MODERN EUROPEAN CULTURE AND THE MAKING OF *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL*

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Modern European Culture and the Making of Beyond Good and Evil offers a historical picture of nineteenth-century European culture by means of examining one of its chief artifacts, Friedrich Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, in effect "seeing" European culture through Nietzsche's "most dangerous book." *Beyond Good and Evil* contained Nietzsche's clearest attack on the foundations of what will be called "national imaginaries," decisive historically for cultural changes, shooting questions about both the "nation" and those "clinging" to it. Likewise, the book also provided an analysis of the emergent "supranational" peoples of Europe that were in need of a transnational cultural community, Nietzsche having asked whether imagined national communities could be relieved by the fact that "*Europe wants to become one*." This discussion suggests an approach to the question of what it would be for Europe to "become one" in Nietzsche's sense, by way of the study of nineteenth-century European culture and one influential historical actor's relationship with it.

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INTRODUCTION

This discussion is about more than Nietzsche's life or philosophy. It is a response to John Richardson's suggestion that to understand what Nietzsche was up to one had to understand the "historical sense" of his projects. For Richardson, the necessity of doing so is merited by Nietzsche's "[insistence] that [philosophical] issues themselves, as well as the concepts, positions, and arguments by which philosophy addresses them, are all essentially historical, [. . .] not just in the obvious sense that they arise and develop through time."[1] Of course, this poses a dilemma: "If we think 'historically' in the way Nietzsche wants us to," Richardson asked, "how will we study him?"[2] The assumption, then, is that in learning about the complexity and scope as well as the very human dispositions of one intensely brilliant European intellectual, one can arrive at some generalizations about the late-nineteenth-century European intellectual experience. As such, this is a discussion focused on changes in European culture rather than attempting, in the words of Mark Anderson, at "telling the same story of Nietzsche's life." Nietzsche here plays the role of a high-profile historical actor from which much can be learned as much about specific topics taken up by cultural historians as any economic or social structures in ways that are both pertinent and refreshing.

The field of cultural history has become the product of a variety of approaches to resolving issues about the connections between intellectual and social historical approaches. As Lynn Hunt

[1] John Richardson, "Nietzsche Studies as Historical Philosophizing," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 49, no. 2 (Autumn 2018): 273.
[2] Richardson, "Nietzsche Studies as Historical Philosophizing," 271-2.

has pointed out, since the 1960s there has been a serious push toward accounting for the everyday life of the average historical actor, in addition to how such an actor imbued their world with meaning. The data of such an approach, so-called *mentalité*s, have been conceived in different ways over the last fifty-plus years. This discussion proposes another interpretive paradigm of this brand of cultural history: what may be called *immanental history*. Cultural historians of the last century have been correct to stress that "[words] did not just reflect social and political reality; they were instruments for transforming reality," and that therefore individuals' senses of their world depended on the way they represented it.[3] For this reason, cultural artifacts like books have been particularly handy in the construction of a historical picture about *mentalité*s, the "stuff" of everyday life. Since texts are paradigm cases of representations, cultural historians have set to work on such constructions by fleshing out leads in a given text. But while constructing a historical world of lived experience can be a productive framework for bridging the gap between intellectual and social histories, there are severe limitations to wholesale textualism in the construction of the world of the past.

One such limitation is that it does little to no explaining of what it was like to be an embodied human subject, to be a *living*, conscious nineteenth-century European, often presupposing human phenomenology to be of less importance than the relationship between texts and those who created them. In other words, so-called "new cultural historians" of Europe have often elevated literary or anthropological approaches without many if any concessions about *what it was like to be a European*. Lynn Hunt is correct that words were often instruments for transforming reality, as it was certainly true of late-nineteenth-century Europe, when words began to play a role in the development of "national imagined communities." Words, then, were important for designating

[3] See Lynn Hunt, "Introduction," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1989.

the meaning of certain spaces. Indeed, by 1850 the urban transformation of physical spaces in Europe begot new nomenclatures, in addition to new sociopolitical structures, and foregrounded major historical developments well before 1900. But space is historically significant not only in a physical but a phenomenological sense: following Ian Tyrell, it will be assumed therefore that transnational spaces are both physical as well as ideological, where the former places concrete limitations on the latter, in effect producing the type, number, and quality of ideological spaces. Still, as Anthony Mora has argued, if it is true that space is socially constituted, then the converse must also be true. Thus, if spaces are to be cashed out in phenomenological and not only physical terms, then the meanings that individuals imbued into spaces were themselves both influenced by and constitutive of what is "immanent" to human subjective experience.

Where does Nietzsche fit in terms of this "immanental" interpretation? Compared to other European intellectuals later in the nineteenth century — figures like the biologist Charles Darwin, historian Hippolyte Taine, or economists like Karl Marx or Eugen Dühring — Nietzsche's work of the 1880s often displayed a sensitivity to how human experience, often in the form of linguistic patterns, both described and inscribed itself onto spaces in multiply realizable ways. Nowhere is this more apparent than in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche's scope expanded from a focus on comparing Greek and German national cultures to a transnational culture and the "good European," is a book concerned with the limits of perspectives that privilege the recorded history of states over that of migration patterns as the center of our understanding of human habitation and movement, thereby opting to capture a historical picture of Europe's intellectual, social, and political trends throughout the nineteenth century to better analyze their consequences for the history of European culture. For example, the problem Nietzsche's chapter "Peoples and Fatherlands" exploited illustratively a tension in the relationship between thought and society, with

diagnoses of European culture that can be read as critical accounts of how human beings thought differently in relation to their locations. Thus, “People and Fatherlands” is an example of how *Beyond Good and Evil* represented many local and national cultural arrangements across Europe. But if cultural historians are to rely on pure reconstruction from the text of *Beyond Good and Evil*, then they commit the same sorts of mistakes as Nietzsche scholars, who, like intellectual historians, have proven deeply concerned with the historical context of Nietzsche’s ideas. Unfortunately, the historical relationships drawn out in Nietzsche scholarship only assume the verisimilitudes of his biographers and tend to relegate most of the historical context far into explanatory backgrounds by their readings of his work.

As such, Nietzsche scholars typically neglect Nietzsche as a historical figure and his works, hence, as historical objects or artifacts. If an analysis of the profound historical influences on Nietzsche’s thought and output is restricted only to the biographical framework, then many of the questions surrounding Nietzsche’s place in modernizing European societies can easily be overlooked as much by Nietzsche scholars as by cultural historians who prefer a textual approach to constructing a coherent picture of the past. Both neglect the fact that Nietzsche was once a living, embodied being. In attempting to depict historical people’s minded and physical worlds, one is confronted immediately with several related questions: namely, those about the constraints on any attempt to understand the protean environmental cues anteceding historical human actions and how historians might draw out measurements for these historical pressures. By posing such questions, this discussion seeks to demonstrate Nietzsche’s own point that thinking is an action, and, like all actions, thoughts ought to be understood as themselves embedded in a social milieu of other actions, thus subject to varied historical forces. Embodied subjective experience is one of

those historical forces, and how physical spaces were so experienced during the nineteenth century set many of the conditions for the development of ideological spaces.

With the relationship between space and subjective experience in view, this discussion aims to analyze the ways that nineteenth-century European culture was as much a product of its intellectuals and societies as either were the product of it. There are three assumptions that assist this aim. First, the relationship between space and subjective experience suggests that individuals acted in any of a various set of networks, social or intellectual. In Nietzsche's case, his participation in intellectual networks at Leipzig, Basel, Tribschen, Sorrento, and Rome had all influenced significantly Nietzsche's thinking by late 1885, when he set to work on *Beyond Good and Evil* inside of a small bedroom in a small Alpine Swiss village called Sils-Maria. Thus, throughout the following discussion, there will be an emphasis on the exchange of ideas within these networks as marks of the developmental changes in Nietzsche's ideological space. The second assumption comes with a caveat: while Nietzsche's social circles and exchanges, including those within the former and the ideas facilitating the latter, comprise the immanent *mentalités* to be analyzed, the discursive content within the former that conditioned the latter had not been removed from broader social forces. When Nietzsche entered into local cultural networks in Leipzig or Tribschen, both of which influenced tremendously his intellectual interests, the concerns and interests of network members were always articulated amidst rapidly changing social and aesthetic backgrounds. This means that to understand more about the changes and developments in Nietzsche's ideological space, it is important to get a clear picture of the changes in intellectual society, both in general as well as in more particular European sites.

Finally, this discussion supposes "methodological nationalism," the view that nation-states are the natural analytic units of historical analysis, to be false at some tier of description. Rather,

following Benedict Anderson, it will be assumed that nation-states are constructed at the intersection of language and subjective experience and are, therefore, one outcome of the dynamic, constructive relationship between the social and the individual among others. As Ian Tyrell has explained, "National identities have been defined in relation to other identities, including transnational phenomena than impinge upon the nation as it is constructed and reconstructed repeatedly. Transnational history historicizes and denaturalizes the nation."[4] But perhaps this is where the choice of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* runs up against some difficulties. How, after all, is it possible to perform the analysis outlined above and reject methodological nationalism? More specifically, how is it possible to reconcile Nietzsche's use of words like "German," "British," "French," etc. with a rejection of methodological nationalism? One can respond that these terms functioned not as natural or political categories but as what François Laruelle has called "first names." The character of nation-states is determined by how they are constructed or how they affect ideological spaces over time, becoming first names by shoving those spaces into the constitution of what Anderson has called an imagined national community. This process treats ideological space under the conditions levied by the construction of a national imaginary, although it may be articulated by certain constructs, the nation-state being one of those constructs, but also certain adjectives like "German," "French," "British," and "Italian."

Beyond Good and Evil contained Nietzsche's clearest attack on the foundations of national imaginaries, hoping to help invent the "good European" by taking stock of conceptual bases of national imaginaries captured by first names. In this book, Nietzsche shot questions at these bases — the "nation" and those "clinging" to it — exploring the national imaginaries constitutive of German, French, and English national communities, where national imaginaries were decisive for

[4] Ian Tyrell, "Reflections on the transnational turn in United States history: theory and practice," *Journal of Global History* 4, No. 3 (2009): 474.

changes in European culture throughout the nineteenth century. The book also provided an analysis of the emergence of "supranational" peoples in need of an equally transnational cultural community, Nietzsche having asked whether imagined national communities could be relieved by the fact that "*Europe wants to become one*." This discussion suggests an approach to the question of what it would be for Europe to "become one" in Nietzsche's sense, by way of the study of nineteenth-century European culture.

What follows is divided into three chapters, beginning in Chapter 1 with Nietzsche's analogy between the music of Richard Wagner and the German national imaginary. For Nietzsche, the Germans had been paradigmatic for the study of national imaginaries. His own lineage and associations, his earlier cultural nationalism and Wagnerian ethical idealism, and the expansion of Prussian imperialism during his student years ought to leave no question for Nietzsche's decisions to begin his study of national imaginaries where he had most clearly experienced it. Music, throughout Nietzsche's argument about the cultural consequences of nation-state construction, was taken to be a primary mark of imagined national communities, in addition to broader changes in society and culture. By the 1870s, Wagner's music had become a fixture in the German national imaginary, a development Nietzsche worked to bring about before his encountered at Wagner's Bayreuth Festival some troubling truths about his icon. Nietzsche's diagnosis of Wagner's "hyper-German" creative output, he wrote, had been motivated by Nietzsche's having heard "once again and for the first time" the overture to Wagner's 1867 *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*. For Nietzsche, the opera had represented a desire to create a music that was "something German in the best and worst sense," as "a magnificent, overladen, heavy and late art which has the pride to presuppose for its understanding that two centuries of music are still living [. . .] This kind of music best expresses what I consider true of the Germans: they are of the day before yesterday and the

day after tomorrow – they have as yet no today."[5] The music of Wagner had reflected the desire to lend such a cultural foundation to the German national imaginary. Thus, by analyzing Wagner's music, Nietzsche had attempted a critique of the German national imaginary, within which he could discern not a solid empirical or cultural foundation but only formlessness and obscurity. Is there, Nietzsche asked, no national foundation or essence for or of Germans?

Chapter 2 examines Nietzsche's membership in transnational intellectual networks based in "southern spaces" — primarily Sorrento and Rome. It begins by tracing the connection between Nietzsche's changing thought and his participation in these networks. Southern spaces formed spatial nodes that played as much a role in the construction of Nietzsche's ideological space as much as in the production of political subjectivities. Many historians have followed E.P. Thompson into an interpretation of communal practice as a set of forces that produce political subjectivities. As Nietzsche travelled in southern spaces, he had no doubt been confronted with this aspect of nineteenth century urban life. Andrew and Lynn Hollen Lees have argued that cities at the time formed stages for a *bellum pro imperio*, or political (collectivist) struggles, that comprised the major force in the construction of political subjectivities. But if what commentators Robin Small, Dirk R. Johnson, Rebecca Bamford, and others have suggested Nietzsche's shifting thought is true, then this limits what can be said about the scope of political subjectivity during the nineteenth century. Rather than engage in political contests, Nietzsche used southern spaces to develop techniques for excluding himself from the political context of society. In this sense, Nietzsche was what Oliver Zimmer has called a "free-floating individual." For Zimmer, cities had been decked with a variety of social formations, political associations being just one example of these formations. In fact, many of what Patryk Babiracki has called "space explorers" lived and

[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin), § 240.

worked often outside the boundaries of the Italian national imaginaries, existing as Mae M. Ngai's "impossible subjects." These individuals often developed strategies of self-exclusion from the *bellum pro imperio* of urban life. For Nietzsche, his philosophical "experimentalism" was developed as such a strategy to avoid the "great relapses" resultant of a strong national imaginary. Understanding Nietzsche, then, requires raising the question of how different spatial contexts might have interacted with any given set of national conceptions; by understanding Nietzsche's space explorations, Zimmer's imago can be polished: namely, by helping locate individuals that constructed ideological spaces outside of political (collectivist) interactions and struggles. This, it will be suggested, is troubling for cultural histories of Europe that rest on E.P. Thompson's assumptions about crowd behavior and the production of political (collectivist) subjectivities. While many people did in fact construct ideological spaces along political or collectivist lines, this was anything but universally the case, as Nietzsche's life and work evince.

During this "middle period," Nietzsche was influenced mightily by research in the natural sciences. By the time he arrived at Sils-Maria with the intention of writing *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche's attitude had shifted from the sharply scientific to the historical. The last part of the book, "From High Mountains: Epode," is filled with allusions to how Alpine spatial distribution and relative isolation had profound effects for the construction of an ideological space: "For you have I set my table at the highest height — who lives so near the stars as I, or so near the depths of the abyss." In Sils-Maria, Nietzsche felt himself becoming a "wicked huntsman" who bow had been focused on the changes in European culture throughout the nineteenth century. Chapter 3, therefore, first demonstrates that Sils-Maria, with its autarkic, pastoral culture, fed into Nietzsche's idea that the construction of ideological space could be a necessarily self-exclusive enterprise, applying corollary arguments, present in previous chapters, to get clearer about the history of

modern European morality as the product of massive social and cultural changes. Understanding the former, it will be suggested, means better understanding the latter. The chapter closes by comparing the historiographical method of *Beyond Good and Evil* with other historical or historicist methods prevalent across Europe in the course of the nineteenth-century. Nietzsche disagreed with what he called the "histrionics" of his contemporaries, in turn substituting their primary historical explanantia with his own explanans — what he called "will to power." While many Nietzsche scholars have offered various interpretations of what constitutes Nietzsche's "will to power," often tending toward a radical metaphysical interpretation, it will be argued that the concept was a heuristic device developed to explain an entire field of historical changes that can be traced back as far as one is interested. History, following Nietzsche, will be assumed history of the "will to power."

I

"What I Consider True of the Germans"

This chapter aims to establish how Nietzsche's analogy between the German national imaginary and the music of Wagner are sustained not only by the broader thought espoused in *Beyond Good and Evil* but also by the young Nietzsche's own philosophical, aesthetic, and political dispositions as they were taken to task later in his life as too interconnected with the academics, newspaper editors, and publishers during a time of massive industrial urbanization across the continent. Beginning with his student years at the University of Leipzig, the chapter moves through Nietzsche's favored Leipzig's cultural spaces to an analysis of the culture of Wagner's Tribschen villa on Lake Lucerne, particular attention will be paid to how these spaces were sites from which disseminated many ideas for a cultural basis for their imagined German community. It will be argued that Nietzsche's turn from his earlier thought cannot be removed from the context of these ideas or efforts to act on them.

NIETZSCHE'S LEIPZIG

Nietzsche arrived at the University of Leipzig in the mid-1860s, as Leipzig's urban landscape was in deep flux due to rapid technological, social, and cultural changes. Whereas before the 1820s, the guilds were at the forefront of Leipzig's culture and society, this began to change. The granting of unprecedented economic freedom by the German territories dramatically altered the social structure of civic life; in part, these fortunes were brought about by robust print or press

industries. According to Benedict Anderson, the press had played among the strongest of roles in "[laying] the bases for national consciousness,"[6] as illustrated in the "print-languages" of the newspapers proliferating across Europe. As readerships increased, Anderson has argued, so too had "the embryo of the nationally imagined community."[7] Publishers, Anderson would have said, simply fixed the parameters of acceptable language for print, helping to "build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation."[8] In effect, the rise of the print industries led to the declination of several local dialects across the Continent. Still, Anderson reminded, "the fixing of print-languages and the differentiation of status between them were largely unselfconscious processes resulting from the explosive interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic diversity," becoming "formal models to be imitated [and] consciously exploited in a Machiavellian spirit."[9] Thitherward, amongst all of these "print-languages," the greatest impulse had been those of nationalists. What Anderson called "national print-languages" could have "[worked] from invisible models provided by their distant [. . .] and not so distant predecessors."[10] The newspapers, moreover, fixed exclusive popular beliefs about local and global culture and society.

Indeed, Leipziger society by midcentury had been driven by the print industry. Throughout the middle decades, Leipzig's "print-languages" were the product of new government policies that either explicitly funded some newspapers, like the *Leipziger Zeitung*, or implicitly provided funds but had not exercised as strong an influence, which had been particularly appealing to middle-class liberals. Historian Abigail Green has pointed out how the Saxon government "[combined] the

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[6] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: *Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983/2016), 44.
[7] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Ibid.
[8] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Ibid.
[9] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 45
[10] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 67

official *Dresdner Journal* with the semi-official *Leipziger Zeitung*" while also "[exercising] systematic influence in the local press through granting monopolies of local government advertising."[11] This united print-language, in turn, helped shape transparency about both public affairs and the public sphere as the press, in principle, sought to exercise greater independence. In 1857, the Saxon minister von Beust had sought to "intensify the ties between the government departments and the official *Dresdner Journal*," in turn specifying the "terms of the changing climate of the political press."[12] When the liberal opposition newspaper the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* had, by 1856, established its slogan "independent and free-thinking," Beust considered their maneuvering a "barometer of the popular mood."[13] Although he preferred the Saxon government not "enter into a debate about government measures and principles in the press," Beust understood that the rise of the middle-class and its independent press demanded a different approach: "the government has no means of stopping the independent press from criticizing government affairs, the only question is: whether the government will leave the power of the press exclusively in the hands of the opposition, or attempt to use it to defend its own position in turn."[14]

By the 1860s, it was clearer than before that a growing middle-class readership meant that Leipzig publications had to accommodate the interests of the general public.[15] If this were to be the means to establish an imagined national community through print-languages, then the public demand for transparency and access to information had to be allowed its due influence on government policy. Elsewhere, Green has written about how for the editor of the *Leipziger Zeitung* the success of opposition newspapers had been due to their news reporting: "Arguably, indirect

[11] Abigail Green, *Fatherlands State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 157-8
[12] Green, *Fatherlands*, 164.
[13] Green, *Fatherlands*, ibid.
[14] Green, *Fatherlands*, ibid.
[15] Green, *Fatherlands*, 167

press influence was in fact the most effective way for governments to shape the wider political climate. [. . .] This was certainly the view of Professor Bulau, editor of the official Saxon newspaper[.]"[16] For Professor Bulau, the minutiae of news reporting often attested to the power of the independent liberal press.[17] Consequently, the Saxon government launched a campaign to disseminate pro-government news through the opposition press. Already in the late 1850s, the editor of the official Saxon *Dresdner Journal* listed a wide range of newspapers which reprinted news from the paper: among them the liberal Leipzig paper the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Green has concluded from this that "the possession of classified information gave governments a certain amount of leverage in their dealings with the press."[18] This was doubly so for Leipzig's newspaper culture, where the local government hoped to that increasing readership of the *Leipgizer Zeitung* would soon displace opposition news sources.[19] This was realized by the mid-1860s, by which time the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* had boasted a readership subscription count of over 1,000, and the *Leipziger Zeitung* boasted a count nearly double that of Hanover's *Zeitung fur Norddeutschland* (about 3,000), leading Bulau to claim that the *Leipziger Zeitung* was "so important precisely because a great many of its readers never see any other newspaper."[20]

The importance of the University of Leipzig was embellished by the dominance of the publishing and book trade. Leipzig boasted the most publishing houses and booksellers in all the German duchies, principalities, or states by the time Nietzsche arrived at the university, whose history throughout the nineteenth century is bound to that of philanthropic endowments, since philanthropy and higher education were never odd bed-fellows in the German territories:

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[16] Green, *Fatherlands*, 153-4
[17] Green, *Fatherlands*, ibid. See also Abigail Green, "Intervening in the Public Sphere: German Governments and the Press, 1815-1870," *The Historical Journal* 44, no. 1 (2001): 168.
[18] Green, "Intervening in the Public Sphere," 169.
[19] Green, "Intervening in the Public Sphere," 173.
[20] Green, "Intervening in the Public Sphere," Ibid.

endowments dated back to the late Middle Ages, and Leipzig's endowments were themselves established beginning in the fifteenth century. Though the increase in the number of endowments had been disrupted in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, the years after 1815 witnessed an "unparalleled growth" in university endowments; given increased demand for professionals or experts, "conflicts over the composition" of the German *intelligentsia*, and with an economic boom during the 1820s and 30s, philanthropic participation "well exceeded" the peaks of the 14- and 1500s.[21] Between the university's founding in 1479 till 1800, 56 endowments for scholarships were created annually, with 447,018 marks in assets; throughout the nineteenth century, however, more than 80 were, with assets valued at over 1.2 million marks, 2.5 times that at the University of Bonn, where Nietzsche had studied previously.[22]

The headlong growth of industry had rapidly created a new middle class during the 1850s and 60s, and the subsequent increase in Leipzig's population meant an increase in the demand for the services of doctors, lawyers, teachers, concert-masters, and others; this, in turn, led to a steady expansion of other middle-class professions; the university's history is, thus, also bound to these developments. "To be middle-class," wrote Richard J. Evans, "was also to boast a degree of education above the mere command of literacy, preferably with a high school, university or professional qualification; to engage in associational, public and charitable life; and to command sufficient income to possess, or more frequently on the Continent to rent a well-furnished house or apartment in a salubrious suburb." Social rank, he concluded, was "won not by title or descent but by hard work, probity, lifestyle, and the outward manifestation of 'respectability'."[23] The expansion of technical and other kinds of expertise in Saxony required a proportionate expansion

[21] Thomas Adam, *Philanthropy, Civil Society, and the State in German History* (Rochester: Camden House, 2016), 49-50.
[22] Adam, *Philanthropy, Civil Society, and the State*, 51-2
[23] Richard J. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815-1914* (London: Penguin), 325.

in the number of experts. The number of German university students nearly doubled between the 1820s and 40s; between 1830 and 1860, about one-third enrolled in German universities to study theology, about another one-third to study law, another one-third to study either medicine or humanistic subjects, and about one-twentieth to study the natural sciences.[24] This meant finding oneself "on the breadline and, just as bad, without a prospect for a job after graduating."[25] Fortunately, Nietzsche's connections managed to help secure modest, peaceful lodgings on the Blumengasse, at an affordablemonthly rate of 3 thalers, where he would discover Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* in the "antiquarian bookstore owned by the landlord."[26]

Given the unmitigated rise in the ranks of the middling sorts, whether working- or professional class, historians have been forced into a necessary dichotomy between elite and middle-class senses of culture. Andrew and Lynn Hollen Lees have made this case for the study of urban history. Because of the fluidity of these senses of culture, "the urban scene reflected a complex multitude of fault lines," therefore "[historians] need to distinguish between elite culture and mass culture, paying close attention to differences with regard to the social class of intended audiences." Still, they hastened to add that "variations among classes were accompanied by important differences within social classes too."[27] But this had hardly an effect on local urban elites until the middle of the nineteenth century, at which point "a good case can be made that popular culture served a compensator function, providing pleasures that helped ordinary city dwellers to reconcile themselves to the conditions under which they lived."[28]

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[24] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 495.
[25] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 187.
[26] Roger Hollingrake, *Nietzsche, Wagner and the Philosophy of Pessimism* (New York: Routledge, 1982/2016), 164.
[27] Andrew Lees and Lynn Hollen Lees. *Cities and the Making of Modern Europe*: *1750-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 207.
[28] Lees and Lees, *Cities and the Making of Modern Europe*, ibid.

Anthony J. La Vopa has argued that without a national governing structure, German universities "played a central role in the creation of public opinion and gave it a distinctly academic coloration." One of the ways the university maintained social cohesion was in the professional assessment of the past. And because the university's history is bound to that of scholarship endowments, it "might be the constitutive element or a major obstacle" to public life.[29] Moreover, the first half of the nineteenth century was an era in Leipzig when "schoolmen made both the diagnosis and therapy central to their professional ideology."[30] In 1807, Friedrich Jacobs "extolled the quest for a 'spiritual antiquity'" that only philology and other historical disciplines.[31] His influence had reverberated throughout educated Leipzig spaces.

Few scholars have attempted to place Nietzsche within this philological tradition. Biographers tell the same story here: Nietzsche's decision to pursue philology at Leipzig was due to his relationship with the work of Friedrich Ritschl, his professor back at the University of Bonn. Anthony K. Jensen, has expressed skepticism about this "biographical error," which presumes that Nietzsche's philology "would have been aligned with his mentor and set in contradistinction to Jahn" and that "Nietzsche's subsequent criticism of the field would have been directed against the sort of scholarship embodied by his chosen mentor Ritschl"; but "even in Nietzsche's most hostile invective against the field his target was never Ritschl."[32] Ritschl studied at Leipzig under Gottfried Hermann, whose expertise was in Plautus; given Nietzsche's disinterest in Plautus, Jensen has argued, it could not have been the catalyst of the decision to arrive in Leipzig. "At the same time,"

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[29] Anthony J. La Vopa, "Specialists Against Specialization: Hellenism as Professional Ideology in German Classical Studies," in *German Professions, 1800-1950*, eds. Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 29.
[30] La Vopa, "Specialists Against Specialization," 31.
[31] La Vopa, "Specialists Against Specialization," 33.
[32] Anthony K. Jensen, "Friedrich Ritschl, Otto Jahn, Friedrich Nietzsche," *German Studies Review* 37, no. 3 (2014): 530.

Jensen wrote, "Ritschl tried to maintain a personal loyalty to his teacher and to both the strict methods and the fierce mistrust of metaphysics taught by Hermann at Leipzig."[33] But while this is certainly part of the story, Nietzsche's letters make it clear that he had been equally motivated to maintain the grand tradition of Leipzig philology following the decline in the status of the university's philology department after Hermann's death, and his faith in Ritschl as a "new academic star" doubled down on his loyalties.[34]

While Jensen's argument can be made to square with La Vopa's, neither fully accounts for the rising interest in science and technology at the university, whose philosophy department employed physicists and encouraged interest in natural science.[35] Already in the 1750s, Johann Heinrich Winkler and Christian August Hausen began Leipzig's first research program into electromagnetism, Karl Friedrich Hindenburg advanced the efficiency of hydraulic systems, and Christian Samuel Weiss mastered unheard-of techniques in applied geometrics and achieved a level of academic dignity paralleled by few others in educated society. Weiss would eventually leverage his reputation against the university, securing the inauguration of an annual research grant of 198 thalers.[36]

Already in the nineteenth century, physics professors had contributed not only to educated society but also to the cultural sphere of Leipzig. Ludwig Wilhelm Gilbert became editor of the leading German journal for physics; then Heinrich Wilhelm Brandes famously petitioned the King of Saxony to build a new research facility. The Physical Institute at the University of Leipzig was finally completed under the tenure of Gustav Theodor Fechner, whose main aim, according to

[33] Jensen, "Friedrich Ritschl, Otto Jahn, Friedrich Nietzsche," ibid.
[34] Curtis Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 50.
[35] Wolfgang Schreier, and Karl-Heinz Schlote, "The Physical Tourist: Physics in Leipzig: An Amble Through the Centuries," *Physical Perspectives* 10 (2008): 225.
[36] Schreier and Schlote, "The Physical Tourist," 227.

historians, was to "investigate on the basis of physics the 'exact relationship between the body and the mind'." It was Fechner, in conjunction with Ernst Heinrich Weber, that established what is now heralded as the Weber-Fechner law.[37] In 1843 Wilhelm Eduard Weber became physics professor at the university, and for nearly a decade his research on electromagnetism was world-renowned; in 1846, he introduced what shortly became the paradigm explanation for electromagnetic phenomena. Three years later, Wilhelm Gottlieb Hankel became physics professor, a position he held for over two decades. According to historians, Hankel is known primarily "for advocating the construction of a separate building for the Physical Institute, which was built in 1873."[38] Indeed, the influence of scientific discourse in educated Leipziger society had also been a serious factor in Nietzsche's decision to attend the University of Leipzig.

Denise Phillips's recent investigation of the conceptual role *Wissenschaft* played in modern German society has had interesting consequences for scholarship: "Historians," she points out, "have a long tradition of treating *Wissenschaft* as the primary conceptual peculiarity that marked off German-speaking intellectual life from other language traditions throughout the nineteenth century."[39] In Leipzig, as elsewhere in German territories, it was not the concept of *Wissenschaft* but of *Naturwissenschaft* that became a crucial component in academic discourse, highlighting the cultural-political dimension of the rise of this discourse. In the eighteenth century, the Economic Society of Leipzig began collecting information and helped build up collections of specimens, physical instruments, and climate data.[40] For this reason, popular conceptions of *Naturwissenschaft* remained largely alien from other European conceptions of natural science;

[37] Schreier and Schlote, "The Physical Tourist," 228.
[38] Schreier and Schlote, "The Physical Tourist," 232
[39] Denise Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature: Defining Natural Science in Germany, 1770-1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 6.
[40] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 36.

when other of these "nature-researching societies," such as the Leipzig Linnaean Society, embraced a model that utilized the rising print industry in order to dispense standards of respectability as a cornerstone of scientific identity, "[advertising] the collective scientific resources of their city within a landscape full of competing centers,"[41] By the nineteenth century, "learned reputation" in Leipzig contributed to this rise of an elite *Naturforscher* ("friend of nature") in the urban imagination, a notion which Phillips has argued by appeal to local cultural politics: "a new general science of nature appeared when [the concept of] the *Naturforscher* appropriated a central value of a new, emerging bourgeois public culture and cast their science in its image."[42] This rhythm, like that of other aspects of "intellectual sociability" in Leipzig, helped shape Nietzsche's early perception of cultural Leipzig.[43]

Founded as part of the university in 1818, Leipzig's Nature-Researching Society had been constituted mostly by members of the growing middle class, much like the Natural-Scientific Medical Society in Dresden.[44] By the 1830s, however, the Nature-Researching Society's membership began to include successful publishers, which would become, in Phillips's words, "important allies to cultivate for those whose reputation depended on their access to the printed word." Of the Society's members, 40% were by this time "involved in commerce, printing, or finance."[45] At midcentury, *Naturwissenschaft* was by and large a tool of social and cultural prestige, where culture had come to have been dominated by members of the middle class.

Antje Pieper has shown that during the second half of the century aristocratic culture had a decidedly smaller impact on the public mind, as ties between middle-class culture and notions of

[41] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 37, 24.
[42] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 150.
[43] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 100.
[44] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 101.
[45] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, ibid.

respectability produced a type of music concomitant with middle-class commitments. Some aesthetic discoveries, Pieper's reasoning goes, could not alter significantly middle-class culture, citing the limited influence of Arthur Schopenhauer's works among educated Leipzigers. Rather, strong middle-class culture demanded art of a certain type, which in turn demanded a stronger relationship between culture and politics. The most influential musical publication in Central Europe, the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik*, was able to meet both domestic and foreign demand while also offering to help specify music's importance to the new, educated middle class.[46] For the journal's founder, Robert Schumann, the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik* was founded, above all, to battle with the degraded musical taste of Berlin and Leipzig.[47] The hegemony of Parisian piano music outraged Schumann and his colleagues at the journal, and their most important reason for founding it was to combat this hegemony.[48] The *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik* emerged, at least to one historian, as "a rostrum from which Schumann and his colleagues could expose all who corrupted music and musical taste in Germany."[49] In this regard, the journal symbolized for Schumann a place where "through printed and spoken word" musicians could exercise a "direct influence" via this public medium for "[expressing] what he has seen with his own eyes, and felt in his own spirit, [. . .] in which he could defend himself against one-sided and false criticism."[50] Leon Plantinga has argued that Schumann's journal was unique primarily for its drive toward "partisan, but progressive" approach toward "seeking to enlighten rather than to entertain"; this drive put the journal in greater touch with extramusical journals in Germany.[51] And Schumann's extramusical appeals connected the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik* to the growing literary movements

[46] Pieper, ibid., 76-8.
[47] See Leon Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 16.
[48] See Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic*, 21.
[49] See Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic*, 22.
[50] Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic*, 23.
[51] Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic*, 47.

in Germany, particularly the Young Germanists and other pan-Germanic movements dissatisfied with the state of German culture since 1848.[52] Often, Schumann's views of music by the local concert-master, Felix Mendelssohn, cut against that of other critics: "[at] least until the early 1840s," Plantinga wrote, "criticism of Mendelssohn in Germany and England was an unbroken litany of superlatives," as "contemplated, never criticized."[53] For his part, Schumann offered a more nuanced idea of Mendelssohn: namely, as an accomplished composer "whose music, always finely crafted, sometimes tends toward excessive facility, and often seems excessively dependent upon models from an earlier time [. . .], who was brought up like a musician of the eighteenth century, and this was reflected in a certain removal from the dominant trends of his own time."[54]

Felix Mendelssohn was concert-master of Leipzig's Gewandhaus Orchestra from 1835 till 1847, and he later appeared in *Beyond Good and Evil* as a "halcyon master" as well as "the beautiful *intermezzo* of German music," embodying middle-class cultural respectability at a time witness to intense levels of bourgeois philanthropic participation in the arts. In fact, Leipzig was proud of its Gewandhaus Orchestra, the first "founded in the German-speaking world without the benefit of aristocratic or court patronage," and financed by subscriptions from bourgeois patrons.[55] Mendelssohn's association with Leipzig's burgeoning middle class had made him indispensable to the town's concert-going public, for whom he was a token representative of the classical ideal. Thus, since he served primarily to lend an imagined community its cultural complacency, his achievements were inevitably consequential for Leipziger society. In 1845, Schumann's recent successor at the journal, Franz Brendel, remarked that Mendelssohn had proven a "representative

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[52] Plantinga, *Schumann as Critic*, 48-9.
[53] Leon Plantinga, "Schumann's Critical Reaction to Mendelssohn," in *Mendelssohn and Schumann: essays on their music and its context*, eds. John W. Finson and R. Larry Todd (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984), 18.
[54] Plantinga, "Schumann's Critical Reaction," 19.
[55] Adam, *Philanthropy, Civil Society, and the State*, 23-4; see also Celia Applegate, *Music and German National Identity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

of classicism," and "for that reason he is not an expression of the present time in its entirety, least of all of future trends."[56] By contrast, Schumann's music had been that "of a younger generation" with Schumann himself "[coming] close to the objectivity of the opposite movement, perhaps even unconsciously influenced by external factors and his residence of classical Leipzig."[57]

After selling the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik* to Franz Brendel in 1844, Schumann's relationship with the journal had been tumultuous. "Many of the musicians who had been regular contributors throughout Schumann's time," Jürgen Thym has remarked, "had been replaced by correspondents who were firm in their partisanship for the Wagnerian cause."[58] By the 1850s, the journal lost its major competitor, the *Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung*, gaining a sizeable monopoly over musical opinion-making in Leipzig. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche described Leipziger musical society's having had with Schumann sunk "into a merely national affair" during this time:

> The 'good old days' are gone, in Mozart they sang themselves out [. . .] Alas, some day it will all be gone – but who can doubt that understanding and taste for Beethoven will be gone first! – for Beethoven was only the closing cadence of a transition of style and stylistic breach and not, as Mozart was, the closing cadence of a great centuries-old European taste. Beethoven is the intermediary between an old mellow soul that is constantly crumbling and a future over-young soul that is constantly *arriving*; upon his music there lies that twilight of eternal loss and eternal extravagant hope – [. . .] Whatever German music came afterwards belongs to romanticism, that is to say a movement which was, historically speaking, even briefer, even more fleeting, even more superficial than that great interlude, that transition of Europe from Rousseau to Napoleon and the rise of democracy. [. . .] All this music of romanticism was, moreover, insufficiently noble, insufficiently musical, to maintain itself anywhere but in the theater and before the mob; it was from the very first second-rate music

[56] Jürgen Thym, "Brendel's Neue Zeitschrift Fur Musik," in *Mendelssohn and Schumann: essays on their music and its context*, eds. John W. Finson and R. Larry Todd (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984), 33.
[57] Thym, "Brendel's Neue Zeitschrift Fur Musik," Ibid.
[58] Thym, "Brendel's Neue Zeitschrift Fur Musik," 29-30.

> to which genuine musicians paid little regard. It was otherwise with Felix Mendelssohn [. . .] who was [. . .] speedily honored and just as speedily forgotten [. . .] But as for Schumann [. . .] Schumann was already merely a *German* event in music, no longer a European event, as Beethoven was, as to an even greater extent Mozart had been – in him German music was threatened with its greatest danger, that of losing *the voice for the soul of Europe* and sinking into a merely national affair.[59]

At the dawn of the 1850s, small cafes became unofficial musical spaces in Leipzig; simultaneously, however, with the rise of the ideas proffered either by the emerging sciences at the university or the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik*, along with their associated social networks, the city was alit with and primed for Prussian nationalistic fervor as Bismarck's *kulturkampf* neared. With Robert Schumann, Nietzsche had observed correctly the broader European trend toward domestic music, and this turn led to the rise of a national musical print-language imitated across Germany during the editorship of Franz Brendel. The aristocratic patronage that had sustained the composers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Leipzig, along with elsewhere in Europe, was no longer available by mid-century, at least not on such a scale as before; although the music of Ludwig van Beethoven, Carl Maria von Webern, and Felix Mendelssohn were celebrated in public spaces, musical life in some respects retreated into private spaces, and all this by the time Nietzsche took to his first concert-going assignment at the Leipzig Staadttheater early in November 1868, where he "[saw] a play by our future director Heinrich Laube, and sat like enthroned Olympians in the gods, and in judgment on a potboiler called *Graf Essex*." For Leipzig's changing public sphere, aesthetic gestures were no longer enough wholly detached from either particularist or nationalist politics.

[59] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 245

In 1868, Nietzsche was introduced to the Leipzig professor Hermann Brockhaus, Friedrich Karl Biedermann, and eventually Richard Wagner. He wrote to a friend named Erwin Rohde on October 8 of "an extremely various year, a year full of warm emotion and of uneasy emotion, full of ascetic and eudaimonistic experiences, a year begun in the stables, continued in the sick bed, ended in indicificatory slave labor: now as I count up this year's good moments, lovely hopes, quiet hours of thought." He continued:

> I am expected in Leipzig, and a notice in the daily paper seeks an "elegant" bachelor's apartment for a scholar. Our good acquaintances there have all mounted ladders of fame: I, poor *homo literatus*, must think first of all about getting a degree, so as to avoid being counted among the *pecus* of *Literaten*. Moreover, I am deciding to become more of a society man: in particular, I have my sights on a woman of whom people tell me marvels, the wife of Professor Brockhaus, sister of Richard Wagner, of whose capacities friend Windisch (who has visited me) has an astonishingly high opinion. What pleases me about this is the confirmation of Schopenhauer's theory of heredity; Wagner's other sister (in Dresden, an actress) is also said to be a remarkable woman. The Brockhauses are almost the only family with whom the Ritschls are friendly.

Since the summer of 1868, Ernst Windisch had been helping Nietzsche find a place to rent by posting advertisements in the local papers. Eventually, Nietzsche ended up at the Lessingstrasse mansion of liberal publisher Friedrich Karl Biedermann for an astonishing 4 ½ thalers per month.[60] Biedermann was the editor of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*; among the many guests who frequented the drawing- and dining-rooms of the Lessingstrasse mansion included politicians, journalists, and authors.[61] Before long, Biedermann had hired Nietzsche as an arts correspondent

[60] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 80-2.
[61] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 83.

for his liberal opposition newspaper, gaining the latter access into local cultural politics in the process.[62]

Previously, Leipzig's premier cultural spaces had been constructed or reconstructed to build upon the restoration of a mythic German past, but by the 1850s, that picture began captivated fewer and fewer Leipzigers. James Walker's completion of the Leipzig-Dresden rail line in 1835, had dramatic consequences for Leipzig culture. For both societies, an artist was to have mirrored the ethos and aspirations of the public sphere. But different notions of culture presaged a difference in the expectations placed upon the artist. In Leipzig, traditional, classical values were those that demarcated between good and bad instrumental music, and they also determined the role and expectations of the artists and concert-masters. Nietzsche's social life was dominated by the cultural milieus of both university and musical spaces, and Leipzig's musical spaces, which both provided the largest congregational spaces within which its own cultural politics played out and aided to universalize middle-class cultural conventions, in turn serving as nodes of public confirmation. According to Sanna Pederson, A.B. Marx's criticisms against Berlin's musical life were set amidst the backdrop of a juxtaposition with Leipzig's "reputation as a serious educated city for music"; the city's musical spaces housed "twice as many concerts a season (twenty-four) as did Moser (twelve)," demonstrating "concern, absent in Berlin, about balancing their cultivation of the masterworks with new symphonies."[63] Moreover, Philipp Ther has shown how Central European musical spaces became "sites of social integration," in addition to "political and national functions."[64] "Space," according to Ther, "allotted audience behavior."[65] Because of rapid

[62] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 84-5.
[63] Sanna Pederson, "A.B. Marx, Berlin Concert Life, and German National Identity," *19th-Century Music* 18, no. 2 (1994): 100-1.
[64] Philipp Ther, *Center Stage: Operatic Culture and Nation Building in Nineteenth-Century Central Europe* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2014), 19.
[65] Ther, *Center Stage*, 10.

transfers to and from Dresden, the aesthetic foundations of culture Leipzig had combined with the musical preferences, they reached as far as to affect audiences' political sentiments.[66] While both Leipzig's and Dresden's public spaces were designed in line with the cultural ideology of their urban elites, and the visual features of the concert halls thus reinforced the kind of music performed, and even though the spatial distribution of the theaters differed, cultural formations followed a dissimilar pattern in Leipzig, where merchant concerts held at coffee houses became mainstays of middle-class culture in Leipzig; soon concert halls and coffee houses allowed an increasing middle class began to socialize with or alongside nobility and other urban elites, "with greater expectations for repertoire and civil behavior."[67] But while the musical spaces of Leipzig were perceived at the forefront of musical innovations according to far off admirers in Berlin, they remained publicly sites of high culture. Except for intermittent performances of Wagnerian overtures in from either Dresden or Munich, works of the *Neudeutsche Schule* were little performed in Saxony.[68] New music was not granted a permanent status within the Leipziger concept of middle-class *Kultur* as "monumentalized" during the 1840s and 50s. Throughout the 1850s and 60s, Beethoven's works were performed six times per season, Schuman's three or four times, with one or two performances each for the works of Franz Joseph Haydn, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, and Felix Mendelssohn.[69]

In November 1868, Nietzsche met Hermann Brockhaus, a Leipzig philology professor and son of a famed publisher, and his wife Ottilie, the sister of the composer Richard Wagner. The Brockhauses' salon was the site for radical political and aesthetic discourse, frequented not only by Wagner or one of his growing Leipziger coterie but by the writer Alexander Herzen, anarchist

[66] See Ther, *Center Stage*, 204.
[67] Ther, *Center Stage*, ibid.
[68] Ther, *Center Stage*, ibid.
[69] See Pieper, *Music in the Making of Middle-Class Culture*, 147.

Mikhail Bakunin, and novelist Ivan Turgenev; aesthetic discourse was dominated by the philosophy of Schopenhauer, whose work Nietzsche had admired for at least a year. He also met Wagner in the Brockhauses' salon that month. According to Nietzsche, Wagner had been "persona non grata" in Leipzig society due to his participation in the events surrounding 1848/9: on May 3, 1848, Wagner, then Court music director at Dresden, busied himself "making hand grenades and looking out for the Prussian army from the top of the Frauenkirche." Disappointed with the ruinous monumentalization of past conventions, he claimed that "'the sublime goddess REVOLUTION comes rushing and roaring on the wings of the storm.'"[70] Wagner's petition to move the Conservatory from Leipzig to Dresden had also earned him little favor in his home town, and tensions with the the city's musical gatekeepers had reached their peak following the publication of his essay "Jewishness in Music" in the *Neue Zeitschrift fur Musik*; by the end of September 1850, Karl Brendel, then the publication's editor, was being pressured to resign. In June of 1868, when King Ludwig II of Bavaria commissioned the premiere of *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, tensions peaked further. At the same time, Nietzsche had spent time in "close study of the *Meistersinger* score," "overwhelmed by the richness of this new, 'truly national opera'" that incorporated "a prophecy from the Middle Ages that 'Evil deeds threaten us; once the German people and the German empire fragment under false foreign domination'."[71] Wagner seemed to hope that a new cultural politics, conveyed through artworks, could establish an imagined cultural political community.

[70] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 210-11.
[71] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 81; Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 527.

"A VERY AMBIGUOUS MAN CROSSED MY PATH"

In the summer he had spent drafting *Beyond Good and Evil*, in 1885, Nietzsche jotted down one of his most autobiographical notebook entries: "In my youth I was unlucky: a very ambiguous man crossed my path. When I recognized him for what he is, namely a great actor who has no authentic relationship to anything (not even to music), I was so sickened and disgusted that I believed all famous people had been actors, otherwise they wouldn't have become famous, and that the chief thing in what I called 'artist' was the *theatrical force*." (Bittner, 1) The "ambiguous man" was Richard Wagner; Nietzsche's later misgivings aside, as a young Leipzig student in 1868, Nietzsche had been thirsting to become a Wagnerian disciple. The Brockhauses' salon drawing-room was the place where Nietzsche first entered into Wagneriana. "Before and after dinner," Nietzsche recounted in a letter the next day to Erwin Rohde, "Wagner played all the important parts of the *Meistersinger* [. . .] In between, I had a longish conversation with him about Schopenhauer; you will understand how much I enjoyed hearing him speak of Schopenhauer with indescribable warmth, what he owed to him, how he is the only philosopher who has understood the essence of music." Given that Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* was little valued within Leipzig's public sphere, the university was highly reluctant to recognize the book.[72]

Wagner had been in Leipzig the evening of November 8, 1868 incognito. "[T]he press knew nothing, and all the Brockhaus's servants had been told was to keep as quiet as liveried graves" Nietzsche told Rohde. When in May 1849 he financed the Dresden rebels' intelligence and resources, it was only too soon before he and his cohort Mikhail Bakunin's plots were discovered and Wagner was exiled, which explains why he had been moving covertly about Leipzig when his meeting with Nietzsche had taken place. Following the events of 1848-9, Wagner was driven by

[72] See R.J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The man and his philosophy* (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1985), 36.

Prussian authorities into exile, though this hardly dented his faith in the Young German cause and a new German *kulturnation* by November 8, 1868.

Soon after his exile in 1849, Wagner penned two essays, "Art and Revolution" and "The Artwork of the Future," both sharp criticisms of the religious or royal control of musical taste. When his musical career began, the only way Wagner would have made a living was as a concert-master to one of the many small courts which then made up the German Confederacy, and he was eventually appointed concert-master to the Court of Saxony under Friedrich August II, who one of Wagner's biographers has referred to as "a perfectly civilized despot taken in the context of his peers."[73] But Wagner was displeased by the tastes of the princes, as, for him, the greatness of music be restored with the theater as the focus of civic life while avoiding overtly religious appeals. Through a new kind of art, Wagner had pontificated, he could purge German culture of alien — French or Jewish — qualities, "convinced that nineteenth-century art and civilization had been debased by the industrial-capitalist epoch, which he felt had been epitomized by Jewish bankers and traders throughout Europe."[74]

Wagner's hostility toward French music and culture had been, in part, the effect of his tenure in Paris from 1839, where he had engaged in local politics, was caught in the middle of artistic rivalries, and quickly ran out of money; from October to December 1840, he had been jailed for failing to pay his debts on time. Up till that point, Wagner had only one of his overtures was performed by the Paris Conservatory Orchestra, with an encore performance following in early 1841.[75] Without much success, he turned to critical journalism, as correspondents to publications

[73] Frank B. Josserand, *Richard Wagner: Patriot and Politician* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 22; see also Ther, *Center Stage*, 57-8.
[74] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, ibid.
[75] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 22-3.

both in Paris as well as in Dresden, for revenue.[76] One of his correspondences, "On German Music," was a Schopenhauerian diatribe about the decadence contemporary German culture. For Wagner, the German people were too comfortable importing operas.[77] In another correspondence, he compared Beethoven and Berlioz, concluding that Berlioz's French identity had been a debilitating mechanism that shackled his creativity.[78]

As Curtis Cate has brilliantly described, the Wagner encounter "exacerbated the growing discontent with his [Nietzsche's] university studies that for months had been simmering and stewing inside [him]:

> The deeper he delved into the nooks and crannies of classical philology, the more he began to question the ultimate utility of this industrious burrowing. Beyond a display of scholastic ingenuity, had he really contributed anything to his contemporaries' understanding of Greek and Roman antiquity?[79]

"The truth was that Nietzsche was fed up with classical philology[, {. . .}] shacking up at the Kintschy café and reading up on critical reviews of Leipzig theater performances." But in January 1869, his professor Friedrich Ritschl's ecstatic review of one of Nietzsche's recent articles drew the attention of Wilhelm Vischer at the University of Basel in Switzerland. In February, Vischer announced Nietzsche as successor to Adolf Kiessling as professor of classical philology after the Eastertime holiday.[80] On April 19, Nietzsche arrived by rail in Basel. The city had long been beneath the feet of a patrician elite until the emerging bourgeois elite of bankers, industrialists, or professionals that had, by 1875, would merge upward into the elite social ranks, as, according to one historian, "economic and social change drove up the numbers and increased the significance

[76] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 25.
[77] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 30
[78] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 36-7.
[79] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 86.
[80] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 88.

of the middle class throughout the century."[81] Because of Johann Gottfried Tula's 1812 plan that eventually channeled the entire Danube at a width of 656 feet, the area's marshlands had begun drying out by the time Nietzsche reached town, mobility in the Basel-Mainz region was easier than at any previous time.[82]

Richard J. Evans has claimed that like elsewhere in Switzerland, "an ideology of freedom emerged in Basel to help lend legitimacy to the Swiss Confederation," itself re-established by the Congress of Vienna after Napoleon's defeat, took precedence in the Swiss national imagination.[83] After the tumultuous events of the 1840s to 60s, Basel had managed to retain its religious culture. The city's religious institutions were among those with "overseas missionary societies dating back to late 1815."[84] Moreover, by 1850 urban dwellers were both of noble and middle-class background. In 1844, the new Swiss Constitution recognized Basel as a "sovereign cantons," one of twenty-two. Resulting social changes in and around the city often spelled low class attendance among students, and low student population had meant low municipal funding and strained relations between university administrators and city officials.[85] Since 1833, the Canton of Basel had had its assets split along urban and rural lines, and that included the books at in the university's library. As the oldest Swiss library, access had equated with status. Eventually, city officials impoverished the university by using all its allotted financial resources to reacquire books it had lost in the deal; this meant, however, reductions in the number of available courses from term to term.[86] One historian has noted how until the mid-1860s students had been encouraged to study at

[81] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 218.
[82] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 370
[83] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 77-8.
[84] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 469.
[85] Lionel Grossman, *Basel in the age of Burckhardt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 35.
[86] Grossman, *Basel in the age of Burckhardt*, Ibid.

Basel for only one or two years before moving on to programs in France or Germany.[87] When Nietzsche assumed his duties at the university, the philology student body was a dissatisfying 17.5% that of Leipzig's in 1869.[88]

"WE TRIBSCHENERS"

But Basel had narrowed the geographical gap between he and Richard Wagner, who was living along Lake Lucerne at the Villa Tribschen, "a short train ride from Basel," and Nietzsche had grown eager to take up the composer's invitation to continue the conversation begun at the Brockhauses' salon about six months prior.[89] In May 1869, Nietzsche first took the Schweizerische Centralbahn rail line to Lucerne and arrived eventually at Wagner's villa, which proved crucial to the construction of his ideological space.[90] Since their first meeting in Leipzig Nietzsche had managed to see two performances of *Die Meistersinger*: the Dresden premiere of January 21, 1869 and a later performance in Karlsruhe on April 18.[91] Whereas both performances were successes, *Die Meistersinger* had been shafted upon its Mannheim premiere, due to Wagner's recent essay "Jewishness in Music"; consequently, Berlin and Vienna rejected the composer's request for staging the opera.[92] It was Ludwig II who would next stage *Die Meistersinger* in Munich. Wagner had presented Nietzsche with a copy of "Jewishness in Music" during that first May visit.[93] Nietzsche's letter of May 22 captured the spirit with which he returned to Basel after his first visit:

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[87] Grossman, *Basel in the age of Burckhardt*, 118.
[88] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 90.
[89] Sue Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!: A Life of Nietzsche* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 48-9.
[90] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 53.
[91] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 95.
[92] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 96.
[93] Cate, *Friedrich* Nietzsche, Ibid.

> How long I have intended to express unreservedly the degree to which I feel grateful to you; because indeed the best and loftiest moments of my life are associate with your name, and I know of only one other man, your great spiritual brother Schopenhauer, whom I regard with equal reverence, even *religione quadam*. I am happy to confess this to you on a festive day, and I do this not without a feeling of pride. For, if it is the lot of genius to be for a while the possession of only *paucorum hominum*, then certainly these *pauci* may feel themselves especially fortunate and privileged, because it is granted to them to see the light and to warm themselves by it, while the mass is still standing and freezing in the cold fog. Also to enjoy the genius does not come easily to these few; rather they have to contend with omnipotent prejudices and their own opposite inclinations, so that, if the struggle's outcome is a happy one, they have a sort of conqueror's right to the genius.

Nietzsche considered himself one of these few with such a right, "after realizing how incapable almost the whole world with which one is concerned has shown itself to be when it comes to grasping your personality as a whole, to feeling the undivided, deeply ethical current that passes through your life, writings, and music — in brief, to be aware of the ambiance of a more serious and spiritual worldview such as we poor Germans have simply lost, through all kinds of political *misere*, through philosophical mischief and importunate Jewry." When compared with Tribschen, Basel seemed like a professional dog kennel.

The thought espoused in Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* was the philosophical foundation at Tribschen. The book begins with the idea that causality was as fundamental to consciousness as space and time. Since causality is what Schopenhauer called an inherent "form" of consciousness, thoughts are as causally connected as our sense impressions when viewed by the thinking subject as cerebral phenomena; human awareness being limited to the world of phenomena that it becomes nearly impossible to penetrate the phenomena. The scientist was thus compared to the man "who goes around a castle, looking for the entrance, and

sometimes sketching the facades."[94] Only through music was one capable of penetrating the world of phenomena into a realm beyond appearance, that of the primary causal force Schopenhauer called Will. According to biographer Rudiger Safransky, Schopenhauer's "ultimate aim," was "fixing [. . .] those structures which would vanish like a spook when, before the bright 'flash' of the 'better consciousness,' all suddenly loses validity."[95] In 1868, Nietzsche noted his enthusiasm for Schopenhauer's "answer to the yearning questions of all metaphysicians is a bold Yes; and to ensure that the new insight was seen far and wide, like an inscription on a temple, he wrote the redeeming formula for the old and most important riddle of the world across the face of his book as the title *The World as Will and Representation*."[96] Ten days after Nietzsche's first visit, he received an invitation from Wagner to stay over Saturday night (June 5) and all of Sunday (June 6) as one of a select few individuals the composer called upon to hear and give Schopenhauerian tangents and social critiques.[97]

At Tribschen, Schopenhauerian ideas were combined with a strain of emerging nationalism rampant already across Europe. "*French late romanticism* of the forties and Richard Wagner," Nietzsche dictated to page in Sils-Maria, "belong most closely and intimately together." Wagner and the French romantics both rejected the music criticism of Eduard Hanslick who Wagner himself "condemned as a man of 'musical temperance'."[98] French musicians had "engaged in repeated nationalist representations" by the 1880s.[99] Like the French romantics, Wagner was of the 1830 generation, when "revolutionary zeal swept through Paris," making it easy for aesthetic

[94] Quoted in Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 66.
[95] Rüdiger Safranski, *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1990), 160-1
[96] Raymond Geuss, Alexander Nehamas, and Ladislaus Lob eds., *Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.
[97] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*, Ibid.
[98] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 529.
[99] Evans, *Pursuit of Power,* 526.

ideas to shift toward "art for art's sake."[100] In another and more important sense, for Nietzsche, Wagner and the French romantics could agree in their sharp antisemitism, which dominated the culture and politics of Tribschen's select few. Wagner's concept of the *Gesamtkunstwerk,* a "complete work of art integrating drama, music, and spectacle," was rooted in the "art for art's sake" movement; only through opera, Wagner was convinced, could one achieve this *Gesamtkunstwerk*; moreover, following Schopenhauer, "Wagner believed that penetrating the veil of apparent phenomena and experience absolute Will was possible only with this total artform"; thus, only opera could achieve these Schopenhauerian ends.[101]

Back on January 21, when Nietzsche had attended the Dresden premiere of *Die Meistersinger*, the opera, with what Ther has called its "majestic music, call for national unity and portrayal of the Protestant middle class as the real bearers of German culture," was "rapturously received"; the "uproarious applause" from the King and others seemed to mirror Nietzsche's own, as the singers, design crew, and conductor "took their several curtain calls."[102] But Wagner's career had by this point begun to surf the waves of nationalist sentiment in cultivating a unified German nation.[103] Following the critical failures of his opera *Tannhäuser* in Paris in 1861, the "scandal" of which has, according to William Gibbons, remained "a central point in the narrative of nineteenth-century French musical history," and which would remain the last production of Wagner's work until about five years after the composers death, in 1891, when *Lohengrin* premiered at the Paris Opera, the Dresden courts came to swift defense of Wagner's opera, pardoning him the following year, in effect permitting the composer to return to Dresden.[104]

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[100] Jeremy D. Popkin, *History of Modern France* (New York: Pearson, 2013), 99.
[101] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 54.
[102] Ther, *Center Stage*, 55-6.
[103] Ther, *Center Stage*, Ibid.
[104] William Gibbons, "Music of the Future, Music of the Past: *Tannhäuser* and *Alceste* at the Paris Opera," *19th-Century Music* 33, no. 3 (2010), 232, 244; see also Ther, *Center Stage*, 54.

For this reason, Ther concluded,

> it is not surprising that of all his works created after 1848, [*Die Meistersinger*] remained the best loved. As well as its nationalist and middle class content, its relatively conventional compositions found broad approval. [*Die Meistersinger*] contained several arias which quickly gained independent popularity as sheet music arranged for piano and vocal parts. Critics admired the many ensemble and mass scenes and choral parts; in other words, all the aspects that corresponded more with conventional contemporary opera than with Wagner's concept of "music drama."[105]

To Wagner much of his success lay rooted in his belief that the future of opera would be the future that of the imagined German community; "Germanness" in opera, for Wagner, could not be of the same species as "Frenchness," simply because of its "Franco-Jewishness." Wagner was determined to both restore the dignity of art as much as to redeem the German people through music. His emphasis on Schopenhauerianism informed his cultural politics of Jewish expropriation. *Beyond Good and Evil* § 251 summates the antisemitic fire of Wagnerism at Tribschen: "About the Jews, for example: listen. [. . .] I have never met a German who was favorably inclined towards the Jews." But in his desire to removed "Jewishness" from music, Wagner revealed his "difficulty [. . .] in absorbing even this quantum of Jew." Wagner's writings of the Tribschen period, particularly "Jewishness in Music," were marks of this bad digestion. Tribschen fit somewhere in the ideological network of antisemitism, varieties of which were on the rise across Central Europe. The ideological amalgam of Schopenhauerian thought, hard nationalist politics, and revolutionary aesthetics formed Tribschen's intellectual milieu.

A letter headed Pilatus, August 4, 1869 and addressed to his childhood friend Gustav Krug captures Nietzsche's initial attitude toward Tribschen:

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[105] Ther, *Center Stage*, ibid.

> I sit down with a bad pen and numb fingers, with which this unfriendly and somber Pilatus provides me, to write and tell you at once about my recent experiences, which are such as to interest you more than any of my friends. Once more I have spent the last few days with my friend Richard Wagner, who has most kindly given me unlimited rights to visit him and is angry with me if I fail to make use of these rights at least once every four weeks. You will understand what I have gained by this permission; for this man [. . .] shows in all his qualities such an absolute immaculate greatness. [. . .] On Sunday morning in my charming room, with its free outlook over the Vierwaldstatter See and the Rigi, I looked through manuscripts which Wagner had given me to read, strange novellas from his first Paris period, philosophical essays, and sketches for dramas, but, above all, a profound expose addressed to his "young friend," the Bavarian king, for the latter's enlightenment as to Wagner's views in *State and Religion*. Never has a king been spoken to more beautifully, nobly, and profoundly; a pity that the young man has, it seems, learned so little from it. [. . .] On Saturday evening a Herr Serov came, a Russian minister of state and author of a series of articles on Berlioz [. . .] they express completely Wagner's opinion of Berlioz. I was invited for Wagner's birthday, but could not come because of work, and so I missed making the acquaintance of the foremost quartet of France and, according to Wagner, of the entire world. In addition, an intelligent man [Edouard Schuré] from Alsace was invited, who has written a very important and detailed article on Wagner, and is very well suited to be the *propagateur* of the Wagnerian spirit in France. Thanks to [Cosima's] efforts *Lohengrin* is being prepared for performance in Paris, and Wagner intends to make an exception and take over the chief rehearsals, perhaps the performance itself.

"These days spent at Tribschen during the summer," he concluded, "are quite the most valuable result of my professorship at Basel."[106]

On April 20, 1871, a warweary Nietzsche sent the opening section of the manuscript of what became *The Birth of Tragedy, Out of the Spirit of Music* to the Leipzig publisher Wilhelm

[106] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!,* 104.

Engelmann as a "non-philological analysis of Greek tragedy."[107] The book's lack of influence in educated Leipzig circles was directly inversely proportionate to its profound degree of influence at Tribschen. At the beginning of September, he received a written inquiry from Cosima into a suitable candidate to guide a friend of the Wagner family around Italy, which he then used as a bargaining chip against Vischer, and Nietzsche's salary was soon increased six-fold, from 500 to 3,500 francs.[108] In December, he declined an invitation to spend Christmas at Tribschen, he needed to collect himself for Wagner's verdict on a piece of music he had sent.[109] By this time, Tribschen felt different. But he had little time to dwell, because on January 1 his book was published. Nietzsche copies not only to the Wagners but to Cosima's father Franz Liszt. That same month, he had also been slated to deliver his address "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," which brought Wagnerian ideas to Basel's educated elite. Nietzsche's last visit with Wagner occurred around the Easter holiday. On Tuesday, April 4, Cosima reported that Nietzsche's journey from Lugano had left him "very run down." April 5's entry reads that Nietzsche read her from his manuscript, "which he wants to dedicate to R." She saw Nietzsche's words, "imbued with R.'s ideas," as a "great delight."[110] On April 8, Nietzsche left Tribschen for Basel, not to see Wagner again until the following year at Bayreuth, the site of the composer's "big plans."[111]

THE OTHER SCHOPENHAUERIAN

It would, of course, be an understatement to assume that the University of Basel was an insignificant space in the making of *Beyond Good and Evil*, even if Nietzsche would have spurned

[107] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 126.
[108] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 134.
[109] Letter to Erwin Rohde, December 21, 1871.
[110] *Cosima Wagner's Diaries: Volume I, 1869-1877*, eds. Martin Gregor-Dellin and Dietrich Mack, rans. Geoffrey Skelton (London: Harcourt, 1978).
[111] Letter to von Gersdorff June 21, 1871

his work at the university for the festering Wagner cult of Tribschen. The truth is that his ideological space would have been rather narrow, had Wagner have been not only the strongest but also the primary intellectual wellspring in Nietzsche's life. The question is how, if Wagner had dominant influence on Nietzsche's thought, the latter could have become anything over and above a token Wagnerian. Throw the question of how Nietzsche could have spent long stretches of his time at the university and *not* have been influenced by some of its ideas into the bargain. At Basel, where *The World as Will and Representation* was hardly read, the only other lecturer with whom Nietzsche could make this basic connection had been the historian Jacob Burkhardt. Nietzsche's biographers certainly fail to neglect the Burkhardt's imprint, at least to an extent. Curtis Cate, for example, grouped Burkhardt as a "close friend or colleague," who "possessed a sufficiently profound understanding of the nature of music to be able to understand Nietzsche's reasoning."[112] Sue Prideaux has ranked Burkhardt in conjunction with Wagner as "the two great influences on Nietzsche's thinking" during this time, and what Nietzsche found in Burkhardt was a reflection of his own war-weariness.[113] But few have explained how the content of Burkhardt's work prefigured Nietzsche's own thinking. Mapping the spaces of *Beyond Good and Evil*, then, must include an understanding of Burkhardt's thought and his role at the University of Basel.

There is a strong connection between Burckhardt's conception of European culture of the Renaissance with that of the ancient Greeks. In his *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, Burkhardt argued that true enlightenment passed from the Greeks up through the Renaissance to present day. Peter Levine has written about how he "spoke for many Germans of the mid-nineteenth century when he described the critical attitude of humanism in largely negative terms."[114] According to

[112] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 91, 106.
[113] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 64, 82.
[114] Peter Levine, *Nietzsche and the modern crisis of the humanities* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 15.

Sue Prideaux, it was Burckhardt that had helped convince Nietzsche that "the Hellenizing world had been the most important event."[115] Nietzsche had been spending "a great deal" of time with Burckhardt as early as May 29, 1869, shortly after taking up his philology position. His letter to Elisabeth referred to Burckhardt as a "well-known esthetician and art historian and an intelligent man." A letter to Erwin Rohde dated November 23, 1870 explained two of Nietzsche's "several joys": "Firstly there is a long essay by Wagner on Beethoven [. . .] Second joy: Jakob Burckhardt is giving a weekly lecture on the study of history—in the spirit of Schopenhauer—a lovely but rare refrain. I am attending his lectures."

Another letter to Rohde, written during Christmastime 1871, helps place Nietzsche with Burkhardt:

> I have spent some good days with Jakob Burckhardt, and we have many discussions about Greek matters. I think that one could learn a great deal about such matters in Basel at present. [. . .] I have had a number of fundamental insights into Plato, and I think that we two might one day well and truly warm up and illuminate from inside the hitherto shabby and mummified history of Greek philosophers.

After the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*, early in 1872, Nietzsche wrote again to Rohde from Basel, explaining how although Burckhardt had had troubles with Nietzsche's philosophy of art, he was "so fascinated by what the book's discoveries bring to the understanding of what Greece means that he thinks about it day and night and in a thousand details gives me an example of the most fruitful historical application of it; so that I shall have much to learn during his summer course on the history of Greek culture, all the more because I know how familiar and intimate is the ground on which this course has grown." Burkhardt remained a constant source of inspiration: "The last few months," he wrote to Franz Overbeck in April, 1884, "I have been reading 'world

[115] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 67.

history', with great delight although with some horrifying results. Have I ever shown you the letter from Jakob Burckhardt which pushed me headfirst into 'world history'."

That Nietzsche wrote fondly of spaces he associated with Burckhardt also helps map the influence: "I celebrated daimon rites with Jakob Burckhardt in his room; he joined my ritual act and we poured a good two beer glasses of Rhone wine down on the street below. In earlier centuries we would have been suspected of witchcraft." In addition, Nietzsche's correspondences with Burckhardt have also proven useful points of reference. It is there where one finds his distaste for Wagnerism, leading Prideaux to conclude correctly that "Wagner, who [. . .] hugely admired Bismarck and German nationalism, while Burckhardt, who was devoted to Europeanism," as the intellectual figure of Basel, "saw Jewish culture as a universal leavening of European bread," became the two poles in Nietzsche's intellectual life throughout his time as philology professor: to one side, Nietzsche's dedication to Wagnerian thought drove him toward a philosophical quest to understand the Greeks; to the other, Burckhardt's work would leave its mark on Nietzsche's own output, *Beyond Good and Evil* being no exception.

NIETZSCHE AND BAYREUTH

When it comes to delving deeper into how spaces configured the thought of *Beyond Good and Evil*, the Bavarian town of Bayreuth merits particular investigation. Looking at both the Bayreuth Festival Theater and the Wagners' Wahnfried mansion, this discussion can shift focus to cultural-political dynamics Nietzsche would forever associate with Germanity. Even more than a study of urban politics, Bayreuth offers insights into how Wagner endeavored to reconfigure the urban

landscape by "changing existing and creating new places of recognized significance."[116] To both the Wagners and their many advocates, Bayreuth constituted an important node within a broader network of German cultural reformists. This was a controversial plan: if one section of an urban population demanded that the theater be improved as a cultural institution, then this could be experienced as humiliating questions of a more existential nature; for the champions of Wagner, the Bayreuth Festival Theater had become life's mission. But for Nietzsche, Bayreuth quickly became a hotbed of monumentality and reinforced a variety of nationalist ideologies, whether iron-fisted militarism or constitutionalist/liberalistic.

The Franco-Prussian war and the founding of the Prussian Empire were accompanied by a rising tide of German nationalism. The democratic wave had been disrupted by Otto von Bismarck's influential "blood and iron" campaigns by the early 1870s, by which time religious difference became a stumbling block for the establishment of a national identity. Bismarck's strategy of "negative integration" resolved this and many related issues surrounding antagonisms between professional and working classes by leading a pugnacious cultural attack on Catholics, Poles, the working class, western and particularly French civilization, and Jews, within as well as without it's the borders of the new Germany.[117] In 1871, when Bismarck began his *Kulturkampf* against the activist clergy, and in 1872, when he ordered government inspection of Church schools and banned Jesuits from education, who "seem to have been a particular object of suspicion to almost all European governments at least since the mid-eighteenth century," in the cultural sphere, Germanic myths and Norse sagas gave Germans non-religious points of identification.[118] When the Wagners settled on Bayreuth as their site for Richard's opera theater, the town was yet another

[116] Oliver Zimmer, *A Contested Nation: History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761-1891* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 191.
[117] Ther, *Center Stage*, 57.
[118] Ther, *Center Stage*, Ibid.; Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 465.

Bavarian town caught in Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*; thus, the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War had foregrounded the Wagnerian ideal in the German imagination.[119]

In most of Germany, the thirst for cultural forms of entertainment was no longer confined to the rich and the educated. This new need for cultural engagement had begun to affect sections of the urban public that Wagner believed required redemption through music, a theme rigidly espoused in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*. Bayreuth, much like Augsburg and less like Nuremburg, was no longer populated by textile factories and guild trading posts by the 1870s, past the days when culture, education, and the arts came second to material interests. It was now widely recognized that "a theater was an educational institution, and a very important one."[120] As an effect of the industrializing patterns of Nuremburg, there were now large influxes of people into Bayreuth; to meet increased demand for a cultural center, Wagner assumed the time days were ripe for the building of a new theater, and Bayreuth's stale cultural life drove his interest to begin his project there. Anticipating the stormy reception his proposal would receive, Wagner set out ridiculing the numerous opponents of the new theater. It was in this spirit that he wrote of the controversy over the theater to King Ludwig: "All is changed: I hardly know Germany anymore." For Wagner, the stagnancy of opera had become a "chaos of absurdities and neglect."[121]

Wagner played on themes of cultural inferiority to elicit the financial weight of Bayreuth's noble and royal patrons when, in 1873, he chastised German culture: "Many an intelligent observer has been struck by the fact that the recent prodigious successes of German politics have not contributed in the slightest toward diverting the sense and taste of the German people from a foolish impulse to imitate foreign ways, toward arousing the desire to cultivate those native

[119] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 271.
[120] Oliver Zimmer, *Remaking the Rhythms of Life: German Communities in the Age of the Nation-State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 193.
[121] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 275.

aptitudes still left in us. Our great German statesman puts forth all his strength against the pretensions of the Romish spirit in the provinces of the church; the French spirit's continuing pretensions to guide and determine our taste, together with the accompanying influence on manners, remain unheeded on every side."[122] Unlike in nearby Augsburg, opposition to the project was much more financial than political, as not only local authorities but King Ludwig II, who had welcomed the development as perhaps a monument to the German nobility, felt compelled to limit their contributions: "the rich mob no longer has a soul, and squanders his wealth either in Jewish or Jesuitical undertakings. Our stock market millionaires want to have nothing to do with me unless my project is destined for Berlin or Vienna."[123] In his letters to Ludwig, Wagner expressed a line of thought with a common implicit logic: urban politicians and administrators, he concluded, were entrusted with a city's cultural sphere, which meant for Wagner and his associates towns like Bayreuth had been left "in a state of dormant neglect by those who should have been its leading reformers."[124] The king understood that he stood to gain from the theater, as it would serve as a crucial destination spot for cultural tourists from throughout the new Germany; a new theater would make divert concert-going emigration to Nuremburg or Munich.

Wagner nonetheless turned to the invention of a journal published from Wahnfried to increase revenue for the Bayreuth Festival Theater project. A notebook jotting of Nietzsche's from the summer of 1885 suggests that the *Bayreuther Blätter* — often a notorious bullhorn for its antisemitic pronouncements — was his fall-guy for the debasement of an "honest atheist and immoralist who invented the figure of Siegfried."[125] Earlier notebook entries of 1878 help

[122] Quoted Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 276-7.
[123] Josserand, *Richard Wagner*, 278.
[124] Zimmer, *Remaking the Rhythms of Life*, 195.
[125] Rüdiger Bittner ed., *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13.

construct Nietzsche's disgust with Bayreuth: "We are experiencing the downfall of the *last art* — Bayreuth convinced me of this"; "My mistake was coming to Bayreuth with an idea: as a result, I experienced the bitterest disappointment."[126] On the day Nietzsche arrived for inaugural concert, he was one of five hundred visitors flowing through Wahnfried, the Wagners' new mansion.[127] His letters convey a sense of extreme distress at the Bayreuth Festival. To his sister on August 1, 1876: "Things are not right with me, I can see that! [. . .] Yesterday I was able to listen to *Die Walkure,* but only in a dark room—to use my eyes is impossible! I long to get away; it is too senseless to stay. I dread every one of these long artistic evenings; yet I go to them."

Nietzsche's distress found expression in "Richard Wagner at Bayreuth," the final of his *Untimely Meditations*. In this essay, Nietzsche had first begun his association of Bayreuth with Wagner, Wagner with imagined "Germanness." Nietzsche's biographers have provided some contextual explanations for its contents. Curtis Cate has identified its construction with Nietzsche's "agonizing uncertainty as to how the great composer would react."[128] Sue Prideaux has filled in some of the gaps: "The process of writing a celebration of the composer's genius made Nietzsche realize the very necessity of freeing himself from Wagner [. . .] Nietzsche had long hymed the sublime power that Wagner's music exercised over his senses but now he realized how it robbed him of his free will [. . . , filling] him with a growing resentment against the delirious, befogging metaphysical seduction that once had seemed like the highest redemption of life."[129] Prideaux has even added an element of drama to lend an extra explanatory oomph to her description: "All the

[126] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ibid.
[127] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 135-6.
[128] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 222.
[129] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 144.

time he was composing it, he was suffering the tortures of the parricide: his head, eyes, and stomach giving him no peace."[130]

The essay began by describing the construction of modern culture before venturing a wager about Wagner's relationship to that construction. The difficulty, Nietzsche argued, was explaining Wagner's cultural reputation. Though Wagner's music was motivated primarily by the metaphysical principles of Germanic myths, it had lost its way often due to its failure to apply sufficient musical concepts on a consistent basis; this meant that Wagner could hardly have been a musician, but something else entirely. Such use of "elevated expressions and inventions" had proved for Nietzsche disastrous, since "the real passion of life does not speak in maxims." For Nietzsche, the romanticism of a Wagner had been much more passionate, therefore much more powerful, than traditional musical output, but this music was possible only as a piece of a web of romanticist assumptions about music and its role in society and nature. It is not that Nietzsche is attacking Wagner when he speaks of his drive for power and fame. Rather, he is tending towards a naturalistic explanation of Wagner's artistic talent and productivity, treating them as the product of traits which, taken by themselves, are not particularly admirable: Wagner's music was more a transfiguration of a past culture rather than the construction of a future one. By the time of its publication, Nietzsche was preparing to leave for Sorrento, where he worked closely for the next five months at the villa of another disenchanted, though perhaps more reverential, Wagnerian.

One commentator has it that this essay stood as "a kind of transitionary work" from Nietzsche's earlier Wagnerian work to his middle works, where its "postulation of unverifiable 'drives' is balanced" by an explanatory approach which moves away from the metaphysical world of *The*

[130] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 145.

Birth of Tragedy.[131] But, perhaps more importantly, the application of historical sense can reveal how "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth" fits within the scope of an attempt to map the spaces of *Beyond Good and Evil* § 240. Perhaps better still is that the context for Nietzsche's early work both as a student and as a professor under the shadow of Wagner (broadly) and Burckhardt (more narrowly) provide helpful tools for mapping the spaces of § 248, where Nietzsche penned his descriptions of "two kinds of genius":

> There are two kinds of genius: the kind which above all begets and wants to beget, and the kind which likes to be fructified and to give birth. And likewise there are among peoples of genius those upon whom has fallen the woman's problem of pregnancy and the secret task of forming, maturing, perfecting — the Greeks, for example, were a people of this kind, and so were the French; and others who have to fructify and become the cause of new orders of life — like the Jews, the Romans and, to ask it in all modesty, the Germans? — peoples tormented and enraptured by unknown fevers and irresistibly driven outside themselves, enamored of and lusting after foreign races [. . .] and at the same time hungry for dominion, like everything which knows itself full of generative power and consequently 'by the grace of God'. These two kinds of genius seek one another, as man and woman do; but they also misunderstand one another — as man and woman do.

By offering his music as a sort of cultural metalanguage, Wagner had helped to contribute to the invention of "Germanness," achieved only by what Nietzsche considered a half-baked output that had to be "fructified" to produce anything at all: "This kind of music," he scribbled in Sils-Maria, "best expresses what I consider true of the Germans: they are of the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow – *they have as yet no today*," a "magnificent, overladen, heavy, and late art which has the pride to presuppose for its understanding that two centuries of music are still

[131] Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* (London: Clarendon Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 22.

living — it is to the credit of the Germans that such a pride was not misplaced!" Wagner's music had proven "German in the best and worst sense of the word [. . .] of the German soul, which is at once young and aged, over-mellow and still too rich in future."[132]

Using music as a hermeneutic byway to a criticism of the imagined German community's construction, Nietzsche concluded that, contrary to the official view of the Prussian Empire, there was never a cultural focal point but only in a vague sense. Where one expected a strong national culture, Nietzsche observed only vapors and convolution. Had there ever been a *kulturnation*, a cultural essence of the imagined German community? Since Nietzsche thought that the "German soul" was a multiplicity, rather than a duality as suggested by Wagner's music, this no doubt meant that he had to recognize the diverse components that had gone into the construction of "Germanness" in people's cultural imaginations. For this reason, Nietzsche seemed to say, that the definition of "Germanness" had remained as elusive as ever, any notions about "Germanness" as an ideology losing themselves in the "corridors," "dungeons," or "caves" of the obscurantist "German soul."[133]

[132] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 240
[133] *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 244.

II

Nietzsche in "Southern" Spaces

§ 242 of *Beyond Good and Evil* assumes, instead, "a great *physiological* process" that gained steam throughout the late nineteenth century: "the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions under which races and classes originate, their increasing independence of any definite milieu which, through making the same demands for centuries, would like to inscribe itself on soul and body [. . .] the slow emergence of an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of man which [. . .] possess as its typical distinction the maximum of art and power of adaptation." This Nietzschean idée fixe about the "process of becoming European" can help refine ideas about the construction of ideological space and its relation to the development of subjectivities, specifically the idea of cities as stages for political struggles and related crowd behaviors whose chief effect had been the invention of political subjectivities. While historians have sided with E.P. Thompson in holding that these forces comprised the *mentalités* of everyday life, Nietzsche's experiences in "southern spaces" reveals that there is more to the story. Oliver Zimmer has argued that if the urban landscape was decked with a variety of colors, and if these colors themselves contained any number of "free-floating individuals,"[134] the likelihood of a unified nationalist ideology or vision was quite narrow. This chapter attempts to get clearer about Zimmer's argument by examining how Nietzsche's thinking changed and what changed it.

[134] Oliver Zimmer and William Whyte eds., "Introduction," in *Nationalism and the Reshaping of Urban Communities in Europe, 1848-1914*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15-16.

"MY LOVE FOR THE SOUTH"

On October 19, 1876, Nietzsche boarded a train that passed through the Mont Cenis tunnel, past Turin, and on to Pisa, then Genoa. For Nietzsche, Genoa was "the city of explorers, founders, innovators," whose efforts "to set sail on uncharted seas in the hope of discovering new worlds" colored Nietzsche's view of the Genoese landscapes, natural and urban.[135] In a letter to Erwin Rohde sent from Genoa on March 24, 1881, where Nietzsche had explained about how "there are moments when I walk about on the heights above Genoa having glimpses and feelings such as Colombus once, perhaps from the very same place, sent out across the sea and into the future," historians can find an example of celebrity-worship common among the German middle class during the time. According to Matthew Unangst, the late nineteenth century "saw a major shift in the meaning that the work of explorers had for many Americans; while before the defeat of the French in 1871, explorers had been prominent all over Europe, "trusted for their scientific detachment"; the celebrity of explorers increased proportionally "with a rise in the prestige of universities and administrative demands for graduate studies abroad"; in addition, because the number of young German scholars exceeded the number of jobs available, many had to explore foreign lands for work.[136] Other than Columbus, Giuseppi Mazzini had long been associated in Nietzsche's mind with his early Wagnerian days, as had the violin virtuoso and composer Paganini; the Promontorio Portofino "inspired" his 1884 *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.[137] It was back in Genoa in 1882 when he overdosed on opium and contemplated "the barrel of a revolver."[138]

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[135] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 227.
[136] Matthew Unangst, "Men of Science and Action: The Celebrity of Explorers and German National Identity, 1870-1895," *Central European History* 50 (2017), 316-17.
[137] Nicholas Walton, *Genoa, 'La Superba': The Rise and Fall of a Merchant Pirate Superpower* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015), 116-17.
[138] Letter to Franz Overbeck, 1883.

After two days in Naples, Nietzsche continued to Sorrento: "Here we are in Sorrento!" he wrote to his mother and sister on October 28, 1876, "The whole trip here from Bex took eight days. In Genoa I was ill. From there we took about three days for the sea journey, and [. . .] we were not seasick." He was hosted at the home of Malwida von Meysenbug, whose own research program, a brand of Schopenhauerian thought expressed in her *Memoirs of an Idealist*, predominated, with its "appeal to young women who admired both the author's struggle for personal independence and her support for progressive causes."[139] At Sorrento, her favorite topics "ranged from women's place in society to issues of religion and morality."[140] Meysenbug's own philosophical outlook was a brand of ethical idealism: scientific knowledge was unable to establish a sufficient reason for moral phenomena, which are excluded from natural science's scope; because of the occurrence of these phenomena, one can *ipso facto* that they are the result of an intention. While the scientific approach may help to trace these phenomena historically to a sort of mental intuition, which is fine, she argued nonetheless that this approach cannot account for moral phenomenology. "How sensations could emerge from some combination of atoms," Robin Small has summarized, "is a mystery for an intellect confined within the conditions of space and time."[141]

Meysenbug's villa was located along Sorrento's outskirts.[142] In the course of their first stay at Rubinacci, Nietzsche, along with his companions Paul Rée and Albert Brenner, passed evenings with Meysenbug in the Rubinacci sitting room to discuss various topics. Meysenbug later recalled how "[in] the evening we came together again for dinner and after this in the shared sitting room for stimulating conversation and common reading."[143] Sitting-room discussions that autumn

[139] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 23.
[140] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, Ibid.
[141] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 24-5.
[142] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 160.
[143] Quoted in Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 23.

focused on Jacob Burckhardt's work on ancient Greek culture, ancient Greek histories, classical Roman poetry, Plato, and the more recent work of Afrikan Spir, whose philosophical system became a common frame of reference between the lodgers. Given that the Wagner circle at Tribschen had been familiar with Burckhardt's writings, his work would also have had a "special appeal" for Meysenbug.[144] Afrikan Spir's *Thought and Reality* was the contribution of Paul Rée, who insisted also on writings by Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, Voltaire, Hume, and others. Meysenbug had observed the effect of Rée's suggestions on Nietzsche: "Rée had a particular preference for the French moralists and communicated this to Nietzsche too, who had perhaps already read them earlier but whose close acquaintance certainly did not remain without influence on his later development and led him to express his thoughts in aphorisms, as I had later occasion to notice." She also called attention to Nietzsche's interest in Rée's "scientific, realistic standpoint," "something almost new to his previous work, always pervaded by his inner poetic and musical element, and gave him an almost childishly amazed pleasure."[145]

Her assessment was both accurate and not. Nietzsche's familiarity with natural science predated his first visit to Rubinacci. Dirk R. Johnson has described Nietzsche's earlier connections with natural science through encounters, foremost, with Friedrich Albert Lange's highly successful 1865 *History of Materialism* at Leipzig in 1866, citing Nietzsche's letters both to Herman Muschacke, who accompanied him to the city less than one year earlier, and to Carl von Gersdorff: "The most important philosophical work to appear in the last decades is undoubtedly Lange, History of Materialism, about which I could write reams of praise. Kant, Schopenhauer, and Lange's book, that's all I need." Moreover:

[144] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 18.
[145] Quoted in Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 26-7.

> At this point I must once again praise the efforts of a man I've already written to you about. If you care to inform yourself about the materialist movement of our age, about the natural sciences with their Darwinist theories, their cosmic systems, their animated *camera obscura*, etc., but also about ethical materialism and Manchester theory, then I can think of no better work to recommend than the *History of Materialism* by Friedr. Alb. Lange (Iserlohn 1866). It is a work which delivers much more than its title promises; it is a true treasure trove that one would like to return to and read over and over again.[146]

Christian J. Emden has recently proposed that Nietzsche had increased familiarity with the projects of Hermann von Helmholtz, particularly his famous 1847 monograph, in addition to trends in academic biology and physiology research programs of the 1840s and 50s.[147] Given Nietzsche's admiration for Goethe, it is also likely that he drew inspiration from Helmholtz's 1853 *On Goethe's Scientific Work*, in which Helmholtz estimated how Goethe, according to one historian, had advanced two animating ideas of nineteenth-century biological science: first, "that the anatomical structures of various kinds of animals revealed a unity of type underlying the superficial differences arising from variability of food, habit, and locality"; second, "the thesis that the various articulations within an organism developed out of a more basic kind of structure." Goethe's "vertebral theory of the skull [. . .]," moreover, "became a standard conception in later morphology."[148] Emden has traced this morphological concern to § 23 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, having claimed that "When Nietzsche [. . .] thus claimed that, 'from now on psychology is again the path to the fundamental problems,' what he had in mind was a 'genuine physio-psychology,' that is, a morphology of mental forms and intellectual configurations, which is always already

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[146] Dirk R. Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18.
[147] Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche's Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 149.
[148] Robert J. Richards, "Nature is the Poetry of Mind, or How Schelling Solved Goethe's Kantian Problems," in *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science*, eds. Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), 27.

linked to the material world since it is embedded in the body," noting that Nietzsche had long become familiar with Harald Hoffding's work, according to whom "psychology only made sense if it was able to look beyond mere introspection, drawing on physiology as much as on the new social sciences," which jibed well with Nietzsche's later conceptions of psychology as unconcerned with introspective methods.[149] Thus, Emden surmised that scholars have continued to make the "fatal mistake [of reading] Nietzsche's emphasis on psychological phenomena [. . .] as proposing a conception of psychology without biology."[150]

Moreover, Nietzsche had both read and reread the *Theory of Natural Philosophy* by Roger Joseph Boscovich, having had frequently borrowed the book from the University of Basel library as early as 1872. He wrote to composer and friend Peter Gast from Genoa ten years later, contrasting the work of Robert Mayer to that of Boscovich:

> I am amazed to find how coarse and naïve [Mayer] is when it comes to general constructions. He always thinks he is being wonderfully logical, but in fact he is just being obstinate. If something has been well and truly disproved, he says it is due to "material" prejudice — even if the disproving comes not from an idealist but from a mathematician [. . .] Boscovitch and Copernicus are the two greatest opponents of optical observation. With effect from him there is no "matter" any more [. . .] He has thought the atomistic doctrine through to the end. *Gravity* is certainly not a "property of matter," simply because there *is* no matter. The *force of gravity* is [. . .] certainly a manifestation of force, simply because force is all there is! Now the *logical* relation between these phenomena and others — for example, heat — is still not at all clear. But if one goes along with Mayer in still believing in matter and solid corporeal atoms, besides motional energy, the two forces of cohesion and gravity.

[149] Emden, *Nietzsche's Naturalism*, 40, 51-2.
[150] Emden, *Nietzsche's Naturalism*, 51.

At the same time, he had been reading *On the Nature of Comets* by Leipziger astrophysics giant Friedrich Zöllner. Robin Small has helped trace a picture of Nietzsche's relationship with Zöllner's work, speculating that inattention to Zöllner's work aroused Nietzsche's sympathies, "given that his own first two books were themselves critically spurned or neglected."[151] But there is room to squint at Small's concise picture. For even if this played a role in Nietzsche's interest — no doubt due to its criticism of traditional wholly empirical models of the cosmos — it does not square with the fact that Zöllner's book sold rapidly in successive editions. Perhaps a more captivating picture would better focus on broader cultural trends that help explain Nietzsche's interest in the book. Historian Klaus B. Staubermann has offered a more likely historical explanation: the truth is that Zöllner had been a celebrated lecturer and professor of astrophysics by the publication of his book on comets, having in 1857 designed the astro-photometer for the Vienna Academy of Science to help distinguish real from artificial stars; as a corollary, the number of photometry articles in Europe increased following the distribution of Zöllner's device, with the German Astronomical Society leading the distribution charge; in addition, the photometer allowed people to learn to "both control and improve their visual judgement."[152] So, by employing instruments "observers learned to share their visual experience, [. . . which] can be considered the most decisive change in the making of astronomy in the nineteenth century";[153] therefore, Zöllner's impact, especially at Basel and Leipzig, where he either studied or taught, was so massive that it is more likely that Nietzsche had been familiar with his activities as a student in Leipzig.

Small has offered some reasons why this interest was missing from Nietzsche's first two books. First, "it was shared by few of his friends in either Tribschen or Bayreuth," whose culture "made

[151] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 9.
[152] Klaus B. Staubermann, "Making stars: projection culture in nineteenth-century German astronomy," *British Journal for the History of Science* (2001), 439, 451.
[153] Staubermann, "Making stars," Ibid.

no claim on the contributions of natural science." Given this, natural science was incongruent with aesthetic research. Small's second reason is that Nietzsche was still attached to the prevailing research models of philology, which is why Nietzsche's earliest mentions of *wissenschaft* in the *Untimely Meditations* of 1872-3, were "designed to invoke a concept of a generally disciplined inquiry that applies to classical philology as much as to the investigation of natural phenomena." This is no historical anomaly, either, since to be *Naturforscher* traditionally meant being an investigator of nature, whether a physicist, chemist, or philologist. Denise Phillips has shown how "for most of the nineteenth century, the British and French struggled to find an easy equivalent for this term": "French-German dictionaries defined a '*Naturforscher*' as both a '*physician*' and a '*naturaliste*' and these words were not synonyms. The former was a student of the physical and mathematical sciences, while the other studied the natural historical disciplines."[154] For German-speakers, *Naturforscher* were necessary to improve society's education.[155] Phillips has explained that due to the *Naturforscher*'s emphasis on the "evocatively emotive character of the later nineteenth-century term 'natural science'," the term proliferated throughout German culture as connected with "collective enthusiasm and emotion."[156] In fact, it was not until the 1850s that there appeared a significant professional-amateur distinction between members of the "German learned public."[157]

Nonetheless, if biographers and scholars have been correct, Malwida von Meysenbug's assessment of Rée's influence upon both Nietzsche and Rubinacci itself cannot be understated. For her part, Meysenbug enjoyed the opportunity to defend the sentiments of her *Memoirs* from Rée's brand of Darwinism:

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[154] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 4-5.
[155] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 29.
[156] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 33.
[157] Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*, 165-66.

> I replied to a positivist who denied that the kernel of spiritual and moral evolution lay a priori in human nature, and asserted that they were only consequences of society and habituation: good, let us concede that the laws of morality first arose out of society and evolved with history following the law of causality; for our behavior that is sufficient, for there the categorical imperative is valid; as long as the individual belongs to some society, he assumes the duty to live according to its laws. For this there is no need to speak of a metaphysical basis: the basis of duty is society, and the concept of duty evolves further in the individual with the evolution of society. On this rests the law, rests all political and social life. But the kernel of the concept of morality must be there a priori, just as the kernel of our thinking must be. Nothing can come from nothing. The possibility of a spiritual and moral evolution is given with the human organism. As the lowest levels the kernel develops only at first in a crude way, it grows to the spiritual essence of humanity, and instead of proceeding from God it raises itself to the godlike, i.e. to the ideal.[158]

Small has also pointed to a few "parallels" between Rée's *Psychological Observations* and Nietzsche's 1878 *Human All-Too-Human*. Aside from the obvious aphoristic style, some of the book's headings followed those of Rée's book: "'On Religious Things'," for example, "became 'Woman and Child'," and 'On the History of Moral Sensations' took its name with respect to Rée's 1875 manuscript for *On the Origin of Moral Sensations*.[159] Even more: the impact of Rée's insistence on a dietetic regimen of French moralist writers on Nietzsche is perhaps most explicit in *Human All-Too-Human*, a book dedicated to Voltaire, whom Wagner despised. Robert B. Pippin has referred to this work as part of Nietzsche's "moralistic" period.[160] Indeed, in *Human, All-Too-Human* the thought of François de La Rochefoucauld, as found particularly in the 1664 *Moral*

[158] Quoted in Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 25.
[159] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 28.
[160] Popkin, *History of Modern France*, 9.

Reflections or Sententiae and Maxims, marked a turn away from the occupations of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* of the mid-1870s.[161]

Rée's thinking descended from Charles Darwin. It is most likely that Nietzsche by this time only knew Darwin's corpus secondhand, either through Lange's *History of Materialism* or talks with Rée. Nietzsche had little firsthand contact with Darwin's works, and it would be 1884 before he would acquire such direct knowledge.[162] This conforms to Jonathan R. Cohen's recent wager that "the science with which Nietzsche sides in *Human, All-Too-Human* produces truths that concern the empirical, time-bound world. [. . .] Those who have been trained by this science are therefore well prepared to do what needs to be done."[163] His emerging interest in this brand of science had entered into conflict with his previous commitments to Schopenhauerian metaphysics that proscribed an "other-worldly" autonomous reason that casts imperatives upon human behavior *a priori*. § 16 of *Human, All-Too-Human* has become an example of the conflict between philosophical metaphysics, on the one hand, and "the steady and arduous progress of science," on the other, concluding that scientific innovations "will deal decisively with all these [metaphysical] views." Nietzsche's enthusiasm for natural science during this period were mired in admiration of the methodology, which although "unable to break significantly with the power of ancient habits of feeling" offered a superior picture to that of metaphysicians and logicians. Meysenbug was right that Rée's Darwinism had had profound effects on Nietzsche and their younger companion, Nietzsche's Basel student Alfred Brenner, coming to dominate many of the "lively conversations" in the Rubinacci drawing room.[164]

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[161] Ruth Abbey, "Skilled Marksman and Strict Self-Examination: Nietzsche on La Rochefoucauld," in *Nietzsche's Free Spirt Philosophy*, ed. Rebecca Bamford (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 16.
[162] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 88-90
[163] Jonathan R. Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-Too-Human* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2010), 83.
[164] See Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 29.

Nietzsche's intellectual turn at Rubinacci had not impressed Wagner, who in August 1878 cited *Human, All-Too-Human* in the *Bayreuther Blätter* and focused on the relationship between the state and the achievements of natural science. Natural science's epistemological models promised multidisciplinary benefit. But Wagner was unimpressed: "Physical science offers both philosophers and philologists [. . .] a special encouragement, even an obligation, to make unlimited advances in the criticisms of all things human and inhuman"; but Wagner distrusted "the newest scientific *method*, which calls itself in general the 'historical school'." Nietzsche's attack on "the cult of genius" in *Human, All-Too-Human* struck Wagner as a repudiation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Robin Small has explained how Wagner contrasted the common faith of society in their great artists, statesmen, and Jesus Christ against the scientific aspirations of Nietzsche's latest work.[165]

Evidence exists to the effect that the Wagners indeed blamed particularly Rée's perceived Jewishness for Nietzsche's turn. By her lights, Cosima considered Rée's ancestry as a cause of Nietzsche's antagonism to Richard: "Finally, Israel intervened in the form of a Dr Rée, very sleek, very cool, at the same time as having been wrapped up in Nietzsche and dominated by him, though actually outwitting him—the relationship between Judaea and Germany in miniature."[166] This is both true and not. For as Small has pointed out, Nietzsche's "attitude toward the 'Jewish Question' was altering, or rather, he was addressing the issue directly for the first time," removing himself from Bayreuther cultural politics. Nietzsche's ideological space had now entered the rural geographic south, as he encountered either new ideas or familiar ones from new perspectives. Of course, as he traveled, Nietzsche understood that places as seemingly removed as Sorrento had in fact not been isolated from the play of broader social forces then ubiquitous across Europe. If

[165] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 34.
[166] See Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: a critical life* (London: Penguin, 1982), 204.

Nietzsche's task was the construction of an imagined trans-European community, then the project constructing a cultural basis for that community rested on critical engagement with those forces.

"THE STRONGEST, TOUGHEST, AND PUREST RACE"

One of the strongest of these was antisemitism, which Nietzsche knew firsthand was a tool of cultural political exclusion. Although symbolic steps were taken, many Jews were still denied basic civil rights in many places across Europe, and thanks to centuries of legal exclusion, Jews were overwhelmingly concentrated in banking, finance, and the rising middle-class professions, or, among the poorer segments of the population, the garment industry.[167] On August 24, 1877, Nietzsche wrote to Siegfrid Lipiner from Vienna — where the mayor, Karl Lueger, had instrumentalized antisemitism for political gains, according to one historian making respectable the term '*Judapest*' — and gave Lipiner his impression of Semites: "I have in fact recently had many experiences which have aroused *very great* expectations in me from precisely young men of this origin."[168]

Nietzsche early on observed that exclusion in Europe had emerged as the product of nation-states and the construction of a national community. In § 475 of *Human, All-Too Human*, he addressed the relationship between nationalism and antisemitism:

> Incidentally, the whole problem of the *Jews* exists only within nation states, inasmuch as their energy and higher intelligence, their capital of spirit and will, which accumulated from generation to generation in the long school of their suffering, must predominate to a degree that awakens envy and hatred; and so, in the literature of nearly all present-day nations (and, in fact, in proportion to their renewed nationalistic behavior), there is an increase in the

[167] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, ibid.
[168] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 51-2, 479.

> literary misconduct that leads the Jews to the slaughterhouse, as scapegoats for every possible public and private misfortune. As soon as it is no longer a matter of preserving nations, but rather of producing the strongest possible mixed European race, the Jew becomes as useful and desirable an ingredient as any other national quality. [. . .] I would like to know how much one must excuse in the overall accounting of a people which, not without guilt on all our parts, has had the most sorrowful history of all peoples, and to whom we owe the noblest human being (Christ), the purest philosopher (Spinoza), the mightiest book, and the most effective moral code in the world.

Indeed, Nietzsche's conclusion that "[i]f Christianity did everything possible to orientalize the Occident, then Judaism helped substantially to occidentalize it again and again" was intended to cut against stereotypic constructions of "Jewishness." The Leipzig publisher Ernst Schmeitzner disapproved of passages like these. By the late 1870s, Schmeitzner, whose *Antisemitishe Blätter* became the bullhorn for antisemitic polemics. In 1881, Schmeitzner later recalled the danger of Nietzsche's 1881 *Daybreak*, where the former was confronted with the idea of Jews as "shining examples of humanity [. . .] compared to whom we Germans are dolts and simpletons," to which Schmeitzner's own antisemitic political party objected.[169]

In *Beyond Good and Evil* § 251, Nietzsche likened the very existence of a "Jewish Question" itself to a sort of nervous disorder made possible by the construction of national communities: "If a people is suffering and *wants* to suffer from nationalistic nervous fever and political ambition," he wrote

> it must be expected that all sorts of clouds and disturbances — in short, little attacks of stupidity — will pass over its spirit into the bargain: among present-day Germans, for example, now the anti-French stupidity, now the anti-Jewish, now the anti-Polish, now the Christian-romantic, now the Wagnerian, now the Teutonic, now the Prussian [. . .] and

[169] Letter of September 4, 1881.

> whatever else little obfuscations of the German spirit and conscience may be called. May it be forgiven me that I too, during a brief sojourn in a highly infected area, did not remain wholly free of the disease and began, like the rest of the world, to entertain ideas about things that were none of my business: first symptom of the political infection. About the Jews, fro example: listen. — I have never met a German who was favorably inclined towards the Jews; and however unconditionally all cautious and politic men may have repudiated real anti-Jewism, even this caution and policy is not directed against this class of feeling itself but only against its dangerous immoderation, and especially against the distasteful and shameful way in which this immoderate feeling is expressed — one must not deceive oneself about that. That the German stomach has an ample *sufficiency* of Jews, [. . .] this is clear in the declaration and language of a universal instinct to which one must pay heed, in accordance with which one must act. 'Let in no more Jews! And close especially the doors to the East (also to Austria!)' — thus commands the instinct of a people whose type is still weak and undetermined, so that it could easily be effaced.

The construction of the national communities across Europe produced an image of "Jewishness" as something alimental and recondite, in turn manufacturing an imaginary image. To be "Jewish" was to pose a threat to European social or cultural institutions. "That which is called a 'nation' in Europe today," wrote Nietzsche, "is in any case something growing, young, easily disruptable, not yet a race [. . .]: these 'nations' should certainly avoid hot-headed rivalry and hostility very carefully!"

> That the Jews *could*, if they wanted — or if they were compelled, as the anti-Semites seem to want — even now predominate, indeed quite literally rule over Europe, is certain; that they are *not* planning and working towards that is equally certain. In the meantime they are, rather, wanting and wishing, even with some importunity, to be absorbed and assimilated by and into Europe, they are longing to be finally settled, permitted, respected somewhere and to put an end to the nomadic life, to the 'Wandering Jew'[.]

Nietzsche's focus was on those in society that had clung to essentialist notions of an imagined cultural community that required understanding "Jewishness" as ruinous to social institutions, the economy, and the state.[170] Georg Ritter von Shonerer, for example, spent the early 1880s campaigning for "the incorporation of Austria into the German nation" by advancing constitutional revisions with an eye toward civic exclusion of Semitic peoples.[171] In his 1879 *The Way to the Victory of Jewdom of Germandom*, Wilhem Marr made the concept of "Jewishness" synonymous with conspiracies for world domination in the national German imagination, demanding job quotas for Jews and restrictions on their business influence.[172] Theodore Fritsch, *au reste*, propagated these ideas, lending a certain respectability to antisemitic thought, due mainly to his affiliation with Bayreuth.[173] Shonerer's, Marr's, and Fritsch's brands of antisemitism, like Schmeitzner's, resonated among poor people coping with the economic problems of the 1870s. For Nietzsche, the construction of an imagined cultural community had to avoid the nervous disorders and stupidities of those founded upon an invented nation-state. Antisemitism — a powerful, exclusionary cultural force during the nineteenth century — was one such stupidity.

In 1884, Nietzsche told the Jewish physician Josef Paneth of his problems with antisemitism. According to Paneth, "it came out that he had been hard pressed in recent times to throw himself in with this 'swinishness'." Toss in the fact that "certain individuals of Jewish origin had behaved badly against him, and that had been used as an argument against the race" into the bargain[174]: Nietzsche was likely responding to his sister's engagement to Bernhard Förster, who began correspondence with Elisabeth shortly after the Bayreuth Theater Festival of 1876.[175] As early as

[170] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 479.
[171] Evans, *Pursuit of* Power, Ibid.
[172] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 478.
[173] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 478-9
[174] Quoted in Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 53.
[175] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 183.

1880, Förster was sending Elisabeth drafts of his own anti-Semitic tracts; by 1881, Förster established the German People's Party, which Sue Prideaux has described as a "thuggish, racist party spouting nationalism and misapplied evolutionary theory."[176] Förster's main network of support can be traced to Bayreuth, where in 1881-2 his ethnically nationalist articles were published in the *Bayreuther Blätter*; soon, Bayreuth's growing, pan-Germanic Patrons' Societies provided him with an outlet of workable readership.[177] In September 1883, Nietzsche's mother sent a letter notifying him that it was his sister's intention to accompany Förster to Paraguay to establish a Nueva Germania colony in South America.[178]

While there were traces of German settler presences in South America before the eighteenth century, the mental image of a Nueva Germania colony had been a parochially nineteenth-century invention. Having analyzed the mobility and economic outcomes of immigrants to South American colonies, Santiago Perez has helped assess the timespan 1869-90 in Argentina, which had been the second-largest space for the German colonial imagination. In colonial South America, Germans could engage in stable economic and social mobility within two generations.[179] This data also supports Benedict Anderson's idea that colonial-settler nationalist imaginations are by and large "modular," since they are "capable of being transplanted [. . .] to a great variety of social terrains."[180] Anti-Semitism had been one of the modes that German colonial settlers in South America attempted to transplant. Nietzsche made the issue explicit in a letter to Franz Overbeck in October 1885, describing Förster as "talking and riding alternately on his two horses (Paraguay

[176] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 246.
[177] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 247.
[178] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 244.
[179] Santiago Perez, "The (South) American Dream: Mobility and Economic Outcomes of First- and Second Generation Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Argentina," *The Journal of Economic History* 77, No. 4 (2017): 971-2, 980, 1002.
[180] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 4.

and anti-Semitism), and will be doing the same in Saxony in November." He emphasized the covert "mass of work and excitement associated with such tasks":

> There are certainly good enough reasons for not generally trusting the anti-Semites any further than one can see them. And their case is much more popular than one supposes from afar—the whole Prussian nobility is indeed in raptures about it. The idea of colonizing Paraguay is something which I have personally studied, in case there might one day be a refuge for me there too. My conclusion is an unconditional no; my climactic needs are quite the contrary.

As for many Germans, these "two horses" had had a special place in Förster's colonial imagination. So fixed had been this imagination that when Julius Klingbeil's 1885 *Revelations Concerning Dr. Bernhard Förster's Colony New Germany in Paraguay* sought to defame the legitimacy of the colony's legal real-estate possessions, the *Bayreuth Blätter* came to the defense of the Försters.[181] The cultural effects of the relationship between national imagination and "Jewishness" was mapped in *Beyond Good and Evil* §s 250-2, where Nietzsche affirmed the notion that the "Germanness" could feel hardly comfortable absorbing any "quantum of Jew." That the construction of ideological space could be so profoundly influenced by the invention of an imagined national community posed, for Nietzsche, a serious difficulty. He called this the "European problem," that of constructing a trans-European cultural community, of "the breeding of a new ruling caste of Europe" free from the disorders and stupidities of nationalist ideologies. For him, resolving this problem meant determining how European culture could be divorced from the expansion of the national imagination and why it was necessary to resolve the issue after the political and social declination of the aristocracy throughout the nineteenth century.

[181] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 288-9.

"THEY ARE NO PHILOSOPHICAL RACE"

One can hardly consider the many changes of European culture and not regard the invented English national community. Throughout the nineteenth century, British industries led a European trend toward industrialization. As a result, many innovative technologies were transported to places across the Continent. But political influence also spread. This had two results: first, as European ideological space became predominated by the project of constructing national communities, governments turned to British developments in technology to improve local economic conditions. But more importantly, the importation of British liberalism into Continental places hastened many presumptions of national communities toward radical democracy. For Nietzsche, the importation of empiricism and Darwinian naturalism also had profound effects for the invention of national imaginations. One major consequence of this had been that the mechanistic thought of a Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and others had come to set the parameters of European ideological space. "It was *against* Hume that Kant rose up," he wrote, "it was Locke of whom Schelling *had a right* to say: '*je meprise Locke*',"

> in their struggle against the English-mechanic stultification of the world, Hegel and Schopenhauer were of one accord [. . .] What is lacking in England and always has been lacking was realized well enough by that semi-actor and rhetorician, the tasteless muddlehead Carlyle, who tried to conceal behind passionate grimaces what he knew about himself: namely, what was *lacking* in Carlyle — real *power* of spirituality, real *depth* of spiritual insight, in short philosophy. — It is characteristic of such an unphilosophical race that they should cling firmly to Christianity: they *need* its discipline if they are to become more 'moral' and humane. The Englishman [. . .] is [. . .] more pious than the German: he is in greater *need* of Christianity.[182]

[182] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 251

Richard J. Evans has claimed that the British national imagination, where "bourgeois respectability was triumphing over aristocratic licentiousness and plebeian immorality," where "Good causes were not to be doubled or made fun of," and where "what censorship could not suppress, fashion consigned to oblivion," also had culturally imperialist visions.[183] After the dissolution of the Anglican Church, he wrote, English Methodism filled the gaps, and by mid-century, British Methodism boasted a membership of 489,000 members, driven by worries about "the influence of the Enlightenment, and of French revolutionary anticlericalism."[184] The religious morality of the constructed British national community, which instrumentalized the Christian conception of the world as an instrument made for humans, wrote Robin Small, "did not seek another basis but simply took the familiar values as self-evident."[185] For Nietzsche, the work of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin was symptomatic of this imperial ambition among the cultivators of a British national imagination:

> There are truths which are recognized best by mediocre minds because they are most suited to them, there are truths which possess charm and seductive powers only for mediocre spirits — one is brought up against this perhaps disagreeable proposition just at the moment because the spirit of respectable but mediocre Englishmen — I name, Darwin, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer — is starting to gain ascendancy in the mid-region of European taste. Who indeed would doubt that it is useful for *such* spirits to dominate for a while? It would be a mistake to regard exalted spirits who fly off on their own as especially well adapted to identifying, assembling and making deductions from a host of little common facts [. . .] After all, they have more to do than merely know something new [. . .] Finally, let us not forget that the English [. . .] have once before brought about a collective depression of the European spirit: that which is called 'modern ideas' or 'the ideas of the eighteenth century' or even

[183] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 456.
[184] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 458.
[185] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, xx.

> 'French ideas' — that is to say that which the *German* spirit has risen against in profound disgust — was of English origin, there can be no doubt about that. The French have only been the apes and actors of these ideas, [. . .] also unhappily their first and most thorough *victims* [. . .]

Rubinacci's sitting room had not been estranged from the work of Mill, Spencer, or Darwin; because of Rée's insistence on the French moralists on that first visit in autumn 1876, Nietzsche then felt that he could finally wedge his own thought into the contemporary "Darwinism debate." But as far as Nietzsche accepted Rée's premise that Darwinian naturalist thought relativized the valuation of human actions, he would later enter the debate in his typically nuanced way, when filtering Darwinian thought through French moralist writers, leaving distinct traces throughout *Human, All-Too-Human* and *Daybreak*. This was in part due to Nietzsche's sympathies for Darwin's negligence toward traditional, absolutist metaphysics.[186] He had agreed with Rée that, sans absolutist criteria for moral judgments, moral standards simply evolved; thus, natural history and science could better explain than speculative metaphysics how this evolution had happened; this suggested that nineteenth-century European morality originated in primitive human activity that demanded a naturalistic explanation. Darwinism, then, could account better for these primitive activities and how they changed as variations proliferated, whereas others were left in the evolutionary backwaters. It was this moral sense that baselined the rise of modern European moral institutions.

The following three Darwinian constituents, then, defined Nietzsche's thought during the Sorrento period: foremost, the denial of a transcendent moral universe and the belief in the relativity of values; second, the emphasis on naturalism; and, finally, the concentration on biological individuals' struggle for existence. Dirk R. Johnson has postulated that "if one were to

[186] See Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, 68, 83, 102, 187.

highlight these surface similarities between them and recognize the Darwinian association between Nietzsche's *moraliste* period and genealogical preoccupations (mediated, in part, through Rée), then one could easily conclude that Nietzsche's philosophy was essentially compatible with Darwin."[187] Grant this: it nonetheless remains both that European culture of the late nineteenth century had slowly been dominated by Darwinian thought and that Nietzsche was no doubt familiar with it.

Nor had others been ignorant of Darwin's iconic thought. Cesare Lombroso's 1876 *Criminal Man* became a quick best-seller in southern urban spaces, popularizing the view that degrees of criminality could be discerned by examining anatomic or physiological traits, which developed into atavisms, or "evolutionary throwbacks." Raymond Grew has pointed out, moreover, that "[like] most positivists, a committed reformer and something of a socialist, he hoped to solve the glaring social problems of Italy's industrial slums and backward South."[188] Lombroso's views mirrored similar approaches by Enrico Ferri, Gustav Aschaffenburg, and Francis Galton.[189] According to Richard J. Evans, the study of crime and criminality "became the province of medicine and of professional criminology," and arguments began to be raised "in favor of the compulsory sterilization of the 'inferior' populations," not to mention Darwinian applications for capital punishment. Even Rée assumed these principles of heritability for acquired habits, including those of association.[190] From this, Evans has inferred that "what underlay all these changes was the growing power of the state to enforce the law and hence the increasing number of people arrested and condemned for criminal offences."[191] It was true that the effects of nation-

[187] Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, 33-4.
[188] See Raymond Grew, "Culture and Society, 1796-1896," in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. John A. Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 231.
[189] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 439.
[190] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 86.
[191] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 440.

building projects across Europe had profound effects for the construction of ideological space from the top down, and since social and cultural changes often occurred laterally, these changes could not do without an account of the ideas and artifacts proliferating across Europe. Much of the innovation that took place on the European continent was, according to Evans, "a direct result of the importation of British men and ideas as much as machinery," meaning that by the 1880s the imprint of these ideas upon European culture had seemed a *fait accompli* of modern life.[192]

In *Nietzsche and the Anglo-Saxon Tradition*, Louise Mabille has offered lecture courses at the University of Boon in 1865 as the origin of Nietzsche's engagement with the work of the British empiricists, but she inferred incorrectly from both this as well as the academic status of British empiricism as an "important precursor" in the story of Kantian thought that Nietzsche's engagement with the empiricist tradition had been "limited."[193] Surprisingly, however, Paul Rée's name is nowhere present in her chapters on Locke, Hume, or Darwin, let alone the name of Malwida von Meysenbug. Louise Mabille also neglects Nietzsche's frequent visits to the popular Hotel Rosenlaui, where he established a quick friendship with George Croom Robertson, editor and co-founder of the philosophy journal *Mind*. In April 1877, Nietzsche and Croom became fast hotel companions, and Nietzsche had even presented him with his own personal copy of Rée's *The Origin of Moral Sensations*. At the time of their initial visit, Croom had introduced Nietzsche to even more principles of Darwinist thought, and the two had bonded over their shared interest in Darwin's "Biographical Sketch of an Infant."[194] They also discussed the journalism of Walter Bagehot.[195] Conversations between the two had also focused on issues taken up in Herbert Spencer's unpublished manuscript of *The Data of Ethics*, to which Nietzsche had by then almost

[192] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, ibid.
[193] Louise Mabille, *Nietzsche and the Anglo-Saxon Tradition* (London: Continuum, 2009), 73.
[194] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 88-9.
[195] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 121.

gotten full rights to the German translation.[196] By the end of the summer, Croom dispatched a review of Rée's *Origin of Moral Sensations* from the Rosenlaui lobby.[197]

Mabille is correct, however, to suggest that Nietzsche viewed Darwinian thought and utilitarian ethics as of a piece with the expansion of a national ideology across the Continent. Utilitarianism had not been a philosophical doctrine but a manifestation of English imperial or bureaucratic expansionist ambitions, undergirded by Jeremy Bentham's "hedonic calculus" designed to quantify the immediate sensations of pleasure and pain to identify the ultimate standards of what he and his successor John Stuart Mill called the "pleasure principle." In fact, as Small has pointed out, "the apparatus that Rée would suggest for the emergence of a moral sense had been drawn by the work of Mill as much as Locke or Hume."[198] Because Nietzsche likened utilitarianism to a secularized Christian ethics, many of his ideas about utilitarianism were tied with those about Christianity. Already in *Daybreak*, he alleged that "in England [it was] John Stuart Mill who gave the widest currency to the teaching of the sympathetic affects and of pit or the advantage of others as the principle of behavior," and then proceeded to characterize pity as an indirect manifestation of self-interest, of which English imperialism was a species.[199] At § 360, titled *No utilitarians*, Nietzsche contrasted the utilitarianism of Mill with the sentiments of the ancients, who "valued the feeling of power more highly than any sort of utility or good reputation." Nietzsche scholarship cannot, therefore, disassociate Nietzsche's views on utilitarianism from the period of membership in the Rubinacci network, since making sense of Nietzsche's limning of utilitarianism in *Beyond Good and Evil* is crucial to understanding his rejection of ideological imperialism. "Nietzsche's

[196] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 169.
[197] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 28.
[198] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 85.
[199] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality,* trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), § 132-3

individualism," to quote Mabille, "is a rich one, forever straining against its boundaries[.] Nietzsche's self by far exceeds Mill's: it demands a playground beyond liberalism."[200]

Other contemporary developments were important topics at Rubinacci. In addition to Darwin's powerful influence on European thought in general, of perhaps equal influence at the time had been socialism and positivism, both of which proposed systematic epistemologies while setting aside the traditional metaphysical or religious pictures. By the 1830s, the socialist fancies of Robert Owen's — in works like *An Address to the Master Manufacturers of Great Britain: On the Present Existing Evils in the Manufacturing System* (1819), *An Explanation of the Cause of Distress which pervades the civilised parts of the world* (1823), and *An Address to All Classes in the State* (1832) — had spread deep into Europe.[201] The positivists had sought to apply transformative scientific principles to resolve social problems. Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" and helped turn Darwinism into "social Darwinism," applying Darwin's principles to social problems.[202] Social Darwinists no sooner appeared all over Europe; by the 1870s, Spencer's thinking became a common, fundamental ideology of educated Europeans. While progressive social Darwinists sought improvements in housing, hygiene, and nutrition, the stronger version of this approach, embodied in the work of Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, which in part argued for the hereditary basis of human genius and, also, that by selectively breeding to improve human intelligence, a single family could in fact begin to change the future of society, it is no minor point that Galton, in the words of Richard J. Evans, "thought that inferior peoples were threatening the future of the race by producing too many sub-standard children."[203] Evans has traced Galton's

[200] Mabille, *Nietzsche and the Anglo-Saxon Tradition*, ibid.
[201] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 175
[202] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 684.
[203] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 684-5.

ideas back to Arthur de Gobineau, whose 1855 *Essay on the Inequality of the Races* argued against race- or class-mixing.[204]

Rubinacci was not immune from such discursive content. Thus, by the time his 1881 *Daybreak,* Nietzsche had been grappling with it, particularly with the notion of a linear progress of human society, with any supposed British national community supposedly at the helm due to the rapidity of industrialization and the influence of democratization, with Europeans as unwilling, often useful idiots of this national community. Events of the 1870s left Nietzsche curious about the extent to which Europe had then been primed for the many technologies and ideas many of its peoples imbued with a specific meaning, namely as "British."

"FRENCH 'TASTE'" IN THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN CULTURE

§ 254 of *Beyond Good and Evil* was penned as a story about "Frenchness" in European culture and society throughout the nineteenth century. "Even now," he wrote, "France is still the seat of Europe's most spiritual and refined culture and the leading school of taste." Still, his thought continued

> One has to know how to find this 'France of taste'. He who belongs to it keeps himself well hidden. [. . .] One thing they all have in common: they shut their ears to the raving stupidity and the noisy yapping of the democratic *bourgeois.* Indeed, it is a coarse and stupid France that trundles in the foreground today [. . .] Something else too they have in common: a great will to resist spiritual Germanization — and an even greater ability to do so! Perhaps Schopenhauer has now become more at home and indigenous in this France of the spirit, which is also a France of pessimism, than he ever was in Germany; not only to speak of Heinrich Heine, who has long since entered into the flesh and blood of the more refined and

[204] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 685-6.

> demanding lyric poets of Paris, or of Hegel, who today, in the shape of Taine — that is to say, in that of the *first* of living historians — exercises an almost tyrannical influence. As for Richard Wagner, however: the more French music learns to shape itself according to the actual needs of the *ame modern*, the more will it 'Wagnerize', that one can safely predict — it is doing so sufficiently already!

But because French culture had been driven by a "capacity for artistic passions, for devotions to *form*, for which [. . .] the term *l'art pour l'art* has been devised," because of the "ancient, manifold, *moralistic*" qualities of the news publications and the "*boulevardiers de Paris*" made possible by Georges-Eugène Haussmann's urban innovations of the 1860s, and because French culture had managed a "half-achieved synthesis of north and south which makes them understand many things," there had to exist something like a "taste" immune to the desire to construct an exclusive national imagination, reveling in what he called "an understanding in advance and welcome for those rarer and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find any satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north and the north in the south — for born Midlanders, the 'good Europeans'. — It was for them that *Bizet* made music[.]"

Prior to the Revolution, "Frenchness" had been the product of interactions between nobility, clergy, and commoners. "Historians who employ modern categories based on social class [. . .] to describe eighteenth-century French society," wrote Jeremy D. Popkin, "risk overlooking the important divisions within those groups, and the importance of the group identifications that mattered the most to the people of the time."[205] Before the Revolution, the nobility was shaped by "new cultural models of family life such as those propagated in the best-selling novels of Jean Jacques Rousseau."[206] Culture during this time was driven primarily by the aristocracy, as even

[205] Popkin, *History of Modern France*, 8.
[206] Popkin, *History of Modern France*, 9.

the thought of the *philosophes* had descended from aristocratic thought. Beginning with his first visit to Sorrento, Voltaire proved significant not only to Nietzsche's intellectual network, but to the development of Nietzsche's own work; it also made a significant impression on post-Napoleonic France. Voltaire retained many of the earlier noble preoccupations with distance from the commonplace: "When the populace becomes involved in thinking, all is lost."[207]

The manifestation of Utopian socialism had been the correlate of the "revolutionary zeal" of post-Napoleonic conceptions of "Frenchness." Following Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, whose central concern was "working with all [his] might to ameliorate the condition of [his] fellows,"[208] many highly trained, educated, and talented people, particularly those associated with the coming world of industry, such as engineers, technologists, and bankers, all sympathized with his thinking. His secretary was Auguste Comte, later the founder of sociology, and others often cited the significance of Saint-Simon's 1822 *Of the Industrial System*. Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy*, published between 1830 and 1842, established firmly the foundations of organized positivist thought from Saint Simon's ideas. In the early 1830s, Felix Mendelssohn became the first composer associated publicly with Saint Simon's followers.[209] Ralph P. Locke has translated Mendelssohn's letters of the period in full to better comprehend the nature of this association. The composer's initial attraction had been taken up in a letter of January 1832 to Karl Immermann, "I thoroughly enjoy and admire Paris, and am becoming better acquainted with it. [. . .] I have thrown myself right into the whirlpool, and do nothing the whole day long but see new things: the Chambers of Peers and Deputies, paintings and theaters, dio-, neo-, cosmo-, and panoramas, social gatherings, and so forth," where "and so forth" was a stand-

[207] Popkin, *History of Modern France*, 9-10.
[208] Quoted in Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 173.
[209] Ralph P Locke, "Mendelssohn's collision with the Saint-Simonians," in *Mendelssohn and Schumann: Essays on Their Music and Its Context,* eds. Jon W. Finson and R. Larry Todd (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984), 109.

in for the socialist meetings held by Saint Simon's followers; the much longer letter of January 14 makes explicit the association: "I have an appeal to all people by Olinde Rodrigues, in which he presents his confession of faith and calls upon everyone to give a portion of his fortune, as small as one may wish, to the Saint-Simonians."[210] Many of Saint-Simon's other followers included Prosper Enfantin, Pierre Leroux, from whose work the French word for "socialism" stems, and Louis Blanc, whose 1839 essay *The Organization of Labor* endorsed profit-sharing methods of factory management, coining the famous dictum "[to] each according to his needs."[211]

But, as Evans has pointed out, utopian socialism was not caged within constructed national boundaries. For instance, Wilhelm Weitling's 1845 *The Gospel of Poor Sinners* established that Christian doctrines formed the bases of communism. Weitling's proposal was to force socialist or communist noesis onto society by a "millenarian uprising of 40,000 convicted criminals."[212] At the same time, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who like the socialists set his powers to addressing the post-Napoleonic world, had made similar proposals.[213] This determination was shared by some of what were called the Young Hegelians, an intellectual network active until the 1880s. When Mikhail Bakunin was in Paris beginning in 1842, he had published a lengthy Hegelian article urging "the realization of freedom" and attacking "the rotted and withered remains of conventionality," offering instead a prophetic vision of the rise of the anarcho-extremist tactics later popularized during the revolutions or uprisings of 1848/9: "The passion for destruction is also a creative passion."[214] (Bakunin's cohorts in Paris included Karl Marx, who Bakunin considered "morose, vain, and treacherous."[215])

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[210] Locke, "Mendelssohn's collisions," 112-13.
[211] Locke, "Mendelssohn's collisions," Ibid.
[212] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 174.
[213] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 175.
[214] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 176.
[215] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.

Angele Kremer-Marietti has described Nietzsche's appeal to historical philosophy in *Human, All-Too-Human* as having been "entirely in Comte's sense," though he admits that, Nietzsche's knowledge of Comte came secondhand via Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism* of 1865.[216] But there are serious problems for this view. For one thing, when Comte *had* appeared in Nietzsche's publications, it had not been till 1881's *Daybreak,* as having provided a philosophy that is the next logical step of outmoded religious thought.[217] Jonathan R. Cohen has gone so far as to claim that even the passages Kremer-Marietti cited are certainly ambiguous at best.[218] Therefore, there is no solid, direct connection between Nietzsche and the thought of Comte, though he had no doubt been aware of Bakunin's and Mendelssohn's sojourns through centers for radical Parisian politics as much as the memoirs of Saint-Simon.

This (non-)association has beguiled Nietzsche scholarship: namely, by raising the question of which version of socialism Nietzsche himself had been criticizing in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Few scholars have gotten clear about what Nietzsche meant by "socialism" as it appears in the text. While the names Comte and Saint-Simon *do* appear both in Nietzsche's notebooks of 1884/5 as well as the text of *Beyond Good and Evil*, an appeal to the presence of their names in the text does little to connect Nietzsche's critique against socialism to these forebearers. There are, at any rate, some clues in the scholarship that may help to map the text of *Beyond Good and Evil* onto socialist ideological spaces.

Robin Small has fleshed out the influence of Eugen Dühring on Nietzsche's thinking from the 1870s on, which, for historical reasons, can perhaps help to trace better the target of Nietzsche's attack on socialist movements. According to Small, Nietzsche had confronted Dühring's thought

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[216] See Cohen, *Science, Culture, Free Spirits*, 253, for discussion of Kremer-Marietti.
[217] Nietzsche, *Daybreak,* § 132
[218] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, 253-4

in its many facets. For one thing, in developing the theme of the eternal recurrence in his 1883 *Gay Science* Nietzsche contested, contra Dühring, that "the adequacy of understanding a past infinity in terms of an infinite regress from the present moment" was a direct affront toward Dühring's work on time.[219] Be that as it may, Nietzsche had not simply rejected Dühring's thoroughgoing finitism, conceding Dühring's "law of definite number," the idea that whatever can be counted must have some definite and limited magnitude. He disagreed with Dühring that this idea suggested only an *a priori* answer to the question about the finitude of the world was necessary. Moreover, by 1875 Nietzsche had made several marginal notes in his personal copy of Dühring's *The Dignity of Life* of ten years earlier.[220] It is most likely, then, that Nietzsche also aimed his attacks on socialism primarily at Dühring's output. Nietzsche's mature thinking about society and culture "[arose] out of a dialogue with [. . .] Eugen Dühring," from whom Nietzsche would eventually upturn the term *ressentiment*, adding that although it is generally accepted that the term was first employed by Nietzsche to address moral phenomena, this would be a mistake: "we can see that he transformed the concept and turned it into a much more powerful instrument of theorizing than it had been in the hands of its originator."[221]

Historians have drawn the connection between Dühring and the socialist ideologies of the nineteenth century. Günter Krause has underlined that the preoccupation of Marx and Engels with Dühring was accorded central importance in the history of Marxism. Krause pointed out that by 1867, there began a "scientific and political controversy [. . .] between Eugen Dühring on the one side and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the other," which "took in equally questions of

[219] See Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context* (New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), xvii.
[220] Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 174.
[221] Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, xix-xx.

philosophy, economics, history and also ideas and concepts of socialism."[222] This controversy, Krause has explained, had two "phases." The first phase of the connection centered on Dühring's review of Marx's 1867 C*apital*, which contained a "comparatively multi-layered contemplation of Dühring the economist," by which time Marx described Dühring's two-fold revolution in political economics: "He has done two things," Marx wrote, "published, first, a *Critical Foundation of Political Economy* and, second, a new *Natural Dialectic* [against the Hegelian]."[223] Krause has shown how Dühring's thought had been endorsed enthusiastically by Marx during this first phase, citing two January 1868 letters to Engels that upheld Dühring's review of his own work as "very decent" but that since Dühring was a university professor, he was an embodiment of "academic normality."[224] Thus, Dühring could not be a true revolutionary due to the "embarrassment and funk" of his assessment of Marx's work.[225]

For Krause, the second and most publicly infamous phase began in the early to mid-1870s, culminating in Engels's *Herr Dühring's Revolution in Science*, published in Leipzig in 1878.[226] With his review of Marx's second, revised 1872 edition of *Capital*, Dühring had been catapulted into the collective German worker and socialist imagination, as much for his work in philosophy and economics in addition to his "social blueprints," forcing Marx's and Engels's hands to critically engage with Dühring's work. "This was," noted Krause, "a matter of following if and how their anti-capitalist emancipation project could be brought into discredit and danger through his ideas on society and socialism."[227] This meant that "the form of their engagement [with

[222] Günter Krause, "Eugen Dühring in the perspective of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels," *Journal of Economic Studies* 29, nos. 4/5 (2002): 345.
[223] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 346-7.
[224] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 347
[225] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 348-9.
[226] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 350.
[227] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 350-1.

Dühring's thought] was dominated [. . .] by calculations of power politics."[228] Engels's critique in *Herr Dühring's Revolution in Science* had a tripartite structure: critique of Dühring's philosophical, economic and socialist theories. Philosophically, Engels criticized Dühring for his "divergently answered questions of natural philosophy, of morality and law and of dialectics" under the rubric of a "philosophy of reality," which Engels deplored as otiose and problematic.[229] Economically speaking, Engels accused Dühring of having understood falsely the relationship of both production and distribution, on the one hand, and the theory of capital and surplus value, on the other, challenging Dühring about the actual cause of economic processes throughout history.[230] Likewise, Marx disputed the principals of socialism espoused in Dühring's *Critical History of Economics and Socialism* of 1875. Krause described how "the form of approach of Marx towards Dühring [. . .] verifies the fact that no systematic treatment of the history of theory was [. . .] intended," writing to Engels to express the difficulties of establishing his own theory of surplus value and socialistic economics against the backdrop of Dühring's criticisms without "training all [his] guns on the man": "Once more in plain words," Marx wrote, "should my point of view be taken up by bunglers and got wrong, before I have a chance to present it."[231]

Political scientist and historian Alberto Chilosi has recently paid some attention to the variety of socialism Dühring had developed. "If the possibility of an influence of Dühring's 'socialitarian' model on Marxist socialism is a matter of speculation," he wrote, "there is a stream of non-Marxian socialism which was more clearly influenced by Dühring and where his influence is explicitly acknowledged."[232] Chilosi, also offered three characteristics of this "socialitarian model": first, the

[228] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 353
[229] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," Ibid.
[230] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 354.
[231] Krause, "Eugen Dühring," 356-7.
[232] Alberto Chilosi, "Dühring's 'socialitarian' model of economic communes and its influence on the development of socialist thought and practice," *Journal of Economic Studies* 29, nos. 4/5 (2002): 294.

system of economic communes that prop up this model must each "have a territorial basis"; second, given such a basis, these communes form a "comprehensive system of economic organization" with their members "bound together to common activity"; finally, land-use issues are public issues independent of both private ownership and public (governmental) ownership, since both had perpetuated "the exploitative characteristics of violence-based ownership [. . .] so long as it continues to be based on excludability."[233]

For Dühring, "free access to semi-public goods is granted through the freedom of membership in the commune," and only whole communes, and not their members, may qualify for the right to hold or access property rights: "the right to land and soil and to economic infrastructure, as well as obviously that to dwelling-houses," Dühring wrote, "no longer has the character of the old exclusive property, suited to the comprehensive exploitation of the labor force":

> It is replaced by a form of availability under public law, which outwardly also does not have the power to behave exclusively, insofar as between the different communes there is freedom to move and settle anywhere and an obligation to accept new members according to given legal norms and administrative regulations.[234]

While individuals, for Dühring, would be able to move from commune to commune freely, this often meant membership was sanctioned by decision makers within a given commune, which, like other communal activities, would depend on prevailing territorial and on political organization.[235] Rural areas, all the while, were where communes were to have been "concerned with large-scale cultivation of the soil," urban and industrial areas had to be those where membership was to be tied to local production quotas "according, first of all, to political subdivision considerations [. . .]

[233] Chilosi, "Dühring's 'socialitarian' model of economic communes," Ibid.
[234] Chilosi, "Dühring's 'socialitarian' model of economic communes," 294-5.
[235] Chilosi, "Dühring's 'socialitarian' model of economic communes," Ibid.

and should be founded on the basis of the right, according to public law, to all sorts of means of production, dwellings and their furniture."[236]

When Nietzsche referred to the "desire" of socialists to "produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number" in *Human, All-Too Human*, he had both Dühring's "socialitarian model" of economic communes as well as the prescribed non-violent basis of the formation of such communes in mind: "If the enduring homeland of this good life, the perfect state, were really achieved," Nietzsche wrote, "it would destroy the earth from which a man of great intellect, or any powerful individual grows [. . .] When this state is achieved, mankind would have become too feeble to produce genius any longer"; he surmised that "[this] state is a clever institution for protecting individuals from one another; if one goes too far in ennobling it, the individual is ultimately weakened by it, even dissolved — and thus the original purpose of [any] state is most thoroughly thwarted."[237] Elsewhere, Nietzsche tackled the matter of socialist conceptions of justice, again with a nod in Dühring's direction:

> For men who always consider the higher usefulness of a matter, socialism, if it *really* is the uprising against their oppressors of people oppressed and kept down for thousands of years, poses no problem of *justice* [. . .] but only a problem of *power* [. . .] To solve that question of power, one must know how strong socialism is, and in which of its modifications it can still be used as a might lever within the current political power game; in some circumstances one would even have to do everything possible to strengthen it. With every great force (even the most dangerous), humanity must think how to make it into a tool of its own intentions. Socialism gains a right only when the two powers, the representatives of old and new, seem to have come to war, but then both parties prudently calculate how they may preserve themselves to best advantage, and this results in their desire for a treaty. No justice without

[236] Chilosi, "Dühring's 'socialitarian' model of economic communes," Ibid.
[237] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), § 235.

> a treaty. Until now, however, there has been neither war in the indicated territory, nor treaties, and thus no rights, and no "ought" either.[238]

At § 451, moreover, Nietzsche tested the idea that "a socialistic way of thought, based on justice, is possible" against the history of culture, concluding that only the ruling caste would have to be on board with the idea in order to affect changes. But this was a serious problem for Nietzsche in *Human, All-Too Human*, since "to *demand* equality of rights, as do the socialists and the subjugated caste, never results from justice but from covetousness," that "[if] one shows the beast bloody pieces of meat close by, and then draws them away again until it finally roars, do you think this roar means justice?"[239] Because of this problem, it seemed to Nietzsche that "[socialism] can serve as a rather brutal and forceful way to teach the danger of all accumulations of state power, and to that extent instill one with distrust of the state itself."[240] It seems then to have appeared that Nietzsche was then drawn to the conclusion that "the two opposing parties, the socialistic and the nationalistic [. . .] deserve one another: in both of them, envy and laziness are the moving powers."[241] Dühring's socialist model had proven only another effect of the construction of national communities, because of its requisite territorialism and communism. For this reason, to ger clearer about which socialist model Nietzsche had in mind at Sils-Maria, his reading of Dühring in the 1870s cannot be overlooked.

In fact, Dühring was clearly a target of much of Nietzsche's criticism of socialism, perceived not only to presuppose the necessity of constructing national communities, but as posing difficulties for the development of a cultural ones:

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[238] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, § 446
[239] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, § 451
[240] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, § 473
[241] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, § 480

> In general and broadly speaking, it may have been above all the human, all too human element, in short the poverty of the most recent philosophy itself, which has been most thoroughly prejudicial to respect for philosophy and has opened the gates to the instinct of the plebeian. For one must admit how completely the whole species of a Heraclitus, a Plato, an Empedocles, and whatever else these royal and splendid hermits of the spirit were called, is lacking in our modern world; and to what degree, in face of such representatives of philosophy as are, thanks to fashion, at present as completely on top as they are completely abysmal (in Germany, for example, the two lions of Berlin, the anarchist Eugen Dühring and the amalgamist Eduard von Hartmann) — a worthy man of science is *justified* in feeling he is of a better species and descent. It is, in particular, the sight of those hotchpotch-philosophers who call themselves 'philosophers of reality' or 'positivists' which is capable of implanting a perilous mistrust in the soul of an ambitious young scholar [. . .] they are one and all defeated men *brought back* under the sway of science [. . .] and who now honorably, wrathfully, revengefully represent by word and deed the *unbelief* in the lordly task and lordliness of philosophy. Finally: how could things be otherwise! Science is flourishing today [. . .] while that to which the whole of modern philosophy has gradually sunk [. . .] arouses distrust and displeasure when it does not arouse mockery and pity. Philosophy reduced to 'theory of knowledge' [. . .] a philosophy that does not even get over the threshold and painfully *denies* itself the right of entry [. . .] How could such a philosophy — *rule!*[242]

Since socialist ideology had been positioned closely with the work of Dühring in Nietzsche's ideological space, it was through Dühring that Nietzsche could make sense of its social and intellectual effects. Because implanted socialist ideology was possible at any moment, particularly since it required the construction of a national community, Nietzsche assumed that by impeding the cultural imperialism of constructed nationalities one could have eliminated the need for socialist thought.[243]

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[242] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 204.
[243] See Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 203.

Likewise, in the sciences and arts European thought had been both facilitating and resistant to cultural nationalism throughout the nineteenth century. Historians Frederick Beiser, Michael Friedman, and Jesper Lützen, for example, have shown how the construction of nationalities was in part a corollary to the rise of scientific interest in the work of Immanuel Kant during roughly the last half of the century. Beiser has shown how the central importance of the philosophy of nature propounded by romanticists F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, which began with the former's attempt to extend and transform the dynamical theory of matter Kant had presented in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to embrace newly discovered phenomena in chemistry and electricity and magnetism. The role of this romantic-style philosophy of nature has been traced through to Oersted's discovery of electromagnetism during the early nineteenth century, while also addressing the importance of this romantic impetus in the intellectual development of Hermann von Helmholtz, a sharp critic of European idealists and romantics. Lützen has also provided an account of Helmholtz's influence on Henri Poincaré, who "defended broadly Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophical positions."[244] Poincaré's commitment to preserving Euclidean geometry, for example, in the face of the radically new physical developments, represented a conservative philosophical impulse that also futher aligned him with contemporary neo-Kantian thought, having "[tended] to stress the simplicity of the classical image of mechanics," even with regard to his own non-Euclidean research; this research, in turn, spun out all across Europe by the dawn of the twentieth century.[245]

[244] Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, eds. "Editor's Introduction," in *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), 3.
[245] Jesper Lützen "Images and Conventions: Kantianism, Empiricism, and Conventionalism in Hertz's and Poincaré's Philosophies of Space and Mechanics," in *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century,* eds. Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), 330.

In the arts, too, the cultural nationalism became a linchpin of "Frenchness," particularly due to Wagner's music for *Parsifal*. But this process was stunted often by political activism within the cultural public sphere of the middle class. That said, when Nietzsche linked Wagner and the construction of "Frenchness," when he says that the more the latter modernizes, the more will it nationalize its culture. Nietzsche may have been on the mark here. Historian Anya Suchitzky has analyzed how Vincent d'Indy's 1897 opera *Fervaal* bore similarities to Wagner's *Parsifal* of fifteen years earlier; beyond the varied textual (in the case of the libretto) and formal (in the case of the musical notation) properties the two operas have in common, Suchitzky has placed d'Indy in Bayreuth on a few occasions, primarily in the late 1870s and early 1880s, even expressing sympathies for Wagner's antisemitic writings.[246] More importantly, however, she has shown how d'Indy "[responded] to Wagner's advice to French musicians to base their operas on their own myths and history," and that "the tensions with *Parsifal* elicited a strong assertion of French identity in *Fervaal*." However, Suchitzky was quick to remark that this "assertion" had been possible only if "articulated in terms of the repertory from which it seeks distance."[247] Her conclusion was that *Fervaal* was "an important reminder of the role of critical reception in the construction of the meaning of a work," insisting how "the common origin of *Fervaal* and *Parsifal* makes us aware not only that perspectives on *Fervaal*'s reception have been complicated by the composer's [. . .] distance from the events [of the 1880s and 90s]."[248] For this reason, *Fervaal*, "[rather] than trying to escape Wagner, [. . .] adopted him as a scaffold with which to fortify the

[246] Anya Suschitzky, "*Fervaal*, *Parsifal*, and French National Identity," *19th-Century Music* 25, nos. 2-3 (2002), 259-61.
[247] Suschitzky, "*Fervaal*, *Parsifal*, and French National Identity," 245.
[248] Suschitzky, "*Fervaal*, *Parsifal*, and French National Identity," 265.

French tradition against modernism," from which perspective "Wagner represented a lost and valued tradition."[249]

Nor had French historians seemed to Nietzsche to have avoided the seduction toward cultural nationalism. § 254 mentions Hippolyte Taine as "the *first* of living historians," but cautions to add the "tyrannical" influence Hegelian thought had on his work. Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche's childhood friend, received a letter a year or so after the publication of *Beyond Good and Evil* that had helped clear up Nietzsche's train of thought; for Nietzsche, Taine had followed in the footsteps of Heinrich von Sybel, whose journal *Historische Zeitschrift,* established in 1859, is reputed to have inspired not only Gabriel Monod's creation of the *Revue historique* in 1876, but also Lord Acton's *English Historical Review* in 1886, both of which were the models for Cornell University's *American Historical Review* in 1895. In Nietzsche's letter, Sybel's 1867 *History of the Revolutionary Period, 1789 to 1795* was described in relation to some "relevant problems" in Taine's work. "I am just reading Sybel's chief work, [. . .] where I find, for example, this proud thought: 'The feudal regime, and not its collapse, gave birth to egoism, avarice, violence, and cruelty, which led to the terrors of the September massacres' [. . .]," adding that "I think that that is 'liberalism' in the act of self-recognition; [. . .] such a blatant hatred of the whole social order of the Middle Ages consorts excellently with the most considerate treatment of Prussian history."[250]

The variety of liberalism he had in mind was Taine's, whose *The Origins of Contemporary France*, most of which had been published by 1883, was bartered to Nietzsche for both his 1883 *Gay Science* and, eventually, 1885's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Each admired the other's research

[249] Suschitzky, "*Fervaal*, *Parsifal*, and French National Identity," Ibid.
[250] Letter to Franz Overbeck, July/August, 1887.

interests. Nietzsche often recommended Taine's work on the role of a "social unconscious."[251] It was often Taine's version of liberalism that featured in *Beyond Good and Evil*'s larger attacks on liberalism itself. Unlike previous versions of liberalism and their common rationalist underpinnings, because it depended on a picture of human nature and mental life that the emerging study of psychology had come to problematize. Alan Pitt has described two aspects of Taine's thinking toward the irrational in this connection: "in his early career there was a certain irrationalism in his academic approach to psychology, a renewal of empirical [. . .] science, and thereafter, [. . .] a more telling and wide-ranging irrationalism in the [*Origins of Contemporary France*]." In addition, developing on the theme of the unconscious to analyze societies historically would "be his most lasting innovation[.]" For Taine, his major inspiration for these ideas came from Schelling and Hegel, whose collective spirit he juxtaposed cuttingly with his own. In fact, Taine had been abroad in Germany throughout the 1850s, "struck (in this he was quite conventional of course) by the naturalness of German life, instinctive and emotional, unmediated by socializing factors, any sense of the need to charm or of public responsibility[.]" Taine, in short, was of the view that social conventions were often "obstacles to Truth."

With Taine's *Origins of Contemporary France*, Nietzsche was confronted with the idea of an unconscious residue of older social arrangements that affects future generations. Here, then, Nietzsche's remark about Taine's connection with Hegel can be understood. Like Hegel's idealistic philosophy of history, Taine's view had emphasized how this residue was inexplicable to wholesale scientific or positivistic analysis, since both are its products. Pitt has conclusively remarked that "Taine deserved to be placed again in the mainstream of European thought, where his irrationalism paved the way for the revolt against positivism by the final years of the century."

[251] See Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 447, 480; see also Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 292, 297.

If true, it is likely the case that only through Hegel could Taine begin to launch his attacks, since for Hegel human history coincided with that of *Absolute Spirit*, an inner set of principles made explicit through rigorous cerebration, whose afterglow manifested in the art, law and politics, religion, or philosophy of any age.[252] Once manifested in these forms, the ideas or principles continued to work themselves out through a process of antithesis and synthesis, in which opposed ideas are resolved in the long run, given the long-term influence of any residues on future generations.[253] For this reason, the philosopher had to be a sort of historian to have achieved the highest probability allowable about this; hence, the unconscious dregs of previous generations could not have been apparent to members of those generations themselves but had to be interpreted by later generations. This, by Taine's lights, was the job precisely of the historian and naturalist. Nietzsche's remarks about him in § 254 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, then, can be coherently historically justified. And Given Nietzsche's own lamentations about the influence of "Hegelry," it is therefore unsurprising that he found Taine's connection to Hegel worthy of precaution, having been itself a mark of the construction of national communities in nineteenth-century Europe.

Gregory Moore has provided reason to believe that Nietzsche had been well familiar with Taine as early as the mid-1870s, when Nietzsche first read Taine's 1865 *Philosophy of Art*, with its "post-Darwinian attempt to account for the artistic impulse and to describe and categorize artworks in terms of the influence of heredity and the environment on the human organism."[254] For Taine, the social norms of different communities and their developments formed environmental pressures that determined the evolution of the species, where these norms functioned as sets of "selective principle[s] for different species of talent."[255] Like most naturalists of the nineteenth century, Taine

[252] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 60.
[253] Cate, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 61.
[254] Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 111.
[255] Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, ibid.

had certainly been familiar with this thought through the brainwork of neo-Lamarckians since the 1860s. The career of naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck spanned from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. Neo-Lamarckians of the 1860s and 70s, however, had not been so much a revival of Lamarck's research frameworks or models as it had been about offering a response to the unresolved problems of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*. Generally, they endorsed the view that inheritability of acquired characteristics formed the basis of the evolution of the species.[256] Like the neo-Lamarckians, Taine necessarily rejected Lamarck's idea that organisms had a tendency toward progress but retained the notion that adaptation of organisms to their environment is what determined the degree of progress in evolutionary terms, in fact driving evolution along.[257] Like Lamarck, Taine argued that this adaptive force was powered by the interaction of organisms with their environment, by the use and disuse of certain characteristics.

While Nietzsche's own relationship with Lamarck and neo-Lamarckian thought has gained recent steam in scholarly discussions, his relationship with Georges Bizet, to whom he ascribed musical form divorced from nationalistic pretensions, has remained relatively unexamined, at least given that Nietzsche saw Bizet's opera *Carmen* about twenty times.[258] Bizet had adapted his opera from a libretto inspired by Prosper Merimee. Unlike Wagner's *Ring* or *Die Meistersinger*, Bizet's *Carmen* was a work of high drama with a strongly realistic and simple story to tell. Realism entered the European opera scene in southern spaces after Italian unification, a companion to the *verismo* literary movement. Like other realist operas, *Carmen* drew consternation in Paris during its initial runs of 1875-6. "All of these bourgeois," Bizet complained, "have not understood a wretched word

[256] See W.F. Bynum, E.J. Browne, and Roy Porter, eds., *Dictionary of the History of Science*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 296.
[257] See the argument in Alan Pitt, "The Irrationalist Liberalism of Hippolyte Taine," *The Historical Journal*, 41, no. 4 (1998).
[258] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 195.

of the work I have written for them."[259] According to Richard J. Evans, during those first runs, *Carmen* "ran to half-empty houses, and after a brief revival in 1876 it was not performed in Paris again until 1883."[260] Bizet's opera, however, was much more successful in places where nationalist cultural politics was established recently, firmly. Indeed, realist operas were crucial apparatuses in the cultivation of the imagined national community across Europe during the late nineteenth century. By mid-century, opera in Italy had become a piece of pop-culture, crucial to the order of Italian nationalist cultural politics, achieved particularly by Giuseppe Verdi's and Saverio Mercadante's depictions of ordinary people confronted with the great issues affecting European civilization.[261] In Vienna, *Carmen*'s subtle commentary about the passions and the place of the emotions in the lives of the working poor had been a modest success.[262] Evans has attempted to cast *Carmen* in its own midcentury historical milieu, a time when "[women] were generally believed to be more dexterous and better at delicate work than men, but their employment outside the home was also concentrated in areas that extended their conventional domestic roles to the outside world, in the food and drink industries, in clothing manufacture and cleaning, and in domestic service."[263] Only after realism and naturalism became dominant forces in French culture — i.e., the early 1880s — would operas like *Carmen* receive stronger attention in Parisian musical spaces.

By 1874, only four years after the incorporation of Rome into the fresh-constructed Italian state, a conference of political reformers was called, resulting in the founding of the *Opera dei Congressi*, an association of Catholic lay organizations that would play an influential role in the

[259] Quoted in Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 526
[260] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.
[261] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.
[262] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.
[263] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 336.

constructed image of "Italianness." This association had two implications: globally speaking, the organization reflected the influence of the Church in southern European societies, with both diocesan committees and parish committees. But, as David I. Kertzer has pointed out, the association established also local youth organizations "devoted to providing credit for peasants, and others devoted to the problems faced by non-agricultural workers."[264] Raymond Grew has added that the *Opera dei Congressi* "maintained a fusillade of cultural criticism" with its "24 daily newspapers and more than 150 other periodicals."[265] When Nietzsche first saw *Carmen* in Genoa, one can speculate that it had been likely a production of the association, which made the strongest push in Italy for a strong musical culture.[266]

Nietzsche's admiration for *Carmen* is clear not only from his letters of autumn and winter 1881, but in his 1883 book *The Gay Science*. In this publication, Nietzsche had already adopted a geographical vocabulary as a heuristic, metaphorical device to convey a distinction with music devised to assist in the construction of a national image. George H. Leiner has suggested that what Nietzsche had admired most about *Carmen* is better framed within the context of the project of this book. According to Leiner, what Nietzsche liked about Bizet's opera cannot be removed from "what is meant [in *The Gay Science*] by 'giving style' to one's character, with this basic concept being analysed in terms of three elements: *amor fati* [literally 'love of {one's} fate], the willingness to take risks in life, and finally the careful measure and rhythm which must be incorporated into the style of one's life."[267] "Not only does Carmen show her discipline and resolution in her spoken words," Leiner added, "but they are there in her dance as well. In this she shows her demand for

[264] See David I. Kertzer, "Religion and society, 1789-1892," in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. John A. Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 198-9.
[265] Grew, "Culture and society, 1796-1896," 230.
[266] See Kertzer, "Religion and society, 1789-1892," 199-200.
[267] George H. Leiner, "To Overcome One's Self: Nietzsche, Bizet, and Wagner," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 9, nos. 9/10 (1995): 133.

absolute freedom is not licentious license, not a laisser aller, but the freedom to define her own center of gravity. [. . .] She demands the prerogative to establish the meter of her life, whether a habanera, a seguidilla, or the time and place of her own death."[268] With both its now-popular habanera or its "hymn-like" duet of Micaela and Don Jose, adapted from Spanish indigenous music, had struck Nietzsche as the total synthesis of the musical ideas of Wagner's operas with the realism of southern operas.[269] Thus, Leiner's conclusion: *Carmen* "illuminate[d] the idea of self-overcoming," since "when one attempts to grasp what Nietzsche is suggesting to us as a way to build our characters, we can find vitality for that image by bringing to our mind Carmen, a single acacia held lightly between her lips"; likewise, "when we want to find an image to warn us away from the opposite extreme, we can bring to mind loutish Siegfried, stomping about Brunhilde, braying to all who will listen of his unbridled passion. Which would Nietzsche recommend? The answer is clear."[270] For Nietzsche, Bizet's *Carmen* had been the first music Nietzsche heard since Wagner that could escape the construction of a purely national image, in effect scoring the rise of a transnational European cultural community.

"EXPERIMENTALISM" AS A STRATEGY OF SELF-EXCLUSION

In 1878/9, Malwida von Meysenbug purchased the Villa Mattei, located atop the Caelian Hill in southeast Rome. A frequent guest lodger, Nietzsche enjoyed reading and reciting from the book he was writing, *The Gay Science*, which he had begun in Genoa after first seeing *Carmen*.[271] The manuscripts' variegated contents formed a piece of the bedrock of an intellectual network established at Mattei, composed mainly of Meysenbug, Nietzsche, Rée, and a young Russian

[268] Leiner, "To Overcome One's Self," 142.
[269] Leiner, "To Overcome One's Self," Ibid.
[270] Leiner, "To Overcome One's Self," 143.
[271] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 202.

émigré named Lou Salome. It was in this book that Nietzsche penned what is today his most infamous passage:

> Have you not heard of the madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the marketplace, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!"? [. . .] "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. *We have killed him*—you and I. [. . .] God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.[272]

Many of the topical themes taken up in the Rubinacci drawing room had also been taken up by this Mattei contingent, but the direction changed. Robin Small has argued that *That Gay Science* was important "because it mark[ed] a further refinement of his skill in the genre [of aphorism]," where "[one] could say that it [was] Nietzsche's answer to Paul Rée's *Psychological Observations*[.]"[273] "Not surprisingly," he added, "the themes [of *The Gay Science*] overlap with *Psychological Observations*," and because of this the book has been viewed as the prelude to the end of their friendship.[274] Small has speculated that Nietzsche's change of heart toward Rée had been the result of Nietzsche's increasing interest in the natural sciences and epistemology.[275]

Nietzsche scholars have cited *The Gay Science* as a statement of Nietzsche's blossoming "philosophical experimentalism." Walter Kaufmann claimed that by 1883 Nietzsche had already been "investigated his problems without any clear notion of possible systematic implications," and this new book had amounted to the continuation of that attitude.[276] Both Jacob Folomb and Volker Gerhardt have followed Kaufmann in concluding that *The Gay Science* was a product of Nietzsche's growing interest in naturalist epistemologies.[277] Lester H. Hunt has identified

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[272] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), § 125.
[273] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 64.
[274] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, 65.
[275] Ibid., 66.
[276] Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 187-8.
[277] See Rebecca Bamford, "The Ethos of Inquiry: Nietzsche on Experience, Naturalism, and Experimentalism," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 47, no. 1 (2016): 10.

Nietzsche's "experimentalism" as a strictly moral, as opposed to quasi-scientific, concept: moral observation does not demand any overarching moral principle, only moral propositions are believed to be true.[278] Hunt has drawn on § 110 of *The Gay Science* to demonstrate his point: "the *strength* of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, [. . .] thus knowledge became a piece of life itself, and hence a continually growing power"

> until eventually knowledge collided with those primeval basic errors: two lives, two powers, both in the same human being. A thinker is now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be also a life-preserving power. Compared to the significance of this fight, everything else is a matter of indifference: the ultimate question about the conditions of life has been posed here, and we confront the first attempt to answer this question by experiment. To what extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the experiment.

Rebecca Bamford has claimed that this and other passages signify *both* scientific *and* moral concerns, rather than either and each.[279] If the idea was to construct a new image of European culture, the ideological space of Europeans had to have been met on from both sides.

Nietzsche's notebook jottings leading up to the publication of *Beyond Good and Evil* cashed out on something like Bamford's sense of "experimentalism." Thus, in June or July 1885, he jotted that "the triumphant concept of 'force', with which our physicists have created God and the world, needs supplementing."[280] Later that summer, Nietzsche jotted the seeming excogitation that "[men] and all organic creatures have done more or less the same thing: they have arranged, thought, devised the world to fit, until they could make use of it, until it could be 'reckoned' with."[281] An even briefer jotting headed "*We without homeland*" reads "let's not exploit the

[278] See Lester, Hunt, *Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 105-11, 135-42.
[279] See Bamford, "The Ethos of Inquiry," 11, 14, 26.
[280] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 26.
[281] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 45.

advantages of our situation, and, far from being ruined by it, draw full benefit of the open air and the magnificent abundance of light."[282] This "abundance of light" is what Nietzsche came to consider a necessary quality of his image of European culture: "There is nothing better than what is good! And that means having one or another proficiency and creating out of it — that is virtue in the Italian, Renaissance sense."[283]

Since there had not been a supposedly ubiquitous Italian *kulturnation*, the construction of a national community called "Italy" had to result from more strictly particularist identities than was often the case elsewhere in Europe, like in Switzerland, where not only political and geographical but cultural borders between it and the constructed German state were "porous in the extreme."[284] So, by the late 1870s, Italian identity was at the forefront of discourse in the public sphere, and the designation between "legal" and "real" Italy had been its major manifestation. As yet unfashioned, Roman urban life by the 1880s was a microcosm for the broader developments in northern cities. In Rome, "monasteries, convents, churches, and multiple new government buildings lay along narrow streets crowded by carriages and foot traffic[, mostly] women that brought food in from the countryside to sell in open-air markets."[285] Immigrants not only from Europe but from as far as the Arabian peninsula worked alongside "real" Italians. "Unification," Benedict Anderson wrote, "meant interchangeability of men and documents," as process "fostered by the recruitment [. . .] of *homines novi*, who, just for that reason, had no independent power of their own, and could serve as emanations of their masters' wills," and especially where "provincial aristocracies had significant independent power," as they had enjoyed in southern Europe throughout most of

[282] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 97.
[283] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 11.
[284] See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 138.
[285] Lees and Lees, *Cities in the Making of Modern Europe*, 13.

modern history.[286] Many travelers to and through Rome often lived and worked as what historian Mae M. Ngai has termed "impossible subjects," a "caste that lives and works outside of official citizenship."[287]

Both the political Left and Right urged strong political education with an even stronger central authority to support it by 1880. As Nietzsche jotted into his notebook in 1885, the role of education appeared at best suspicious: "in political economy: the abolition of slavery: lack of a redeeming class, a *justifier* – Emergence of anarchism. 'Education?'" Education had been important if a hegemonic Italian identity could have been constructed, thus its alleged justification stood then, as one historian has put it, to "inculcate national symbols and values and thereby 'make' Italians."[288] "The strongest advocate of 'political education'," Christopher Duggan cut, "was the man who would dominate Italian politics from 1887 until 1896 – Francesco Crispi."[289] Crispi had been following a long stream of nationalist thought that had been driven primarily by the political Right throughout the 1860s, primarily due to their admonishment of Bismarck's "national principle," and by the socialism of the late 1870s. By that time, the idea of "nationalizing the masses" had begun to foreground public opinion, a unifying political solution.[290]

If "Italianness" could be conveyed in patriotic terms and to subordinate private to public interest, evils such as corruption, clientelism, and the excessive focus on local and regional issues, might be resolved. By the 1880s, industrializing Rome had been caught between the political extremes that led Francesco Crispi's political moonshot. Like Nietzsche, Crispi had long

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[286] See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 55.
[287] Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*: *Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 6-7.
[288] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 214, 590-1, 593.
[289] See Christopher Duggan, "Politics in the era of Depretis and Crispi, 1870-96," in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. John A. Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 168.
[290] Duggan, "Politics in the era of Depretis and Crispi," 170, 164.

commented on presence of France in Europe. But whereas Nietzsche perceived the presence of France in other European spaces a positive outcome of the "physiological process" of "becoming European," Crispi believed "that history had made the French nation almost incorrigibly imperialist [. . .] and it wanted control of the Mediterranean, hence its deep-seated aversion to united Italy."[291] Nietzsche's notion of an experiment was a strategy that promised critical engagement with cultural-political consequences of traditional morality: dogmatism and fixed universalisms had been the opposite of Nietzsche's experimental attitude in *The Gay Science*, where experimentation is exalted as an odd virtue, in as far as it made turning from dogmatic ideologies easier. Instead, experimenters were presented there as critical and imaginative and forward-thinking, as Robert B. Pippin has convincingly argued: in short, they were questioners of the concept of truth that had had such profound cultural-political consequences throughout the nineteenth century: "Not only utility and delight but every kind of impulse took sides in [the] fight about 'truth'."[292]

This "fight about truth," Andrew and Lynn Hollen Lees have suggested, played out politically in the urban arenas of Europe. From 1876-1883, Roman public discourse often centered on matters of political education and what Nietzsche referred to as "the compulsion to grand politics." After its incorporation in 1870, the city immediately became the national capital, and when the government had set to improvements in urban infrastructure, there was a growing public concern to monumentalize national unity in "symbols of its imperial heritage."[293] In 1881, shortly after Malwida von Meysenbug had shacked up at the Villa Mattei, Crispi had become the most stringent vocal advocate of the Romans "[perpetuating] themselves in marble and in monuments."[294] In

[291] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 590-1.
[292] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* § 110.
[293] Lees and Lees, *Cities in the Making of Modern Europe*, 247.
[294] Lees and Lees, *Cities in the Making of Modern Europe*, Ibid.

conjunction with modern improvements, such "symbols" would, he thought, enter Romans into a greatness "like our fathers."[295] There were, however, large numbers of what historians have dubbed "internationalists," folks who drew primarily on the brainwork of Mikhail Bakunin and, though to a lesser extent, Karl Marx,[296] who had sought through modern improvements a way to usher in a new Italian social order, to include the abolition of the primordial class distinction between middle-class urban dwellers and rural pastoral elites.[297] "Indeed," Nietzsche wrote in Sils-Maria, "I can imagine dull, sluggish races which, even in our fast-moving Europe, would need half a century to overcome [. . .] attacks of patriotism and cleaving to one's native soil and to be restored to [. . .] 'good Europeanism'."[298] He described a conversation between two old "patriots" that captures the heated sense of political discourse typical not of German, as is taken for granted in the scholarship, but to Italian society, one of what Anderson has called "the last wave" of nationalization. Over the course of a long conversation about both what and who it would take to achieve "grand politics," Nietzsche noticed how "[the] old men had obviously grown heated as they thus shouted their 'truths' in one another's faces; I, however, in my happiness and beyond, considered how soon a stronger will become master of the strong; and also that when one nation becomes spiritually shallower there is a compensation for it: another nation becomes deeper."[299]

Roman culture, especially, had given Nietzsche the impression he mapped out in *Beyond Good and Evil* § 242, where he sees the commonness of this period as displayed in "weak-willed and highly employable workers who *need* a master, a commander, as they need their daily bread; [. . .] a type prepared for *slavery* in the subtlest sense: in individual cases the *strong* man will be found

[295] Lees and Lees, *Cities in the Making of Modern Europe*, Ibid.
[296] Duggan, "Politics in the era of Depretis and Crispi," 157.
[297] Duggan, "Politics in the era of Depretis and Crispi," Ibid.
[298] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 241.
[299] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ibid.

to turn out stronger and richer than has perhaps ever happened before[.]"[300] Whatever else may be gleamed from this passage, it is clear that during his time in Rome Nietzsche had been ponderously disconcerted with the political fallout of unification in Rome. Thus, he developed on his notions of experiment and experimentation as both tools and virtues of their own sake in order to self-exclude from southern political geographies. Already in *Human, All-Too-Human*, one finds a disconcerted attitude toward the *bellum pro imperio* of urban politics: "He who thinks a great deal is not suited to be a party man: he thinks his way through the party and out the other side too soon."[301] In 1881's *Daybreak*, Nietzsche expressed this disconcerted attitude toward the group-think engendered by nationalist cultural politics. The best way to ruin youth, he had suggested there, was to "instruct him to hold in high esteem only those who think like him" with "*moral narrow-mindedness*" common to pundits and dolts and others that disdain "small individual questions and experiments," whereas Nietzsche sought these questions and experiments as a way of removing himself virtually from local politicks, who desired "precepts *for everyone*" rather than individual development.[302] This line of thought was clear in Nietzsche's conception of "experimentalism" in his *Gay Science*, written and edited mostly in Rome: "we who [. . .] are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment. [. . .] We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs."[303] To be one's own guinea pig, then, meant being an "impossible subject" often divorced from "the compulsion to grand politics," which Anderson characterized as "an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community."[304] The

[300] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §242.
[301] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human,* §579.
[302] Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, §s 297, 574; see § 194.
[303] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §319.
[304] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 101.

ideological spaces of experimenters, then, constituted the *mentalités* of many "free-floating individuals" throughout the nineteenth century.

Cultural historians have chosen often to follow up on the work of E.P. Thompson and Natalie Davis, who "decisively shown the importance of cultural and communal factors" of the construction of political subjectivities, where an "emphasis on worldview, ritual, and shared meaning" have "helped shape the history of *metalités*[.]"[305] Andrew and Lynn Hollen Lees place this emphasis at the center of their work on modern European urbanity. If communal factors play a role in the construction of ideological space, it must follow that urban developments played out in terms of a set of political struggles, a *bellum pro imperio*, where these struggles constituted the *mentalités* of urbanizing Europe. Where Nietzsche's "experimentalism" depended on its ability to allow the "experimenter" an ideological space removed from the *bellum pro imperio* of urban society historians are presented with a historical externality: the occurrence of "impossible subjects" like Nietzsche, the notion of *mentalités* must be extended not only to include the construction of political subjectivities but the aesthetic dimension of individuals' experiences, not to mention the role of those experiences in the construction of a cultural category beyond that of "citizen." When Nietzsche sought out an experimental attitude, he had wittingly attempted to concoct something like a method for achieving the construction of ideological space at the level of Oliver Zimmer's "free-floating individual." Nietzsche's experimentalism, then, cannot be distanced from the degree to which it had appeared to him as an epistemic virtue by comparison with contemporary urban politics of the *bellum pro imperio*. The study of Nietzsche's conception of "experimentalism," therefore, offers more today for the study of nineteenth-century ideological spaces beyond traditional views in cultural historiography.

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[305] Suzanne Desan, "Crowds, Community, and Ritual in the Work of E.P. Thompson and Natalie Davis," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 71.

III

"AT THE HEIGHEST HEIGHT"

Nietzsche's biographers have essentially told the same story about the Alpine village of Sils-Maria, little of which is beneficial to historians.[306] Even fewer historical questions about the village have been resolved by Nietzsche scholars, even where certain historical generalizations are likely. The late nineteenth century was also a period of spatial changes in the region, as the development of the "town center" led to wholesale societal change, correlating with a redistribution of population across a wider geography.[307] An increase in the village's summer tourism during the earlier part of the century necessitated the development of lodgings. But because most lodgings were expensive, Nietzsche instead opted for a cooped-up bedroom in the home of the village's mayor, Gian Durisch, at the rate of one franc per day.[308] Pier Paolo Viazzo has explained how low nuptiality, mortality, and birthrates throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries maintained a manageable level of environmental homeostasis in the Alps.[309] In this regard, Nietzsche's Sils-Maria was like other Alpine communities.[310] These conditions were mapped on the last pages of *Beyond Good and Evil* as a "far domain of ice and rocks," where one had to live "as an Alpine goat": "Did I seek where the wind bites keenest, learn to live where no one lives, [. . .] become a ghost flitting across the glaciers?"[311] Sils-Maria was the place where Nietzsche could

[306] See Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 190-1.
[307] Pier Paolo Viazzo, *Upland Communities: Environment, Population, and Social Structure in the Alps Since the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 70.
[308] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 191.
[309] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 179, 181.
[310] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 217-19.
[311] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, ibid.; see also *Beyond Good and Evil*, "From High Mountains: Epode" (last page).

become a "*wicked* huntsman," drawing his "mighty bow" on the big game of European culture, where he could reconstruct his ideological space unimpeded.[312]

The rest of this chapter, therefore, covers Nietzsche's construction of an ideological space foreign from the construction of imagined national communities that drew from traditional ideological constructs and how the project of *Beyond Good and Evil* reflected his concern with the establishment of a trans-European ideological space. If ideological space, as an experimental construct, was the basis of cultural changes, then Nietzsche's construction of ideological space unhinged from conceptions of "nationhood" supposedly immune from the principles of human geography and increased migration across Europe. In Sils-Maria, Nietzsche could finally attempt to construct an ideological space distinct from that of any nation-state, since modern cultural developments have proven only that "nationhood," while complex, was something young and fragile and subject to revision due to trends in human geography. Nation-states, then, were products of morality (of the cultural conventions inherent to religion, philosophy, science, and history) and so they were subject to the multitudinous changes throughout the constitution of a new, trans-European ideological, cultural domain.

"THE PASSION FOR GOD": RELIGIOUS MORALITY AND CULTURE

A piece with Nietzsche's historical representations of nineteenth-century European philosophy, those of institutional Christianity rest upon his critique of its many cultural consequences, which he traced through not only philosophy and science but also from the arts to everyday urban society. Because of this, Nietzsche's history of Europe in *Beyond Good and Evil*, it will be assumed, must follow a similar trajectory, and this assumption ought to be tested against the text with the highest

[312] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!,* ibid.

level of probability possible about its historical content. At § 186, Nietzsche gave the scope of the historical problemata of modern European morality. Subsequent sections provide his attempt at a comparative history of how various Europeans responded to these problems. The foremost problem of modern European morality for Nietzsche was its attempt to reinforce many of the dated values of old cultures by grounding it rationally; thus, contemporary moral problems had been grossly neglected:

> Moral sensibility is as subtle, late, manifold, sensitive and refined in Europe today as the 'science of morals' pertaining to it is still young, inept, clumsy and coarse-fingered. [. . .] Philosophers one and all have [. . .] demanded [. . .] the *rational ground* of morality — and every philosopher hitherto has believed he has furnished this rational ground; morality itself, however, was taken as 'given'. [. . .] it was because they were ill informed and not even very inquisitive about other peoples, ages and former times, that they did not so much as catch sight of the real problems of morality — for these come into view only if we compare *many* moralities. [. . .] What philosophers have called 'the rational ground of morality' and sought to furnish was [. . .] only a scholarly form of *faith* in the prevailing morality, a new way of *expressing* it, and thus itself a fact within a certain morality, indeed even in the last resort a kind of denial that this morality *ought* to be conceived of as a problem — and in any event the opposite of a testing, analysis, doubting and vivisection of this faith. [. . .] The difficulty of furnishing the rational ground for the principle [harm no one, but do as much as possible to help them] may indeed be great — as is well known, Schopenhauer failed to do it.[313]

Moreover, the history of European morality, because it correlated with that of the natural sciences, supervened that history:

> He who has followed the history of an individual science will find in its evolution a clue to the comprehension of the oldest and most common processes of all 'knowledge and understanding'; in both cases it is the premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid will

[313] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §186.

> to 'believe', the lack of mistrust and patience which are evolved first — it is only late, and then imperfectly, that our senses learn to be subtle, faithful, cautious organs of understanding. It is more comfortable for our eye to react to a particular object by producing again an image it has often produced before than by retaining what is new and different in an impression: the latter requires more strength, more 'morality'. To hear something new is hard and painful for the ear; we hear the music of foreigners badly. When we hear a foreign language we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds we hear into words which have a more familiar and homely ring[.][314]

The main problem of modern European morality, for Nietzsche, turned on cultural problemata, not a problem of establishing solely rational grounds for it. This was broadly the view of Thomas Kuhn's 1962 *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, who like Nietzsche criticized nineteenth-century scientists as having "rejected one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another," thereby having "rejected science itself."[315] Because of their insistence on natural explanations for traditional moral phenomena, Nietzsche saw European scientists and the educated public as "mistaking scientific theory for moral dogma."[316] The question, then, was not that of a rational grounding for morality, but of how ideological space had become overfilled with values that rendered culture superfluous, turning people into stagnant, needy, and obedient herd animals.[317]

Romanticism opened the way for religion to escape the scorn of Enlightenment rationalists and to come back into the cultural mainstream. Hegel's 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, identified "the religion of morality and conscience" with "an awareness of the inner-self, but as having all the differentiation of all actuality outside of itself."[318] As a result, religion helped human

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[314] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 192.
[315] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/1996), 79; see also Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 188.
[316] See Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 271.
[317] See Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, Ibid.
[318] G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 676.

beings "[comprehend] all essence and all actuality."[319] Whereas the Enlightenment had produced intellectuals Hegel called "dead spirits," the nineteenth century ought to exhibit a strong Christian morality despite atheistic contestations. But when Descartes, for example, set out to establish the foundations of knowledge in reason, what he had really done, according to Nietzsche, was prove the superficial instrumentality of reason.[320] Much of the history of science, he added, had been the result of this instrumentality, science's "truths" simply "premature hypotheses" and "fictions," having provided no more truth in moral matters than had those of philosophers, substituting for religion in much of late-nineteenth century society. Scientists often sought to justify many Christian ethical principles, something Nietzsche discerned in his readings of Ree's *On the Origin of Moral Sensations* and other works. During a time when Christians across Europe looked to expand their ideological influence, scientific "truths" had become instruments of Christian morality: "it seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in vigorous growth — but that it rejects the theistic answer with profound mistrust."[321]

Moreover, the inverse relationship in degrees of secular authority between Church and State left an indelible mark on the constructed national imagination, leading Nietzsche to raise the question of industrial societies' relationships to the promulgation of secular or atheistic ideals. "Among those in Germany for example who nowadays live without religion, [. . .] industriousness [. . .] has extinguished the religious instincts[.] [. . .] The great majority of German middle-class Protestants can today be numbered among these indifferent people, especially in the great industrious centers of trade and commerce; likewise the great majority of industrious scholars and the entire university equipage":

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[319] Hegel, *Phenomenology*, § 677.
[320] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 191.
[321] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 53.

> The practical indifference to religious things in which he was born and raised is as a rule sublimated in him into a caution and cleanliness which avoids contact with religious people and things; and it can be precisely the depth of his tolerance and humanity that bids him evade the subtle distress which tolerance itself brings with it. – Every age has its own divine kind of naivety for the invention of which other ages may envy it – and how much naivety [. . .] there is in the scholar's belief in his superiority [. . .] he, the little presumptuous dwarf and man of the mob, the brisk and busy head- and handyman of [. . .] 'modern ideas'![322]

Sue Prideaux has charted this concern to Nietzsche's time at Rubinacci, as "[religious], moral and aesthetic sensibilities belong only to the surface of things, though man likes to believe that they touch the heart of the world," and "[belief] in 'the higher swindle' that is religion, and that includes belief in the ideal, is in danger of being replaced by a blind belief in science which, through its promise of certainty, is becoming elevated to the status of religion,"[323] adding elsewhere that "[today] a man of knowledge might easily feel as if he were God become animal."[324] Given the moralistic optimism of the works he constructed under the influence of the Rubinacci network, Nietzsche's work of the late 1870s clearly fell beneath *Beyond Good and Evil*'s critical lens. Throughout the 1883-6 timespan, Nietzsche had come to present morality not as one area among others in which metaphysical beliefs must be punctured so that scientific attitudes toward morals could be organized but as an impediment to the construction of a new ideological spaces and a trans-European cultural community constituted by free-floating individuals.

For Nietzsche, there had been no clearer signal of morality's constraints upon these institutions than in the ethics of Kant, whose "categorical imperative" was notoriously deflated by Nietzsche into a crypto-Christian skeleton: "Quite apart from the value of such assertions as 'there exist in

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[322] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 58.
[323] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 174-5, 176.
[324] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 101.

us a categorical imperative' one can still ask: what does such an assertion say of the man who asserts it?" had been his leading question. For Kant, there had been "one imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It is not concerned with the matter of the action and its intended result, but rather with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows[.] This imperative may be called that of morality."[325] Moreover, all moral actions cannot abide by maxims that cannot be universalized: "[the] will is thus not merely subject to the law but is subject to the law in such a way that it must be regarded also as legislating for itself and only on this account as being subject to the law[.]"[326]

Conformity to this imperative, then, can be achieved "only if we carefully conduct ourselves according to maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature."[327] Insofar as the categorical imperative provided criteria for determining what ought to be done by pointing out an end, a rule, and an incentive, it is a practical principle. But there are certain limitations when one uses this principle to decide about moral character. An unlawful act is, thus, unjust; it is also morally wrong, especially if it lacks a rational ground. But when it comes to moral character, Kant relegated that to divine provenance.[328] Like Kant, a whole motley of scientists and scholars had assumed the compatibility of their discoveries with Christian morality, whereas socialists tended to think of Biblical authority having been horribly wounded by those discoveries.[329] According to Richard J. Evans, by linking evolutionary thinking "to a manifestly Christian interpretation of the natural

[325] Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1785/1993), 26:416.
[326] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 38:432.
[327] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 61:463.
[328] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, x, 46:443, 39:433, 43:439.
[329] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 472.

order," Darwin had "softened the blow to religion struck by the publication of his *Origin of Species*."[330]

Michael B. McDuffe has suggested that a secular cultural imagination was not absolute but always partial and incomplete. While the number of church attendees across Europe declined in the second half of the nineteenth century, abstinence from the church meant only partial rejections of Christian principles. Kant, after all, had argued that empirical facts might very well suggest that a Deity is the noumenal cause of the phenomenal, apparent world. In the 1790 *Critique of Judgment*, which Nietzsche had begun reading as early as 1865, Kant argued that the existence of organisms, locally, and the natural world, globally, give us reason to believe there exists a God. For "the principle that allows us to refer the world to a supreme cause, as deity, because some of the beings in it are morally destined for a purpose" it may simply be "sufficient [. . .] to provide this reference directing our attention to the purposes of nature and by inviting us to investigate the unfathomably great art that lies hidden behind nature's forms, so that the ideas that pure practical reason supplies may find incidental confirmation in natural purposes."[331]

"In belief, the instinct of *obedience to the highest authority*, thus *one* instinct, takes precedence," Nietzsche jotted into his notebook in April 1885, clearly with Kant's three proposed moral feelings — gratitude, obedience, and humiliation — supposedly embodied "special attunements of the mind to duty."[332] "The categorical imperative is a *wished-for* instinct, where reason and *this* instinct are one."[333] Later that autumn, Kant's imperative appeared again in Nietzsche's notebooks as insincere.[334] Early in 1886, Nietzsche jotted that Kant's imperative was

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[330] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 471.
[331] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1790/1987), 333-4:444-5.
[332] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 2; Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 335:446.
[333] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ibid.
[334] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 55.

a version of a "scientific attitude (and a more ambitious instinct for sincerity, thus again under Christian influence)" but had not also sought to foreclose the Christian worldview: "[t]he subtlest way out: Kantian criticism. The intellect disputes its own right both to interpret in that spirit and to *reject* interpretations in that spirit. One is then content to fill up the gap with an *increase* in trust and belief, with a renunciation of all provability for one's belief, with an incomprehensible and superior 'ideal' (God)": "critique has *never* dared address the ideal itself, but only the problem of what gave rise to the objection against it, why it has not yet been achieved or why it is not provable in detail or in whole."[335] The same applied to utilitarian or socialist/democratic ethical models, which "[criticized] the origins of moral valuations, *but it [believed] in them* just as the Christian does."[336] For Nietzsche, moral judgments were "a way of interpreting," where each moral judgement were symptomatic "of a particular intellectual level among the ruling judgements."[337] In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche concluded from this that "[there] are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena . . ."[338] Philosophers, political activists, and scientists, so far as they were concerned with principles of morality, ended up where "[they were] not opposed to religious usages; if participation of such usages [was] demanded in certain cases, by the state for instance, they [did] what [was] demanded of them as one [did] so many things[.]"[339]

Because of its position within Europeans' ideological spaces throughout the nineteenth century, Christian morality had damaged Europe's social strata, having produced a culture secularized only with the institutional curbing of religious authority: "Christianity has been the most fatal kind of self-presumption ever. Men not high or hard enough for the artistic refashioning of *mankind*; men

[335] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 92-3.
[336] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 93.
[337] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 97.
[338] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 108.
[339] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 58.

not strong or farsighted enough for the sublime self-constraint needed to *allow* the foreground law of thousandfold failure and perishing to prevail; men not noble enough to see the abysmal disparity in order of rank and abysm of rank between men and man — it is *such* men who, with their 'equal before God', have hitherto ruled over the destiny of Europe, until at last a shrunken, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good will, sickly and mediocre has been bred, the European of today . . ."[340] To construct an ideological space free from Christian morality, Nietzsche suggested, one had to understand the cultural role of morality and how this role functioned historically within European society. Thus, an ideological space removed from Christian morality had to grapple with the social conditions amidst which that morality prevailed, which meant resolving a problem already posed in his 1881 *Daybreak*: "with what is the aristocracy henceforth to occupy itself, now it is becoming daily more apparent that it will be *indecent* to engage in politics?"[341] In enduring the decline of the nobility, European culture and society had become nationalized, and the nobility had become but a piece in the construction of national imaginations and communities.

THE "EUROPEAN PROBLEM": WHAT IS NOBLE?

The rise of the middle class had left a profound mark on the life of the nobility. While nobility had been conferred previously through inheritance, often where middling aristocrats were a rarity before the 1870s, during that decade noble culture began reflecting middle-class culture, as in Prussia, where all 1,129 ennoblements between 1871 and 1918 had been middle-class individuals.[342] This decline of aristocratic power was inversely proportional to the rise of state

[340] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 62.
[341] Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, § 201.
[342] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 278-9.

authority, which by 1870 had "abrogated noble rights of self-governance with basic freedoms of movement, labor and inheritance, and equality before the law" in most European places.[343] In the course of the late nineteenth century, to be noble no longer meant that one had dominion over one's possessions or subjects, as legal definitions left nobles on as a similar footing as their subjects, and this loss of political capital created a cultural crisis, as the aristocracy had sought desperately to maintain its status and retain its social capital.[344] By the 1870s Continental landed estates were often foreclosed upon and bought up by middle-class purchasers, a ubiquitous social practice after 1815.[345]

This growing middle-class nobility — industrialists, bankers, and financiers — developed cosmopolitan models of industrial investment while simultaneously clinging to old notions of respectability, and connections with the titled aristocracy only increased social prestige. By the 1860s, for example, inheritance of stocks and shares increased 500% in much of Europe.[346] By the 1870s, the decline of the landed aristocracy, coupled with the rise industrial or banking aristocracies, meant that to have been noble suggested membership in a status group; yet, this was in part due to collective attempts toward increasing social prestige in the face of its new economic identity, as had happed since the late 1780s. "When," Nietzsche wrote "an aristocracy such as that of France at the start of the Revolution throws away its privileges with sublime disgust and sacrifices itself to an excess of moral feeling, then that is corruption — it was really only the closing act of that corruption which had been going on for centuries by virtue of which it had step by step abdicated its prerogatives of government and demoted itself to a *function* of the

[343] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 281.
[344] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 281.
[345] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.
[346] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 287.

monarchy."[347] Before leaving Sils-Maria in the autumn of 1885, Nietzsche jotted into his notebook a belief that "everything we in Europe today are used to admiring as 'feeling for humanity', [. . .] while it may have a superficial value in weakening and softening certain dangerous and powerful fundamental drives, is nevertheless in the long term nothing other than the diminishment of the whole human type — its irreversible *mediocratization*." This "diminishment" had been driven by the cultivation of "all the virtues by means of which a herd can flourish, and pushing back those other and opposite virtues which give rise to a new, higher, stronger, *masterful* species, they only develop the herd animal in man and perhaps thus *fix* the animal called 'man'[.]" Thus, the [. . .] democratic movement of Europe [. . .] fundamentally signifies the tremendous, instinctive conspiracy of the whole herd against everything that is the shepherd, beast of prey, hermit and Caesar, to preserve and elevate all the weak, the oppressed, the mediocre, the hard-done-by, the half-failed":

> One question occurs to me again and again, a tempting and wicked question perhaps [. . .]: might it not now, as the 'herd animal' type is increasingly developed in Europe, be high time to try a whole, artificial and conscious *breeding* of the opposite type and its virtues?[348]

Toward establishing the conditions upon which a new ideological space could effectually determine the European cultural nobility, Nietzsche had to first pose the question of what, given the effects of rapid economic, political, and cultural changes, "does the word 'noble' mean to us today?"[349] For Nietzsche, the decline of the aristocracy since the 1790s engendered a degeneration of possible human achievement, particularly in the hybrid of old and new, middle-class values. Every serious development in European ideological space had "been the work of an aristocratic

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[347] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 258.
[348] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 67-8.
[349] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 287.

society — and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man and needs slavery in some sense or other":

> As to how an aristocratic society [. . .] originates, one ought not to yield any humanitarian illusions: truth is hard. Let us admit to ourselves unflinchingly how every higher culture on earth has hitherto *begun*. Men of a still natural nature, barbarians in every fearful sense of the word, men of prey still in possession of an unbroken strength of will and lust for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more civilized, more peaceful, perhaps trading or cattle-raising races, or upon old mellow cultures, the last vital forces in which were even then flickering out in a glittering firework display of spirit and corruption.[350]

"The essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy," moreover, "is [. . .] that it does *not* feel itself to be a function (of the monarchy or of the commonwealth)," as any "healthy" aristocracy "accepts with good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who *for its sake* have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments."[351] Jonathan R. Cohen has argued convincingly that the word "slavery" had been "meant to shock," as "Nietzsche's writing [got] shriller in his later years," since "with his health failing, and no one listening, he strove harder and harder to rouse his readers."[352]

Having granted this initial proposition, the typical view of Nietzsche scholars has been that there had been a "slave revolt" in morals at the fall of the Roman Empire and with the rise of Christian civilization. Most scholars have read, for example, § 260 of *Beyond Good and Evil* as a description of some cunning ploy on the part of the weak (*slaves*) to revolt against the nobility (*masters*) from power, with the invention of morality being the slaves' weapon of choice against the masters. "There is *master morality* and *slave morality*," Nietzsche wrote from his bedroom in

[350] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 257.
[351] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 258.
[352] Cohen, *Science, culture, and free spirits*, 216.

Sils-Maria, from which major "moral value-distinctions have arisen," whether "among a ruling order which was pleasurably conscious of its distinction from the ruled" or "among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of every degree."

> It should be noted at once that in this [noble] morality the antithesis 'good' and 'bad' means the same thing as 'noble' and 'despicable' — the antithesis of 'good' and 'evil' originates elsewhere. The cowardly, the timid, the petty, are mistrustful with their constricted glance, those who abase themselves, the dog-like type of man who lets himself be mistreated [. . .] The noble type of man feels *himself* to be the determiner of values, he does not need to be approved of, he judges 'what is harmful for me is harmful in itself', he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he *creates values*. [. . .] The noble human being too aids the unfortunate but not, or almost not, from pity, but from an urge begotten by superfluity of power. [. . .] A morality of rulers is, however, most alien and painful to contemporary taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only towards one's equals; that towards being of a lower rank, [. . .] one may act as one wishes or 'as the heart dictates' [. . .] it is here that pity can have little place.

Still, Nietzsche wrote, "it is otherwise with the second type of morality, *slave morality*":

> Suppose the abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of themselves and weary should moralize: what would their moral evaluations have in common? Probably a pessimistic mistrust of the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together with his situation. The slave is suspicious of the virtues of the powerful [. . .] he would like to convince himself that happiness itself is not genuine among them. [. . .] Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the source of the famous antithesis 'good' and 'evil' [. . .] Thus, according to slave morality the 'evil' inspire fear; according to the master morality it is precisely the 'good' who inspire fear and want to inspire it [. . .] The antithesis reaches its height when, consistently with slave morality, a breath of disdain finally also comes to be attached to the 'good' of this morality [. . .] because within the slaves' way of thinking the good man has in any event to be a *harmless* man: he

> is good-natured, easy to deceive, perhaps a bit stupid, *un bonhomme*. Wherever slave morality comes to predominate, language exhibits a tendency to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together.[353]

This and similar passages are often interpreted as a bit of a "conspiracy theory," where the slave revolts in morality are the result of explicit strategy, since slaves sought allegedly to benefit themselves at the expense of the nobility.[354] But even if this is the case, Nietzsche's suggestion is that the revolution in morality may not have been in the slaves' best interests, since it is possible to institute moral values while being mistaken about whether those values turn out in one's best interest. Whether nineteenth-century morality originated from a set of coldly calculated intentions, it may have turned out that this morality may have not been culturally beneficial.

It seems, then, that § 260 provided Nietzsche's grounds to regard morality, on some level, as to the slaves' benefit, having served to protect the weak from direct physical harms; at the expense of the nobility, this led to the development of a resentment-based morality with a triumphalist or "self-vindicating" basis.[355] Even so, it need not follow that the conjunction of slave revolts in morals and the aristocracy's declination throughout the nineteenth century had produced cultural benefits. For all the benefits of a bourgeois industrial elite, Nietzsche would have thought, their consequences for culture left potentially irreversible ideological dangers: "The industrious races find leisure very hard to endure: it was a masterpiece of *English* instinct to make Sunday so extremely holy and boring that the English unconsciously long again for their week – and working-days – as a kind of cleverly devised and cleverly intercalated *fast*, such as is also to be seen very frequently in the ancient world[.]"[356]

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[353] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 260.
[354] See Brian Leiter and Neil Shinhababu, *Nietzsche and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[355] See R. Jay Wallace, "*Ressentiment,* Value, and Self-Vindication," in *Nietzsche and Morality*, eds. Brian Leiter and Neil Shinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 110-37.
[356] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 189.

When Nietzsche equated slave morality with that of utility, in part because of the transnational penetration of utilitarian thought into Central European spaces, his point was that modern European morality was that of "the herd," "beside which, before which, subsequent to which many other, above all *higher*, moralities are possible or ought to be possible," where

> it has got to the point where we discover even in political and social institutions an increasingly evident expression of this morality: the *democratic* movement inherits the Christian. But that the tempo of this movement is much too slow and somnolent for the more impatient, for the sick and suffering of the said instinct, is attested by the ever more frantic baying, the ever more undisguised fang-baring of the anarchist dogs which now rove the streets of European culture: apparently the reverse of the placidly industrious democrats and revolutionary ideologists, and even more so of the stupid philosophasters and brotherhood fanatics who call themselves socialists and want a 'free society', they are in fact at one with them all in their total and instinctive hostility towards every form of society other than that of the *autonomous* herd [. . .] at one in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege [. . .] for when everyone is equal no one will need any 'rights' [. . .] at one, one and all, in their faith in the community as the *savior*, that is to say in the herd, in 'themselves' . . . [357]

Nietzsche had long been suspicious that the modern European democratic movement would prove a "breeding ground for tyrants." Perhaps as early as the autumn of 1876, when he made his first visit to the Villa Rubinacci, Nietzsche came to the belief that proliferation of "modern ideas" had been an organically transnational affair, free from constructed national essences and yet indispensable to the "physiological process" of "becoming European." About the construction of an imagined transnational community of "good Europeans" Nietzsche offered an experimental approach where these individuals are seen as progenitors of the process of ideological space

[357] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 202.

construction. In the case of the British, for example, Nietzsche observed an ideology of extreme conformity, weariness, and anxiety, having led Nietzsche to infer that "Britishness," with its slave morality, failed to achieve any broad utilitarian goals: it may have just as easily been the case that the slave morality, as it figured into the construction of the imagined British nation, had in many ways cut against cultural outcomes that were in the better interests of slaves.

One need not scour much of English historiography before seeing what Nietzsche meant. Industrial protest in England increased dramatically by the 1820s, following both the Luddite disturbances of 1811 and other expressions of political radicalism. Historians focusing on industrial protest in provincial England have suggested that protest violence had been, before the nineteenth century, a mark of communal sustainability rather than weakness of will or political chaos. According to Eric Hobsbawm, machine breaking, destruction of property, and rioting had been respectable means for employer engagement primarily from the eighteenth century, a tactic he infamously termed "collective bargaining by riot."[358] These tactics had evolved by the 1820s, a period Hobsbawm delimited as one of hostility toward machine innovations, which, he judged, became a chief failure of labor movements during industrialization.[359] E.P. Thompson argued that the advent of new machinery in the 1820s engendered the rise of Luddism and other radical politics, the crux of what Thompson called a "crisis point in the abrogation of paternalist legislation, and in the imposition of the political economy of laissez faire upon, and against the will and conscience of, the working people."[360]

By the 1840s, an intensified English radical politics fueled political zealots in both urban and rural areas. For historians John E. Archer and others, the Chartist movement embodied the growing

[358] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1968), 6.
[359] Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men*, 17.
[360] E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*. (Harmondsworth, 1968), 594.

zealous spirit of the period, representing "the culmination of the many movements [for . . .] parliamentary reform, trade unionism, factory reform and anti-New Poor Law sentiment."[361] By their 1838 Working Men's Charter, these radical parliamentarians motioned for full male suffrage and equal electoral districts secured by an anonymous voting system. Feargus O'Connor, leading propogandist against London's New Poor Law, addressed tens of thousands of Chartist supporters in several meetings in the 1840s.[362] Archer has pointed out how Chartists "owed considerable debt" to the shifting tides of protest tactics since across Europe after 1815, in effect as "the culmination of what had gone before and also the first truly independent working-class movement."[363] Richard J. Evans has cited the height of Chartist political protest as the "quarrels between moderates and radicals" that surrounded the 1839 London Convention, "[revealing] a serious split within the movement."[364] "Altogether," Evans wrote, "500 Chartists were in jail by 1840";[365] as the movement dissolved following the parliamentary rejections of their Charter, the radical political spirit was carried through till midcentury by the Anti-Corn-Law League. According to Evans, this group "enjoyed strong middle-class backing for the ending of import tariffs on corn," waging a "sophisticated," "well organized," and ultimately successful campaign against such tariffs.[366] But this group tapered off following the legislative fallout of this campaign, and by 1850, Chartism seemed all but dead.[367]

The definition of cultural "Frenchness" also shifted dramatically during and following the decline of its nobility, and, by the 1840s, the ideological expansion of "Britishness" had produced

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[361] John E. Archer, *Social Unrest and Popular Protest in England, 1780-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 74.
[362] Archer, *Social Unrest and Popular Protest*, ibid.
[363] Archer, *Social Unrest and Popular Protest*, ibid.
[364] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 184.
[365] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 185.
[366] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.
[367] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.

a series of crises that disrupted urban social life. Cities, to borrow from Evans, had been "fulcra" of the 1848 revolutions.[368] So, the revolutions of 1848 had not been unexpected by Europe's political leaders, as it had been obvious that a certain degree of "insurrectionary" zeal usually associated with the "Frenchness" spread rapidly across Europe.[369] It was with this sort of zeal that Wagner participated in the 1848/9 Dresden Uprising; in southern Europe, the fall of the July Monarchy was the sharpest foreign influence of the 1848 revolutions, whether those of "slum-dwellers" in Naples or those that pressured into law constitutions like those in Tuscany (February 12) and Piedmont (March 4).[370] In Saxony, where Nietzsche had grown up and studied, King Friedrich Augustus II enacted constitutional reforms in response to the events in Dresden by March 6. One American staying in Vienna had recorded that revolution "fell like a bomb amid the states and kingdoms of the Continent; and, like reluctant debtors threatened with legal terrors, the various monarchs hastened to pay their subjects the constitutions which they owed them."[371]

Chapter 1 set Leipziger culture and society within the broader picture of national community construction. Recall that Philip Ther had made his main argument about operatic culture upon the premise that opera theaters and other musical spaces had become sites of social integration for noble and commoner alike. An implication from this is that Nietzsche, at § 244 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, had modeled Leipzig as a site of typical German taste, which was more true than it wasn't: "If you want the 'German soul' demonstrated *ad oculos*, you have only to look into German taste, into German arts and customs: what boorish indifference to 'taste'! How the noblest and the commonest here stand side by side! How disorderly and wealthy this whole psychical household is! [. . .] [W]hatever 'German profundity' may be [. . .] we would do well to hold its

[368] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 187.
[369] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 188.
[370] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 190.
[371] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, Ibid.

appearance and good name in respect henceforth too and not to sell the former old reputation as the profound nation too cheaply for Prussian 'dash' and Berlin wit and sand." When Nietzsche entered Leipzig's cultural fray during the late 1860s, the construction of a European ideological space had been mediated by the invention of an imagined national community.

According to Robert B. Pippin, the resulting liberal politics of the 1860s to the 1880s had struck Nietzsche as "the ever-possible sudden disappearance of desire, the role of illusion in sustaining any such [desire], and the total impossibility of any rational translation of desire into a calculus of mutual satisfaction[.]"[372] Pippin has also demonstrated convincingly how both noble and common values are flexible — often mutually inclusive — and this formed the basis of Nietzsche's critique of the contemporary nobility of nineteenth-century Europe.[373] Herman Siemens has argued that there were likely no greater cultural effects than the negative definition of *freedom*, according to which "freedom" meant "freedom *from* external obstacles that would inhibit or prevent [one] from doing what [they] want," for which Nietzsche had partially blamed Kantian thought.[374] Nietzsche had also previously attacked Kant for endorsing this liberal view of the concept of freedom. For Nietzsche, individual human freedom required a goal, where "[freedom] can only be freedom *for* something" and "cannot be abstracted or separated from acting or doing itself, from the actual exercise of our capacities for agency, any more than it can be separated from our goals or 'governing thoughts'."[375] Kant's notion of freedom, by contrast, had been the product of his concept of *dignity*, which had been constituted by the capacity to exercise the faculties of pure reason. Whereas *Beyond Good and Evil* reframed the history of the nobility as one of a dynamic

[372] Robert B. Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 64.
[373] Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy*, 81.
[374] Hermann Siemens, *Nietzsche, power and politics rethinking Nietzsche's legacy for political thought* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2008), 437.
[375] Siemens, *Nietzsche, power and politics*, 443.

jostling for status, Kant's required a "pure thought of duty and of the moral law generally, unmixed with any extraneous addition of empirical inducements, has by the way of reason alone [. . .] an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives which may be derived from the empirical field that reason in the consciousness of its dignity despises such incentives and is able gradually to become their master."[376] Freedom, for Kant, was explicitly connected with this sort of dignity, as the ability to perform a morally good action constrained dignity's definition to an "unconditional and incomparable worth," where "the word 'respect' alone provides a suitable expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it."[377]

In June or July 1885, Nietzsche jotted into his notebook reflections on some of the obvious cultural consequences of degenerating aristocratic values through both demographic changes and the justifications of legalism, and the subsequent rise of tyranny: "The legislative moralities are," like Kant's, "the main means of fashioning out of men whatever a creative and profound will desires, assuming that such an artistic will of the highest rank holds power and can assert its creative will over long periods of time, in the shape of laws, religions, and customs." This aristocratic-type individual, "the really great men in my understanding," had begun to disappear wholesale from Europe: "until, after much disappointment, one finally has to begin to understand why it is that they're missing and that nothing now presents, or will present for a long time to come, a more hostile obstacle to their emergence and development than what in Europe is nowadays straightforwardly called '*morality*', [. . .] that morality of the herd animal [. . .] which strives with all its force for a universal green-pasture happiness on earth, namely security, harmlessness, comfort, easy living, and which in the end, 'if all goes well', also hopes to rid itself of all kinds of shepherds and bellwethers. The two doctrines it preaches," moreover, "are 'equal

[376] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 22:411.
[377] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 41:436.

rights' and 'sympathy with all that suffers' — and it takes suffering itself to be something that must be *abolished*."[378] Nietzsche contrasted this "herd morality" with a that of the noble "Colombus of the spirit" that later received its textual foundation in *Beyond Good and Evil* as the "free spirit."[379]

In his *Nietzsche on Morality*, Brian Leiter noted that the foremost distinguishing factor between the two moralities is that "[the] egalitarian premise of all contemporary moral and political theory — the premise, in one form or another, of the equal worth or dignity of each person — is simply absent in [Nietzsche]," since, as Keith Ansell-Pearson has put it, "[unlike] liberalism, Nietzsche [did] not hold that the individual person [was] inviolable and that human life [was] sacrosanct."[380] Indeed, *Beyond Good and Evil* is an excellent source for Nietzsche's attempt to draw such a line between, to one side, the democratic movements in Europe at the time and, to the other, that which ought to characterize a new nobility, which he had termed "free spirits". Andrew Huddleston has done the best job so far of explaining Nietzsche's view of freedom in connection with his critique of the Kantian notion of dignity. He has correctly surmised that "Nietzsche [was] doubtful that people [had] any such property that makes them *inherently* worthy of the respect of others," which amounted to a "cheapening of dignity that the standards are lowered so that every person is easily able to meet them in this way, with absolutely no effort on his or her part whatsoever."[381] But this comes with a stereotypically Nietzschean caveat: "rather than consigning the notions of worth and dignity to the dustbin of moral and theological error, Nietzsche," wrote Andrew Huddleston, "[presented] an alternative [. . .] that accomplishment is the real ground of dignity," where

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[378] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 31-2.
[379] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 32.
[380] Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 290; Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11.
[381] Andrew Huddleston, "Consecration to Culture: Nietzsche on Slavery and Human Dignity," *The Journal of the History of Philosophy* 52, no. 1 (2014): 145.

"[dignity] is something we can gain or lose based on how we lead our lives and on what fate befalls us."[382]

By 1885-6, Nietzsche had the advantage of several decades of aristocratic decline to point to over Kant and the neo-Kantian thinkers across Europe during past decades. Throughout most of the century, middle-class liberals had cashed out on the Kantian view in terms of increasing the security of "human dignity."[383] Earlier in the century, Auguste Blanqui had dubbed liberal revolutionaries as "martyrs for liberty."[384] In Leipzig, liberal political reformers drove the initiation of municipally supplied water, street-cleaning, and public bathhouses, but it also became a covert mouthpiece for Prussian nationalist ambitions and "dash."[385] Such liberal constitutionalists sought many safeguards that had been offered at great social and individual benefit. When moderate Swiss liberals passed a centralist constitution and seized Catholic property; this met with fervent opposition from rural communities, having been predominantly Catholic, who established a "special league" to protect Catholic human dignity in 1843, the *Sonderbund*, which violated of the Swiss Federal Treaty of 1815; the subsequent Civil War ended in November four years later, and soon a more liberal constitution was passed.[386] Wherever Nietzsche had looked, so to say, it appeared that rather than defending some inherent property these cases paint a different picture, one of how dignity is *acquired* or *achieved* and just the same *misplaced* or *lost*, and when one lost dignity, they not only likely lost status, but had their attitude

[382] Huddleston, "Consecration to Culture," ibid.
[383] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 46.
[384] See Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 32.
[385] See Brian K. Ladd, *Urban Planning and Civic Order in Germany*, *1860-1914*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 60-1, 65.
[386] Ladd, *Urban Planning and Civic Order*, 182; see also Oliver Zimmer, *A Contested Nation: History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761-1891* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 55-8, 62-4, 70.

changed almost entirely, what in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche had called "the last man," for whom everything had become "small":

> "We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth.
>
> One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.
>
> "We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink.[387]

Huddleston has added that although Nietzsche "[did] not continue to harp on 'dignity' as such" in his work of the 1880s, that had not meant Nietzsche was no longer concerned about his previous concerns with the place of freedom and dignity in human life.[388] No place in *Beyond Good and Evil* had this concern been better illustrated than in Nietzsche's critique of women's liberation ideology. "The weak sex has in no age been treated by men with such respect as it is in ours," he wrote:

> Wherever the spirit of industry has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit woman now aspires to the economic and legal independence of a clerk: 'woman as clerk' stands inscribed on the portal of the modern society now taking shape. As she thus seizes new rights, looks to become 'master', and inscribes the 'progress' of woman on her flags and banners, the reverse is happening with dreadful clarity: *woman is retrogressing*[, . . .] and the 'emancipation of woman', in so far as it has been demanded and advanced by women themselves (and not only by male shallow-pates), is thus reealed as a noteworthy symptom of [. . .] *stupidity* [. . .], an almost masculine stupidity, of which a real woman – who is always a clever woman – would have to be ashamed from the very heart[;] to seek with virtuous

[387] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Prologue," in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003), § 5.
[388] Huddleston, "Consecration to Culture," 153.

> assurance to destroy man's belief that a fundamentally different ideal is *wrapped up* in woman, that there is something eternally necessarily feminine; [. . .] the clumsy and indignant parade of slavery and bondage that woman's position in the order of society has hitherto entailed and still entails [. . .] – what does all this mean if not a crumbling of the feminine instinct, a defeminizing?[389]

Nietzsche had long been convinced that "[nobody] talks more passionately about [their] rights than [they] who in the depths of [their] soul doubts whether [they have] any,"[390] and by *Beyond Good and Evil*, he attempted to map that attitude onto the "emancipation of women."

Because status had been the mark of middle-class respectability, women were often masters of their own domestic spheres. Most women did not engage in paid work outside the home in the first half of the nineteenth century; by mid-century, most middle-class women took either to philanthropic or other charitable work. "Yet," as one historian has pointed out, "this did not mean they were mere passive advertisements of a higher social status; in the bourgeois home, the mother had to manage the servants and control the family's expenditure as well as ensuring the home was supplied with food, clothing, and all the accoutrements of domestic existence."[391] This had not at all eluded the pages of *Beyond Good and Evil*: "If woman were a thinking creature," Nietzsche wrote, "she would, having been the cook for thousands of years, sure have had to discover the major facts of physiology, and likewise gained possession of the art of healing," and only noble women resist the idea of liberalism as "what she believes of the eternal manly."[392] For Nietzsche, it had been as good as historical fact that women had somehow been deceived by men's alleged "superior" intellect: "has a woman," he penned, "ever conceded profundity to a woman's mind or

[389] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 239
[390] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, § 597
[391] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 325-6.
[392] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 234-6.

justice to a woman's heart?"[393] His response: "To be sure, there are sufficient idiotic friends and corrupters of woman among the learned asses of the male sex who advise woman to defeminize herself in this fashion and to imitate all the stupidities with which 'man' in Europe, European 'manliness', is sick[.]"[394] What nineteenth-century European men had wanted, according to Nietzsche, was to craft the female sex in their own image: "who would like to reduce woman to the level of 'general education'" — by the late nineteenth century, universities across Europe were admitting women as students or research partners — "if not to that of newspaper reading and playing at politics."[395]

Indeed, Richard J. Evans has uncovered a similar connection between the so-called "new women" of Europe and the emerging national imaginations of the late nineteenth century. Because they were mostly middle class in origin, women had been swept up in the political fevers of the 1860s and 70s across Europe. "The most successful examples of a symbiosis between nationalism and feminism occurred in Scandinavia," Evans wrote, while "links between feminism and nationalism [. . .] had an even more dramatic effect in Finland, which although part of the Russian Empire still possessed its own political institutions."[396] After 1875, the image of "Germanness" also included many women, most of whom had urged for initiatives like the one passed into law in 1875 that declared women as legally independent persons.[397] "German feminism," Evans noted, "was dominated by middle-class protestants [. . .] who had already been [active] during the 1848 revolutions," taking "advantage of the revival of liberal politics to found the German Women's Association in 1865."[398] Nietzsche had doubtless been aware of this organization, particularly

[393] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 232.
[394] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 239.
[395] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ibid.
[396] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 546.
[397] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 507.
[398] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 508.

given that it had developed the reputation of restricting women's political engagement.[399] Their activities must have struck him as the product in male chauvinism: "Here and there [men] even want to turn women into free-spirits and *literati* [. . .]; almost everywhere her nerves are being shattered [. . .] and she is being rendered more and more hysterical with every day that passes[.] There is," he began his conclusion, "a desire to make her in general more 'cultivated' and, as they say, to make the 'weak sex' *strong* through culture: as if history did not teach in the most emphatic matter possible that making human beings 'cultivated' and making them weaker [. . .] have always gone hand in hand, and that the world's most powerful and influential women [. . .] owed their power and ascendancy over men precisely to the force of their will – and not to schoolmasters!" Therefore: "That in a woman which inspires respect and fundamentally fear is her *nature*, which is more 'natural' than that of the man, her genuine, cunning, beast-of-prey suppleness [. . .] That which [. . .] evokes pity for this dangerous and beautiful cat 'woman' is that she appears to be more afflicted, more vulnerable, more in need of love and more condemned to disappointment than any other animal."[400] By having hastened to point out the connection between "cultivation" and "weakening," Nietzsche had no doubt drug the political issues surrounding women into his thought about master and slave moralities and long-standing questions about dignity and respectability.

In nineteenth-century Europe, society was the result primarily of industrialization, and because of this Europeans everywhere had become overworked and slavish. Already in *Human, All-Too-Human*, Nietzsche had expressed concerns about the emerging modern manifestation of an old duality: "Today as always, men fall into two groups: slaves and free men. Whoever does not have two-thirds of his day for himself is a slave, whatever he may be: a statesman, a businessman, an

[399] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, ibid.
[400] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 239.

official, or a scholar."[401] By the time he made his permanent contributions to *Beyond Good and Evil*, this situation had become what Nietzsche felt was a necessary condition for the construction of any culture, having thought that there must always be "slavery in some sense or other."[402] The real problem facing European culture and society had turned out, then, to be that of attempting to make new masters out of the motley of aristocratic and middle-class types. As Robert B. Pippin has put it, "[Nietzsche] clearly admits that it *is* quite possible to lead a life without much depth commitment to anything, perhaps because the skeptical climate of late modernity has made such commitments seem impossible to sustain."[403] Nietzsche understood that he had to urge "on the necessity of a historical dimension to any logos of any psyche, [. . .] that psychic functioning is always a second nature, a kind of historical result or product."[404] Dignity, then, takes a backseat to a "psychological self-relation as constitutive of freedom," an ideological space constructed "along a spectrum of possibilities, not an either-one-has-it-or-one-doesn't kind of capacity," where "whatever the resistance that has to be overcome, there results no settled state; the resistance must be constantly overcome." "Profound suffering," Nietzsche wrote, "ennobles."[405] Pippin has concluded from this that "at just the moment in the nineteenth century when western European societies [. . .] seemed to start paying off the Enlightenment's promissory notes [. . .] is also seemed that many of the best, most creative minds produced within and as products of such societies rose up in protest, even despair, at the social organization and norms that also made all of this possible."[406]

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[401] Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human,* § 283.
[402] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 257.
[403] Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy*, 30.
[404] Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy*, 31.
[405] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 270.
[406] Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy*, 122.

For Nietzsche, then, even many of the innovators (scientists, legalists, scholars, etc.) in Europe became the willing slaves of a traditional, common morality; to have understood this, he wrote in 1885-6, meant that any socially offered ideal of a "free man" could only amount to a "*collective degeneration of man* down to that which the socialist dolts and blockheads today see as their 'man of the future' [. . .] to the perfect herd animal," which meant anybody who "has thought this possibility through to the end knows one more kind of disgust than other men do – and perhaps also a new *task*!"[407] To paraphrase historian Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, Nietzsche's picture of a future European nobility had to be one that worried those whose social life hinged upon a national imaginary.[408] To be noble, then, had to amount (in part) to avoidance of "degrading our duties into duties for everybody," as Kant had suggested, "not to the want to relinquish or share our own responsibilities; to count our privileges and the exercising of them among our *duties*."[409] But who could comprise such a nobility? Nietzsche's answer had been that this must be the domain of "free spirits."

Cohen has argued that the best way to understand Nietzsche's picture of this noble type is to trace its origins to its relationship to the natural sciences. Not an unjustifiable maneuver: recall that the Nietzsche of the Rubinacci period had produced works that were laudatory of scientific institutions or investigations, as he had finally engaged the evolutionary thought of Darwin and come to grips with works by Duhring, Zöllner, Mayer, Boscovich, and others. Nietzsche's attacks on the metaphysical tradition in the history of ideas in *Human, All-Too-Human* had been buttressed by this at times reverential attitude. According to Cohen, "[Nietzsche's] primary target there is the ordinary assumption in moral discourse that our actions are free" because of a desire "to fulfill the

[407] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* § 203.
[408] Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, *American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and His Ideas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014), 114.
[409] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 272.

book's program of naturalism."[410] One need not peruse *Human, All-Too-Human* (subtitled "*a Book for Free Spirits*") to draw a similar conclusion to the effect that "free spirits" were Nietzsche's "companions, ideal humans, and shock troops" in a "war between science and metaphysics [. . .] through a multitude of local, individual battles over specific metaphysical beliefs."[411] There Nietzsche had taken refuge in science against religion as against the tradition of metaphysics.[412] There he had enthusiastically proclaimed that people "with no real interest in a science" as diminishing the "ennoblement of reality."[413] The free spirit, Cohen has argued correctly, appeared in the middle works as a sort of scientifically enlightened critic or researcher; he has also argued convincingly that since Nietzsche's relationship to science had changed, so too had his conception of the free spirit, from one who obliges contemporary moral institutions to one that regards science as useful if it does not get in the way of its own "perspectival character."[414]

This would be true had Nietzsche not written *Beyond Good and Evil* in a historical, not scientific, mode. In other words, while his changing view of science may have caused a change in his conception of what constituted these noble "free spirits," Cohen's picture neglects the purpose of the project: namely, to address the crisis within aristocratic cultural imaginations after having forfeited nearly all of their political capital and diminished the notion of nobility by adopting middle-class cultural norms: "As has happened lately, in all the clarity of modern times, with the French Revolution [. . .] into which [. . .] noble posterity could once again misunderstand the entire past and onlny thus perhaps make the sight of it endurable [. . .] have we ourselves not been this 'noble posterity'? And [. . .] is it not at this moment – done with?"[415] Science having emerged

[410] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, 209.
[411] Cohen, *Science, culture, and Free Spirits*, 18, 83.
[412] See Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, §s 68, 110-11, 128, 131.
[413] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, 182, 214.
[414] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, 209-10, 228.
[415] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 38.

within a middle-class social milieu, Nietzsche's relationship to science could have only been a small piece of his description of noble free spirits, particularly given what has been said in previous chapters about the social aspect of science's cultural proliferation. For Nietzsche, this figure "ventures into a labyrinth [. . .] and is torn to pieces limb from limb by some cave-minotaur of conscience," and what "refreshes" this noble ("good") European "must to a very different and inferior type almost poison," a type which "renounced the belief in governesses."[416] The mechanisms of science, then, appear as "something unutterably late, derived, unoriginal – for it presupposes something that *holds together* and *can* press and push!"[417] In December 1885 or January 1886, he jotted into his notebook about how "the Christian-moral God is not tenable: hence 'atheism' – as if there could be no other kind of god."[418] In the summer of 1886, he referred to science as aimed at "[bringing] about [the] *slavery of nature*," whereas the ideological space of noble free spirits could do without religious virtues: "*consequently* we lose them – [. . .] means of *making possible* for man a tremendous self-conquering," since Nietzsche's "*new aristocracy*" avoided the "two futures of humanity," both "the consequence of mediocratization" as well as the "conscious distinction, [and] self-shaping."[419] Noble free spirits were to be, as Richard Schacht has put it, "beyond thinking moralistically," where "the topic [. . .] is what it takes to become and be not just a good free-spirited philosopher, but the kind of thinker and force Nietzsche now envisions as a philosopher of the highest sort."[420]

But what is noble, Nietzsche nonetheless thought, in a Europe where there existed "a morbid sensitivity to pain [. . .] which, with the aid of religion and odds and ends of philosophy, would

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[416] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 29-30, 34.
[417] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 78-9
[418] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, Ibid.
[419] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 114.
[420] Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge, 1983), 177, 184.

like to deck itself out as something higher," where there existed "a downright cult of suffering" that produced "bad taste" and had to be warded off with "gay science," a tool of the new nobility.[421] In addition, solitude was a necessity for coming to the realization that "concepts themselves [. . .] are something incommunicable and reluctant which blows cold on every passer-by."[422]

To establish a new European nobility free from the cage of national imaginaries, then, free spirits had to be willing to retreat into solitude one's own prejudices in order to discern better those of society at-large. The construction of such ideological space would have profound effects on modern culture. Pippin has claimed that this is because Nietzsche had, by 1885, had expressed an understanding of "freedom to consist in some sort of affirmative psychological relation to one's own deeds, a relation of identification finding one's deeds, experiencing them as genuinely one's own [. . .] as an achieved state [that] involves both a kind of wholehearted identification and affirmation as well as the potential for great self-dissatisfaction."[423] "If sense is to be made of what Nietzsche was proposing," Schacht deduced from this, "it would seem to me that it involved taking seriously the idea that in the long run the pen at least can be mightier than the sword, or the vicissitudes of what we ordinarily mean by politics."[424] Indeed, Nietzsche's goal was the cultivation of a cultural, not a political, subjectivity: "One finds today among artists and scholars sufficient who reveal by their works that they are driven on by a profound desire for the noble: but precisely this need *for* the noble is fundamentally different from the needs of the noble soul itself, and in fact an eloquent and dangerous sign of its lack."[425]

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[421] See Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 293.
[422] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 289.
[423] Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy*, 119.
[424] Schact, *Nietzsche*, 186.
[425] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 287.

The shape of the emerging bourgeois world and its liberal democratic or socialist politics was much clearer to assess in solitude. Historians have argued that the aristocracy changed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from a social order to a class, but that Nietzsche seemed to have had a different view while he was in Sils-Maria. While the agrarian, feudalist social order allowed the aristocracy certain rights and privileges by title, it had also constituted a culture, often guiding European culture, defined by taste, as a culture within society with the greatest social impact. As being "noble" became a social marker, retaining its social prestige at the cost of its cultural identity, the nobility had been left with an irreconcilable dilemma between "strong" Europe, organized on the principle of rank and social order and a "decadent" Europe, organized on the notion of equal rights. § 242 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, however, had been Nietzsche's attempt to resolve this dilemma by telling a story in which both aristocrats and commoners, so long as they are true individuals, can co-exist as free spirits, as "nomadic" and "without roots" in some imagined national community. Noble Europeans had to forge their own ideological spaces. To be noble, then, was to have mastered the construction of one's own ideological space. Nicholas Martin has remarked that historians "are on safer ground when treating Nietzsche's notions [. . .] as foils to the Europe of the nineteenth century than as blueprints for the Europe of the twentieth."[426] This, in turn, required a method for examining the sludgy trail of modern history. An account of how Nietzsche understood not only histories but the history of those histories will conclude this chapter.

[426] Nicholas Martin, "'We good Europeans': Nietzsche's New Europe in *Beyond Good and Evil*," *History of European Ideas* 20, nos. 1-3 (1995): 144.

HISTORY AND "WILL TO POWER"

Nietzsche read histories. By 1885, he set out the historical project of *Beyond Good and Evil* in Sils-Maria. He was driven by the thought that nineteenth-century historiography had become either too nihilistic or otherwise to narrow, practical, and short-term.[427] His *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* of 1884-5 described this historiography as having soiled the earth's "skin." "I have unlearned," says Zarathustra, "belief in 'great events' whenever there is much bellowing and smoke about them. [. . .] The greatest events — they are not our noisiest but our stillest hours." Sure of the noisy, disruptive tendencies of this historiography. "If there is no goal in the whole history of man's lot," he jotted in June 1886, "then we must put one in: assuming, on the one hand, that we have *need* of a goal, and on the other that we've come to see through the illusion of an immanent goal and purpose. And the reason that we have need of goals is that we have need of a will. 'Will' [is] the compensation for lost 'belief'."[428] Later that summer, another jotting was penned describing "psychological history" as a method for examining "the 'whole' constructed by the eye" the whole history of modern Europe, itself having been beset with "prejudices prompted by the whispers of instincts (of races, communities, of different phases such as youth, withering, etc.)"[429] Nietzsche defined the "*historical sense*" in *Beyond Good and Evil* § 224 as "the capacity for divining quickly the order of rank of the evaluations according to which a people, a society, a human being has lived, the 'divinatory instinct' for the relationships of these evaluations, for the relation of the authority of values to the authority of effective forces." Moreover, such historical sense had "come to us in the wake of the made and fascinating *semi-barbarism* into which Europe has been plunged through the democratic mingling of classes and races – only the nineteenth century knows this

[427] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 84.
[428] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 124.
[429] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 92, 93.

sense, as its sixth sense." He even waged a critique: "[the] past of every form and mode of life [. . .] streams into us 'modern souls' thanks to this mingling [. . .]. Through our semi-barbarism [. . .] we have secret access everywhere such as a noble age never had, above all the access to the labyrinth of unfinished cultures and to every semi-barbarism which has ever existed on earth; and, in so far as the most considerable part of human culture hitherto has been semi-barbarism, 'historical sense' means virtual the sense and instinct for everything [. . .] which at once proves it to be an *ignoble* sense [. . .]: that which men of the 'historical sense' find hardest to grasp [. . .] at bottom finds us prejudiced and almost hostile, is just what is complete and wholly mature in every art and culture, that which constitutes actual nobility[.]" For this reason, he concluded, the noble virtue of historical sense had to have been its differentiation from common "good" taste, abiding some "itch for the infinite": "Like the rider on a charging steed we let fall the reins before the infinite, we modern men, like semi-barbarians." Robin Small has attempted to explain this critique within Nietzsche's broader critique on a "Heraclitean doctrine of becoming [. . .] to reject those conceptions of time which reify events as distinct individuals."[430] If true, it is hardly sufficient evidence to establish Nietzsche's relationship to modern European historiography: maybe to understand Nietzsche's criticism, one ought first to get a clear picture of the historiographical foxhole into which he wished to drop his dynamite.

Most nineteenth-century European historians had been preoccupied with causal stories about the forces driving the modern world. By midcentury, most serious academic historians were attached to a national imaginary, doubling as either archivists or politicians, as in the case of August Böckh or Ludwig Keller. Earlier in the century, Leopold von Ranke had set out the methodological assumptions upon which modern history would be based. According to Richard J.

[430] Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 86.

Evans, most European historians had "widely thought that history had been established as a science by Ranke."[431] Ranke's approach found sympathizers by the 1890s, when Lord Acton conducted his own research in Cambridge to meet "the scientific demand for completeness and certainty."[432] But not all historians had made such empirical endorsements. Others, such as Heinrich von Treitschke, authored multi-volume histories of Germany awash in an unabashed Hegelian vision of the emergence of the Prussian Empire.[433] The son of a Saxon army officer, Treitschke had become a lecturer in history and politics at Leipzig, Treitschke was a radical Hegel; he also endorsed Social Darwinist racial views being popularized by his contemporaries in England.[434] Treitschke praised the idea of a coming *kulturkampf* in an 1862 essay, which espoused a quasi-mystical view of Prussians' "noble German blood," and offered what one historian has termed as "the praise of a mythical migration eastward conducted by German ancestors would eventually become a means of legitimizing claims to further eastern territories."[435]

Friedrich Engels's and Karl Marx's 1848 *The Communist Manifesto* offered another neo-Hegelian picture that had also promised to meet the criteria of a rigorous science, what is called the materialist conception of history: "[t]he history of all hitherto existing society," they wrote, "is the history of class struggles." The stimulus of this history, they claimed, was the economic structure prevailing at any given time. In 1859's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx established that "[no] social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed, and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society

[431] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, 499.
[432] Quoted in Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, ibid.
[433] Evans, *Pursuit of Power*, ibid.
[434] Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers: the clash of religion and politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005) 27.
[435] Burleigh, *Earthly Powers*, Ibid.

itself," where "the sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure, the real basis, on which rises a legal and political superstructure."[436] Like Engels and Marx, the historian Thomas Carlyle had been profoundly concerned with the crises that precipitate matters of class or political struggles. When his colleague John Stuart Mill had proposed that Carlyle produce a history of the French revolution, Carlyle set to work on what would eventually become his 1837 *The French Revolution: A History*.[437] But unlike Engels or Marx, Carlyle held that the forces pushing history along had all along been broadly spiritual, not material. The chaos of events like the French Revolution, he thought, demanded what he called "heroic figures" to tame the chaotic forces of society. He adapted this idea into a series of lectures dating 1840, entitled *Heroes and Hero Worship*. In Carlyle's view, only heroic figures could direct spiritual forces, leading sociologist Herbert Spencer to reply that "[one] must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. [. . .] Before he can remake his society, his society must make him."[438]

Historian Susanna Barrows has attributed the "architectural structure of modern French [. . .] historiography" to Hippolyte Taine, another neo-Hegelian historian who, like Carlyle, sought the movement of history beyond the structural materialism of Engels and Marx. Unlike Carlyle, however, Taine had been certain that these motivations were often unconscious phenomena, whose transtemporal residues would form intentional objects for future social arrangements.[439] Over the course of the late-nineteenth century, Taine achieved a level of success that eventually opened

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[436] Quoted in G.A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*: *A Defence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 27-8.
[437] See Charles William Eliot, "Introductory Note," *The Harvard Classics* XXV, Part 3 (New York: P.F. Collier & Son): 318.
[438] Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (New York: Appleton, 1896), 31.
[439] Susanna Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-century France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 83.

doors into academia, becoming professor of history or law at Saint-Cyr and Oxford by 1871. Taine's *The Origins of Contemporary France* had a significant, transnational impact. Nietzsche's admiration for Taine's work has already been documented in this chapter. Suffice it to say that Taine's influence rested in his antagonism to the political institutions that were erected by Robespierre and eventually canonized pathetically under Louis Napoleon III. Owing to Taine, an entire generation of French critics and historians emerged that criticized these institutions for having contradicted the natural development of French statehood.

1886 was the year Nietzsche reckoned the name "will to power" as the proper function of human beings throughout history: "The world viewed from inside, [. . .] it would be simply 'will to power' and nothing else[.]"[440] Thus, human reality had been the product of "will to power," and any history of this human reality was the history of the dynamics within it, thereby constituting the *mentalités* necessary for "[explaining] the temporal world with the lowest expenditure of presuppositions and means."[441] It was this will to power that Nietzsche had observed driving along the physiological process of "becoming European." But what exactly was "will to power," and how could it have driven along historical processes?

First, this question presumes that Nietzsche conceived of will to power as a quasi-Hegelian entity that manifests itself until fully actualized. The truth is that Nietzsche had not endorsed this interpretation of the will to power.

Nietzsche described these *mentalités* as relational, either in attraction or repulsion, rather than synthesis through antithesis, informed primarily through his readings of Roger Boscovich's *Theory of Natural Philosophy* of 1758. According to Boscovich, material ontology cannot account for anomalies he called "centers of force," dynamic quanta that exchanged information in a universal

[440] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 36.
[441] KSA, 7:23[30]

field of constant, frenetic interaction, while never interpenetrating. Forces, Boscovich determined, had to be mutual forces that "act in opposite directions [. . .] Hence a force of this kind, from the very meaning of the term, may be called a repulsive force."[442] "If," moreover, "repulsive forces act at very small distances, & these forces increase indefinitely as the distances decrease, so that they are capable of destroying any velocity however large; then there never can be any finite force [. . .] that can make the distance between two points vanish, as is required for compenetration."[443] Nietzsche used these principles about force to establish a psychological analysis of historical issues. The "forces" of this analysis are what Nietzsche described as "drives," a more deeply imbedded and "primitive" form of the world "in which everything still lies locked in mighty unity and then branches out and develops in the organic process."[444] Unlike the neo-Hegelians, such as Engels and Marx or Taine, Nietzsche's historical picture of the nineteenth century was not one of oily political struggles, nor of a thick-brushed development of political subjectivities but, rather, the history of the development of these various "drives." His notion of "will to power" had served, then, as a hypothesis about some ways that this development played out. For Nietzsche, the teleological quality of other histrionics had all assumed a fixed end. Nietzsche, by contrast, sought to preclude such ends with drive history. In *Beyond Good and Evil* § 13 Nietzsche criticized Herbert Spencer's notion of self-preservation as another in such a series of "*superfluous* teleological principles." "A living thing," rather, "desires above all to *vent* its strength."

Nietzsche's historical method was designed as a causal story about the efficiency of these *mentalités*: "if we do so," Nietzsche wrote in Sils-Maria, "then we *have* to make the experiment of

[442] Roger Joseph Boscovich, *A Theory of Natural Philosophy* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1763/1922), 77, § 75.
[443] Boscovich, *Theory of Natural Philosophy*, 267, § 360.
[444] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 36.

positing causality of will hypothetically as the only one."[445] And because these sets of drives can operate only on one another, and not on, e.g., the supposed "mechanical" or "material" world, doing history of these causes demanded "the hypothesis that wherever 'effects' are recognized, will is operating upon will – and that all mechanical occurrences, in so far as a force is active in them, are force of will, effects of will [. . .] one would have acquired the right to define *all* efficient force unequivocally as: *will to power*."[446] Explanation of these efficient causes, Nietzsche had thought, required the assumption that historical events like wars or the rise of nationalism could only be analyzed in the development of these drives.

Typical historical and historicist methods had been assumed the best way to approximate the deep truth about historical events, and many conventional historians or writers had often assumed that individual psychology displayed at best a new way of implementing the insights contained in more traditional models. For Marx, human psychology had been a result of relationships to the products of one's labor, what he had termed "alienation." This was because such a relationship, which Marx had cited as between labor, superior (manager/capitalist), and the "modes of production." In his 1867 *Capital*, Marx argued that "from the moment that the bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distribution corresponding to it are recognized as *historical*, the delusion of regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes and the prospect opens a new kind of society, a new economic formation, to which capitalism was only a transition."[447] Like other historians and writers of his time, Marx had committed himself to the idea, derived in part from Saint-Simon, that a single relation — i.e., class struggle for "the conditions of production and distribution" — obtained between socialist and conventional

[445] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ibid.
[446] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Ibid.
[447] Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, *Volume I*, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1992) 332.

historical models for every class and aspect of society studied by historians and historicists throughout the nineteenth century.

Nietzsche's method had not required this assumption. This may have been because the assumption seemed to him obscuratinist, on the one hand, or unhelpful, on the other. Most straightforwardly, it had obscured the lived past only if modern history were understood in terms of a multiplicity of drives, some of which had adapted both to symbolic (nationalist, religious, etc.) and for sub-symbolic (unconscious, non-conceptual) processing. Throughout human history, Nietzsche thought, everyday performance had involved the shared, but variegated, set of activities motivated by these drives. Thus, Nietzsche introduced the set of drives that appeared in *Beyond Good and Evil* as "will to power." Having had turned away from teleological historical visions, Nietzsche's conception of "will to power" could even account historically for the "*need* of a goal."[448]

Rather important, though perhaps much less straightforward, was that Nietzsche claimed that these drives had admitted of multiple historical *explanations*: there will always remain a need for higher levels of analysis of the "will to power." But for that, historians and history-minded writers had to provide, for example, what it is that a multiplicity of *different* drives, all of which have in common only their movements with respect to one another. Finding and exhibiting the commonalities that underpin important psychological generalizations across time was, in a sense, the whole point of having extended the concept "will to power" from the get. And it may be that in order to exhibit such commonalities historians ought to be familiar with the kinds of analysis Nietzsche had found in his various and rapacious historical readings. *Beyond Good and Evil* traced

[448] *Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 124.

the expansion of the field of "will to power" and the complicated interactions between these drives at the macro-level in terms of the drives he identified as "commanding" and "obeying."

Marx had viewed the processes of history as having had placed humanity into two main groups, subordinates and superiors, where, according to G.A. Cohen, "in so far as their livelihoods depend on their relations with their superiors, [subordinates] tend[ed] to be poorer than the latter."[449] "In slavery," then, "the exploiter is not obliged to maintain an idle slave."[450] This suggested that the worker-manager/master-slave relationship is the product of the modern development of capitalist production where the "master" understood the necessity of tending to their "slaves'" well-being to better ensure the obedience of the "slave." This power imbalance, then, had become the consequence of the productive forces (of capitalism) that have driven the history of Marx's modern world.

But for Nietzsche these "productive forces" were at best irrelevant in the relationship between "masters" and "slaves," because obedience cannot be taken as a sufficient explanation of historical processes. While he would have agreed with Marx that the basis of all human life is activity, these productive forces were an effect of an entire set of drives developed over millenia. That it is possible one could well conduct the behavior of another meant not that such a power relationship lies in historical processes themselves: the relation had proven, instead, to be the result of their own interaction, where both "master" and "slave" are both driven to command, but the stronger drives more often win out.

This even played out within ideological space. "[Life]," Nietzsche jotted into his notebook probably in mid-1886, "is not adaptation of inner to outer conditions, but will to power, which

[449] Cohen, *Marx's Theory of History*, 69
[450] Cohen, *Marx's Theory of History*, 190.

from within subordinates and incorporates ever more of the 'external'."[451] The establishment of a subordinate-superior hierarchy, then, had been the outcome of this interaction of drives, therefore drives formed the main historical explanans in Nietzsche's account. For instance, § 199 of *Beyond Good and Evil* reads that "[inasmuch] as there have been human beings, there have been human herds [. . .] and always very many who obey compared with the very small number of those who command":

> The strange narrowness of human evolutions, its hesitations, its delays, its frequent retrogressions and rotations, are due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience has been inherited best and at the expense of the art of commanding. If we think of this instinct taken to its ultimate extravagance there would be no commanders or independent men at all; or, if they existed, they would suffer from a bad conscience and in order to be able to command would have to practice deceit upon themselves: the deceit, that is, that they too were only obeying. This state of things actually exists in Europe today: I call it the moral hypocrisy of the commanders. They know no way of defending themselves against their bad conscience other than to pose as executors of more ancient or higher commands [. . .], or even to borrow her maxims from the herd's way of thinking and appear as 'the first servant of the people'[.] On the other hand, the herd-man in Europe today makes himself out to be the only permissible kind of man and glorifies the qualities through which he is tame, peaceable and useful to the herd as the real human virtues: namely public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, pity. In those cases, however, [. . .] there is attempt after attempt to substitute for them an adding-together of clever herd-men: this, for example, is the origin of all parliamentary constitutions. All this notwithstanding, what a blessing, what a release from a burden becoming intolerable, the appearance of an unconditional commander is for this her-animal European, the effect produced by the appearance of Napoleon is the greatest witness — the history of the effect of Napoleon is

[451] KSA, 12:7[9]

> almost the history of the higher happiness this entire century has attained its most valuable men and moments.

This suggests that histories had been written to perpetuate a Janus-faced error. In the case of Marxist history, even if the contention that pure history of the forces of production included a complete, formal account of individual psychological dispositions, it would not follow that the higher-level pictures of society and culture were dispensable. Such pictures, rather, may have been the essential set of principles for historical explanations that run from causal processes to causal stories. Like other historians of the nineteenth century, Marx's argument had to rest on a condition of causal efficacy that, were it to have been applied, would betray an entire spectrum of legitimate explanations both in the historical and the ordinary senses. In the case of "Carlylism," this condition could itself have been called into doubt by the power of higher-level historical explanations, explanations which, Nietzsche likely thought, may have done at the local level what historical explanations do at the global. That is, they may enable historians to mark the shared contributions of a variety of Great Men, or "heroes." Such marking would, Nietzsche believed that Carlyle had thought, provide the historian with resources to introspect and deduce their own basic methodological strategies. In this way, historical forces that Carlyle had viewed as emergent at a higher level of Great Men may in fact be *incarnate* in the causes of social or political events. But if this is correct, one notable implication is that the entire debate about historical causes then becomes a catfight about the origins or certain actions taken by Great Men and none else. Where the question once seemed one of historical explainer, it had now become merely one of an event's origins. By positing drives as *mentalités*, Nietzsche attempted to move beyond this captivating picture, having left it up to historians to test whether the "will to power" conception of history, with its various, complicated sets of drives, can shake the discipline free of that picture.

Conclusion

Following the self-publication of *Beyond Good and* Evil, Nietzsche's life during the autumn and winter of 1886 "looks quiet and harmless but it was during this time that, with all the fury of the neglected prophet, he was examining the foundations of our moral and intellectual traditions and taking a hammer to them in the books of his mature philosophy."[452] He had spent that winter at the Pension de Genève, where he had previously sketched ideas for *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* a couple of years before, and whose lobby salon Nietzsche frequented as much for the booze as for the disparate company.[453] When he returned to Nice the following winter, there had been a great deal on his mind. He took quickly to mailing sixty-six copies of his self-published *Beyond Good and Evil* out to several prominent and not so prominent figures. Mid-winter, Nietzsche received word that the German composer Johannes Brahms, fresh off the critical success of his 1885 *Symphony No. 4 in E minor*, had expressed publicly his interest in the book.[454] This winter had, however, differed from the previous, where he would mentally vacation while writing his most dangerous book. Rain had displaced any chance he had of getting a swim early upon his arrival, and the subpar level of attendance at in the lobby salon had pushed him back toward himself and his thoughts. And so there, in Nice, he had begun to follow through on the project of cashing out the diagnoses of *Beyond Good and Evil* in terms of a more coherent historical story, but only this time it would have to be about the ancient past. Doubtless he had much on his mind. He reread Rée *On the Origin of Moral Sensations*, and reread it, and again; then again.

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[452] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!*, 268.
[453] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!,* Ibid.
[454] Prideaux, *I am Dynamite!,* 291.

No doubt memories often occupied his cognitive economy. After all, could he have become who he was if not for his relationship with Rée? Or Wagner, for that matter? Could he have not endured the tumultuous illness that plagued him for nearly ten years had it not been for these stimulating connections? Of course, this is all speculation about what a dead person thought about 130 years ago. But it there is anything that can be gleamed from Nietzsche's life, it is that it seems to have manifest in his work in profound ways. Indeed, this was the case for *Beyond Good and Evil*, whose pages read neither as "Nietzsche's most philosophical book" or "Nietzsche's most dangerous" but, in the end, as Nietzsche's most personal book prior to *Ecce Homo* or *The Case of Wagner* (both written in 1887-8). It is within its pages that one encounters, foremost, a historical quality to the text that offers stopgaps, open questions, or direct historical criticism where necessary. It has been suggested throughout this discussion how this quality is of foremost importance when analyzing the book, an effort to make good on Richardson's idea that to understand Nietzsche, one may well to imbue his works with one's own historical sense, which is what Nietzsche advocated precisely in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

This discussion began by leaping from Richardson's ledge into the deep seas of nineteenth-century European history. To that end, this discussion proposed, initially, a study of some social practices constitutive of the German national imaginary over the course the late-nineteenth century and how those practices were codified in cultural artifacts, having manifested, first, within the Leipzig's cultural spaces during Nietzsche's student years of the late 1860s. Because the borders constructed between Germany and Switzerland had much more porous than those between the latter and either France or Italy, it is likely that the cultural politics of Basel was of little variation from that common with German national imaginary. This was of course both true and not, but for Nietzsche's purposes, there could have been very little difference. Tribschen may as well as have

been a German space, where Wagner and his acolytes disseminated aesthetic "print-languages" with an aim toward establishing a new cultural sense to redeem the German national imagination, essentially the project of Wagner in Bayreuth. If Benedict Anderson was right to suggest that nationhood hinged on individual imaginations, then it must have been subject to the very limits of individuals' embodied experience, their phenomenological embodiment. Historical individuals were not passive purveyors of experience, nor were they things or objects for scholars to research, but each of them had possessed a level of bodily awareness or embodied subjectivity. This subjectivity was exclusive from political subjectivity. Though national imaginaries could be crucial for constructing ideological spaces, not all nineteenth-century Europeans followed this model, developing instead strategies of self-exclusion from prevailing attitudes or dispositions of those within any constructed national community. As many free-floating Europeans moved in search of either better-paying work, improving health, or intellectual inspiration, participating in networks that connected them to the broader world, they had done so as "impossible subjects" caught outside the bounds of either citizenship or political commitment. More than just national identities, though, the analysis of space and identity or belonging as developed in the course of this discussion implies that non-political subjectivities ought to be better researched by Nietzsche scholars as much as historians.

Chapter 2 cited "southern" spaces as the transnational basis of Nietzsche's thought in *Beyond Good and Evil*, with comparative and conceptual connections, which took the form of a network-like analysis that can itself be mapped with methods presently available to historians. It was suggested throughout the first two chapters that while the study of any two or more social or cultural institutions, for example, might offer a basis for thinking about each of those institutions, this would, in turn, only make sense within wider spatial contexts, as spaces where not only ideas,

but *people* and their ideas moved. This can lead historians to two modes of explanation. One, endorsed by Lees and Lees, is to understand these institutions as props upon the urban stages of Europe, where the chief motions of modernity had been achieved during political struggles. While that may be true, in some sense or other, the existence of a cultural artefact like *Beyond Good and Evil*, and the experiences that led to its composition has had as much a profound effect on such struggles that it seems impossible to assume that the latter prefigure artefacts such as the former. By the time Nietzsche had taken up the experimental attitude of *The Gay Science*, he had inadvertently provided future historians with an example of how Oliver Zimmer's "free-floating individuals" multiply realized the functions of urbanity.

Grant that European cultures do not strictly resemble one another: an institution or social practice's reaction to cultural change will not always have shared a similar impetus or have the same goal. Thus, *Beyond Good and Evil* qua historical representation does not proceed as a direct comparison between European culture, instead raising the issue of cultures as represented in tokens of general cultural typologies. In that way, the ebullition of European society and culture could not have been analyzed without tight analytic pressure placed upon these typologies. And if there are good reasons either to limit the scope of comparative analysis or to refine it, then perhaps a method may be deduced that lends possibility to affirming the disjunction rather than disconfirming one of its disjuncts, a point that was brought home in Chapter 3. To illustrate his view of nineteenth-century Europe, his most dangerous book thrashed about at developments in culture, society, and politics. Among Nietzsche's many targets in the book, both nationalism and socialism do not escape from a broader historical context; underneath, problems of aristocratic fallout sustained these motions. Historians and historicists in Nietzsche's day (Carlyle, Marx, Taine) often took to

explaining such movements teleologically, either through Hegelianism or Carlylism. *Beyond Good and Evil*, by contrast, is a historical representation written with sense of its own historicity.

For Europeans, culture reflected both the dramas and the repetitions of everyday life. Understanding Nietzsche historically means situating him within this context, rather than as an ahistorical force. He was a nineteenth-century European between two European worlds. Europeans from all over had often occupied a self-exclusive place within the spaces of those worlds, since ideas about geography and space have often been critical to the meanings of places throughout history. Historians of modern Europe can learn not only about how space explorers traversed regions, moving from place to place, but how they severed their ideological spaces from any commitment to a national imaginary. Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* provides a case study corrective for both historians and Nietzsche scholars. For the former, it helps make a powerful case for the historical relevance of embodied subjective experience (in just about any form). And in terms of the latter, it can help to address Richardson's question about how Nietzsche scholars ought to study him — if they were to do so historically.

Europe's nineteenth century, like that of any other continent, is now a story of fissures and divaricates historians' quodlibets about the articulation of varied subjectivities. Political subjectivity was only one type of subjectivity during the century, and not all urban spaces enclosed some sort of political struggles. Embodied subjective experience itself constituted *mentalités* over both space and time. To understand embodied subjective experience, one cannot be restricted to evidence of articulated political identity among members of large groups, nor to crowd behavior. "A living body only perceived outwardly," Edith Stein wrote in her *On the Problem of Empathy*, "would always be only a particularly disposed, actually unique, physical body, but never 'my

living body'."[455] If historians propose to examine the role of many individuals in the development of modern European culture, then they cannot ignore the fact that there was then, as there is now, something in subjective experience that aids in motivating the articulation of any type of identity. People moved around during the nineteenth century, traversed constructed national boundaries, and exchanged ideas. They did so, however, in certain spaces. Both historians and Nietzsche scholars would do better to investigate painstakingly how free-floating space explorers or impossible subjects narrowed the gap between historical circumstances and larger discussions about how spaces play critical roles in the explanation of cultural nationalism and other ideologies. Location impacted Europeans' lives in profound ways, and severe meaning had been projected onto places. Making spaces meaningful was an active part of being any nineteenth-century European, whether they had socio-political or socio-economic relationships or commitments. Rapid social and cultural changes throughout the late-nineteenth century were the result of a set of attempts during prior decades at fixing the meanings of and beliefs about these spaces, organizing relationships "on the ground." But spaces could often function as a refuge or a cave rather than a battleground or coliseum in the construction of cultural ideologies grounded in collectivist subjectivities. For many Europeans, spaces intimated meaning heavily, which made it easier to develop ideological and cultural frameworks free from the vision of "grand politics" Nietzsche thought was characteristic of modern European society.

[455] Quoted in Joel Smith, *Experiencing Phenomenology: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 145.

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