority), psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy (independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control), and uniqueness, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the groups created from the Nonconformity Scale (Smith, 1967). The two anti-influenceability subscales, independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, were also included in the MANOVA. Because the original groups were slightly unequal in number (conformers = 111, independents = 113, rebels = 101), cases were randomly deleted from the conformers and independents to achieve a more robust test with equal sample sizes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). See Table 16 for the descriptive statistics of the variables.

The multivariate result was significant for nonconformity level, $Wilks' \lambda = .58$, $F(18, 584) = 9.97$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .23$, indicating that about 23% of the variance in the multivariate dependent variable was accounted for by nonconformity level. The covariance matrices between the groups were assumed to be equal for the purposes of the MANOVA, Box's $M = 118.52$, $p = .048$, as Box's test was not significant based on the suggested level of $p < .001$ and having equal sample sizes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). The homogeneity of variance assumption was tested for the nine personality measures on a series of Levene's F tests. Three of the tests violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance: right-wing authoritarianism, $F(2, 300) = 3.97$, $p = .02$, uniqueness, $F(2, 300) = 4.23$, $p = .016$, and self-jeopardizing anti-

influenceability, $F(2, 300) = 4.61, p = .011$. For that reason, a more stringent alpha level ($p < .025$) was used for the univariate tests for these measures.

Given the significance of the overall multivariate test, the univariate main effects were examined. A series of post-hoc analyses with a Bonferroni correction to control for Type I errors were performed to examine individual mean difference comparisons across all three levels of nonconformity and all nine personality measures. The results revealed that all the main effects were statistically significant ($p < .003$), see Table 17 for the univariate F test results and Table 18 for the results of the pairwise comparisons.

The pairwise comparisons for right-wing authoritarianism indicated that conformers ($M = 2.84, SD = .55$) reported significantly higher rates of right-wing authoritarianism than independents ($M = 2.46, SD = .55$), who reported significantly higher rates than rebels ($M = 2.09, SD = .70$), see Figure 4. For psychological reactance, rebels ($M = 3.22, SD = .49$) scored significantly higher than independents ($M = 3.05, SD = .54$) and conformers ($M = 2.90, SD = .54$), who were not significantly different, see Figure 5. Rebels ($M = 3.35, SD = .67$) reported significantly higher rates of cynical distrust than both independents ($M = 3.05, SD = .57$) and conformers ($M = 3.07, SD = .62$), who were not significantly different, see Figure 6. Rebels also reported significantly higher rates of autonomy on both the independent goal attainment subscale ($M = 4.00, SD = .51$) and the sensitivity to others' control subscale ($M = 3.65, SD = .50$) than both independents ($M = 3.68, SD = .41, M = 3.49, SD = .41$) and conformers ($M = 3.69, SD = .41, M = 3.41, SD = .50$), who were not significantly different on either subscale, see Figures 7 and 8.

On the measure of need for uniqueness, rebels ($M = 3.24$, $SD = .38$) scored significantly higher than independents ($M = 2.95$, $SD = .30$) and conformers ($M = 2.89$, $SD = .31$), who were not significantly different, see Figure 9. Rebels ($M = 3.24$, $SD = .32$) reported significantly lower amounts of behaviors indicative of acceptance of authority than independents ($M = 3.43$, $SD = .29$), who scored significantly lower than conformers ($M = 3.26$, $SD = .32$) see Figure 10. Finally, the pairwise comparisons for the subscales of the Anti-Influenceability Scale revealed that rebels ($M = 2.30$, $SD = .66$) reported significantly higher rates of independence than both independents ($M = 2.04$, $SD = .64$) and conformers ($M = 1.97$, $SD = .53$), who were not significantly different, see Figure 11. Reported behavior indicating self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability was significantly higher for rebels ($M = 1.69$, $SD = .60$) than conformers ($M = 1.55$, $SD = .62$), but there were no significant differences between independents ($M = 1.41$, $SD = .45$) and the other groups, see Figure 12.

Study 2 Discussion

The aim of the current Study 2 was to investigate the idea that anti-influenceability is not merely the absence of influenceability, as is often assumed. Instead, it was proposed that there are two distinct types of anti-influenceability, *independence* and *self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability*, which have different personality predictors. Individuals who reported more previous incidents of independence were expected to be resistant to social influence in a positive way: skeptical, but not antagonistic. In contrast, individuals who reported more previous incidents of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability were expected to be highly resistant and antagonistic to social influence, to the point of jeopardizing their own self-interests.

Anti-Influenceability

The Anti-Influenceability Scale was developed for this study and consisted of 16 items created in a manner similar to the Experience With Others Scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016), the measure used in previous studies of influenceability. As expected, the scale factored into two subscales: independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. These subscales were used as the dependent variables in multiple regression analyses to identify potential personality predictors of the two types of anti-influenceability.

Individuals who reported higher rates of independence tended to score higher in psychological reactance, lower in social desirability, and were more likely to be male. In other words, individuals who report more previous instances of independent behavior tend to react negatively to any perceived threat to their freedoms and are more likely to report potentially undesirable or non-normative behaviors. The finding that males reported more instances of independence behavior is consistent with gendered expectations of males being more independent and assertive in their behavior (Maslach et al., 1987).

Respondents who reported higher rates of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability were more likely to score low in their acceptance (higher rejection) of authority, score higher in psychological reactance and right-wing authoritarianism, and also be male. In addition, the data revealed that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) was a positive predictor of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability for individuals who tend to reject authority, but not for those who reported high amounts of acceptance of authority. This relationship was not in the anticipated direction. It was expected that individuals who reported lower rates of acceptance of authority and higher rates of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability would report lower rates of RWA. It is as if these

individuals believe that they do not have to abide by society's rules, but that everyone else should. One reason for this puzzling finding could be the unmeasured effects of political ideology. Feldman (2003) found an interaction between social conformity-autonomy and social conservatism on RWA:

In addition, the interaction of social conservatism and social conformity-autonomy is *negative*. This is a critical finding because it shows that right-wing authoritarianism is not produced by the joint combination of social conservatism and a preference for social conformity. Instead, the effect of social conservatism on RWA increases as the value placed on personal autonomy increases. This means that conservatism most contributes to higher scores on RWA among people who most value personal autonomy, not social conformity. Conservatives will thus get higher scores on RWA than liberals even when (and especially when) they strongly value personal autonomy (and therefore are not predisposed toward authoritarianism). (p. 64)

In addition, in a series of studies, Knight, Tobin, and Hornsey (2014) first established that individuals who scored high in psychological reactance reported higher anti-authority attitudes towards government than those who scored low in psychological reactance. In their subsequent studies, the authors demonstrated that when threatened with a loss of control, these high-reactance, anti-authority individuals responded by increasing their support for government authority, thus going against their normal inclinations. The data for the current study were collected just prior to a particularly contentious Presidential election. It is possible that high-reactance people were feeling threatened and responded by embracing the systems they normally reject.

Nonconformity

Finally, to further examine the premise that there are different types of anti-influenceability, the final hypothesis in the current study involved an additional outcome measure. Smith's (1967) Nonconformity Scale was used to create groups of three levels of nonconformity: conformists, independents, and rebels. A MANOVA was conducted with the same personality variables (authoritarianism: right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority, psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy: independent goal attainment and sensitivity to others' control, and uniqueness), along with the two subscales from the Anti-Influenceability Scale previously used as outcome measures. By distinguishing between independents and rebels, the assumption of symmetry often made in influenceability studies was addressed.

Rebels were significantly different from conformers on all of the personality measures, including the anti-influenceability subscales, and significantly different from independents on all measures except for self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Rebels tended to score low in right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority and high in psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy, uniqueness, and anti-influenceability. Independents were significantly different from rebels on all of the measures except for self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, and significantly different from conformers on right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority. Independents tended to score low in cynical distrust and uniqueness, low-to-moderate in autonomy and anti-influenceability, and moderate in right-wing authoritarianism, acceptance of authority, and psychological reactance. Conformers were significantly different from rebels on all of the measures and significantly different from independents on right-wing authoritarianism

and acceptance of authority. Conformers tended to score high in right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority and low in psychological reactance, cynical distrust, autonomy, uniqueness, and anti-influenceability.

In conclusion, using the Nonconformity Scale (Smith, 1967) to create distinct groups based on level of nonconformity revealed that are the distinct differences between conformers, independents, and rebels in the personality variables selected for this study. These results support the main hypothesis of this study that there are different types of anti-influenceability. However, although independents were very different from rebels, they tended to resemble conformers, except when dealing with authority. In comparison to conformers, independents had lower right-wing authoritarianism scores and lower acceptance of authority (but not as low as rebels). These findings do raise a question about independents: Since they did not differentiate from conformers on most measures, are independents conceptually different enough from conformers to be considered independent?

One explanation for independents being not very distinct from conformers could be because of the measure used. Smith (1967) reported that the Nonconformity Scale skewed towards nonconformity, indicating that the majority of individuals scored towards conformity. In the current study, the data were more normally distributed, but the range of scores determined to be “independent” was small (.40), so it could be that independents are not as homogenous in real life.

Another explanation could be because the behavior of independents is free from the constraints of normative expectancies and therefore less predictable, they may just be more

difficult to identify. Bem and Allen (1974) argue that some people are highly variable and inconsistent across situations, making their behavior difficult to predict.

It could also be that the majority of people tend to conform, for various reasons. In a study that reported a boomerang effect of anti-conformity, Argyle (1957) found that almost 8% of participants changed their opinion away from the influencer's opinion. Also, Frager (1970) found anti-conformist responses on an Asch-like experiment conducted in Japan, in which approximately 33% of the participants gave at least one anti-conformist response in a neutral trial in which the majority group gave the correct answer (17% gave one anti-conformist response out of 10 possible, and 16% gave more than one anti-conformist response). Independents may resemble conformers more often than not because they choose to conform in most situations, not necessarily because that is what is expected, but because it may be the easiest or most logical choice to them at that time. Independents may choose to pick their battles, whereas for rebels, everything is a battle.

There are contradictory findings in regards to right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) on the outcome measure of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability and among the nonconformity groups of independents and rebels. RWA scores tended to be higher in individuals reporting more instances of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability, whereas when using the Nonconformity Scale, RWA was found to be low in independents and even lower in rebels. These differences are most likely due to measurement distinctions. The Nonconformity Scale is comprised of attitude items that were determined to distinguish between levels of conformity and nonconformity. Items that the rebels were anticipated to score higher on include: "People all behave the same because they are afraid to be different." and "I don't care if people think I'm eccentric." On the

other hand, the Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability subscale consisted of self-reported anti-influenceability behavior resulting in negative consequences, with items such as: “Have you alienated a friend or co-worker by criticizing his or her lifestyle when it was at odds with your own beliefs?,” and “Have you been fired from a job for violating workplace policies and procedures?” It seems reasonable to conclude that individuals who hold nonconforming attitudes are not necessarily the same as individuals who report self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability behaviors.

General Discussion

Social influence research has tended to rely on situational over dispositional determinants to explain behavior. One reason for this trend may be the lack of consistent findings in regards to individual differences in influenceability. Study 1 of the current research has attempted to introduce a bit of clarity by bolstering previous findings of reliable personality predictors of distinct forms of influenceability. Using a dispositional strategy to study influenceability, Robinson and Ickes (2016) suggested that a differentiated view of influenceability was warranted. They developed the Experience With Others Scale in order to assess retrospective reports of self-jeopardizing influenceability, susceptibility to peer pressure, and emotional contagion behaviors. The consistent personality predictors of each form of influenceability were subsequently replicated in the current research.

In addition, the concept of anti-influenceability has been largely ignored in social influence research. Anti-influenceability is often operationalized as the lack of influenceability and is therefore not investigated as a distinct concept. The present study initiated the examination of individual differences in anti-influenceability using a dispositional strategy of investigation.

The Anti-Influenceability Scale was developed to assess two types of anti-influenceability: self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability and independence, and several personality measures were found to be predictive of each type.

Results of the Present Investigation

With regard to individual differences in influenceability, the results supported the consistent findings in Robinson and Ickes (2016) of different personality traits being predictive of different forms of influenceability. First, individuals who reported higher instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability tended to have an external locus of control, be more other-directed, have a weaker sense of self, and be more prone to dispositional emotional contagion. Second, individuals who reported higher instances of susceptibility to peer pressure tended to be low in social desirability, other-directed, and high self-monitors. Third, individuals who reported higher instances of emotional contagion behaviors were more likely to be higher in dispositional emotional contagion, lower in social desirability, and female.

Concerning individual differences in anti-influenceability, individuals who reported higher instances of independence tended to score higher in psychological reactance, lower in social desirability, and be male. Respondents who reported higher rates of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability were more likely to have lower acceptance (higher rejection) of authority, higher levels of psychological reactance and right-wing authoritarianism, and also be male.

The results of the examination of differences between the nonconformity groups created from the Nonconformity Scale (Smith, 1967) revealed that rebels were significantly different from conformers on all of the personality measures, including the anti-influenceability subscales, and significantly different from independents on all measures except for self-jeopardizing anti-

influenceability. Independents were significantly different from conformers on right-wing authoritarianism and acceptance of authority.

Strengths and Limitations of the Current Studies

One strength of both of the current studies is the differentiated approach that was taken. The studies involved two dispositional examinations of three types of influenceability and two types of anti-influenceability. Another strength is that both studies included large, racially/ethnically diverse samples of over 300 respondents. Several demographic and personality variables were assessed across multiple outcome measures in order to identify the best predictors and generate a description of the types of individuals who demonstrate different types of influenceability and anti-influenceability. The results provide a foundation for future studies to use the dispositional approach that has been lacking in social influence research.

A clear limitation of the current studies is the use of a convenience sample of college students. The samples consisted mainly of young adults who may be limited in their life experiences. To address this limitation, future studies should attempt to replicate and expand the current findings using samples that are more diverse in age and life experiences. Another limitation is that instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability are rare, as the majority of people do not tend to be victims of a major scam or join extremist groups or be so consistently against the idea of being influenced as to cause major problems in their life. Despite this infrequency, the current studies were able to identify promising determinants of both forms of potentially problematic influenceability/anti-influenceability.

Another limitation of the current studies is the use of retrospective self-reports as the outcome measures for influenceability and anti-influenceability. It is possible that reports of past behavior can suffer from bias and accuracy issues. However, it would be difficult to simulate all of the different situations and social dynamics captured in these measures in a laboratory setting or to follow participants and record their behavior in the various situations. As Jaccard (1974) demonstrated, when predicting social behavior from personality traits, using a *multiple act criterion*, where patterns of behavior are collected across several situations can significantly improve predictability. Furthermore, across several studies, Seymour Epstein (1979) concluded that when measures are averaged over several behaviors, that we can “predict most of the people much of the time” (p. 1124).

Implications and Future Directions

Influenceability. The major implication of the current research is that consistent individual differences are related to different forms of influenceability, which can be revealed by examining social influence in a more differentiated manner. Employing a dispositional strategy of investigation, though potentially onerous, can provide valuable insights into the type of person who is more susceptible (or resistant) to particular forms of influenceability.

For instance, the current Study 1, in conjunction with the studies of Robinson and Ickes (2016), provides a description of individuals who report engagement in self-jeopardizing behaviors. These individuals tend to have an external locus of control, rely on others to direct their behavior, have a weak sense of self, and are prone to take on others’ feelings as their own. The people who possess these traits may be more susceptible to persuasion and manipulation because they lack a strong self-identity and an internal guide on how to respond to social

influence, which can result in having their behavior, and even their emotions, being directed by others.

Fortunately, self-jeopardizing influenceability appears to be rare, as the majority of people do not fall victim to major scams and/or join extremist groups. Nevertheless, the consequences can be devastating to the individuals who are vulnerable to such extreme levels of influenceability, as there can be severe adverse short- and long-term effects on an individual's financial security and general well-being. Not only is there the possible physical loss of financial assets, but there can also be negative psychological effects from losing one's autonomy and experiencing the self-doubt that inevitably follows.

Most likely due to the emphasis on investigating situational determinants of influenceability, previous research involving the effects of social influence has been limited to specific self-jeopardizing behaviors, such as binge eating (Crandall, 1988) and suicide rates (Phillips & Carstensen, 1988; Garland & Zigler, 1993). Using a dispositional approach to the study of self-jeopardizing influenceability allows for potential identification and intervention opportunities. For example, because individuals who are prone to self-jeopardizing influenceability tend to seek guidance externally, discovering techniques that can foster a more internal approach could be a way to defend against extreme levels of influenceability. Parks, Becker, Chamberlain, and Crandell (1975) found that a therapeutic workshop designed to eliminate self-defeating behaviors in college students resulted in an increased internal locus of control, even up to four months later. In addition, McIntosh and Rawson (1999) found that a behavior modification program increased internal locus of control for children starting at age 10 (but not younger). Interventions involving the improvement of an internal locus of control could

be provide a strong internal guide for behavior and reduce instances of self-jeopardizing influenceability, particularly if started at a young age.

Unfortunately, research in social influence has tended to focus on the ways in which individuals are influenced and not how vulnerable individuals can resist influence. However, based on indications from sources such as research in social psychology, guides for police interrogators, and interviews with former cult members, Philip Zimbardo has provided advice on how individuals can resist social influence (Andersen & Zimbardo, 1984; Zimbardo, 2008; see <http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide.htm> for an in-depth guide for resisting different forms of influence). Suggestions include acquiring “sensitive skepticism” and critical thinking skills, being mindful, and having self-assurance, among others. In addition, Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, and Serna (2002) found that demonstrating that individuals were vulnerable to manipulation increased resistance to persuasion over simply learning a technique to identify manipulation. Therapeutic interventions that incorporate these components would seem to have the best chance for success. Such an intervention should have a cognitive component that demonstrates how to critically analyze social situations in order to recognize potential persuasion and manipulation, mindful awareness of the dynamics of the current situation, strengthening of individual sense of self and internal control, and a demonstration of how the individual was previously vulnerable to manipulation. Providing the tools to resist self-jeopardizing influenceability can decrease the occurrences and improve the well-being of individuals who are susceptible to manipulation.

Future studies can investigate additional individual differences related to self-jeopardizing influenceability in order to improve both identification of susceptible individuals and the development of potential interventions.

Anti-Influenceability. Another implication of the current research is that the absence of a measured social response should not necessarily be assumed to be the polar end of a single dimension. For example, nonconformity has often been assumed to be the opposite of conformity and measured as the number of times an individual does *not* respond in a conforming behavior. Willis (1965) argues against this “assumption of symmetry,” in which determinants of influenceability are considered to be the same as anti-influenceability, but transposed. This assumption precludes the notion that there are different forms of anti-influenceability.

The intent of the current study in anti-influenceability was to initiate a dispositional investigation into the determinants of the two forms of anti-influenceability: independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability is particularly interesting because of the potential negative life outcomes that can result from being constantly resistant to social influence. Occupational and interpersonal problems can result from such inflexibility.

Based on the results of the current study, individuals who report more engagement in self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability behaviors tend to be male, are high in psychological reactance, and tend to reject authority. Counterintuitively, they also tend to score high in right-wing authoritarianism, which may be because of unmeasured effects of political ideology and/or attitudes resulting from the current sociopolitical environment. Therefore, the relationship between self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability and right-wing authoritarianism should be investigated further.

This description of those who are prone to self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability sounds similar to a disorder often diagnosed in childhood: oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). The

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), describes ODD as a persistent pattern of angry/irritable mood, argumentative/defiant behavior, or vindictiveness. Individuals with ODD are often argumentative and regularly refuse to comply with or actively defy authority. Children diagnosed with ODD are at a greater risk of developing conduct disorder and, later, antisocial personality disorder (Hamilton & Armando, 2008), which is historically difficult to treat. However, intervention at a young age may deter this progression. Support has been found for the use of collaborative problem-solving techniques in children diagnosed with ODD (Greene et al., 2004).

Regarding interventions in adults, a meta-analysis revealed that for individuals high in trait reactance, nondirective treatments that minimize the therapist's authority and advance patient control and self-direction are more effective than directive treatments (Beutler, Harwood, Michelson, Song, & Holman, 2011). Furthermore, Holthouser and Bui (2015) have suggested that a mindfulness-based intervention may be effective with individuals with antisocial personality disorder, a potential extreme result of self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability.

Fransen, Smit, and Verlegh (2015) describe three motivations for resistance to social influence: threats to freedom, reluctance to change, and concerns of deception. Interventions designed to counteract these motivations may be beneficial in reducing resistance to influence. For instance, rational emotive behavior therapy that focuses on irrational beliefs about the inability to trust and rely on others could potentially increase flexibility and reduce the tendency to resist social influence.

Future studies can investigate additional individual differences related to self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability in order to improve both identification of individuals resistant to influence and the development of potential interventions.

Conclusions

Extreme forms of influenceability and anti-influenceability can result in an assortment of negative outcomes for the individuals who possess these characteristics. Dispositional studies can contribute to identifying these individuals. The current Study 1 provided several consistent traits that describe individuals who are prone to three types of influenceability: self-jeopardizing influenceability, susceptibility to peer pressure, and emotional contagion behaviors. The current Study 2 provided an introductory investigation into the types of individuals who are prone to two types of anti-influenceability: independence and self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability. Future studies can build upon the framework identified in these studies, with the goal of intervening prior to the onset of negative long-term consequences. If we can identify ways to make the highly influenceable less compliant and the highly anti-influenceable less defiant, long-term outcomes could become more favorable for these individuals.

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Table 1

Internal Reliability and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Personality Variables

Variables	α	M	SD	Response Range
Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability	.79	1.56	.59	1 - 4
Susceptibility to Peer Pressure	.68	2.02	.70	1 - 4
Emotional Contagion Behaviors	.75	2.86	.61	1 - 4
Social Desirability	.55	3.09	.48	1 - 5
Social Individuation	.72	3.79	.49	1 - 5
Preference for Consistency	.86	3.47	.52	1 - 5
Need to Belong	.82	3.31	.67	1 - 5
Conformity	.73	2.77	.51	1 - 5
Emotional Contagion	.84	3.39	.61	1 - 5
Self-Monitoring	.81	3.68	.47	1 - 5
Locus of Control	.83	3.53	.46	1 - 5
Inner-Other Directedness	.60	0.28	.36	-2 - 2*
Sense of Self	.86	2.81	.69	1 - 5

Note. *No zero point.

Table 2

Bootstrapped Standardized Regression Weights from a Three-factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the Experience With Others Scale

Item	Factor	Estimate	Lower	Upper	<i>p</i>
11	SJI	.73	.66	.80	.002
12	SJI	.64	.54	.72	.001
13	SJI	.58	.48	.66	.001
14	SJI	.66	.57	.74	.002
15	SJI	.65	.55	.73	.002
16	SJI	.58	.47	.67	.001
7	SPP	.41	.32	.50	.001
8	SPP	.75	.67	.81	.001
9	SPP	.56	.47	.64	.001
10	SPP	.69	.61	.76	.001
1	ECB	.56	.45	.65	.001
2	ECB	.76	.67	.83	.002
3	ECB	.54	.43	.64	.001
4	ECB	.50	.40	.60	.001
6	ECB	.65	.56	.73	.001

Note. SJI = Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability, SPP = Susceptibility to Peer Pressure, ECB = Emotional Contagion Behaviors

Table 3

Zero-Order Correlations of the Study 1 Personality and Outcome Measures

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. SJI	—												
2. SPP	.51***	—											
3. ECB	.11*	.17**	—										
4. SD	-.05	-.16**	-.08	—									
5. SI	.02	-.01	.01	-.05	—								
6. Pfc	.08	.10	.20***	.02	.28***	—							
7. NtB	.06	.09	.34**	-.21***	-.06	.25***	—						
8. C	.14*	.02	.20***	-.05	-.18**	.08	.39***	—					
9. EC	.13*	.12*	.63***	.09	.05	.30***	.29***	.21***	—				
10. SM	-.12*	.11	.17**	.05	.22***	.23***	-.02	-.29***	.19**	—			
11. LoC	-.27***	-.12*	-.13*	.20***	.16**	-.02	-.44***	-.68***	-.13*	.40***	—		
12. IOD	-.15**	-.14*	-.01	-.02	.14*	.01	-.26***	-.27***	-.08	.15**	.31***	—	
13. SOS	.16**	.03	.13*	-.21***	.01	-.03	.38***	.43***	.09	-.29***	-.59***	-.08	—

$N = 314$; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. SJI = Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability, SPP = Susceptibility to Peer Pressure, ECB = Emotional Contagion Behaviors, SD = Social Desirability, SI = Social Individuation, Pfc = Preference for Consistency, NtB = Need to Belong, C = Conformity, EC = Emotional Contagion, SM = Self-Monitoring, LoC = Locus of Control, IOD = Inner-Other Directedness, SOS = Sense of Self

Table 4

Regression Summary for the Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability Subscale

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Age	.31	.12	.13	2.48	.014	.02
Need to Belong	-.03	.01	-.12	-1.88	.061	.01
Emotional Contagion	.04	.01	.16	2.88	.004	.02
Locus of Control	-.07	.02	-.24	-3.33	.001	.03
Inner-Other Directedness	-.04	.02	-.11	-1.88	.060	.01
Sense of Self	.02	.01	.07	1.10	.270	.00

Note. $R^2 = .12$

Table 5

Regression Summary for the Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability Subscale Minus Locus of Control

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Age	.30	.13	.13	2.36	.019	.02
Need to Belong	-.02	.01	-.07	-1.15	.249	.00
Emotional Contagion	.04	.01	.16	2.84	.005	.02
Inner-Other Directedness	-.06	.02	-.16	-2.88	.004	.02
Sense of Self	.04	.01	.19	3.29	.001	.03

Note. $R^2 = .09$

Table 6

Regression Summary for the Susceptibility to Peer Pressure Subscale

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Age	1.90	.61	.17	3.11	.002	.03
Gender	0.04	.07	.03	0.54	.588	.00
Social Desirability	-0.30	.08	-.21	-3.83	.000	.04
Preference for Consistency	0.10	.07	.08	1.39	.164	.01
Self-Monitoring	0.16	.08	.11	1.96	.050	.01
Inner-Other Directedness	-0.30	.10	-.16	-2.88	.004	.02

Note. $R^2 = .10$

Table 7

Regression Summary for the Emotional Contagion Behaviors Subscale

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Gender	-.14	.05	-.12	-2.64	.009	.01
Social Desirability	-.13	.06	-.10	-2.28	.023	.01
Social Individuation	-.04	.06	-.03	-0.65	.514	.00
Conformity	.09	.06	.07	1.64	.101	.00
Emotional Contagion	.63	.05	.60	13.06	.000	.30

Note. $R^2 = .44$

Table 8

Regression Summary for the Emotional Contagion Behaviors Subscale Main Effects and Interactions

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Gender	-.13	.05	-.11	-2.45	.015	.01
Social Desirability	-.15	.06	-.11	-2.60	.010	.01
Social Individuation	-.04	.06	-.03	-0.72	.469	.00
Conformity	.10	.06	.08	1.82	.070	.01
Emotional Contagion	.64	.05	.61	13.44	.000	.31
Gender X Social Desirability	-.03	.10	-.01	-0.33	.745	.00
Gender X Conformity	.18	.10	.08	1.88	.062	.01
Social Desirability X Conformity	.06	.11	.02	0.57	.570	.00
Gender X Social Desirability X Conformity	-.62	.17	-.16	-3.59	.000	.02

Note. $R^2 = .47$

Table 9

Moderated Moderation of Conformity (X) on Emotional Contagion Behaviors (Y) Moderated by Gender (M) and Social Desirability (W) Controlling for Social Individuation and Emotional Contagion

Predictor variables and interaction terms	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Gender	-.13	0.06	-2.18	.030
Conformity	.10	0.06	1.67	.096
Conformity X Gender	.17	0.11	1.55	.122
Social Desirability	-.15	0.07	-2.33	.021
Conformity X Social Desirability	.07	0.12	0.57	.569
Gender X Social Desirability	-.03	0.12	-0.25	.801
Conformity X Gender X Social Desirability	-.62	0.20	-3.03	.003
Social Individuation	-.04	0.06	-0.66	.512
Emotional Contagion	.64	0.05	13.23	.000

Note. $R^2 = .47$

Table 10

Component Loadings (Direct Oblimin) of the Anti-Influenceability Scale Items

Item	Pattern Matrix		Structure Matrix	
	Component 1	Component 2	Component 1	Component 2
16	.876	-.211	.769	.235
8	.803	-.045	.781	.364
14	.761	-.052	.735	.336
12	.735	-.060	.704	.314
10	.675	.107	.730	.451
11	.675	.099	.726	.442
9	.547	.202	.649	.480
15	.493	.263	.626	.513
13	.476	.312	.634	.554
4	.393	.374	.584	.574
7	.351	.276	.491	.455
2	-.094	.741	.283	.693
1	-.074	.696	.280	.658
5	.043	.640	.369	.662
3	.159	.602	.465	.683
6	.135	.540	.410	.608

Table 11

Internal Reliability and Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Personality Variables

Variables	α	M	SD	Response Range
Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability	.88	1.55	.58	1 - 4
Independence	.72	2.10	.63	1 - 4
Nonconformity	.61	4.96	.60	1 - 9
Social Desirability	.57	3.14	.49	1 - 5
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.93	2.48	.67	1 - 5
Psychological Reactance	.77	3.05	.54	1 - 5
Cynical Distrust	.80	3.15	.63	1 - 5
Autonomy Independent Goal Attainment	.79	3.78	.50	1 - 5
Autonomy Sensitivity to Others' Control	.65	3.51	.49	1 - 5
Need for Uniqueness	.81	3.66	.42	1 - 5
Authority Behavior	.67	3.01	.36	1 - 5

Table 12

Regression Summaries for Study 2 Demographic Variables on the Three Outcome Measures

Predictor variables	Independence ^a					Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability ^b					Nonconformity ^c				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE_b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE_b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE_b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
<u>Step 1</u>															
Age	-.40	.54	-.04	-0.74	.457	.01	.12	.01	0.11	.916	.03	.52	.00	0.05	.959
Gender	.14	.07	.12	2.17	.031	.06	.01	.24	4.27	.000	.02	.06	.02	0.37	.710
SocioEconomic Status	-.01	.02	-.03	-0.54	.587	.00	.01	.02	0.38	.706	.02	.02	.05	0.81	.421
<u>Step 2</u>															
Age	-.61	.55	-.07	-1.11	.269	-.02	.12	-.01	-0.18	.859	.00	.54	.00	0.00	.997
Gender	.14	.07	.12	2.14	.033	.06	.01	.25	4.30	.000	.01	.07	.01	0.21	.836
SocioEconomic Status	-.03	.03	-.06	-0.94	.350	.00	.01	.03	0.39	.697	.01	.03	.02	0.38	.707
Race_Black	.12	.09	.09	1.34	.181	.03	.02	.09	1.48	.140	-.05	.09	-.03	-0.51	.608
Race_Hispanic	-.05	.07	-.06	-0.79	.433	.00	.02	.00	0.05	.960	-.01	.07	-.01	-0.20	.842
Race_Asian	-.06	.06	-.06	-0.90	.371	-.01	.01	-.04	-0.64	.524	-.02	.06	-.02	-0.31	.761
Race_Other	-.04	.13	-.02	-0.32	.746	-.02	.03	-.03	-0.56	.576	-.13	.13	-.06	-0.99	.325

Notes. ^a Step 1: $R^2 = .02$, Step 2: $\Delta R^2 = .01$; ^b Step 1: $R^2 = .06$, Step 2: $\Delta R^2 = .01$; ^c Step 1: $R^2 = .00$, Step 2: $\Delta R^2 = .01$.

Table 13

Zero-Order Correlations of the Study 2 Personality and Outcome Measures

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Independence	—										
2. Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability	.59***	—									
3. Nonconformity	.21***	.21***	—								
4. Social Desirability	-.22***	-.13*	-.02	—							
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism	-.11	.03	-.48***	.06	—						
6. Psychological Reactance	.39***	.40***	.26***	-.24***	-.15**	—					
7. Cynical Distrust	.24***	.26***	.16**	-.11*	.04	.37***	—				
8. Autonomy Independent Goal Attainment	.12*	.11*	.29***	.13*	-.19**	.19***	.11*	—			
9. Autonomy Sensitivity to Others' Control	.24***	.16**	.21***	-.06	-.15**	.45***	.38***	.42***	—		
10. Need for Uniqueness	.11	.27***	.50***	.05	-.20***	.24***	-.04	.52***	.07	—	
11. Acceptance of Authority	-.23***	-.42***	-.50***	.08	.38***	-.34***	-.23***	-.16**	-.17**	-.49***	—

$N = 321$; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 14

Regression Summary for the Independence Subscale

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Gender	.13	.06	.11	2.19	.029	.01
Social Desirability	-.20	.07	-.15	-2.84	.005	.02
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	-.03	.05	-.03	-0.54	.590	.00
Psychological Reactance	.30	.07	.26	4.14	.000	.04
Cynical Distrust	.08	.06	.08	1.34	.180	.00
Independent Goal Attainment	.06	.09	.05	0.65	.517	.00
Sensitivity to Others' Control	.05	.09	.04	0.58	.562	.00
Need for Uniqueness	-.06	.13	-.03	-0.45	.655	.00
Acceptance of Authority	-.15	.13	-.08	-1.22	.224	.00

Note. $R^2 = .19$

Table 15

Regression Summary for the Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability Subscale

Predictor variables	<i>b</i>	<i>SE b</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>sr</i> ²
Gender	.04	.01	.16	3.23	.001	.02
Social Desirability	-.02	.01	-.07	-1.32	.188	.00
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.04	.01	.21	3.95	.000	.03
Psychological Reactance	.07	.02	.27	4.60	.000	.05
Cynical Distrust	.02	.01	.07	1.24	.217	.00
Independent Goal Attainment	.00	.02	-.01	-0.08	.934	.00
Sensitivity to Others' Control	-.01	.02	-.03	-0.56	.576	.00
Need for Uniqueness	.03	.03	.08	1.15	.251	.00
Acceptance of Authority	-.14	.03	-.33	-5.28	.000	.06

Note. $R^2 = .32$

Table 16

Descriptive Statistics for the Study 2 Personality Variables by Nonconformity Level

Measures	Conformers					Independents					Rebels				
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI Lower	CI Upper	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI Lower	CI Upper	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>SE</i>	CI Lower	CI Upper
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	2.84	.55	.06	2.72	2.95	2.46	.55	.06	2.34	2.58	2.09	.70	.06	1.97	2.20
Psychological Reactance	2.90	.54	.05	2.80	3.00	3.05	.54	.05	2.95	3.15	3.22	.49	.05	3.12	3.33
Cynical Distrust	3.07	.62	.06	2.95	3.19	3.05	.57	.06	2.93	3.17	3.35	.67	.06	3.22	3.47
Independent Goal Attainment	3.69	.45	.05	3.60	3.78	3.68	.41	.05	3.59	3.77	4.00	.51	.05	3.91	4.09
Sensitivity to Others' Control	3.41	.50	.05	3.32	3.50	3.49	.41	.05	3.39	3.58	3.65	.50	.05	3.55	3.74
Need for Uniqueness	2.89	.31	.03	2.82	2.95	2.95	.30	.03	2.89	3.02	3.24	.38	.03	3.18	3.31
Acceptance of Authority	3.60	.33	.03	3.54	3.66	3.43	.29	.03	3.37	3.49	3.26	.32	.03	3.20	3.32
Independence	1.97	.53	.06	1.85	2.09	2.04	.64	.06	1.92	2.16	2.30	.66	.06	2.18	2.42
Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability (log)	1.41 (.13)	.45 (.12)	.06 (.01)	1.30 (.11)	1.52 (.16)	1.55 (.16)	.62 (.15)	.06 (.01)	1.44 (.14)	1.66 (.19)	1.69 (.20)	.60 (.14)	.06 (.01)	1.58 (.18)	1.80 (.23)

Note. *N* = 303; 95% Confidence Interval

Table 17

Univariate F Tests for the Study 2 Personality Measures on Nonconformity Level

DV	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Partial η^2
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	14.21	38.75	2, 300	.000	.21
Psychological Reactance	2.67	9.67	2, 300	.000	.06
Cynical Distrust	2.73	7.12	2, 300	.001	.05
Independent Goal Attainment	3.31	15.62	2, 300	.000	.09
Sensitivity to Others' Control	1.47	6.59	2, 300	.002	.04
Need for Uniqueness	3.67	33.20	2, 300	.000	.18
Acceptance of Authority	2.97	30.18	2, 300	.000	.17
Independence	2.95	7.91	2, 300	.000	.05
Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability (log)	0.12	6.44	2, 300	.002	.04

Table 18

Mean Differences of the Study 2 Personality Measures Between Conformers (C), Independents (I), and Rebels (R)

Measure	Compare	Mean Difference	<i>p</i>	CI Lower	CI Upper
Right-Wing Authoritarianism ^b	C - I	.37	.000	.15	.60
	C - R	.75	.000	.52	.98
	I - C	-.37	.000	-.60	-.15
	I - R	.38	.000	.15	.60
	R - C	-.75	.000	-.98	-.52
	R - I	-.38	.000	-.60	-.15
Psychological Reactance ^a	C - I	-.15	.132	-.33	.03
	C - R	-.33	.000	-.50	-.15
	I - C	.15	.132	-.03	.33
	I - R	-.18	.055	-.35	.00
	R - C	.33	.000	.15	.50
	R - I	.18	.055	.00	.35
Cynical Distrust ^a	C - I	.02	1.000	-.19	.23
	C - R	-.28	.005	-.49	-.07
	I - C	-.02	1.000	-.23	.19
	I - R	-.29	.003	-.50	-.08
	R - C	.28	.005	.07	.49
	R - I	.29	.003	.08	.50
Independent Goal Attainment ^a	C - I	.02	1.000	-.14	.17
	C - R	-.31	.000	-.46	-.15
	I - C	-.02	1.000	-.17	.14
	I - R	-.32	.000	-.48	-.17
	R - C	.31	.000	.15	.46
	R - I	.32	.000	.17	.48

Table 18 —Continued

Measure	Compare	Mean Difference	<i>p</i>	CI Lower	CI Upper
Sensitivity to Others' Control ^a	C - I	-.08	.730	-.24	.08
	C - R	-.24	.001	-.40	-.08
	I - C	.08	.730	-.08	.24
	I - R	-.16	.052	-.32	.00
	R - C	.24	.001	.08	.40
	R - I	.16	.052	.00	.32
Need for Uniqueness ^b	C - I	-.07	.430	-.19	.06
	C - R	-.36	.000	-.48	-.23
	I - C	.07	.430	-.06	.19
	I - R	-.29	.000	-.41	-.17
	R - C	.36	.000	.23	.48
	R - I	.29	.000	.17	.41
Acceptance of Authority ^a	C - I	.17	.000	.06	.27
	C - R	.34	.000	.24	.45
	I - C	-.17	.000	-.27	-.06
	I - R	.17	.000	.07	.28
	R - C	-.34	.000	-.45	-.24
	R - I	-.17	.000	-.28	-.07
Independence ^a	C - I	-.07	1.000	-.28	.14
	C - R	-.32	.001	-.53	-.12
	I - C	.07	1.000	-.14	.28
	I - R	-.25	.010	-.46	-.05
	R - C	.32	.001	.12	.53
	R - I	.25	.010	.05	.46
Self-Jeopardizing Anti-Influenceability (log) ^b	C - I	-.03	.373	-.08	.02
	C - R	-.07	.001	-.12	-.02
	I - C	.03	.373	-.02	.08
	I - R	-.04	.128	-.09	.01
	R - C	.07	.001	.02	.12
	R - I	.04	.128	-.01	.09

Note. A Bonferroni correction has been applied for multiple comparisons; ^a = $p < .05$,

^b = $p < .025$.




Figure 1. Three-factor CFA model with standardized parameter estimates for the Experiences With Others Scale items. CFI = .92; AGFI = .90; RMSEA = .06; NNFI = .90; $\chi^2 = 177.97$, $p < .001$, Bollen-Stine bootstrap $p < .01$.




Figure 2. Three-way interaction of the effect of conformity on emotional contagion behaviors by gender.




Figure 3. Interaction of the effect of right-wing authoritarianism on self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability by acceptance of authority.




Figure 4. Mean right-wing authoritarianism scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 5. Mean psychological reactance scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 6. Mean cynical distrust scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 7. Mean independent goal attainment scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 8. Mean sensitivity to other's control scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 9. Mean need for uniqueness scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 10. Mean acceptance of authority scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 11. Mean independence scores by nonconformity group.




Figure 12. Mean self-jeopardizing anti-influenceability scores by nonconformity group.

APPENDIX A**Study 1 Scales**

**Unless otherwise indicated, the measures have the following directions and are scaled on the following rating scale:

Directions: Please read each of the following statements and indicate the degree to which each statement is true of you. It is important for you to realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are interested in how YOU feel. You are free to decline to answer any question, though declining to answer is considered a response.

Scale: Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Decline to answer

*Items that are reversed scored have an asterisk at the end.

List of Study 1 Scales

1	Demographic Scale	113
2	Social Desirability Scale	115
3	Social Individuation Subscale.....	116
4	Preference for Consistency Scale.....	117
5	Need to Belong Scale.....	118
6	Conformity Scale	119
7	Emotional Contagion Scale.....	120
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9	Internal Control Index.....	122
10	Inner-Other Social Preference Scale	124
11	Sense of Self Scale.....	129
12	Experience with Others Scale	130

1. Demographic Scale

1. In order to ensure that you receive credit for participation, please provide your first and last name. Any identifying information will be removed after credit is awarded and before data analysis begins.

First Name: _____

Last Name: _____

2. What is your age? Please enter the number of years. _____

3. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Decline to answer

4. What best reflects or represents your racial or ethnic background?

White/Anglo-American

Black/African-American

Hispanic/Latino

Asian

Other/Multiracial

Decline to answer

5. Which of the following best describes your father's (or legal guardian's) level of education?

No high school diploma or GED

A high school diploma or GED

Some college or university education but no degree

A two-year degree from a community college or university

A four-year (bachelor's) degree from a college or university

A master's degree from a college or university

A doctoral (Ph.D.) degree from a college or university

Decline to answer

6. Which of the following best describes your mother's (or legal guardian's) level of education?

No high school diploma or GED

A high school diploma or GED

Some college or university education but no degree

A two-year degree from a community college or university

A four-year (bachelor's) degree from a college or university

A master's degree from a college or university

A doctoral (Ph.D.) degree from a college or university

Decline to answer

7. In which of the following ranges is your family's [or your legal guardian's] annual household income?

Less than \$30,000

\$30,000 to \$50,000

\$50,000 to \$70,000

\$70,000 to \$90,000

\$90,000 to \$110,000

\$110,000 to \$130,000

More than \$130,000

Decline to answer

2. Social Desirability Scale (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972)

1. I like to gossip at times.*
2. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.*
3. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
4. I always try to practice what I preach.
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.*
6. At times, I have really insisted on having things my own way.*
7. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.*
8. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
9. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
10. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

3. Social Individuation Subscale (Ickes & Hutchison, 1998)

1. In my interactions with others, I have a clear and definite sense of the difference between my perspective and theirs.
2. It's important to me to have a distinct sense of my own identity and to know how it differs from that of other people.
3. It's easy for me to keep track of what I contribute and what the other person contributes to a discussion.
4. I like to maintain a clear distinction between myself and others when I interact with them.
5. I like to have a clear sense of who I am dealing with, and of how that person is different from me.
6. When I interact with other people, I am aware of the "invisible barrier" that separates us.
7. In conversations with others, I am very aware of the thoughts and feelings I should keep to myself.
8. I tend to stay absorbed in my own thoughts and feelings, even in social situations.
9. As a person, I have clear-cut boundaries and I expect other people to respect them.

4. Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini, Trost, & Newson, 1995)

1. I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate.
2. It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs.
3. Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others.
4. It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do.
5. I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person.
6. Admirable people are consistent and predictable.
7. The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world.
8. It bothers me when someone I depend upon is unpredictable.
9. I don't like to appear as if I am inconsistent.
10. I get uncomfortable when I find my behavior contradicts my beliefs.
11. An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.
12. I typically prefer to do things the same way.
13. I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions.
14. I want my close friends to be predictable.
15. It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.
16. I make an effort to appear consistent to others.
17. I'm uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent.
18. It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent. *

5. Need to Belong Scale (Leary, et al., 2013)

1. If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me. *
2. I try hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject me.
3. I seldom worry about whether other people care about me. *
4. I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need.
5. I want other people to accept me.
6. I do not like being alone.
7. Being apart from my friends for long periods of time does not bother me. *
8. I have a strong need to belong.
9. It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans.
10. My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not accept me.

6. Conformity Scale (Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995)

1. I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others.
2. I would be the last one to change my opinion in a heated argument on a controversial topic.*
3. Generally, I'd rather give in and go along for the sake of peace than struggle to have my way.
4. I tend to follow family tradition in making political decisions.
5. Basically, my friends are the ones who decide what we do together.
6. A charismatic and eloquent speaker can easily influence and change my ideas.
7. I am more independent than conforming in my ways.*
8. If someone is very persuasive, I tend to change my opinion and go along with them.
9. I don't give in to others easily.*
10. I tend to rely on others when I have to make an important decision quickly.
11. I prefer to make my own way in life rather than find a group I can follow.*

7. Emotional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997)

Never
Rarely
Usually
Often
Always
Decline to answer

1. If someone I'm talking with begins to cry, I get teary-eyed.
2. Being with a happy person picks me up when I'm feeling down.
3. When someone smiles warmly at me, I smile back and feel warm inside.
4. I get filled with sorrow when people talk about the death of their loved ones.
5. I clench my jaws and my shoulders get tight when I see the angry faces on the news.
6. When I look into the eyes of the one I love, my mind is filled with thoughts of romance.
7. It irritates me to be around angry people.
8. Watching the fearful faces of victims on the news makes me try to imagine how they might be feeling.
9. I melt when the one I love holds me close.
10. I tense when overhearing an angry quarrel.
11. Being around happy people fills my mind with happy thoughts.
12. I sense my body responding when the one I love touches me.
13. I notice myself getting tense when I'm around people who are stressed out.
14. I cry at sad movies.
15. Listening to the shrill screams of a terrified child in a dentist's waiting room makes me feel nervous.

8. Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolf, 1984)

1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for.
2. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.
3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.
4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.
5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.
6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.
7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.
8. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.
9. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.*
10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.
11. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.
12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.*
13. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.

9. Internal Control Index (Duttweiler, 1984)

Rarely
Occasionally
Sometimes
Frequently
Usually
Decline to answer

1. When faced with a problem I ____ try to forget it.*
2. I ____ need frequent encouragement from others for me to keep working at a difficult task.*
3. I ____ like jobs where I can make decisions and be responsible for my own work.
4. I ____ change my opinion when someone I admire disagrees with me.*
5. If I want something, I ____ work hard to get it.
6. I ____ prefer to learn the facts about something from someone else rather than have to dig them out for myself.*
7. I will ____ accept jobs that require me to supervise others.
8. I ____ have a hard time saying "no" when someone tries to sell me something I don't want.*
9. I ____ like to have a say in any decisions made by any group I'm in.
10. I ____ consider the different sides of an issue before making any decisions.
11. What other people think ____ has a great influence on my behavior.*
12. Whenever something good happens to me, I ____ feel it is because I've earned it.
13. I ____ enjoy being in a position of leadership.
14. I ____ need someone else to praise my work before I am satisfied with what I've done.*
15. I am ____ sure enough of my opinions to try to influence others.
16. When something is going to affect me, I ____ learn as much about it as I can.
17. I ____ decide to do things on the spur of the moment.*
18. For me, knowing I've done something well is ____ more important than being praised by someone else.
19. I ____ let other peoples' demands keep me from doing things I want to do.*
20. I ____ stick to my opinions when someone disagrees with me.
21. I ____ do what I feel like doing, not what other people think I ought to do.

22. I ____ get discouraged when doing something that takes a long time to achieve results.*
23. When part of a group, I ____ prefer to let other people make all the decisions.*
24. When I have a problem, I ____ follow the advice of friends or relatives.*
25. I ____ enjoy trying to do difficult tasks more than I enjoy trying to do easy tasks.
26. I ____ prefer situations where I can depend on someone else's ability rather than just my own.*
27. Having someone important tell me I did a good job is ____ more important to me than feeling I've done a good job.*
28. When I'm involved in something, I ____ try to find out all I can about what is going on even when someone else is in charge.

10. Inner-Other Social Preference Scale (Kassarjian, 1962)**Directions:**

A number of controversial statements or questions with two alternative answers are given below. Answer every item as it applies to you.

Some of the alternatives may appear equally attractive or unattractive to you. Nevertheless, please make a real attempt to choose the alternative that is relatively more acceptable to you.

It is important for you to realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are interested in how YOU feel. You are free to decline to answer any question, though declining to answer is considered a response.

Scale:

- Agree with A (1)
- Strongly agree with A (2)
- Agree with B (-1)
- Strongly agree with B (-2)
- Decline to answer

1. With regard to partying, I feel*

- a. the more the merrier (25 or more people present);
- b. it is nicest to be in a small group of intimate friends (6 or 8 people at most).

2. If I had more time

- a. I would spend more evenings at home doing the things I'd like to do;
- b. I would more often go out with my friends.

3. If I were trained as an electrical engineer and liked my work very much and would be offered a promotion into an administrative position, I would*

- a. accept it because it means an advancement in pay which I need quite badly;
- b. turn it down because it would no longer give me an opportunity to do the work I like and am trained for even though I desperately need more money.

4. I believe that*

- a. it is difficult to draw a line between work and play and therefore one should not even try it;

- b. one is better off keeping work and social activities separated.
5. I would rather join*
- a. a political or social club or organization;
 - b. an organization dedicated to literary, scientific or other academic subject matter.
6. I would be more eager to accept a person as a group leader who
- a. is outstanding in those activities which are important to the group;
 - b. is about average in the performance of the group activities but has an especially pleasing personality.
7. I like to read books about*
- a. people like you and me;
 - b. great people or adventurers.
8. For physical exercise or as a sport I would prefer*
- a. softball, basketball, volleyball, or similar team sport;
 - b. skiing, hiking, horsebackriding, bicycling, or similar individual sport.
9. With regard to a job, I would enjoy more
- a. one in which one can show his skill or knowledge;
 - b. one in which one gets in contact with many different people.
10. I believe*
- a. being able to make friends is a great accomplishment in and of itself;
 - b. one should be concerned more about one's achievements rather than with making friends.
11. It is more desirable*
- a. to be popular and well-liked by everybody;
 - b. to become famous in the field of one's choice or for a particular deed.
12. With regard to clothing*
- a. I would feel conspicuous if I were not dressed the way most of my friends are dressed;
 - b. I like to wear clothes which stress my individuality and which not everybody else is wearing.
13. On the subject of social living
- a. a person should set up his own standards and then live up to them;
 - b. one should be careful to live up to the prevailing standards of the culture.
14. I would consider it more embarrassing

- a. to be caught loafing on a job for which I get paid;
 - b. losing my temper when a number of people are around of whom I think a lot.
15. I respect the person most who*
- a. is considerate of others and concerned that they think well of him/her;
 - b. lives up to his/her ideals and principles.
16. A child who has had intellectual difficulties in some grade in school
- a. should repeat the grade to be able to get more out of the next higher grade;
 - b. should be kept with his age group though he has some intellectual difficulties.
17. In my free time
- a. I'd like to read an interesting book at home;
 - b. I'd rather be with a group of my friends.
18. I have*
- a. a great many friends who are, however, not very intimate friends;
 - b. few but rather intimate friends.
19. When doing something, I am most concerned with
- a. "what's in it for me" and how long it will last;
 - b. what impression others get of me for doing it.
20. As leisure-time activity I would rather choose
- a. woodcarving, painting, stamp collecting, photography, or similar activity;
 - b. bridge or other card game, or discussion groups.
21. I consider a person most successful when
- a. he can live up to his own standards and ideals;
 - b. he can get along with even the most difficult people.
22. One of the main things a child should be taught is*
- a. cooperation;
 - b. self-discipline.
23. As far as I am concerned*
- a. I am only happy when I have people around me;
 - b. I am perfectly happy when I am left alone.
24. On a free evening
- a. I like to go and see a nice movie;
 - b. I would try to have a television party at my (or a friend's) house.

25. The persons whom I admire most are those who
- are very outstanding in their achievements;
 - have a very pleasant personality.
26. I consider myself to be
- quite idealistic and to some extent a "dreamer";
 - quite realistic and living for the present only.
27. In bringing up children, the parents should*
- look more at what is done by other families with children;
 - stick to their own ideas on how they want their children brought up regardless of what others do.
28. To me it is very important
- what one is and does regardless of what others think;
 - what my friends think of me.
29. I prefer listening to a person who
- knows his subject matter real well but is not very skilled in presenting it interestingly;
 - knows his subject matter not as well but has an interesting way of discussing it.
30. As far as I am concerned
- I see real advantages to keeping a diary and would like to keep one myself;
 - I'd rather discuss my experiences with friends than keep a diary.
31. Schools should*
- teach children to take their place in society;
 - be concerned more with teaching subject matter.
32. It is desirable*
- that one shares the opinions others hold on a particular matter;
 - that one strongly holds onto his opinions even though they may be radically different from those of others.
33. For me it is more important to
- keep my dignity (not make a fool of myself) even though I may not always be considered a good sport;
 - be a good sport even though I would lose my dignity (make a fool of myself) by doing it.

34. When in a strange city or foreign country I should have no great difficulty because
- a. I am interested in new things and can live under almost any conditions;
 - b. people are the same everywhere and I can get along with them.
35. I believe in coffee breaks and social activities for employees because*
- a. it gives people a chance to get to know each other and enjoy work more;
 - b. people work more efficiently when they do not work for too long a stretch at a time and can look forward to special events.
36. The greatest influence upon children should be*
- a. from their own age group and from educational sources outside the family since they can be more objective in evaluating the child's needs;
 - b. from the immediate family who should know the child best.

11. Sense of Self Scale (Flury & Ickes, 2007)

1. I wish I were more consistent in my feelings.
2. It's hard for me to figure out my own personality, interests, and opinions.
3. I often think how fragile my existence is.
4. I have a pretty good sense of what my long-term goals are in life.*
5. I sometimes wonder if people can actually see me.
6. Other people's thoughts and feelings seem to carry greater weight than my own.
7. I have a clear and definite sense of who I am and what I'm all about.*
8. It bothers me that my personality doesn't seem to be well defined.
9. I'm not sure that I can understand or put much trust in my thoughts and feelings.
10. Who am I? is a question that I ask myself a lot.
11. I need other people to help me understand what I think or how I feel.
12. I tend to be very sure of myself and stick to my own preferences even when the group I am with expresses different preferences.*

12. Experience with Others Scale (Robinson & Ickes, 2016)

No, never
Yes, once
Yes, more than once
Yes, often
Decline to answer

1. Have you talked with a friend who was really angry at someone, and found yourself being just as angry at that person as your friend was?
2. Have you felt stressed after being with friend or family member who was experiencing a stressful situation?
3. Have you cried because a friend or family member was crying?
4. Have you ever become really excited because someone you were with was excited?
5. Have you been in a situation in which one of your friends found something so funny that he or she laughed until tears came, and you started doing that too?
6. Have you spent time with a friend or family member who was depressed, and come away from that situation feeling depressed yourself?
7. Have you been caught up in the “party atmosphere” of a large group of celebrators, so that you left the party feeling much better than when you came?
8. Have you drunk too much because the people you were with were drinking heavily?
9. Have you been talked into doing something by a friend or acquaintance that got you into trouble?
10. Have you been talked into doing something by a friend or acquaintance that you both knew was probably illegal, knowing that there was very little chance that you would be caught?
11. Have you been talked into signing a purchase order or a sales contract that you later decided was designed to take advantage of you?
12. Have you given in to pressure to donate more time or money to a charity or non-profit organization than you actually felt comfortable contributing?
13. Have you given in to the implied pressure or expectation to be physically intimate with someone when you really didn't want to?

14. Have you been persuaded to support a social cause or a political group that required much more from you than you actually felt comfortable giving?
15. Have you been the victim of con artist or a scam situation in which someone promised you something, took your money, and then gave you little or nothing in return?
16. Have you been persuaded to join and support a religious group or organization that you soon decided was not a good place to be?

Subscales:

Emotional Contagion Behaviors = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

Susceptibility to Peer Pressure = 7, 8, 9, 10

Self-Jeopardizing Influenceability = 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

Note. Item 5 was dropped after confirmatory factor analysis.

APPENDIX B**Study 2 Scales**

**Unless otherwise indicated, the measures have the following directions and are scaled on the following rating scale:

Directions: Please read each of the following statements and indicate the degree to which each statement is true of you. It is important for you to realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are interested in how YOU feel. You are free to decline to answer any question, though declining to answer is considered a response.

Scale: Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Decline to answer

*Items that are reversed scored have an asterisk at the end.

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1. Demographic Scale

1. In order to ensure that you receive credit for participation, please provide your first and last name. Any identifying information will be removed after credit is awarded and before data analysis begins.

First Name: _____

Last Name: _____

2. What is your age? Please enter the number of years. _____

3. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Decline to answer

4. What best reflects or represents your racial or ethnic background?

White/Anglo-American

Black/African-American

Hispanic/Latino

Asian

Other/Multiracial

Decline to answer

5. Which of the following best describes your father's (or legal guardian's) level of education?

No high school diploma or GED

A high school diploma or GED

Some college or university education but no degree

A two-year degree from a community college or university

A four-year (bachelor's) degree from a college or university

A master's degree from a college or university

A doctoral (Ph.D.) degree from a college or university

Decline to answer

6. Which of the following best describes your mother's (or legal guardian's) level of education?

No high school diploma or GED

A high school diploma or GED

Some college or university education but no degree

A two-year degree from a community college or university

A four-year (bachelor's) degree from a college or university

A master's degree from a college or university

A doctoral (Ph.D.) degree from a college or university

Decline to answer

7. In which of the following ranges is your family's [or your legal guardian's] annual household income?

Less than \$30,000

\$30,000 to \$50,000

\$50,000 to \$70,000

\$70,000 to \$90,000

\$90,000 to \$110,000

\$110,000 to \$130,000

More than \$130,000

Decline to answer

2. Social Desirability Scale (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972)

1. I like to gossip at times.*
2. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.*
3. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
4. I always try to practice what I preach.
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.*
6. At times, I have really insisted on having things my own way.*
7. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.*
8. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
9. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
10. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

3. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 2006)

1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.*
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.*
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.*
7. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.*
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.*
10. The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.*
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way things are supposed to be done."*
14. God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
15. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

16. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.*
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.
18. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.*
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family values.*
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.

4. Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (Revised; Hong & Faedda, 1996)

1. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me.
2. I find contradicting others stimulating.
3. When something is prohibited, I usually think "that's exactly what I am going to do."
4. I consider advice from others to be an intrusion.
5. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions.
6. It irritates me when someone points out things which are obvious to me.
7. I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted.
8. Advice and recommendations induce me to do just the opposite.
9. I resist the attempts of others to influence me.
10. It makes me angry when another person is held up as a model for me to follow.
11. When someone forces me to do something, I feel like doing the opposite.

5. Cynical Distrust Scale (Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989)

1. No one cares much what happens to you.
2. It is safer to trust nobody.
3. I think most people would lie to get ahead.
4. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.
5. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage rather than lose it.
6. Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.
7. I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing something nice to me.
8. Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them.
9. When a man is with a woman he is usually thinking about things related to her sex.

6. Autonomy Scale from the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale (Bieling, Beck, & Brown, 2000)

1. It is more important that I know I've done a good job than having others know it. ^a
2. It bothers me when people try to direct my behavior or activities. ^b
3. I prize being a unique individual more than being a member of a group. ^a
4. If I think I am right about something, I feel comfortable expressing myself even if others don't like it. ^a
5. It is more important to meet your own objectives on a task than to meet another person's objective. ^a
6. I am not influenced by others in what I decide to do. ^a
7. It is very important that I feel free to get up and go where ever I want. ^b
8. It is more important to be active and doing things than having close relationships with other people. ^b
9. If a goal is important to me I will pursue it even if it may make other people uncomfortable. ^a
10. When I achieve a goal I get more satisfaction from reaching the goal than from any praise I might get. ^a
11. I prefer to make my own plans, so I am not controlled by others. ^b
12. It is more important to get a job done than to worry about people's reactions. ^a
13. I don't like to answer personal questions because they feel like an invasion of my privacy. ^b
14. When I have a problem, I like to go off on my own and think it through rather than being influenced by others. ^b
15. In relationships, people often are too demanding of each other. ^b
16. I set my own standards and goals for myself rather than accepting those of other people. ^a
17. I enjoy accomplishing things more than being given credit for them. ^a
18. I feel confined when I have to sit through a long meeting. ^b
19. I don't like people to invade my privacy. ^b
20. The possibility of being rejected by others for standing up for my rights would not stop me. ^a

Independent Goal Attainment ^a = 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20

Sensitivity to Others' Control ^b = 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19

7. Need for Uniqueness Scale (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977)

1. When I am in a group of strangers, I am not reluctant to express my opinion publicly.
2. I find that criticism affects my self-esteem. *
3. I sometimes hesitate to use my own ideas for fear that they might be impractical.*
4. I think society should let reason lead it to new customs and throw aside old habits or mere traditions.
5. People frequently succeed in changing my mind. *
6. I find it sometimes amusing to upset the dignity of teachers, judges, and “cultured” people.
7. I like wearing a uniform because it makes me proud to be a member of the organization it represents.*
8. People have sometimes called me “stuck-up”.
9. Others’ disagreements make me uncomfortable.*
10. I do not always need to live by the rules and standards of society.
11. I am unable to express my feelings if they result in undesirable consequences.*
12. Being a success in one’s career means making a contribution that no one else has made.
13. It bothers me if people think I am being too unconventional.*
14. I always try to follow rules.*
15. If I disagree with a superior on his or her views, I usually do not keep it to myself.
16. I speak up in meetings in order to oppose those whom I feel are wrong.
17. Feeling “different” in a crowd of people makes me feel uncomfortable.*
18. If I must die, let it be an unusual death rather than an ordinary death in bed.
19. I would rather be just like everyone else than be called a “freak.”*
20. I must admit I find it hard to work under strict rules and regulations.
21. I would rather be known for always trying new ideas than for employing well-trusted methods.
22. It is better to agree with the opinions of others than to be considered a disagreeable person.*
23. I do not like to say unusual things to people.*
24. I tend to express my opinions publicly, regardless of what others say.
25. As a rule, I strongly defend my own opinions.

26. I do not like to go my own way.*
27. When I am with a group of people, I agree with their idea so that no arguments will arise.*
28. I tend to keep quiet in the presence of persons of higher ranks, experience, etc.*
29. I have been quite independent and free from family rule.
30. Whenever I take part in group activities, I am somewhat of a nonconformist.
31. In most things in life, I believe in playing it safe rather than taking a gamble.*
32. It is better to break rules than always to conform with an impersonal society.

8. Authority Behavior Inventory (Rigby, 1987)

Never
Rarely
Occasionally
Frequently
Very Frequently
Decline to answer

1. Do you listen attentively to what older people say about how you should behave?
2. Do you question the judgment of umpires or referees when you think they have made an incorrect decision?*
3. When a person in authority whom you trust tells you to do something, do you do it, even though you can't see the reason for it?
4. Do you criticize people who are rude to their superiors?
5. Do you encourage young people to do what they want to do, even when it is against the wishes of their parents?*
6. When you go to work, do you dress so as to be acceptable to the people who run the place?
7. Do you treat experts with respect even when you don't think much of them personally?
8. Do you support left-wing, radical policies?*
9. Do you take part in demonstrations to show your opposition to policies you do not like?*
10. Do you express approval for the work of school teachers?
11. Do you go to church?
12. Do you make fun of the police?*
13. When things are bad, do you look for guidance from someone wiser than yourself?
14. Do you sympathize with rebels?*
15. When you are in a hurry, do you break the speed limit or encourage your driver to do so, if it seems reasonably safe?*
16. Do you follow doctor's orders?
17. Do you question what you hear on the news?*
18. Do you cross the road against the pedestrian traffic lights?*
19. Do you ask for a "second opinion" when you feel uncertain about a doctor's advice?*

20. Do you stand when they play the National Anthem in public?
21. Do you express contempt for politicians?*
22. Do you get annoyed when people sneer at those in authority?
23. Do you show special respect for people in high positions?
24. Do you speak up against your boss or person in charge when he or she acts unfairly?*

9. Nonconformity Scale (Smith, 1967)

100%	75	50	25	0	25	50	75	100%
Disagree completely		Disagree moderately		Neutral		Agree moderately		Agree completely

1. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.*
2. I find it difficult to get rid of a salesman.*
3. I am generally cynical about members of the opposite sex.
4. I trust people in most ways.*
5. People all behave the same because they are afraid to be different.
6. The only way to show that you are an individual today is to perform the unusual or unacceptable act.
7. There is less need to take risks once one has lived past the early, troubled years.*
8. I think I am about average in my political, religious, and social beliefs.*
9. Science must have as much to say about moral values as religion does.
10. Most people would be happier if they lived more with their fellows and did the same things.*
11. I prefer team games to games in which one individual competes against another.*
12. Humiliating experiences bother me.*
13. It bothers me if people think I am being too unconventional or odd.*
14. The unfinished and the imperfect often have greater appeal for me than the completed and polished.
15. I don't act rude, even when doing so would discourage irritating people.*
16. A group in which people disagree will be an ineffective group.*
17. The wise person gives up adventurous schemes once he has reached a mature age.*
18. One should be quite careful so as not to appear foolish.*
19. I believe you should ignore other people's faults and try to get along with almost everyone.*
20. I suspect people who seem very friendly upon first meeting them.
21. Most laws today are so insulting to a person that they deserve to be broken.

22. Persons who cling to the old ways are almost invariably afraid of new policies and ideas.
23. It might be better to legalize the use of drugs and narcotics.
24. There is practically never an excuse for officially banning a book.
25. I like to fool around with new ideas although they often turn out to have been a waste of time.
26. A drunken woman is no more disgraceful than a drunken man.
27. Some of my friends think that my ideas are impractical and even a bit wild.
28. I don't care if people think I'm eccentric.

Note. Scaled towards nonconformity (opposite of original).

10. Anti-Influenceability Scale

No, never
Yes, once
Yes, more than once
Yes, often
Decline to answer

1. Have you resisted well-intentioned advice because you tend to evaluate what people tell you with a dose of skepticism?
2. Have you missed out on an opportunity because you thought it sounded “too good to be true”?
3. Have you been ostracized by others because you voiced an unpopular opinion?
4. Have you had a falling out with a relative or friend because you refused to listen to their advice?
5. Have you spoiled what would otherwise have been a pleasant social occasion by refusing to go along with what the other people wanted to do?
6. Have you decided not to get involved in a romantic relationship that you later realized would have been really good for you?
7. Have you refused to participate in a practice common in your work or school environment because you felt that it was somehow a violation of your personal integrity?
8. Have you been expelled from a group for taking a position that was unacceptable to the other group members and refusing to "give an inch"?
9. Have you found yourself arguing with superiors when they disagree with your ideas?
10. Have you had disputes with a teacher or manager for refusing to follow orders?
11. Have you created conflict at work or school for insisting that the right way to do things was not the way that your manager or teacher wanted them done?
12. Have you alienated a friend or co-worker by criticizing his or her lifestyle when it was at odds with your own beliefs?
13. Have you had issues with other people that they have attributed to your unwillingness to change?

14. Have you lost a substantial amount of money because you refused to take a friend's advice that you were making a poor purchase decision?
15. Have you damaged a friendship or a romantic relationship by being too unwilling to compromise, even on issues that were more important to the other person than they were to you?
16. Have you been fired from a job for violating workplace policies and procedures?

Subscales:

Independence = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6

Anti-Influenceability = 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

Note. Items 4 and 7 were dropped after principal components analysis.