A SPEECH ACT THEORY BASED INTERPRETATION MODEL FOR WRITTEN TEXTS

by

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ABSTRACT

A SPEECH ACT THEORY BASED INTERPRETATION MODEL

FOR WRITTEN TEXTS

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In recent years, so called **Speech Act Theory** (a branch of the philosophy of language) has focused on such concepts as 'intention' (or 'intentionality'), 'interaction' and 'comprehension'. The author believes that this theory gives the theoretical basis for an interpretation model which is developed in this study.

After human speech activities are placed in the larger context of human actions, a model which explains the performing process of speech acts is presented. In this model, four levels of intentionality are posited: utterance intent, propositional intent, illocutionary intent, and perlocutionary intent. These levels of intentionality are inseparable from each other and operate simultaneously in performing speech acts. Speech acts are categorized according to their illocutionary intents. Six major categories are suggested:

Representatives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, Declarations, and Responsives.

The model of the speaker presented above is completed when the model of the hearer (or interpreter) is added to it. The combined model, which can be called a cyclic or interactive model, is developed. Corresponding to the four levels of intentions on the part of the speaker, four levels of effects are posited in order to explain the 'comprehension' process of the hearer. These four levels of effects are: utterance effect, propositional effect, illocutionary effect, and perlocutionary effect. It is contended that only after this stage of comprehension can the hearer make a legitimate response to the speaker by his 'decision' and 'response action'. The process of comprehension, then, is explained extensively, paying particular attention to the concepts of 'context' and 'inference'.

The main contributions of the study are: (i) the resolutions of some of the lingering theoretical problems in Speech Act Theory; (ii) the development of an interactive model of speech acts, which is applied to text analysis; and (iii) the develoment of such concepts as 'author's intent structure' and 'referential intent structure' for the application of Speech Act Theory to text analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is intended to invite theoretical discussion on how the theory expounded by Beekman, Callow and Kopesec (1981) in The Semantic Structure of Written Communication (hereafter abbreviated as SSWC) can be modified so that it can be applied effectively to narrative texts. In order to accomplish this purpose, one alternative model of analysis for narrative material will be presented.

As Beekman (1978:2) notes, until recently the theory of SSWC has been primarily occupied with the analyses of the epistle material of the New Testament, which is categorized in genre as 'hortatory' or 'expository'. And the theory generally has proved to be effective for such analyses.

However, when the same theory has been applied to narrative material, the analyst has confronted a new type of problem. The problem, in short, is that it is not possible to find the kind of thematic structure which would be expected from the simple reading of the text. This is a feeling of mismatching or skewing between the result gained from the analysis and the thematic impression perceived from a simple reading. Why does this happen? Did the analyst leave out some important information during the process of analysis? These questions have not been asked when the New Testament Epistles were being analyzed. The question, therefore, remains: is SSWC an adequate theory for narrative material? If not, how should it be revised?

There have been some efforts made to solve the problem stated above. Beekman (1978) was well aware of the difficulty of applying this theory (first expounded extensively in Translating the Word of God (1974)), to narrative material, and he suggested (1978) some necessary theoretical modifications. Tuggy (1979) is probably the first among the SSWC analysts who tackled seriously the thematic structure of narrative material, in this case, the Gospel of John. The special seminar held for two months in late 1983, by the Translation Department at the International Linguistics Center in Dallas, focused on the same issue and sought some possible ways to revise the present theory of SSWC so that it might be better able to accommodate a wider range of materials, including narrative.

In this dissertation, I want to propose that a concept of meaning such as developed in **Speech Act Theory** (hereafter abbreviated as SAT) by philosophers of language should be incorporated into the SSWC theory in order to improve it for a more comprehensive analysis of language phenomena. There are some scholars in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) who have discussed SAT and pointed out its usefulness for application to translation. SSWC, however, refers to SAT very briefly, only touching on it in the discussion of 'proposition' (1981:58-59). Huttar (1977a & 1980) is probably the first linguist in SIL who demonstrated how the concepts in SAT can be significantly utilized for the interpretation and translation of a written text. We will see in more detail what he has done in a later chapter. Miehle (1981), referring to van Dijk (1977), emphasizes the importance of perlocutionary intent in the analysis of a text. Thomson (1982), referring to the works of Searle (1969, 1975 & 1977), summarizes the main concepts of SAT, and tries to apply them to some passages in the Gospel of John. Some of these linguists explicitly state that the study of SAT is necessary for deeper understanding and more accurate translation of a text. For example, Miehle says (1981:194):

> The Beekman-Callow approach, with its emphasis on determining the underlying semantic and rhetorical structure by examining the surface structure linguistic signals, has done much to point the way to this intermediate structuralism. However, the addition of the emphasis on determining the perlocutionary function of individual propositions (as motivated by van Dijk's cognitively based model) could lead to a revolution not only in interpretation but also in translation of Scriptures by the inclusion of perlocutionary information either in the text or in marginal notes.

Thomson also says (1982:28):

> The amount of research needed to be done is immense. Study is needed to determine the ways in which implicatures were generated in Greek, and the exact nature of indirect illocutionary acts in the New Testament. The illocutionary structure of various New Testament passages should be investigated in detail.

I have taken up these challenges and present here some of the insights attained in my thinking and reading. The following are my main theses:

1. Any linguistic discourse, whether oral or written, is a part of human action, i.e. discourse occurs as speech acts, with clear speaker or writer intention inherent in them. And this intention is the key to the thematic structure of a discourse.

2. There is a hierarchical intention structure in every discourse, and its highest level intention coincides with the theme of that discourse.

3. Any discourse, irrespective of its genre type, is produced in order to exercise a certain social conventional force over the addressees to bring about some changes in their attitudes towards their value or

belief systems. Therefore, discourses are deeply rooted in the value or belief systems of the culture or the sub-cultures of the society to which the communicators belong.

4. Any speech act, whether oral or written, explicitly or implicitly manifests various stages of social interaction, such as speaker-hearer, writer-reader, and interactions among participants in a story (hero-villain, protagonist-antagonist, etc.). Social interaction is the most basic unit of communication with two poles of interacting agents.

In the following five chapters where I develop a theory, these theses are shown to be valid inductively or deductively, by referring to some researchers who have touched on these topics. The order of the presentation of the theses is not fixed. One chapter may deal primarily with only one thesis, while in another chapter two or three of these theses are intermingled in the discussion.

CHAPTER ONE

SPEECH ACT AND HUMAN ACTION

This dissertation focuses its primary attention on human speech actions, and especially on written speech acts (discourses). However, it is important to understand the general characteristics of human action, since speech acts are a part of human action. Therefore, in this chapter we will look at some of the research done in the area of human action and draw some overall pictures of human action. The importance of this study of human action is emphasized by Goldman (1970) in the preface of his book, A Theory of Human Action, in the following way:

> The prominence of the subject of action on the contemporary philosophical scene can be traced to two sources: first, the extent to which it is intertwined with other areas of philosophy, and second, the intrinsic interest of the subject. Philosophers have come to realize that one cannot go very far in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethics, or many other fields, without confronting crucial problems in the analysis of action (1970:v).

We will look at the well-known work on human action by the two contemporary philosophers: G.E.M. Anscombe and Alvin I. Goldman.

1.1 Anscombe's Account of Human Action

Anscombe (1957) begins Intention with the introduction of three concepts: expression of intention for the future, intentional action, and intention in acting. After some discussion, she changes her line of inquiry and raises some questions: "`How do we tell someone's intentions?', or 'What kind of true statements about people's intentions can we certainly make?', and 'How do we know that they are true?'"(ibid. p.7). She goes on to say that in order to answer these questions it is necessary that we inquire into the contents of the mind, namely, "we must be investigating something whose existence is purely in the sphere of the mind" (ibid. p.9).

With this preliminary preparation, she begins to tackle intentional actions. She demonstrates that answers to the question 'why?' about a certain action reveal various types of mental causality for that action. Her next step is to find out exactly what type of mental causality can be called 'intentional'. For this purpose, she discusses the difference between 'mental cause' and 'motive' and concludes that only 'forward-looking motive' can be intentional. In other words, "If the answer to the question 'why?' is a simple mention of something future, then it expresses the intention" (ibid. p.34).

However, it is often the case that the question of 'why?' to a certain intentional action leads to a series of answers in which a chain of intentional actions are manifested. Anscombe's example is the man who is pumping. Here is the background:

(1) A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drinking water of a house. Someone has found a way of systematically contaminating the source with a deadly cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until they can no longer be cured. The house is regularly inhabited by a small group of party chiefs, with their immediate families, who are in control of a great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a world war. The man who

> contaminated the source has calculated that if these people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will govern well, or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and secure a good life for all the people; and he has revealed the calculation, together with the fact about the poison, to the man who is pumping (ibid. p.37).

With this background in mind, a question can be raised concerning the following four descriptions of the man performing a certain action:

(2) The man is moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump handle.

(3) The man is operating the pump.

(4) The man is replenishing the house water-supply.

(5) The man is poisoning the household.

Is the man performing four actions, or only one? To this question, Anscombe answers that the man is performing 'only one' action, but that there are four descriptions of this action. She reasons that each description is identical, i.e. referring to the same action, considering the circumstances in which these descriptions become possible. However, she sees clearly that there is a means-end relationship between the adjacent descriptions. The following figure shows this relationship among these four descriptions.

```
                                    5
                          4
                3         means────→end
      2         means────→(end)
      means────→(end)
────→(end)
```

Figure 1: <u>Relationships Among the Descriptions of the Same Action</u>

Is it possible to speak of four intentions instead of one in Figure 1? Anscombe's answer: there is only one intention. In order to support her answer, she introduces the concept of 'swallowing up'. This means that the highest end (which is 5) is the intention which is capable of 'swallowing up' all the other preceding ends or intentions (i.e. 2, 3 and 4). In other words, she is saying that it is possible to understand these four descriptions as a series of means except for the last term (in this case, 5) which is treated as the intended end.

Anscombe, of course, touches on many other aspects of intention in her book. However, I will limit myself to mentioning one more of these aspects which is especially relevant to my theses. She says that failure to achieve one's intention is common and that this unsuccessfulness interests people. I think this is a very important observation, because it seems that in most interesting stories, a main participant's failure to achieve a certain intention plays a central role in that story.

Davidson (1975) takes a view similar to Anscombe's in his treatment of human action. However, Goldman (1970) presents a slightly different view.

1.2 Goldman's Account of Human Action

Goldman (1970) calls Anscombe's and Davidson's way of accounting for human action the "identity theses". He gives the following examples:

(6) John moves his finger.

(7) He pulls the trigger.

(8) He fires the gun.

(9) He kills Smith.

Goldman insists that Anscombe and Davidson consider all these descriptions identical, therefore, (6) = (7) = (8) = (9). He presents four objections to this identity thesis: (i) it does not allow plural cases of effects or consequences for one identical action; (ii) it neglects the existence of causes or causal factors; (iii) it cannot explain the asymmetric or irreflexive relation of purpose-means; (iv) it does not distinguish between basic actions and non-basic actions. Goldman says, "Instead of saying that John's pulling the trigger = John's killing Smith, we must say that John's pulling the trigger is a different act from John's killing Smith." (ibid. p.8)

I would argue that these objections miss the point because Goldman misunderstands what Anscombe and Davidson are saying. All the examples which Anscombe and Davidson use in their discussions are about a certain intentional action which allows some alternative descriptions. For example, Davidson (1975:238) lists the following example which is similar to Anscombe's in (2) - (5):

(10) I am writing my name on a piece of paper.

(11) I am writing a check.

(12) I am paying my gambling debt.

Notice that in this example ((10) - (12)) and Anscombe's example ((2) - (5)), the present progressive aspect of the verbs is used. This means that all the descriptions are referring to the same event from different perspectives or ways of looking at the event. Therefore, in these descriptions, there is no mention of effects or consequences which rise from that event. From this, it is clear that Goldman's first objection misses the point. Goldman's example ((6) - (9)) gives the impression that each description is distinct and that these events are related by a chronological sequence. If this is what he means, his example is not functionally the same as that of Anscombe or Davidson. We will see this point more clearly by changing all the present tenses in (6) - (9) into present progressive aspects in the following way:

(13) John is moving his finger.

(14) He is pulling the trigger.

(15) He is firing the gun.

(16) He is killing Smith.

If these descriptions are considered to be referring to the same event, then Goldman's objection is valid. I have found that there is no fundamental difference between his theory and those of Anscombe and Davidson.

In spite of the unfortunate misunderstanding mentioned above, Goldman's work provides valuable insights into human action. I will present some of them in the following sub-sections.

1.2.1 Act-types and act-tokens and categories of act-tokens

Goldman defines act-types as representing act-properties "such as mowing one's lawn, running, writing a letter, or giving a lecture" (ibid. p.10). In other words, these types are very similar to scripts (Schank et al. 1977) which are conventional activities having particular sets of expected behavior patterns. Act-tokens are particular acts which exemplify a certain act-type. What Goldman is interested in doing is to examine how these individual acts are related to each other. For this purpose, he introduces a concept called "level-generation". Level-generation is "a relation holding between ordered pairs of act-tokens of the same agent" (ibid. p.21). The following figure explains what level-generation is:

Act A		Act A′
John is moving his finger	---->	He is pulling the trigger
He is pulling the trigger	---->	He is firing the gun
He is firing the gun	---->	He is killing Smith

Figure 2: An Example of Level-Generation

Goldman presents four categories for various cases of level-generation. They are: 1. causal generation; 2. conventional generation; 3. simple generation; 4. augmentation generation. Categories 1 and 2 are rather straightforward, since their names clearly indicate the types of relationships which exist between Act A and Act A′. For categories 3 and 4, Goldman (ibid. p.25-28) lists the following examples:

Act A		Act A′
S′s jumping 6 feet 3 inches	-->	S′s outjumping George
S′s asserting that p	--------->	S′s contradicting his earlier statement
S′s coming home after 12:00	-->	S′s breaking his promise
S′s asserting that p	--------->	S′s lying
S′s dangling a line in the water	--->	S′s fishing

Figure 3: Examples of Simple Generation

Act A		Act A′
S′s extending his arm	--------->	S′s extending his arm out the car window
S′s saying "hello"	------------>	S′s saying "hello" loudly
S′s running	------------------>	S′s running at 8 m.p.h.
S′s shooting (a basketball)	--->	S′s jump-shooting

Figure 4: Examples of Augmentation Generation

For the examples of **simple generation** in Figure 3, an agent′s intentions, motives, beliefs, etc. are often the circumstances for those action-tokens. In other words, it is necessary for an agent to have a clear understanding of how Act A is related to Act A′: i.e. of whether Act A′ is an intent, motive, desire, belief or other mental state. The examples of **augmentation generation** are characterized by Act A = generic statement and Act A′ = specific statement, with additional information in Act A′.

Goldman′s classification of level-generation explained above is a valuable step forward compared to what Anscombe does. Anscombe is also well aware of the relationship which exists between Act A and Act A′ as seen in her example (sentences (2) - (5)). However, she emphasizes the importance of the function of the last description of action (namely Act A′) which terminates the chain of descriptions, and insisted that the intention of an agent which is expressed in Act A′ is so pervasive that any number of intermediate chains of actions which can be set up between Act A and Act A′ are easily explained in terms of Act A′. Goldman, building on what Anscombe has done, pays more attention on the relationships between Act A and Act A′ as well as among some intermediate actions. Goldman devises a method called 'Act Diagram', through which a number of the act-tokens of a certain act-type are made explicit. The following figure is an example of this 'Act Diagram':



Figure 5: An Act-Diagram (from Goldman)

Figure 5 can be interpreted as: 'Moving his hand' is related to 'Moving his queen' by causal generation (1), which signifies that the former action causes the latter action; then 'Moving his queen' is related to

'Moving his queen to King-Knight-Seven' by augmentation generation (4), which signifies that, compared to the former action, the latter action has an additional specific information; and so on.

1.2.2 Intentional Action

Goldman takes a mentalistic view and contends that one's want or belief essentially causes any act-tokens. However, this want-and-belief causation does not guarantee that every act-token is intentional. He understands that only act-tokens performed with their planned contributions to achieve their end or goal in mind are intentional. There are non-intentional act-tokens, but they are not basic to any act-types. Any basic act-token for a certain act-type is considered to be intentional. In other words, intentional act-tokens are more prominent or important than those non-intentional act-tokens.

Goldman, then, extends this understanding to various act-types and holds the view that even for act-types, want-and-belief causation is true. He touches on the dependence of one's want-and-belief on one's will or volition when he says (ibid. p.83):

> The idea of performing an act (in the fullest sense), as I have argued, is explicable in terms of want-and-belief causation. Similarly, the idea of something being up to me, or within my power, is connected with the idea of something being dependent on my desires. It is up to me, whether or not there will be a light on in this room, for the light's being on or off is dependent on my desires. But it is not up to me whether De Gaulle is reelected, since my desires have no effect in the matter whatsoever.

This statement indicates clearly that there is a social or cultural limitation for an agent on what kinds of act-types can be performed. His social status, the rules or conventions of his society, the value system of his society etc. are some factors which determine what act-types are expected to be performed by him. This point is very important, since every society has its normal behavioral patterns which are expected to be performed by its members.

Goldman, in his discussion of 'wanting', distinguishes between **occurrent wants** and **standing wants**. He defines these two concepts in this way: "an occurrent want is a mental event or mental process; it is a 'going on' or 'happening' in consciousness. A standing want, on the other hand, is a disposition or propensity to have an occurrent want, a disposition that lasts with the agent for a reasonable length of time" (ibid. p.86). He contends that any occurrent wants are the causes for intentional acts, since standing wants and beliefs become occurrent wants and beliefs when activated in suitable situations. The distinction between **occurrent wants** and **standing wants** which Goldman makes here is especially relevant when it is applied to the analysis of narrative material. In a narrative story where interactions of major participants play vital roles in the story line, the diametrically opposing standing wants of the two major participants are manifested as the actual clashes between their corresponding occurrent wants.

Goldman, defending his mentalistic view of action, demonstrates that even though behavioral views (expounded by J.B. Watson and others) do not refer to mentalistic concepts such as wants and beliefs in their hypotheses, they are actually presupposing concepts quite similar to those. This means, according to Goldman, that his theory of action which makes explicit use of mentalistic or purposive notions is not vastly different from the theories of behaviorism.

1.3 Speech Act as Human Action

From the discussions of Anscombe and Goldman above, the nature of human action has been analytically clarified. Our next important question is: how is human speech related to human actions? Is speech a part of human action? If so, how is speech analyzed and described as human action?

For the first question, there seems to be no disagreement among philosophers about considering speech as human action. Many speech act theorists assume, as their starting point, that speech is a kind of human action (for example, see Austin (1962)). Anscombe (1957:3), alongside with Wittgenstein (1967: paragraph 25), and Goldman (1970:90), also consider speech as a kind of human action.

The second question is: how is a speech act described as human action? Austin (1962) is probably the first philosopher of language who discussed the various speech acts which occur simultaneously in an utterance. He insists that there are three main speech acts: **locutionary act**, **illocutionary act** and **perlocutionary act**. The locutionary act roughly corresponds to "uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference" (ibid. p.108). The **illocutionary act** roughly corresponds to a speaker's exercising a certain force upon his hearer(s) such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c," (ibid. p.108). The **perlocutionary** act corresponds to "what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading" (ibid. p.108). He subdivides locutionary act into three other acts: **phonetic act** -- "uttering certain noises," (ibid. p.95) **phatic act** — "uttering of certain vocables or words," (ibid. p.95) and **rhetic act** -- "performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference" (ibid. p.95).

Searle (1969) develops Austin's analysis further. He presents four kinds of speech act: **utterance act, propositional act, illocutionary act,** and **perlocutionary act.** In this classification, Searle combines Austin's phonetic act and phatic act into his 'utterance act', and gives a distinctive place for Austin's rhetic act, which he calls 'propositional act'.

I follow Searle's classification in the following discussion. These four acts set up by Searle for utterances in a communication situation can be described by the analytical method presented by Goldman. In Goldman's terminology, these four acts are **act-tokens** of a **speech act-type.** Therefore, the following act-diagram can be obtained:

perlocutionary act — "I am demanding a due response from you (hearer)."

2 or 3

illocutionary act — "I am exposing my mental state towards you."

2

propositional act — "I am referring to intensional and extensional meaning."

2

utterance act — "I am producing sounds following conventional phonological and syntactical rules of the language."

Note: 2 stands for 'conventional generation', and 3 stands for 'simple generation'.

Figure 6: Act-Diagram of the Act-Tokens of a Speech Act-Type

Several significant comments and observations can be made from Figure 6:

(a) A speech act-type can be exemplified by those four act-tokens alone, nothing more is necessary and anything less is inadequate.

(b) The level generation is all conventional, except for the last level generation where conventionality cannot always be applied.

(c) A speech act-type cannot be defined only by the factors related to the speaking subject. The factors relating to the hearer(s) need to be considered also, as is clearly seen in illocutionary as well as perlocutionary acts.

(d) Utterance act-->perlocutionary act is the fundamental level generation, with two intermediate act-tokens. This means that the perlocutionary act expresses the ultimate goal or intention of the speaker in a certain speech-act type.

There will be more discussion of these points in later chapters. The brief discussion above about speech acts now leads to the main topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

INTENTION IN SPEECH ACT

In the preceding chapter, it was pointed out that speech acts are a part of human action and that they share the same properties or characteristic features as human actions. This chapter expands the scope of discussion concerning speech acts and focuses on one of the very important concepts in speech act theory, namely, **intention**.

The term 'intention' or 'intent' used in SAT follows the traditional usage in philosophy (see Grice 1957). Other terms which are roughly equivalent to it are used in linguistics and other disciplines. 'Purpose' (Pike & Pike: 1977, L. Jones: 1977), and 'goal' (Schank & Abelson: 1977) are such terms. Van Dijk (1977) uses two terms: 'purpose' as overall final goal of actions, and 'intention' as conventional intermediate goals of actions. In the following, the various aspects of intention, i.e. its origin and definition, are discussed.

2.1 Origin of Intention

When we think of the question: 'Where does **intention** come from?', most of us agree that it comes from ourselves, our minds. As Goldman (1970:49) admits, "a central feature of human nature is that people do things **intentionally**, or **on purpose**." Therefore, we ourselves are responsible for the production of intentional actions, including speech acts. As discussed in 1.2.2, Goldman thinks our wants, wishes or desires based upon our values and beliefs are the origin of our intentions.

2.2 Intention and Meaning

In the following discussion, two opposing views on the concept of 'meaning' are represented by Grice (1971) and Ziff (1971).

The terms 'meaning' (noun) or 'to mean'(verb) are frequently used in our daily conversations as well as in the literature of the various disciplines of the humanities. So often the users of these terms take it for granted that the 'meanings' of the terms are self-evident to everyone. However, when a question, 'what is the exact definition of meaning?', is asked, the answer cannot be given easily. As a matter of fact, for centuries the definition of meaning has been one of the controversies among philosophers, and various definitions have been given without resolving the controversy decisively.

This controversy about meaning in philosophy has carried over to modern linguistics. Linguistics, in dealing with human languages must tackle the concept of meaning, because languages are considered to be but the signs which express the messages of their users, and these messages are deeply related to meaning. In recent years, the importance of an in-depth study of meaning has been increasingly recognized not only in linguistics and philosophy, but also in other disciplines of the humanities.

My discussion of this controversy proceeds as follows: first, a brief summary of each view (Grice's and Ziff's) on the concept of meaning will be given and then a controversial issue will be pointed out; second, Grice's position will be defended by demonstrating that each counter-example given by Ziff can be explained in terms of Grice's understanding of meaning, with some modifications; lastly, it will be shown that Ziff's position and Grice's can be reconciled by giving each of them a proper place and function within the total system of communication in language.

2.2.1 An Issue at Stake

Grice (1971) begins his investigation of meaning by classifying the various uses of the verb 'to mean' in English sentences. Then he maintains that in most cases the use of 'to mean' in a sentence falls into either a **natural** sense or a **nonnatural** sense. For example, the use of 'to mean' in 'Those spots mean (meant) measles' belongs to the former sense, and 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) means that the bus is full' belongs to the latter sense. Hereafter, 'to mean' in a nonnatural sense will be designated as 'mean-NN.' Before presenting his own definition of 'meaning-NN,' Grice rejects the position represented by C.L. Stevenson by pointing out two primary deficiencies which he claims to be inherent in Stevenson's position. These deficiencies may be summarized as circularity and inability to deal with 'particularities.' Then, in order to explain particular utterances spoken or written by a particular speaker or writer on a particular occasion, Grice presents his own account of 'meaning-NN.' In short, what he proposes is the introduction of the concept of 'intention' for the definition of 'mean-NN.' He sums up his position (ibid. p.58):

(i) 'A meant-NN something by x' is roughly equivalent to 'A intended the utterance x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.'

(ii) `x meant something ' is roughly equivalent to `Somebody meant-NN something by x.'

(iii) `x means-NN(timeless) that so-and-so' is roughly equivalent to `people (vague) intend (with qualifications about `recognition') to effect by x.

I want to point out, as a final remark on Grice, that his main concern for setting up the above definitions of `meaning-NN' is to explain particularities of language use.

Ziff(1971), on the other hand, responding to Grice's article above, contends that such an attempt to extend the concept of meaning in order to include even a particular psychological element, i.e. intention, as Grice did is untenable, since many counter-examples can be raised against his position. The counter-examples which Ziff raises are primarily novel or ambiguous utterances, such as tautologies, nonsense utterances, soliloquy, utterances in a dream or in an extraordinary mental condition, etc. His thesis is this: these many counter-examples are sufficient to discredit Grice's employment of the concept of intention for the definition of meaning; therefore, meaning needs to be grasped not in terms of `A meant something by uttering x.', but in terms of `A meant something by x.' In this way, Ziff counterattacks Grice, who attacks C.L. Stevenson in his article that Stevenson's `causal-tendency' theory of language (which is also Ziff's position) can only explain "the standard meaning, or the meaning in general, of a `sign.'" Although Ziff does not say much, in his discussion, about his own view of `meaning', it is rather apparent that he considers "a set of projective devices"(65) as the basic ingredient of meaning. In other words, he claims that language is "essentially recursive in character" so that the meaning of any given sentence "depends on what (various) other sentences in the language mean."(65)

The controversy between Grice and Ziff in regard to the concept of meaning can be summarized as pragmatics (Grice) vs. semiotics-semantics (Ziff).

2.2.2 Grice's Position Defended

Before setting out to examine each counter-example raised by Ziff against Grice's definition of meaning, it is important to make Grice's basic ideas explicit. Here are some of these which can easily be derived from his article:

(a) Grice's definition of meaning in (i)-(iii) is set up in order to explain a certain aspect of the psychological attitude which is expressed in an utterance. This, however, is not intended to exclude the semiotic aspect of meaning, but to add another aspect of meaning to it. (See his discussion (ibid. p.55) on how he distinguishes the standard meaning, or the meaning in general, of a 'sign'" from "what users of the sign do (or should) mean".)

(b) Grice's definition in (i)-(iii) is set up primarily for normal utterances where the speaker sincerely intends to communicate his intention to his hearer(s) using the language which is shared by both. In other words, it is presupposed that both the speaker and the hearer(s) have sufficient linguistic competence in their language.

(c) Grice (ibid. p.59) admits that often the context plays an important role when the hearer(s) cannot clearly understand the intention(s) of the speaker.

With these three points in mind, let us examine the counter-examples which Ziff presents against Grice.

Ziff presents two examples of utterances by a man named George, who is asked by an army officer, 'What would you say if you were asked to identify yourself?' Suppose George answered by either of the two following utterances:

(17) Ugh ugh blugh blugh ugh blug blug.

(18) Pi.hi.y pi.hi.y.

In both of these cases, there was a clear intention on George's part to offend the officer. Also, (18) is in the Hopi language which the officer does not know. Ziff contends that George meant to offend the officer by uttering (17), but George did not mean anything by the utterance itself. However, although George also meant to offend the officer by uttering (18), George meant something by that utterance (18) itself. From this argument Ziff concludes that Grice's definition (i) is not equipped to distinguish between 'A meant something by uttering x' and 'A meant something by x', therefore, (i) in Grice is untenable.

Grice could answer that his definition (i) is primarily for utterances whose semiotic meanings are shared both by the speaker and the hearer(s). There is no way that the officer can detect any semiotic meaning either in (17) or (18) since he does not associate those sounds uttered in (17) and (18) with his own language, English. However, it is not difficult even for those utterances to be explained in terms of

Grice's definition of (i). If we apply Grice's definition (i) to (17) or (18) we obtain something like the following:

(19) George intended by (17) or (18) to produce the effect of offending the officer by means of the recognition of this intention.

I think this is perfectly understandable. The officer, in an ordinary situation, knowing from his records that George is an academic, would probably recognize George's intention of offending him by uttering such nonsense utterances, although there is always a possibility that the officer may misinterpret George's intention. Ziff's objection has missed the point. However, he does offer some appropriate modifications for Grice's definitions. They are: (a) to add the semiotic aspect of meaning in his definition; (b) to add a note that his definitions are primarily for sincere normal utterances.

Another example Ziff uses is the following:

(20) Claudius murdered my father.

Context 1: George uttered (20) in a morning soliloquy.

Context 2: George uttered (20) in the course of a discussion with Joseph.

Context 3: George uttered (20) in the evening while delirious with fever.

From these examples, Ziff contends that as far as semiotic meaning is concerned, utterance (20) in all three contexts shares the same meaning component, but that when Grice's definition of meaning (ii) is applied, only context 2 is sufficiently dealt with but not context 1 or 3. In other words, Ziff claims that in context 1 or 3, there is no way that `somebody meant-NN something by (20)' because there seems to be no audience involved in context 1 or 3. Ziff may be right, if we restrict the term `audience' to refer only to other ego(s) than the utterer himself. However, although this usage of `audience' is normal in most of communication situations, it is not impossible to posit imaginary other ego(s) or even another ego-pole inside the utterer's self. Langsdorf (1980:108) argues that not only linguistic acts which are performed in dialogue with others but also such activities as `monologue' and `thought' need to be understood in terms of the "discourse community" which is supposed as present even in those activities. When she talks about `discourse community', she refers to the "multisubjectivity" which is explicitly demonstrated in many linguistic acts which are performed between a speaker and hearer(s). If this thesis is accepted, then we can say that the positing of an audience in context 1 or 3 is theoretically possible. This means that even for utterance (20) in context 1 or 3, Grice's definition of (ii) can be held.

Some other examples which Ziff uses against Grice are those utterances which are uttered with clear intention of transmitting some meaning on the part of the speakers, but nevertheless, on the part of the hearer(s) the uttered sentences do not mean anything, because the uttered sounds are either so deteriorated due to some physical defects of the speaker, or completely foreign to the hearer(s). Ziff contends that those utterances cannot be explained adequately by Grice's definitions of meaning, because Grice presupposes that the hearer(s) understands utterance meaning. Ziff claims that, although each of those utterances was uttered with a clear intention to make the audience believe that the content of the proposition expressed is true, there was no meaning perceived on the part of the hearer(s). Therefore, Ziff thinks that for those utterances, Grice's definitions (i) and (ii) cannot be applied.

Even for this attempt by Ziff to discredit Grice's concept of meaning, it seems possible to defend the position of Grice. First of all, as noted earlier, Grice's definitions were set up primarily for utterances in normal communication situations in which we can assume that the speaker and the hearer share the same phonological, syntactic and semantic rules of their common language. However, in our actual communication situations, even if some nonsense utterances are uttered, there are some possible strategies which can be taken for the hearer(s) to deal with these utterances. The hearer may doubt whether there is seriousness in the attitude of the speaker, or whether he is sane or not. The context, including facial expressions, of the speaker usually give some clues for judging on those matters. In other words, what the hearer does, when he faces such nonsense utterances, is to find out the reason behind the abnormal ways of expression and to judge whether that reason is intentional or not. This means that even for out-of-norm nonsense utterances, the hearer tries to determine the intention of the speaker behind those utterances. Even though there is always a greater possibility of misinterpretation on the part of the hearer in regard to the intention of the speaker for those out-of-norm nonsense utterances, the component of meaning which Grice suggested in (i) is clearly seen. Thus, it can be concluded that even for those nonsense utterances, Grice's definitions of meaning can be applied provided that the hearer relies more heavily on the contextual information in order to interpret or decide the intention of the speaker.

Ziff presents one counter-example against Grice's definition of (iii):

(21) He's a son of a stickleback fish.

(22) Sentence (21) means the male referred to is a son of a small scaleless fish (family Gasterosteidae) having two or more free spines in front of the dorsal fin.

Ziff asks, "What do people intend to effect by (22)?", since hardly anyone has ever uttered (22) before. In other words, what Ziff is saying is that (22) is the meaning of (21) and nothing more than that. Grice would respond to this attack from three different angles. First, Ziff's counter-example (21) is not appropriate for the category of Grice's definition of (iii). When Grice says, 'x means-NN (timeless) that so-and-so,' he seems to mean primarily those sentences which are considered to be universally true, i.e. 'gnomic' expressions. Second, as stated earlier, Grice's definitions (i)-(iii) do not exclude the aspect of meaning expressed in (22). Grice's aim of introducing those definitions is to grasp another aspect of meaning which can be captured in terms of the concept of 'intention.' Third, even if (21) is an utterance which has never been uttered before, still, in a normal communication situation, the hearer of (21) would inevitably try to interpret the intention of the speaker behind the utterance. In this interpretation, he relies not only on the meaning conveyed in (22) but also on all possible contextual or situational information available, including their social relationship and the speaker's kinesics. Thus, it can be concluded that here also Ziff's argument against Grice is not conclusive.

I will not examine further examples which Ziff uses to attack Grice, since arguments similar to the preceding ones can be made against them. But I want to point out, lastly, that what Ziff is trying to propose -- delimiting the domain of `meaning (or semantics)' to what he calls `regularities' -- is untenable, because `meaning', in actual communication situations, cannot be grasped with the regularized idealistic system of a particular language alone. Language in use is a creative process which produces situationally (or contextually) bound additional meaning which is based upon the more basic meaning defined by the closed system of a language. Ricoeur (1981:140) explicates this point very well when he says:

> The sense is the ideal object which the proposition intends, and hence is purely immanent in discourse. The reference is the truth value of the proposition, its claim to reach reality. Reference thus distinguishes discourse from language [langue]; the latter has no relation with reality, its words returning to other words in the endless circle of the dictionary. Only discourse, we shall say, intends things, applies itself to reality, expresses the world.

Pike and Pike (1977:363) also see this point when they set up a third hierarchy called, `referential hierarchy,' in addition to their other two hierarchies, i.e. `phonological hierarchy' and `grammatical hierarchy':

> Study of the referential hierarchy analyzes the content of what the speaker "wants to say" about some unit, element, situation, action; or speaker or hearer attitude, emotion, presupposition, evaluation, or belief that is communicated (intentionally or unintentionally) by the speaker about that statement or content of that statement, or that is elicited from the hearer about that statement.

2.2.3 Some Final Remarks

In the above discussion, it has become clear that the real issue between Grice and Ziff is whether we should include the element of 'intention' in the study of semantics. Grice insists that we should do so, because that aspect of meaning is important in linguistic communication. Ziff, on the other hand, thinks that we should exclude the factor of 'intention' as proposed by Grice, because that concept is too vague and intangible.

We have demonstrated that the counter-examples which Ziff uses against Grice are not successful by pointing out that those counter-examples can be explained adequately in terms of Grice's definitions of meaning with some minor modifications. What's more, we have briefly suggested that Ziff's concept of meaning, though it is one basic aspect of meaning, cannot handle real communication situations by itself.

Therefore, our conclusion is: Grice's definitions of meaning (i)-(iii) should be accepted with the following modifications or additions made:

(23) (a) to include the semiotic aspect of meaning somewhere in his definition,

(b) to attach a note that his definition is primarily for sincere, normal utterances,

(c) to develop a theory of 'context' or 'situation' and add this element to his definition.

2.3 Intention in Grice, Strawson and Searle

A speech act is an intentional act. This proposition is established in Chapter One. However, how are intentions expressed in speech acts?

As discussed in the preceding section, Grice (1971) presents his concept of meaning in terms of **intention** by saying that:

(24) To say that A meant something by x is to say that "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention."

Here, Grice's understanding of the intention of the speech act agent A is to "produce some effect in an audience." In other words, this understanding of intention represents the content of the perlocutionary act, as discussed in the preceding chapter.

Searle (1969:49-50) revises this Grician concept of meaning in the following way:

(25) S utters sentence T and means it (i.e. means literally what he says) = S utters T and

(a) S intends (i-1) the utterance U of T to produce in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary effect, IE).

(b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i-1.

(c) S intends that i-1 will be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) T.

Searle's emphasis here is clearly on the illocutionary act ((a) and (b)), and on conventional rules of the language which are shared by S and H. In other words, Searle is suggesting some levels of intention here which are different from that was proposed by Grice, that is, the intention to produce in H a perlocutionary effect (PE). What Searle is proposing is the addition of the two other levels of S's intention, i.e. S's intention to produce IE by means of H's recognition of IE, and S's intention to bring about H's recognition of IE by means of H's knowledge of the particular conventional rules of the shared language between S and H.

Strawson (1964) also modifies Grice's definition of meaning in presenting his own theory. What he does is to add a fourth level of intention to the three levels of intention which he thinks Grice established. The following is my version of the list of intentions Strawson thinks necessary for the definition of the meaning of an utterance:

(26) S means something by an utterance (U) if,

(a) S intends (i-1) to produce by uttering U a certain response (r) in H, and

(b) S intends (i-2) that H shall recognize S's intention (i-1), and

(c) S intends (i-3) that H shall recognize his intention (i-2), and

(d) S intends (i-4) that the above recognition on the part of H of S's intention (i-1 and i-2) shall function as H's reason, or a part of his reason, for his response (r).

Strawson (1964:29) thinks that even the addition of i-4 is not sufficient to elucidate thoroughly the communication process between S and H, but that i-4 at least is a necessary addition. It is rather difficult to grasp concretely what kind of 'intention' is meant by Strawson in (d). It seems, however, that (d) roughly corresponds to S's desire that H should recognize that S has the intention of PE.

Grice presented primarily one level of intention in speech acts.

Searle added two other levels of intention in speech acts. Strawson thought that Grice had presented three levels of intention but that at least one more level of intention was necessary. How are these three positions reconciled? I will try to present a model which is designed to reconcile them.

2.4 Intention in a Proposed Model

I propose in this section that the insights gained in Chapter One of this study should be employed to combine those different views introduced in the preceding section into an integrated one.

2.4.1 Overall model presented

I want to present the following figure, a modified version of Figure 6 (p.18), in order to give an overall picture of the proposed model:



Figure 7: <u>Kinds of Intention in Speech Acts</u>

In the following, I will briefly explain some of the terminology and symbols used in Figure 7.

The four small circles on the left-hand side indicate the four act-tokens of a speech act-type, following the categories established by Searle (1969). Those four act-tokens are utterance act, propositional act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act, each of which is related to its contiguous act-token(s) by the processes of level generations. The lines between the circles indicate level generation.

The numbers placed beside the vertical lines indicate types of level generation. The number 2 means that the type of level generation is **conventional generation**, and the number 3, **simple generation**. These two types of level generation are among those four types of level generation developed by Goldman (1970). Here I do not go into a discussion of demonstrating the validity of those categories. I simply assume that those empirically induced categories are useful for the study of speech acts, which constitute a very significant part of human action. The numbers chosen and placed in Figure 7, of course, reflect my own judgments.

I assume that, since a speech act is an intentional act, the act-tokens of a speech act are also intentional. Therefore, I set up four levels of intention as seen in the 'SPEAKER'S SIDE' of Figure 7. These are utterance intent (UI), propositional intent (ProI), illocutionary intent (II) and perlocutionary intent (PI).

Another assumption which I make is the setting up of 'HEARER'S SIDE' in Figure 7. I assume that for each intentional speech act-token there is a corresponding effect in the mental or psychological state of the hearer. This effect can be considered to be the very beginning stage for the response which the hearer makes to the speaker. In other words, this stage is the stage of decoding or interpretation of the message of an utterance. There are four effects: utterance effect (UE), propositional effect (ProE), illocutionary effect (IE), and perlocutionary effect (PE).

Between the two columns of `SPEAKER'S SIDE' and `HEARER'S SIDE', there is a wall which separates the two worlds of two egos. Arrows which penetrate through the wall to `HEARER'S SIDE' mean that communication is taking place between the speaker and the hearer.

In the subsequent subsections, some of the assumptions made for the model presented in Figure 7 will be discussed more in detail.

2.4.2 Relations among utterance act, propositional act and perlocutionary act

An **utterance act** is the act of producing articulated phonemic sounds, plus their accompanying stresses and intonational patterns, using the lungs, vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc. This utterance act, in turn, simultaneously generates a **propositional act.** The relationship between a **utterance act** and a **propositional act** is that the former act is the `conventional' means of generating the latter act.

A **propositional act** is the act of referring and predicating `intensional' and `extensional' meanings. By `intensional meaning', we mean **sense**, i.e. what is signified by conventionally defined signs. By `extentional meaning', we mean that intensional meaning has virtual events, objects, and situations in a specified context of a communication situation. This **propositional act**, in turn, simultaneously generates an **illocutionary act**. The relationship between a **propositional act** and an **illocutionary act** is also conventional (see Austin 1962), since every natural language has a limited number of conventional forms to express various kinds of illocutionary force (such as commands, requests, questions, promises, declarations, apologies, etc.).

Sadock (1974:155) believes that illocutionary acts are conventional in both "the conditions that guarantee their success", and their clear relationship to the conventions of a language. Searle (1975) demonstrated that even in indirect speech acts, where there is skewing between the ordinary forms of expressing illocutionary forces and actually expressed illocutionary forces, there are conventional ways to deal with those forces. However, Strawson (1971) asserts that some illocutionary acts are not conventional, and defends his view by examining Austin's claim that illocutionary acts are conventional. We do not go into a detailed discussion of this matter here. But it seems that by accepting a wider concept of conventionality Strawson's view can be demonstrated to be unacceptable.

2.4.3 Relation between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts

According to Figure 7, an **illocutionary act** simultaneously generates a **perlocutionary act**.

A **perlocutionary act** is the act of a speaking agent in seeking a certain consequence or effect on the actions, thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of the hearer(s), on the basis of its counterpart illocutionary act.

There may be some arguments against setting up this kind of speech act-token, i.e. the perlocutionary act. However, Austin (1962:109) believed that it is necessary to distinguish illocutionary acts from perlocutionary acts. This means that, for Austin, the setting up of perlocutionary acts is a necessary step. In Figure 7, numbers 2 and 3 are placed for the relationship between the two act-tokens. This means that a perlocutionary act is simultaneously generated from its illocutionary act conventionally (2=conventional generation) or unconventionally (3=simple generation). The examples of the conventionality between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts are found in any utterances of Searle's (1977) 'declaration' type, as well as in the utterances which are tightly glued to a conventional social system, with little possibility of deviation from the fixed roles of the speaker and the hearer. An example of the former case is found in the sentence, 'I name this ship, Elisabeth.' An example of the latter case is found in the various military commands in an actual combat operation, where obedience to the commands is more or less taken for granted.

Cases of unconventional relationship between illocutionary and perlocutionary act are common and yet are very important in the analysis of information structure. Goldman's examples (found in Figure 3) are those of simple generation (3=unconventional). I personally do not favor the use of the term 'simple', as employed by Goldman, for this level-generation. There seems to be a factor of covert motive or intention in Act A (of Figure 3), which provides the logical relationship of grounds for the conclusion in Act A'. If this claim is correct, then it would seem better to call this level generation 'grounds-conclusion generation' rather than 'simple generation'. At any rate, what is significant to note here is the fact that in some cases illocutionary act is related to perlocutionary act by the relationship of **grounds vs. conclusion**. For example, the sentence, 'Pass me the ball.', uttered while playing a basketball, has the illocutionary act of 'I (speaker) have a desire concerning you (hearer) that you pass the ball right now to me.', as well as the perlocutionary act of 'I am requesting that you pass the ball right now to me.' The emphasis placed on the illocutionary act is the originating side of the force of the intent or desire expressed, i.e. the speaker's side, whereas the emphasis which is placed on the perlocutionary act is the fulfillment side of the intent or desire expressed, i.e. the hearer's side. This distinction is very important, for in this way it is logically possible to set up the two closely related speech act-tokens, i.e. illocutionary act and perlocutionary act.

2.4.4 Setting up of 'SPEAKER'S SIDE' and 'HEARER'S SIDE'

In Figure 7, I set up two columns for 'SPEAKER'S SIDE' (Intent) and 'HEARER'S SIDE' (Effect). The reason behind this way of presenting the two poles is the presence of perlocutionary acts, as discussed in the preceding subsection. Among the four act-tokens of the speech act, perlocutionary act is very characteristic because of its heavy dependence upon the concept of the hearer in its definition. The terms 'consequence' or 'effect' cannot even be mentioned without explicitly introducing the concept of the hearer into the definition of the perlocutionary act. In this sense, illocutionary act, too, requires one to refer to the concept of the hearer explicitly in its definition, as Sadock (1974:147) admits. All these considerations have led me to set up two poles, namely, **Speaker's Intent** and **Hearer's Effect**.

Searle (1969) mentions 'illocutionary effect' and 'perlocutionary effect', but (1977:28) also 'illocutionary intent' and 'perlocutionary intent'. Mohan (1974) sets up two binary pairs of concepts: 'illocutionary act - illocutionary effect', and 'perlocutionary act -intended perlocutionary effect'. Dore (1977), setting up the concept of speaker's 'communicative intention', which is derived from the concept of illocutionary act refers to two kinds of effects, viz. 'illocutionary effect' and 'perlocutionary effect'. All these works seem to support what I have done in setting up two poles as in Figure 7. The necessity of setting up 'HEARER'S SIDE' as a pole can be also supported by our intuition regarding the functions of language. Language in use usually presupposes at least two people (speaker - hearer, writer - addressee, etc.). (See Watts 1981:31.) This means that the speech-acts of one side cannot be described adequately without referring to the other side.

I need to mention here one other aspect of Figure 7: the addition of the pairs of 'propositional intent (ProI) - propositional effect (ProE)' and 'utterance intent (UI) - utterance effect (UE)'. It seems legitimate to fill in the slots which were produced by the matrix in Figure 7. Goldman's theory of human action, in which he claims that if an act-token is performed by an occurrent want, it is possible to observe the intention of the agent, seems to support this setting up of ProI-ProE and UI-UE.

Among the four pairs of the Intent-Effect set, perlocutionary

Intent-Effect and illocutionary Intent-Effect are very important in speech acts. Therefore, we will focus on these two pairs of Intent-Effect in the following subsection.

2.4.5 Intention in perlocutionary and illocutionary acts

The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts has been a controversial issue. Austin (1962:108-9) intuitively thought that this distinction must be made. He suggested that the difference between 'in saying it I was warning him' and 'by saying it I convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop' reflects the difference between illocutionary act and perlocutionary act. This suggestion indicates that we must draw the line between an action we do (here an illocution) and its consequence. He also points out that an illocutionary act is also connected with the production of effects in certain senses. He thinks such effects as 'securing uptake', 'taking effect', and 'inviting responses' are characteristic of illocutionary acts. In the case of perlocutionary acts he makes a distinction between two effects: 'achieving an object' and 'producing a sequel'. Another difference which he points out between illocution and perlocution is that the former is conventional but the latter is not.

It seems that the reason for Austin's lack of success in distinguishing the two acts lies in the fact that he treats the perlocutionary act as somewhat chronologically subsequent to the illocutionary act. If both acts are condidered to be act-tokens of a certain speech act-type, it is necessary to assume that these two act-tokens are simultaneous.

Searle, the most prominent successor to Austin, has not focused his attention on this issue. Although he sets up the perlocutionary act as type of one speech act, his primary interest and effort has been to elucidate illocutionary acts.

Cohen (1973) raises the question of whether an illocutionary act is instrumental in the production of the perlocution. He argues that in most of cases in speech act situations an illocutionary act is associated with a perlocutionary act. He investigates the relation between an illocutionary act and its associated perlocutionary act. Cohen strongly emphasizes the important role which perlocutionary acts take in describing a language by saying, "If the suggestion of this paper is right, then the grammar of I (illocution) must take explicit account of P (perlocution); and this means that such apparently non-grammatical matters as who believe and expect, must be accounted for in any adequate treatment of the use of language" (1973:503, parentheses are my insertions). He points out the necessity of incorporating the concept of the perlocutionary act as distinct from the illocutionary act. Basically, however, he holds Austin's original position, and is unable to make a clear-cut theoretical distinction between the two acts.

Davis (1980) agrees with Austin in his thesis that illocutionary acts are causes for perlocutionary acts which can be achieved in a person only through the understanding of what is said to him. However, he argues against Austin's criteria for distinguishing between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts by demonstrating that these criteria do not always work. Davis (ibid. p.40) maintains that there are cases where illocutionary acts do not have perlocutionary purposes.

And yet when there are such purposes for illocutionary acts, he claims that achieving these purposes are identical with the performance of the perlocutionary acts. He proposes (ibid. p.53) necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a perlocutionary act in the following way:

(27) Standardly, S's x-ing H (to y) by uttering p is the intentional performance of a perlocutionary act if and only if,

(a) S performs an illocutionary act or propositional acts by uttering p.

(b) S means by p what p means in the language of which it is a part.

(c) H understands what illocutionary act or propositional acts S means to perform by uttering p.

(d) H understands what S means by p.

(e) What H understands S to mean causes H to x or be y-ed.

(f) S intends H to x or be y-ed because H understands what he means.

(S: speaker, H: hearer, x: a perlocutionary act verb, y: a variable for x which preserves grammaticality)

In order to illustrate the above formula, the following example is given by Davis (ibid. p.53):

(28) In a speech act of my frightening you by telling you that there's a spider on your lap, I intentionally perform this act in the standard way uttering 'There's a spider on your lap' if and only if,

(a) I tell you that there's a spider on your lap by uttering 'There's a spider on your lap'.

(b) I mean by 'There's a spider on your lap' what it means in English.

(c) You understand that I have told you something by uttering, 'There's a spider on your lap'.

(d) You understand what I mean by 'There's a spider on your lap'.

(e) What you understand me to mean causes you to become frightened.

(f) I intend that you become frightened because you understand what I mean.

So far, we have reviewed some of the important works in which a theoretical distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts were attempted to be made. Austin originally raised this problem, but he himself could not present a sufficient solution. Others followed, and yet there seems to be no single theory which can comprehensively deal with the various problems raised so far. Among the theorists of speech acts, roughly speaking, there seems to be the following three views concerning how illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts are related to each other:

(i) All perlocutions are outside of the speech acts of a speaker -- they are "by products of acts of communication" (Sadock 1974:8). (Held by Sadock and Watts)

(ii) Some perlocutions are inside of the speech acts of a speaker, others are not. (Held by Austin, Searle and Davis)

(iii) All perlocutions are inside the speech acts of a speaker. (Held by Grice, Strawson and Cohen)

As an example of one who takes the position (ii) and defends his view against the position (iii), Searle says (1969:46):

> I now turn to my second objection to Grice's account. In effect, the account says that saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform a perlocutionary act. In the examples Grice gives, the effects cited are invariably perlocutionary. I wish to argue that saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary act. First, it could not be the case that in general intended effects of meant utterances were perlocutionary because many kinds of sentences used to perform illocutionary acts have no perlocutionary effect associated with their meaning. For example, there is no associated perlocutionary effect of greeting. When I say "Hello" and mean it, I do not necessarily intend to produce or elicit any state or action in my hearer other than the knowledge that he is being greeted.

Contrary to Searle I want to defend position (iii): within every speech act-type, there is an intended perlocutionary act-token in one degree or another. In other words: even in greetings, I assume a certain degree of intended perlocution. In order to defend my position, I will first present a figure which represents my position; then I will clarify some of the terminology used in SAT. I want to base my arguments on some of the insights reflected in the figure. The following is, so to speak, a close-up of Figure 7, and is designed to explain the basic concepts involved in a communication situation where there are two poles, i.e. the speaker and the hearer.



Figure 8: Distinction Between Illocution and Perlocution

Here are definitions of the key terms used in Figure 8:

(a) 'Force' originates in the speaker, i.e. in his desires and wants based on his value or belief system (II), and is directed towards the destination, i.e. the hearer, in order to bring about some changes in the actions, thoughts or beliefs, etc. of the hearer (PI). Thus, 'force' is like a vector which is represented as: II------>PI.

(b) 'Illocutionary Intent' (II) is the intention of the speaker in his illocutionary act (IA) by which he expresses his desire about something.

(c) 'Perlocutionary Intent' (PI) is the intention of the speaker in his perlocutionary act (PA) by which he requires the hearer to take a certain action in such a way that the action taken will be a fulfillment of II and PI.

(d) 'Wall of Ego-Ego' is an invisible boundary, which separates the intentionality of the actions of the two communication poles (speaker and hearer).

(e) 'Effect' is the term which signifies that the intentions of the speaker are cognitively recognized, perceived, or understood by the hearer.

(f) 'Illocutionary Effect' (IE) means that the hearer recognizes what the II of the speaker is.

(g) 'Perlocutionary Effect' (PE) means that the hearer recognizes what the PI of the speaker is.

(h) 'Response Action' is the intentional action performed by the hearer on the basis of his four effects (UE, ProE, IE and PE) in response to the speaker. This response action can be either verbal or nonverbal, or both.

I believe these explicit definitions of the terms used in this study will clarify a lot of vagueness surrounding the concepts of illocution and perlocution in SAT.

In order to defend my position ((iii) on p.45), I will demonstrate in the following that the definitions of the above terms are necessary in order to solve some of the problems inherent in the theories of some SAT scholars.

Searle (1977) wrote a superb article in which he insightfully presents five main categories for illocutionary acts or forces, and so revises Austin's classification. The insights which he exhibits are so useful that I will explain them in detail here. In order to get at the most basic categories of illocutionary acts, he establishes three basic features which are inherent in every illocutionary act. These features are `illocutionary point (or purpose)', `direction of fit', and `sincerity condition'.

`Illocutionary point' is a more general term than `illocutionary act or force' because the former usually includes many elements of the latter. Searle says, "the point or purpose of an order can be specified by saying that it is an attempt to get the hearer to do something. The point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or inaccurate) of how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation by the speaker to do something" (ibid. p.28).

`Direction of fit' is a feature which indicates how the content of a proposition expressed is supposed to be related to the world. There are two possible relations, i.e. `word-to-world' direction of fit (for statements, descriptions, assertives and explanations, etc.), and `world-to-word' direction of fit (for requests, commands, vows, and promises, etc.). The actions taking place or having been taken place are the main concern of the former, because `words' are just the descriptions of the reality of the `world'. The desired or probable actions in the future are the main concern of the latter, because the reality of the future `world' will be shaped by `words'.

`Sincerity condition' indicates that in performing an illocutionary act, the speaker expresses a certain kind of psychological state or attitude. Searle sets up four major categories of sincerity condition: `belief' (for statements, assertions, remarks, explanations, reports, claims, deductions, arguments, etc.), `desire or want' (for requests, orders, commands, askings, prayers, pleadings, beggings, entreaties, etc.), 'intention' (for promises, vows, etc.), 'social feeling' (for congratulations, felicitations, welcomes, etc.). The term 'social feeling' is my own term, following a suggestion from Searle.

Using these three major features, Searle (ibid. pp.34-39) sets up five major categories for illocutionary acts. The following figure is my summary of Searle's five categories:

Features / Names of the Categories	Illocutionary point	Direction of fit	Sincerity condition
Representatives	For S to commit to the truth of p.	Word-to-World	S has belief that the content of p is true.
Directives	For S to attempt to get H to do something.	World-to-Word	S has want or desire that H does A.
Commissives	For S to commit to some future action of S.	World-to-Word	S has intention that S does A.
Expressives	For S to express his psychological state.	No (?)	S has social feeling concerning the content of p.
Declarations	For S to declare that the concept of p immediately becomes reality.	Word-to-World(?) and World-to-Word	No (?)

S: speaker, H: hearer, p: proposition, A: action (future)

Figure 9: Searle's Five Categories for Illocutionary Forces

In the places marked with question marks, I have some argument with Searle's conclusions. The 'direction of fit' of 'Expressives' does not exist in Searle's understanding. I believe, however, that there should be a 'Word-to-World' direction of fit there, because the existence of social feelings on the part of the speaker can be treated as a factual mental phenomenon. Searle listed two 'directions of fit' for 'Declarations', but I think the 'direction of fit' there should be only 'World-to-Word', because in declarations the speaker brings future states into reality, although this process is immediate and conventionally fixed. Thirdly, I do not agree with Searle's analysis of the 'sincerity condition' of 'Declarations'. Something like, 'S has conventional authority that the state of affairs specified by p immediately becomes reality', is necessary.

In the following, I challenge the appropriateness of the notion of 'illocutionary force' used by Searle and others. My thesis is this: 'force' in a speech act cannot be defined adequately from the illocutionary aspect of speech act alone, but needs to be defined by both concepts of illocution and perlocution.

Austin's real motivation in introducing the concept of 'illocutionary forces' was his negative evaluation of the traditional philosophical position, in which the study of meaning had been restricted to the aspect of locution, i.e. 'sense' and 'reference'. Therefore, for him, 'force' (or 'illocutionary force') is a concept antithetical to the traditional sense of 'meaning'. In other words, he focused on the function of language in use between its user and addressee(s) rather than upon the function of language in determining truth values of statements. (See Austin 1962:100.)

Searle (1977:27) mentions that "there are different kinds of differences that enable us to say that the force of this utterance is different from the force of that utterance." He also says (ibid. p.28) that "Illocutionary point is part of but not the same as illocutionary force. Thus, for example, the illocutionary point of requests is the same as that of commands: both are attempts to get hearers to do something. But the illocutionary forces are clearly different." From these remarks, we can say that for Searle, force of utterance = illocutionary force.

Wunderlich (1980:292) comments in regard to `illocutionary force', that its performance "brings about a certain effect in that it changes the obtaining state of interaction."

Sadock (1974:154) says that "the illocutionary force of a sentence has the unique ability to change the real world."

If these quotations are interpreted correctly, then we can induce that `force' as used in these places means `the potentiality of an utterance to bring about some changes in the actions, thoughts or beliefs, etc. of the hearer.' Interestingly enough, this definition is roughly equivalent to my definition of `force' in (a) of Figure 8.

Now let us check how this important concept of `force' is represented in Figure 9, which is a summary of Searle's classification of illocutionary forces. In order to do this more easily and more effectively, I have modified Figure 9 with S (speaker) represented by first person singular and H (hearer) by second person singular, and with a single summary statement for the three features in each row. Figure 10 is the result of this modification.

Representatives	I am expressing my belief and commitment to the truth of the content of p.
Directives	I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to do A.
Commissives	I am expressing my intention to commit myself to do A.
Expressives	I am expressing my social feeling concerning you in relation to p.
Declarations	I am declaring that the state of affairs specifed by p immediately become reality.

S: speaker, H: hearer, p: proposition, A: action (future)

Figure 10: Modification of Figure 8

In my attempt to locate the concept of 'force' described above, I find that, except for 'Declarations' and possibly also for 'Directives', it is hard to find the idea of 'force' in the summary statements. There are no explicit expressions which clearly indicate the characteristics of the vector of 'force', i.e. the origin and destination of 'force'. Figure 10 seems to present the **origin** part of the vector of force. However, presenting only one side of the vector does not tell much. This seems to be the primary reason why I could not see the element of force in Figure 10.

Therefore, following my proposal of considering **force** as a vector (presented in this subsection earlier), let us add the **destination** part of the vector to Figure 10 and see whether or not the combination of these two parts produces a clearer concept of the vector of force. Figure 11 is based on Figure 10, and is the result of the operation described above.

Intentions / Speech-Act Types	Illocutionary Act/Intent (Origin)	Perlocutionary Act/Intent (Destination)	Speaker's Primary Intention (Origin + Destination)
Representatives	I am expressing my belief and commitment to the truth of the content of p.	Believe so and act accordingly hereafter.	I am expressing my belief and commitment to the truth of the content of p, therefore believe so and act accordingly hereafter.
Directives	I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to do A.	Do A.	I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to do A, therefore, do A.
Commissives	I am expressing my intention to commit myself to do A.	Believe so and act accordingly hereafter.	I am expressing my intention to commit myself to do A, therefore, believe so and act accordingly, hereafter.
Expressives	I am expressing my social feeling concerning you in relation to p.	Accept my feeling and act accordingly hereafter.	I am expressing my social feeling concerning you in relation to p, therefore, accept my feeling and act accordingly hereafter.
Declarations	I am declaring that the state of affairs specified by p immediatealy becomes reality.	Accept my declaration and act accordingly hereafter.	I am declaring that the state of affairs specified by p immediately becomes reality, therefore, accept my declaration and act accordingly hereafter.

p: proposition, A: action (future)

Figure 11: Five Main Categories of the Intention of the SA

As far as the labels are concerned, Figure 11 follows the system used in Figures 9 and 10.

When we observe Figure 11, and especially when we focus upon the last column, the idea of the vector of force is clearly manifested. The origin of force (from the speaker himself), and the destination of force (towards the hearer(s)) are explicit. Also the information regarding what kinds of force are in operation is distinctly provided in the first column of Figure 11. From all these observations, we can conclude that Figure 11 offers a concrete manifestation of the vector of force.

Our overall conclusion for the discussion started in this subsection is: **Force** in speech acts needs to be defined in terms of two perspectives, i.e. illocutionary intent (origin of the vector) and perlocutionary intent (destination of the vector). Therefore, I propose that the term, 'illocutionary force', be replaced by 'speech-act force' or some other term which can embrace the two elements of the vector, namely, illocution and perlocution.

Now we want to proceed to another crucial issue in SAT, that is, the concept of 'effect' or 'consequence'.

Austin (1962:120) distinguishes several kinds of realization of the concepts of 'effect' or 'consequence' in SAT when he says:

> We distinguished in the last lecture some senses of consequences and effects in these connections, especially three senses in which effects can come in even with illocutionary acts, namely, **securing uptake**, **taking effect**, and **inviting responses**. In the case of the perlocutionary act we made a rough distinction between **achieving an object** and **producing a sequel**. Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional.

The five items in bold letters are five kinds of 'effect' or 'consequence' according to Austin. In the following, I will present these five kinds of 'effect' with their brief definitions and the examples used by Austin.

(29) 'Securing uptake' of IA = "understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution" (ibid. p.116).

(no example)

(30) 'Taking effect' of IA = "changes in the natural course of events" (ibid. p.116).

ex. 'I name this ship the **Queen Elizabeth**.'

(31) 'Inviting responses' of IA = "IA invites by convention a response or sequel, which may be 'one-way' or 'two-way" (ibid. p.110).

ex. 'I ordered him and he obeyed.'

(32) 'Achieving an object' of PA

ex. 'I got him to obey.'

(33) 'Producing a sequel'

ex. 'I tried to warn him but only succeeded in alarming him.'

Note: "I may surprise you or upset you or humiliate you by a locution" (ibid. p.117).

It is no wonder that Austin could not succeed in distinguishing IA and PA by trying to draw a line between IE and PE , as Davis (1980) points out. As I have stated earlier in 2.4.1, the concept of effect is logically as well as chronologically subsequent to its related act or intention. For this reason, I did not include any elements of effect on the side of the speaker in my model (see Figure 8). It is true that some effect can take place in the psychological state of the audience, while our sentences are being uttered, and especially when our speeches are long monologues. Even if this is the case, however, still it is theoretically difficult, especially upon the basis of the general theory of human action (see the discussion in Chapter One) to incorporate the concept of 'effect' into a speech act, since act-tokens of a certain act-type (in this case, speech act-type) need to be performed by the same agent (or the speaker in speech act-type). Then, was it a mistake for Austin to include the concept of perlocutionary act in his SAT? I do not think so. I believe that he was right when he perceived that a certain element which can somehow deal with the idea of effect or consequence needs to be incorporated into his SAT. If this be the case, then, what was his problem? I believe that there are two theoretical reasons why he got into the trouble of distinguishing between IA and PA: first, as stated above, he did not make a theoretical distinction between the act-tokens of solely one agent (the speaker) and the act-tokens of another agent (the hearer); second, he did not make a theoretical distinction between the recognition or understanding of an utterance and the response(s) to it on the part of the hearer.

I now will explain, on the basis of my model, why I consider that these two theoretical problems cause Austin a lot of difficulty.

From the model presented in Figure 7 or 8, we can deduce at least the following distinctive 'effects' on the part of the hearer:

I. EFFECT

A. Understanding Effect (UnE) = 'communication achieved'

1. Utterance Effect (UE) --- The hearer has recognized that the conventionally stipulated sounds were uttered by the speaker.

2. Propositional Effect (ProE) --- The hearer has recognized by means of UE above that the speaker has uttered meaningful sounds in order to refer to something and to talk about something.

3. Illocutionary Effect (IE) --- The hearer has recognized by means of UE and ProE above that the speaker intended one of the five illocutionary act types.

4. Perlocutionary Effect (PE) --- The hearer has recognized by the IE that the speaker has exercised one of the five forces of the five perlocutionary act types (3 and 4, by nature, are always tied together).

B. Misunderstanding Effect (ME) = 'pseudo-communication achieved'

When more than one of UI, ProI, II, or PI is misinterpreted, misunderstanding effect (ME) takes place on the part of the hearer.

C. Partial-Understanding Effect (PUE) = 'communication not achieved'

When one of UI, ProI,or II & PI is not fully understood, only partial understanding takes place on the part of the hearer.

D. No-Understanding Effect (NUE) = 'communication impossible'

The effect takes place when the hearer has failed to understand the speech act as a whole (UI, ProI, II & PI). This typically happens when the hearer does not share the language of the speaker.

II. RESPONSE (R) IN SINCERITY

A. Response in Decision (RD)

1. Response in Decision based on UnE (I-A)

a. Acceptance --- The hearer has accepted the speaker's intention.

b. Rejection --- The hearer has rejected the speaker's intention.

c. Deferment --- The hearer has withheld his decision whether to accept or reject. Eventually, he will take a position one way or another.

2. Response in Decision based on ME (I-B)

a. Pseudo-Acceptance --- The hearer has accepted the speaker's intention in spite of his misunderstanding.

b. Pseudo-Rejection --- The hearer has rejected the speaker's intention in spite of his misunderstanding.

c. Pseudo-Deferment --- The hearer has withheld his decision whether to accept or reject without realizing his misunderstanding. It is hoped that eventually his misunderstanding will be exposed so that it may be corrected.

B. Response Action (RA)

1. Response Action based on II-A-1

a. Acceptance Action

b. Rejection Action

c. Deferment Action

2. Response Action based on II-A-2

a. Pseudo-Acceptance Action

b. Pseudo-Rejection Action

c. Pseudo-Deferment Action

3. Response Action based on I-C

a. Setting one's mind to achieve communication and performing an act (such as asking the speaker some questions, etc.).

b. Giving up of communication to slip into I-D.

4. Response Action based on I-D

No meaningful interpersonal response takes place.

III. By-products (Residue)

In this category, all the emotional, mental, or physical effects which are not directly associated with the force of the speech act are included. (See Cohen (1973) for concrete examples.) This does not mean that these by-products of the speech act are not important. As a matter of fact, they constitute an essential part of our human life. However, they are beyond the scope of this study.

The above categories of possible effects and responses may seem to be too numerous for analytical purposes. However, it is necessary to recall that, in actual communication situations, there are more delicate shades and complications than those being presented here. One which I have not dealt with at all in the above classification is the matter of deceiving, lying, or other intentionally insincere speech acts. The hearer can take various kinds of insincere (or deceptive) attitudes in his responses. This whole topic may be worthy of a separate study, but we will deal with it briefly in a later section. However, I have assumed that responses of the hearer are sincere. At any rate, I propose that these categories give a theoretically sufficient background to deal with all the phenomena of effects and responses in an actual communication situation. Figure 12 gives a flow-diagram of those categories.



Figure 12: <u>Flow-Diagram of Possible Effects and Responses</u>

We now return to our original discussion. I would like to demonstrate that the theoretical dilemma which Austin faced in dealing with the problem of distinguishing illocutionary effects from perlocutionary effects can be dissolved by my model. For this purpose, I will examine the examples of Austin in (29)-(33), and check whether the effects or responses described there can be sufficiently explained.

Example (29), 'securing uptake' exactly corresponds with UnE (understanding effect), i.e. with the successful achievement of communication in accomplishing all the four effects (UE, ProE, IE & PE).

Example (30), 'taking effect' in the sense of 'changes in the natural course of event' can be explained sufficiently in the following way. The speaker, by proclaiming, 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', performs a speech-act-type of Declarations (as in Figure

11). Then, the hearers produce a series of effects and responses conventionally, i.e. they produce the UnE - Acceptance - Acceptance Action. Since this process is conventionally stipulated, the hearers of this kind of declaration almost automatically accept it. However, this does not mean that there is no possibility of breach on the part of the hearers. Though very extraordinary, an individual hearer can act against the declaration. Therefore, 'taking effect' is necessarily based upon UnE and Acceptance. Only after these two effects take place will we call the ship the Queen Elizabeth.

Example (31) --- 'inviting responses' is a very natural result of a speech act. In 'I ordered him and he obeyed', 'I ordered him' represents a speech act type, that of Directives (in Figure 11) and 'and he obeyed' represents the process of UnE --> Acceptance --> Acceptance Action (in Figure 12). This example gives the same result as example (30). There is a difference, however, between the two examples. Example (30) is conventionally regulated and there is almost no room for an individual hearer to have freedom in response, whereas in the case of (31), an individual hearer usually has a larger degree of freedom to decide whether to accept or reject.

Example (32) --- 'achieving an object' is considered by Austin to be the perlocutionary effect of a perlocutionary act. However, the only way to achieve the object of the speaker by a speech act is by going through the process of UnE --> Acceptance -->Acceptance Action on the part of the hearer. Then what is the difference between examples (31) and (32)? The model clearly indicates that there is no essential difference in the process of achieving that response in the hearer, i.e.

UnE --> Acceptance --> Acceptance Action. But this means that the factors that make a difference between examples (31) and (32) needs to be found in their socio-psychological contexts or situations. In other words, for the case of (32), the speaker, before he utters anything, need to contemplate how he can achieve his object and to try to create an better environment for the accomplishment of his goal. Only after these preparations does he utter anything, and if he succeeds, we can describe his success as 'I got him to obey', describing himself in the first person. However, in the case of (31), the situation is a little different. We have to assume there was not as much pre-planned activity of the speaker as in (32), although there should be at least some in order to make his speech act intentional. The discussion so far seems to indicate that the distinction between (31) and (32) can be made adequately only in the realm of speech acts.

Example (33) --- 'producing a sequel' can be explained in four possible ways by using the model. First, 'the purpose of warning him' was achieved by the process of UnE --> Acceptance --> Acceptance Action, and yet the speaker misinterpreted the response action of the hearer as 'having been alarmed instead of warned.' Second, the process UnE --> Rejection --> Rejection Action took place on the part of the hearer; nevertheless, the speaker's interpretation was that at least he succeeded in alarming him. Third, the process UnE --> Deferment --> Deferment Action took place, and the speaker's interpretation of the response of the hearer was that at least he succeeded in alarming him emotionally even though he neither accepted nor rejected the warning. Fourth, the process ME --> Pseudo-Acceptance --> Pseudo-Acceptance-Action took place on the part of the hearer. The speaker's interpretation of the response of the hearer was that he only succeeded in alarming him instead of warning him, even though the hearer sincerely responded on the basis of his misinterpretation of the intention of the speaker (in this case 'warning'). In this way, I may be able to find other ways to explain Austin's example (33). As pointed out in the discussion of (32), our decision as to which of the four processes explained above took place depends on how much situational or contextual information we have.

We can draw some conclusions from the application of the model to Austin's examples. First, it has been shown through the discussion that the model is sufficiently equipped to explain various effects or responses of speech acts. This means that the problem Austin faced in distinguishing between illocutionary and perlocutionary effect is solved by this model. Secondly, it has become clear that the explanation of the delicate differences among similar responses can be sufficiently made by getting more situational or contextual information about the speech act.

I have demonstrated so far that my position, exemplified in Figure 8, is tenable by showing that the two important concepts in SAT, viz. **force** and **effect or consequence**, can be redefined more comprehensively in the model proposed. To be concrete, I have pointed out that Searle's concept of 'illocutionary force' can be made complete by adding the destination part of the vector of force, i.e. **perlocutionary intent** (see Figure 11). I have also pointed out that Austin's controversial concept of `effect' can be clarified and redefined by using the **effect-response** model (Figure 12) which is derived from the proposed model.

Finally, in this subsection, I like to return to the formula given by Davis for the performance of a perlocutionary act (see (27) and (28) on p.43). If what Davis has done can either be adequately explained or shown to be inadequate by the proposed model, it will be added evidence that the proposed model is at least as tenable as that of Davis.

A simple examination reveals that the first two conditions, i.e. (i) and (ii) in (27) or (28), corresponds with UA, ProA and IA; the condition (iii) with UE, ProE, IE; the condition (iv) with PE; the condition (v) with **Response Action**; the condition (vi) with PA. It is significant to note here that I could not find in Davis another condition which corresponds to **Response in Decision** in my model. If I were to add this factor of **Response in Decision** to Davis' model as a condition, it would be something like `H accepts what H understands what S means by his statement that p is true.'

The above examination has revealed that Davis's model perfectly fits my propoed model, with one factor lacking. However, it is my contention that by using the proposed model we can set up a better and more consistent formula for the conditions of the successful performance of H in regard to the perlocutionary act of S. Here is the formula which can be derived from the proposed model:

(34) Standardly S's xing H (to y) by uttering p is successfully achieved if and only if,

(a) S performs an utterance act by producing conventionally stipulated sounds of his language.

(b) H recognizes that by S's utterance act he is speaking the language shared both by H and S.

(c) S performs a propositional act by uttering meaningful sounds, i.e. p, for the purpose of referring to something.

(d) H recognizes that (c).

(e) S performs an illocutionary act by uttering p, choosing one of the five categories shown in Figure 9.

(g) H understands that (e).

(h) S performs a perlocutionary act which is based upon the illocutionary act of (e) by uttering p, i.e. he exercises some force towards H.

(i) H recognizes that (h).

(j) H responds in deciding that what S intends to communicate by uttering p is true based upon his recognition of (b), (d) and (h).

(k) H responds by an action of xing or being y-ed on the basis of (j).

This formula follows the proposed model consistently. I claim that it has more explanatory power than that of Davis because of finer theoretical distinctions made in analyzing the process of bringing about effects and responses by a speech act.

2.4.6 Levels of intention

In this section (2.4) so far we have endeavored to establish the validity of the proposed model. In this subsection, we will use the model as it stands and try to explain various levels of intention in a speech act, relating those to the models presented by Grice, Strawson, and Searle in 2.3.

Earlier in 2.1, I pointed out that a speech act is an intentional human action, that the intention involved there originates in the wants and desires of the speaker, and that these wants and desires are based upon the value or belief system of the speaker. Then, in order to deepen the understanding of the concept of intention in speech acts, we looked at the work of Grice (1971), Searle (1969) and Strawson (1964) (see (24), (25) and (27) in 2.3). We have found from our comparison of those three theorists that each takes a slightly different position in their definitions of utterance meaning in terms of the concept of intention. In order to find a way to reconcile these differing views, we set out to establish a model which can explain comprehensively how they differ from each other and to give an integrated view.

The model proposed in the preceding subsections requires us to set up at least four levels of paired intentions. The following is what I propose for the definition of an utterance meaning based upon Figures 7 and 8:

(35) S utters sentence T and means it (i.e. means sincerely what he says) = in uttering T,

(a) S intends (i-1) to produce a certain response (R) in H and indends (i-2) that H should recognize (i-1), and

(b) S intends (i-3) to express his mental state or attitude which is the ground of the intention (i-1), and intends (i-4) that H should recognize (i-3), and

(c) S intends (i-5) to refer to something in order to talk about it, using words and syntax which are shared also by H in order to accomplish (b), and intends (i-6) that H should recognize (i-5), and

(d) S intends (i-7) to produce sounds which are conventionally used and shared also by H in order to accomplish (c), and intends (i-8) that H should recognize (i-7).

(e) S intends (i-9) that the successful fulfillment of (i-1) through (i-8) will cause H to produce R specified in (a).

To sum up the above statements:

Stage (a) corresponds with PI (i-1) and Intention (i-2) of PE,

Stage (b) corresponds with II (i-3) and Intention (i-4) of IE,

Stage (c) corresponds with ProI (i-5) and Intention (i-6) of ProE,

Stage (d) corresponds with UI (i-7) and Intention (i-8) of UE,

Stage (e) corresponds with Intention (i-9) of S for H to take one of the courses of responses specified in Figure 11.

Now, we will try to reexamine the similar definitions given by Grice, Searle, and Strawson and see how they are related to this definition.

First, Grice's definition in (24) can be interpreted as consisting of two kinds of intention, i.e. PI and Intention of PE. In other words, Grice's definition focuses only on the aspect of stage (a) above. It is important to note here, however, that the meaning of the term effect used in Grice as in "to produce some effect in an audience" (Grice 1971:58), is not the same as that of effect used in the concepts of PE, IE, ProE or UE. Grice's effect corresponds with response in my proposed model.

Searle's definition in (25) is more extensive than that of Grice. His first stage of (25)-(a) seems to correspond to II & PI, his second stage, (25)-(b), to Intention of IE and Intention of PE. But his third stage, (25)-(c), is clearly referring to the shared conventions of language between S and H --- this probably corresponds to ProI and Intention of ProE, and UI and Intention of UE in stage (c) and stage (d) above. It is significant that in Searle's definition all the stages set up in (35) except stage (e) can be found. But this does not mean that the definitions stated in (35) and (25) are essentially the same. In fact, there are significant differences. The definition of (35) has the following advantages over that of (25), and is, therefore, more useful:

(i) Searle does not include the concept of "intended perlocutionary effect" (1969:71) in his definition of (25). This means his definition can deal only with utterances without 'intended perlocutionary effect.' In contrast to this, definition (35) is designed for every utterance to set up 'perlocutionary intent.' Therefore, one strong advantage of (35) is that there is no need to distinguish between utterances with 'intended perlocutionary effect' and those without it. I have argued that perlocutionary act and effect need to be incorporated into every utterance. It was also pointed out that the crucial weakness of Searle's view is that he does not make a theoretical distinction between effects and responses as does the model on which definition (35) is based.

(ii) Because of this failure to make a distinction between effects and responses, it is impossible for Searle to set up a stage similar to that of (e) in (35).

(iii) Searle seems to summarize the two speech acts, i.e. utterance act and propositional act, in (25)-(c). This is too broad and general to deal with the various kinds of effects and responses described in Figure 12.

Strawson's definition in (26) -- my version of Strawson -- can be compared to (35) in the following way: (26)-(a) corresponds to PI; (26)-(b) to Intention of PE; (26)-(c) to Intention that H recognizes Intention of PE. Strawson's definition, in comparison with that of Grice or Searle, has two distinctive aspects in regard to the concept of intention. First, he adds a new level of intention in (26)-(c), that is, S's intention that H should recognize S's intention that H should recognize PI. As mentioned earlier (in 2.3), it is difficult to understand why this kind of intention is necessary beyond the intention expressed in (26)-(b), i.e. S's intention that H should recognize PI. In our definition of (35), we do not include this intention. However, if it is an inevitably necessary intention, it must be included in the definition. I do not include this aspect of intention in (35) because my assumption is that S's intention in (26)-(b) should conventionally imply that (26)-(c) is the case. In other words, in making an utterance S intends that H should recognize his intention (PI) of that utterance, but this, at the same time, seems to lead to a natural conclusion that H will recognize that S intended that H would recognize PI by his utterance. Secondly, Strawson insightfully adds a fourth intention in (26)-(d). This addition is very significant, because it suggests the necessity of setting up at least two stages of consequence on the part of H. Strawson is saying here that the **recognition** of H in regard to S's PI causes H's **response**. In our model (Figure 12), this distinction (i.e., Strawson's between **recognition** and **response**) parallels our distinction between **effects** and **responses**. However, in our model, we further divide 'responses' into **responses in decision** and **response actions**. All these suggest that it is necessary to include the information that S has a certain intention that the intended response of H (PI) will be caused by H's recognition and understanding of S's other intentions. In our definition of (35), this aspect of intention is clearly expressed in the last stage, i.e. (35)-(e).

2.5 Intention in Indirect Speech Act

In the preceding discussions, the proposed model has been demonstrated to be effective primarily for explaining utterances with a single **speech act force** (in Searle's term, illocutionary force). (My preference for the term **speech act force** was explained earlier in 2.4.5.) However, as Searle (1975b) pointed out, there are many cases in which utterances are not simply meant to be understood literally, but mean something more. Hints, insinuations, irony and metaphor, etc. are included in this category. Searle calls such utterances **indirect speech acts**, "in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another" (ibid. p.60).

In order to give adequate accounts for those indirect speech acts, Searle (1975b) introduces three basic concepts: 'cooperative conversational rules', 'mutually shared factual background information' and 'inference'. Using these concepts as fundamental, he insists that he can explain most indirect speech acts. Huttar (1980) also tries to give a theoretical account for 'metaphorical expressions', using the terminology introduced by I.A. Richards (1936) and modifying and refining the model developed by van Dijk (1975).

In this section, I use the accounts made by Searle and Huttar for indirect speech acts in order to compare them to an account derived from the proposed model. Then, I will see whether the account derived from our model is sufficiently equipped to deal with indirect speech acts or not. If it is not, then some modification must be made to refine the proposed model.

2.5.1 Searle's account and the proposed model

The examples Searle (1975b:61) uses are the following:

(36) Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight.

(37) Student Y: I have to study for an exam.

The utterance (36) has a speech act force of 'proposal'. However, the utterance (37) in an ordinary sense seems to have two speech-act forces: the primary speech act force of 'rejection' and the secondary speech act force of 'statement'. From this we can say that (37) is an indirect speech act. How can student X reach the conclusion from Y's statement of (37) that Y rejected his proposal? Searle (ibid. p.63) gives his answer to this question by assuming ten reasoning steps which X may go through before he reaches his conclusion. The following are those ten steps:

(38) STEP 1: I have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has made a statement to the effect that he has to study for an exam (facts about the conversation).

STEP 2: I assume that Y is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant (principle of conversational cooperation).

STEP 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (theory of speech acts).

STEP 4: But his literal utterance was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response (inference from STEPS 1 and 3).

STEP 5: Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming that his remark is relevant, his primary illocutionary point must differ from his literal one (inference from STEPS 2 and 4).

STEP 6: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening, and I know that going to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening (factual background information).

STEP 7: Therefore, he probably cannot both go to the movies and study for an exam in one evening (inference from STEP 6).

STEP 8: A preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal or on any other commissive, is the ability to perform the act predicated in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts).

STEP 9: Therefore, I know that he has said something that has the consequence that he probably cannot consistently accept the proposal (inference from STEP 1, 7 and 8).

STEP 10: Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the proposal (inference from STEP 5 and 9).

In order to compare what Searle analyzed for (35) and (37), in terms of student X's interpretation of student Y's response in (37) as rejection, I will give the most likely reasoning which may occur in the mind of X before he can judge or interpret that Y's response means rejection.

First, let us analyze X's utterance in (36), which is a proposal. Using Figure 11, we can represent (36) in the following way:

(39) X: (Directive) I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to go the movies tonight with me, therefore, come with me and we will go to the movies.

Also, from Figure 12, we can make explicit the process of the expected fulfilment of X's perlocutionary intent in the following way:

(40) UnE --> Acceptance --> Acceptance Action

X's intention (or expectation) that [Y should recognize all the four stages of X's intentions in (35)(a) - (d), and Y should accept my speech act force in (39), and Y should respond to it affirmatively].

To this proposal of X, the actual response action Y made was utterance (37). How is X going to interpret (37)? In order to clarify the situation, we will also analyze (37) as we did for (36):

(41) Y: (Commissive) I am expressing my intention to commit myself to study for an exam (tonight), therefore, believe so and act accordingly hereafter.

And from Figure 12, we can make explicit the process of the expected fulfilment of X's perlocutionary intent in the following way:

(42) UnE —> Acceptance —> Acceptance Action

Y's intention (or expectation) was that [X should recognize all the four stages of X's intention in (35)(a) - (d), and X should accept Y's speech act force in (41), and X should respond to it affirmatively].

Before we try to spell out the possible steps for a process of interpretation on the part of X regarding (41) and (42), as a preparation, let us consider a likely straightforward response Y could have made to X instead of (37). For example, it could could have been:

(43) No, I cannot go to the movies with you tonight.

The utterance (43) can be analyzed as the following:

(44) Y: (Commissive) I am expressing my intention to commit myself to the inability of my going to the movies with you tonight, therefore, believe so and act accordingly hereafter.

('No' is a syntactic marker in English which expresses Y's attitude of rejection of the proposal made by X.)

Now, one important question which needs to be raised is how X can interpret Y's statement in (41) and reach his conclusion (in this case rejection on the part of Y) which is similar to (44). The following are the probable steps for X to take to reach his conclusion:

(45) STEP 1: I have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has replied in saying that he has to study for an exam tonight so that I should believe this and act accordingly.

STEP 2: I assume that Y is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant (principles of conversational cooperation).

STEP 3: There are three possible responses Y can make for my proposal, i.e. **Acceptance**, **Rejection**, and **Deferment**. (SAT - Figure 12)

STEP 4: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a lot of time relative to a single evening, and I know that going to the movies normally takes a lot of time relative to a single evening (factual background information).

STEP 5: Therefore, he probably cannot both go to the movies and study for an exam in one evening (inference from STEP 4).

STEP 6: Therefore, most likely his response means **rejection**, because it is most probable that he has given a reason of his not being able to go to the movies tonight (inference from STEP 3, 4 and 5).

The single most significant observation which we can make from the comparison between Searle's ten steps (38) and our six steps (45) is that we did not have to make a distinction between the primary and secondary speech act force. The main reason behind this difference is the fact that, in our proposed model, perlocutionary intent is required to be made explicit for any type of utterance. This means that even if a response is made in a statement, it necessarily contains its perlocutionary intent which directly reflects the hearer's decision in his response. I believe our model provides more realistic explanations to some complex phenomena of the communication process. I agree with Searle in his claim that we rely on such apparatus as 'mutual background information', 'cooperative conversational principles' and 'inferences'. Without such apparatus, no communication take place. However, I believe that there is more information available which is attached to utterances than Searle thinks there is. One such type of information is **perlocutionary intent**, which is inherent in every utterance.

Let us try to apply our model to one more example which Searle uses:

(46) (A, B and others are at the table eating and A says to B.)

A: Can you reach the salt?

Searle (ibid. p.60) understands that there are two illocutionary acts performed in (46), i.e. the primary illocutionary act - request, and the secondary illocutionary act - question. Searle may be able to set up another set of ten steps for B, the addressee of the utterance, to reach his conclusion that it should be a request. In our model, if (46) were to be considered purely as a question, it could be represented as:

(47) A: (Directive) I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to tell me whether you are able to reach the salt or not, therefore, tell me (your answer).

If (46) were a sincere question, its perlocutionary intent would be expressed in the last part of (47), i.e. "tell me (your answer)." Supposing B would respond to this utterance sincerely and would answer to A, an answer will be as the following:

(48) B: Yes, I can reach the salt.

If A would take this answer as a sincere and honest reply, then he would finally make his ultimate intent explicit in saying:

(49) A: If that's the case, then, pass the salt to me.

The utterance (49) has a force of request. When Searle claims that the utterance (46) has two speech act forces (question and request), the most reasonable explanation we can make for this claim is found in the relationships among (47), (48) and (49). It is rather apparent from these utterances that (47) and (48), as newly established shared knowledge between A and B, i.e. B's ability to reach the salt, function as the grounds for A's request in (49). However, it is usually taken for granted that the person sitting near the salt not only can reach the salt but also socially is expected to pass the salt whenever he is asked if he can do so. Given this kind of normal situation at the table, the utterance (46) will be interpreted to be an utterance which will logically lead to (49). In other words, when (46) is uttered, as long as the situation at the table is normal and the answer in (49) is taken for granted, the perlocutionary intent of (49) is superimposed upon the perlocutionary intent of (46). Therefore, it seems to me that Searle's claim that there exists two forces in (46) is valid only when it is considered in the above specified context. I believe it is better for us to say that the utterance (46) has a superimposed force of request in addition to its original force of question only in a socially allowed situation, although it is important to recognize that such is the normal situation in American culture and thus the normal interpretation.

The fact that this superimposed force relies heavily on the context can be demonstrated quite easily by deliberately changing the situations in which (46) is uttered. Suppose A, B and others are eating at a large round table. A needs the salt but cannot reach it, because it sits just in the middle of the table. So, A looks at B -- who is the tallest among those who are eating -- and says, "Can you reach the salt?" Given this kind of context, the above utterance does not seem to have the same speech act force as the above case. It seems that in this case the force of question is much stronger, because the speaker (A) can not assume at the time of uttering that his addressee (B) is able to reach the salt. Only after B tries to extend his hand and succeeds in reaching the salt will the superimposed force of request become effective.

Now, let us create a situation where the force of request cannot be superimposed on the utterance, 'Can you reach the salt?' Suppose a mother and her one-year old toddler are in a living room and the mother has just noticed that her toddler is approaching a table on which there is a small bottle of salt which was left behind. The mother becomes curious about the ability of her son and asks him, "Can you reach the salt?" Given this context, only the force of question seems to be relevant, since the mother is not interested in requesting the baby to do something for her after he successfully reaches the salt.

Another possible situation is at an informal family table. I wonder whether it is usually the case, in this context, that a husband may ask for the salt which is in front of his wife by saying, "Can you reach the salt?" I feel a more appropriate request form would be, "Will you please pass the salt?" or other similar less indirect expressions (such as "Please pass the salt.").

Lakoff (1977) points out that the situational or sociological concept of **politeness** is a decisive factor for the explanation of the existence of various possible expressions for the same perlocutionary intent when he says (ibid. p.104):

> I have tried in the course of this paper to approach a puzzling question: when several ways of saying approximately the same thing exist, and some are more complex or less clear than others, why do they exist? And why, when several ways of saying something exist, is the usability of each confined to a particular range of contexts? I have shown that politeness is often a decisive factor, as well as a very complex one, and, therefore, that sociology must go hand in hand with linguistics if we are to explain many aspects of language use.

Lakoff's finding and our discussion lead to the following important conclusions regarding indirect speech acts:

(i) A certain speech act, in a conventionally regulated context, can refer to more contexually determined perlocutionary intents of the speaker than the original perlocutionary intent (i.e. that which is attached to literal understanding) expressed in that speech act. We call such speech acts **indirect speech acts**.

(ii) Indirect speech acts work smoothly when both the speaker and the addressee(s) share the same language and culture, because inference, which is used for interpretation on the part of addressee(s), relies heavily on some aspects of the shared backgrounds of the interlocutors.

(iii) The reason for the fact that there are many ways of expressing or referring to approximately the same speaker's ultimate perlocutionary intent can be sought in social factors which may determine the appropriateness of a certain speech act. Lakoff has pointed out that politeness is one of these social factors. Besides this, degree of formality, the social relationship between the interlocutors, and many other possible factors can be added.

(iv) For the interpretation of an utterance, the hearer usually assumes that both he and the speaker are cooperating with each other to make each of their utterances relevant to the common topics or subjects of their communication.

2.5.2 Huttar's account and the proposed model

Huttar (1980:384) understands that metaphor is "non-literal speech generally." In this sense, his metaphorical speech acts are very similar to Searle's indirect speech acts. However, Huttar deals with a different kind of indirect speech act than Searle does. He deals with metaphorical expressions which present two aspects for research attention: reference and illocutionary act, whereas Searle deals with indirect speech acts with the latter aspect only.

One particular example he uses extensively in his article is the following quotation from Matthew 7:16 (Revised Standard Version):

(50) Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles?

For the sake of a later discussion, we also quote a larger portion of Matthew in which (50) occurs:

(51) 15. Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves. 16. You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles? 17. So every sound tree bears good fruit; but the bad tree bears evil fruit. 18. A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. 19. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 20. Thus you will know them by their fruits. (From RSV)

Before Huttar begins his extensive discussion, he assumes that (50) is a rhetorical question, i.e. it asserts something strongly rather than truly interrogating. Therefore, he presents the following shortened utterance as the main object of discussion rather than (50):

(52) Thornbushes don't produce grapes.

Concerning (52), Huttar deals with two main issues, reference and illocutionary act. He presents (ibid. p.386-391) three possible positions as to the reference and illocutionary act of (52): (a) The speaker is referring to plants; asserting something about plants; (b) The speaker is referring to people; asserting something about people; (c) The speaker is doing both (a) and (b).

Huttar skillfully defends his third position (c), by dealing with the issues of reference and illocutionary act separately. In so doing he seems to agree with Mooij (1975, 1976). Having established his position, he goes on to define output and input conditions of such metaphorical expressions as (50) or (52). He modifies van Dijk's (1975) view by incorporating Grice's (1975) conversational maxims, and presents the following as his conclusion (ibid. p.395-396):

(53) (i) For a speaker to be using an utterance metaphorically, he must be intending it to be given an interpretation (in the marginal case only by himself) other than whatever literal interpretations may be given it.

(ii) For a speaker to intend that a particular hearer recognize that he is using an utterance metaphorically, he must assume that the hearer either

(a) expects metaphoring because of the cultually or linguistically defined context in which the utterance occurs, or

(b) recognizes that interpreting the utterance literally would entail that the speaker is violating one or more of the conversational maxims.

(iii) For a speaker to intend that a particular hearer recognize the non-literal meaning of a magistral metaphor, he must

(a) assume that the hearer has at some time been aware that the vehicle of the metaphor has some particular feature or features,

(b) intend the hearer to know that he wants the hearer's attention directed to the fact that the vehicle has those features, and

(c) intend the hearer, being aware that the vehicle has those features, to thereby give attention to the notion that the tenor has those features.

(iv) For a speaker to intend that a particular hearer recognizes the non-literal meaning of a magistral metaphor, he must assume that the hearer's language competence includes the ability to select the intended tenor and the intended features common to vehicle and tenor in cases where not all of this information is explicitly given in the metaphorical utterance.

[note 1: Grice's (1975:67) conversational maxims include: (i) Quantity = "make your contribution as informative as is required (for the currect purposes of the exchange)"; (ii) Quality = "try to make your contribution one that is true"; (iii) Relation = "be relevant"; (iv) Manner = "be perspicuous"

note 2: I do not list Huttar's (iv) and (vi), which deal with other metaphorical expressions not discussed in this paper.

note 3: By `vehicle' Huttar means "literal referent" (ibid. p.386), and by `tenor', "primary referent"(ibid. p.386).]

How can our model, which was originally developed primarily for nonmetaphorical expressions, be applied to such metaphorical utterances as (50) or (52)? In the preceding subsection, it was demonstrated that our model is more adequate for the analysis of metaphorical expressions than that of Searle, because it allows any indirect speech acts to function as they are with their respective inherent perlocutionary intents, but at the same time it also can allow a different and more situationally determined perlocutionary intent to be superimposed conventionally or contextually, thus avoiding Searle's necessity to assign two inherent perlocutionary intents (or acts) to an utterance. In other words, it was claimed that the context (with its many conventional rules) shared between the interlocutors is primarily responsible for assigning a superimposed meaning to a particular utterance. And it was also contended that the addressee(s) arrives at this kind of superimposed meaning through the operation of general cooperative rules and inference (reasoning power being inherent in every human being).

Before trying to apply our model to (52) in Matthew, I would like to explicate further the first claim which was made earlier in this subsection, i.e. an utterance can be analyzed as having superimposed illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in addition to its syntactically or linguistically determined illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, which are inherent in the form of utterances. Let us go back to the example given by Anscombe, (1) -(5) on pages 6-7. The description of (1) gives a clear context for the approximately equivalent descriptions in (2) - (5). Given the context (1), and supposing that I am an author, which of the available descriptions do I wish to choose among (2) - (5) for the man's particular action? If I choose (2), i.e. 'The man is moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump handle', my readers may be able to understand (2) by supplying the information about the purpose of his action from the context. This means that because of the contextual information of (1), the reader can figure out (or infer) that 'The man is moving his arms up and down with his fingers round the pump handle' = (3) 'The man is operating the pump.' = (4) 'The man is replenishing the house water-supply' = (5) 'The man is poisoning the household'. From this, can we say that the utterance (2) can at least refer to three other action-tokens? I believe we can. Let us reverse the situation. If I, as a writer, choose (5) instead of (2) as a description of the man's action, given the context of (1), my readers will be able to understand it easily, by supplying the information about the purpose or intent of his poisoning action. In this case, the reader does not supply purpose or intent information from (2) - (4), which are lower in the intent hierarchy, though they are shared presuppositional knowledge, but rather supply or infer information of higher intent on the intent hierarchy. For example, he can supply from the information given that (5) is the case, because 'The man is helping a political reformer to kill the leaders', or 'The man is trying to establish a better country through a political reform by eradicating the present leaders', etc. If this is the case, can we say that given the context (1) the utterance (5) is being superimposed with two other perlocutionary intents which are described above? There is no reason we cannot.

The above discussion presents some very important implications to the understanding of a speech act. Here are some of them:

(i) Almost every utterance can be to one degree or another considered to be an **indirect** speech act or a metaphorical expression, because no speech act exists in isolation, outside of context. That context usually supplies some information about the perlocutionary intents which are different from, and higher in prominence than, what is inherent in the speech act. And these perlocutionary intents are often superimposed on an utterance in various ways.

(ii) The speech act of an utterance usually is part of a means-end chain (as in Figure 1) which constitutes a paraphrase set of descriptions from a very concrete physical impersonal description to a highly interpersonal ethically oriented description. The context (textual or extra-textual) determines its highest end (or ultimate intention of the agent performing actions), which overrules all the other lower level ends or intentions of the agent.

With this brief discussion of Anscombe's examples and some theoretical implications drawn from them, we will set out to apply our model to Matthew 7:16. We will repeat (50):

(50) Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles?

From the larger context, we know that Matthew is assummed to be the author of the whole book to which this name is ascribed, and that a particular portion with which we will deal primarily, i.e. Matthew 7:15-20, is supposed to be a saying of Jesus, the main participant of the book of Matthew. Therefore, in the following discussion, we assume that the whole utterance in (51) was written by Matthew reporting what had been spoken by Jesus.

First, we will briefly look at the context and see what information precedes (50). In Matthew 7:15, Jesus admonishes his audience, "Beware of false prophets." This directive is very important in this portion of Jesus' saying. Then he begins to explain who false prophets are in the latter half of verse 15. Jesus describes two characteristics of false prophets by introducing two metaphorical expressions: first, they come "in sheep's clothing" (i.e. they appear harmless as sheep); second, "inwardly they are ravenous wolves" (i.e. they are as ferocious inside as wolves). In order to beware of false prophets, the audience of Jesus should be able to tell who are false prophets and who are not. Therefore, Jesus needed to begin verse 16 with, "You will know them by their fruits." This is also a metaphorical expression. Right after this is the utterance (50) which we want to investigate in some detail. This contextual consideration is very important, because Jesus and his original audience were supposed to have shared at least all the preceding information as their background before the utterance (50) was uttered.

Assuming that utterance (50) were a sincere question, without any superimposed contextually determined perlocutionary intents, it can be represented by our model as follows:

(54) (Directives) I am expressing my want/desire to attempt to get you to answer this question: "Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles?" Therefore, answer my question.

Jesus is well aware that his question if taken in isolation is somewhat absurd, because of its obvious answer. But at the same time Jesus is well aware that his audience will try to connect what they have just heard to what they heard up to that point. In other words, the audience is expecting to hear from Jesus how to tell whether one is a false prophet or not by his "fruits", so that they may be aware of him of whether he truly is a false prophet. Therefore, Jesus' statement, "You will know them by their fruits," is very important because it suggests two things: (i) there may be a shift of reference from people to fruits or related subjects; (ii) but we will keep people as our main topic. Thus considered, (54) is not absurd at all. Because, through this utterance Jesus helps his audience to attend to their real world knowledge and use an analogical method to understand his point. Therefore, to the utterance of Jesus in (50) or (54), the natural mental response of the audience would be something like the following:

(55) Of course not, we all know that grapes are not gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles, but that grapes are from vines and figs are from fig trees.

Of course, (55) would not be a verbal response from his audience, but at least it would be a most typical silent response from his audience. I think this is the point of Jesus' utterance of (50): it is a rhetorical question which enables Jesus to shift the audience's referential attention smoothly without shifting their thematic attention.

Granted the above mental response (55) from the audience, the utterances of Jesus in verses 17-19 are easy for the audience to grasp, because they are simply a further elaboration of (55). And by the time Jesus is ready to utter verse 20, his audience is expected to understand his point, i.e. 'you should look at their behavior or works: if they are bad they are false prophets, if they are good, they are true prophets.' It is significant to note that verse 20 is exactly the same as the beginning half of verse 16, except for the connector word 'thus' in verse 20. (Verse 20: Thus you will know them by their fruits.) This does not mean that verse 20 is a mere repetition, for it has vastly different functions from the beginning half of verse 16. These functions are: (i) it tells his audience that the information packaged between verse 16 and verse 20 is a unit which serves to elucidate the meaning of its anteroposterior utterances; (ii) it signals an end to the discussion Jesus started in verse 16; (iii) it indicates Jesus' assumption that his audience has reached an understanding of that utterance.

From the above discussion, we can draw an information structure diagram in the following way, using Figure 1:

```
                                                  [Beware of false
                                                   prophets.] v.15a

                                  means -----------> purpose

                             [Know them by their
                              behaviors.]

          means ----------------> Purpose

     [Understand this analogy:
      people's behaviors =
      fruits, people = trees;
      sound tree bears good
      fruits, and evil trees
      bear evil fruits.]
```

Figure 13: Information Structure Diagram of Matt 7:15-20

From this figure, we can say that when the utterance (50) was uttered, its speech act intent is not the only factor operating there; at the same time contextually superimposed speech act intents are also in operation.

Now let us compare what we have done so far on the Matthew passage to Huttar's conclusion (53).

Concerning (53)-(i): I generally agree with it. It is true that the user (the speaker) of a metaphorical utterance should intend that an interpretation be given othen than literal interpretation of that utterance. However, I have two comments. First, it needs to be pointed out that, in the case of Matthew 7:16, the fact that the speaker intends to use a metaphorical utterance seems to be indicated prior to the time of his uttering that metaphor. In Matthew 7:16, when the word `fruits' which precedes the utterance (50) occurs, it signals that the speaker has an intention to shift into a metaphorical explanation. Secondly, it needs to be emphasized that nonliteral interpretation (in Huttar's term, `tenor') consists necessarily of context bound notions and that the nonliteral interpretation is more thematic (or prominent) than its literal interpretation.

Concerning (53)-(ii): I do not have any objection to (a), because this seems to correspond exactly to the example from the book of Matthew. However, I cannot fully agree with (53)-(ii)-(b), where Huttar claims that one possible way for the hearer to recognize that a certain utterance is metaphorically used is that "interpreting the utterance literally would entail that the speaker is violating one or more of the conversational maxims." As is suggested in (a), we usually try to find the revelance of the spoken utterance to the information which is registered in our short-term memory system through the preceding utterances or conversational exchanges in order to interpret it. While we are engaged in this task of interpretation, we assume that the speaker utters something which is relevant to the mutual knowledge which he and his hearer/reader share through their exchanges up to that point. In this way, whether in a conversation or in reading a text, our comprehension depends upon constant interpretation in order to achieve maximal relevance. (See Sperber and Wilson (1982) for further discussion of this point.) Our searching for maximal relevance starts when the speaker has uttered his first word of his utterance. I do not think it realistic to suppose, as in (53)(ii)(b), that we first try our literal interpretation to determine whether it makes sense, and then if it does not, we change our strategy of interpretation to include metaphorical implication. My speculation is that what is going on in the mind of an interpreter is not just a static binary choice system between x or y, but rather a dynamic holistic system in which choices are made.

Concerning (53)-(iii): I do not have any objection to it. In the process of interpretation, the hearer has to go through all these three steps ((a)-(c)) in order to arrive at the intended meaning of the speaker.

Concerning (53)-(iv): this seems to constitute a part of the preparatory condition of speech act (Searle 1969). I think this is a necessary assumption that the speaker has to make.

To sum up this subsection: first, Huttar's view of how metaphorical utterances are produced or interpreted was introduced. Then the proposed model was applied to the same text as in Huttar in order to see how it works. Lastly, a comparison was made between our interpretation and Huttar's conclusion in (53). It has become clear that in the proposed model there is no need to make a clear-cut distinction between ordinary speech acts and indirect speech acts or metaphorical speech acts. It was demonstrated that an utterance is a part of larger contextual information structure and that every utterance, to one degree or another, needs to be interpreted as manifesting some superimposed prominent intentions of the speaker which are situationally or contextually determined.

2.6 Intention in Insincere Speech Act

So far, all the discussions on the intentions of speech acts are based on the assumption that the speech act agent is sincere in communication. In other words, all the four conditions which Searle (1969) thinks need to be met, i.e. propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition and essential condition, are assumed to be fulfilled.

Philosophical analyses have scarcely deviated from this basic assumption. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981:115) say that "this kind of intentionality - attaining goals through deception - is not widely dealt with in philosophical discussions." We can no longer retain this assumption in text analysis, however, since there are many instances in a text in which the assumption of sincerity cannot be held.

This subsection is an initial effort to search for a possible framework in which we may deal with insincere speech acts. Searle (1969:66) lists the following concrete items as those conditions for a request type of speech act:

(56) Propositional content condition: Future act A of H.

(57) Preparatory condition: (i) H is able to do A. S believes H is able to do A. (ii) It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events of his own accord.

(58) Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A.

(59) Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to get H to do A.

In case this request speech act is considered to be performed in response to a preceding speech act on the part of H, then S has to meet all the conditions which can be derived from Figure 12. Some key conditions are:

(60) S must sincerely intend to recognize in what he heard: (i) what is being referred to; (ii) what psychological state or attitude of the speaker is expressed; (iii) what his purpose is in regards to me.

(61) S must sincerely intend to respond in making a decision, basing his decision on (60).

(62) S must sincerely intend to respond on the basis of his decision, which is a speech act of request.

Those three conditions are logically prior to (56) - (59), since these conditions must be met before the actual preparation of a speech act of S.

If we can assume that an insincere speech act is defined as a speech act in which there is included at least one intentional violation of one of the conditions, i.e. (56) - (62), on the part of S, and yet S pretends that it is met, then at least the following kinds of insincere speech act are possible for S in his response, which is a request to H:

(63) Suppose A and B engage in the following conversation which consists of a speech act exchange.

B: By the way, I am going to New York tomorrow.

A: That's great. Can you deliver a small package to my uncle there?

Then, A's insincere speech acts could fall into one of the following:

(i) A violates (60), eg. if he says: 'That's great. Tell me what you saw in New York.' -- A was not attentive to what B said. A heard the word, 'New York', and guessed wildly that B told him that he had been to New York. Thus A's attitude of lack of attention needs to be clearly distinguished from ME (misunderstanding effect) in Figure 12, which can occur unintentionally while one is being attentive to what is being spoken.

(ii) A violates (61), eg. if he says: 'That's super! Would you kindly deliver a small package to my uncle there for me?' -- Here, A actually rejected what B said, i.e., A really did not believe B. However, A pretended **Acceptance** (Figure 12) and thus responded as above. This kind of insincere attitude of A can be termed, 'teasing', 'mocking', 'provoking', 'derision', 'ridicule' or 'despising' etc. depending on the situation and the social relationship between A and B.

(iii) A violates (62), eg. if he says: 'Is that right? Do you really mean it.' -- A accepted what B claimed, and yet A pretended not to accept B's statement and responded as above. This insincere attitude of A can be termed, 'provoking', 'joking', 'teasing' or 'challenge' etc., depending on the situation and the social relationship between A and B.

(iv) A violates (56) — if A does not have any uncle in New York, but knowing this, A nevertheless spoke as in (63). In this case, A's insincere attitude is clearly 'lying'. In addition to this attitude, A's hidden intention could be 'testing', if, for example, A is interested in knowing how willing B would be to comply with his request or order.

(v) A violates (57) --if A knows that it is impossible for B to do what he requested, and yet A dares to make the request to B. This insincere attitude of A could be 'begging', 'coercion', 'threat', 'intimidation' or 'provoking' etc., depending on the situation and the social relationship between A and B.

(vi) A violates (58) — if A does not have any want/desire for B to deliver a package to his uncle in New York. And yet he intentionally pretended it to be the case and requested as above. His attitude could be 'lying', 'joking', 'testing (his loyality)', etc., depending on the situation and the social relationship between A and B.

(vii) A violates (59) -- This automatically means the violation of (58). See the explanation for (vi) above.

So far in linguistics, the primary emphasis has been on the elucidation of the norm, i.e. sincere speech acts. Linguists have intentionally avoided dealing with, for example, lying, pretence and others. They have also avoided dealing with emotive aspects of language use in our linguistic research. Very little has been done in these areas, although some linguists have often suggested the necessity of studying them. (See Gregerson, 1980.)

The presentation made in this subsection is a very tentative attempt to establish a possible framework with which we can deal with some aspects of insincere speech acts. This must be done, since insincere speech acts occur frequently in language use. In written material, and especially in narrative, insincere speech acts are very important because often they make the story dramatic and interesting. Norms are what we take for granted or what we can expect, therefore, in some way they are unmarked. Of course the actual manifestations of norms may be different from culture to culture. And yet especially in stories we expect something which is extraordinary or unexpected. And it is those unexpected off-norm incidents which constitute the prominent parts of the story and move the story forward to the end.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL INTERACTION IN SPEECH ACTS

So far, our discussion has been primarily on utterances which were treated as if they are more or less isolated single speech acts. In other words, our emphasis has been on one agent, i.e. an uttering individual and his intentions in his speech acts. However, we have noticed that such key concepts in SAT as **intention**, **illocutionary act**, **perlocutionary act**, **speech act force**, etc. cannot adequately be defined without referring to the concept of '**inter-action**', or setting up a counterpart agent who can react to an utterance. Our speech act types, which we set up in Figure 11 (p.53), clearly presuppose an agent who can respond to the force of a speech act. Furthermore, our **Effect** or **Response** model (see Fig.12, p.61) is a very clear indication that any utterance is, to one degree or another, intended by the speaker to bring about some **effects** and **responses** on the part of the addressee(s). This seems to point to the fact that speech acts presuppose interactions between the interlocutors.

This chapter focuses on the concept of **social interaction** (SI) in speech acts. It is assumed that **interactions** observed among human beings by means of speech acts are considered to be **social**, since human beings possess conventionalized communication sign systems, i.e. languages, and their activities are performed in the context of a society or a culture.

3.1 The Concept of Social Interaction in Some Early Models of Linguistics

Although extensive theoretical reseach on the concept of **social interaction** (SI) is relatively recent in linguistics, as well as in philosophy of language, there are some earlier works in linguistics in which the concept of SI is clearly represented in their models.

Saussure (1959:12) suggested the following model for the process of verbal communication between two people:

```
Audition------<<<-------------------<------Phonation

  ---->           c = concept              ---->
 c     s                                  c     s
  <----           s = sound-image          <----

Phonation------>------------------>>>------Audition
```

This model clearly presents a cyclic view of communication, in which each person functions as both encoder and decoder, thus opening up the possibility of setting up an infinite number of interactions between the interlocutors. However, the model has some weaknesses: (i) it does not indicate anything about the effects or consequences which may result from an utterance on the part of the hearer; (ii) it does not account for the relationship between verbal acts and non-verbal acts; (iii) it can not explain functions of language such as expressing intention, achieving goals, etc.

Bloomfield (1933:24-27), following the behaviorist concept of **Stimulus-Response**, sets up a model which can be diagrammed as follows (adopted from Gregerson, 1980:6):

S >>>>-----------> r .... s >>>>----------> R

Practical events　　　acts of speech　　　Practical events

Jill　　S,s: stimulus　　Jack
　　　R,r: response

Bloomfield (ibid. p.26-27) says:

> As students of language, however, we are concerned precisely with the speech event (s........r), worthless in itself, but a means to great ends. We distinguish between language, the subject of our study, and real or practical events, stimuli and reactions.

This model, compared to that of Saussure, possesses a wider perspective (social context or situation) for speech phenomena. There is enough room in this model to incorporate situational or contextual factors to explain important functions of speeches. In the model, it is clearly depicted that language as a connecting link functions both as **response** and **stimulus**. One crucial question in this model is whether the concepts of **stimulus** and **response** are sufficient to explain the complicated mechanism of the human mind which relates sounds to reality (the world) in the communication process.

Malinowski (1949) and Firth (1951) are considered to be influential figures in the development of the systemic model of linguistics, the chief proponent of which is M.A.K. Halliday. They emphasize the importance of extra-linguistic factors for the understanding of languages. They contend that utterances should never be detached from the real life situations in which they are used. Therefore, for them, there is no meaning for an utterance without relating it to its context of situation. Malinowski introduced the concept of phatic communion--a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. This is a typical example in which the concept of social interaction is assumed in language use.

Thus Malinowski says (1949:333):

> Speech, as we saw, is one of the principle modes of human action, hence the author in speech, the speaker, stands to the foreground of the pragmatic vision of the world. Again, as speech is associated, with concerted behaviour, the speaker has constantly to refer to hearer or hearers. Thus, the speaker and hearer occupy, so to speak, the two principle corner-sites in the perspective of linguistic approach.

3.2 Social Interaction in Some of the Recent Theories of Language

In the following subsections, we would like to review briefly how the concept of social interaction is treated in some of the recent theories of language in linguistics, as well as in some other disciplines.

3.2.1 Tagmemic Model

Among tagmemicists, Pike and Pike (1977) are probably the first who seriously incorporated the concept of social interaction (SI) into their scheme. In their chart of paired grammatical levels (ibid. p.24), the highest paired levels are **exchange** (as a minimum unit) and **conversation** (as an expanded unit). And the grammatical meaning of these paired units is considered to be **social interaction**. Concerning this the authors say (ibid. p.21):

> Meanings are observable when a speaker and an addressee interact within a behavioral environment. It should not surprise us, therefore, to find that some of our most basic linguistic units are directly related to a situation in which one person speaks and another replies. This speaker-addressee

> **exchange** event comprises a social unit with special characteristics.

Again they say (ibid. p.25):

> Exchange and conversation both represent **verbal social interaction.** A speech by one person plus an interacting reply by another is an **exchange.** A **conversation** is the highest unit postulated for the verbal system (although it is itself included in much larger behavioral structures); it is indefinite in length with an indefinite number of exchanges, that is with numerous taking of turns seen via different speaker-addressee axes.

In addition to the grammatical hierarchy, Pike and Pike set up a third hierarchy, i.e. a referential hierarchy, which also has several levels which are related to each other in part-whole relationships. Among those levels set up for the referential hierarchy, the highest level is called, **'Performative interaction'.** This term is defined by them as follows:

> **PERFORMATIVE INTERACTION** is the referential counterpart to the grammatical **I-THOU-HERE-NOW-AXIS,** as embodied in the communication exchange GCO.1 **I say something to you.** and GÇO.2 **I hear something from you.** This is either implicit or explicit for every stream of speech (Pike & Pike 1983:66).

As seen above, Pike and Pike posit the concept of 'interaction' as the highest level constituent for both the grammatial and referential hierarchy. And they consider that "grammar is the structure of the text as it is told (or written); reference is the structure of the events in history which the stream of speech (or writing) is refering to" (Pike and Pike 1983:72).

There are a couple of noticeable problems in this scheme: (i) If the referential hierarchy is not identical with the reality itself, then we have to assume that it is an organized structure in the mind, as is the grammatical hierarchy, or a blend of the other two. In either case, the exact relationship between the two hierarchies needs to be defined. I do not think that this task is done sufficiently in tagmemics; (ii) In the referential hierarchy, it is also assumed that the part-whole relationship can be held among the levels. The referential levels posited by them are: "performative interaction, macro-event, vector, complex, event, identity, and relation" (1983:7-8). Are those levels related to each other through part-whole relationships from the lowest to the highest successively? It seems that the term 'part-whole' gives an impression that the levels are related to each other homogeneously, i.e. each level has more or less the same characteristics or features. I do not believe that those referential levels are related to each other through part-whole relationships.

Longacre (1976, 1983a) specifically deals with the concept of social interaction in what he calls **repartee**. Repartee is a notional structure for a surface structure term, dialogue. In both cases, "the distinctive feature of the relations here considered is that they involve a SEQUENCE OF SPEAKERS" (1983a:44).

3.2.2 Stratificational model

The stratificational model of linguistics has its root in Hjelmslev. Sidney M. Lamb and H. A. Gleason have been the primary developers of the theory. The material presented here is based upon Fleming (1977) and Larson (1978).

Fleming sets up a stratum called **communication situation** in addition to the other strata, which are roughly equivalent to semantics, grammar, phonology and representation (sounds or written symbols). In the communication situation stratum, such concepts as referential realm, culture, language, social setting, social relationships, communicator and audience are taken into consideration. Although she does not specifically mention the concept of social interaction here, it is clear that it is included in those concepts of the stratum of communication situation.

Larson (1978:147) presents an interesting classification of Aguaruna discourse genres, in which she singles out three parameters for distinguishing each discourse genre. They are: content, situation and purpose. It is interesting to observe that these three features are sufficent to categorize five main discourse genres which she terms NARRATIVE, PROCEDURAL, EXPOSITORY, HORTATORY and REPARTEE respectively. The concept of social interaction is clearly employed in this scheme especially in the feature of situation.

3.2.3 Systemic model

The systemic model has been developed primarily by Halliday, but its historical roots are found in B. Malinowski and J.R. Firth.

Right from the beginning of the formalization of the theory, Halliday (1961) was interested in introducing the concept of situation into his theory, as Figure 14 indicates:

Phonetics		Linguistics		
SUBSTANCE	<----->	FORM	<----->	SITUATION
Phonetic substance Graphic substance		Phonology Orthography Grammar lexis context		Extra-textual features

Figure 14: Halliday's (1961) Model

Halliday (1970), from his extensive research on clauses of English, realizes that there are three basic functions in language. They are **ideational**, **interpersonal** and **textual**. These three functions serve to relate the speaker to the real world, to establish and maintain social relation, and to provide coherence syntactically as well as situationally. Halliday (1977) has modified his previous overall linguistic model (Figure 14). He now sets up a tri-stratal model of language: **semantic**, **lexico-grammatical** and **phonological**. In the semantic stratum, the three functions of language are considered to be three functional components which are present in the use of language in every social context.

It is clear from the above description of the systemic model of linguistics that the concept of social interaction is roughly identical with the interpersonal component of semantics in that model.

3.2.4 Van Dijk model

Van Dijk (1977, 1980) distinguishes **language use** from **language systems**, and considers that the use of language is an integral part of social interaction when he says (1977:167):

> It should be added that the use of language is not only some specific act, but an integral part of SOCIAL INTERACTION. Language systems are CONVENTIONAL systems. Not only do they regulate interaction, but their categories and rules have developed under the influence of the structure of interaction in society. This FUNCTIONAL view of language, both as a system and as an historical product, in which the predominent SOCIAL role of language in interaction is stressed, is a necessary corrective to a `psychological' view of language and language use, where our competence in speaking is essentially an object for the philosophy of mind.

Van Dijk (1980) develops the notion of `macrostructure' which is a key concept in the theory of social interaction:

> Finally, macrostructures in the **theory of social interaction** are needed to account for the fact that participants plan, see, interpret, and memorize actions both locally and globally. In communicative verbal interaction, first of all, this means that we speak of **pragmatic macrostructures** to account for the **global speech act** being carried out by a sequence of speech acts. More important for a general theory of interaction, however, is the fact that various kinds of **social structure**, such as the social context and frames of interaction, rules, convention, norms, and the various categories of participants like functions or roles, may be linked to global actions and not always to individual local actions (ibid. p.10-11).

These statements made by Van Dijk place the concept of social interaction as a most basic and inclusive concept which can give linguistic research a proper perspective. Van Dijk's approach to textual analysis will be explained more in detail in a later chapter.

3.2.5 Ethnomethodological model

Some linguists of Chomskian generative transformational school engage actively in the study of conversations. This school was started by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). Esau (1981) gives a good summary of the studies done among those who represent this view. He emphasizes the importance of the study of conversations which the traditional 'competence grammar' has neglected when he says:

> During the last decade, however, more and more scholars have turned their attention away from a concern with idealized rule systems designed to generate all and only the 'grammatical' sentences of a language to a concern with real conversations used by real people in real social context (Esau 1987:9).

The concept which is considered to be the key to understand conversations is 'turn taking'. And some of the researches in this school have come to realize that the explanation of the mechanism of 'turn taking' in conversations is possible only by using the concept of intention as a basis for determining turns (Esau 1981:13). In other words, **social interaction** and **intention** are focal concepts under investigation in this school for the elucidation of communication in conversations.

3.2.6 Cognitive model

This view is represented by researchers who have their interests in psychology and artificial intelligence. The name 'cognitive science' has been used to refer to this interdisciplinary field.

Schank and Abelson (1977) have developed a **conceptual dependency theory** which is based upon such concepts as **causal chains, scripts, plans, goals** and **themes**. In other words, they argue that such theoretical entities must form the basis of human memory organization. This view of memory is called 'episodic memory' and it insists that "memory is organized around personal experiences or episodes rather than around abstract semantic categories" (ibid. p.17).

One of their concepts, themes, is defined as "other strands of background knowledge necessary to anticipate goals" (ibid. p.132). And the one important aspect of themes is social relationships. They say (ibid. p.138):

> For years we have had trouble representing relationships between people in Conceptual Dependency. The reason for this is that social relationships are themes: 'LOVE' for example is not merely a stative conceptualization, but is in essence a bundle of predictions about how one person will act towards another in various situations.

Here again the concept of social interaction is acknowledged as a crucial factor for the understanding of linguistic concepts.

3.2.7 Speech act theory (SAT) model

The initial emphasis in SAT was on one side of two communication poles, i.e., the speaker. Much foundational research has been done in this area by Austin (1962), Searle (1969), Grice (1971) and others. They were well aware of the fact that the speech acts of an agent are performed with the hearer(s) or reader(s) clearly in mind. However, they have chosen to elucidate first the mechanism of performing speech acts by the speaker (or writer), before they can legitimately go into an investigation of how the hearer or reader can react, respond or interact to the performed speech acts.

However, more recent SAT researchers[1] have shifted their research emphasis from the performer of speech acts (speech production) to the receiver or undergoer of speech acts (speech comprehension). Because of this emphasis, the concept of social interaction has emerged as one of their primary concerns.

Wunderlich (1980) accepts the basic notions of SAT expounded by Austin and Searle, but tries to expand the theory so that it can be applied profitably to speech acts sequences. He develops such notions as **turn, move, speech act pattern, complex speech unit and discourse type** in order to explain speech acts sequences. He believes that this kind of application of SAT intersects with a general theory of interaction.

Bierwisch (1980) understands SAT as "a branch of the theory of communication, viz. that involving linguistic utterances, rather than a part of the theory of language" (ibid. p.3). This means that for him SAT interconnects a domain of language use based on the rules and structures of language and a domain of communication based on its own principles, rules, and structures. He believes that the domain of communication belongs to the 'more inclusive area of social interaction'. To him, communication (whether verbal or non-verbal) can be possible only when the system of social interaction (SI) is available to a communicator. This specifies "what types of structure are possible interactional settings and communicative senses, and what types of rules are involved in generating them and relating them to meaningful activities" (ibid. p.7). Therefore, he concludes that the task of SAT is to determine exactly the conditions and rules which belong to the system of social interaction. He does not think that we have a sufficient theory of the system of SI at present.

Motsch (1980) sets out to develop "a theoretical frame which allows a more exact investigation of the dependence between language and social interaction" (ibid. p.156). He assumes that an adequate description of speech acts can only be possible by grasping concrete social situations in which those speech acts are embedded. In order to understand the concept of SI, he posits three important concepts; **situational meaning** of an utterance u of language L, (SM(u)); **language meaning** of an utterance, (LM(u)); and **Information** on properties of the situational context (SC), relevant to the interpretation of u in SC, (I(SC(u))). He then assumes that SM(u) is constituted by LM(u) and contextual information, I(SC(u)). Then he claims that a "theory of symbolic interaction" provides a thoretical basis for the description of possible I(SC(u)) and the specification of the relationship between LM(u) and I(SC(u)) both of which constitute SM(u). It is clear in the scheme of Motsch that a clear understanding of the concept of SI is considered to be a necessary step for a deeper understanding of the relationship between linguistic information and extra-linguistic information.

Sadock (1978), Werth (1981), Wilson & Sperber (1981, 1982),and Joshi (1982) all deal with the problem of comprehension in the context of (social) interaction between the speaker and the hearer, although they do not specifically mention the concept of SI. Most of them are expanding, reexamining or revising the theory first propounded by Grice (1975), i.e. maxims of cooperative principle and conversational implicature.

Although not mentioned in the preceding subsections, there are other linguists[2] and philosophers[3] who consider that the concept of SI is necessary to explain verbal communication activities.

3.3 Social Interaction in the Proposed Model

In the proposed model, the concept of SI is considered as one of the most basic concepts. Although our primary focus in the preceding chapter was on **intention**, it is apparent that in many instances the concept of SI is taken for granted.

For example, in subsection 2.2, where we examined the definition of meaning proposed by Grice, we basically agreed with his definition that incorporates the concept of 'effect', which is intended to be brought about on the part of the hearer(s) by the speaker through utterances. In other words, here we can clearly see that the speaker and the hearer are engaging in social interaction using socially shared means, i.e. language.

In subsection 2.4 (Intention in a Proposed Model), we defined 'speech act force' as consisting of two basic components as a vector, i.e. 'illocutionary intent' and 'perlocutionary intent'. Illocutionary intent is understood as possessing intentionality which designates the origin of speech act force -- which is a mental state such as belief, desire, want, sorrow, etc. On the other hand, perlocutionary intent is understood as possessing intentionality which directs speech act force to its destination, i.e. the hearer(s), or addressee(s). This part of the theory is the core of the proposed model. And it is clear that, as in the definition of meaning by Grice, speaker-hearer or writer-addressee(s) interaction is assumed in the concepts of illocutionary intent and perlocutionary intent. In 2.4, I also tried to resolve some of the lingering theoretical problems in SAT concerning the concept of 'effect' or 'consequence'. I suggested that three distinct steps are necessary for the hearer to be able to make a verbal or non-verbal response to the speech acts performed by the speaker. These three steps are EFFECT, RESPONSE IN DECISION, and RESPONSE IN ACTION (see Figure 12, page 61). I will not repeat the discussion here, but it is apparent that, especially in this part of the theory, the concept of SI is clearly manifested.

In subsections 2.5 and 2.6, the model proposed was tested briefly to see whether or not it is adequate to explain indirect speech acts or insincere speech acts. The results have shown that the model is adequate for those speech act types. Throughout the previous discussion the concept of SI is assumed as a matter of course.

Accordingly, in this section, we will focus our attention on the concept of SI in the proposed model, examining it from various perspectives. We will look at it in relation to other key concepts in the model, i.e. speech act, intention, and comprehension (or understanding).

3.3.1 Social interaction and speech act

It is essential to understand that the process of uttering or writing words or sentences is the process of performing acts on the part of the speaker or the writer. This basic insight, which was extensively investigated by Austin (1962), has provided the starting point for SAT, as stated earlier. But it is significant to find many quotations in the work of Malinowski which show that he pointed out, even before Austin, that verbal phenomena should be understood as "modes of human action" (1949:333). It is this understanding that we are doing something to others by uttering linguistic sounds, which makes social interaction through language possible among human beings.

In fact, it is difficult to think of any social interaction situation in which speech acts are not involved. Our every encounter with people in the course of our life almost always involves interaction using language. Most of the communication media rely on language. Telephone, radio, television, movie, tape recorder, etc. utilize sound symbols as their means of communication. Books, signs, monuments, documents, notes, etc. utilize orthographic symbols for communication. In addition there are some communication media which utilize both means mentioned above. Thus considered, it is not too much to say that in our daily social life, speech acts play a central role in our interactions with each other.

Another important feature of speech acts is that they are essentially social. What I mean by 'social' is that speech acts are performed among a group of people (a society) as an **interpersonal** means of communication. In other words, linguistic signs of a particular language are the commonly shared possession of a society where the language is used. Since human interactions are usually performed by means of language which is basically social, we call such interactions **social** interactions.

Scott and Powers (1978), specialists in communication theory, point out that communication by means of language is a basic and essential need for human beings as well as a means to satisfy human needs when they say (ibid. p.20):

> What has communication got to do with human needs? The answer is everything. Human communication and human needs are inextricably tied to each other. Not only is human communication a need as basic and as essential to a person's psychological development and well-being as any of the needs previously discussed but also it is the very means by which human needs are identified and satisfied.

3.3.2 Social interaction and intention

In this dissertation, terms such as **intention**, **intent**, and **intentionality** are used to refer to that general property or capacity of the mind to relate a certain mental state to a segment of reality which is focused on and which is usually represented by propositions in speech acts. Therefore, when we say 'illocutionay **intent**', the word 'intent' can be replaced by '**intention**' or the whole phrase can be paraphrased as 'illocutionary act is **intentional**' or 'illocutionary act has **intentionality**'. It is important, however, that this usage should not be confused with the usage of **intent** or **intention** as a kind of specific mental state, as in commissives, i.e. intent or intention on the part of the speaker to commit himself to a future action. Intention or intent in the former sense is the primary concern in this study.

Searle (1983:1) defines intentionality as "that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the worlds". This means, for example, if I have a mental state called belief, this belief of mine needs to be about something. Or if I have a mental state called desire, this desire of mine also needs to be directed at something or someone. This definition of intentionality is accepted in this study. As discussed in chapter one, speech acts are intentional or have intentionality. Is this property of intentionality in speech acts related to our present topic, i.e. social interaction? The answer is affirmative. In the following, I would like to demonstrate that intentionality is the essential property of the speaker or the writer which makes social interactions possible.

In Figure 7 (p.34), we posited four kinds of intent (or intentionality), i.e. utterance intent, propositional intent, illocutionary intent, and perlocutionary intent. These four kinds of intentionality correspond to four kinds of speech act-tokens as indicated in the figure. Therefore, the theoretical distinction made between act-type and act-token in the proposed model (see the discussion in 1.2.1) can be applied also to the realm of intentionality, since act and intentionality always form a composite which can not be separated in reality. Thus, it is theoretically possible to make a distinction between intent-token and intent-type. This means that, in uttering a stretch of sounds for communication, the speaker is performing a speech act-type based upon essentially one intent-type which consists of four intent-tokens.

For example, if I say, 'I am writing a dissertation' in a context of communication, I have performed four act-tokens with four intent-tokens. In other words, in uttering the above sentence, I have performed the four following act-tokens: I moved my lips and tongue to produce some sounds of my language; I appealed to the commonly shared knowledge of my language (grammar and lexicon) to refer to specific things ('I' meaning 'Takashi Manabe, the speaker'; 'a dissertation') and an event ('am writing') and relations; I expressed my belief that 'I am writing a dissertation'; I asked my hearer(s) to accept my belief.

Here I would like to add two more elements to the four original intent-tokens, viz. superimposed illocutionary intent (SII) and superimposed perlocutionary intent (SPI). Concerning these concepts, there is an extended discussion in 2.5 (Intention in Indirect Speech Act) with the conclusion that the positing of such intent-tokens is necessary for explaining various kinds of indirect speech acts such as idiomatic expressions, hyperbole, irony, etc. Therefore, Figure 15 gives a more complete picture of various act-tokens and intent-tokens of speech act:

		(SPEAKER'S SIDE) ⟹	(HEARER'S SIDE)
Superimposed perlocutionary act etc.		Superimposed perlocutionary intent (SPI) (SII) (SProI) (SUI)	Superimposed perlocutionary effect (SPE) (SIE) (SProE) (SUE)
↓		↓	↓
perlocutionary act	2 or 3	perlocutionary intent (PI)	perlocutionary effect (PE)
illocutionary act	2	illocutionary intent(II)	illocutionary effect(IE)
propositional act	2	propositional intent (ProI)	propositional effect (ProE)
utterance act		utterance intent(UI)	utterance effect(UE)

wall of ego-ego

Figure 15: <u>Kinds of Intention in Speech Acts</u> (modified version of Figure 7)

It is important to note the SII and SPI are not necessary components for every speech act-type. They are primarily employed when necessary for such speech acts as indirect speech acts, metaphors, etc. Whenever they are used, they will play a more important role in communication than the original II and PI. We have demonstrated the feasibility of the above claim in the earlier discussion (see the discussion on superimposed perlocutionary intent on pp.77-81, 87-93).

Before I answer my original question of how intentionality is related to social interaction, I would like to mention the concept of **double intentionality** in speech acts. It may be theoretically possible for us to posit a fourfold or sixfold layer of intentionality rather than double intentionality, simply because the number of intent-tokens posited in speech acts warrants it. However, it seems possible to categorize these intent-tokens into two main types of intentionality, viz. representation intent and communication intent. Searle (1983) discusses these concepts quite extensively in their relation to the concept of meaning. For example, he says (ibid. p.165):

> We need to have a clear distinction between representation and communication. Characteristically a man who makes a statement both intends to represent some fact or state of affairs and intends to communicate this representaton to his hearers. But his representing intention is not the same as his communication intention. Communicating is a matter of producing certain effects on one's hearers, but one can intend to represent something without caring at all about the effects on one's hearers.

This is a very significant insight. It seems to me that if it is possible to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics, the distinction which Searle makes between representation and communication gives a crucial theoretical basis for such a distincton. In other words, it is possible to understand semantics as the study of representation and pragmatics as the study of communication. Although I do not want to go into a more extended discussion about this topic right now, my conclusion is that representation intent (RI) is comprised of utterance intent-token and propositional intent-token, and communication intent (CI) is comprised of illocutionary intent-token and perlocutionary intent-token. In some cases these RI and CI have their superimposed counterparts. This theoretical conclusion can be summarized in the following way:

	(Superimposed speech acts) ↓
CI	Perlocutionary Intent (PI)
	Illocutionary Intent (II)
RI	Propositional Intent (ProI)
	Utterance Intent (UT)

Figure 16: Representation Intent (RI) and Communication Intent (CI)

How is intentionality (illustrated in Figure 15 and 16) related to the concept of social interaction? The discussion so far seems to indicate clearly that social interaction is what is designed as the function of language. What then is the point of RI? In order to represent, we have to produce a stretch of sounds which are conventionally regulated by the phonology and grammar of a specific language. The principles or rules in its phonology and grammar are conventions, i.e. the mutually agreed upon items of the people living in a society where the language is spoken. Therefore, the fact that the people often intend to represent something using their mutually agreed upon system (their language) indicates implicitly that this intentional act of representation has interpersonal purposes, which is a prerequisite for social interactions.

What about CI and social interaction? In this case, the relationship between the two concepts is more direct than the case of RI. CI means that the user (the speaker or the writer) of the language intends to communicate what is represented to his hearer(s) or addresse(s). As Searle points out in the above quotation, in CI the speaker intends to bring about a certain effect on the part of the hearer by expressing his mental state about a certain proposition and asking his hearer to accept it and do something. In this way, there seems to be no question about the claim that CI is a necessary condition for verbal social interactions.

As shown in the discussion so far, intentionality and social interaction are deeply related to each other. Intentionality in language use presupposes subsequent social interaction. Verbal communication without social interaction is inconceivable. This means that RI and CI exist under the social interactive poles of the speaker and the hearer(s).

3.3.3 Social interaction and comprehension

In the preceding subsection we have discussed the fact that the speaker's intentionality is a prerequisite for the initiation of social interaction. In this subsection we would like to examine the relationship between social interaction and comprehension in the proposed model.

What is meant by 'comprehension'? In our model it means the process of the hearer (or the reader) recognizing all the intent-tokens of the speech acts performed by the speaker and understanding them in terms of their intentional states and contexts. If we use the broader categories for those intent-tokens, i.e. RI and CI, we can say that the process of comprehension involves the recognition and understanding of RI and CI. I would like to use this latter definition in the following discussion in order to avoid unnecessary complication in describing each intent-token.

In Figure 12 (p.61), we posited four levels (or layers) of effect which correspond to the four levels of intent-tokens. These four levels of effect are: understanding effect (UnE), misunderstanding effect (ME), partial-understanding effect (PUE), and no-understanding effect (NUE). The definitions of these four kinds of effect are given in pages 57-58. They roughly represent the four degrees of comprehension. It is possible to represent these four by the following formula, although the decision between ME and PUE is questionable as indicated in the formula:

(65) UnE > ME > PUE >NUE
(?)

The hearer (or the reader) usually tries to do his best to get at UnE in his process of comprehension, though often he cannot achieve this; that is, he may end up with ME, PUE or NUE. In the latter cases, however, the hearer can choose to ask questions or do other appropriate things to arrive at UnE. As Figure 12 indicates, the hearer can make a responsible decision or action only when the process of comprehension (effect) is finished. The flow of these stages of comprehension and response can be indicated as in Figure 17:



Figure 17: Flow-Diagram of Comprehension and Responses

Although Figure 17 does not present any new ideas or insights beyond what has already been presented in Figure 12, it does illustrate two things: (1) The stage of EFFECT or COMPREHENSION is a pivotal step for the stage of RESPONSE; therefore, (2) Social interactions between Person A and Person B through speech acts cannot be carried out without COMPREHENSION. Thus Figure 16 seems to give an answer to the question of how comprehension is related to social interaction. This is our conclusion: Comprehension is a prerequisite for social interaction, as is intentionality. Therefore, without comprehension there is no social interaction.

3.3.4 Social interaction in Motsch's model compared to the proposed model

It seems appropriate to end this subsection by introducing the work of one recent speech act theorist who touches on such concepts as intention, social interaction, and comprehension and by comparing it with my proposed model. I have chosen an article by Wolfgang Motsch[4], "Situational context and illocutionary force", published in 1980.

What Motsch has done seems relevant to what I have presented, because he, too, clearly sees the significant relationship between intention and social interaction.

Motsch sets out to develop "a theoretical frame which allows a more exact investigation of the dependence between language and social interaction" (ibid. p.156). He assumes that an adequate description of speech acts is possible only by grasping concrete social situations in which those speech acts are embedded. Furthermore, he says that "the social nature of speech acts can only be grasped if at least a sketch of a theory of human social activity is available" (ibid. p.156).

Motsch presents three important concepts: **situational meaning** of an utterance u of language L, (SM(U)); **language meaning** of an utterance, (LM(U)); **information** on properties of the **situational context** (SC) relevant to the interpretation (or comprehension) of u in SC, (I(SC(u))). He assumes that SM(u) is constituted by LM(u) and I(SC(u)), which is contextual information. And he claims that a "theory of symbolic interaction" (ibid. p.158) provides a theoretical basis for the description of possible I(SC(U)) and the specification of the relationship between LM(U) and and I(SC(U) both of which constitute SM(U). This is a significant statement. He claims that **intention** produces a communicative situation in which social interactions take place. In other words, he is saying that without **intention** there is no interaction, therefore, no situational meaning.

Before Motsch presents some components which comprises I(SC(u)), he delimits the domain of his investigation to that of an "ideal condition", which assumes that both the speaker and the hearer act in a rational manner and do not make any errors in the assessments (in our terms, **effect** or **comprehension**) of one's mental state. Granted this kind of ideal situation (in our term UnE in Figure 12), I(SC(u)) can be described in terms of a **structured attitude** or a "configuration of attitudes". Motsch (ibid. p.159-161) gives the following four kinds of **attitude** which are the components of a configuration of attitudes:

(a) **Motivational attitudes** --- represent the **desirability** of the speaker regarding an action or state. This desirability can be described in two directional (positive and negative) scales in terms of a degree of desire.

(b) **Epistemic and doxastic attitudes** --- represent the speaker's degree of knowledge regarding the hearer's mental state. This degree of knowledge can be described by such verbs as **know, assume, conjecture, guess, believe, be convinced** or **doubt** depending on the degree of certainty.

(c) **Intentional attitudes** --- represent the decisions made on the part of the hearer concerning a desired (or undesired) action or state.

(d) **Normative attitudes** --- represent the speaker's irresistible inclinations to refer to **social norms, maxims** or **conventions** etc. in his decisions for a certain action. Of course, they can be intentionally violated byy the speaker.

Motsch, then, shows how these four components of I(SC(u)) can be represented in formulas for **future actions of the hearer** and **future actions of the speaker**. He presents many formulas for both categories by setting up various possible situations in which the speaker and the hearer(s) interact. The following two examples demonstrate the kinds of formulas he uses to represent I(SC(u)):

(a) **Future actions of the hearer** (ibid. p.163-64)

(i) P_1 DESIRE (P_2INTEND A);

(ii) P_1 INTEND SA_i, where $S(SA_i)=P_2$ INTEND A;

(iii) P_1 -DEMANDa(P_2)vP_1 -DEMAND-a(P_2);

(iv) P_1 DESIRE A;

(v) P_1 ASSUME (P_2 DESIRE A).

The above formulas need to be interpreted as:

"The speaker (P_1) wants the hearer (P_2) to perform A (action). He assumes that the hearer wants A as well. The speaker cannot command A. In this case he will request the hearer to do A."

(b) **Future actions of the speaker** (ibid. p.164-65)

(i) P_1 DESIRE (P_2 KNOW (P_1 INTEND A));

(ii) P_1 INTEND SA_j, where $S(SA_j)=P_2$ KNOW (P_1 INTEND A);

(iii) P_1 ASSUME (P_2 DEMANDa(P_1));

(iv) P_1 DESIRE A;

(v) P_1 ASSUME (P_2 DESIRE A)

The above formulas need to be interpreted as:

"The speaker (P_1) intends an action (A) and he wants the hearer(P_2) to know that he plans that action. The speaker assumes that A is commanded by the hearer. He has a positive motivation for A. In this situation the speaker will inform the hearer that he accepts the commitments commanded in that situation or that he agrees to accomplish what the hearer expects."

The comparison of what Motsch presents above with the proposed model in the areas of social interaction, intention, comprehension, reveals some significant facts. Here are some of them:

(a) Both Motsch and the proposed model consider that the concept of social interaction in performing speech acts gives a sufficient framework in which speech acts can be described more accurately and realistically.

(b) Both models admit that speaker's intention (or intentionality) determines the overall intended situational meaning of an utterance which consists of linguistic meaning (proposition act or intent in the proposed model) and the situational information of a context (illocutionary act and perlocutionary act in the proposed model). This means that social interaction becomes possible because of the intentionality of the speaker.

(c) Both models consider that comprehension (Motsch uses the term assessment for this) is a necessary process for the speaker and the hearer to have a successful communication, i.e. meaningful social interaction.

(d) Motsch thinks that for comprehension the understanding of the situational information of a speech act context is crucial, and he tries to describe this complex situational information by establishing a concept of structured attitude or configuration of attitudes which is explained by some formulas as shown in the above examples.

In section 2.2 (Intention and Meaning), it was pointed out that "to develop a theory of 'context' or 'situation'" (p.31) is necessary to make the definition of meaning by Grice more acceptable and therefore, more useful. This means what Motsch has done is a step toward accomplishing this goal of developing an adequate theory of 'context'.

The study of 'context' pointed out in (d) above is one area which we have not yet sufficiently dealt with so far. As mentioned many times earlier, the understanding of a context in which speech acts are performed by the speaker is the most important factor in the process of comprehension (or interpretation) of that speech act on the part of the hearer. So it is necessary to investigate the 'context' of the speaker and the hearer in order to understand how the speaker assesses available contextual information and incorporates it into the production of his utterances as well as how the speaker utilizes the similar information for his comprehension or interpretation of those utterances. This conviction of mine leads to an investigation of 'context' or 'situation' in the following chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

[1]Some of the researchers introduced here may not strictly be called speech act theorists. It seems to be a general tendency in recent years that those linguists whose research areas deal with the mechanisms of generation and comprehension of streams of speech acts tend to be interdisciplinary in their approach. In some way, this is an unavoidable situation, since linguistics, psychology, sociology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and other related disciplines need to merge into one for the common purpose of elucidating a theory of communication by means of language.

[2]For example, Watts (1981), in laying his theoretical foundation for text analysis, presents his basic concept of communicative acts as a "complex relationship between linguistic, linguistic-social and non-linguistic constituents in a communicative situation" (ibid. p.3), which "can only be carried out by at least two partners." (p.3). De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) introduce some important notions for text linguistics, such as 'coherence', 'intentionality', 'acceptability', etc., and admit that without having the concept of SI in a model no adequate explanation is possible for any speech acts, when they say, "There can be no doubt that real communicative behaviour can be explained only if language is modelled as an interactive system" (ibid. p.33).

[3]Some philosophers who consider themselves 'phenomenologists', or successors of a German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) think that an **interactive** model is necessary to explain the phenomena of linguistic meaning. For example, Langsdorf (1980) stresses that, not only in actual face to face dialogue with others, but also in monologue or thought, we should set up "a **multiplicity of subjects** functioning as a community" (ibid. p.108). In other words, the understanding of linguistic meaning only in terms of a single subject (speaker, writer, etc.) is not sufficient; rather, interactive partners have to be set up to understand the meaning of utterances. **Intention** is also important in her scheme, since she understands discourse, "as the fundamental intentional activity within which (linguistic) meaning and reference may be described" (p.108).

[4]There is a brief discussion on Motsch in this chapter. See 3.2.7.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPREHENSION PROCESS IN SOCIAL INTERACTION

In the preceding section, the concept of social interaction and its relationships with other concepts such as speech acts, intention and comprehension was examined. And we have concluded that social interactions in speech acts are possible on the basis of the speaker's intentionality in speech acts and the hearer's comprehension. Since we have not paid much attention to comprehension, this chapter will further investigate this concept.

'Comprehension' is defined in our model as the first stage (or step) of the hearer (or addressee) in having a social interaction with the speaker (or writer). We have called this stage 'the stage of EFFECT or COMPREHENSION' (see Figure 17). In other words, comprehension in speech acts is the process in which the hearer will grasp what the speaker has intended to represent and communicate in his speech acts (see Figure 16). It seems that the term 'EFFECT' has a connotation of 'passiveness' or even 'inanimateness' in it. I think this is because of the unbalanced emphasis in the theory on the part of the speaker rather than the hearer. From the speaker's perspective, he is interested in bringing about some 'effect' or 'consequences' in his hearer(s) through speech acts activities. In a sense, from this speaker-emphasized perspective, theorists may tend to regard the hearer(s) as 'thing(s)'. On the other hand, the term COMPREHENSION does not have such a connotation and refers instead to 'activeness' and 'animateness'. The latter term seems to reflect the reality better than the former, since the hearer is not a thing but a person with his own mind and volition. Because of this, we will use the term 'comprehension' rather than 'effect' in the following discussion.

It is interesting to note that in recent linguistics, philosophy of language and other language related discussions there has been a tendency to de-emphasize the speaker's perspective (represented by terms like 'linguistic competence', 'generation', etc.) and to emphasize more and more the hearer and his ability to comprehend. For example, Prince (1982:103) says:

> In recent years, the study of literature in general and narrative in particular has been shifting from a concern with the author or with the text to a concern with the reader. Instead of establishing the meaning of a given text in terms of an author's intentions or a set of textual patterns, for instance, students of literature have focused more and more frequently on the ways in which readers, armed with expectations and interpretive conventions, structure a text and give it meaning. Ideal readers, virtual readers, implied readers, informed readers, competent readers, experienced readers, super-readers, archreaders, average readers, and plain old readers now abound in literary criticism and we seem to have entered an age in which the writer, the writing and the written are less important than the read, the reading and the reader.

The similar attitude seems to be reflected in what Green and Morgan (1981:167) say:

> Our main point is that most of the work of accounting for discourse comprehension is to be done not by a linguistic theory of discourse, but by a general theory of common-sense inference, plus certain kinds of language-related knowledge distinct from linguistic competence as presently conceived. The thrust of our program is not to replace the standard view of linguistic competence, nor to subsume it under some more general set of abilities; rather, it is to suggest that the role of linguistic competence in discourse comprehension is smaller than one might suppose.

Considering the nature of comprehension as an active conscious activity on the part of the hearer, we may be able to posit a type of act here. I believe this hypothesis may be a fruitful one, since intentionality is considered to be involved in 'seeing' (a kind of perception) as well as in 'remembering' as Searle[1] claims. It is also true that we are, in a sense, using our perception in comprehension. We use our eyes to look at the various facial expressions and body movements of the speaker as well as to look at written symbols. Our ears hear the sounds which come from the mouth of the speaker. Therefore, following Searle, we may claim that, since we are using our perception in our comprehension, comprehension is intentional. Remembering is also used in comprehension, because it is necessary for us to draw some information (linguistic, encyclopedic, etc.) from our memory system. Inference which is used in comprehension is considered by many to be a kind of mental act. All these observations seem to indicate that it is possible to consider comprehension as a type of action. However, for some reason, there have been hardly any arguments for this kind of approach. The reason for this silence seems to be a deeply rooted common belief that the comprehension process is something which is not under conscious control[2]. I personally believe that there is more weight of evidence for taking the former view. However, the whole matter needs to be investigated from various angles before accepting a view which is contrary to common belief. An investigation of this kind seems to be beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, in the following, we simply assume that comprehension is a kind of mental activity which is somewhat different from speech acts or other human actions.

In this chapter, we want to first discuss the information which is available to an interpreter (one who comprehends) for comprehension. We would like to know what kinds of information the interpreter can use and to categorize them according to their roles in the comprehension process. Secondly, we would like to examine the role of inference in comprehension. Lastly, we would like to evaluate some of the most recent endeavors to explain the comprehension process and to then present our own view, based on our proposed model.

4.1 Kinds of Contextual Information Available for Comprehension

Before we can explicate the process of comprehension adequately, it is necessary to know what kinds of contextual information are available in comprehension for the interpreter, since the comprehension process involves utilizing some contextual information. It seems that the amount of information derivable is vast and varied. However, in the process of comprehending an utterance we do not need every bit of derivable contextual information. We recognize that we are operating with a limited number of selected items of information for comprehension. Thus, we can agree with Sperber and Wilson (1982:65) that "using the context in comprehension involves retrieving specific items of information."

In the following discussion we make a list of the various types of contextual information which can be derived in the standard face-to-face communication between the speaker A and the hearer B. What the interpreter B has as knowledge stored in his memory system is vast, ranging from various conventions of the society (including linguistic knowledge), various know-hows for social living, some general knowledge about the laws of nature, and mathematics; and extending to particular experiential knowledge about himself, his family, his friends, the organizations to which he belongs, his country, and so on. However, when B tries to comprehend A's utterances, only a small portion of the total knowledge possessed by B is used as relevant information for his comprehension of the utterance. There are three main factors[3] which trigger the mind of B to retrieve relevant information from his memory system, namely, identification of physical environments, identification of his interlocutor (in this case A), and identification of linguistic forms. These three factors are, as it were, three threshholds through which the interpreter simultaneously retrieves necessary information for the comprehension of a specific utterance. In the following, each of these three threshholds is discussed in more detail.

4.1.1 Contextual information through the identification of physical environments

In the communication situation between A and B, where A is the utterer and B is the interpreter, there are many kinds of physical environments conceivable in reality. Each person, since birth, has been in a certain 'location' at any time, whether it is in his house, at his school, at his company, in the hospital which he visits, in the park where he jogs, or on the road to a store, etc. We can even divide the space of a house into several distinct spaces such as living room, kitchen, bedrooms, bathroom, etc. This means that each person has his own specific 'location' hierarchy stored in his memory system with appropriate behavior and specific past experiences attached to various levels of the hierarchy. A and B, each having his own location hierarchy, meet each other on a specific location and time and engage in a communication as part of their social interaction.

It is possible to set up two kinds of physical environment in which A and B can engage in a communication endeavor, that is, face-to-face environment and non-face-to-face environment.

By 'face-to-face', we mean that A and B share approximately the same visual awareness of their environment, although there is always at least a slight difference between what A can observe and what B can observe. For example, suppose A and B are sitting in a cafeteria where A is facing towards the entrance door of the cafeteria whereas B is not. A may be able to observe someone who has just entered the cafeteria while B is not aware of it. In this case, B is not sharing that particular part of the environment of which A is aware. Unless this piece of information which A has is relevant to their communication, we may neglect this kind of one-sided visual information. Granted that there is this sort of difference, we can still say that in the face-to-face environment, A and B share approximately the same visual awareness of the environment. This means that in the cafeteria case, A and B have a similar visual awareness of the table at which they sit, the things on the table, the general arrangement of the furniture in the cafeteria, the people eating in the cafeteria, the movements of the waitresses, etc.

However, there is more than visual awareness of the environment.

Both A and B also usually have what may be called 'functional' awareness of the environment, in addition to their visual awareness. 'Functional awareness' refers to information which is retrievable at the conscious level regarding the functions or roles of the particular items in the environment, or the functional relationships among those items. For example, (again, in the cafeteria example), both A and B know the functions of the salt shaker, the pepper shaker, the napkin dispenser, etc. which are on the table. In this area of functional awareness of the environment, often there are many differences between the interlocutors. For example, if A is the owner of the cafeteria and if B is a foreigner who does not know too much about the system of cafeterias, there is a big difference in the degree of functional awareness between A and B. In any case, when B comprehends (or interprets) A's utterance, B is ready to use any information available from his visual and functional awareness of the physical environment.

By 'non-face-to-face environment', we mean the communication environment in which interlocutors A and B cannot see each other, since they are in separate locations. In this case, although each of the interlocutors can have visual awareness of his own environment, there is no overlapping between what A can see and what B can see. However, it is possible for them to imagine each other's environment if necessary. The amount of information retrievable in this case is dependent upon how well one knows, from past experience, his interlocutor's environment. In the case of a telephone conversation between A and B in which B has not the slightest idea where A is, except that A is in a telephone booth somewhere, there is no way B can have some information about A's environment unless A tells where he is or explain some of the items in his environment. In this way, in a non-face-to-face environment, some direct or immediate sharing between A and B in visual awareness as well as in functional awareness is lacking, compared to the face-to-face environment. This factor seems to affect A's utterances and the way B interprets them.

4.1.2 Contextual information through the identification of one's interlocutor

This aspect of contextual information through one's interlocutor cannot be separated from the contextual information through environment, because an interlocutor must exist somewhere and thus he constitutes a significant part of the environment. The reason why we deal with this aspect of contextual information separately is because of its relative importance in the process of comprehension. In this case also, it is possible to divide up the possible environments in which the interlocutors interact into two types, i.e., 'face-to-face environment' and 'non-face-to-face environment'.

In a face-to-face environment in which A utters something to B, the interpreter B is visually aware of A's existence. He observes various things about A, from how A has dressed or combed his hair, etc. to his facial countenance and body movements. But at the same time, B can have some functional awareness of A, i.e. how A is related functionally to himself (B), to the environment and to the communication situation. All of this information can be used by B for his comprehension of A's utterance.

Tubbs and Moss (1974:148-155), for example, list five areas of visual observation usually made by the interpreter in face-to-face verbal communication situations. They are, Facial Expression, Eye Contact, Body Movements, Hand Gestures and Physical Appearance. In every language group, many of the specific items under these five categories are culturally bound cues which have their corresponding evaluative (or interpretive) meanings, although there are some items which seem to be universally present. All these kinds of information are usually available for the comprehension of an utterance.

A good example of the kinds of 'functional awareness' which an interpreter can have about his interlocutor can be noted in an article written by Green and Morgan (1981). The kinds of information the interlocutors utilize in communication includes the following (ibid. p.180):

> The knowledge of one's interlocutor that is required includes not only the same kinds of knowledge that the speaker has about OTHER individuals, kinship ties, and the like, but also estimates of her knowledge of the world, including what she can observe at the time of the speech act, and her relevant beliefs. It also includes beliefs about her view of her role in the ongoing conversation, her model of the speaker's model of the world, and beliefs about her goals and plans for the ongoing discourse. Finally, it includes beliefs about the likelihood of her having correctly interpreted acts of the speaker earlier in the discourse.

Some of their observations seem to be better categorized as belonging to the information concerning physical environment (discussed above in 4.1.1), or as belonging to the information concerning the utterance (which will be discussed in the following subsection). Sometimes, it is difficult to classify some items of information as belonging neatly to one of the three categories of information under discussion. This is because in speech acts what is uttered usually reflects some aspect of the abilities and mental states of the speaker as well as the environment in which a communication is taking place. Therefore, it should be understood that the three categories of information set up in our discussion are not something absolute.

In a non-face-to-face environment, the information the interpreter can gather through the identification of his interlocutor is less direct in the area of visual awareness, compared to the case of a 'face-to-face environment'. For example, in a telephone conversation between A and B, there is no way B can visually observe A's facial expressions or body movements. What B can rely on in his comprehension is A's voice quality and various kinds of his own knowledge about A stored in his memory system. We will discuss the matter of information which is retrievable from voice quality and written style in the next subsection.

4.1.3 Contextual information through the identification of linguistic forms

The contextual information which we deal with in this subsection is crucially important for the accurate interpretation of any 'verbal' communication situation where the interpreter cannot rely on the information retrievable from the direct observation of the communicator.

There are two main ways[4] by which linguistic forms can be represented concretely, i.e. oral representation or orthographic (or written) representation. To this, if we add another set of parameters, namely, 'face-to-face environment' vs. 'non-face-to-face environment', we can set up four communication situations in which linguistic forms can be identified as follows:

	Oral Representation	Orthographic Representation
Face-to-Face	ex. conversations, debates, etc.	ex. communication through handwriting between people who cannot speak
Non-Face-to-Face	ex. telephone conversations, radio conversations, recorded message, etc.	ex. books, letters, newspapers, etc.

Figure 18: Four Categories of Communication Situation

As far as the column of oral representation is concerned, it is not difficult to find specific examples of communication forms for both rows of 'Face-to-Face' and 'Non-Face-to-Face'. For the 'Orthographic Representation' column, however, it seems to be extremely difficult to find specific communication forms for the row of 'Face-to-Face', whereas, to do the same for the row of 'Non-Face-to-Face' is very easy. This observation seems to suggest that oral representation arises prior to orthographic representation, the primary purpose of which may be to serve for non-face-to-face communication situations. The fact that the invention of orthographic symbols has been found always to be historically subsequent to the establishment of oral language also supports this claim. The difference between oral and orthographic (or written) representation will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter. In this subsection, we would like to note specifically what kinds of contextual information the interpreter can obtain through the identification of linguistic forms. We would like to follow the categories set up in Figure 18 for this purpose.

As far as 'Oral Representation' is concerned, following our model of speech acts, I will now discuss three areas: **utterance, proposition,** and **communication.**

Information through identification at utterance level --In 'utterance' level identification what kinds of contextual information are available for the interpreter? In linguistics, we deal with this level in phonetics and phonology. Therefore, the question can be paraphrased as: 'What kinds of information can the interpreter retrieve from the phonetic or phonological features of the utterence'.

Tubbs and Moss (1974:156-161) list four specific areas of oral representation where the interpreter intuitively gathers relevant information for comprehension. They are **volume, rate and fluency, pitch,** and **quality.** Usually features in these areas provide cues for the interpreter's understanding of the utterer's mental state. For example, a louder voice tends to express aggressiveness in many languages, and frequent pauses when answering a controversial question tends to expose lack of credence in what is said. Pike & Pike (1983:74-103) hold that such semantic features as **social relevance, impact, tension, after-thought, anticipation, climax, involvement, finality, attention, focus, attitude,** etc. are indicated by the phonology of a language, which includes **intonation, pause, rime, voice quality, pitch, stress,** etc. I will not go into a detailed discussion of these terms, or of theoretically relating semantic features to phonological features. I believe this is the task of phonology and much work is necessary in this area. Phonological theory in linguistics has been primarily based upon either structural phonemics or distinctive features (or generative phonology). In either case, little work has been done in explicating the process of how phonetic features are interconnected with the semantic and pragmatic features pointed out above. However, our common sense tells us that native speakers of a language rely on some information obtainable from the phonetic and phonological features of their language.

The difference between 'Face-to-Face' situations and 'Non-Face-to-Face' situations in oral representation is quite obvious. In both cases, the information obtainable from hearing utterances is about the same. The difference between the two lies in the fact that in the former case the interpreter can have extra information through his visual observation of his interlocutor, whereas in the later case this is not possible.

<u>Information through identification at proposition level</u> -- In the identification of utterance at 'proposition' level in oral representation, what kinds of information can the interpreter obtain? There seem to be five main areas from which relevant information can be retrieved for comprehension. They are **sense**, **reference**, **grammar**, **rhetoric**, and **presupposition**. In the following, I will briefly explain what information is available in these areas. Such information is crucial for the comprehension of any utterance, since 'verbal' communication signifies by its own definition that any information retrievable from 'verbal' elements is nuclear, and all the other information is marginal.

By sense information, I mean the type of information which we can get from a dictionary. Each lexical item in an utterance allows the interpreter to draw from the information listed under that particular lexical item. For example, if A says to B,

(64) I have some ideas I want to share with you,

for each lexical item (or word) in this utterance, it is possible for B to retrieve information such as ``I' refers to a single speaker', ``have' refers to a present status of being in possession of something', ``ideas' refers to plural contemplated thoughts in one's mind', etc. However, since the lexical items which we process usually occur in a chained sequence forming larger units such as phrases, clauses and sentences, collocational restriction rules which exist among those lexical items are intuitively perceived by the interpreter. This results in reducing a potentially large amount of available information which is retrievable from isolated lexical items to a small amount of relevant information for comprehension.

By reference information, I mean information which the interpreter can obtain through relating some `sense' information to particular things, events or relations of the world in which the utterance under investigation is embedded. For example, in the above utterance (64), B can have information that `I' refers to a particular person A and `you' refers to a particular person B. Since most of the utterances generated for communication purposes are talking about things and events of the world, to determine what particularities are exactly referred to by some words and phrases is an important part of relevant information for comprehension. When particular things, people, and events are referred to, the interpreter can draw on any information in his memory which is related to those particular items.

By grammar information, I mean information which the interpreter can retrieve from his knowledge of the grammar of a particular language in which utterances are made. This kind of information is typically represented by a grammar textbook of a language. We also find some aspects of grammar information in dictionaries. For example, again using the sample utterance above (64), such grammar information as ``I' is the subject of the verb `have' and `some ideas' is the object of the verb `have'', ``I want to share with you' is a relative clause which modifies the word `ideas', `the whole utterance is a complex sentence which consists of a main clause `I have some ideas' and a relative clause `I want to share with you'' etc. are all considered to be retrievable grammatical information which the interpreter can utilize to comprehend the utterance. Recently linguistic research in this area has produced much literature which tries to specify what sort of grammatical rules and principles are involved in the production and comprehension of a speech act.

By rhetoric information, I mean information which the interpreter can retrieve (or perceive) from the way the speaker presents his material, using some rhetorical devices or techniques available in the language of his expression. Rhetorical devices such as rhetorical question, metaphor, hyperbole, irony, litotes, language-specific rhetorical techniques to indicate the peak or climax of a story, etc. are a part of the knowledge to which adult speakers have access. This means that in the comprehension process, the interpreter who possesses adequate knowledge of rhetorical techniques can retrieve necessary information when those techniques are employed by the speaker in his text. This kind of knowledge is beyond the so-called 'linguistic competence' which is considered to be established quite adequately by a native speaker before he is six or seven years old.

By presupposition information, I mean information which is presupposed in order that the proposition expressed may be judged true, valid or satisfactory. For example, if A says to B, "I want you to return my book", it is presupposed that sometime before this utterance, there was the event of A's lending a book (which is referred to by 'my book' in the utterance) to B, and it is also presupposed that B's returning the book is a future action. Searle's (1969) prepositional content condition seems to be understood best if it is considered to belong to this category of information (see examples (56)-(59) in section 2.6).

Information through identification at communication level -- In the identification of an utterance at the 'communication' level in oral representation, what kinds of information does the interpreter have access to? This area of 'communication' has been our main focus of study; any information the interpreter has access to is related to the illocutionary and perlocutionary intents of the speaker. What the speaker has intended to convey through these illocutionary and perlocutionary acts has been discussed earlier (see Figure 9-11). So, for example, if A says to B

(65) Jack is married to Mary,

as long as B can trust that A's utterance (65) is intended to be a sincere speech act, then B can have access at least to the following kinds of information:

(66) a. A has a belief that Jack is married to Mary (from A's illocutionary intent).

(Equivalent to Searle's 'sincerity condition')

b. A is trying to insist that 'Jack is married to Mary' is a fact, so that B, too, should accept it (from A's perlocutionary intent).

(Equivalent to Searle's 'essential condition')

c. A has evidence for his claim that Jack is married to Mary, and A thinks that B does not know about this.

(Equivalent to Searle's 'preparatory condition')

(66)(c) should not be confused with the **presupposition** information discussed earlier. The latter information is usually derived from individual concepts which are constitutes of a proposition, whereas, the former information deals with the presupposition of the interlocutors concerning the whole proposition. For example, some typical **presupposition** information for (65) is: Two particular individuals referred to by 'Jack' and 'Mary' exist; A thinks B knows the two particular individuals referred to by 'Jack' and 'Mary'; at one time, both A and B knew that Jack and Mary were not married; etc. All of this information can be derived from individual concepts which are usually realised by one or more lexical items in a proposition.

Most of what we have discussed so far for **oral representation** can also be applied to **orthographic representation** (going back to Figure

18). What cannot be applied is only what was discussed under the heading of Information through identification at utterance level. However, a suitable surrogate for this kind of information in orthographic representation is the analysis of handwriting (graphology) and rhetorical devices employed in the text.

Analysis of handwriting may offer some information which may help the interpreter to judge the writer's mental and emotional states. This kind of information is especially significant when the interpreter knows well the normal handwriting style of the writer.

Rhetorical devices or techniques are much more commonly used in orthographic representation than in oral representation. We can understand this phenomenon when we think of the fact that orthographic representation of a language is a later invention, and was probably specifically designed for the purpose of communication in non-face-to-face situations. This means that the writer cannot rely on much of the contextual information discussed above and therefore has to appeal to any available means to compensate for a lack of contextual information. He may have to give some relevant background information to his readers by writing it somewhere in the text or he may employ, for example, exclamation marks, to express that his mental state is full of emotion. In such cases a greater emphasis is placed by the writer on written (or typed) symbols of linguistic forms in his orthographic representation.

So far we have shown that contextual information which is available for the interpreter comes from three main categories: environment, interlocutors, and linguistic forms. We have given some specific kinds of information that are available in each category, and have tried to classify them. Although we listed many important kinds of information that are utilized in the process of comprehension, this list is by no means exhaustive. The subject matter of our investigation is so vast and so very complicated that any systematic attempt to try to capture all categories of information is impossible. The following examples of information (or knowledge) seem very difficult to classify.

Fiction vs. fact convention — Wirrer (1982) discusses the remarkable ability of a person to distinguish fictitious texts from non-fictitious texts. He introduces the concept of 'convention' and says (ibid. p.372) that "this concept is based on the idea that - in our European Society - there are two conventions closely connected with our reactions towards non-fictitious and fictitious discourses." He calls one of them "fact convention" and the other "fiction convention"[5]. How can we distinguish one from the other? Wirrer claims that there are a number of "normative statements" for each convention from the two perspectives as a speaker/author and a hearer/reader. He believes these normative statements are definitely used as criteria to distinguish one convention from the other. For fact convention, normative statements from the two perspectives can be seen in the following (ibid. p.374):

(67) For the speaker/author,

* Believe in the truth of your utterance with respect to your model of reality;
* Defend the truth of your utterance, if you are requested to;

* Accept all the consequences of your utterance and defend the truth of these, if you are requested to.

For the hearer/reader

* Believe in the truth of the speaker's/author's utterance with respect to your model of reality, provided you have no substantial reasons not to do so;
* If you believe in the truth of the utterance, defend it, if you are requested to;
* If you believe in the truth of the utterance, accept all its consequences and defend the truth of these if you are requested to;
* If you don't believe in the truth of the utterance with reference to your model of reality, and if this utterance is relevant to you in a certain respect, apply strategies which allow for the support and/or the falsification of this utterance and defend the results of your investigation, if you are requested to.

For fiction convention, normative statements are given as follows (ibid. p.378):

(68) For the speaker/author

* Believe in the truth of your utterance with respect to your model of the world created by your discourse;
* Accept all the consequences of your utterances and defend the truth of these, if you are requested to.
* Accept the speaker's/author's violation of the sincerity rule;

* Take into account that your model of discourse world and your model of reality may deviate from one another in different degrees;
* Never judge any utterance that does not correspond with your model of reality as a lie or as an error.
* Take any utterance which is true with respect both to your model of the discourse world and to your model of reality as an utterance referring to reality, if you want to.

We may disagree with some of the details of the above statements, but in general we, living in the societies where fictitious as well as non-fictitious literature abound, can agree with what Wirrer presents as 'normative statements'. This means that we possess kinds of knowledge (or information) which are represented by these normative statements, and we use them for the production and comprehension of fictitious and non-fictitious literature. How can we then categorize this kind of knowledge by the interpreter into the scheme which we presented earlier? One possibilty is that this kind of information may be categorized either as <u>rhetoric information (p.142-3)</u> or <u>information at communication level (p.143-5)</u>. It is true that we learn these conventions (fiction and fact) at school or at various other occasions from our teachers, parents or others. And it seems that for one to fully understand what is written in (67) and (68) and to apply them satisfactorily to every occasion of the communication situation (oral or written) will take many years of education and experience. In this sense, such ability (competence) is comparable to the ability of fully utilizing available rhetorical techniques in his language.

<u>Cooperative principle and maxims of communication</u> -- Another type of knowledge (or information) the interpreter seems to utilize in his comprehension of an utterance or a text is expounded by Grice (1975). Earlier in this study (p.84) we explained briefly Grice's conversational maxims. We will see in more detail what Grice has contributed to the understanding of the comprehension process later in this chapter. Grice thinks that our talk exchanges consist not of incoherent disconnected remarks but of a coherent sequence of remarks. He claims that the reason behind this kind of coherence in our exchanges is our cooperative efforts which is guided by the principle paraphrased as:

(69) "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (ibid. p.67).

This principle is Grice's **Cooperative Principle.** Then, Grice develops some specific categories, which he calls 'maxims', under this cooperative principle. The following are the summary descriptions of Grice's four maxims (ibid. p.67):

(70) <u>Maxims of Quantity</u>

a. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);

b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

<u>Maxims of Quality</u>

a. Do not say what you believe to be false.

b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxims of Relation

a. Be relevant.

Maxims of Manner

a. Avoid obscurity of expression.

b. Avoid ambiguity.

c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

d. Be orderly.

There is a good possibility that some of the maxims Grice introduced are not universal but are culturally bound or language specific. However, generally speaking, it is true that regardless of our particular languages or cultures we do engage in our communication activities as cooperative efforts which are guided by similar principles or maxims to those Grice outlines. This means that any native speaker uses such knowledge for the production and comprehension of speech acts. How can we categorize this kind of knowledge (or information) within our scheme? On the one hand, we may treat this exactly like the knowledge about fact and fiction conventions. However, since the kind of knowledge under investigation here is vitally involved in the comprehension process, it may well be the case that we should set up a different category of information. We will return to this topic later.

The fact that we can retrieve necessary information from our memory system and the fact that we can gather relevant information from our visual and/or auditory perception and utilize this information very efficiently for comprehending oral or written texts in a matter of seconds reveals a remarkable capacity of our minds in the process of comprehension. This capacity of our minds is, in recent comprehension theory, often called 'inference'. We will now focus on inference.

4.2 Role of Inference in Comprehension

The term 'inference' is frequently used in comprehension theories. It is therefore necessary to understand this concept well by defining its role in the process of communication. First, we will define the term. Secondly, we will examine some literature to find out how the concept of inference is incorporated into a comprehension theory.

4.2.1 Definition of 'inference'

Gorovitz, et al. (1979:64-66), discuss the difference among three philosophical terms, namely, 'imply', 'infer', and 'entail' (their corresponding nouns are: 'implication', 'inference', and 'entailment'). In their definition **imply** is regarded as a synonym for **entail**. Therefore, we will focus on the first two terms. The distinction between the two is that "people infer whereas sentences imply" (ibid. p.64). For example, suppose X='John is a car mechanic', and Y='John has much knowledge about cars', we may say:

(71) I concluded Y from X or I **inferred** Y from X.

(72) X **implies** Y.

(71) means that I consider that Y to be a very probable consequence of X. It follows that there is a possibility that I may infer incorrectly. In contrast to this, (72) does not suggest this kind of incorrectness in

that it signifies that Y is either a logical consequence of X or it is not. From the above discussion, it is possible to give a definition to 'inference':

(73) 'Inference' is the mental capacity of a person which enables him to judge on logical relationships among two (or more) sets of propositions.

In the study of logic, 'inference' is regarded as the 'acceptance' of a conclusion on the basis of a set of premises. Therefore, in the following example:

(74) a. John is a car mechanic.

b. Every mechanic is knowledgeable in his job.

c. John is knowledgeable in his job.

If I can accept (a) and (b) as true ((a) and (b) are called premises in logic), I can accept (c) as a conclusion. In this case, I inferred from (a) and (b) that (c) should be the case. In logic (74) can be explained as: The premises (a) and (b) imply the conclusion (c).

4.2.2 Inference in some technical terms of comprehension

As mentioned earlier in the preceding subsection, inference is a frequently used term in many comprehension theories. We would like to summarize some of the key terms in which 'inference' occurs as a nucleus.

Deductive vs. inductive inference — The difference between deductive inference and inductive inference lies in the nature of the conclusions drawn from inferences. A deductive inference necessitates the conclusion from the evidence in the premises, whereas an inductive inference supports (not necessitates) the conclusion. For example, from the facts 'The light in the living room was off ten minutes ago'; 'But now it is on'; 'John and I are alone in the house'; 'I did not flip the switch', in a normal situation I can deductively infer that 'John flipped the switch'. However, if the facts of the situation are that 'The light in the living room was off ten minutes ago'; 'But now it is on'; 'John and Mary and I are in the house'; 'John is reading in the living room'; 'Mary is cooking in the kitchen'; 'I did not flip the switch', in a normal situation I can inductively infer that 'John flipped the switch'.

Inference of mutual belief -- In a verbal communication situation between the two people A and B, if they have come to a point where they fully understand each other regarding their subject matter X, we can say that A has inferred B's opinion regarding X correctly and B, too, has inferred A's opinion regarding X correctly; therefore A and B share mutual beliefs regarding X. Some theorists object to this concept of mutual belief, because they think that it suggests an infinity of conditions and that it is impossible to satisfy all the conditions to attain mutual belief.

Trivial inference vs. non-trivial inference -- From any set of premises (represented by propositions or sentences) we can derive an almost unlimited number of implications (conclusions). For example, from the two premises P and Q, conclusions such as `P and P', `P and Q', `Q and Q', `P or P', `P or Q', `P and P and P or Q', etc. can be logically derived. These are called **trivial inferences**, most of which do not have any psychological significance at all. However, in reality, we concentrate on meaningful deductions as in (74). The inferences required to derive (c) from (a) and (b) are called **non-trivial inferences**. Usually non-trivial inferences are finite, but trivial inferences are infinite.

Intended inference -- It is possible for the speaker to intend his hearer to draw a number of inferences from his utterance. We call these kinds of inferences, **intended inferences**. For example, a teacher may says to his lazy pupil, `You will end up on welfare!' with the intention that the pupil should infer the following: `I am a idle pupil', and `If I continue to be lazy, I can't get a good education' and this means that `I may end up on welfare', therefore `My teacher is encouraging me to be diligent and study hard'. Although the speaker intends that his utterance will trigger a series of inferences in order for the hearer to arrive at a correct interpretation, there is always a possibility that the hearer may infer incorrectly.

Chain of inferences -- It is often the case that the hearer needs to infer in several stages before he reaches his conclusion (or interpretation). These inferences are related to each other reasonably from the perspective of the hearer. We call these inferences a **chain of inferences**. It is quite possible in the interpretation of an utterance for several separate chains of inferences to take place depending upon individual interpreters, since inferences allow room for subjectivity.

4.3 Comprehension Process - Mutual Knowledge Model

In the preceding two sections, we have discussed 'contextual information' and 'inference', both of which take vital roles in comprehension. With this background knowledge we are ready to examine some of the recent models of the comprehension process. In my review of the recent literature in linguistics, I have observed two main schools of comprehension theory, viz. the school of mutual knowledge which has inherited some Gricean traditions, and the emerging school of maximum relevance propounded chiefly by Wilson and Sperber.

The concept of mutual knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is shared and known to be shared, according to Smith (1982:xii), "was first identified in these terms by Lewis (1969)[6] and Schiffer (1972)[7], although the problems involved had been hinted at more or less explicitly in a number of earlier works, most notably Grice's seminal paper Meaning (Grice, 1957)". Schiffer's definition of mutual belief is explained as follows by Clark and Carlson (1982:3):

(75) A and B mutually believe that p =

(a) A believes that p.

(a') B believes that p.

(b) A believes that B believes that p.

(b') B believes that A believes that p.

(c) A believes that B believes that A believes that p.

(c') B believes that A believes that B believes that p.

et cetera ad infinitum.

According to Clark and Carlson (ibid. p.3) Lewis' concept of 'common knowledge' is equivalent to (75) if the verb 'believe' is substituted for 'know'.

How is this kind of definition of mutual belief related to comprehension theory? Those theorists who hold this definition of mutual belief generally believe that mutual belief between the speaker and the hearer is crucially important for the production and comprehension of any speech act. In the following, we would like to review some of the influential literature on comprehension theory based on 'mutual beliefs' and evaluate them from various angles.

4.3.1 Grice's model and its critique

Grice's (1975) article, "Logic and conversation", has been very influential in most recent approaches to pragmatics. For example, Wilson and Sperber say (1981:155):

> Although specific proposals have been made for extending, supplementing or modifying Grice's machinery, it seems no exaggeration to say that most recent theories of utterance interpretation are a direct result of Grice's William James Lectures.

Grice's contribution to comprehension theory can be summarized with the three well known technical terms which he has coined, namely, **conversational implicature, cooperative principle** (CP), and **maxims of conversation.** We have discussed the last two terms in 4.1.3 (p.151-2), and we have listed the maxims of conversation in (70). Our main concern here is to see how these concepts function together to make the comprehension of an utterance possible.

Grice was primarily interested in those utterances in conversational exchanges which necessitate distinguishing between what is said and what is implied or suggested. Grice's term of implicature is introduced for those utterances which have distinct meanings (implicatures) beyond what words and phrases of the utterances mean (literal meanings). Grice, then, makes a distinction between conventional and nonconventional implicature. The former is more or less similar to idiomatic expressions like, 'He is in the grip of a vice', or 'He kicked the bucket', etc. In these expressions the implications beyond the literal meanings are conventionally understood by normal speakers of English. These utterances do not require any specific inference on the part of the hearer to understand them, since their idiomatic meanings are understood automatically. Grice does not deal with this kind of utterance much in his article. He focuses his attention on a certain subclass of nonconventional implicature which he calls, conversational implicatures.

How can we arrive at the implicated meaning (implicature) of an utterance in a conversation? This question is Grice's primary concern in his article. We will use Searle's examples (1975b:61) for the sake of easier comparison. I repeat the utterances (36) and (37) but with different numbers.

(76) Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight.

(77) Student Y: I have to study for an exam.

(76) is a request or an invitation in a normal sense, therefore it is expected that the answer is either 'yes' (acceptance) or 'no' (rejection). However, (77) seems to fall into neither case. How does Grice explicate the process of student X's interpretation of (77)? This seems

to be a typical case of conversational implicature. According to Grice, what is implied is quite distinct from what is literally said in (77).

To start with, Grice thinks that there are five kinds of data the interpreter (hearer) can rely on. They are: "(i) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references which may be involved; (ii) the CP and its maxims; (iii) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (iv) other items of background knowledge; (v) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous heading are available to both participants, and that both participants know or assume this to be so" (ibid. p.70). It is clearly suggested in (v) above that Grice's model is based upon mutual belief between the interlocutors.

Grice (ibid. p.70) presents the following as a general pattern for the interpreting or comprehending (Grice uses the term 'working out' here) of a conversational implicature:

(78) a. He has said that p. (i)

b. There is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP. (ii)

c. He could not be doing this unless he thought that q. (iv) and (inference).

d. He knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required. (v)

e. He has done nothing to stop me to think that q. (iii)

f. Therefore he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q. (inference)

g. And so he has implicated that q. (inference)

It is significant to observe that every category of information the interpreter can rely on ((i) through (v)) occurs in the comprehension process Grice suggests in (78), and that (inference) is drawn in stages c, f, and g.

Let us apply Grice's theory summarized in (78) to (77) as a reply to (76). Presumably the comprehension process of student X would be the following:

(79) a. Y has said that he had to study for an exam in reply to my invitation of going to the movies tonight.

b. There is no reason for me to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP.

c. Y could not have said that unless he thought that he rejected my invitation.

d. Y knows that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that he needs to reject my invitation.

e. Y has done nothing to stop me from thinking that he rejected my invitation.

f. Therefore he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that he rejected my invitation.

g. And so Y has implicated that he rejected my invitation.

It seems to me that Grice's model lacks some detailed inferential steps for X to reach Y's implicature. It is difficult to understand why X can reach the stage c from the stages a and b. There should be more steps of processing information involved through which X can come to the stage c. The model is too simplified in this respect. Another puzzling problem in Grice's model is how stages d through g are related to c. For me c and g are not different; they seem to present the same conclusion of the interpreter. If this is so, then, what are the functions of stages d through f?

Stage d points out the importance of the concept of mutual belief or knowledge between X and Y. Y needed to have a belief that X has an ability to infer Y's utterance. This belief seems to the very basis which makes communication possible. The speaker, if he truly intends that his utterances are to be interpreted correctly, needs to have a belief that the information he provides through his utterances is sufficient for the hearer (interpreter) to arrive at the intended meaning. Stage d, thus considered, seems to be more than a stage (or a step) in the proces of comprehension (or interpretation). I would like to suggest that stage d is not a intermediate step of the comprehension process but a prerequisite for the possibility of comprehension.

Stage e is ambiguous. 'Y has done nothing to stop me' seems to presuppose that Y has a recognition that X has interpreted his utterance correctly. If this is the case, it means that Y needed to observe some kind of X's response (verbal or nonverbal) to Y's utterance of (77) in order for him to realise that X has interpreted correctly. Then, this means that we are no longer in the realm of X's comprehension process of (77), we are beyond it, i.e., we are in a new exchange. The following chart explains this point:

(80) X: (76) --> [Y's comprehension of (76)
↓
Y: (77)] -->

[<u>X's comprehension of (77)</u>
↓
X: (p)] --> [Y's comprehension of (p)
↓
Y: (q)] -->etc.

The underlined comprehension process is the focus of our analysis. In (80), it clearly indicates that, in order for X to check objectively whether his interpretation of Y's utterance (77) is correct or not, X needs to rely on Y's response (q) which is based on his interpretation of (p). No doubt this process requires a new exchange between X and Y as shown in (80).

Let us go back to our original investigation of stage e. In the discussion above, we have demonstrated in (80) that Grice could not have meant by stage e Y's apparent response. The only way to keep stage e within X's comprehension process of (77) is to understand stage e meaning: "Y has uttered nothing more than he has uttered, therefore, there is nothing in his utterance which prevents me from thinking that he rejected my invitation." If this is the way we have to understand stage e, then stage e is no more than stage a and b. This means that Grice's stage e is vacuous; it is nothing more than a reiteration.

As pointed out earlier, stages f and g are similer to stage c. Thus, our conclusion on Grice's model of comprehension process explained and exemplified in (78) and (79) is that it is inadequate as a step by step detailed description of the comprehension process, and it seems to have much repetition in it, although the crucial elements which need to be distinguished in the comprehension process are there. In this latter sense, what Grice has done is to open up a new field and to lay a good foundation for further research and refinement.

The example (77) which we have analyzed does not seem to involve any violations of conversational maxims. However, Grice (ibid. pp.70-73) claims that many conversational implicatures are generated by the violation or exploitation of the maxims. He sets up three main cases in which conversational implicatures are generated: (i) No maxim is violated, or at least it is not clear that any maxim is violated; (ii) A maxim is violated, but its violation is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim; (iii) A maxim is exploited and flouted for the purpose of getting in a conversational implicature by means of something of the nature of a figure of speech. As an example of (iii), compare what Huttar (1980) does on a metaphorical expression. (His work is explained above in 2.5.2.) Grice explains such figures of speech as irony, metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole, etc., as clear cases where the maxim of quality is exploited and flouted. However, it is important to notice that although Grice admits violations, or exploitations of maxims, he believes that the cooperative principle (CP) can be held in either case.

4.3.2 Searle's model and its critique

Among the articles and books with which Searle has contributed to the philosophy of language and especially to SAT, we would like to focus on one of his articles, "Indirect Speech Acts" (1975b), which explains his model of the comprehension process.

We have already discussed some of Searle's (ibid.) contributions in 2.5.1 (Searle's account and the proposed model). There we demonstrated how a model based on intentionality can be beneficially applied to the understanding of indirect speech acts, including metaphors. However, in this subsection, we would like to see how Searle's model of the comprehension process incorporates such key concepts as 'contextual information', 'inference', 'cooperative principle', 'conventions' and others, and evaluate his contribution by comparing it to Grice.

Searle uses examples (76), (77) -- in fact he is the first to use these examples -- to explain how an indirect speech act such as (77) can be comprehended by its hearer. The ten steps which Searle claims take place in the process of comprehension gives a clear outline of his model. These ten steps are quoted in (38) of this study, which comes from Searle (ibid. p.63). To avoid repetition of (38), I would like to list here only the kinds of information that the interpreter uses in those ten steps of comprehension. They are:

(81) STEP 1 -- Facts about the conversation

STEP 2 -- Principle of conversational cooperation

STEP 3 -- Theory of speech acts (acceptance, rejection, etc.)

* STEP 4 -- Inference from STEPs 1 and 3

* STEP 5 -- Inference from STEPs 2 and 4

STEP 6 -- Factual background information

* STEP 7 -- Inference from STEP 6

STEP 8 -- Theory of speech acts (Preparatory condition)

* STEP 9 -- Inference from STEPs 1,7, and 8

* STEP 10 - Inference from STEPs 5 and 9

(STEPs of inference are marked by *)

These ten steps can be subdivided into the two major components of the comprehension process, namely, **contextual information** and **inference.** Contextual information gives the basis for drawing inferences. Inferences are always drawn from established information. Therefore, for each STEP of inference the necessary information needs to be established before the actual inference. Some inferred information becomes established information which then is used for further inferences as in STEPs 4, 5, 7 and 9. Only the last inference is not used for further inference, because it is the conclusion of the interpretation. The relationship of these STEPs can be made explicit by the following figure:



Note: Subscript numbers indicate numbers of STEP in (81)
* indicates identical information
CI(LM)=Contextual Information from Literal Meaning
CI(CP)=Contextual Information from Cooperative Principle (Searle's 'Principle of conversational cooperation')
CI(SA)=Contextual Information from Speech Acts Theory (Searle's 'Theory of Speech Acts')
CI(B)=Contextual Information from Background (Searle's 'Background information)
I(INF)=Information from Inference
INF=Inference

Figure 19: Searle's Model of Communication Process Diagrammed

We will base the following discussion on my modified version (Figure 19) of Searle's model rather than on the ten STEPs which Searle presents in (81). Figure 19 seems to make some implicit relationships among those STEPs explicit and therefore serves better for the discussion, as well as serving as an evaluation of Searle's model. We will now discuss and evaluate each of the categories set up in Figure 19.

CI(LM)=Contextural Information from Literal Meaning -- Searle thinks that the first step for the interpretation of an indirect speech act is to start with the information of its corresponding 'direct' speech act. This information is nothing more than what he calls the 'literal meaning' of the speech act. Searle (1979:115) gives six kinds of utterances, namely, 'literal utterance', 'metaphorical utterance (simple)', 'metaphorical utterance (open ended)', 'ironical utterance', 'dead metaphor', and 'indirect speech act'. In all these categories, he sets up two levels of meaning, i.e. 'sentence meaning' and 'utterance meaning'. In all these cases except 'literal utterance' and 'indirect speech act', 'sentence meaning' is considered as a separate entity which provides the initial information for interpretation, so that 'utterance meaning' may be inferred from it. In 'literal utterance' there is a complete overlapping between sentence meaning and utterance meaning, whereas in 'indirect speech act' there is a partial overlapping between the two, sentence meaning being included in utterance meaning. Therefore, when Searle talks about 'literal meaning', he means 'sentence meaning' as described above. For example he says (ibid. p.133):

> The distinction, for example, between literal sentence meaning and metaphorical or ironical utterance meaning remains intact. Similarly, the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts remains intact. The modification that the thesis of the relativity of meaning forces on that system of distinctions is that in the account of how context plays a role in the production and comprehension of metaphorical utterances, indirect speech acts, ironical utterances, and conversational implications, we will need to distinguish the special role of the context of utterance in these cases from the role that background assumptions play in the interpretation of literal meaning.

The above quotation is very significant, because it clearly indicates the necessity of distinguishing the two kinds of roles of context interacting for comprehension. One role of context is the interpretation of literal meaning, the other role of context is the interpretation of utterance meaning. And only in the interpretation of a direct speech act do the two roles of context coincide.

It is apparent from the above discussion that CI(LM) is the information obtained through the interpretation of (77) as a direct speech act by X. This means that Searle's model of comprehension described in (38), (81) or Figure 19 is a comprehension process model for indirect speech acts. Does Searle present a comprehension model for direct speech acts elsewhere? I have found no article or book in which he deals primarily with the comprehension process for direct speech acts. It appears that since the process of comprehension or interpretation of direct speech acts is taken so much for granted in our everyday experience, we tend to neglect this aspect of research. We assume without evidence that the comprehension process is just the reversed process of the generation (or production) of speech acts. Such an assumption seems untenable according to some of the insights gained in recent linguistic research[8]. At any rate, this apparent gap in linguistic research needs to be filled. In next section, I will try to provide a tentative solution to fill this gap. Here I only want to point out that CI(LM) primarily consists of what the interpreter comprehends out of utterance intent, propositional intent, illocutionary intent, and perlocutionary intent of the speaker (see Figure 15). We have discussed this kind of information in the preceding subsection when commenting upon contextual information through the identification of linguistic forms (see 4.1.3).

CI(CP)=Contextual Information from Cooperative Principle -- Searle begins his model of the comprehension process with CI(LM) as in STEP 1. In examples (76) and (77), this stage is X's awareness of his proposal to Y and his recognition that Y's response to it is a statement to the effect that he has to study for an exam. After this stage, Searle introduces STEP 2 which is our concern here, namely CI(CP). Using the cooperative principle, and especially the maxim of relevance (both of which were originally developed by Grice), STEP 2 advances X's comprehension process a step further, in that X assumes that Y's remark should be intended to be relevant because of the cooperative principle.

Searle seems to agree with Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) and its subclasses of maxims of conversation. However, Searle (1975b:76) claims that "there seems to be an additional maxim of conversation that could be expressed as follows: **Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to**". He claims that, by taking this maxim into considertion, the possibility of truly nonconventional indirect speech acts is largely found in nonidiomatic expressions, because conventionally established idiomatic indirect speech acts cannot generate implicatures which are live and vivid as in the case in nonidiomatic indirect speech acts.

This kind of information was discussed previously (p.149-151) under the heading, Cooperative principle and maxims of communication. I have changed Grice's term, 'maxims of conversation' to 'maxims of communication', because I believe those maxims to have application to more than conversations. Pratt (1977) uses the model Grice has developed and applies it to some literary work satisfactorily; she concludes by saying (ibid. p.200):

> Grice's account of rule-breaking in conversation clearly shows that intentional deviance does occur routinely outside literature. And the fact that Grice's account seems perfectly able to handle deviance within literature as well shows that there are no clear grounds for distinguishing the way deviance occurs in the two supposedly opposed realms of discourse. In this regard, it is perhaps worth reiterating that fictivity cannot be viewed as a form of "poetic deviance" either. As I discussed earlier, fictive or "imitation" speech acts are readily found in almost any realm of discourse, and our ability to produce and interpret them must be viewed as part of our normal linguistic and cognitive competence, not as some special by-product of it.

CI(SA)=Contextual Information from Speech Act Theory -- This kind of contextual information from SAT makes Searle's model of the comprehension process very unique. In (81) or (38), CI(SA) is utilized in STEP 3 and STEP 8.

In STEP 3 the interpreter X, relying on the information from STEP 1 and STEP 2, namely, Y's response in a statement to X's proposal to Y, draws a part of CI(SA) which is necessary to infer that Y's response in a statement is relevant when it signifies one of 'acceptance', 'rejection', 'counterproposal', or 'further discussion', etc. The specific information employed here as CI(SA) is what Searle claims to be a part of SAT which designates that 'a possible response to a proposal (or request) is one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc.' However, as far as I know, Searle has not developed a consistent framework for this part of SAT. In his most recent work (1983:178-9) he suggests the need of SAT in this area by saying,

> The perlocutionary effects of our utterances cannot be included in the conventions for the use of the device uttered, because an effect which is achieved by convention cannot include the

> subsequent responses and behavior of our audiences. What the conventional procedures can capture is, so to speak, the illocutionary analogue of these various perlocutionary aims.

Searle claims here that the "subsequent responses and behavior of our audiences" cannot be included in what can be achieved by the convention of language. In other words, he is saying that the function of the convention of language can extend as far as the recognition (or understanding, or interpretation) of the audience, and after this point it is beyond the intentionality of the audience. The proposed model expounded earlier in chapters one and two, especially Figure 12, is a theoretical attempt to explicate consistently what Searle says. This means that CI(SA) in the area of response on the part of the audience can be explained by our proposed model.

Another problem which can be pointed out concerning Searle's model (Figure 19) is that STEP 3, which is based on CI(SA) as explained above, is not treated as 'inference'. It seems to me that STEP 3 can be understood as an inferred result (or conclusion), because the expressed conclusion in STEP 3 is based on the information retrieved in STEP 1 and 2. It seems difficult to prove that STEP 3 is not an inferential step. I do not think Searle meant this when he termed STEP 3 'theory of speech act' rather than 'inference'. Probably what Searle meant was that in speech act theory itself, since it is a 'theory', a certain amount of inference is presupposed. If this is what Searle meant, then we have to say that the cooperative principle CI(CP) in STEP 2 should be included as a component of SAT. This conclusion seems to be something which is not resolved by Searle. If Searle wants to keep CI(CP) distinct from CI(SA), the best solution for him would be to admit the presence of inference in STEP 3 and to make a distinction between CI(SA) and inference in STEP 3 itself. This means that STEP 3 needs to be divided further into two steps as is shown in the following:

(82) STEP 3a: A possible response of the hearer to a proposal made by the speaker is one of rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (theory of speech acts).

STEP 3b: Therefore, a relevant response of Y must be one of rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (inference from STEP 2 and 3a)

In STEP 8, another type of CI(SA) is utilized. The CI(SA) here is "a preparatory condition for the acceptance of a proposal". In the present example, this preparatory condition specifies Y's ability to perform the act predicated in the propositional act of X's proposal, namely, 'for Y to go to the movies tonight'. As discussed earlier (p.94 and p.143-4), Searle has developed a set of satisfaction conditions which need to be met in order that any type of speech act can be satisfactory or fulfilled. Those conditions are: propositional content condition; preparatory condition; sincerity condition; essential condition. On page 94, (56)-(59), the concrete examples of these conditions for a request type of speech act are listed. Also on pages 143-144 we have demonstrated that these conditions can be derived from the levels of intent-tokens of a speech act. Essential condition can be derived from perlocutionary intent, sincerity condition from illocutionary intent, and preparatory condition and propositional content conditions from propositional intent. However, it is important to be reminded that these intents are not autonomous but; rather, they are inseparably connected to each other to form a coherent unit in one intentionality of the speaker, although the relative importance or prominence among them can be shown as:

(83) perlocutionary intent > illocutionary intent
> propositionary intent > utterance intent

STEP 8 deals with CI(SA) of `preparatory condition for the **acceptance of a proposal**'. The reason why I put `acceptance of a proposal' in bold face is because this represents a type of illocutionary act. Is `acceptance of a proposal' a type of illocutionary act? I think the answer is yes, because there are many speech acts which indicate the acceptance of a proposal. For example, for the proposal of X in (30), `Let's go to the movies tonight', Y can accept this by answering in the following way:

(84) a. student Y: Sure, let's go.
b. student Y: I was planning to study for an exam tonight. But, forget it, let's go to the movies.

Both speech acts in (84.a) and (84.b) are considered to be `acceptance of the above proposal'. Then my question is: Among the main categories of speech acts Searle has developed (see Figure 9), i.e., representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations, which category is represented by (84.a) and (84.b)? To this question, there seem to be two possible answers from the categories set up by Searle, i.e. either directives or commissives. If (84.a) and (83.b) are taken as directives, then they have to satisfy the crucial conditions of directives, which are the sincerity condition and the essential condition. The sincerity condition of directives is: Speaker wants hearer to do the future action specified by the propositional act. The essential condition of directives is: It must count as an attempt by the speaker to get the hearer to do the future action specified by the propositional act. It is clear that (84.a) and (84.b) do not match neatly to these conditions, because Y does not need to have a want that X may go to the movies (X already expressed his want!), and Y is not attempting to get X to go to the movies. To categorize (84.a) and (84.b) as directives is untenable. What about categorizing them as commissives? The sincerity condition of commissives is: The hearer wants the speaker to perform the future action specified by the propositional act, and the speaker intends to do the specifed future action. The essential condition of commissives is: It counts as the undertaking by the speaker of an obligation to do the future action specified by the propositional act. Commissives seem to be more promising than directives. As far as the sincerity condition is concerned, both (84.a) and (84.b) meet this condition. However, for the essential condition, they do not seem to satisfy this condition, because both (84.a) and (84.b) do not imply that what Y has said is 'the undertaking of an obligation' for Y to go to the movies. What Y has done in (84) is a 'simple acceptance' of X's proposal or request.

The above discussion reveals that in Searle's classificatory system of speech acts there is no room for such speech acts as (84.a) and (84.b). Why is this? It seems to me that the answer lies in the fact that Searle's classification system has been developed primarily with the speaker's perspective in mind. In other words, Searle has established a useful theoretical framework in which he can consistently look at language phenomena from the speaker's speech act perspective, but it seems to me that he has not yet established an additional framework which enables him to capture some of the language phenomena from the interlocutors' inter-active perspective. Wunderlich (1980:294) points out the danger of over-emphasizing "the class of initiating speech acts" by saying:

> For several reasons, in speech act analyses linguists and philosophers tend to over-emphasize the class of initiating speech acts. (a) If one looks at speech acts in isolation, one is intuitively tempted to conceive merely the beginning of a sequence, and not parts of it. (b) A speech act which starts a sequence must make explicit its propositional content and its illocutionary point or force as much as possible. By contrast, a speech act within a sequence can make use of parts of the propositional contents that have been provided by preceding utterances, and its illocutionary force can partly be defined by its position within the sequence.

What I have proposed in the first two chapters of this dissertation (see especially Figures 8 and 12) is a step towards establishing a theoretical framework which satisfies Wunderlich's criticism. Therefore, I suggest that in addition to the five categories Searle (1977) has presented, at least a speech act type which can explain acceptances, rejections, or deferments as speech act responses, should be posited. At this stage, I do not want to go into an extended discussion to elaborate this suggested speech act type.

<u>CI(B)=Contextual Information from Background</u> -- Searle uses CI(B) only in STEP 6 in Figure 19 for the comprehension of the utterance, 'I have to study for an exam' as in (37). In STEP 6, CI(B) is represented by two pieces of information, namely, the interpreter X's knowledge from

his past experiences that `studying for an exam normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening', and `going to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening'. This kind of contextual information is discussed briefly in the preceding subsection under the heading of presupposition information (p.143).

Searle (1980) discusses CI(B) extensively and claims that the meaning of an utterance only has application "against a background of assumptions and practices that are not representable as a part of the meaning" (ibid. p.221). He refutes the idea that the literal meaning of a sentence can be perceived in a so called `null context', or `zero context'. He claims that even a literal meaning can emerge only against background information and demonstrates this with the English verb `cut'. The verb occurs in sentences which range from seemingly very literal to idiomatic and can be understood only with some appropriate background information for each of its usages. He makes this point very cogently when he says (ibid. p.226-227):

> The reason that the same semantic content, "cut", determines different sets of truth conditions in these different sentences 1-5 derives not from any ambiguity of a semantic kind, but rather from the fact that as members of our culture we bring to bear on the literal utterance and understanding of a sentence a whole background of information about how nature works and how our culture works. A background of practices, institutions, facts of nature, regularities, and ways of doing things are assumed by speakers and hearers when one of these sentences is uttered or understood. I understand the sentence "He cut the grass" differently from the way I understand "He cut the cake", not because of the different semantic content of "cake" and "grass", nor because of any vagueness in the original, but because I know a lot of things about grass, e.g. what people have grass lawns for, what they do to their lawns, etc., and I also know a lot of things about cakes, e.g. what they are for and what people do with cakes, etc; and my knowledge that

> cutting grass is a different sort of business from cutting cakes is part of this larger system of knowledge. This phenomenon seems to me quite generel: for a large number of cases (perhaps not all) the literal meaning of a sentence or expression only determines a set of truth conditions given a set of background assumptions and practices.

This is a lengthy quotation, but I believe Searle's insight revealed here is a significant step forward in explicating theoretically the concept of 'context' which tends to be treated as vague and elusive. He has also pointed out clearly the importance of 'culture' for the understanding of speech acts. Linguistic research is inevitably bound to merge with other disciples such as sociology and anthropology whose main object of study is 'culture'. Thus considered, it is not asking too much to say that linguistic research should be carried out not with an absurd assumption that it can be autonomous but with a solid assumption that it is embedded in a larger human context, namely culture or society. In this way, Searle defines the term 'background' as "the set of assumptions and practices that make interpretation possible" (ibid. p.227).

<u>I(INF)=Information from INFerence</u> -- Our discussion so far in this subsection is concerned primarily with the various types of CI (contextual information) used in Searle's model for the process of comprehension. As discussed in 4.2, it is the capacity of our minds called 'inference' (or reasoning) which can utilize this information to arrive at the conclusion in comprehension (or interpretation). The remarkable capability of the human mind has been a challenging subject for thousands of years, especially among philosophers. I will not discuss the

views of the human mind which have been propounded by various philosophers from ancient Greek philosophers to modern 20th century philosophers. However, it seems to me that no philosopher has ever denied the presence of this intriguing capacity of the human mind. Thus, Searle as well as other philosophers and linguists start with the assumption that inference is a basic property of our minds.

Inference is used in five stages in (81) and in Figure 19, namely, STEP 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10. There are several significant things which we can observe from Figure 19 concerning inference:

(i) First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between 'inference' (INF) and 'inferred information'. 'Inference' is a function of our minds, whereas 'inferred information' refers to the information obtained through 'inference'. And it is important to bear in mind that 'inferred information' becomes new information or knowledge which serves as data for a further step of 'inference'. In Figure 19, the arrows signify the sources of information for 'inference', and the four capital letters I(INF) signify 'inferred information'. For example, $I(INF)_4$ signifies the inferred information gained from the inference in STEP 4. The inference in STEP 4 is based on the information from STEPs 1 and 3, namely, $CI(LM)_1$ and $CI(SA)_3$ which specify that 'X has made a proposal to Y, and in response he has made a statement in saying that he has to study for an exam', and 'Y's relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc.'. From this an inference is drawn by X leading to a conclusion $I(INF)_4$ in STEP 4 that 'Y's literal utterance was not one of those, and so was not a relevant response'.

(ii) 'Inference' in the comprehension process has a starting point and an end point. This means that 'inference' needs to be initiated with information such as CI(LM), CI(SA), CI(CP) and CI(B) fed into it and that it has its own end point (or destination). The end point of 'inference' in Figure 19 is $I(INF)_{10}$. It is clear from the above discussion that inferences are chained from the start to the end. This is exactly what is meant by **chain of inferences** in 4.2.1 (p.154-155).

(iii) 'Inferences' in the comprehension process are hierarchically structured. In (ii) above, it was pointed out that inferences in the comprehension process are **chained**. However, they are not chained in a concatenated way, that is, in a linear sequential way. They are related to each other by forming small units and then fitting into a larger unit. In an 'inference' hierarchy, there are levels and part-whole relationships between the levels. The following figure is based upon Figure 19 and explains various concepts just mentioned above, but also suggests that (82) should be taken into consideration:



Figure 20: <u>Figure 19 revised</u>

In the above figure, we can observe that $I(INF)_{10}$ is derived from $I(INF)_5$ and $I(INF)_9$ each of which, in turn, is derived from other smaller inferential units, thus forming a hierarchy. As well as dividing up STEP 3 into STEP 3a and STEP 3b there is a further modification reflected in $CI(SA)_{3a}$ and $I(INF)_{3b}$. This is the addition of $CI(LM)_1^*$ after $CI(B)_6$. Searle thinks that only the information represented by $CI(B)_6$ is needed for $I(INF)_7$ as (38) or (81) indicates. But it is impossible to draw an inference only from $CI(B)_6$ and to come to a conclusion $I(INF)_7$. What $CI(B)_6$ presents is two pieces of information, namely, 'a knowledge of X that studying for an exam normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening', and 'a knowledge of X that going to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening'. There is no way X can draw a conclusion like $I(INF)_7$ from only these two pieces of knowledge. If these two pieces of knowledge are combined with the fact that a particular person in a particular evening plans to do both actions, an inference becomes possible and a conclusion like in $I(INF)_7$ will be obtained. And the latter information can be supplied from $CI(LM)_1$, in our example. Therefore, it is necessary that the inference in STEP 7 be drawn from $CI(B)_6$ and $CI(LM)_1$.

(iv) The lowest level of an inference hierarchy in Figure 20 should supply various types of information which are 'primitive' except $CI(LM)_1$. By 'primitive' I mean that they are not inferred information. As was pointed out earlier under the heading of CI(LM)=Contextual Information from Literal Meaning, CI(LM) is the result of the inferences in the process of literal interpretation. Although we have not presented a particular model for this comprehension process, we presume that CI(LM) is obtained from the literal interpretation of speech acts. We can predict that various kinds of contextual information may be involved in the process of literal interpretation. All the other types of information besides CI(LM) in Figure 20, viz. CI(SA), CI(CP), and CI(B), are primitives. This means that for an inference to be drawn at least two items of primitive information are necessary.

(v) The inferred information on which all the inferences converge is the comprehended (or interpreted) information. The comprehension process ends here. It is the destination of the comprehension.

(vi) It is possible to see the concept of 'prominence' in an inferential hierarchy. Any inferred information which is nearer to the last inferred information of the comprehension process is more prominent than those inferences which are not. For example, in Figure 20, we can set up a prominence ranking as follows:

(85) $$\mathrm{I(INF)}_{10} > \begin{matrix}\mathrm{I(INF)}_5 \\ \mathrm{I(INF)}_9\end{matrix} > \mathrm{I(INF)}_4 > \begin{matrix}\mathrm{I(INF)}_{3b} \\ \mathrm{I(INF)}_7\end{matrix}$$

(vii) In logic the relationship between the information and the inferred information is represented by the relationship between premises and conclusion. However, it seems to me that this relationship can be subcategorized by the content of the premises. From Figure 20, at least, three types of content of premises are observable. They are: Premises = CI only; Premises = CI+I(INF); and Premises = INF only. I do not go into a further discussion concerning these types of relationship.

Conclusion on Searle's model of comprehension process -- Compared to Grice's model, Searle's model is far more precise and refined, although even Searle's model needs further clarifications and corrections, as I pointed out above in my detailed evaluation. We would like to summarize our investigation of Searle's model of the comprehension process, specifically of 'indirect speech acts' from two perspectives, viz. contributions and further research needs.

Contributions:

(i) Searle states clearly that there are **four components** which make up the interpretation of any indirect speech acts. These four components are, according to Searle, "a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation [some of which have been discussed by Grice (this volume)], and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences" (1975b:61). Using our abbreviated terms, these four components are represented by CI(SA), CI(CP), CI(LM) & CI(B), INF (see Figure 19 and 20).

(ii) Searle's greatest contribution is to specify CI(SA) in an exact way, thus taking a significant step towards explicating the vague concept of '**context**'. The significant insight which Searle has developed in this area is the idea of four kinds of satisfactory conditions for speech acts.

(iii) Searle's step by step delineation of the process of comprehension for indirect speech acts in (81) demonstrates how inference is drawn from various kinds of available information.

Further research needs:

(i) The ten steps of the comprehension process in (81) do not comprise a generalised theory of comprehension. What we need is the type of research which I have begun (as is demonstrated in Figure 19 and 20) in order to establish a general framework (or theory) of the comprehension process.

(ii) In order to accomplish the purpose mentioned in (i), we need to develop a general theory of comprehension for direct speech acts. What Searle (1969 & 1979) did for speech act theory forms a solid starting point.

(iii) Further reseach is needed on other types of speech acts, such as metaphor, irony, etc. in order to make the theory proposed in (i) more comprehensive. What Searle (1979:79-116) did for metaphor, for example, needs to be incorporated into the general theory of comprehension.

(iv) The nature of 'inference' needs to be investigated further. What I have done above (under the heading of I(INF)=Information from INFerence) is proposed as a step forward in this direction.

4.3.3 Some other models and critique

There are many theorists who can be broadly categorized as 'speech act theorists', because of their theoretical indebtedness to Grice or Searle, even though they may not refer to themselves as such. In this subsection, we would like to introduce some typical models of the comprehension process which fall within the broader category of mutual knowledge (or beliefs) model. We would like to look in particular at what Clark and Carlson (1982) and Joshi (1982) have done.

Clark and Carlson's understanding of mutual beliefs -- Clark and Carlson (1982) "Speech acts and hearer's beliefs", is a typical elaboration of the comprehension process based upon the mutual knowledge (or beliefs) which exist between interlocutors. They claim that mutual knowledge is not only necessary in the interpretation of **canonical speech acts** (speech acts where a simple speaker is addressing a single hearer), but also of a type of non-canonical speech act where there is more than one addressee. They believe that shared beliefs among hearers are crucial for any joint acts performed by them, and that a new type of speech act called **informatives** is necessary to achieve this mutual belief among the hearers.

For them, "mutual beliefs can be represented as mental primitives of the form A and B **mutually believe that** p along with the inference rule: If A and B **mutually believe that** p, **then:** (a) A and B **believe that** p and **believe that** (a)" (ibid. p.5). And according to Clark and Carlson, this mutual belief can only be achieved by inductive inference, which they call **mutual belief induction schema.** This induction inference is based upon information which serves as the grounds for mutual beliefs. Depending on the reliability of such grounds, mutual beliefs "range from weak to strong in line with the grounds on which they are based" (ibid. p.6).

What kinds of information are available as grounds for mutual beliefs? Clark and Carlson think there are three basic domains where information can be sought, namely, 'physical co-presence', 'linguistic co-presence' and 'community membership'. 'Physical co-presence' means that interlocutors A and B can have an awareness of three things, viz.

A, B and the physical objects around them. Therefore, it is possible for A and B to share mutual beliefs about these things by operating their mutual belief induction schema. 'Linguistic co-presence' means that both A and B can be aware of some presupposed entities which are indicated in each of their speech acts. For example, if A says to B, 'I bought a book', the existence of the book which was bought by A is mutually believed by both A and B, because of their awareness of the utterance. 'Community membership' means that both A and B mutually share various knowledge as the members of the same community. This knowledge includes "such generic things as that dogs are animals, objects fall because of gravity, certain causes lead to certain effects, and trees have leaves" (ibid. p.7) and other general or specific facts or states of affairs about some items including themselves. The mutual beliefs along with this concept of "community membership" represent the culture of a society to which A and B belong.

Clark and Carlson (ibid. p.9) also claim that mutual beliefs (or knowledge) can be treated as "mental primitives", although they are 'inferred' information gained by applying the mutual belief induction schema. I think this is a very significant statement. In the preceding subsection (p.179-80), I mentioned that contextual information such as CI(SA), CI(CP) or CI(B) can be treated as primitives and so is distinct from I(INF) (i.e. inferred information). However, what Clark and Carlson suggest is that even CI(SA), CI(CP) or CI(B) can be considered as inferred information. Am I then contradicting myself when I say that CI(SA), CI(CP) or CI(B) is not inferred information? I do not think so. What Clark and Carlson are talking about is 'inductive' inference, whereas the inference I talk about in Figure 19 and 20 is 'deductive' inference. The reason why Clark and Carlson have to employ the term 'inductive' in their mutual belief inductive schema seems to be that the experience of mutually sharing of a belief between interlocutors A and B cannot be described as a sure logical consequence but only as a most probable thing. I believe that this latter sense causes Clark and Carlson to employ the term 'inductive'. They do not seem to mean that inductively inferred information obtained by applying their mutual belief induction schema to their so called 'mental primitives' is anything more or less than those mental primitives. Mental primitives which have come to be shared mutually by A and B are nothing but the same mental primitives. Therefore, it is still tenable to say that CI(SA), CI(CP) or CI(B) are not inferred information, with the proviso that inference here means deductive inference and not the inductive inference which is used in Clark and Carlson's 'mutual induction schema'.

Joshi's understanding of mutual beliefs -- Joshi (1982) presents some significant insights from his research in man-machine interaction. First he distinguishes between 'general knowledge', which is broadly shared by S (system) and U (user), and 'mutual beliefs'. For him 'mutual beliefs' refer to "those beliefs that are discerned by a participant only as a result of the interaction, more precisely a certain segment of the interaction" (ibid. p.181). His understanding of 'mutual beliefs' is therefore much narrower than that of Clark and Carlson.

The main purpose of his paper is to explicate how this kind of mutual beliefs can be obtained by U in man-machine interactions. In order to accomplish this purpose, Joshi first specifies the co-operative principles for the interactions between S (system) and U (user). He gives the following co-operative principles (ibid. p.183):

(86) (i) S truthfully and informatively answers U's question (i.e. provides the requested information).

(ii) At the end of the interaction (with respect to the given request), the mutual beliefs of S, i.e. MB(S,M,P) and the mutual beliefs of U, i.e. MB(U,S,P) are "squared away"; i.e. if S has discerned any misconceptions on behalf of U about the content of the knowledge base (KB) (with respect to the given request), then S informs U about it, and similarly U informs S.

Examples which are used in Joshi (ibid.) for man-machine interactions consist of U's asking a question (or making a request) as the initiation of the first interaction, and S's response as a simple 'yes' answer or a clarification question which causes another set of interactions. The process of 'squaring away of mutual beliefs' between U and S consists of a series of interactions between the two until both of them perceive that they have reached relevant mutual beliefs without any discernable misconceptions or misunderstandings on both sides.

Joshi's scheme as explained so far can be applied to man-man interactions as long as (86) (i) and (ii) can be held, although the condition of (86) (i) seems to be unrealistic in most of our daily communication situations, except situations in which one party is obligated to be true and informative to any person who asks for some information. The cooperative principle of (86) (ii) seems to be more promising for the application to man-man interactions. It seems that most of our serious communication interactions are aiming towards achieving `squaring away' of most relevant mutual beliefs.

What Joshi has proposed is relevant to what I have suggested in Figure 12, i.e. an interactive model between the interlocutors. Joshi's concept of `squaring away of mutual beliefs' corresponds to repeated interactional processes which are necessary for the interpreter to upgrade his status of PUE [(Partial Understanding Effect) --> Actions for getting UnE (Underdtanding Effect)] in Figure 12 to UnE.

4.4 Comprehension Process - Maximum Relevance Model

The preceding section has introduced some models of the comprehension process which can be categorized broadly as `Mutual knowledge Models' and contains my critique of them. However, in recent years, there have often been criticisms of the the models based on the concept of mutual knowledge (or beliefs), especially of the model developed by Grice. Wilson and Sperber (1981), Werth (1981)[9], and Sperber and Wilson (1982) consider that Grice's maxim of `relevance' is the most powerful maxim and the other maxims can be subsumed under it. This upgrading of the rank of `relevance' is also indicated by Sadock (1978)[10]. In the following, we would like to focus our attention on Wilson and Sperber (1981) and Sperber and Wilson (1982).

4.4.1 Objection to Gricean Maxims

Wilson and Sperber (1981) present three arguments against the Gricean model. Their three arguments are: (i) the distinction between 'saying' and 'implicating' is not as simple as Grice suggests; (ii) there is more to the interpretaion of such figures as 'irony' and 'metaphor' than a mere knowledge of the maxims of conversation; (iii) the maxims are not all independently necessary for the generation of implicatures: they may in fact be reduced to a single principle, which they call 'the principle of relevance'. In the following discussion each of the above points demonstrated by them is presented.

Concerning (i) -- Wilson and Sperber (ibid. pp.156-7) understand Grice (1975) as attempting to provide a model for comprehension (or interpretation) of utterances, in which he equates the semantics-pragmatics distinction with the distinction between saying and implicating. They believe Grice is wrong in doing this, because they think that the view that the distinction between saying and implicating being co-extensive with the semantics-pragmatics distinction does not hold. For example, note the very simple and ordinary utterance:

(87) Refuse to admit them.

The utterance (87) itself is quite ambiguous especially in two areas: the meaning of 'admit' and the referents of 'them'. How is it possible to disambiguate the meaning of 'admit' and assign specific referents to 'them'? Suppose either of the following questions precedes (87):

(88) What should I do when I make mistakes?

(89) What should I do with the people whose tickets have expired?

Then, the meaning of 'admit' in (87) becomes clear, as well as the referents of 'them' given the text of (88) or (89). This fact implies that "disambiguation and the assignment of reference - are not semantically but pragmatically determined" (ibid. p.157). This is clear evidence that what Grice proposes as 'what is said' cannot be explained only by semantic features but must allow additional considerations from pragmatics.

<u>Concerning (ii)</u> -- Grice (1975) explains such figures of speech as 'irony', 'metaphor', 'meiosis', and 'hyperbole' as possessing conversational implicatures generated by the violation of the maxim of 'quality' (i.e. they are false if taken literally). Wilson and Sperber differ; they maintain that in the comprehension of some figures of speech it is not logical factors alone that determine what is implicated by an utterance, but that other psychological factors also influence the judgment of the interpreter on the relationships between propositions. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain by Grice's model the difference between patently false utterances such as mistakes, jokes and irrelevancies, and true figures of speech. This means that the violation of the maxim of quality is not a sufficient condition for figures of speech to be interpreted as such rather than in other ways. Wilson and Sperber think that the psychological factors involved in the interpretation of figures of speech seem to demand a separate treatment in a theory of rhetoric. Thus they say (ibid. p.164):

> Considerable progress has been made, largely thanks to Grice, by relieving semantics of a number of problems which were better handled within an improved theory of pragmatics; it now

> seems that if pragmatics is to progress further, it will have to be relieved in turn of a number of problems which cannot be handled in purely grammaticl or logical terms, and demand treatment within a separate theory of rhetoric.

They say in their note that they are preparing a separate theory of rhetoric in a forthcoming book. One thing which I think should be included in any theory of rhetoric is an exact specification of the contextual as well as rhetorical conditions which need to be met in order that figures of speech can be generated or interpreted as such. What seems to be a significant characteristic of figures of speech is their emphasis on the emotive aspect of communication. If it is possible to distinguish the emotive aspect of communication from the volitional aspect of communication in the total intended meaning of an utterance, it seems to me that many figures of speech involve the former aspect of meaning. In other words, figures of speech are often special devices which express the emotion or feeling of the speaker in regards to a certain thing or its state of affairs as well as expressing propositional content. For example, consider the following sentences:

(90) a. My car is a lemon.

b. My car is giving me a lot of trouble.

c. My car is not mechanically sound.

These three utterances are considered to express a very similar volitional assessment of the condition of the car. However, when it comes to the emotive aspect of communication, we tend to judge that (90)(a) has the highest emotional involvement whereas (90)(c) has the lowest, and (90)(b) is somewhere in the middle. In other words, even if we have the same degree of belief concerning the state of affairs of an item, we may still have to choose the form which is most appropriate for matching the degree of our emotional involvement in that state of affairs. What I am saying is that, for example, the choosing of (90)(a) rather than (90(c) by the speaker is largely determined by how he is feeling about the car. Therefore, in conclusion, we claim that the higher the emotional involvement of the speaker concerning a certain person or the state of affairs, the more rhetorical sophistication will be required to express that emotive aspect in his speech acts. The following examples used by Wilson and Sperber (ibid. p.165) also seem to support my conclusion:

(91) Do you ever talk to Charles?

(92) a. No, I never talk to Charles.

b. He is a philosopher, and I never talk to a philosopher.

c. I never talk to philosophers.

d. I never talk to plagiarists.

In the above four responses made to (91), all signifying a negative answer, it seems clear that the speaker's emotional involvement with Charles is ranked as a < b < c < d. And it is significant to note the both (90)(a) and (92)(d), which have highest emotive aspect of meaning, are metaphors (rhetorically devised expressions).

<u>Concerning (iii)</u> — Wilson and Sperber (ibid. p.170) claim that Grice's maxims can be replaced by a single **principle of relevance** which can be represented as:

(93) The speaker has done his best to be maximally relevant.

They insist that Grice's maxims of conversation listed in (70) or on p.149-50 can be all subsumed under (93). They come to this conclusion by demonstrating cogently that each individual description of four main categories of maxim can be embraced in the more general description of (93).

I believe Wilson and Sperber are justified in trying to redefine Grice's maxims of conversation in order to make them less redundant and therefore more useful. It seems true, as Sadock (1978:285) points out, that "so powerful is each of the maxims that at times they vie for the privilege of explaining the same fact." I do not think Grice's view reflects real communication situations. In our verbal communication situations we intuitively assess what should be the most socially appropriate and yet effective ways of communication and then regulate our verbal behavior by abiding by them. In other words, 'the most socially appropriate and yet effective ways of communication' can be replaced by 'the most relevant ways of communication' following Wilson and Sperber's insight. I also suggest that under the principle of relevance we have to posit many kinds of rules and regulations (in which Grice's maxims are also included), which are in some way language specific or culturally bound. For example, in Japanese, there is an extended system of honorifics. The native Japanese speaker knows exactly in what situations he should switch to an honorific way of communication. In those situations where the honorific system is being employed, the most relevant or important maxim which we have to keep is 'be polite'. And because of this maxim, the overriding of other less significant maxims such as maxims of quantity or quality are common. However, in other situations, it is possible that the maxim of quality is the top priority, for example in court cases where the truthfulness of the utterances counts the most. This brief discussion suggests that much research is needed in each particular language on how the principle of relevance is realized specifically in terms of the maxims and principles for various types of communication situations. It seems to be the case that the native speaker of a language can assess the communication situation intuitively and retrieve whatever maxims or rules are necessary for the communication situation, so that his production as well as his comprehension of speech acts may be maximally relevant or appropriate. Lastly we would like to quote Wilson and Sperber's (ibid. p.169) definition of 'relevance' as follows:

> (94) In general, the relevance of an utterance is established relative to a set of beliefs and assumptions - that is, a set of propositions; relevance is a relation between the proposition expressed by an utterance, on the one hand, and the set of proposition in the hearer's accessible memory on the other.

Their definition is unique in that it makes 'relevance' their trump card. 'Relevance' here does not seem to be an inclusive generic term for all the maxims of Grice, but is rather the inclusive principle which needs to be used in every step of inference for interpretation (or comprehension). In other words, it is guiding the interpreter by saying 'Be relevant!' for each inference drawn for interpretation. This does not seem to mean that the kind of information Grice suggested as maxims is not necessary, but that each needs to be specified as relevant in each communication situation. We will come back to this point later.

4.4.2 Objection to mutual beliefs model

Another characteristic of the Sperber and Wilson model is its strong opposition to the mutual beliefs model.

Let us quote from Sperber and Wilson (1982:62):

> On this approach, the identification of mutual knowledge is a major factor in every aspect of comprehension, and one of the most urgent goals of pragmatic theory is to explain how it is achieved. We would like to develop three main arguments against this approach. First, the identification of mutual knowledge presents problems which, contrary to the predictions of the mutual knowledge framework, do not give rise to corresponding problems of comprehension. Secondly, mutual knowledge is not a sufficient condition for belonging to the context: a proposition may be mutually known without being part of the context. Thirdly, it is not a necessary condition either: a proposition may belong to the context without being mutually known. --- The fact that some knowledge is considered mutual is generally a result of comprehension rather than a precondition for it.

We would like to briefly examine their three main arguments against the mutual beliefs model and present our critique to each of the arguments.

<u>Concerning the first argument against the mutual beliefs model</u> -- Sperber and Wilson's first argument against the mutual beliefs model is this: "If mutual knowledge is to play a role in the real-time production and comprehension of utterances, it must be very easily identifiable. --- But at first sight, it is hard to see how such a method could exist" (ibid. p.63). The authors claim that if the identification of mutual beliefs is a prerequisite to comprehension, comprehension becomes very shaky because there would be no adequate method to establish the identification of mutual beliefs. They believe that even Clark and Carlson (1982)'s 'mutual induction schema' with its three main sources of evidence, i.e. 'physical co-presence', 'linguistic co-presence' and 'community membership' (discussed on pp. 184-5) is not sufficient, since there still is "some room for doubt in the hearer's mind about whether

he has correctly understood" (ibid. p.65).

I do not think the above argument by Sperber and Wilson is persuasive. It seems to me that they are neglecting some fundamental facts of communication. First of all, they seem to bring in a philosophical controversy which is not relevant to the issue under investigation. Philosophically it is true that there is not such a thing as perfectly shared knowledge between two people. There seems to be no way to prove, for example, that my understanding or beliefs about a tree in front of me is absolutely the same as that of my interlocutor beside me. Even if both of us are facing the tree, I cannot be absolutely sure that even the simplest fact of the existence of the tree on my part is also believed by my interlocutor. In other words, philosophically speaking, there is no way that absolute mutual knowledge or beliefs can be established between interlocutors. It seems to me that Sperber and Wilson have resorted to this philosophical claim in their argument against the mutual beliefs model of comprehension. However, in actual communication situations, there are many things which we take for granted without any absolute evidence. We presume that others are perceiving things in the real world in about the same way as we are. We presume that others possess about the same basic knowledge of a language (its phonology, grammar, and lexicon, etc.), and so on. Without these basic presumptions no communication can exist. When Clark and Carlson refer to 'mutual beliefs', they seem to refer primarily to these presumptions. Therefore, Sperber and Wilson's attack against Clark and Carlson seems pointless because it is on the basis of an irrelevant philosophical claim.

Secondly, Sperber and Wilson seem to neglect the fact that even in a mutual beliefs-based model of the comprehension process there is always the possibility that a certain assessment of mutual beliefs by the interpreter may be found not to be the correct one. If this wrong assessment is detected, then reinterpretation will be necessary. If it is not detected, the original interpretation will be kept in the memory of the interpreter, until its validity may be challenged later. Grice and Searle and others who follow the so-called mutual beliefs model clearly admit that sometimes interpreted conclusions which were based on a series of inferences may be different from what was intended by the speaker (or the author). The fact that there can be possible misinterpretations in the mutual beliefs model indicate that the model is flexible enough to accept that either the assessment of mutual beliefs or the process of inference has caused such misinterpretations. Therefore, we need to be reminded that in the mutual beliefs model as well, comprehension is essentially a matter of probability.

<u>Concerning the second argument against the mutual beliefs model</u> -- Sperber and Wilson's second argument is this: Since the contex which is actually used for comprehension "is much smaller than the common ground" (ibid. p.66), it is possible that there are many propositions which are mutual beliefs but not part of the context, therefore mutual knowledge is not a sufficient condition for belonging to the context. I do not think the followers of the mutual beliefs model would consider this an attack against their model. They believe that whatever mutual beliefs (which are obtained by inductive inferences) are used in the

comprehension process they are necessarily a part of the context (in a narrow sense). But at the same time they do admit in the broader context that there are immeasurable amounts of implicit (or unretrieved) mutual beliefs which have nothing to do with the actual comprehension process. Sperber and Wilson's attack on the mutual beliefs model here has also missed the point.

Concerning the third argument against the mutual beliefs model -- Sperber and Wilson say that mutual knowledge is not a necessary condition for belonging to the context. In order to support their argument they present two concrete examples of verbal communication situations in which "a proposition can be included in the context although it is not part of the common ground" (ibid. p.70). Both of the examples used are cases where the speaker's assessment of mutual beliefs between himself and his hearer before making his utterance turned out to be a wrong assessment as the result of their interactions, a new mutual belief being established. Therefore, in the context which the speaker used in producing his utterance the assessed mutual knowledge above was surely included, even though it was found that the assessment made was wrong. The hearer, however, did not accept it as part of his context upon which he based his interpretation. Rather, he responded in such a way that his interlocutor's incorrect assessment concerning their mutual beliefs could be straightened out. Therefore, it can be concluded that even in those examples which Sperber and Wilson have used against the mutual beliefs model of comprehension, each specific context used by each interlocutor in an interaction consists of assumed mutual beliefs (or knowledge) or common ground, even though those mutual beliefs may "vary from strong to shaky" (Clark and Carlson 1982:6). Therefore, Sperber and Wilson are wrong when they say that there are cases where "a proposition can be included in the context although it is not part of the common ground" (ibid. p.70). They do not seem to realize the fact that context is ever-changing from one interlocutor to the other, and that it cannot be fixed within an interaction between interlocutors.

We have concluded above that Sperber and Wilson's arguments against the mutual beliefs model of the comprehension process are all without real basis. However, this does not mean that their whole theory of comprehension is useless. In fact, I value highly their insight regarding their concept of 'relevance' which allowed them to make a searching inquiry about the validity and usefulness of Grice's maxims. In the following, we would like to see briefly what Sperber and Wilson present as their model of the comprehension process.

4.4.3 Sperber and Wilson's model of comprehension process

We would like to begin by quoting a passage from Sperber and Wilson (1982) which clearly reveals their position in comparison to Grice and/or other mutual beliefs models. They (ibid. p.71) say:

> We believe that an alternative framework can be developed. The basic insight on which it rests was suggested by Grice (1967; see Grice 1975, 1978 for published parts). Comprehension, he argued, involves not only a particular utterance and a particular context, but also the presumption that the speaker has tried to conform to some general standards of verbal communication. This presumption is used as a guide to the intended interpretation. The question is whether this guide is good enough for comprehension to proceed without a prior assessment of mutual knowledge: this in turn depends on how constraining

> the standards governing verbal communication turn out to be. (Underlining is my addition.)

Another quotation from Wilson and Sperber (1981:166) is:

> It is clear from the account of (23a-d) just given that the process of utterance-interpretation is essentially a deductive one, and that the elements involved in the deductions are:
> (95) a. the propositional content of the utterance
>   b. items of the hearer's background knowledge
>   c. a set of inference rules
>   d. the maxims of conversation
> (Numbering (95) is my addition)

From these two quotations, (94), (95), and the information about "choosing a context" in Sperber and Wilson (1982:76), it is possible to summarize Sperber and Wilson's model of the comprehension process in Figure 21.



Figure 21: Sperber and Wilson's Model of Comprehension Process

Sperber and Wilson's model of comprehension can be divided into three phases: (I) Determining context, (II) Determining propositional content, (III) Determining contextual implications and the intended interpretation (these Roman numerals are used in Figure 21). In the following we would like to explain the three phases just mentioned in more detail and make some comments upon them.

(I) Determining context -- Sperber and Wilson (1982:76) define 'initial context' as consisting of "the interpretation of the immediately preceding utterance in the conversation or in the texts". This clearly demarcated view of context is unique to Sperber and Wilson. This initial context <1> functions as the hub of the comprehension (or interpretation) process, because it provides vital information for the subsequent two steps of comprehension, i.e. determining the propositional content of the utterance, and determining the intended interpretation of the utterance. Without this initial context which is immediately attached to the utterance which is being interpreted, neither can the referents of the proposition be identified nor the intended meaning of the utterance be determined.

There are a couple of intriguing questions about this concept of 'initial' context. Is it possible to set up an initial context when there is no immediately preceding utterance in the conversation or in the text? Another question is: Does initial context consist of mutual beliefs (or knowledge) between the interlocutors?

Concerning the first question, note first of all that Sperber and Wilson's model, summarized in Figure 21, is for the comprehension of an utterance which is in the midst of a conversation or a text. The question raised is interesting, because it requires us to know whether or not there is an initial context for the first utterance in a conversation or a text, and if there is, how it is going to be determined. I do not think Sperber or Wilson have specifically answered this question.

This suggests that their definition of initial context needs to be modified to include the interpretation of the first or initial utterance of an interaction. From my understanding of their theory, I would like to suggest that there should be some kind of initial context even for the first utterance of a text or a conversation. Although there may be no linguistic information available which can constitute the initial context of the first utterance of a text, there usually is metalinguistic information (such as discussed in 4.1.1 or 4.1.2) available which can serve as the initial context for the first utterance. For example, suppose A meets B in a store, and A says to B, 'Hi, how is your father doing nowadays?', it is usually presupposed that A knows B and that he thinks B's father is still alive, and that B, too, knows A and knows that A knows him and something about his father. If this is the case, then we can say that for the above utterance of A, there is at least this information as part of the initial content for the utterance. Sperber and Wilson (1982:76) list three main sources of information (indicated as **information pool** in Figure 20) which they describe as "what he remembers of utterances further back in the conversation (or in previous exchanges with the same speaker) -- encyclopedic knowledge which is attached in his memory to the concepts present in the utterance or in the context -- whatever he is attending to at the same time as the conversation is taking place". In the above example the initial context of A's utterance can be A's recognition of B in the store, A's recalling the encyclopedic knowledge about the existence of B's father, etc. This means that the initial context of the first utterance of a text or a conversation consists of some elements from the information pool of the utterer. In other words, what is recalled to the consciousness of A by his encounter with B has triggered his utterance. So far we have demonstrated that there was a definite initial context for A's utterance. However, our further question is: Is A's initial context for the production of his utterance identical with B's initial context for interpreting A's utterance? To this we can answer 'yes', if B interprets correctly, and 'no' if B misinterprets or misunderstands A's utterance. It is B's responsibility to infer the initial context of A's utterance using his own information pool in order to interpret A's utterance. Only when he succeeds in inferring an initial context which is practically[11] identical with A's initial context of his utterance can his interpretation progress a step forward to arrive at the correct one intended by A.

Let us go back to the second question raised earlier. The above discussion concerning the first question has paved the way to answering the second. Does 'initial context' in Figure 21 consist of mutual beliefs between the interlocutors? Our answer is 'yes', although Sperber and Wilson may not agree. The discussion of the above example indicates clearly that the interpreter's initial context should be practically identical with the utterer's initial context in order to guarantee that his interpretation will be the right one. This means that the interpreter needs to establish a mutual-beliefs-based-context for the right interpretation. In this sense the process of comprehension can be described as a process in which the interpreter strives to attain a satisfactory mutual-beliefs or knowledge level which is identical or near equivalent to that of the speaker concerning his utterance.

And in order to accomplish this the interpreter progressively enlarges his context until he arrives at his conclusion (see initial context <2> and <3> in Figure 21).

(II) Determining propositional content -- The second main stage in Sperber and Wilson's model of the comprehension process is for the interpreter to determine the content of the proposition expressed in an utterance of a text or a conversation (indicated by $(\text{UTTERANCE})^n$ meaning 'n-th utterance' in Figure 21). Sperber and Wilson consider the role of this stage of comprehension crucially important when they (ibid. p.71) say:

> Secondly, and more seriously, Grice's model relaxes some crucial constraints on the comprehension process by allowing the literal meaning of figurative utterances to act as no more than a loose set of hints at the intended message, rather than being a necessary part of the message itself.

According to their theory, propositional content information is a necessary part of the message itself, since the message is the contextual implication inferred from the context and the propositional content. This emphasis on the form of utterance is also seen in Searle (see Figure 20, repeated use of CI(LM)) as well as in my proposed model (for example, see the analysis of a metaphor in pp.87-9).

What do Sperber and Wilson mean by 'propositional content'? It is rather difficult from their discussion to determine which information is included under this label. There seem to be only two alternative answers to this, viz. either the information about ProI or the information about ProI, II and PI. ProI (propositional intent), II (illocutionary intent) and PI (perlocutionary intent) are the concepts developed in our proposed model (see Figure 15 for an example). If their model is for any type of utterance (and I believe this is the case), whether direct speech acts, indirect speech acts, or metaphors, then there should not be any elements of the results of interpretation in stage II. This means stage II includes only the identification of ProI. In this way, the first contextual information usually results in a literal interpretation of an utterance, and then if necessary, a 2nd or 3rd contextual implication can be drawn with the corresponding expansion of context (<2>, <3> etc.). If the model is only for the special kinds of utterance which have implicatures beyond their literal meanings, then stage II must include not only ProI but also II and PI. In other words, stage II must include the interpretation of literal meaning. I do not think the latter case is what they have in mind. The fact that they refuse the sharp dichotomy which Grice sets up between 'saying' and 'implicating' (see the discussion in 4.4.1 (i)) seems to indicate that their comprehension model is designed for any utterance.

This stage, therefore seems to be different from ones by Grice or Searle where the interpretation of literal meaning is somewhat distinguished from the interpretation of the utterance with implicatures (such as metaphors, ironies, indirect speech acts, etc.). However, the weakness that I pointed out for Searle's model (on p.182), i.e. the lack of a theory of the comprehension process for direct speech acts, is also a weakness of Sperber and Wilson's model. They need a separate sub-theory which explicates the process of determining propositional content (ProI) from the 'initial context' and the linguistic properties of the utterance which is being interpreted.

<u>(III) Determining contextual implication</u> -- This stage is the core stage of the comprehension process, because through the process of this stage a conclusion is given to the interpretation of an utterance. Sperber and Wilson (1982:72-3) describe the concept of 'contextual implication' in the following way:

> A new utterance in a given context makes it possible to draw inferences which would not be available if either the context or the utterance were missing. We shall call these **contextual implication.** A contextual implication of an utterance is a nontrivial logical implication derivable not from the content of the utterance alone, nor from the context alone, but only from context and content combined.

Figure 21 describes the main points of the above quotation. There are several characteristics in stage III which make Sperber and Wilson's model of the comprehension process unique.

First of all, the model allows misinterpretations or misunderstandings on the part of the interpreter. If the initial contextual implications obtained through inferences do not make sense, the interpreter can go back to **four distinct places** to check whether there are any problems in them. He may check whether his **inferences** have been drawn correctly, or he may check whether some of the rules which have been employed under the **principle of relevence** for inferences are appropriate or not. He may even go back to the starting base of inferences, i.e. 'propositional content' and 'initial context', and check whether all the referents have been determined correctly or whether the initial context has been assessed correctly. If he finds some problems in those areas, he can correct them and try to make inferences again to obtain another set of contextual implications. In this way, misunderstandings or misinterpretations which often occur in our daily lives can be included in the model. This characteristic of Sperber and Wilson's model has also been noticed and pointed out in this study within a different framework (see Figure 12).

Secondly, the model uses **the principle of relevance** (PR) as the guide for inferences. This principle can be compared to Grice's cooperative principle (CP), and the difference between the two positions was discussed earlier. One advantage of PR is that it can eliminate such ideas as 'violation of rules', 'exploitation of rules' or 'opting out of rules' which occur in Grice's model. What PR says is simply 'Be relevant'. However, this does not mean that the kinds of rules which Grice has developed are of no use, but rather that PR demands that a certain set of rules which govern a certain set of inferences need to be given at each attempt of interpretation. As I pointed out earlier in Chapter Two (p.92), because of PR there is no need to judge in a binary way whether a certain inference which has been drawn is black (violation of maxims) or white (no violation of maxims). As they point out (ibid. p.74):

> We would like instead to investigate the possibility that relevance is not a simple binary concept, but a matter of degree; that one can assign degrees of relevance to possible interpretations, so that speakers and hearers might be conceived of as operating not by a standard of maximal relevance.

Third, the model is unique because it allows the dynamic function of the context. What I mean by 'dynamic function' is that the context can be expanded progressively several times until the principle of relevance can be sufficiently satisfied. For Sperber and Wilson this means that the comprehension process involves "a search for the context which will make this interpretation possible" (ibid. p.76).

We have discussed Sperber and Wilson's model of the comprehension process so far in this subsection. Their model seems to possess some real advantages over that of Grice or Searle because of the characteristics described above. However, there seem to be weaknesses and problems in some areas. The following are some of them:

(i) The mechanism of determining propositional contents needs to be explicated in more detail.

(ii) The relationship between the principle of relevance and other specific rules and principles which support the principle of relevance needs to be specified in various communication situations.

(iii) The initial context of the first utterance of a text or a conversation needs to be specified. (Some work has been done towards this direction in this dissertation.)

(iv) The mechanism of the expansion of contexts needs to be explicated in more detail for the interpretation of various types of utterance.

(v) Their claim that their model does not need to appeal to mutual beliefs seems to be wrong. Their 'initial context' usually consists of the mutual beliefs established in the previous interpretations. But in the ongoing process of comprehension, mutual beliefs are not yet fully established.

4.5 Comprehension Process in the Proposed Model

This subsection is intended to be an integration of my proposed model in regard to the comprehension process. In the preceding chapters and sections many differentiated points have been made concerning comprehension from various perspectives. Now it is important to refresh our memories concerning those points, and relate them to each other, and combine them into an integrated whole. Therefore, in this section, there will not be many attempts to create new insights and ideas, rather there will be much paraphrasing and explaining in order to make the model consistent and coherent.

First of all, we would like to review what we have achieved so far in regard to our comprehension theory, and then we would like to summarize the main characteristics of our model of the comprehension process.

4.5.1 Review of the preceding chapters

Chapters one and two have as their primary emphasis the speaker (or the writer) who produces or generates linguistic symbols for communication. In other words, these two chapters are oriented towards the production of speech acts rather than the comprehension of speech acts, although some elements of comprehension are discussed towards the end of Chapter Two. In these two chapters it was demonstrated that linguistic behavior is part of those intentional human actions called speech acts; also the concept of intention in speech acts is explicated in detail. From the discussion, it has become clear that there are four levels of intention inherent in each of the four act-tokens posited for a speech act-type (see Figure 7, p.34). In order to clarify a lingering theoretical problem in SAT (speech act theory) concerning the concept of 'effect' or 'consequence', we have suggested the theoretical distinction between PI (perlocutionary intent) on the one hand, and PE (perlocutionary effect) and RESPONSE on the other hand. This suggestion is reflected explicitly in Figure 12 (p.61). Then, our proposed model was tested by applying it to three concrete utterances (two indirect speech acts, and one metaphorical expression) with substantial results. However, the real essence of this application was to explicate the process of comprehending those three utterances. Therefore, in this sense, the application was made in anticipation of what has been discussed in later chapters, i.e. comprehension.

Chapter three discusses the concept of social interaction (SI). This is a necessary step in bridging one side of communication, i.e. the speaker (or the writer), to the other side of communication, i.e. the hearer (or the reader), thus making SI possible between the two interlocutors. The speaker's intentionality is extended to things and events (representation intention), and then to his interlocutor (communication intention). Beyond this, it is the hearer's responsibility of how he will re-act or respond to the force extended to him. His first step is to comprehend or interpret the exact nature of the speech act force so that he may be able to respond to it appropriately. Thus considered, such comprehension is the threshhold for social interaction. One intentionality is extended by a speech act; it is then connected to another intentionality only by a knot called `comprehension' or `interpretation'.

Chapter four, our present chapter, so far has discussed the main components of comprehension, i.e. context and inference. We have asked the question of how they interact with each other to bring about comprehension. In order to answer this question, we have attempted the following: First, to give a list of any possible information which may constitute the context; second, to critically examine some recent models of the comprehension process, particularly those of Grice, Searle, and Sperber and Wilson, in order to gain some significant and useful insights.

In the following subsection, we would like to present our model of the comprehension process, which is based primarily upon the insights reviewed above. We will first present it macroscopically in a larger setting of social interaction and then shift our attention to its detailed mechanism and describe it microscopically.

4.5.2 Comprehension process overviewed

Let us look at comprehension in the larger context of our model. The following figure describes an ideal social interaction between two people, A and B. By 'ideal' we mean that there is no interruption which will cause a sudden change of the communication situation in a conversation or a text, so that both interlocutors (A and B) can concentrate on engaging in communication. Figure 22 focuses on the comprehension or interpretation of xth verbal response in a social interaction which is described as $R_x(U_x)|IN_x$:

World
(A)
(B)
etc.

$$\Big|\ \overset{A}{P\text{-}R_1}\ \Big|\ \overset{B}{IN_1\text{-}R_2}\ \Big|\ \overset{A}{IN_2\text{-}R_3}\ \Big|\ \overset{B}{IN_3\text{-}R_4}\ \Big|\quad \cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots$$

$$\cdots\cdots\ \Big|\ \overset{A}{IN_{x-1}\text{-}R_{x}}_{(U_x)}\ \Big|\ \overset{B}{IN_x\text{-}R_{x+1}}\ \Big|\ \cdots\ \Big|\ IN_{n-1}\text{-}R_n\ \Big|$$

World
(A)
(B)
etc.

P: Perception
R: Response (verbal or nonverbal or both)
R_x: xth response in a unit of social interaction
U_x: xth verbal response in a unit of social interaction
IN_x: Interpretation of R_x
R_n: nth (last) response in a unit of social interaction
|: vertical line indicates a wall of ego-ego

Figure 22: Comprehension in a Social Interaction

Figure 22 depicts a unit of social interaction (SI) between A and B, in which a particular utterance $U_x(=R_x)$ and its interpretation IN_x is embedded.

Before going into a further discussion of the above figure, I would like to clarify a possible confusion which may occur concerning some terminology. We have used three terms, i.e. **effect**, **comprehension**, and **interpretation**, referring to the same capability of our minds called 'understanding'. The reason why we have had such a diversity of expressions for the same entity is related to the development of our proposed model. 'Effect' is employed to highlight the emphasis on the part of the speaker to bring about some **effect** or **consequence** on the part of the hearer(s). (See pp.39-40 for setting up various levels of 'effect' which correspond to various levels of 'intent'.) 'Comprehension' is employed to highlight the emphasis on the part of the hearer to understand the utterance which is addressed to him so that he can respond properly to his interlocutor (see 3.3.3 for the role of comprehension in social interaction). 'Interpretation' has been employed and will be employed more in later chapters because of its appropriateness for describing the act of comprehension of not only oral utterances but also written texts. In other words, 'interpretation' is intended to be a broader or more comprehensive term than 'comprehension'.

In the following, I would like to explain some of the important features of Figure 22.

A unit of social interaction -- A unit of SI starts with an encounter of two people (A with B) in the world and ends with a separation whereby each follows his own course of life. When A initiates a SI with B, he has to start with a certain kind of perception (P) of the world which causes A to do something (i.e. R_1 -- usually a verbal initiation) to B. This encounter can be very casual; A, for example, happens to meet B on the street, or it can be planned; A, for example, meets B in his office because of a previous appointment. After A initiates a SI, it is usually the case that B interprets (IN_1) A's action (R_1) and responds (R_2) to it, resulting in n times of turn taking between A and B before this unit of SI comes to an end. A unit of SI can be carried out through various means of communication. A & B may engage in a face-to-face conversation, A & B may have a telephone conversation, A may write a letter to B, etc. For a more consistent classification of communication situations, see Larry Jones (1983: Chapter One).

The difference between a speaker-hearer vs. a writer-reader situation of communication is important. In a speaker-hearer communication situation, it is usually the case that there is no significant time gap between response and interpretation, i.e. interpretations immediately follow responses throughout the process of a unit of SI. Another significant characteristic of the speaker-hearer situation is that more flexibility is usually allowed in regards to turn taking as well as in the means of response between the interlocutors. However, in the case of the writer-reader communication situation, usually A writes a text which consists of many speech acts at one time, and then sometime later the reader B interprets each speech act of the text and reacts to it through reading. This means that when A writes the text, he needs to assume that each of his written speech acts will be interpreted correctly by his reader (IN_1, IN_3, IN_5, etc.), because only within this assumption can he go on writing, i.e. he can develop a theme (R_1, R_3, R_5, etc.) in his text. For example, when A writes a letter to B, A usually assumes that every speech act (usually represented by a clause or a sentence) he writes will be correctly understood and accepted by B as a sincere speech act. In other words, A expects B to accept that A's beliefs, desires, etc. expressed in his speech acts represent his true mental states, so that A may be able to continue to write and complete his text, although, in reality, B may misinterpret or even doubt that what A says is true, in his responses to A's speech acts. We will discuss more about the difference betweeen oral and written communication later.

Perception (P) -- A needs to have some initial understanding of the situation (environment, interlocutor, A's retrieved information from memory by his encounter with B, etc.) in order for him to initiate a conversation or to begin to write something. We would like to call this kind of initial information which triggers A's oral or written speech acts 'perception'. As pointed out earlier, development in this area is lacking in Sperber and Wilson's model, as we have shown in Figure 21. The information which is included in P has been selected by A from all the available information which he can observe or recollect from his memory about the environment as well as his interlocutor B. Some kinds of information available to A are discussed in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The mechanism of A's selective perception of relevant information from inside and outside of himself which prompts him to produce an initial speech act (R_1) seems to be very complex. It is an area which rightly belongs to psychology or psycholinguistics. In this study we will not go further than the common sense understanding that A needs some information (initial context) which motivates (or prompts) him to speak specifically to B in order to initiate a unit of SI.

Blocks of social interaction -- A block of SI is represented in Figure 22 by area with two vertical lines. Each block of SI should belong to an individual, either A or B, because in a block only one individual is responsible for interpretation (IN) as well as a response (R) which is based upon IN. In other words, a block of SI represents the extent of the intentionality of one individual mind. This distinction is crucial to the proposed model. Figures 7, 8, 12, 15, and 17 all incorporate this important distinction in their schemes. We will discuss this aspect of the model in more detail in the following subsection.

4.5.3 Comprehension process described

In this subsection, we would like to focus on just two blocks of SI in Figure 22, i.e. $|IN_{x-1} - R_x(=U_x)|IN_x - R_{x+1}|$ by A and B. R_x is a xth response in this unit of SI by A. However, since we are primarily interested in the comprehension of verbal responses, we presume that R_x is an utterance, namely, U_x. Therefore, in the following discussion, we will replace R_x with U_x. IN_x, as pointed out earlier, is B's interpretation of U_x and it will be the immediate focus of our discussion.

The process of IN_x in our proposed model can be explained by combining Figure 15 with the insights gained from the rather extensive analyses of Searle's as well as Sperber and Wilson's models (see Figures 20 and 21). It is difficult to combine these three figures into one integrated figure for explicating the major features of the comprehension process of our proposed model, because of the difference in their foci of attention. In the following, we will explain our proposed model of the comprehension process from two perspectives, viz. 'literal interpretation' and 'non-literal interpretation'.

Literal interpretation -- For most of the speech acts in a conversation or a text, literal meanings are the intended interpretations of the speaker or the writer. In Figure 20, this literal interpretation is represented as CI(LM), i.e. Contextual Information from Literal Meaning. We will use the abbreviation I(LM) rather than CI(LM), in referring to literal meaning as the intended interpretation. As was pointed out earlier (p.167), the CI(LM) is part of the most important contextual information which is used to begin the inferential process in order to determine the intended meanings for indirect speech acts. However, Searle himself has not developed a concrete model or theory to deal with the process of how an interpreter arrives at I(LM). This needs to be done, even though the interpretation of literal meaning appears quite apparent on the surface. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson's model, which is summarized in figure 21, incorporates the process of the interpetation of literal meaning into their scheme. I agree with them fully in this respect, although what they have done is only a suggestion and not a fully developed theory. In verbal communication situations, and especially in written communication, the words or phrases expressed are the keys to understanding the intended meanings of the speaker/writer. The fact that the speaker chooses to utter specific words and phrases implies that he definitely intends the interpreter to use them to infer his intended meaning. And so often, the literal meaning is what was intended by the speaker!

As Searle points out (see the discussion on p.175), literal meaning is not the meaning of a 'null' or 'neutral' context. It has its significance only in a certain context. Therefore, we need to specify the context in order to understand the literal meaning.

In our model of the comprehension process, the literal meaning

I(LM) of an utterance (U_x in Figure 22) is determined by some Contextual Information of Lexicon and Syntax (CI(L&S) which can be retrieved because of U_x, Contextual Information from Speech Act theory (CI(SA)), and the Immediate Context (IC) which is represented by the preceding utterance (U_{x-1} in Figure 22), and INFerence (INF). Therefore, B's interpretation (IN_x in Figure 22) of U_x is expressed by the following formula:

(96) B's IN_x of A's U_x (literal interpretation):

$$\text{CI(L\&S).CI(SA).IC=B's } U_{x-1} \xrightarrow{\text{INF}} \text{I(LM) of A's } U_x$$

This formula represents IN_x of the person B in Figure 22.

Let us now return to two familiar examples (36) and (37) for further elaboration of these ideas. Utterance (36) 'Let's go to the movies tonight' uttered by student X corresponds to U_{x-1} by B, and utterance (37) 'I have to study for an exam' uttered by student Y corresponds to U_x by A. How can B interpret A's utterance U_x? Formula (96) tells us that B has to infer the literal meaning of U_x on the bases of three main categories of information, i.e. CI(L&S), CI(SA), and IC=B's U_{x-1}. For example, we can specify the information for (36) and (37) as follows:

(97) CI(L&S): -Dictionary type lexical information about 'I', 'have to', 'study', 'for', 'an' and 'exam'

-Two main grammatical units of the whole utterance identified, 'I' as a subject, 'have to study for an exam' as a predicate

-Two main grammatical units of the predicate identified, 'have to study' as a verb, 'for an exam' as a complement

CI(SA): $-U_x$ refers to a future action X of A

(propositional content condition)

-A is able to do X; it is not obvious to both A and B that B knows X (preparatory condition)

-A has an intention to do X (sincerity condition)

-Counts as an attempt to get B to believe that A has an intention to do X (essential condition)

-Possible response A can make to B's request is one of the following: acceptance, rejection or deferment (from Figure 12)

IC=B's U_{x-1}: -All the information B used to generate U_{x-1}, such as U_{x-1} is a proposal of B to A, B thinks that A can do X, etc.

All the information listed in (97) is readily available for B to infer I(LM) of U_x by A that:

(98) To my (B's) proposal expressed in U_{x-1}, A responded by expressing his intention to commit himself to do X (X: A will study for an exam tonight). And his response must be one of 'acceptance', 'rejection' or 'deferment'.

It is presupposed in our model that B needs to rely on the information specified in (97) in order to arrive deductively at this conclusion (98).

One addition which we have to make to our original classification of speech acts was suggested earlier (p.174). There, we pointed out that the five basic categories of speech acts developed originally by Searle and modified by me (Figure 11) cannot be applied sufficiently to classify some utterances which indicate just one of the possible responses, i.e. 'acceptance', 'rejection', and 'deferment'. For example, such utterances as 'Yes.', 'No.', 'Let me see.' etc. used simply to express one's attitude towards proposals, requests, etc. seem to have no place in the classificatory system proposed earlier. Therefore, we would like to add a sixth category of speech acts 'responsives'. This speech act-type, responsives, can be described in the following way, which can now be added as a sixth category at the bottom of Figure 11 (p.53):

Speech Act-Type	Illocutionary Intent(II)	Perlocutionary Intent(PI)
Responsives	I am expressing my attitude of acceptance, rejection or deferment in regard to your speech act force expressed in your utterance.	Accept my attitude and act accordingly hereafter.

Figure 23: <u>Sixth Category of Speech Act</u>

I do not wish to extensively discuss this category. However, we must remember that in our model of SI it is necessary to posit responsives for the other speech act types in a conversation or a text (see Figure 12). And often responsives are not indicated by any surface structure devices. This means that in many cases we have to make responsives explicit in order to describe the speech acts which go together with the responsives, as in (98).

Non-literal interpretation -- What I mean by 'non'-literal is 'beyond'-literal, i.e. 'non-literal meaning' is 'beyond-literal meaning' and 'non-literal interpretation' is 'beyond-literal interpretation'. In the above discussion, we looked at how direct speech acts are interpreted so that we can assign their literal meanings. Here we are interested in how indirect speech acts, metaphors, ironies, etc. which have non-literal or beyond-literal meanings, are interpreted in order to reach the intended meanings.

We have applied our initial model to an indirect speech act (pp.74-77) and a metaphor (pp.81-92), not to develop an interpretation theory based on our model, but to check whether some of the assumptions made for the model are valid even for those speech act-types. Earlier in this chapter we have also discussed extensively the comprehension models propounded by such theorists as Grice, Searle, and Sperber and Wilson and have given some critical comments to them. Some significant insights were gained in the process of our critiques.

The following are the significant characteristics of our comprehension process model for speech acts which have non-literal meanings.

(i) The distinction is made between 'original speech acts', which are responsible for literal meanings, and 'superimposed speech acts', which are responsible for non-literal (or beyond-literal) meanings. The concepts of 'superimposed II and PI' were discussed quite extensively in pp.77-81 and in Figure 16 (p.118). This distinction is discussed by Searle, who thinks that it can be justified (p.166).

(ii) The interpretation of original speech acts is logically prior to the interpretation of superimposed speech acts. This means that literal meanings are the bases or the starting points for the interpretation of non-literal meanings in superimposed speech acts. In this respect, I agree with Sperber and Wilson who strongly claim that literal meanings are the most important information for the interpretations of implicatures (see the quotation from them on p.204).

(iii) Mutual beliefs between the interlocutors play an important role in the process of interpretation (or comprehension). Sperber and Wilson insist that they have developed an alternative model of interpretation in which there is no need of a prior assessment of mutual knowledge (see the quotation from them on p.199). I believe they are wrong in this respect. As pointed out earlier, mutual beliefs which are talked about here do not refer to philosophically absolute mutual beliefs (which are practically impossible to achieve between the two separate individuals), but rather to some general common ground between interlocutors. The communication process can be understood as the process of trying to achieve the maximum degree of mutual beliefs between the interlocutors in the preoccupied area of conversational topics. The fact that our model is based on mutual beliefs does not mean that the model cannot allow any misinterpretations or misunderstandings. On the contrary, the model allows room for possible wrong assessments of mutual beliefs, which will be detected eventually and corrected, if the communication is continued with sincere attitudes on both sides.

(iv) The context which is used in interpretation is manageable in quantity and selective in quality. There is no need for an interpreter to retrieve all the information which he has stored in his memory system. He only needs information which is relevant to his interpretation. In verbal communication, the most relevant contextual information the interpreter can use comes from the linguistic symbols generated by the speaker, which is the very object of his interpretation. We have already discussed how some contextual information used in the interpretation process, such as CI(L&S), CI(SA), IC (see (97) for concrete examples for such information). For the interpretation of non-direct speech acts such as indirect speech acts, metaphors, ironies, etc. we need other kinds of contextual information. The following are some major ones:

(99) CI(LM): Contextual information from literal meaning

CI(CP-MR): Contextual information from cooperative principle and maximum of relevance

CI(B): Contextual information from background

RC=Remote Context: Preceding Utterances-->all the interpreted information of the preceding utterances

CI(E): Contextual information from environment

CI(RD): Contextual information from rhetorical devices

Most of the contextual information listed above has been explained in either Figure 19 or Figure 21. CI(LM) comes from I(LM) in (96) which is the result of the interpretation of literal meaning. CI(CP-MR) is approximately the same information as in Sperber and Wilson. However, behind their principle of maximum relevance (94), such maxims as developed by Grice form a sub-system of rules from which a set of relevant rules is selected for each communication situation. CI(B) is identical with what Searle has presented in p.175-6. RC=Preceding Utterances is what is lacking in Searle's model but is clearly pointed out by Sperber and Wilson. The difference between IC (immediate context) and RC (remote context) can be explained by Figure 22. IC is the information only about U_x, whereas RC is the information about R_1, R_2 ... R_{x-1}. Sometimes R_{x+1}, R_{x+2}...R_n is also included in RC when they are written speech acts. In other words, the interpreter can have access to the information which can be derived from any preceding utterances, or, in the case of written communication, from any subsequent utterances. CI(E) is primarily used in oral communication situations. This kind of information is discussed rather extensively in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. CI(RD) is something which needs further specifications. Many indirect speech acts and other types of non-direct speech acts such as metaphors, ironies, etc. are usually rhetorical devices which are based upon certain conventional rules or principles. Mature native speakers of a language are supposed to possess the knowledge of those rules and principles which govern the existing rhetorical devices of their language. This knowledge is often used for the interpretation of non-direct speech acts. Sperber and Wilson are interested in developing this aspect of context into a theory (see Wilson and Sperber 1981:164). Searle (1975b and 1979) has done some work on indirect speech acts and metaphors. More extensive research is necessary in this area.

The above and other characteristics of our model of interpretation for non-direct speech acts can be summarized by the following formula using the interactional situation described in Figure 21:

(100) B's IN_x of A's U_x (non-literal interpretation):

$$CI(LM).CI(CP\text{-}MR).CI(B).RC{=}R_1 \ldots R_{x-2}.CI(E).CI(RD) \xrightarrow{INF} I(NLM) \text{ of A's } U_x$$

I(NLM) stands for 'information of non-literal meaning', i.e. intended interpretation for non-direct speech acts. At this point I will not discuss further how or in what ways this contextual information is combined to produce a series of inferences to reach a conclusion (I(NLM)). Again we will use examples (36) and (37) to explain how the formula 100 works. The following are some concrete bits of information derivable (or retrievable) from the communication situation of (36) and (37).

(101) CI(LM):

-I(LM) gained by B which is described in (98), that is, 'To my proposal expressed in U_{x-1}, A responded by expressing his intention to commit himself to do X (X: A will study for an exam tonight), and his response must be one of acceptance, rejection, or deferment.'

CI(CP-MR):

-A's utterance in (37) 'I have to study for an exam tonight' must be relevant to B's proposal in (36).

CI(B):

-To study for an exam usually takes much time.

$RC{=}R_1 \ldots R_{x-2}$:

-(For examples (36) and (37), this category of information cannot be applied.)

CI(E):

-B observes A's facial expression and notices that A has somewhat hardened his face.

CI(RD):

-Utterance (37) can be a indirect speech device in English to express a 'rejection' for the proposal in a shorthand manner by stating the grounds of rejection.

Formula 100 tells us that B should use all the available information listed in (101) to draw inferences to reach his interpretive conclusion, i.e. I(NLM). Without explaining a step by step inferential development[12], the conclusion seems to be apparent:

(102) B's IN_x of A's U_x (non-literal meaning):

'A intended (37) to express his rejection of my proposal made to him in (36) by specifying the grounds for his rejection.'

In this way the literal meaning of (37) presented as in (98) has served as the nucleus of contextual information from which inference are made to obtain the non-literal meaning which was intended by the speaker.

In our interpretive model, we have posited two layers of interpretation, i.e. a literal interpretaion and a non-literal interpretation. A literal interpretation, which is more basic than the other, can be described by the formula in (96). In short, the formula summarizes the complicated process of identifying the four intentions of the speaker (i.e. UI, ProI, II, and PI described in Figure 7 and 15) by the interpreter (or the hearer). So often the interpretation of a speech act ends with this literal interpretation. However, occasionally some speech acts require another layer of interpretation called 'non-literal interpretation'. Such speech acts as indirect speech acts, metaphors, rhetorical questions, ironies, hyperboles, etc. fall into this category. The formula in (100) summarizes the process of non-literal interpretation. This formula serves to identify the four superimposed intentions of the speaker (see Figure 7 and 15) through a series of inferences which are based on various kinds of contextual information.

Our model of interpretation was applied earlier in chapter two to a metaphorical expression (see pp.81-92). More research is necessary in this area of application. Our model, which is represented by the two formulas in (96) and (100), needs to be applied to more specific non-direct speech acts so that the pattern of inference (as in Figure 20), the nature of CI(RD) and other aspects can be described more rigorously.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

[1]Searle (1983) claims that intentionality needs to be posited for perception as in `seeing something' or for `remembering something'. He considers visual and other sorts of perceptual experiences as "conscious mental events" (ibid. p.45). For example, he explains a visual experience of seeing a yellow station wagon as follows: "I have a visual experience that there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow wagon there is causing this visual experience" (p.48). Therefore, in his theory, "perception is an intentional and causal transaction between mind and the world" (p.49).

[2]For example, Green and Morgan (1981:168) take this view, although they admit there are some conscious components in the comprehension process such as "consciously choosing among multiple interpretations unconsciously arrived at, or similar kinds of meta-assessments".

[3]These three factors roughly correspond to `knowledge of language', `knowledge of the use of language' and `knowledge of one's interlocutor' in Green and Morgan (1981), and to `physical co-presence', `linguistic co-presence', and `community membership' in Clark and Carlson (1982).

[4]Besides these two means of representation, there are other ways to represent linguistic forms. Larry Jones (1983), for example, refers to `sign language' and `Morse code' as such means of representation. In this dissertation, however, we will not deal with such cases.

[5]Searle (1975a) discusses fictional discourses in his speech acts theory, and concludes that in fiction the author **pretends** to perform a series of illocutionary acts. He contends that behind this act of pretention on the part of the author there "is a set of extralinguistic, nonsemantic conventions, that break the connection between words and the world established by the rules mentioned earlier" (ibid. p.326). It is clear that by `a set of extralinguistic, nonsemantic conventions', Searle means something like Wirrer presents as in (68), namely, fact vs. fiction convention.

[6]Lewis, D.K. 1969. Convention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

[7]Schiffer, S.R. 1972. Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[8]For example, Parker-Rhodes (1978) presents the concept of a `conversational cycle' with two contrastive concepts, i.e. `expression' and `comprehension'. He makes a comment that compared to expression the study of comprehension has been comparatively neglected. He also points out that recent research indicates that the relationship between the process of expression and the process of comprehension is very complicated and not just an inverse relationship, as has been assumed by many theorists. Therefore, he says (ibid. pp.17-8), "some consideration has

also been given to the inverse process of comprehension, to the extent that this is equivalent to the extraction of a deep structure from a surface text. The difficulties of this phase have lately been discussed at some depth by Wanner and will be considered further in Sec.2.3; it seems, from the lack of real progress, doubtful whether comprehension is an algorithmic process at all. It may rather be a questing search ('what would I have had to be thinking in order to say that?'), an open-ended enterprise bearing to expression something like the relation which, in the calculus, integration bears to differentiation. Failure to face up to this contrast may well have retarded our understanding of grammar in many ways." It is interesting to note here that the relationship of expression to comprehension is considered to resemble that of integration to differentiation in calculus. Wirrer (1982) skillfully distinguishes fact convention from fiction convention, as I have shown in 4.1.3 of this study. He then presents particular rules of those conventions from two perspectives, namely, that of the speaker/author and that of hearer/reader, as shown in (67) and (68). In those places, we find that there are more conventional rules involved in the process of comprehension than in that of production. This fact seems to indicate that the comprehension process is more than the inverse of the production (or generation) process.

[9] Werth (1981), in his article "The concept of 'relevance' in conversational analysis", develops a model of conversation within which the relevance of an utterance is indicated. His position is that "the model of conversation which all of these accounts seem to suggest, therefore, is a co-operative venture in which the participants seek to increment the commonly accepted set of propositions by contributing further propositions which are relevant to it." (ibid. p.134). Therefore, in his scheme, 'relevance' functions as the monitor so that the contributions from each interlocutor are maximally effective. He also introduces the concept of 'coherence' and claims that coherence which can be defined as "complete or partial synonymy or coinciding implications" (ibid. p.153) is equivalent to the concept of 'relevance' which can be defined as "the appropriateness of an utterance meaning to the meaning of the previous utterance, together with the context in which both occur" (ibid.p.153).

[10] Sadock (1978) seems to be one of the earliest critics of Grice's maxims of conversation. He says, "the Cooperative Principle with its maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner is so vague that almost anything can be "worked out" on the basis of almost any meaning" (ibid. p.285). He thinks that among those powerful maxims there is too much redundant information so that at times it is difficult to determine which maxim is responsible for the implicature under investigation. He suggests in his discussion that some possible conversational implicatures of an utterance can be disambiguated and explained by the demand for relevance" (ibid. p.291).

[11] The reason why I use the term `practically' here is because of the philosophical problem which we discussed earlier. Philosophically or psychologically speaking, there is no way that we can say A's initial context for the production of his utterance is identical with B's initial context for the interpretation of A's utterance, because A and B are differnt individuals and their informations pools are quite different from each other. However, from the perspective of communication theory, we can assume that A's initial context is sufficiently identical with B's initial context, if B's interpretation turns out to be a correct one.

[12] In chapter two in (45) p.76, a step-by-step inferential development for reaching an interpretative conclusion is shown in the same examples. In those six steps, the first three types of contextual information in (101) are utilized. The rest of the contextual information in (101) seems to be either irrelevant to that particular analysis (for $RC=R_1-R_{x-2}$) or reinforcement information (for CI(E) and CI(RD)). Therefore, the analysis in (45) is basically the same as that of (101) and (102), although the latter includes more contextual information.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN INTERPRETATIVE MODEL FOR WRITTEN TEXTS

In the four preceding chapters, we have discussed primarily Speech Act Theory and its implications in the areas of social interaction and interpretation (or comprehension). Therefore, we can justly call the preceding chapters the 'THEORY PART'. In the following four chapters, however, we would like to apply the insights gained in the theory part to actual texts in various languages.

As pointed out in the INTRODUCTION, the theory of literary semantic analysis expounded in SSWC (Beekman, Callow, and Kopesec, 1981 edition) has proved insufficient for deriving themes of texts, especially of narrative texts. The research effort of this dissertation was initiated, in the first place, to search for a practical methodology which would be effective in deriving themes for narrative texts. My initial effort in this direction is summarized in a forthcoming publication[1]. In this article, I have tried to incorporate the concept of 'author's intent or purpose' into an analytical method of deriving themes for narrative texts. I have also proposed, among other things, that social interactions among the participants in a narrative text are the backbone of the text. This initial research prompted me to investigate further these basic concepts, resulting in the present dissertation research. With some substantial results from the theoretical discussions in the preceding chapters, a practical interpretative methodology which will be presented in the following chapter is intended to be more tenable than my initial methodology.

The application of Speech Act Theory (SAT) to interpretation or literary analysis is a recent phenomenon and we have not yet reached the stage where we have a fully developed theory in this area[2]. The following attempt, therefore, should not be considered a refined well-articulated model or theory but rather a tentative one which is hoped to serve as a useful stepping-stone for future development.

5.1 Difference Between Oral and Written Communication

It is important to make a clear distinction between oral and written communication before we present an interpretation model for written texts. There is no essential difference between the two in regard to their most basic property, that is, that they represent verbal actions. It has been our basic assumption that any verbal behaviour, whether oral or written, is part of that human action called 'speech act'. However, when it comes to more practical aspects of those two types of communication, there are some significant differences between the two. And these differences in some way determine how the interpretation of a text should be carried out. In the following, I would like to point out some major differences between the two types of communication.

5.1.1 Degree of retrieval of information

As formulas (96) and (100) in the preceding chapter indicate, the retrieval of contextual information (CI) is crucial to the interpretation process. In oral communication, the amount of CI the interpreter is able to retrieve is severely limited, because the interpreter can focus on a particular utterance while it is being uttered and while it is being retained in his short-term memory. The interpreter may remember a few utterances exactly as they were spoken but most of the spoken utterances in the course of a verbal interaction between himself and others will be forgotten. Only the most important points of the interaction will be remembered for a relatively long period of time. On the contrary, in written communication, the amount of CI the interpreter can retrieve is much larger. The interpreter, in this case, can use as much time as he wants pondering a particular utterance, because the utterance is fixed on a piece of paper through orthographic symbols. He may go back, or even go forward, in the text to remote utterances to obtain necessary information to understand the particular utterance under investigation.

This difference has many implications for interpretation theory. A non-native speaker of a language usually has a lot of limitation in understanding oral utterances, because the amount of time allowed for him to interpret them is too short to retrieve necessary CI and process it for understanding. However, if he is a reader of the same language and is asked to interpret the same utterance in written form, his interpretation will be easier and more accurate, assuming that all the other conditions are the same.

5.1.2 Freedom to take turns

The degree of freedom to take turns seems to form a scale which ranges from complete freedom to no freedom. 'Complete freedom' is represented by a casual conversation between housewives who belong to the same social class. 'No freedom' is represented by the activity of reading any written material.

Figure 20 in the preceding chapter describes an ideal case of social interaction between two people, A and B, who equally share taking turns. Although in most actual face-to-face conversations one party tends to dominate the speaking opportunity, this does not mean that the other party has no right to the floor. Basically he has the freedom to present his opinions or make any responses he desires to make.

However, when it comes to reading written material or to an audience hearing a speech or a narration, usually there is no freedom to take turns. The audience may be able to shout at the speaker in the latter case, but usually one is not permitted or expected to make any explicit verbal responses directly to the speaker. One may be able to frown or harden his features when he does not approve of what he is hearing or reading, but he is not able to respond verbally to the speaker or the writer spontaneously. He needs to exercise patience and let the speaker or the writer say whatever he wants to say first before he may be able to make a legitimate response, i.e. he may go to the speaker to ask some questions after the speech, or he may write a letter to the author about his feelings, etc. Pratt (1977) also claims that in natural narratives, as well as in written texts, the hearers or the readers give up their right to have the floor when she says (ibid.p.105):

> Natural narratives formally acknowledge that in voluntarily committing ourselves to play the role of audience, we are accepting an exceptional or unusual imposition. This claim, I believe, holds for voluntary audience rules in general and is crucial to our understanding of the appropriateness conditions bearing on many kinds of speech situations, including literary ones.

What implications does this difference have to interpretation theory? Pratt (ibid. p.106) thinks that because of voluntarily giving up of the right to the floor and taking up the role of the audience, the expectations of the speaker increase, and his obligations to the audience likewise increase. This means that the speaker/writer has to prepare himself well in order to achieve better communication so that his audience can understand him and be benefitted from it. Therefore, the interpreter can assume, when he interprets a written text or a good narration, that enough contextual information will be available for correct interpretation.

5.1.3 Oral Proximity vs. printed distance

Oral communications are prior to written communications, and the former can be characterized by the word 'proximity' and the latter by the word 'distance'.

By 'proximity' we mean that the oral and vocal apparatus required for oral communication limits the activities of communication within relatively small circles. In ancient times, when there were no modern transportation systems and no major world languages shared by millions, the speakers of a language shared everything, communicating orally primarily among themselves in proximity.

However, by the invention of script around 3500 BC, 'distance' was introduced to human beings by writing activities. Ong (1977:21) explains the function of writing in the following:

> Alienation, cleavage, is not all bad. To understand other things and themselves, to grow, human beings need not only proximity but also distance, even from themselves. Out of alienation, and only out of alienation, certain greater unities can come. Persons at ease with their origins and with their own unconscious welcome certain alienations, for they can put them to good use. The evolution of human consciousness would be impossible - unthinkable - without the alienations introduced by writing, print, and the electronic transformations of the word.

What Ong seems to suggest in his lofty statement is that human beings by writing can extend their horizons and learn from others through much wider interactions beyond one's culture and language. It is, then, presupposed by Ong that the interpretation of written documents has been effective for the transfer of cultural as well as scientific knowledge.

Ricoeur (1981) introduces a concept called 'distanciation' which is very similar to 'distance' in Ong. He sets up four areas where distanciation is characteristically observed in writing. The first area is that the event of speaking is surpassed by the meaning of what is said. The meaning, not the event, is inscribed in writing by means of various grammatical and lexical devices. The second area concerns the relation between the inscribed expression and the original speaker. Ricoeur thinks that there is no coincidence between the intention of the speaker and the meaning of what is said. The third area concerns the relation between the inscribed expression and the original audience. In oral communication, the hearer is specified because of its very limited social interactional situation, but in written communication the potential readers are virtually open-ended. The fourth area is that of reference. In oral communication, because of the shared communication situation, the speaker can have access to various ostensive (or deictic) expressions. However, in written communication, usually there is a lot of distance between the writer and the readers so that the writer can no longer rely on such ostensive expressions as exist in oral communication.

There are several important implications to be drawn from the above discussion for interpretation theory of written materials:

(i) In written communication, especially, there is no objective way for the interpreter to go into the psychological mental states of the author beyond what is expressed by orthographic symbols. We usually assume that the author is 'sincere' in his speech acts, i.e. his intentions expressed in speech acts reflect his true intentions. However, especially when we are interpreting documents whose authors do not share the language and culture with us, we never know for sure about an author's "ulterior motives" (Searle 1975a:325) or an author's subconscious states which are "far beyond what the author intended" (Green and Morgan 1981:170). Therefore, it is important for us to realize as interpreters that there is a clear limit on how far we can go if we want our interpretations to be as objective as possible, basing our inferences on reliable information which can be obtained from the text itself. Our interpretation process formulas described in (96) and (100) specify exactly what kind of information will be available for the interpreter.

(ii) In written communication, since the author before writing is aware of the fact that he cannot take for granted for his readers this immediate environment, or sometimes even his own cultural judgement, he tries to make such information explicit in writing in order to insure that he can communicate to his readers. In other words, some of the contextual information (CI) which is present and important in oral communication, such as facial expressions, voice quality, ostensive expressions, etc., somehow need to be compensated for in written communication. The only compensation the author can make in this case is to use words and phrases to inscribe the necessary CI for his readers. This means that a careful interpretation of a text itself should be quite sufficient to infer the intended meaning of an author, granted that the interpreter (or the reader) is within the range of the author's expectation of who would be the readers.

(iii) In written communication, since the text which is the object of interpretation is fixed, the interpreter can prepare himself for his better understanding of the text. For example, for the interpretation of Biblical texts, twentieth century interpreters, who are far removed from the original settings, can study the original languages, i.e. Koine Greek and Hebrew, and read other cultural as well as historical information of the ages when the texts were written. In this way even a twentieth century interpreter can obtain a status which is almost equal to the original qualified readers.

5.2 Classification of Written Texts

Any interpreter, before he begins to interpret (or read) a written text, usually has some general ideas about the nature of the text. For example, when we read a bit of fiction or non-fiction, we have certain preliminary knowledge about what is 'fiction convention' or 'non-fiction (fact) convention' as described specifically by Wirrer (1982). (See (67) and (68) of this dissertation.) Where does this kind of preliminary knowledge about a text type come from? It seems each text type (genre) has its own distinctive features by which it is identified. In the following, we will examine critically two of the classificatory systems presented for text types particularly as to the features employed for classification, and then we would like to present an alternative view which, in my judgement, is more realistic.

5.2.1 Longacre's classification and its critique

Longacre (1983) presents his classification system for discourse genre as shown in Figure 23.

	+Ag -Orientation	-Ag -Orientation
+Contingent	NARRATIVE	PROCEDURAL
Succession	Prophesy	How-to-do-it +Proj.
	Story	How-it-was-done -Proj.
-Contingent	BEHAVIORAL	EXPOSITORY
	Hortatory Promissory	Budget Proposal +Proj. Futuristic Essay
Succession	Eulogy	Scientific Paper -Proj.

Figure 24: Longacre's Notional Types (From Longacre 1983a)

Longacre uses three parameters for setting up various categories. These parameters are: 'Contingent temporal succession' (expressed as ± Contingent Succession in the figure); 'Agent Orientation'; 'Projection (abbreviated as ±Proj. in the figure). According to him, Contingent temporal succession "refers to a framework of temporal succession in which some (often most) of the events or doings are contingent on previous events or doings" (ibid. p.3); Agent orientation "refers to orientation towards agents (cf. Chapter 5) with at least a partial identity of agent reference running through the discouse" (ibid. p.3); and Projection "has to do with a situation or action which is contemplated, enjoined, or anticipated but not realized" (ibid. p.4).

Two parameters, ±Contingent +Succession and ±Ag -Orientation yield the four text types, viz. NARRATIVE, PROCEDURAL, BEHAVIORAL, and EXPOSITORY as in Figure 23. Then by the addition of another parameter ±Proj. a total of eight categories are produced. In this way, each of the four main categories is further subdivided into binary pairs by $\pm$Proj. as is shown in Figure 23.

Longacre (ibid. p.5) refers to a fourth parameter, which he did not employ in Figure 23 but thinks would be possible to add to the figure, called 'Tension'. If this parameter is added to the classification, then mathematically a total of sixteen categories will be created. Therefore, by adding more parameters it is possible to set up theoretically 32, 64, or 128, etc. categories for finer distinction among text types.

Longacre claims this classificatory system 'notional' in contrast to 'surface'. The notional versus surface distinction is the backbone of Longacre's linguistic theory. It seems to me that his 'notional structure' is somewhat similar to 'deep structure' in generative transformational grammar or to 'semantic structure' of SSWC. He believes that normal realizations of those notional text types correspond to their couterpart surface structure types, but that there are cases in which notional types and their realizations in surface structures are skewed.

I do not think Longacre's classificatory system reflects the way we perceive various text types (genres) in our daily communication situations, for the following major reasons:

(i) We are more interested in practical matters than some semantic features of the content of a text. This means that when we read a text we tend to perceive pragmatic features more prominently than some semantic or notional features. Therefore, I believe some pragmatic features of texts should be our primary parameters for the classification of text or genres. We will ask questions like, 'Is it fiction or non-fiction?' 'What benefit can we get by reading this text?', etc. rather than the content questions like, 'How is chronological sequence expressed?' 'Who is the main participant?' etc. I am not insisting that semantic or notional features are not important but that pragmatic features are more important for the classification of major literary text types.

(ii) In Figure 23, the four main types of text (or discourse) are treated as equal in his classificatory hierarchy, their differences being manifested only by the plus or minus values of the binary features. I do not think they are mutually exclusive types. For example, narratives are usually behavioral because they often express morals, explicitly or implicitly. And often these morals are important and often they are the themes of the author when narratives are told or written. Van Dijk (1980:116) admits that the two major constituents of narrative are 'plot' and 'moral'. I have also noted (T. Manabe 1983) that in Japanese, as well as Kwanga[3], narratives or stories are a means to teach the norms of those societies. Not only NARRATIVE in Figure 23, but also PROCEDURAL and even EXPOSITORY, seem to possess a behavioral (or normative, or prescriptive) element as an essential constituent.

(iii) In Figure 23, there are some categories set up with -Proj. From my theory which is based on Speech Act Theory, it is clear that all speech acts have `perlocutionary intents' which are +Proj. Since all text are conceived of as speech acts, every text should possess this element of `perlocutionary element' or `projection'. This means that to use ±Proj. as a classificatory parameter is unsatisfactory.

(iv) In Figure 23, the classificatory system is based on the parameters which have only two extreme values. However, this judgment which requires that everything be black or white, can be misleading. It seems that such parameters as `Contingent Succession', `Ag-Orientation' etc. are matters of degree and not simply one or the other. For example, it does not seem to be unthinkable that a certain text or discourse might have all the four major types (NARRATIVE, PROCEDURAL, BEHAVIORAL,and EXPOSITORY) as its constituents or embedded in its constituents. If this is the case, how is this text going to be categorized?

5.2.2 SSWC's classification and its critique

SSWC (1981 edition) presents the following chart to classify various types of discourse:

	NONPRESCRIPTIVE	PRESCRIPTIVE
Logical relations presented within a chronological framework	Narrative Discourse	Procédural Discourse
Logical relations presented without a chronological framework	Expository Discourse	Hortatory Discourse

Figure 25: SSWC's Classificatory System for Texts Types (from SSWC 1981)

SSWC, from my point of view, has presented a better classificatory system than Longacre's. It uses two binary features as parameters, i.e. ±Prescriptive and ±Chronological Framework. These two parameters are similar to Longacre's ±Contingent Succession and ±Proj. The significant differences between SSWC and Longacre are twofold:

(i) SSWC considers the parameter of ±PRESCRIPTIVE most important, whereas Longacre treats a similar parameter, ±Proj., as a third parameter;

(ii) SSWC seems to insist that logical relations are prior to choronological (or temporal) relations because they are posited for every major text type, whereas Longacre does not consider them as primary parameters. The four major types of texts or discourses set up in SSWC are almost identical with those of Longacre.

SSWC's classification system for text types, in my judgment, has an advantage over Longacre's system, because it seems to suggest the importance of the author's intention and purpose which is reflected in the choices of the terms, i.e. NONPRESCRIPTIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE, and

'Logical relations'. However, the system seems to contain the same problematic claim as was also pointed out above (iii) for Longacre's system. Narrative discourse as well as expository is considered to be NONPRESCRIPTIVE. From my modified theory of speech acts, this is an untenable claim. What is the point of the author when he writes a narrative text or a expository text? As I have pointed out (Manabe:1983), what the author tries to accomplish on the part of the reader(s) through writing a narrative text or an expository text is: "I want you to learn a lesson (or something) from a story which I am going to tell," or "I want you to follow this particular course of action, because of the grounds which I am going to explain". What specific lesson the reader has to learn, or what particular course of action the reader has to follow, is usually determined by the context. If this is the case, we can no longer consider NARRATIVE or EXPOSITION as NONPRESCRIPTIVE.

This conclusion is supported by John Tuggy who admits that Longacre (1976) has given him the insight to see that the Gospel of John, which is usually considered as NARRATIVE, is essentially HORTATORY. Tuggy says (1979:124):

> We noted that the Gospel of John has a deep structure purpose of exhortation and exposition, but it is encoded in a narrative and conversational genre to achieve vividness.

Tuggy, as well as Longacre, may think that the Gospel of John is unusual, but rather this is the normal and essential function of narrative.

Walrod (1983) seems to support our claim in his research on Ga'dang (a Philippine language) normative discourse. He concludes that "normative discourse is the primary function of language" (ibid. p.18). Then he maintains that any type of discourse may have this component (norm or prescription): he claims that "any discourse which realizes a speaker's intention which is primarily to affect or change the beliefs or behavior of others, or to bring about or maintain a desired social structure, is a normative discourse." (ibid. p.101-2).

5.2.3 A classification system based on intention

I would now like to present an alternative classificatory system for text types which is based on our proposed model. As expounded earlier in chapters one and two, in Speech Act Theory (SAT), all verbal communication activities are considered as part of human actions. Since they are actions, they are based on intentionality. In our discussion, intentionality was defined as consisting of two elements, i.e. illocutionary intent (II) and perlocutionary intent (PI).

According to Searle (1977:44), what we can do through language is summarized as follows:

> If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes, and we bring about changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the some utterance.

The above five categories indicating what we can do through language are represented by five speech act types which are explained elsewhere (especially Figure 9, 10, and 11). These speech act types are: Representatives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, and Declarations.

However, we have added one more speech act type called 'Responsives', which seems to fill up a gap in the original five categories (see the discussion in p.220). Therefore, we can consider that these six speech act types represent what we can accomplish by using language. Then it seems perfectly legitimate to think that whatever we produce in writing is also intended to achieve at least one of the six major things we can accomplish by using language. Therefore, by extending these six categories of speech acts to written texts, we can obtain the same number of written text types. This is the classificatory system which we want to propose here. We may call this a 'SAT based classificatory system for text types'. I would like to point out some arguments for this position:

(i) This classificatory system is a natural result of the application of SAT to written texts. Therefore, for the sake of consistency in the proposed theory, it is a most tenable or defensible position.

(ii) Some might argue that since Searle's classificatory system is based primarily on sentence level speech acts, the uncritical application of this system to discourse level is problematic. It is true that various kinds of modification are necessary when sentence level concepts are applied to discourse (or text) analysis. However, it has been an established fact that the theme (or the most prominent information) of a text can usually be represented by one or a few propositions whose surface structure realization in English is a clause or a sentence. For example, SSWC (ibid. pp.24-5) admits that the most prominent proposition of a text can be derived due to the fact that the propositions in the text are related to each other in such a way as to specify their relative importance in the text. L.K. Joness (1977:45) claims that the theme at the highest level is related to the purpose or intent of the author or speaker. If we take the same view, and if the theme states author's intention, then it is possible that texts can be classified according to their themes, which are usually represented by a sentence or two. This means that our classificatory system is justified.

(iii) The classificatory system we are proposing is based upon the purpose or the intention of the author of a text, and this seems to best reflect our perception when we read or interpret a written text. When we say 'intention' of the author, we do not mean by it some hidden or subconscious mental state of the author, but rather mental state clearly expressed through linguistic representations in a text. We believe that the author's overall purpose or intention should be the most important criterion for the classification of texts. Some of the structural semantic features which are used as primary criteria in Longacre, as well as in SSWC, seem to apply better to the derivation of finer distinctions after major text types are set up.

(iv) This classificatory system allows us to distinguish between fiction and non-fiction, because this distinction emerges only when the concept of intention or purpose of the author is introduced. However, in the classificatory system where only structural features are used for criteria, it is impossible to obtain the fiction vs. non-fiction distinction.

I would now like to introduce a classificatory system proposed by Kinneavy (1971), a literary critic, who considers purpose in discourse to be all-important for classification. Then, I would like to present a classificatory system which is also based on purpose or intention but is more consistent with SAT.

Kinneavy's classificatory system -- Kinneavy (1971) in A Theory of Discourse, first introduces his classificatory system for discourse types in depth. His system is based on the 'purpose' or 'aim' of a discourse. His understanding of the concept of purpose or aim is best seen in the following quotation (ibid. p.48):

> Yet purpose in discourse is all important. The aim of a discourse determines everything else in the process of discourse. "What" is talked about, the oral or written medium which is chosen, the words and grammatical patterns used - all of these are largely determined by the purpose of the discourse. In the terminology of the first chapter, mode of discourse, art of discourse, and the semantic and syntactic components of the language are all functions of the aim of discourse.

He proposes four major aims, i.e. to display reaction of the self (EXPRESSIVE), to represent reality (REFERENTIAL), to present artifact (LITERARY), and to persuade others (PERSUASIVE). The following figure is adoped from Kinneavy (ibid. p.61) with most of his examples omitted:



EXPRESSIVE	REFERENTIAL	LITERARY	PERSUASIVE
Examples: Diaries Prayer Manifestoes Myth	Examples: (Exploratory) Seminars Diagnosis (Scientific) Deductive Argument Inductive Argument (Informative) News Articles Text Books	Examples: Short Story Lyric Short Narrative Drama etc.	Examples: Advertising Sermons Editorials etc.

Figure 26: Kinneavy's Classification of Texts

As seen in the figure, Kinneavy presents four pragmatic components, i.e. ENCODER, DECODER, SIGNAL, REALITY. Then he claims that whichever component the author chooses to emphasize most in his discourse determines the aim of the discouse. He says (ibid. p.60):

> ... emphasis on the encoder or decoder gives **person** discourse,, emphasis on reality to which reference is made gives **reference** discouse, and emphasis on the discourse product itself gives **product** discourse. Since **person** discourse can focus on either the encoder or the decoder, there are two kinds of person discourse; expressive, emphasizing the encoder and persuasive, emphasizing the encoder. And **reference** discourse must be further subdivided into scientific, informative, and exploratory, ...

Although Kinneavy's model is innovative because of his introduction of pragmatic concepts for text classification, there are a couple of theoretical problems which cause some inconsistencies in his scheme. I will point out these problems with an expectation that our proposed classificatory system can overcome the problems.

First, there is an essential difference between the LITERARY type and the other three types. According to Kinneavy, the emphasis on LITERARY is production, and its aim is to produce artifacts. However, this emphasis does not seem to be a sufficient reason for making LITERARY distinguishable from other types, because all of them seem to have an emphasis on production and their products can be considered as artifacts. It seems to me that Kinneavy unjustly introduces here a hetrogeneous criterion of a fiction (literary) vs. non-fiction distinction into an intention (or aim) based classification system.

Second, he seems to claim that four types of discourse can be obtained from four different emphases on the four components of the communication situations as shown in Figure 26. However, theoretically this is not the case. Aims or purposes are not essentially related to the degree of emphasis on those four pragmatic components. They are essentially related to the author's mental states or events which specify his kinds of intentionality.

SAT based classificatory system proposed -- The two theoretical problems of Kinneavy's system as noted above give us some assurance that our alternative view is better because it can solve these problems.

First, I propose, following Wirrer (1982), that the fiction vs. fact (non-fiction) distinction should be made for texts. Then second, I propose that the six speech act types mentioned earlier in this subsection be used as representing six text types. These two suggestions bring forth the following classificatory system for texts:

TEXTS

FACT	FICTION
Representatives	Representatives
Directives	Directives
Commissives	Commissives
Expressives	Expressives
Declarations	Declarations
Responsives	Responsives

Figure 27: Proposed Classificatory System for Texts

Figure 27 represents a classificatory system for texts which is based upon two main criteria, i.e. the 'fact - fiction convention' and 'intention of author'. In this scheme, Kinneavy's LITERARY corresponds to FICTION and his EXPRESSIVE to **Expressives**, his REFERENTIAL to **Representatives**, and his PERSUASIVE to **Directives**.

We have already discussed the fact vs. fiction convention in (67) and (68) in 4.1.3. Although it is true for some texts, to determine objectively whether they belong to a fact convention or a fiction convention is difficult, the interpreter (or the reader) usually takes either of the two. This decision has a significant implication to interpretation. For example, in Biblical hermeneutics, Ramm (1970:145) admits that "our stance about the literary genre of the book determines our entire interpretation of the book." The relationship between fact vs. fiction from our SAT point of view is that fiction is always subservient to fact. Searle (1975a:332) thinks that in fiction imagination takes a vital role and its product "conveys a 'message' or 'messages' which are conveyed by the text but are not in the text. In other words, the point (or message) of fiction needs to be specified between the writer and the readers in their real (not fictional) social interactional scheme. Searle (ibid.) admits that "there is as yet no general theory of the mechanisms by which such serious illocutionary intentions are conveyed by pretended illocution."

We have already discussed in various places the six subcategories under both FACT and FICTION in Figure 26. Here we want to just mention the point (message) of each text type as follows (1st person representing the author):

Representative -- "I express my belief that p."

Directives -- "I express my want/desire that you do A."

Commissives -- "I express my intention to do A."

Expressives -- "I express my specific feeling towards you concerning your action or state of affairs."

Declarations -- "I express my authority that a certain state of affairs may take effect."

Responsives -- "I express my acceptance, rejection, or deferment concerning your perlocutionary intent."

(A refers to a future action, and p refers to a proposition.)

It is expected that various kinds of literary genre can be categorized under these six texts types whether they are fictional or factual.

5.3 Intent Structure

If the interpretation of a written text starts with the decision on its text type according to our system explained above (5.2.3), the main task of interpretation after this first step is to make the intent structures of the text explicit. In this sence, interpretation can be defined as the process of inferring the intent structures of a text. In this subsection, we would like to discuss this concept of 'intent structure'. Specifically, we will deal with its definition and characteristics, as well as how it can be derived from available information.

5.3.1 What is 'intent structure'?

When we talk about **intent structure**[4], it is important for us to ask whose intent structure we are talking about.

First of all, there is **'author's intent structure'**. In any written text, there always exists explicitly or implicitly the axis of author and addressee, through which the author is performing speech acts which are directed at his addressee(s). We want to call this interaction going on between the interlocutors, 'primary social interaction'. This primary SI is actually 'in progress' whenever the speech acts in a text are performed by the author. Practically speaking, this SI takes place when the addressee reads the text. In our theory, this primary SI is represented by the communication intent (CI) of the author. And CI is defined as consisting of illocutionary intent (II) and perlocutionary intent (PI) according to our theory (see Figure 16). Therefore, it is legitimate to posit 'author's intent structure' which is implicitly indicated by those IIs and PIs in the speech acts performed in a text.

Secondly, there is another type of intent structure, which can be derived also from a text, called **'referential intent structure'**. This intent structure is related to the representative intent (RI) of speech acts. RI consists of utterance intent (UI) and propositional intent (ProI) according to Figure 16. This means RI enables the writer to use a specific language which is shared by both the writer and the addressees in order to refer to particular things as well as their actions and states of affairs. RI thus provides the content of the intentional state described by CI. Any intent structure of an agent which is described by RI we shall call 'referential intent structure'. When RI describes the primary SI in which the author is referred to by 'I' and the addressee(s) by 'you' grammatically, then the author's intent structure represented by CI and the first person referential intent structure described by RI overlap. For example, letters mostly fall into this category. However, when RI describes social interactions which are other than the primary SI, it is necessary for the interpreter also to infer the referential intent structures which is distinct from the author's intent structure. Narratives typically fall into this category. Thus considered, there are three kinds of referential intent structures, namely, the first person referential intent structure, the second person referential intent structure, and the third person referential intent structure. Theoretically speaking, whenever any intentional action is described in speech acts, it is possible to set up a referential intent structure. However, practically speaking, the referential intent structures of major characters described in a text need to be dealt with in the interpretation.

Accordingly, we can conclude that the interpretation of a text is identical with the identifications of both the author's intent structure (typically manifested by CI) and the referential intent structures (typically manifested by RI). Any text inherently possesses both of these intent structures. Practically speaking, they cannot be separated. However, if we admit the theoretical distinction between the two structures, the interpretation of a text becomes amazingly clear.

5.3.2 Hierarchical organization of intent structure

The two kinds of intent structures described in the previous subsection are organized in a certain manner. Intent structures reflect the organization of a person's intentionality, whether it be that of the author (the author's intent structure), or of the addressee, or any third person described (2nd or 3rd person referential intent structures). Intentionality is defined in our theory (see the definition on p.115) by its two components, i.e. **intentional states** and **intentional contents**. Any intentional actions including verbal communication activities and mental acts (planning, contemplation, etc.) are all composed of those two components. (See further discussion on this topic in Searle 1983, Chapter 3.) And intentional states (or mental states) are theoretically prior to intentional contents. This means that our psychological factors basically determine the way we relate ourselves to certain things or people in the world. We have noted that this intentionality which is at work in a certain action of a person (we call this **intention in action**) is almost always related to his previous intentionality in his mental acts such as thinking, contemplation, imagination, etc. We call this latter intentionality **prior intention**. In Figure 13 we pointed out that mental acts usually produce a hierarchical organization in which various contemplated units of actions are interrelated to each other by a means-purpose relationship.

This means-purpose relationship is usually observed in all human mental acts. And this mental side of our activities usually prompts the physical side of our activities in order to fulfil the purpose laid down previously by the mental acts. For example, stretching a hand to a cup of water may be performed in order simply to quench one's thirst. Even in this simple action, however, there is an intention in action operating in the movement of his hand. And this intention is caused by the prior intention which specifies the purpose - 'to quench one's thirst' and the means - 'to stretch one's hand to a cup of water'. A presidential candidate's unceasing smiles at the people around him may be related to his long-standing desire to become the President of the United States of America. If this is the case, then we can say that his prior intention has prompted his smiles in order to accomplish his ultimate purpose. From the above discussion, we can obtain three very important formulas for the interpretation of texts.:

(103) a. Author's Intent Structure (Written or text speech acts) > Referential Intent Structure (Reported or described in written speech acts)

b. Prior Intention > Intention in Action

c. Purpose > Means (in Prior Intention)

(X > Y in these formulas means that X is prior to Y or X determines Y, therefore, X is more prominent than Y for the author.)

These three formulas are crucial to the interpretation of any written text. The formulas are designed to interpret intentional actions, whether verbal or nonverbal. And because of these formulas, we can claim that intent structures are organized 'hierarchically'. We will now briefly discuss each formula.

Formula (103)(a) says that, for the interpretation of a text, the speech acts performed by the speaker in order to interact with the addressee are more prominent for the speaker than those actions or reported speech acts described in his speech acts. Since the author's intent structure is taken so much for granted in our verbal communication situations, we tend to focus our attention only on the content of information, that is, the things and events described by the speaker. However, this formula reminds us of the significant fact that the author's intent structure needs to be made explicit, and related to the referential intent structures of a text in order for the addressee to interpret the text in a fuller sense. Mildred Larson (1978) has studied extensively the functions of reported speeches in the Aguaruna language in Peru and has presented an interesting observation as follows:

> In Aguaruna, there is a distinction between performatives which are related to the discourse as a whole and those which relate to the sentence. Performatives which realize the communicator's intent go with the entire discourse, and those which realize the communicator's source of information are more closely linked to the sentence (ibid. p.54).

This distinction which is made in Aguaruna seems to be closely related to the distinction made in (103)(a).

Formula (103)(b) simply says that our mental activity, in which we think or plan in order to achieve a certain purpose, determines what we actually do to accomplish that purpose. In other words, what we think is theoretically prior to what we do, since our intentional action needs to be accompanied by the mental state called **Want** which is prompted by our prior intention. This distinction between 'prior intention' and 'intention in action' made by Searle (1983) is also observed in Goldman (1970). Goldman uses a different set of terms: 'standing want' for prior intention and 'occurrent want' for intention in action. He defines (ibid. p.80) these terms as follows:

> An occurrent want is a mental event or mental process; it is a "going on" or "happening" in consciousness. A standing want, on the other hand, is a disposition or propensity to have an occurrent want, a disposition that lasts with the agent for a reasonable length of time. Though it is perhaps theoretically possible for a person to have such a disposition without even having any manifestations thereof, we would not ascribe such a disposition to anyone unless the relevant manifestations appeared from time to time. Hence, a standing want for x is ascribed to someone only if he has a number of occurrent wants for x over a period of time.

In some way the distinction between prior intention and intention in action parallels to the distinction between deep structure and surface structure. Just as deep structure features are realized in surface structures, so prior intention is realized (or actualized) in intentions in actions.

Formula (103)(c) specifies the relationship between the two intentional actions which are posited in the thinking of an individual person. It says that one intentional action, which is posited in order to accomplish another in mind, relates itself as a means to the other intentional action which can be considered as a purpose. For example, my intentional action of going to the refrigerator may be a means of my intentional action of drinking a cup of milk. And my intentional action of drinking a cup of milk may be a means of my intentional action of quenching my thirst, and so on. Because of this relationship of means-purpose, human intentional actions are always forward-facing. Our present actions are related in some way to our projected (or planned, contemplatd, desired) future actions. And they are related by the means-purpose relationship. We have already discussed this earlier (see Figures 1 and 13).

The speech acts performed by an author through writing linguistic symbols are but intentional actions which serve as the means to accomplish a certain goal or purpose of the author. This fact clearly indicates that the author's intent structure is hierarchically organized as a chain of means-purpose relationships.

The formulas presented in (103) reflect the fundamental attitudes of us human beings in our coping with the reality or the world around us. We can relate ourselves to nature as well as to other human beings only with our intent structure as the frame of reference (103)(a), and we try to bring about some desired changes in nature or in other people within our own capabilities (103)(b,c). Writing something for communication is an intentional action of the author to bring about intended consequences on the part of the addressee.

5.3.3 Intent structure vs. surface structure

In written speech acts, the only way the author can express his own intention is through linguistic representations. Therefore, there should be a certain relationship between the author's intent structure and the linguistic representations which he employs. Otherwise, it will be impossible to communicate intent structure through lanaguage.

Speech act theory (SAT), which we have expounded in Chapters One and Two, gives crucial insights into the relationship between the author's intent and the linguistic representations which he uses. In Chapter Two, we first set up five main categories of speech acts based upon Searle's insights (see Figure 11). Then we added in Chapter Four one more type of speech acts which Searle seems to have omitted (see Figure 23). These six types of speech acts are: **Representatives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, Declarations,** and **Responsives.**

These six types of speech acts are constituted by their distinctive intentional states (or mental states) and their corresponding intentional contents. The hierarchical organization of an author's intent structure in written speech acts necessitates the ranking of those intentional states and intentional contents as to their importance or prominence for the author.

Concerning the ranking of prominence among intentional states and intentional contents expressed by the six types of speech acts, the following formulas can be given:

(104) a.	Want (Directives)	>	Intention, (Commissives) Decision, (Responsives)	Feeling (Expressives) Authority (Declarations)	>	Belief (Representa- tives)

b.	Future Referred	>	Present Referred	>	Past Referred

c.	Self Referred as Topic	>	Addressee Referred as Topic	>	Other Person Referred as Topic

The formulas given in (104) are considered universal and therefore are basic factors which determine the surface structures of a specific language as to its various categories. Now, we will discuss each of these formulas in more detail.

The formula (104)(a) gives a ranking of relative prominence for the major six types of speech acts. According to the formula, the mental state of **Want**, which represents II of **Directives** type of speech act, ranks the highest Why is it possible to give such ranking of prominence among those speech act types? In order to answer this question, it is necessary for us to consider the nature of speech acts. In our previous discussion (especially in Chapter Two), we stated that speech act force, which is intended by the speaker/author to bring about some effects and consequences on the part of the hearer/addressee, consists of II and PI. We have also claimed that II designates the source of speech act force and that PI designates the destination of speech act force. From this basic understanding, we can claim that, as far as direct speech acts are concerned (what I mean by 'direct speech acts' are those speech acts without superimposed speech acts), the impact of speech act force on the addressee as to its intensity and degree of specification determines how well that speech act fulfils the PI of the author.

According to (104)(a), **Directives** have the highest rank, because they express the author's mental state of **Want** which directly specifies the PI of the author, whereas the other speech act types do not do this. For example, if I say to my addressee, 'Go home!', it is very clear that I have a want which is specified as that 'my addressee go home'. In other words, the mental state of **Want** has the greatest impact upon the addressee in order to bring about certain changes or consequences on his part, since this mental state explicitly reveals the author's PI.

Representatives which express the mental state of **Belief** seem to have the least speech act force to bring about certain changes or consequences on the part of the addressee. Notice that here again we are talking about 'direct' speech acts rather than 'indirect' speech acts, because some indirect speech acts in the forms of Representatives have superimposed speech acts of **Directives**. Anyhow, **Representatives** in direct speech acts merely communicate to the addressee that the author has a certain belief about the truth of a certain proposition. The PI of a Representatives type of speech act is very general and not specific. The addressee is simply asked to accept the author's belief and act accordingly. Representatives, therefore, usually describe the belief system of the author, thus preparing his addressee for a subsequent speech act force which specifies the PI of the author. In this way, Representatives often function as background for more prominent speech acts. They are very important for laying the foundations for successful speech acts performances. Without them no communication takes place. But as far as their direct contribution to the realization of the author's PI is concerned, they rank the lowest as indicated in (104)(a).

Other speech act types, **Commissives**, **Responsives**, **Expressives**, and **Declarations** (which have their corresponding mental states of **Intention**, **Decision**, **Feeling**, and **Authority** respectively), rank in the middle between Directives and Representatives. It is difficult at this stage of general consideration to give finer ranking of prominence among them. Therefore, I will explain only two things: the reason why they are less prominent than Directives, and the reason why they are more prominent than Representatives.

Such speech act types are less prominent than directive, because the PI of these types is less specific or less direct than that of Directives. In other words, the mental state of **Want** (Directives) specifies exactly what the author is trying to achieve on the part of his addressee, whereas the mental states of these other types of speech acts do not. The intention of the author to do something (Commissives), the decision of the author as to his attitude towards a request, etc. (Responsives), the feeling of the author expressed concerning a certain proposition (Expressives), or the authority of the author expressed in order that a certain proposition may take effect (Declarations) are all intended by the author to be accepted by the addressee. But beyond this acceptance, the author does not specifically require that a certain concrete course of action be taken by the addressee. Instead the author requires that the addressee accept his mental state and its content and 'act accordingly hereafter'. This feature of not specifying PI of the author is also the characteristic of Representatives.

The four speech act types ranked in the middle in (104)(a) is more prominent than Representatives, because, generally, their speech act force has more impact on the addressee than that of Representatives. It is generally true that a statement of belief can be made for anything and for anyone as long as the author believes that it is true. Because of this capacity of Representatives the addressee usually has the attitude of fathoming the PI of the author, wondering how the belief expressed by the author is related to his PI. Compared to Representatives, those four types of speech acts generally present information which makes it easier for the addressee to infer the specific PI of the author. For example, the author's promise to do something usually implies a certain specific request of the author made to the addressee, and the author's declaration that a certain proposition should take effect usually implies a certain specific course of action which needs to be taken by the addressee, etc. This means that the addressee receives greater force from those speech acts which prompt him to act to satisfy the PI of the author.

The surface structures of various languages encode the distinction made in (104)(a) in various ways. I do not want to discuss any particular language here. It seems, however, that there are some universal syntactic categories set up in any language to encode such distinction. For example, in most of the Indo-European languages, syntactic categories such as **imperatives**, **interrogatives**, and **optatives** are used to encode Want, and **indicatives** are used to encode primarily Belief but also Intention, Decision, Feeling and Authority as well. When Want or Intention needs to be embedded in Belief, syntactic categories such as subjunctives or infinitives are used in order to do it. I am not claiming that in any particular language there are exactly the same syntactic categories as mentioned above, rather I am claiming that any particular language needs to be equipped to be able to make the basic distinction listed in (104)(a) in order that its speakers may perform speech acts.

The formula (104)(b) presents a ranking of the three kinds of intentional contents in speech acts. 'Future Referred' means the author performs the ProA in a certain speech act in which he refers to a future action or state. 'Present Referred' and 'Past Referred' can be defined in similar ways. Why, then, is it possible to make such distinctions in prominence as in (104)(b)? The reason can be found in the nature of human actions. Human actions including speech acts, as pointed out earlier, are perfomed expecting that some desired changes may occur in the future. Past events and situations are referred to by the author, as long as they are relevant to present events or states. What we decide to do now in some way shapes the future. Human beings have a unique capacity of projecting themselves into the future, thus creating desires to bring about changes in the environment which may come up to their expectations. The history (past and recent past) is irreversible, although we can learn from it. We learn from the past and place ourselves in the present, projecting ourselves into the future. Only the future in some way is within our possible manipulation. All of us have some expectations in the future which are based upon our past and present. Therefore, as far as human actions are concerned, we are inevitably anticipating the future. From this we can claim that for us human beings the future is more prominent than the present, and the present is more prominent than the past.

If we apply the above result to speech acts, then we obtain (104)(b). Formula (104)(b) reinforces the claim in (104)(a). Directives can refer only to the future action or state, likewise Commissives. Responsives and Declarations can only refer to the present as well as to the recent past but cannot refer to the future nor to the remote past. Representatives, on the other hand, can primarily refer to the past and the present and, in some cases, to the future as well. But when Representatives refer to the future, they refer either to some highly probable future events or states which we take for granted (ex. natural phenomena, customary behaviors, some predictions, etc.) or to some contingent future events or states with which the author does not have any particular personal involvement.

There are usually distinctive surface structure devices to encode (104)(b) in any language. Some languages have finer distinctions than that of (104)(b). The so called **tense** system of a particular language is rooted in such universal human categories as (104)(b). As discussed above, the time distinction in (104)(b) is deeply related to the distinction made for the various mental states of speech acts. This fact is reflected in the way some languages encode both distinctions. For example, the Kwanga language which I have studied (T. Manabe, 1981) has a complicated tense-mode system in which the two aspects interact with each other to produce finer distinctions.

Formula (104)(c) is related to the intentional content of the various speech act types. As far as the author's intent structure is concerned, the primary SI (I-you) between the author and the addressee is the backbone and there is no way other parties can get into this structure. However, when it comes to referential intent structures, any person (1st, 2nd and 3rd) can be described or reported there by the author. The author may choose to describe himself, the addressee or some third party. Once this decision is made, then formula (104)(c) can be applied. If the author chooses to describe himself, then (104)(c) needs to be interpreted as presenting: Author > Addressee > Other Person. If the author chooses to describe addressee, (104)(c) needs to be interpreted as: Addressee > Embedded Addressee > Embedded Other Person (the latter two items are from the perspective of the addressee).

Formula (104)(c) thus claims that in the intentionality of one person, whether that of the author himself or that of the one described by the author, he himself (ego) is most important. Then, the next most important person is the one who is addressed by the term 'you' in their particular social interaction, and then lastly the least prominent person is the one referred to by 'he', 'she', 'they', etc. This egocentric perspective of intentionality is something universally inherent in human nature. We just cannot escape this perspective.

In any language, there are syntactic devices which distinguish the categories set up in (104)(c). I personally have had opportunity to study a wide variety of languages, (Japanese--my native language, English, German, Vietnamese, New Testament Greek, Hebrew, Pidgin English, Kwanga), some extensively and some casually. In these languages, there are specific surface structure devices by which the distinction described in (104)(c) are clearly made. There is abundant literature available these days, in which the results of research in various languages are described. As far as I know, however, there is no language which is not equipped to make the distinctions made in (104)(c).

The intent structures of a written text are governed by such formulas discussed as in (103) and (104). And it is our contention that each particular language should have its specific surface structure devices to signal those distinctions, otherwise there is no way to understand or interpret what is written.

5.3.4 Intent structure vs. SSWC's semantic structure

The theory of intent structure expounded in the preceding subsections owes much theoretically to <u>Semantic Structure of Written Communication</u>, Fifth Revision by John Beekman, John Callow and Michael Kopesec (SSWC). They present very significant insights gained from their many years of research in text analysis. I have adopted some of their basic concepts such as **unit, coherence, prominence, hierarchy** and **communication relations**, which have been attested as indispensable for text production (generation) as well as interpretation.

Intent structure in our model is comparable to semantic structure in SSWC. Although there are many similarities between the two, there are also some significant differences between them. Some of them are:

(i) In our model, we have made a clear distinction between the author's intent structure and referential intent structures. However, in SSWC, there is no such distinction made in its semantic structure.

(ii) In our model, every utterance in a text is consistently treated as part of human action. So-called SAT is the basis of our mode, whereas, in SSWC, such a view is not consistently taken.

(iii) In our model, the author's intentionality is claimed to be the overall principle for interpreting (or analyzing) any text. The author's intentionality is responsible for making certain information a semantic unit, and relating it to other units. It also determines which information is more prominent than the other, thus making a text into a hierarchical organization. Most of the basic concepts which SSWC and our model employ are subsumed under the concept of intentionality. SSWC does not explicitly take this position.

(iv) In our model the concept of social interaction (SI) is valued and used for interpretation. The author's intent structure is dependent upon the SI between the author himself and his addressee, which we call the primary SI. SSWC does not explicitly incorporate this concept of SI into its semantic structure.

(v) In our model, interpretation is defined as the addressee's (or the interpreter's) inferring the author's intent structure and the referential intent structures in a text and relating these two structures to each other. SSWC understands interpretation as the process of describing the semantic structure of a text.

In the following, I will briefly introduce some basic concepts of SSWC which our model employs with some modifications. Then I will explain how our intent structures are related to those concepts.

Unit and Coherence -- SSWC's semantic structure is considered to consist of **units** which are posited because of the function of the mind "to 'package' information if it is to communicate or understand efficiently" (ibid. p.16). Three basic units are posited in SSWC: **concept**, **proposition**, and **propositional configuration.** (For further explanations for these concepts, refer to SSWC, pp.16-19.) Each unit needs to be distinguished from other units. In order to make this possible, a unit must be recognized as possessing **coherence.** The coherence of a unit signifies that the constituents of the unit "will be semantically compatible with one another" (ibid. p.21). Three kinds of coherence are set up in SSWC: **referential coherence, situational coherence** and **structural coherence.** Referential coherence signifies that what the constituents of a unit refer to should have semantic compatibility among them. Situational coherence signifies that the "emotive overtones" of a given unit must be compatible with each other and that it "exibit a degree of illocutionary continuity" (ibid. p.21). Structural coherence signifies that there must be "appropriateness of relation" between the parts that make up a given unit.

In our model, the concept and the proposition are accepted as basic constitutive units of the most basic communication unit which we call **sentence.** Sentences are very similar to propositional configurations in SSWC, but their definition is different in some ways. We consider situational coherence most important for deciding the boundaries of sentences. Each language seems to have specific ways to mark such units. For example, in Japanese the punctuation mark (o) which is placed at the end of a certain unit in a written text indicates that the author intended the unit which precedes the mark to be a sentence. And syntactically it is necessary that a sentence in Japanese needs to have a final verb, although sometimes it may be omitted. In English, the unit of sentence is usually marked by the period (.) at the end of the unit, and an independent clause must be present as a nucleus. In New Testament Koine Greek, the sentence is usually marked by the existence of an independent clause as in English. It is our contention that the author explicitly imposes his specific intentional state (illocutionary intent) on a sentence. Theoretically speaking, any number of propositions can be posited in a sentence. This means a sentence can be realized in surface structure by a simple clause or the combination of a dozen of clauses. The fact that the author chooses to make a certain unit a sentence by assigning a specific intentional state to it reflects the way the author intentionally packages the information in order to give it a proper function in the total system of the information flow of a text.

In our model, situational coherence determines other types of coherence. And the intentionality of the author of a text ultimately determines the exact nature of situational coherence as to its intentional states and intentional contents (propositional contents). This suggests that for interpretation or analysis sentences are the most basic communication units. We start our analysis from them upwards to a whole text and downwards to a concept. Mann and Thompson (1983) seem to present a similar concept to our 'sentence' which they call 'relational proposition'. For example, they say (ibid. p.18):

> Having shown that relational propositions arise regularly in texts, the issue of what <u>role</u> they play in the functioning of the presents itself. That is, in precisely what way do they contribute to conveying the information which a text coveys? Our answer to this question is that relational propositions are involved in communicative (or illocutionary) <u>acts</u>; specifically we will show in this section that texts have the force of either <u>assertions</u>, <u>questions</u> or <u>commands</u>, where the propositional (act-neutral) part of any of these are the very relational propositions we have been talking about.

<u>Prominence</u> -- This concept, I believe, is the most significant contribution of SSWC to text interpretation. The fact that we have the ability to summarize a whole text into a sentence or a couple of sentences seems to suggest that we assign different degrees of importance to the various units of information in a text. According to SSWC, "prominence is simply making one or more parts of a unit more important than the other parts" (ibid. p.24).

In our model also, the concept of prominence is very important. We have already discussed this concept and have established some basic formulas which, we claimed, are universally applicable to any speech act in any specific language. The formulas are given in (103) and (104). There we have claimed that speech acts as intentional human actions reflect the basic attitudes of the speaker/author in how he relates himself to the addressee and to other referents. Because of the basic nature of human speech acts expounded in those formulas the concept of prominence can be posited. There is no question of the key role of intentionality in the concept of prominence.

Hierarchy -- SSWC considers that the semantic structure of a text is **hierarchically** organized. What this means is that some propositions form into a propositional configuration (in our term sentence) and then groups of propositional configurations form into a yet larger unit and so on, thus forming a hierarchy. This hierarchy is possible because of the basic characteristics of human speech acts, which we have discussed so far, namely, **unit**, **coherence**, and **prominence**. SSWC (Chapters 2 and 10) has developed various terms for various semantic units such as **propositional cluster**, **paragraph**, **section**, **division**, etc. (for non-narrative material), and **episode**, **scene**, **act**, etc. (for narrative material).

In our model, too, intent structures have a hierarchical organization (see the discussion in 5.3.2). In our previous discussion, we have contended that human intentional actions (including speech acts) usually are the products of our mental acts which have clear hierarchically organized structures, and that therefore a series of human intentional actions which seek to realize what has been planned also manifest hierarchically organized structures.

Communication Relations -- SSWC's other major contribution to text analysis is its extensive elaboration of the relationships between various semantic units. They call these relationships, **communication relations**. They contend that the communication relations which they have developed can be applied to any relationship between two semantic units of a text, one of which at least consists of one or more propositions. Figure 28 describes the framework of the kinds of relations they have developed.



Figure 28: <u>SSWC's Framework of Communication Relations</u> (from SSWC 1981)

The most basic criterion employed in Figure 28 for classifying various kinds of communication relations is whether the two communication units under investigation are equal in prominence (Addition) or unequal in prominence (Support). 'Support' signifies that the less prominent unit is supporting the other more prominent unit in some way. (For a detailed discussion of the terms developed in Figure 28 as well as the specific terms for cummunication relations, see Chapter 8 of SSWC (ibid. pp.77-113)).

Recently there has been some research effort made to reevaluate the basic assumptions of SSWC upon which its classificatory system of communication relations is based. For example, Kathleen Callow (1984b) considers that a more solid theoretical foundation is necessary for the classification and grouping of communication relations. In her initial effort, she presents some possible parameters for the classification such as 'prominence', 'significance', 'focus' or 'pace', 'comprehension', 'expectancy', etc., and elaborates those concepts. It seems to me that what she has been doing is an effort similar to what we have been doing in this study so far.

In our model, the communication relations are but the finer definitions of the various types of causality which exist between two speech act units. We have noted earlier that human intentional mental acts (thinking, planning, imagination, etc.) manifest the causality which is defined by the means-purpose relation. Speech acts are defined as a means of realizing the highest purpose (goal) set up in the prior intention through a series of mental acts. So here we posit another kind of causality, namely, the causality which exists between a mental act and a series of specific intentional actions (including speech acts) which realize the blueprint drawn by the mental act. Of course, we need to posit another kind of causality which exists between the two performed intentional actions.

The three causality types discussed above have one common basic property, that is, the intentionality of one agent (actor, speaker or author) is involved in them. However, there is another important causality which we can draw from our concepts of speech acts and social interaction. Speech acts are performed in order to be directed toward other people who possess their own minds and therefore their own intentionalities. Communication presupposes that we can do something to others by speech acts. This means that there must be some kind of causality between two egos (individuals) so that interaction between people may become possible. We may call this causality 'interpersonal causality'.

Lastly, there is yet another type of causality which is very common in our environment. The causality which exists between two physical phenomena which are governed by a certain law of nature is a typical case of such causality. Here in this causality, there is no intentional actions involved, although intentionality is necessary for observation, judgment, etc.

From the above discussion, we can summarize these types of causality in Figure 29.



△ : non-intentional physical events and states;
X,Y: two individual people;
ma: mental act/event
ea: executed action of mental act/event
(1)...(6): represent six types of causality

Figure 29: <u>Types of Causality</u>

Speech acts are intentional human actions and they are capable of representing non-intentional events and states. Therefore, we can conclude that the author's intent structure and referential intent structures as manifested in a text inevitably reflect the above six types of causality. I suggest that a kind of theoretical basis which is expounded in Figure 29 be employed for the classification of communication relations. In this study, I will not theoretically elaborate those concepts developed in Figure 29 beyond what has been said. It is hoped, however, that the following two chapters in which we will apply our model to actual texts may shed some light upon those concepts.

5.4 Interpretative Procedure to Infer Intent Structure

An interpretative procedure which I want to present here is primarily aimed at deriving the so-called theme structure of a text. We have demonstrated so far in our discussion that theme structure is nothing but the author's intent structure. So the derivation of theme structure is identical with inferring the intent structure of a given text. Linda Jones (1977) supports this claim by saying that "theme at the highest level of a text is related to purpose" (ibid. p.45). However, in this study so far, I have demonstrated not only in the highest level but also even in the sentence level the author's perlocutionary intents (purposes) can be posited.

In a previous work (Manabe 1983a) I presented an initial attempt to infer intent structures of a narrative. At that stage of research, I did not have a solid theoretical base with which I could distinguish an author's intent structure from referential intent structures. Follingstad (1984), however, followed my initial model and applied it to the analysis of the book of Mark in the New Testament. Then, Mary Walker (1984) applied some of the insights expounded in this study to the analysis of the larger communication units of the book of Romans in the New Testament. Both these works and my initial work have presented some substantial results, suggesting that a theoretical framework such as that expounded in this study is very effective and useful for text analysis and interpretation.

We consider that inferring the intent structures of a text constitutes the most basic part of the interpretation of the text. So now, we present four major steps to infer (derive) intent structures. It is presupposed, however, that the interpreter is a `qualified' reader of a particular text which is given. This means that if the interpreter of the text is not the original addressee, he has sufficient cultural background knowledge which is almost equivalent to that of the original reader(s) of the text. The author usually sets up before him an imaginative reader who is expected to possess a certain level of cultural background knowledge. This kind of knowledge is taken for granted by both the author and the expected readers. Therefore, any interpreter is required to attain this level of knowledge before he can interpret a text properly.

5.4.1 Step one: Production of a chart

Any text which is going to be interpreted consists of a series of sentences which are related to each other to form a hierarchical structure. This means that each sentence (Note: in our theory `sentences' are the most important basic units of speech acts) needs to be located somewhere in the hierarchy as to its value of relative prominence. To produce a chart which indicates roughly the relative prominence among the sentences of a text is the first step for the interpretation of the text. As mentioned earlier, an interpreter of a text is expected to possess a level of cultural knowledge roughly equivalent to that of the original readers. Such knowledge as to whether a particular text under investigation is fiction or non-fiction (see Wirrer's (1982) work in this area, which is introduced earlier in 4.1.3 on p.146), which text type it belongs, etc. is included in this cultural knowledge. In our model of interpretation we do not discuss this subject area beyond what we have discussed so far in this chapter.

Given a text which needs to be interpreted, it is necessary to read it through at least twice, giving initial rough assessments on the author's overall purpose, the dominant speech act type, the main participants involved, etc. After these attentive readings, we begin to produce an overall chart of the text. The format of a chart and the procedural steps of producing a chart are explained as follows:

(i) Prepare three columns as shown below:

CHART	DISPLAY OF (the title of a given text)			
	Intentional States	Intentional Contents		
		(1)	(2)	(3)
S_1	Belief			xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
S_2	Belief		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	
S_3	Want	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		
etc.	etc.		etc.	

(a) The first column is for indicating sentence numbers. It is important to decide on sentence boundaries in our theory. The interpreter is required to develop some specific criteria for the language of the text. Usually a sentence is marked by the existence of a finite verb and some major punctuation.

(b) The second column is for indicating the 'intentional state' (mental state) which is expressed for each sentence. In our theory, 'intentional state' is one of the two constituents of a speech act. As in the sample chart, such mental states as **belief** (for Representatives), **Want** (for Directives), **Intention** (for Commissives), **Feeling** (for Expressives), **Authority** (for Declarations) and **Decision** (for Responsives) fill this column. Decisions on this column are usually relatively easy.

(c) The third column is for indicating the 'intentional content' of each sentence. We have not devised any particular symbols for this purpose. Symbols tend to complicate the matters rather than clarify them in cases like these. Here, we just write down that portion of the text which corresponds to a sentence. Depending on a type of text we usually set up three to several subcategories, depending upon the interpreter. If he wants a finer distinction of relative prominence among the sentences of a text, he tends to set up more subcategories. It is important, however, that whatever subcategories are set up need to be justified by the universal prominence criteria already set up in this study (see (103) and (104) for these criteria). The numbers (1), (2), (3) in the sample chart indicate three subcategories set up which are ranked as (1) > (2) > (3).

(ii) The criteria set up in (103) and (104) and other criteria set up particularly for the text under investigation should be used in order to decide on the relative prominence of each sentence of the text. The fewer the subcategories in the column of 'intentional contents' the easier to produce a chart.

(iii) It is helpful to write down any significant observations and findings during the process of producing a chart as notes. These notes may turn out to be crucial for infering the intent structures of the text.

(iv) The process of producing a chart should be understood as a trial and error process. The decision on the relative prominence of a particular sentence may be changed. The number of subcategories set up initially may be increased or decreased, or all the subcategories may be replaced by a new set of subcategories which fit better for the particular text under investigation. Therefore, the interpreter (analyst) needs to be flexible at this stage.

5.4.2 Step two: Framing of the prominence structure

After the chart of a text under investigation is completed, the next step is to frame the prominence structure of the text based upon the chart. The chart itself presents only the rough decisions on the sentences of the text as to their relative prominence in the text. And it does not explicitly indicate how some sentences combine into a larger unit and then how this unit combines with other units into a still larger unit, and so on. In other words, the chart does not indicate the levels (layers) of the hierarchical structure of the text.

The so-called 'prominence structure', which we frame in this second step, is intended to fill the specific need pointed out above. The following is a sample figure which explains the various notations employed:

(A sample of prominence structure)



Here are the explanations of the notations employed:

(i) S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4 S_5 ... indicate the sentences used in the chart which is produced in Step One. This level (LEVEL (I)) is the lowest level of the larger communication units of the text.

(ii) The asterisk (*) signifies that the sentence which is marked by it is the most prominent communication unit in the whole text. In the sample figure, S_4 is such a communication unit.

(iii) The circles (solid circles and clear circles) indicate that they are basic communication units (sentences) which can be traced by dotted lines to their corresponding sentences (S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4, etc.) regarding their sources. Some circles are connected by straight vertical lines. A vertical line indicates that the circles connected by it are related to each other to form a larger communication unit. In the sample figure, there is only one solid circle among those circles which are connected by straight vertical lines. This means that the communication unit represented by the solid circle is more prominent than the communication units represented by those clear circles. Thus the solid circle of a larger communication unit represents that unit when it will be related to another unit.

(iv) As indicated above, a **horizontal dotted line** indicates that the basic communication units (o or •) connected by it can be represented by essentially the same information which is identified as the particular sentence at the right end of the line. A **vertical straight line** indicates that the communication units connected by it form a larger communication unit.

(v) LEVEL: (I) (II) (III) and (IV) indicate that the four levels are set up in the sample prominence structure. The number of levels set up depends upon an individual text. LEVEL (I) is the lowest level of prominence structure which is the base for the higher levels of prominence structure. It is possible to give labels such as 'paragraphs', 'sections', 'divisions', etc. to each LEVEL which is higher than LEVEL (I) as is done by John Callow (1982). However, it is important to remember that these labels are somewhat arbitrary, since the number of labels which can be set up is different from one text to another.

The framing of the prominence structure of a text usually is a difficult task. Careful syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic considerations are required for various decisions which need to be made. There are three important areas where decisions need to be made based on sufficient textual evidence. Those areas are: boundaries of larger communication units (including coherence); communication relations between the units; and prominence.

5.4.3 Step three: Discussions to support the decisions in Step one and Step two

In the process of making a chart (Step One) and framing prominence structure (Step Two), many decisions are necessary. These include such decisions as sentence boundaries, the relative prominence of each sentence of a text, the setting up of the levels and their larger communication units, the communication relations between the units, etc. All of these decisions should be based upon objective criteria as well as textual evidence. Therefore, in this Step, the decisions which are made concerning the text on **coherence**, **relation** and **prominence** need to be backed up by supporting evidence.

5.4.4 Step four: Presentation of intent structures

This step is the one which produces final results. What has been done so far in each step has paved the way for this most important presentation of the results of the interpretation, namely, the presentation of intent structures. So-called theme derivation is essentially identical with this step.

The presentation of intent structures can be made in three stages: the inferring of the author's intent structure, the inferring of referential intent structures, and the presentation of intent structures as a whole.

<u>The inferring of the author's intent structure</u> -- As discussed earlier in this chapter, if the text under investigation is such that it explicitly includes the first person (the author) as a main referent,

the inferring of the author's intent structure is relatively easy from the result of the prominence structure of the text. If the text does not include any explicit statements which suggest the specific purpose of the author, the interpreter needs to rely on some extra-textual information which often is taken for granted by the author and the original readers. For example, in my earlier work (Manabe, 1983a), I suggest a model[5] in which the author can identify himself completely with one of the important participants he describes in a narrative story. In this case the author's intent structure overlaps the referential intent structure of that main participant. In other cases, because of the particular genre, the author's intent structure is often clear. For example, advertisements, legal documents, school textbooks, etc. fall into this category.

<u>The inferring of referential intent structures</u> -- In (103)(a), we claimed that referential intent structures are always under the author's intent structure. If we lose sight of this fact, we will get bogged down with the actions and events of the participants within a text without relating them to the author who is ultimately responsible for describing them. In my previous work (ibid. p.52) I claimed that in a narrative text it is necessary to posit two kinds of social interactions: the author-the addressee SI, and the SI between the participants. And I have demonstrated that the latter SI needs to be subordinate to the former SI. The relationship between these two kinds of SI is exactly what I mean by the relationship between the author's intent structure and referential intent structures.

The first person referential intent structure of the given text often overlaps with the author's intent structure. Sometimes it may be necessary to infer the second person referential intent structure. In some texts, especially in narrative texts, there are many participants. So theoretically speaking, for each participant, a third person intent structure can be posited. Practically speaking, however, it is sufficient to infer only the referential intent structures of the major participants.

The inferring of referential intent structures (as well as the author's intent structure) needs to be as objective as possible. The author should have encoded sufficient information in the text for the interpreter to infer such intent structures. This means that it is necessary to find out what specific surface structure devices are used to indicate the intent, purpose or goal behind each described action. I have suggested (ibid. pp.21-22) that in Koine Greek (in the Gospel of John) there are about a dozen of such devices. I do not list these here, but a similar list needs to be developed for each particular language in which the given text is written.

<u>The presentation of the resulting intent structures as a whole</u> -- After the author's intent structure and the referential intent structures are inferred, it is necessary to combine both structures in order to get the whole intent structure (theme structure) of the given text. It is important to note, however, that the author's intent structure, which reflects the communication intent (CI) of the speech acts, overrules the referential intent structures which reflect the representation intent (RI) of the speech acts.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

[1]To appear in START (Selected Technical Articles Related to Translation), a journal of the Translation Department of the Summer Institute of Linguistics. This article is almost identical with my earlier work (see Manabe, 1983a).

[2]For example, Pratt (1977:xiii) says, "The theory of language use is still in its infancy, and its application to literature is younger yet. For the most part, then, the present study confronts only the most obvious preliminary issues." Van Dijk also admits that the pragmatic theory itself which is primarily based upon Speech Act Theory "is still in its infancy, both in linguistics and in the philosophy of language, where its main ideas originally came forth in the 1960s" (1980:176).

[3]My wife and I had an opportunity to live among the Kwanga-speaking people of Papua New Guinea for over two years during the period of 1978-1982, producing some initial linguistic as well as anthropological research papers.

[4]Van Dijk (1980) presents a similar concept which he calls 'macro-structure'. He defines it (ibid. p.v) as "higher-level semantic or conceptual structures that organize the 'local' microstructures of discourse, interaction, and cognitive processing. They are distinguished from other global structures of a more schematic nature, which we call **superstructures.** These are, so to speak, the global 'form' of the macrostructural 'content'." Besides 'macrostructures', van Dijk developes two other structures: 'microstructures' and 'superstructures'. SSWC's semantic structure seems to be almost identical with van Dijk's superstructure. Two kinds of intent structure which we will be presented in this section are similar to van Dijk's macrostructure but they include more than that, because of our 'referential intent structures'. Our referential intent structures seem to provide a partial answer to what van Dijk suggests: "macrostructures in the **theory of social interaction** are needed to account for the fact that participants plan, see, interpret, and memorize actions both locally and globally" (ibid. p.10).

[5]I have set up (Manabe, 1983a:15) three main groups among the participants about whom the author describes or reports: Central Group, Opposition Group and Neutral Group. And I have contended that in many narrative stories the author has an empathy with the Central Group particulary with the main participant. This means that the author's intent structure which reflect the belief or value system of the author is transferable to the intent structure of the main participant.

CHAPTER SIX

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO A JAPANESE TEXT

In the three following chapters, the interpretative model expounded in chapter five is applied to actual texts for theme derivations. In this chapter, the model is applied to a Japanese advertisement text. The text is displayed and translated into English in APPENDIX I (A - Actual text, B - Transliteration, C - English literal translation). This text is from Bungei Shunjū (April Issue, 1984), a well known monthly magazine in Japan.

6.1 Overview

The overview of the text will be based upon CHART I below. Each Japanese sentence is considered to be a basic unit of speech acts. Japanese sentences are usually characterized by the existence of final verbs which can be distinguised from medial verbs, although sometimes those final verbs may be omitted, as in S_3, S_8 and S_{10}. The columns represent intentional state (or mental state) and intentional content (propositional content). Intentional content is subdivided into three parts, i.e. 'psychological state or event', 'physical state or event' and 'background'. Most of the information in the chart is given in English for the benefit of English readers. However, some Japanese words or phrases which are important for analytical purposes are inserted in the chart with their English translations.

CHART I DISPLAY OF A JAPANESE TEXT

(1): Psychological state/event

(2): Physical state/event

(3): Background

	Intentional State	Intentional Content (1) (2) (3)
S_1	Belief (past memory)	"I went to Onomichi" "for the first time" "twenty years ago"
S_2	Belief (past memory)	"I went to Onomichi" "for filming"
S_3	Belief (past memory)	mazu ("in the first place") "The thing that surprised me was the large number of Buddhist Temples"
S_4	Belief (past memory)	(I saw) "A mountain stands very close to the back side of the town, "many temples are observed on its mid-slope"
S_{5a}	Belief (past memory)	Soshite (and) (I saw) "Many grandfathers and grandmothers were strolling leisurely in the precincts"
S_{5b}	Belief (past memory)	"I thought the place was such an ingenuous place"
S_{6a}	Belief (past memory)	"The filming was carried out on a sloping road surrounded by stone walls"
S_{6b}	Belief (past memory)	"The sloping road had a really tasteful appearance"
S_7	Belief (past memory)	"I could almost imagine that -- --Naoya Shiga might appear --"
S_{8a}	Belief (past memory)	"I went to the fishermen's settlement of Onomichi" "six years ago" "for another film location"

S_{8b}	Belief (past memory)	"Every person whom I met was light-hearted and kind"
S_9	Belief (past memory)	"Even for a mid-night location, they kindly cooperated with us without making ugly faces"
S_{10}	Belief (present state)	Toiuwakede ("accordingly") "When it comes to Onomichi, I have only good impressions, though I visited it only on the occasions of making those films "
S_{11}	Belief (present state)	"I am thinking that someday I want to roam about the town leisurely while free from my work"

The chart above is based upon our speech act theory expounded earlier in this study. The column 'Intentional State' is set up in order to gather information about the communication intent (CI) of speech acts. CI consists of illocutionary intent (II) and perlocutionary intent (PI) as shown in Figure 16. The column 'Intentional Content' is set up in order to gather information about the representation intent (RI) of the speech acts. RI consists of propositional intent (Pro I) and utterance intent (UI). In written texts, utterance intent is related to producing orthographic symbols rather than articulating phonemic sounds. These speech act intents are concerned with primary social interaction (SI) (i.e. the SI between the writer and the readers). The derivations of the author's intent structure and the intent structures described in INTENTIONAL CONTENT (we have termed these referential intent structures) are a very important part of interpretation. In the present text, we will deal with author's intent structure and his 1st person referential intent structure (see the formulas in (103)).

The decisions on the sentence boundaries are based on Japanese syntax and punctuation. In the text, sentences are marked by obligatory final verbs, although sometimes they are implicit (i.e. are omitted in the surface structure). They are also marked by sentential punctuation dots (。) in Japanese.

The first two of the three subcategories set up under INTENTIONAL CONTENT 'Psychological state/event', and 'physical state/event' are related to each other in such a way that the perception of physical states/events causes corresponding psychological states/events in the perceiver's mind. In other words, they are related by a cause-effect relationship. This causality corresponds to (2) in Figure 29. Background is in some way similar to 'physical state/event'. However, the former is different from the latter in the following points: (i) 'Background' tends to occur at the beginning of the larger linguistic units; (ii) 'Background' often provides information about time and location in which specific events occur; (iii) 'Background' provides information which helps the readers to have a proper perspective or direction for interpretation.

So far, we have discussed some of the main features of the chart. As an overview of the text, I would like to explain how the whole text can be divided up into various levels of larger or smaller communication units. The following figure reflects my decisions on the boundaries of these communication units of the text:



Figure 30: <u>Prominence Structure of a Japanese Text</u>

The structure in Figure 30 is termed 'prominence' structure, because it primarily reflects the way the author places relative prominence on each basic linguistic unit of text. The notational system adopted here is explained in 5.4.2.

First of all I will give an overview of the text in terms of its genre (text type), and its summary.

<u>Genre (text type) of the text</u> — According to our classification system for texts established in Figure 27, it is necessary to decide

first whether the given text is a FACT convention or a FICTION convention. Then secondly, it is necessary to decide the text type of a given text among six possible candidates.

Concerning the first matter, the decision required seems to be apparent, that is, it is a FACT convention. There are many bits of evidence which support this decision, some significant ones are: (i) The author (Michiko Hayashi, her name is stated before the actual text begins; see Appendix) is a real person, a well-known television actress; (ii) The author herself makes it clear that she is talking about her own personal factual experiences (S_1 and S_{8a}); (iii) The expected readers (native, well-educated Japanese readers) probably know the fact that the author played important parts in both television films mentioned in S_2 and S_8 (the names of the films are given in the actual text; see Appendix); (iv) The fact that the text is employed as an advertisement by Japan Travel Bureau concerning a scenic town called Onomichi (a real town) indicates that the content of the text should be factual.

Concerning the second matter, the decision required is also very apparent. In CHART I, the first column indicates the intentional states of all the sentences of the text. The result of our analysis (see discussion below) tells us that all the sentences are factual statements expressing author's beliefs about certain events, or states of affairs. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the text belongs to the category of 'Representative'. Therefore, what the author is trying to do through the text can be described as:

(105) I am expressing my belief and commitment to the truth of the content of my text, therefore, believe so and act accordingly hereafter (from Figure 11).

From the above discussion, our conclusion about the genre of the text is: It is FACT-Representatives based on our classification system developed in Figure 27.

Summary of the text -- According to Figure 30, the most prominent information in the text is in S_{11} which says, 'I am thinking that someday I want to roam about the town leisurely while free from my work'. In other words, the whole text can be represented by this information (S_{11}) which is the most prominent. Why is it the most prominent information? What evidence can we get to support the claim above? We will discuss this matter extensively later in this chapter.

The most prominent information (S_{11}) is supported by the information in S_{10} (LEVEL VI). S_{10} is represented as 'When it comes to Onomichi, I have only good impressions'. Because of S_{10}, S_{11} is derived. In other words S_{10} causes S_{11}. This causality corresponds to (1) in Figure 29. And S_{10}, then, is supported (LEVEL V) by three bits of less important information represented by S_{5b}, S_7 and S_{8b} which can be expressed as: S_{5b} 'I thought the place (Onomichi) was such an ingenuous place!'; S_7: 'I could almost imagine that Naoya Shiga might appear!'; S_{8b}: 'Every person whom I met was light-hearted and kind!' Therefore, an outline of the text can be given from the above discussion concerning LEVEL (V) and (VI) as follows:

(106) Concerning Onomichi which I visited twice for film location purposes, I have only good impressions (S_{10}). The temples and their surrounding areas were ingenuous (S_{5b}). The sloping road had such a tasteful appearance

that I almost imagined that Naoya Shiga might appear on the spot (S_7). And every person whom I met on my second visit was light-hearted and kind (S_{8b}). Therefore, I am thinking that someday I want to roam about the town leisurely while free from my work (S_{11}).

I believe (106) gives a good summary of the whole Japanese text. However, it is important to note that this is only one possible paraphrase and that there are many other possibilities. For example, in my paraphrase in (106), I departed from the original information order (S_{5b}-->S_7-->S_{8b}-->S_{10}-->S_{11}) to the present one (S_{10}-->S_{5b}-->S_7--S_{8b}-->S_{11}). Of course, there are many other possible orders. The relationship of (106) to (105) is that (106) is the content of the belief of the author, therefore, is embedded in (105). Since (106) represents the first person referential intent structure, the author's more dominant intent structure (between the author and the addressee(s)) expressed in (105) is prior to (106) as is shown in (103)(a).

Concerning the intent structure of the advertiser, Japan Travel Bureau, see the subsequent discussion intent structures (6.2.4).

6.2 Interpretation (Analysis)

As explained in Chapter Five, the emphasis in our interpretation is on larger communication units which are more than sentences. Sentences are the most basic communication units for our analysis. Compound sentences are divided into simple sentences and/or complex sentences as in S_5 (S_5-->S_{5a} and S_{5b}). We will not try to analyze sentences further into propositions or propositional clusters, except in cases where such analyses are required for the better understanding of intent structures.

I would now like to present a more extensive discussion of the text itself. The discussion will be based upon CHART I and Figure 30, and it is intended to give a theoretical as well as a practical explanation of how the various decisions made in CHART I, Figure 30 or the summary in (106) are justified. Therefore, the discussion will be primarily on LEVEL (I) through (VI) in Figure 30 focusing due attention to the concepts of **prominence**, **relation**, and **coherence** introduced in Chapter Five.

6.2.1 Discussion of S_1 through S_7

As is indicated in LEVEL (IV) on Figure 30, S_1 through S_7 form a unit. The main reasons for the coherence of this unit can be given from two perspectives, an external one and an internal one.

External reasons are:

(i) S_1 through S_7 has an analogous structure with S_{8a} through S_9. Both units have background information (S_1 and S_2 vs. S_{8b}) which is followed by the description of author's particular experiences and its evaluation (S_3-S_7 vs. S_{8b} and S_9).

(ii) S_1 through S_7 is about the author's past experience twenty years before her writing of the text, whereas S_{8a} through S_9 is about her experience six years ago. These time elements are indicated in S_1 and S_{8a}.

Internal reasons are:

(i) The content of S_1 through S_7 is about author's experience twenty years prior to her writing of the text.

(ii) The experience mentioned in (i) above is in the same location (Onomichi) and on the same occasion (on a film location trip).

The degree of prominence among the sentences in S_1 through S_7 is indicated in CHART I as well as in Figure 30. The speech act type found in these sentences is **Representatives**. Representatives express the author's intentionality in terms of the mental state called **belief** which is directed toward the truth of a certain proposition. Therefore, it is not possible to decide on their relative prominence from the speech act-type criterion set up in (104)(a). We need some finer criteria which can be used to determine relative prominence among various kinds of representatives. I suggest the following criterion as one such:

(107) Psychological state/event > physical state/event > Background

The above criterion has come directly from CHART I, in which the column 'Intentional Content' is subdivided into the three items listed in (107).

As pointed out earlier, 'Background' information given in S_1 and S_2 provides necessary information for the better understanding of the text. In other words, 'Background' gives initial context to the readers in order to prepare them for the coming speech acts. Because of this function of Background in the text, its importance, from the perspective of author's intention or purpose of the text, is usually the lowest.

However, Background is something indispensable for the understanding of any text.

The fact that `Psychological state/event' is more prominent than `physical state/event' seems to come from our common sense intuition. However, this intuition can be supported by the theory presented in this dissertation. In any human actions (including speech acts) the intentionalities of actors are involved. For example, intentionality is involved in seeing some temples (S_4), observing some people walking (S_{5a}), registering feelings such as surprise, pleasure, etc. (S_3 and S_6), or, giving evaluative judgments on something (S_{5b}, S_{6b}, S_7). Is there a degree of prominence in these intentionalities? I believe it is usually a rule of thumb that events or actions which require more mental effort and contemplation are more prominent than those which require less mental effort and contemplation. Therefore, the following criterion can be established in regard to (107):

(108) Mental acts
Evaluation
Imagination
Planning $>$ Registering of feelings $>$ Perceptions of the five senses

It is also significant to observe that in the given text it is the case that the less prominent item in (108) causes the more prominent item. The causality observed here seems to correspond to (1) and (2) in Figure 29.

Using these criteria in (107) through (108) it is possible to decide on the relative prominence among S_1 through S_7 as in CHART I and Figure 30. In other words, the following relative prominence among the units can be established:

(109) S_{5b}, S_7 > S_3, S_{5b} > S_4, S_{5a}, S_{6b} > S_1, S_2

S_{5b}, S_7	S_3, S_{5b}	S_4, S_{5a}, S_{6b}	S_1, S_2
(Evaluation, imagination, and other mental acts)	(Registering of feelings)	(Perceptions)	(Background)

S_1 through S_7 can be divided further into three smaller parts, which are reflected in LEVEL (III) in Figure 30, i.e. S_1-S_2, S_3-S_{5b} S_{6a}-S_7. We will now discuss each of these three communication units.

S_1-S_2 -- The function of this unit, i.e. background, has been discussed earlier. The features of coherence of this unit are distinctive, and therefore provides good evidence to support that this part forms a unit. The following are some major bits of evidence:

(i) It gives time (20 years ago) and location (Onomichi) in which the subsequent events and state of affairs (S_3-S_7) are embedded;

(ii) It provides the information which helps to identify the author in regards to her profession (and her relation to Onomichi;

(iii) Syntactically, it is characterised by the two occurrences of the expression "itta" (I went) in both S_1 and S_2. And this serves as a good introduction to what follows from S_3;

(iv) An adverb "mazu" (in the first place) used at the beginning of S_3 indicates in Japanese that there is a major break before this adverb. This adverb is marking the introduction of a larger communication unit.

Because of what was stated in (iv), I posit that S_1 and S_2 provide the background information for S_3 through S_7, since similar background information is also given in S_{8b} for S_{8b}-S_9. In Figure 30, S_1 & S_2 are related to other larger communication units (S_3-S_{5b} and S_6-S_7) in LEVEL (IV). Background information functions as the groundwork for the linguistic unit to which it is related. Although it does not stand out as conspicuous, it is something indispensable for that unit. LEVEL IV in Figure 30 means that S_1 & S_2 is related to both S_3-S_{5b} and S_6-S_7 as 'Background'.

The above point is supported by PI (perlocutionary intent) of S_1 & S_2. For example, according to the proposed model, the speech acts in S_1 & S_2 can be represented as:

(110) I am expressing my belief and commitment to the truth of the content of S_1 & S_2, therefore, believe so and act accordingly hereafter (from Figure 11).

What (110) is actually saying is: "My readers, believe the factual statements in S_1 & S_2, and use them as background information hereafter for the following speech acts, which I am going to perform".

S_3-S_{5b} -- LEVEL III in Figure 30 presents S_3-S_{5b} as a unit which can be divided further into two smaller units (LEVEL II), viz. S_3-S_4 and S_{5a}-S_{5b}.

The **Coherence** of S_3-S_{5b} can be established by the fact that the unit refers to the mental state of 'surprise' (S_3) and the mental act of 'evaluation' (S_{5b}), both of which are directed towards the things in the same location. "<u>Otera</u>" (Buddhist temples in S_3 and S_4) were there, and in the "precincts of the temples" (Keidai in S_{5a}) there were many "grandfathers and grandmothers".

The relative prominence among the sentences in S_3-S_{5b} is indicated in Figure 30 and in (109). From (109), this can be summarized as:

(111) $S_{5b} > S_3 > S_{5a} > S_4$

The reasons behind the decisions on this scale of prominence can be sought in the criterion established in (108).

The relations set up among the units in S_3-S_{5b} are indicated in Figure 30: S_3 vs. S_4, S_{5a} vs. S_{5b} and S_3-S_4 vs. S_{5a}-S_{5b}. Concerning S_3 vs. S_4, S_3 is RESULT of the REASON in S_4. In other words, the perception of seeing many Buddhist temples has caused a surprise which is registered in the mind of the author. Concerning S_{5a} vs. S_{5b}, S_{5a} is the GROUNDS of the CONCLUSION in S_{5b}. It is significant to observe that in a GROUNDS-CONCLUSION relationship, there is a component which is lacking in a REASON-RESULT relationship, that is, the component of assessment, judgement, or reasoning (inference). In other words, the author's (or the actor's) mental act of interpretation is presupposed in a GROUNDS-CONCLUSION relationship. The relationship between S_3-S_4 vs. S_{5a}-S_{5b} is that (S_3-S_4) is the GROUNDS and (S_{5a}-S_{5b}) is the CONCLUSION. It seems the most appropriate interpretation here is that the fact of the author being surprised by the extraordinarily large number of Buddhist temples has caused her to observe the environment more carefully. And then what she has observed in the precincts of the temples is primarily responsible for her evaluative judgment in S_{5b}.

S_6-S_7 -- This unit is very similar to S_3-S_{5b}. The coherence of this unit can be established externally as well as internally:

(i) There is sudden change of location from 'the temples and their precincts' (S_3-S_{5b}) to 'sloping road' (S_6-S_7).

(ii) In S_8, there is a complete substitution of background information. The background information given in S_1 and S_2 no longer applies after S_8. The background information given in S_8 takes over the roles played by S_1 & S_2 up to that point.

(iii) Internally, S_6 and S_7 deal with the intentionalities of 'evaluation' (S_{6b}) and 'imagination' (S_7), both of which are directed at sakamichi ("sloping road").

The relative prominence among S_{6a}, S_{6b} and S_7 is indicated in Figure 30. It is summarized by the following formula:

(112) $S_7 > S_{6b} > S_{6a}$

This formula can be established from the criteria set up in (108) and (109). The decision that S_7 is more prominent than S_{6b} is valid because of (109), which leads to the conclusion that the mental act of evaluation that the sloping road "has a really tasteful appearance" (S_{6b}) has caused a further mental act of imagination which is described in S_7.

The communication relations among the units in S_{6a}-S_7 are indicated in Figure 30. We will determine the relations between S_{6a} and S_{6b}, and between S_{6b} and S_7.

Concerning S_{6a} vs. S_{6b}, the most natural interpretation seems to be that S_{6a} has given an occasion for the author to make an evaluative comment about the particular sloping road. In other words, the information contained in S_{6A} causes the author's evaluation in S_{6b}. Therefore, the relationship between S_{6a} and S_{6b} is that S_{6a} is the GROUNDS of the CONCLUSION in S_{6b}.

Concerning S_{6b} vs. S_7, it seems to be apparent that the author's mental act of evaluation has caused a further mental act of imagination. In other words, the positive evaluative judgment on the part of the author regarding the sloping wall where the filming was carried out has caused her to have the positive romantic imagination described in S_7. Therefore, the relationship between S_{6b} and S_7 is that S_{6b} is the REASON for the RESULT in S_7.

One interesting syntactic phenomenon needs to be pointed out concerning S_{6b} and S_7, viz. the main verbs used both in S_{6b} and S_7 are not past tenses, although in English they are translated in past tenses. In Japanese, the tenses used in S_{6b} and S_7 are usually categorized as 'present' tense, but I would prefer a term like 'super temporal' tense. In other words, when the author tells a story, or shares an experience, often at one point of his story he becomes so preoccupied with the sentiment attached to that particular section of the story that he seems to lose his original perspective as the person referring to past events and experiences. In this particular kind of situation, the author often uses the 'super temporal' tense in Japanese as in S_{6b} and S_7.

Longacre (1983a:25) admits that tense/aspect shift may occur at the peak of a story. Ishikawa (1980:7), in his analysis of a Japanese folk tale (a narrative), finds out that at the peak of the story tense shift occurs and present tense is used.

From the above discussion, it seems to be possible to conclude that S_{6b} and S_7 mark the peak in S_1-S_9 which constitutes a story about the author's past experiences.

6.2.2 Discussion on S_{8a} through S_9

The main reasons why S_{8a} through S_9 form a larger communication unit are very similar to those for S_1 through S_7 in 6.2.1.

The external reasons are:

(i) S_{8a} through S_9 has an analogous structure with S_1 through S_7 (see the discussion in 6.2.1);

(ii) S_{8a} through S_9 is about the author's past experience six years before her writing the text, whereas S_1 through S_7 is about her experience twenty years ago;

(iii) S_{10} indicates that it introduces a major change of information flow. A connective, toiuwakede ("accordingly") usually occurs towards the end of speech acts in Japanese and it introduces a conclusion.

The internal reasons are:

(i) The content of S_{8a} through S_9 is consistent as the description of the author's experience six years before her writing of the text.

(ii) The experience in (i) is in the same location (the fishermen's settlement of Onomichi) and on the same occasion (another film making trip).

The degree of prominence among the sentences in S_{8a} through S_9 is indicated in CHART I as well as in Figure 30. Using the criteria set up in (107)-(109), it is possible to obtain the following conclusion as to the relative prominence:

(113)	S_{8b} (Evaluation-generic)	>	S_9 (Evaluation-specific)	>	S_{8a} (Background)

Both S_{8b} and S_9 are evaluative statements and yet in (113) S_{8b} is considered more prominent than S_9. This is because of (109) which can be applied to our case here. S_9 is a specific cause which leads to a generic evaluative statement in S_{8b}.

S_{8a}-S_9 can be divided further into three smaller communication units: S_{8a}, S_{8b}, and S_9. S_{8a} functions as background for S_{8b} and S_9. S_{8b} and S_9 are evaluative statements made in the context specified in S_{8a}.

S_{8a} functions exactly as S_1 and S_2 do. It provides necessary background information for the interpretations of the two succeeding sentences S_{8b} and S_9.

The communication relation between S_{8a} and S_{8b} (indicated in LEVEL (II) in Figure 30) needs some explanation. The relationship there is not between the literal meaning of S_{8a} and S_{8b}, but between the presuppositional information in S_{8a} and S_{8b}. One implicit bit of information which is presupposed in S_{8a} is the fact that the author met some people. In the English translation for S_{8b}, I made this information explicit as in "and every person whom I met was light-hearted and kind". With this explanation in mind, we can relate S_{8a} to S_{8b}: S_{8a} gives the GROUNDS for the CONCLUSION in S_{8b}.

The relationship between S_{8b} and S_9 is fairly straightforward. S_9 is a specific evaluative statement which functions as the GROUNDS for a more general evaluative CONCLUSION in S_{8b}.

6.2.3 Discussion on S_{10} and S_{11}

S_{10} and S_{11} are distinctively different from the rest of the text in that they represent the author's present mental state of belief rather than a past mental state of belief (S_1-S_9). The coherence of these two sentences is indicated by the above fact as well as by the connective (toiuwakede "accordingly") used at the beginning of S_{10}. This Japanese connective is usually employed in order to introduce the conclusion part of a text at the end.

The relative prominence between S_{10} and S_{11} is indicated in LEVEL (VI) of Figure 30. There, it says that S_{11} is more prominent than S_{10}. Why this conclusion? First of all, S_{10} causes S_{11}. In other words, the fact that the author has only good impressions about Onomichi has caused her to have a want to visit the town again. Secondly, S_{11} expresses the author's belief that she has a present mental state called 'want' whose content is 'to go to Onomichi'. This mental state of 'want' which is directed at a particular future action is more prominent than other mental states which are not directed at future actions. This conclusion is the direct application of the formula established in (104) (b).

The communication relations of S_{10} to the whole preceding unit is indicated in LEVEL (V) of Figure 30. S_{10} is a SUMMARY impression of the author about Onomichi for her SPECIFIC impressive experiences in her two trips to the town for film locations. LEVEL (V) indicates that her past experiences are represented by S_{5b}, S_7 and S_{8b}, which are considered to be the most prominent information in two major parts of the text which describe the author's experiences in her two separate occasions of film making. There are clear surface structure indications which support the claim that S_{10} is a summary. They are: (i) A connective, toiuwakede ("accordingly") indicates that the conclusion of the text has started; (ii) A clause, "when it comes to Onomichi" refers back to the preceding references to Onomichi; (iii) A concessive relative clause, "although I visited it only for the occasions of those film locations", clearly refers back to what the author has described in the text up to this point (S_1-S_9).

The reason why S_{10} is more prominent than S_{5b}, S_7, or S_{8b} in LEVEL (V) is found in the criterion set up in (104)(b). The fact that the author still has good impressions about Onomichi is more prominent (or important for her) than the fact that she could remember some good things about the town from the past. It is usually the case that our present attitudes are the products of our past experiences. And our present attitudes and conditions determine our future.

I did not make any difference among S_{5b}, S_7 and S_{8b} in regard to their relative prominence. I have done this because there is no noticeable causality indicated by the author among the impression at the temples and their surrounding area (S_{5b}), the impression at the sloping road (S_7), and the impression of the people (S_{8b}). The fact that these impressions are separable by time and location supports the above claim. The outline of the whole text given in (106) reflects our discussion here.

The communication relation of S_{11} to S_{10} is suggested in (104)(b). S_{11} is the RESULT of the REASON in S_{10}. In other words, the author's present good impressions about Onomichi has caused her to have a specific want to go there again and roam about the town while free from her work. In the Japanese language, as is indicated in Appendix I-B, the final verb in S_{11} is "I am thinking", but the content of thinking is specified by a want/desire of the author. This means that the mental act of thinking presupposes a certain want or desire as a mental state. And this want/desire should be caused by something. In the text, S_{10} is causing S_{11} as discussed above.

The most prominent information in the text, therefore, is S_{11}. This is clearly indicated in Figure 30.

6.2.4 Intent Structures

As discussed in Chapter Five, there are two kinds of intent structure which correspond to two kinds of intentionality, i.e. communication intent and representation intent.

Communication intentionality deals with the social interaction between the author and the addressee(s). Representation intentionality deals with the social interactions set up in the text itself.

In the present Japanese text, we have to deal with three intent structures: the advertiser's intent structure, the author's intent structure, and referential intent structure. We will describe each intent structure, in reverse order.

Referential intent structure -- We have discussed briefly this intent structure in the overview. The intentionality which we focus on here is that of the main participant (or character) described in the text. Concerning the present text the main participant is the author herself. The occurrence of many first person indicatives throughout the text supports this claim strongly. Theoretically, it is possible to posit intentionality and mental state/event for every action and perception of the participant. Here, however, we focus our attention on only the actions and perceptions of the author described in LEVEL (IV), (V), and (VI) of Figure 30.

Concerning LEVEL (IV) the referential intent structure of the author herself can be described in two units: S_1-S_7 and S_{8a}-S_9. S_1-S_7 consists of three units (S_1-S_2, S_3-S_{5b} and S_{6a}-S_7). The mental state of the author's action of going to Onomichi for making a film (described in S_1 and S_2) can be termed 'obligation'. The mental state of the author's mental act of evaluation in S_{5b} can be termed a 'esthetic sentiment'. The mental state of the author's mental act of imagination in S_7 can also be termed a 'esthetic sentiment'. S_{8a}-S_9 consists of two units (S_{8a} and S_{8b}-S_9). The mental state of the author's action of going to Onomichi to make another film (described in S_{8b}) can be termed 'humane sentiment'.

Concerning LEVEL (V), the referential intent structure can be represented by four mental states. Three of the four mental states have been discussed in LEVEL (IV). The mental state of the author's mental act of evaluation in Sl_0 can be termed 'general sentiment'.

Concerning LEVEL (VI), the referential intent structure can be represented by two mental states. One of the two mental states has been dealt with in LEVEL (V). The other mental state is expressed in S_{11}. The mental state of the author's mental act of thinking can be termed 'want'.

Therefore, the referential intent structure of LEVEL (IV)-(VI) in Figure 30 can be described by Figure 31.



Figure 31: <u>The First Person Referential Intent Structure (of the Japanese advertisement text)</u>

The referential intent structure of the author described in Figure 31 gives the backbone of the outline made in (106).

<u>Author's intent structure</u> -- This structure always overrules its referential intent structures, because it is based on the communication intentionality of the author. In the Japanese text under investigation,

there are no explicit surface structure expressions which specifically define the author's communication intentionality. However, according to our modified SAT, we can express the author's intent structure quite generally without specifying the content of the PI of the text as in (105). As Figure 31 gives the backbone for (106), Figure 32 gives the backbone for (105).

CI	PI	WANT (You believe my BELIEF and act accordingly hereafter) ↑
	II	BELIEF
RI	Referential Intent Structure	WANT (To go to Onomichi) (Figure 29)

Figure 32: Author's Intent Structure (of the Japanese advertisement text)

If the author himself does not specify the PI of his text explicitly in his texts, then usually extra-textual information such as genre type, the social relationship between author and readers, social function of a text, etc. determines the PI of the author if necessary. There are cases in which the author himself wants to leave the PI of his text as general as in Figure 32. However, in the present Japanese text, there is more than Figure 32, because the text we have analyzed is an advertisement! This means that the text was intended by an advertiser to be used to accomplish his purpose. And we culturally presume that the author of the text consented to this plan of the advertiser before writing the text. Therefore, in some way we can say that an advertisement text is the product of co-authorship, that is, of the author and the advertiser who hired her. Therefore, it is usually the case that the author of such a text leaves off without specifying his PI of the text and the advertiser comes in to specify it. This is exactly what has happened in our present Japanese advertisement text under investigation.

Advertiser's intent structure -- In Appendix I-A, there is a copy of a page from Bungei Shunjū in which the Japanese advertisement text we have analyzed is included. There, the advertiser is identified as 'Japan Travel Bureau', and a message of the advertiser is included. The message from the advertiser is found at the lower part of the page. The information given by the advertiser ranges from very general, such as the name of the advertiser, the locations of the branches and their telephone numbers, to specific. The specific information there can be summarized as follows:

(114) We have prepared 'Tickets as Gifts' which are unique in our new modern age. Why don't you send 'travels' as your gifts to your special friends by using our tickets?

However, (114) can be substituted by the following Directives:

(115) Buy our tickets and send them as gifts to your friends.

We assume that (115) is the core message of (114) without doing any further analysis of (114).

How can we fill the gap between (115) and Figure 32? The answer is given by the following intent structure of the advertiser:

WANT
(to sell you tickets to use as gifts)

WANT
(to arouse WANT inside you to buy
tickets to use as gifts)

WANT
(to inform you of our
new program of
'tickets as gifts')

WANT
(to ask someone to arouse
WANT inside you to go to a scenic
place, so that you may also want
your friends to go there)

Advertiser's Message

Michiko Hayashi's Essay

Author's Intent Structure — PI: (Believe my belief that I want to go to Onomichi, and act accordingly hereafter)

(The Whole Advertisement page)

Notes: 'you' indicates 'readers' of <u>Bungei Shunjū</u>
---> indicates 'unfulfilled' causal relationships

Figure 33: <u>The Advertiser's Intent Structure</u>

Figure 33 builds upon the unspecified PI described in Figure 32 and specifies it. In other words, the author's intent structure merges into the advertiser's intent structure so that the unspecified PI of the author may be described specifically. In our proposed model, it is possible to understand the author's intent structure as presenting the original PI of the author and the advertiser's intent structure presenting SPI (superimposed perlocutionary intent) as discussed in Chapter Four. In other words, the advertisement text here is a kind of indirect speech act or a figure of speech; that is, it has its original speech act intentionality as well as its superimposed speech act intentionality.

One other important feature of Figure 33 needs to be noted here, that is, 'means-purpose (end) chains' between the various WANTs described. As discussed previously (see Figure 1, p. 7 and Figure 13), intentional actions performed are often the MEANS to accomplish a certain PURPOSE (or END), which in turn becomes a further MEANS to accomplish yet another PURPOSE, and so on. If we apply this idea to Figure 33, we can conclude that the two lowest WANTS of the advertiser are fulfilled by producing the advertisement, and that these fulfilled WANTS are the MEANS for the WANT which is one level up, and so on.

From this discussion we can establish another criterion for relative prominence among the units of communication which expresses the mental state of WANT. That is:

(116) WANT of Effect > WANT of Cause
(PURPOSE) (MEANS)

The criterion in (116) says that any WANT which causes another WANT (as effect) is less prominent than the WANT that is caused. The causality type discussed here belongs to (1) in Figure 29.

6.3 Comments on the Application

The application of the interpretative model, which is specifically designed for theme derivation (or intent structure derivation), to a particular Japanese advertisement text has been very satisfactory. This means that the methodology explicated in detail in this chapter has been demonstrated to be powerful at least for the given text. However, in order to solidify this conclusion, more application of the model to various other types of texts will be necessary.

There are some specific areas where further research is necessary:

(i) The types of causality pointed out in this chapter (causality type (1); causality type (2)) need to be examined further by considering more concrete examples from other texts and to be defined in terms of their relation to the relative prominence between cause and effect.

(ii) Some communication units do not seem to be related by the causality defined in Figure 29. For example, we have pointed out that S_{5b}, S_7, and S_{8b} in the Japanese text are not related to each other by any causality expounded in Figure 29. It seems to me that the author was not interested in positing any specific causality there. These sentences just represent three rather independent items in the memory system of the author which are loosely connected by temporal succession. It seems that they are related to how information can be stored in our memory system or how we represent such information on a sheet of paper. What SSWC presents as 'Addition' (in Figure 28) needs to be studied further in terms of author's intentionality as well as his memory system.

(iii) It has become apparent in the application, that it is necessary to develop the finer categories of mental states behind intentional events or actions. Such terms as 'OBLIGATION', 'SENTIMENT', etc. developed in the application need to be checked further with other data.

(iv) The criteria set up in (107), (108) may be checked with the results of psychology in the same area, if there are such results available.

CHAPTER SEVEN

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO A KOINE GREEK TEXT

This chapter deals with the application of the interpretation model proposed in Chapter Five to a Koine Greek text. The Book of Philemon from the New Testament is chosen for this purpose. The format of presentation is similar to that of Chapter Six. The Greek text used is based upon The Greek New Testament, United Bible Societies (Third Edition). Two English translation versions, Today's English Version (TEV) and Revised Standard Version (RSV), are used extensively for reference purposes. In APPENDIX II, the original Koine Greek text as well as its transliteration alongside the TEV are displayed.

The purpose of this application is not to present a lower level linguistic analysis which is characterized by a word by word exposition of the text, but rather to present a higher level linguistic analysis for theme derivation. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five, it is assumed in our analysis that the theme structure of a text is identical with the intent structures of the text. Therefore, the main emphasis in this chapter is placed on illustrating how such intent structures can be derived from a specific text.

In the following discussion, first, we will present an overview of the text which we want to investigate. Second, we will examine the text closely in its many parts. Third, we will construct intent structures. And lastly, we will evaluate our own application.

7.1 Overview

The overview of the Greek text will be given in two ways: a chart which displays the text, and a figure which describes the prominence structure of the higher level linguistic units of the text.

7.1.1 A display chart

The following is the chart which displays the whole Koine Greek text (the book of Philemeon) according to the notational systems developed in the previous chapters. As mentioned there, this system is based on the theory developed in the first four chapters of this study.

In the chart, the RSV, which is considered to be a fairly literal English translation version, is used instead of original Koine Greek for the benefit of the readers. This does not mean that I have relied heavily on the RSV or other English translation versions for various decisions necessary in the analysis. I have worked on the original Koine Greek text extensively, and all my decisions are based upon my insights and thinkings from this research into the original text. Here is the chart:

CHART II DISPLAY OF A KOINE GREEK TEXT (PHILEMON)

(1): Directives, Commisives, Expressives, Declarations

(2): Representatives (realized as independent clauses, sujects being 1st person)

(3): Representatives (realized as independent clauses, subjects being 2nd or 3rd person)

(4): Representatives (realized as subordinate clauses, subjects being 1st person)

(5): Representatives (realized as subordinate clauses, subjects being 2nd or 3rd person)

A: Authority (for Declarations)
B: Belief (for Representatives)
I: Intention (for Commisives)
F: Feeling (for Expressives)
W: Want (for Directives)

Sentences (verses)	Intentional state	Intentional Content				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
S_1 1-2	A	Paul, a prisoner for Christ Jesus, and Timothy our brother, To Philemon our beloved fellow worker and Apphia our sister and Archippus our fellow soldier, and the church in your house:				
S_2 3	F	Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.				
S_3 4a	B		I thank (Eucharistō) my God always			
4b					when I remember you (mneian sou poioumenos) in my prayers (epi tōn proseuchōn mou),	
5a					because I hear (akouōn) of your love and of the faith which you have (echeis) toward the Lord Jesus and all the saints,	
6a			(and I pray) (?)			
6b					that (hopōs) the sharing of your faith may promote the knowledge of all the good that is ours in Christ.	

S_4	7a	B	For I have derived much joy and comfort (Charan gar pollen eschon kai paraklesin) from your love, my brother,
	7b		because (hoti) the hearts of the Saints have been refreshed (anapepautai) through you.
S_5	8	F	Accordingly (Dio), though I am bold enough (parresian echon) in Christ to command (epitassein) you to do what is required,
	9a		yet for love's sake (dia ten apapen) I prefer to appeal to you (parakalo)
	9b		I, Paul (toioutos on), am ambassador and now a Jesus --
S_6	10a	F	I appeal (parakalo) to you for my child, Onesimus,
	10b		whose (hon) father I have become in my imprisonment.
	11		Formerly he (ton pote) was useless to you, but now he is indeed usuful to you and to me.
	12a		I am sending him back (hon anepempsa) to you,
	12b		-- he is my very heart--
	13a		I would have been glad (hon ego eboulomen) to keep him with me,
	13b		in order that he might serve me on your behalf during my imprisonment for the gospel;

	14a		but I preferred to do (ethelesa poiesai) nothing without your consent
	14b		in order that your goodness might not be (hina me...e) compulsion but of your own free will.
S_7	15a	B	Perhaps (tacha), this is why (dia) he was separated (echoristhe) from you for a while
	15b-16a		that you might have him back for ever, (16a) no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother,
	16b		especially to me but more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord.
*S_8	17a	W	So if you consider me your partner,
	17b		receive (proslabou) him as you would receive me.
*S_9	18a	W	If he has wronged you at all, or owes you anything
	18b		charge (elloga) that to my account.
S_{10}	19a	B	I, Paul, write (egrapsa) this with my own hand,
S_{11}	19b	I	I will repay (apotiso) it
	19c		—to say nothing (hina me lego) of your owing me even your own self.
S_{12}	20a	B	Yes, brother, I want some benefit (onaimen) from you in the Lord.
S_{13}	20b	W	Refresh (anapauson) my heart in Christ

S_{14}	21a	B	confident of your obedience,
	21b		I write (egrapsa) to you,
	21c		knowing that you will do even more than I say.
S_{15}	22a	W	At the same time, prepare (hetoimaze) a guest room for me,
	22b		for I am hoping (elpizō gar) through your prayers to be granted to you.
S_{16}	23 24	A	Epaphras, my fellow prisoner in Christ, Jesus, sends (aspazetai) to you, (24) and so do Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, and Luke, my fellow workers.
S_{17}	25	F	The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit.

I will now briefly explain some of the specific arrangements made for this chart. Arrangements such as these will be necessary for each particular language and/or for each particular genre.

The most basic communication unit of Koine Greek language is the sentence. The sentence in the Koine Greek language is typically realized by the existence of an independent clause which has a finite verb. A finite verb in Koine Greek is one of imperative, indicative, hortatory subjunctive, or optative. The finite verbs of independent clauses are often omitted, as in S_1, S_2, S_{17} especially when such clauses are used for conventional expressions. And for each sentence posited, its intentional (mental) state which designates a type of illocutionary intent is given. In the given text, five of the six intentional states of speech acts occur. Each sentence is further subdivided into small communication units which are indicated by the verse numbers and letters on the right side of the first column of the chart. The decisions on these communication units are made based on specific surface structure devices. Those specific surface structure devices noted in the given text are:

(i) Participles modifying the finite verb in an independent clauses (4b, 5a, 8, 9b, 21a, 21c)

(ii) Subjunctives modifying the finite verbs in independent claused (6b, 15b-16b, 19c)

(iii) Indicatives forming subordinate clauses for their corresponding independent clauses (7b, 10b, 11, 12a, 13a, 14a, 17a, 18a, 22b)

(iv) Subjunctives modifying the finite verbs in subordinate clauses (13b, 14b)

(v) Indicatives (explicit or implicit) forming subordinate clauses which function as comments for a particular concept (12b, 16b)

The five subcategories ((1), (2)...(5)) set up in the third column for 'Intentional Content' have a scale of relative prominence among them as follows:

(117) (1) > (2) > (3) > (4) > (5)

The decisions on the relative prominence among these subcategories are based upon the criteria established in (104)(a) and (104)(c) and the following criterion:

(118) Information in independent clauses > Information in subordinate clauses

Most of the languages in the world seem to be make the distinction indicated in (118). The terms 'independent' and 'subordinate' (or `dependent') seem to suggest that the information in the former sense is more prominent than the information in the latter sense. Why is it so? It is necessary to give sufficient evidence for the claim made in (118). I believe this can be done by a the closer examination of each occurence of an `independent-subordinate' combination in the text. The types of causality involved in such combinations need to be identified and evaluated. I will explicate this later in this chapter.

7.1.2 A prominence structure

The next step after producing the chart which provides the sentence boundaries and the rough relative prominence among those sentences is the framing of the hierarchical prominence structure of the text.

The result of this step is shown in Figure 34.



Figure 34: <u>Prominence Structure of a Koine Greek Text</u>

The notational system employed in Figure 34 is almost identical with Figure 30 in Chapter Six. One minor difference between the two figures is that in Figure 34 each sentence is provided with its verse reference in a parenthesis.

In Figure 34, a total of nine LEVELs are posited from the lowest, LEVEL I, to the highest, LEVEL IX. The asterisk placed at S_8 means that it is the most prominent communication unit in the text.

S_8 is characterized by the presence of an imperative, <u>proslabou</u> "receive". This fact indicates that the text belongs to the text type called Directives, according to the classification system developed in Figure 27. Verses 1-3 indicates clearly that the text is a letter sent from two individuals, Paul and Timothy, addressed to an individual, Philemon, and others. This text which is referred to by 'the Epistle of Paul to Philemon' in the New Testament has been traditionally considered a genuine letter. This means that the text belongs to FACT convention.

The whole text can be summarized from LEVEL (IX) as follows:

(119) I, Paul, am writing a letter to you, Philemon. Greetings from me! The whole point of my letter is to urge you that you should receive Onesimus, whom I am sending back to you, as you would receive me. Greetings to you from your fellow workers here! Final Greetings from me!

The above summary indicates that the author's intent structure overlaps with the first person referential intent structure. We have already discussed this phenomenon in 5.3.1. However, the text is expected to reveal the author's past circumstances which have led the author to take the measure of writing a letter. If this is the case, then we can expect that this part of the first person referential intent structure functions as the basis for the author's intent structure which is prominently marked in the text. The referential intent structures of second person (in the given text, Philemeon is the second person) or of third person (Onesimus) may be significant for the interpretation of the text.

In the following section, I will present sufficient evidence for the various decisions made for the chart as well as the figure above.

7.2 Interpretation (Analysis)

Following the format in Chapter Six, my discussion here will be focussed on three important concepts: **coherence**, **prominence**, and **communication relations**. The discussion deals primarily with communication units larger than the sentence. This means that the nine LEVELs posited in Figure 34 are the main concern of our discussion, although the constituents of each sentence which are indicated by verse numbers in CHART II are often referred to in the discussion. We will start our analysis from the highest level (LEVEL IX) and then proceed step by step until we arrive at the lowest level (LEVEL I).

7.2.1 Discussion on LEVEL (IX)

LEVEL (IX) is the highest level posited. This level consists of three parts: S_1-S_2, S_3-S_{15}, and S_{16}-S_{17}. The **coherence** of each of these three units is apparent. The following are the main reasons which support it:

(i) S_1-S_2 seems to be a typical way to open a letter among the Christians in the first century. (See the introductions to all the other New Testament epistles.) The functions of this part are: the identification of the writer of the letter; the identification of the addressees; and the expression of the writer's greetings. The expressions used here are somewhat formal.

(ii) S_{16}-S_{17} seems to be a typical way to close a letter among the Christians in the first century (cf. for example, the endings of the New Testament epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Philippians, etc.). The functions of this part are: the expression of greetings for other fellow workers to the addressees; and the expression of the author's final greetings to the addressees. This part, too, is formal in its style.

(iii) Another piece of evidence which supports the claim that S_1-S_2 and S_{16}-S_{17} are distinctive units of the letter is found in the intentional states expressed by those sentences. As shown in CHART II, both units have A (authority) and F (feeling) as their intentional states. Concretely speaking, what this means is that the author of the letter is declaring something by exercising socially or conventionally entrusted authority, and is expressing a certain feeling towards the addressees. In other words, what the author is doing in S_1-S_2 and S_{16}-S_{17} can be summarized in the following way:

(120) S_1-S_2: I declare that this is a letter from me to you. I express my greetings to you (by asking God's blessings on you). (Therefore, accept these and act accordingly hereafter.)

S_{16}-S_{17}: I declare to you that such and such people have sent their greetings to you. I express my final greetings to you. (Therefore, accept these and act accordingly hereafter.)

I have indicated the perlocutionary intent (PI) of each unit in the final parentheses. Each PI in these units is usually understood as a social convention. The PI in S_1-S_2 is something like, "Read the following as a letter". The PI in S_{16}-S_{17} is something like "I am herewith concluding my letter".

(iv) S_3-S_{15} can be separated off from S_1-S_2 and S_{16}-S_{17}, because S_3 starts with a Representatives type of speech act which is marked by the first occurrence of the first person indicative (Eucharistø in Greek), and S_{15} is characterized by a Directives type of speech act (hetoimaze) which indicates that it is still part of the content of the letter. Both S_3 and S_{15} deal with specific events rather than formalized activities. This indicates that S_3 through S_{15} is the content of the letter in which the author deals with specific matters.

(v) S_3-S_{15} are represented B (belief), W (want) and I (intention) as far as the intentional states of their speech acts are concerned. This fact indicates that the author is expressing his specific beliefs, making some specific promises, and requesting the addressee to do some specific things.

The relative prominence among S_1-S_2, S_3-S_{15} and S_{16}-S_{17} is indicated in Figure 34. S_3-S_{15} is the most prominent unit. The reason for this decision is found in the formula presented in (104)(a). The formula says that W is more prominent than A or F. This means that S_3-S_{15} which includes W is more prominent than S_1-S_2 or S_{16}-S_{17} which consists of A and F.

The **communication relations** which exist between these units do not seem to be based upon any causality type described in Figure 29. What is the communication relation between S_1-S_2 and S_3-S_{15}, or S_3-S_{15} and S_{16}-S_{17}? The only answer I can give to this question is that those units are placed as they are simply because the rules of writing letters require such orders. Therefore, appropriate functional labels for those units would be: S_1-S_2 --> Opening of the letter; S_3-S_{15} --> Body of the letter; S_{16}-S_{17} --> Closing of the letter. Such communication relations as we have just discussed seem to be quite distinctive from the communication relations which can be explained by one of the causality types described in Figure 29. I want to call the former kind of communication relations, **communication relations of rhetorical conventions**, and the later kind of communication relations **communication relations of causality.**

SSWC (p. 112) categorizes the types of communication relations we have just discussed as belonging to a 'Support-Head Nonchronological Orientation' type. And most of the communication relations of causality are categorized in SSWC as belonging to 'Support-Head Nonchronological Logical' type. The contrastive features which make these two kinds of communication relations distinctively different from each other are 'Orientation' and 'Logical'. What are the exact definitions of these two terms? How are they different from each other? How is author's intentionality involved in these concepts? SSWC does not give adequate answers to these questions. It seems that the parameter set up here (i.e. rhetorical conventions vs. causality) is something more basic than just the difference between 'orientation' and 'logical'. I will come back to this point later as more relevant data arises.

7.2.2 Discussion on LEVEL (VIII)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (VIII) deals with two communication units: S_3-S_{14} and S_{15}. In other words, LEVEL (VIII) covers the body of the letter and divides it further into the two communication units specified above.

The **coherence** of each of these two units and the contrastive relationship of these two units are as follows:

(i) S_3-S_{14} and S_{15} are contrastive units to each other, because each unit has an imperative form (proslabou vs. hetoimaze) which presents the most prominent information in each unit.

(ii) S_3-S_{14}, although quite large as a unit, deals consistently with the social interactions among Paul, Philemon, and Onesimus, whereas S_{15} deals only the social interaction between Paul and Philemon. In this way there is a clear shift of topic in S_{15}.

(iii) At the beginning of S_{15} (or v.22), there is an adverb, hama "at the same time", which seems to suggest that the subsequent imperative is constrastive to the imperative which has already been given.

(iv) S_{15} is a sentence, because it has an independent clause (with an imperative, hetoimaze) and a subordinate clause which is indicated by gar "for" at its beginning. The subordinate clause gives a GROUNDS for a CONCLUSION in the independent clause. The type of causality involved here is (1) in Figure 29: a mental act ('hope') causes another mental act ('want').

The relative prominence between the two units, S_3-$_{14}$ and S_{15} is indicated in Figure 34. S_3-S_{14} is more prominent than S_{15}. The following are the main reasons for this conclusion:

(i) An adverb, hama "at the same time", at the beginning of S_{15} (v.22) implies that the subsequent command is an additional occasional command to the previously given command (v.17) which is more important.

(ii) The amount of space which is alotted and the extent of detailed expositions given for S_3-S_{14} in order to support its most prominent information in S_8 (v.17) indicate that this unit is more prominent than S_{15} for the author.

The communication relation between these two units may be explained by the causality type (3) in Figure 29. This type of causality indicates that a certain action performed causes another action as a realization of the prior intention. Some have suggested that Paul intended that the command in S_{15} would promote Philemon's willingness to accept Paul's important request made in S_8 (v.17). I do not, however, take this position. I believe that Paul commanded Philemon to accept Onesimus in S_3-S_{14} and then immediately after this he simply added another request without specifically intending to relate this request to the previous one.

I think the position taken above is safer, since the surface structure devices in S_{15} (v.22), hama de kai "and at the same time", seem to suggest the request in S_{15} is just simply added. But on the other hand it is very difficult to deny the possibility that a mature

Christian leader like Paul, who has mastered various persuasive arts, could very possibly have intended that the suggestion of his going to meet Philemon face to face in the near future would have some impact upon Philemon so as to influence his decision whether or not he should to accept Onesimus. This kind of speculation, however, seems to be beyond what the surface structures of the text clearly express as the intentions or mental states of Paul. We cannot deal with this kind of information objectively here, because from the text itself we cannot determine its validity.

The communication relation between S_3-S_{14} and S_{15}, therefore, is not based upon the author's prior intention according to our interpretation. S_3-S_{14} has simply provided an occasion for the author to make an extra request in S_{15}. SSWC does not seem to have a suitable term to specify this kind of communication relation. John Banker (1981) understands S_3-S_{14} as 'Primary Matter' and S_{15} as 'Secondary Matter'. I suggest that a term **occasional addition** be used for S_{15} as its relation to S_3-S_{14}.

7.2.3 Discussion on LEVEL (VII)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (VII) deals with S_3-S_{14} and this unit is furher divided into two smaller units: S_3-S_{13} and S_{14}.

The **coherence** of each of these two units is indicated by the following points:

(i) S_3-S_{13} is characterized by the occurrence of a series of imperatives: <u>proslabou</u> "receive" in S_8 (v.17); <u>elloga</u> "charge" in S_9 (v.18); <u>anapauson</u> "refresh" in S_{13} (v.20). These imperatives relate to the same social interaction involving Paul, Philemon and Onesimus.

(ii) There is a sudden change of the mood of the author in S_{14} which is indicated by the finite verb, egrapsa "I wrote", which is an indicative in the aorist (past) tense. In other words, S_{14} has a Representatives type of speech act. On the other hand, the predominant mood of the author up until S_{14} is that of request (or exhortation) which is prominently marked by the series of imperatives pointed out in (i) above.

(iii) S_3-S_{13} and S_{14} are contrastive to each other, because S_{14} refers back to S_3-S_{13} as a whole to present a summary. We will discuss more about this relation below.

The **relative prominence** between these two units is very apparent. In S_3-S_{13}, there are three occurrences of W (want) in the forms of imperative, whereas S_{14} is associated with B (belief). The formula established in (104)(a) clearly indicates that S_3-S_{13} is more prominent than S_{14}.

The **communication relation** between S_3-S_{13} and S_{14} seems to present a problem similar to that discussed in 7.2.1. The relation here is a type of **communication relation of rhetorical conventions**. It seems difficult to posit any type of causality here. The rhetorical convention the author employs seems to be a summary with which the author indicates that the major thrust of the letter is ended. The reason S_{14} is a summary of S_3-S_{13} becomes clear if we examine the content of each unit closely.

The main verb, egrapsa (indicative, first person, aorist tense) in

S_{14} seems to refer to what the author has done in written speech acts up to this point. The point of what the author has done is the most important request in S_8. Therefore, it is possible to say that "I write to you" in S_{14} (v.21b) is referring to the request, "receive him".

The two particles in S_{14}, pepoithōs "being confident" and eidōs "kowing", describe the author's mental states which have prompted him to write the letter (or to make a specific request). The causality observed here is (2) in Figure 29, namely, the author's mental events of having confidence and expectation are the cause of the result, his writing action. However, these mental events expressed by the two participles refer back to the mental states and events which the author has already described in S_3, S_4 and parts of S_5, S_6 and S_7. So in every sense, S_{14} is a summary of S_3-S_{13}.

The aorist tense used in egrapsa is another evidence that S_{14} is a summary, because it is referring back to the preceding request type of speech acts as performed speech acts.

7.2.4 Discussion on LEVEL (VI)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (VI) deals with the unit, S_3-S_{13}. And this unit is further divided into two smaller units: S_3-S_{11} and S_{12}-S_{13}.

The coherence of each of these two units is indicated by the following facts:

(i) The surface structure devices at the beginning of S_{12} (v.20a), namely, nai "yes", adelphe "brother (a vocative)", and onaimēn "I may have benefit", indicate that there is a major shift of information structure. This shift of information structure is indicated by the sudden change of topic from the author's promise to repay the debt for Onesimus to his desire to get benefit from Philemon.

(ii) S_3-S_{11} is characterized by the occurrences of two imperatives (proslabou "receive" and elloga "charge") which are distinctively different from each other but are related to each other by the means-purpose communication relation forming a unit. What this relation concretely means is this: "If Onesimus owes anything, and if it is causing you not to receive him, then charge that debt to me."

(iii) S_{12} and S_{13} are closely related to one another. S_{12} (v.20a) describes the author's desire to get benefit from Philemon, thus serving as the GROUNDS of the EXHORTATION in S_{13}.

(iv) S_3-S_{11} and S_{12}-S_{13} have parallel constructions. The point of S_3-S_{11} is to make a specific request, which is indicated in S_8, and the grounds for making such a request are explained at length. Similarly, S_{12}-S_{13} consists of a request (S_{13}) and its grounds (S_{12}). This fact indicates that the two units are contrastive to each other.

The relative prominence between S_3-S_{11} and S_{12}-S_{13} is indicated in Figure 34. The former unit is more prominent than the latter unit. How is this conclusion obtained? Here are the main reasons:

(i) As indicated in (iv) above, S_{12}-S_{13} seems to be analogous in semantic and rhetorical structures to S_3-S_{11}, although S_3-S_{11} has extra distinctive information attached to it in S_9-S_{11}. However, S_3-S_{11} occupies much more space than S_{12}-S_{13}. This may indicate that, for the author, S_3-S_{11} is more important than S_{12}-S_{13}.

(ii) The request in S_8 (v.17), proslabou "receive", is heavily marked by the repeated reference to the mental state of the author in S_5 and S_6, where parakalō "I appeal" (first person, indicative) is used twice. This indicative verb clearly describes the author's mental state behind his specific request in S_8.

(iii) Note the carefully arranged material from S_3 (v.4) to S_8 where the author's real intent (or purpose) of his letter is made explicit. S_3 and S_4 describe how the author is thankful to God for Philemon in regard to his loving care for the saints and his faith in Christ. In S_5 (vv.8-9) the author reveals for the first time in his letter that he has a specific request which he wants to make to Philemon. However, at this stage the content of the request or appeal is not made explicit. In S_6 and S_7, the author gradually make the content of his request clear. First, in v.10a the author makes it clear that the request is about Onesimus. Then the lengthy explanation about Onesimus' past and present situations are given (vv.10b-14b). In S_7 (vv.15-16) the content of the author's appeal is parenthesized in a subordinate hina clause. At this point the reader of the letter should recognize what is coming next. In S_8 (v.17), at last, the author's real thrust of the letter is introduced, namely, the content of the author's request to Philemon is made explicit: "Receive Onesimus!". The rhetorical artifice displayed here indicates the weight of importance placed upon the imperative in S_8.

(iv) The imperative in S_{13} (v.20b) is anapauson "refresh" (aorist imperative). The same verb is used in S_4 (v.7b) in a different grammatical form, namely, anapepautai "have been refreshed" (perfect, passive, indicative). The hospitality and loving care of Philemon for the travelling saints resulted in refleshing their hearts. The fact that the author repeats this verb in an imperative form in S_{13} seems to imply that he is asking Philemon's concrete loving action which results in refreshing the heart of the author. The context specifies clearly what this loving action is -- it is nothing more than receiving Onesimus back. The discussion so far indicates that the two imperatives in S_8 and S_{13} are referring to the same event. If this is so, then there is no question that proslabou in S_8 is more prominent than anapauson in S_{13}.

The **communication relation** between S_3-S_{11} and S_{12}-S_{13} seems to be another case where the types of causality developed in Figure 29 cannot be applied. As explained above, S_{12}-S_{13} reinforces the point of S_3-S_{11}. Using the terms developed in SSWC, the communication relation here may be defined as `Support-Head, Nonchronological, Clarification, Overlapping Information, Head-Equivalent' type. From our analysis, we would like to suggest that the communication relation here is one of rhetorical conventions. We would like to call the function of S_{12}-S_{13} to S_3-S_{11} REINFORCEMENT.

7.2.5 Discussion on LEVEL (V)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (V) deals with S_3-S_{13}. This unit is divided further into two smaller units: S_3-S_{11}, S_{12}-S_{13}. We have discussed these two units in LEVEL (VI). However, each of these units can be divided further: S_3-S_{11} ---> S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11}; S_{12}-S_{13} ---> S_{12} and

S_{13}. Since we have already dealt with S_{12} and S_{13} quite well, in this subsection we will focus on the various relationships between S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11}.

The **coherence** of S_3-S_8 and that of S_9-S_{11} is suggested by the following points:

(i) As described above in (iii) in the discussion of relative prominence, S_3-S_8 exhibits a remarkable rhetorical artifice which is a superb example of persuation or making a request. This fact indicates that S_3-S_8 forms a unit.

(ii) S_3-S_8 presents an imperative, proslabou "receive", in S_8 as its most prominent information. On the other hand, S_9-S_{11} presents an imperative in S_9 (v.18b), elloga "charge", as its most prominent information. Each of these imperatives functions as the nucleus of the unit which it represents, and is contrastive with the other.

(iii) S_9-S_{11} presents the same general topic, that is, 'the author's willingness to pay the debt for Onesimus'. In this respect, S_9-S_{11} can be a unit.

The **relative prominence** between S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11} is indicated in Figure 34, LEVEL (V). S_3-S_8 is more prominent than S_9-S_{11}. The reason behind this conclusion can be derived from the formula set up in (103)(c), which says that **purpose** is more prominent than **means** in Prior Intention. If we apply this formula to our present data, we can obtain the following: "The author had in his prior intention that **in order** for Philemon to receive Onesimus back, Philemon's charging the debt of

Onesimus to the author might serve as a means for it." This understanding seems to be very natural, because we know from our own experiences that the huge debt someone owes us tends to cause us to be unwillingly to accept that person, especially when he has done something wrong towards us. Therefore, we can conclude that S_3-S_8 is more prominent than S_9-S_{11}.

The communication relation between S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11} is indicated clearly in the discussion above. The former unit functions as PURPOSE for which the latter unit functions as a MEANS. The type of causality between these two units is type (1) in Figure 29.

7.2.6 Discussion on LEVEL (IV)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (IV) deals with S_3-S_{11}. This unit can be divided further into S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11}. The various relationships between these two units have been discussed in 7.2.5. S_3-S_8 divides further into S_3-S_7 and S_8, and S_9-S_{11} divides further into S_9, S_{10} and S_{11}. In this subsection, we will discuss S_3-S_8 and S_9-S_{11} and their constituents.

Discussion on S_3-S_8 -- This unit consists of two smaller units: S_3-S_7 and S_8.

The coherence of each of these units is suggested by the following points:

(i) S_3-S_7 consists only of indicatives as far as the most prominent information of each sentence is concerned. In this respect S_3-S_7 coheres.

(ii) S_8 has an imperative which expresses the mental state of W (Want). So, the shift from S_3-S_7 to S_8 is very distinctive. In other words, the author shifts his focus from stating some propositions as his beliefs to issuing a command which makes his desire explicit.

(iii) S_3-S_7 and S_8 are constrastive in their primary functions of expressing the author's intentional state (S_3-S_7) and specifying the author's intentional content (S_8).

The **relative prominence** between these two units is apparent from the criterion established in (104)(a). S_8 which expresses the mental state of Want is more prominent than S_3-S_7 which express the mental state of Belief.

The **communication relation** between S_3-S_7 and S_8 is not easy to identify. The most prominent information in S_3-S_7 is expressed by an indicative verb in S_6 (v.10a), parakalō "I appeal". The function of this indicative in Koine Greek is to express the author's specific feeling (a kind of mental state) directly to the addressee. In Speech Act Theory, this kind of expression is called an 'illocutionary force indicating device'. In our context, however, the mental state expressed in S_6 (v.10a) as well as in S_5 (v.9a) is identical with the mental state inherent in the imperative in S_8 (v.17b). In (iii) above, I have suggested that S_3-S_7 has the primary function of specifying the intentional state of the author, and that S_8 has the primary function of specifying the intentional content of the author. However, if we examine closely other less prominent information in S_3-S_7, we will note quickly that the intentional content of the author is also revealed clearly. For example, in S_6 (v.10a) the author clearly reveals that the content of his appeal is related to a particular individual called Onesimus. Again in S_7 (vv.15-16), it is clearly suggested through the <u>hina</u> "so that" subordinate clause that Philemon should receive Onesimus back to him: for v.15a says, "that you might have him back for ever".

The discussion so far seems to suggest that all the information in S_8 is found in S_3-S_7 directly or suggestively. Then what is the communication relation of these two units? I do not think these units are related by any type of causality explained in Figure 29. The communication relation between S_3-S_7 and S_8 seems to be one of **communication relations of rhetorical conventions.** Tentatively, I want to call the rhetorical convention employed here **building up of expectation.** In other words, rhetorically speaking S_3-S_7 is carefully presented to build up the expectation of being given the specific content of the already specified mental state of appeal. I believe this rhetorical convention is employed by the author as one technique of persuasion. If the author has just expressed his intentional state and its content without considering this reality (persuasion, etc.) of his speech act, he would have written something like, "This is my desire, that you should receive Onesimus when I send him back to you," instead of the lengthy description in S_3-S_8.

<u>Discussion on S_9-S_{11}</u> -- This unit consists of three basic communication units (sentences): S_9, S_{10} and S_{11}.

The **coherence** of each of these sentences is already discussed in 7.1.1 where we discussed how sentences are expressed in Koine Greek in the book of Philemon.

The **relative prominence** among these sentences is indicated in

Figure 34, LEVEL (IV). S_9 is the most prominent information. This conclusion is based upon the criterion established in (104)(a).

The communication relations among these sentences can be decribed in terms of the types of causality in Figure 29. S_{10} is related to S_{11} by causality type (2). Paul's own handwriting in his letter which Philemon will receive functions as the guarantee of Paul's promise to repay the debt for Onesimus if requested by Philemon to do so. Therefore, we can conclude that Paul's handwriting (S_{10}) serves as GROUNDS for the giving of his promise to Philemon, which is the CONCLUSION.

The above discussion implies that it is possible to set up a separate level for S_{10} and S_{11} as suggested in parenthesis in Figure 34. Then S_{11}, which is more prominent than S_{10}, should be related to S_9. In our analysis, this distinction is neglected, since the relationships among these sentences are apparent.

The communication relation between S_{10}-S_{11} and S_9 is described by the causality type (1) in Figure 29. In other words, S_{10}-S_{11}, in which the author promises to repay the debt, if there is any, functions as a GROUNDS for his further desire that Philemon should charge that to him. So S_9 can be termed CONCLUSION in this respect.

7.2.7 Discussion on LEVEL (III)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (III) deals with S_3-S_7. This unit divided further into two smaller communication units: S_3-S_4 and S_5-S_7.

The coherence of each of these two units is indicated by the following points:

(i) S_3-S_4 has two indicative verbs (Eucharistō in S_3 (v.4a) and eschon in S_4 (v.7a)) which form independent clauses, thus forming the nuclei of the sentences. And these two sentences are connected to each other by gar "for" which indicates that the part which follows this conjunction gives a reason or a grounds for the preceding part.

(ii) S_5-S_7 has three indicative verbs (parakalō in S_5 (v.9a), parakalō in S_6 (v.10a), and ēchōristhē in S_7 (v.15a)) which form independent clauses, thus becoming the nuclei of the sentences. The conjunction, gar "for" in S_7 suggests that the information following this conjunction gives a reason or a grounds for the preceding information.

(iii) The discussion above, (i) and (ii), indicates that S_3-S_4 and S_5-S_7 have a parallel construction which can be described as 'indicative plus gar'.

(iv) The conjunction, Dio "therefore", at the beginning of S_5 (v.8) indicates that there is a major break in the information flow here.

The relative prominence between S_3-S_4 and S_5-S_7 is easily decided from our established criteria in (104)(a), and (104)(b) where it says that for the author an Expressives type of speech act is more prominent than a Representatives one. S_5-S_7 has two sentences which are Expressives type of speech acts, whereas S_3-S_4 has only Representatives type of speech acts. Therefore, as shown in Figure 34, S_5-S_7 is more prominent than S_3-S_4.

The communication relation between S_3-S_4 and S_5-S_7 can be described by the causality type (2) in Figure 29. This means that the reality or the fact presented in S_3-S_4 causes a certain mental act in which the author forms a certain mental state which is directed at a specific proposition. Concretely speaking, Paul's thankful feeling which he expresses to God in regard to Philemon, motivates Paul to execute his desire to appeal to Philemon to do a specific thing for him. This relation is clearly indicated in Koine Greek by a conjunction, dio, which is placed in between. Therefore, we can conclude that S_3-S_4 gives a GROUNDS for his appeal (in S_5-S_7) as a CONCLUSION.

7.2.8 Discussion on LEVEL (II)

According to Figure 34, LEVEL (II) deals with two units: S_3-S_4 and S_5-S_7. S_3-S_4 is further divided into S_3 and S_4. S_5-S_7 is further divided into S_5, S_6 and S_7. We will discuss the constituents of S_3-S_4 and those of S_5-S_7 separately.

Discussion on S_3-S_4 -- The coherence of this unit is discussed in the preceding subsection. This unit is divided further into S_3 and S_4.

The coherence of S_3 or S_4 is based upon the criteria given for sentence boundaries in 7.1.1. S_3 (vv.4-6) has a problem. The problem is represented by this question: How is the subordinate clause in v.6b related to its independent clause? As far as surface structure is concerned, there is only one independent clause in S_3, which is represented by an indicative verb, Eucharistō "I thank" (v.4a). But it does not make sense if we relate the subordinate clause in v.6b back to this independent clause. In the Eight Translation New Testament, all the versions except King James Version supply one of the following information: "I pray" or "my prayer is". According to Harold Greenlee (personal communication), there are two alternatives to our question here. One alternative is to understand that the information like "I pray" or "my prayer is" is 'implied' in the context. The other alternative is to understand that an indicative verb is 'omitted' for some reason. I personally take the first alternative, because a noun, proseuchōn "prayers", in v.4b seems to indicate that "I pray" or "my prayer is" is implied for that subordinate clause in v.6b. The question mark placed after the parenthesis at v.6a of CHART II indicates the existence of the problem which we have discussed. From our discussion we conclude that vv.3-6 forms a sentence (S_3) with one independent clause (v.4a) with three subordinate clauses (v.4b, f.5a, and v.6b).

The **relative prominence** between S_3 and S_4 is determined from the criterion set up in (104)(b). The criterion (104)(b) says that the propositions which refer future events/states, present events/states, or past events/states have the same order of relative prominence. This means, if it is applied to S_3 and S_4, that S_3 which refers to the present mental even of the author ("I thank my God") is more prominent than S_4 which refers to his past mental event ("I have derived much joy---"). Another crucial bit of evidence which suggests that S_3 is more prominent than S_4 is that the conjunction gar "for" used at the beginning of S_4.

The **communication relation** between S_3 and S_4 seems to be apparent. The relation here is based upon the causality type (3) in Figure 29. The fact that the author heard from other people about Philemon's actions of love caused great joy and comfort in his heart (S_4). But this joy and comfort experienced by the author has caused his present mental event of thanking God for Philemon. Our conclusion: S_4 gives the REASON for the RESULT in S_3.

<u>Discussion on S_5-S_7</u> -- The coherence of this unit is discussed in 7.2.7. This unit is further divided into S_5, S_6, and S_7.

The coherence of each of these sentences is based upon some specific surface structure markers in Koine Greek. We have established some surface structure criteria with which we can single out a group of sentences as a unit. For these criteria, see 7.1.1.

The relative prominence among these sentences can be determined by the formula presented in (104)(a) and the contextual consideration. The formula partially says that speech acts of Expressives type are more prominent than those of Representatives type. If we apply this to S_5, S_6, and S_7, we can obtain the result that S_5 and S_6 is more prominent than S_7. How about the relative prominence between S_5 and S_6? Both of these sentences are represented by the same verb, <u>parakalō</u> "I appeal" (first person, singular, indicative). So, in this respect there is no difference in prominence. In Figure 34, I indicated that S_6 is more prominent than S_5. But the decision there is not based upon established criteria. The fact that S_6 provides more crucial information than S_5 is the only evidence I have for the decision. The lengthy detailed explanation about Onesimus made in S_6 seems to be very important to prepare the heart of Philemon so that he may receive Onesimus.

The communication relations among these sentences needs to be considered in two ways: the relation between S_5 and S_6 and the relation between S_5-S_6 and S_7.

Concerning the communication relation between S_5 and S_6, there is no causality involved. They are related to each other by one of the **communication relations of rhetorical conventions.** The nuclear information in S_5 is represented by parakalō "I appeal". However, there are other pieces of information attached to it as satellites, viz. a concessionary alternative course of action which could have been taken by the author (v.8), the grounds of his appeal which is declared love (v.9a), and the comment-like description of the author himself (v.9b). In S_6, there is a detailed explanation about Onesimus, which is made by a series of subordinate clauses (vv.14-14). I do not think that any of the communication relations SSWC has developed can adequately be applied to determine the case here. As a tentative solution, I suggest that a term **Repetition Emphasis** given for such a communication relation of rhetorical convention as is found between S_5 and S_6.

Concerning the communication relation between S_5-S_6 and S_7, the causality type (2) in Figure 29 seems to be applicable to this relation. After expressing the mental state of appeal in S_6 (v.10a), the author begins to specify the content of the appeal by giving a detailed explanation about Onesimus which begins at v.10b. In vv.13-14, the author explains the process of his contemplation in which he has reached a certain conclusion in regard to his treatment of Onesimus. Such indicative verbs as eboulomēn "I would have been glad" (v.13a), ēthelēsa "I decided" (v.14a), employed in vv.13-14, indicate the above point. And S_6 ends here. Then, S_7 follows being introduced by tacha gar "for perhaps". It seems to me that, even though the author does not use such volitional verbs, the adverb tacha here suggests that there is the mental event of author's judgment on the reason why Onesimus was separated from Philemon. The author estimates (or believes) that it happened because of God's purpose that Philemon may receive Onesimus back in a fuller sense forever. Therefore, we can say that S_7 clearly presents Paul's innermost motivation or conviction which is the real basis for his preceding motion of appeal in S_5 and S_6 as well as for his execution of the appeal in the following sentence (S_8). Thus our conclusion: S_7 gives the GROUNDS for the appeal in S_5-S_6 as the CONCLUSION.

7.2.9 Intent Structures

As the summary of our analysis of interpretation of the text so far, we will present the intent structures of the text. We need to consider the two types of intent structures in our theory: the author's intent structure, and the referential intent structures. Concerning the referential intent structures, theoretically speaking, any person referred to in the text can be a candidate for the construction of a referential intent structure.

Practically speaking, however, all the third person participants described in the text including Onesimus cannot be candidates for the constructions of their referential intent structures. Many individuals listed in S_1 and S_{16} besides Paul (the first person) and Philemon (the second person) are not significant for constructing their referential intent structures, because their intentional actions are not described in the body of the text. In the body of the text, "the Lord Jesus" (v.5, v.6, v.8, v9), "the saints" (v.5, v.7) and "Onesimus" (vv.10-18) are referred to in the third person. However, even Onesimus who is constantly referred to in vv.10-18 cannot be a candidate for a referential intent strucure, because there is no significant data such as reported speech acts or clear descriptions of his intentional actions in the text.

Concerning the second person, there are two possible referents: Philemon himself, and the ones (including Philemon) to whom the letter is addressed. The latter groups of people, indicated in v.2, are not the candidates for the construction of their referential intent structures, because there is no sufficient information in the text concerning their speech acts or intentional actions. What about Philemon? My conclusion is that, even for Philemon who is referred to by the second person in the letter, it is not necessary to construct his referential intent structure. Here are the reasons for the conslusion: (i) there are not enough reported speech acts of Philemon or his intentional actions which are described by the author as performed, except in vv.5 and 7 where it is suggested that Philemon performed acts of love for the saints; (ii) some possible future actions described by the author (v.6, v.8, v.14, v.15, v.17, v.18, v.20, v.21, and v.22) in the forms of imperatives, subordinate clauses, or nouns are not adequate for the construction of Philemon's referential intent structure, because Philemon's intentionality in those possible actions are only the product of the author's expectation or imagination and not of Philemon's own intentionality.

Therefore, in this subsection we will describe the author's intent structure and the first person (the author) referential intent structure for the given text. As we have already discussed, however, this text is a typical case where the author's intent structure and the referential intent structure merge into one structure, since the author describes his own events and states in his speech acts. We will discuss first the author's intent structure revealed in his speech acts from Figure 34 as well as from CHART II. Then we will examine how the author describes himself in the text as to his intent structure.

<u>The author's intent structure inferred from Figure 34</u> -- I want to deal only with the nuclear speech acts here. What I mean by 'nuclear' is that the speaker's intentionality which operates in S_1-S_2 and S_{16}-S_{17} in LEVEL (IX), and consists of the formalities of the writing of a letter, is not taken into consideration, even though they are prominent as individual speech acts. In other words, the speech acts which are performed for the purposes of fulfilling rhetorical conventions can be omitted or reduced in order to get to the speech acts which are related to each other through one of the causality types described in Figure 29. S_{15} will not be included, because we interpreted that S_{15} is an occasional addition which is marginal in the body of the letter, and therefore no intentional causality is involved between S_{15} and the body of the letter.

Therefore, we will focus on the unit, S_3-S_{14}. From these sentences we want to select the pieces of information which are marked by solid circles and arrange them in the order of their relative prominence. The following is the result:

(121) $S_8(W) > S_{13}(W) > S_9(W) > S_6(F) > S_3(B)$

The items inside the parentheses refer to the intentional states described in CHART II. It is interesting to note that the scale of relative prominence in (121) exactly conforms to the general criterion set up in (104)(a). Now, the author's intent structure in his written speech acts can be inferred from (121), by making the information of each sentence clear, and relating them to each other hierarchically. Figure 35 is the result of this analysis.



Figure 35: <u>Author's Intent Structure of Philemon</u>

Figure 35 presents the essence of the author's intent structure of his written speech acts. Since the author's perlocutionary intent (PI) is made explicit in imperative forms as in S_8, S_9, and S_{13}, it is not necessary to infer the PI of the author. This is usually one of the characteristics of letters, because in letters, the authors refer to themselves in the first person and therefore they directly express their wants or feelings. The communication relations between the units in the figure are indicated by the straight lines. We have discussed extensively these communication relations in the preceding subsections.

The intent structure in the figure is similar to the summary of the text given in (119), because both results are based on Figure 34. The difference between the two is the matter of emphasis. The emphasis of (119) is on the structure of the text as a whole, and the emphasis of Figure 35 is on the core message of the text.

The first person referential intent structure -- The necessary textual data to infer (or construct) the first person referential intent structure are found in the speech acts of a Representatives type, since the more prominent speech acts of the Directives type or Expressives type have been dealt with in the author's intent structure.

The first step for the construction of the referential intent structure is to find out significant textual data which are related to the prior intentions of the author which have prompted the author to write the text. It is our assumption that behind almost any intentional action there is planning, thinking, or contemplation. Whatever the author reveals in this area are the data we need for our objective inference.

The following are the important pieces of information which I have obtained from the text:

(122) v.6 "and I pray that (hopōs) the sharing of your faith may promote the knowledge of all the good that is ours in Christ"

v.8 "though I am bold enough (parresian echon) in Christ to command (epitassein) you to do what is required (to anekon)"

v.12a "I am sending him back (hon anepempsa) to you"

v.13 "I would have been glad (hon ego eboulomen) to keep (katechein) him with me, in order that he might serve (hina... diakone) during my imprisonment for the gospel"

v.14 "but I preferred to do (ethelesa poiesai) nothing without your concent (gnomes), in order that your goodness (to agathon) might not be (hina... me) by compulsion (anagke n) but of your own free will (hekousion)"

v.15 "Perhaps (tacha), this is why he was separated from you for a while that you might have him back (hina auton... apeches) for ever,"

v.19 "I will repay (apotiso) it — to say nothing (hina me lego) of your owing me even your own life"

v.21 "Confident of your obedience (hupakoe) I write (egrapsa) to you, knowing that you will do (poieseis) more than I say"

In collecting the above data, I have used the following criteria in deciding which information I should choose or reject:

(i) The author's intent structure is based on the primary social interaction (SI) between the author (Paul) and Philemon. Therefore, gather information which is related to the primary SI.

(ii) Among the pieces of information gathered through (i), choose only those which are referring to future actions (or unrealized actions). This criterion is based on our established principle in (104)(b).

(iii) Mark any surface structure forms which indicate the author's mental activities (planning, contemplation, imagination, etc.) through which his prior intention can be made. This criterion is based upon (103)(b) and (c).

The above criteria do not suggest that other types of SI (eg. that of between Paul and Onesimus or between Philemon and Onesimus), or past actions or events are not significant for the interpretation or analysis of the text. They are important, because they function as the background information for more prominent information. If we need to treat them, they should be treated separately.

The second step for the construction of the referential intent structure is to use the data obtained through the first step and carefully construct a hierarchical intent structure which reflects the author's means and purposes in various level. Figure 36 presents the result of this step.



Notes: The verse numbers indicate the sources of the items in the brackets.

Figure 36: First Person Referential Intent Structure of Philemon

The items in the brackets indicate that they are mental states. Most of the mental states in the figure are 'Want', because it is our basic assumption that whenever we exercise our intentionality in order to bring about some future events or states, we need to have the mental state of 'Want'. The reason why I employ 'Hope' instead of 'Want' at the top of the hierarchy is that it is not clear from our textual evidence whether the author clearly intended to include the content information of 'Hope' to be his ultimate purpose or not. Because of this lack of evidence, I have used a dotted line instead of a continuous line in the figure.

All the mental states in the brackets are related to each other by the means-purpose relationship. In the hierarchy, only the top and the bottom brackets have just one label, namely, 'Purpose' and 'Means' respectively. But all the other brackets have two labels, namely, 'Purpose' in relation to the lower bracket, and 'Means' in relation to the higher bracket.

I will not discuss the figure extensively, since the meaning of the figure is self-evident.

Comparison between Figure 35 and Figure 36 -- The comparison of the two structures is revealing, because when we comprehend a text, we are consciously or unconsciously trying to set up hierarchies such as those in the figures. The following are some of sigificant observations from the comparison:

(i) Figure 36 presents the prior intent structure of the author which has prompted him to a specific action of writing a letter.

(ii) Figure 35 is the author's intent structure of his speech acts performed which are based upon his prior intention described in Figure 36.

(iii) There is an apparent overlapping between the two figures. Among the intentional actions projected in Figure 36, the two actions which are marked by an asterisk (*) were executed when Paul wrote a letter and sent Onesimus back to Philemon with it. When Philemon got the letter and read it, then all the steps of his plan, except the last two items in Figure 36, were translated into actions. Figure 35 reflects exactly what are translated into actions. And here is the point of contact between the two figures.

(iv) Figure 36 is constructed from the data which are obtained from less important information in the text (from the Representatives type of speech acts). On the other hand, Figure 35 is constructed from the most prominent part of the information of the text. And yet the structures presented in both figures closely resemble or overlap each other. What is the reason behind this resemblance? The reason, I think, can be found in our theory. As indicated in the principle set up in (103)(c), one of the important presuppositions in our theory is that behind any intentional actions (in this case speech acts) there are prior intentions. This means that concrete actions cannot be truly comprehended without knowing the prior intention of the author which caused him to perform those actions. This is why the author of a text needs to communicate not only concrete actions but also the prior intent structure behind these actions.

7.3 Comments on the Application

Generally speaking, the application has been satisfactory. The interpretative model which is proposed in this study is intended to provide a theoretical framework with which we can elucidate the process of the comprehension of written texts, making the invisible mental phenomena of comprehension as explicit as possible. The presentation of the intent structures of Philemon in the previous section seems to be an important step towards accomplishing our goal.

Practically speaking, however, there are areas where further research is needed. Here are my assessments of the need for further research:

(i) One urgent need for further research is in the area of **communication relations** between the units. As was pointed out in the preceding section (7.2), there seem to be sufficient theoretical as well as practical reasons to make a clear distinction between communication relations which are based on the causality types described in Figure 29 and those which are not. I have suggested that such terms as **communication relations of causality** and **communication relations of rhetorical conventions** be used for the distinction made above. Kathleen Callow (1984b) has also suggested a similar line of research. SSWC's classificatory system will be a good start for the suggested research. The clear theoretical distinction between the two giving an exact definition to each of these two categories seems to be an immense task.

(ii) The formulas set up in (103) and (104) have been profitably applied to the given text. However, further application will be needed to truly establish such formulas.

(iii) I have proposed that the sentence (in terms of our definition) should be considered the most basic communication unit of speech acts. In some way, this has been the traditional understanding. The main basis for this claim is provided from our SAT expounded in the beginning chapters of this study. I believe there are other pieces of evidence in the way the grammar or phonology of a specific language marks this unit of sentence. More research in this area is needed.

(iv) The criteria set up in (117) and (118) for CHART II are in some way language specific. Each language (and possibly each genre) seems to need slightly modified criteria which are based upon more universal ones. Further applications in more specific languages and in more specific types of genre are necessary.

(v) It is very helpful to know what specific surface structure devices were used in Koine Greek in order to indicate 'purpose', 'goal', 'intention', 'want', 'desire', or 'hope' of the participants described in a text. In the construction of the first person referential hierarchy in the book of Philemon, the following surface structure devices are used:

1) hina + subjunctive of verbs -- used in v.13; v.15; v.19.

2) hopos + subjunctive of verbs -- used in v.6.

3) Infinitive of purpose -- used in v.8; v.13; v.14.

4) Verbs which indicate 'Want', 'Purpose', etc. -- used in v.13 (boulomai "want, desire"); v.14 (thelo "wish, desire").

5) Nouns which indicate mental states of future orientation -- used in v.8 (parresia "boldness"); v.14 (gnome "consent", anagke "compulsion", hekousios "willingness"); v.21 (hupakoe "obedience".

6) Nouns or noun phrases referring to future actions -- used in v.8 (to anekon "what is required"); v.14 (to agathon "goodness").

7) Epistolary aorist -- used in v.12; v.21. Dana and Mantey (1969:198) says, "A Greek writer would sometimes place himself at the viewpoint of his reader or readers, and use an aorist indicative in stating an act or event which was present or future to him."

8) First person future indicatives which express 'intention' of Commisives type of speech acts -- v.19.

9) Future indicatives -- v.21.

In my previous work (Manabe, 1983), I have pointed out a total of eleven such surface structure devices similar to those listed above. In narratives it is expected that imperatives and first person indicatives will be very important for the construction of the referential intent structures of the major participants. Much application will be necessary before we can have an exhaustive list.

CONCLUSION

I began my research for this dissertation when I became convinced that theoretical concepts such as `intention', `purpose', or `goal' are very important for the deeper understanding of the function of language. Because of my interest in a branch of the philosophy of language called **Speech Act Theory** since my previous work in Papua New Guinea (cf. Manabe, 1981), I soon realized that SAT had dealt with these concepts extensively for some time, although its research had been concentrated on the sentence level. Therefore, I decided to learn more about recent developments in this theory through reading.

In the initial research effort, I came to a point where I felt the need of reading in the particular section of philosophy where `human actions' are dealt with specifically in relation to the concept of `intention' or `intentionality'. Through the reading, I was convinced that speech acts are a part of intentional human actions. After I established this understanding of the relation between speech acts and human actions, I applied Goldman's (1970) insight of `act-diagram' to speech acts in order to treat speech acts fully as human actions. The result of this effort is summarized in Chapter One.

After placing speech acts in the larger context of human actions, I focused my research effort on the concept of `intention' or `intentionality'. The research has revealed the fact that intention in speech acts always involves other persons. This insight has led me to set up an interactive model for the understanding of speech acts. Searle's (1977) model has become the basis for this interactive model which is the core of this dissertation. In the process of setting up this model, I have tried to clarify some unresolved problems in SAT, with some satisfactory results. Chapter Two primarily describes these points which have just been made.

In the first two chapters of the study, the predominant perspective of my research has been that of the performer of speech acts. This seems to be an inevitable result, because 'intention', which is the topic of those two chapters, is one of the fundamental properties of the performer of speech acts. When I shifted my attention from this perspective to social interaction (SI), however, all of a sudden the other person (the hearer or the addressee) began to play an important part. Thus, Chapter Three focused on the hearer, and the concept of SI was discussed extensively. In this discussion, I came to realize that the hearer, too, needs to use his intentionality in order to make a proper response to the speech act force which is directed at him. This insight led me to a cyclic model in which two egos (individuals) interact with each other by extending their intentionality to each other to bring about certain effects and consequences. However, it was pointed out that there is one very important aspect of theory which needs to be discussed. That is the process of comprehension which bridges the two separate intentionalities. Chapter Four deals with this concept of comprehension. It is a big topic and could be the subject of a whole dissertation by itself. What I did in this chapter was to make an initial attempt to describe the context and the process of comprehension. The research of this area in linguistics is relatively new and further theoretical developments can be expected.

The first four chapters have been the theory part of the dissertation. Chapter Five dealt with the development of a particular method of interpretation for written texts. The methodology developed here is based upon the insights gained in the theory part of this dissertation. One significant contribution made by this chapter was the elucidation of intent structures and the clear theoretical distinction made between 'author's intent structure' and 'referential intent structure'.

In Chapters Six and Seven, the application of the interpretative model developed in Chapter Five has been made to two specific texts: a Japanese advertisement text; and a Koine Greek text from the New Testament (Philemon). The results, generally speaking, have been substantial. Specific evaluative comments were made for each application at the end of the respective chapters.

Throughout the research on material for this dissertation, I often felt that I am alone. I think this is due to the fact that there has not been any established theory of interpretation developed which is consistently based on an interactive model such as is expounded in this study. I do hope that some of the insights presented in this study will be followed up with more research so that in the near future we may be able to accomplish the goal of establishing a full-fledged theory of text interpretation based on intentionality.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

A. Actual Text.

1 私のもう一度行ってみたい街 No.70 尾道

2 お寺と坂道

4 林美智子(女優)



3

尾道へ初めて行ったのは二十年ほど前のことです。NHKの連続テレビ小説「うず潮」で、林芙美子さん役をやらせてもらった折、芙美子さんゆかりのこの町へロケに行ったのです。まず驚いたのがお寺の多いこと。町のすぐ後に山が迫り、その中腹にいくつものお寺が並んでいます。そして、境内をおじいさん、おばあさんがのんびり散歩していて、素朴なところだなと思ったものです。ロケは石垣のある坂道が中心でしたが、この坂道の風情が実にいいのです。苔むした石段を踏んで、今にも志賀直哉先生が杖をついて現われるのではないか。そんな思いにさせられるのです。

六年前にも読売テレビ「坂部ぎんさんを探してください」のロケで、迷路のように入り組んだ市内の漁師町に行きましたが、カラッとした親切な人ばかり。真夜中のロケにもいやな顔をせず協力してくれました。

というわけで、尾道というといい印象ばかりなのですが、訪れたのはロケのときだけ。いつか仕事抜きでゆっくり歩き回ってみたいと思っています。

(さし絵 西島武郎)

林美智子

5

(333)

See Appendix One-B for the explanation of the text.

The numbers placed in the Japanese text represent the Japanese characters and syllabic symbols beneath them. The information each sentence represents is explained as follows:

1= The serial title, "the town I want to visit again -- No.70 -- Onomichi"

2= The title of the text, "temples and slope roads"

3= The body of the text

4= The name of author, Hayashi Michiko (actress)

5= The advertisement section by Japan Travel Bureau

B. Romanization and its transliteration

The town which I want to visit again -- No.70

"Onomichi"

Temples and slope roads

By Michiko Hayashi

S_1	Onomichi-e	hajimete	ittanowa
	to	for the first time	that (I) went
	nijū-nen-hodo	mae-no-kotodesu.	
	twenty-year(s)-about	ago-of-it was	

S_2	NHK-no	renzoku-terebi-shōsetsu	'Uzu-shio'-de ,	
	-of	series-television-novel	eddying-current-on	
	Hayashi Emiko-san-yaku-wo		yarasete-morrata-ori,	
	Mrs.-named part-		to be assigned-was given-occasion a privilege to do	
	Emiko-san	yukari-no	kono-machi-e	roke-ni
	-Mrs.	connection-of	this-town-to	film making-for
	ittanodesu.			
	that (I) went			

S_3	mazu	odoroita-noga	otera-no
	in the first place	(I) was surprised-what	temple
	ōi-koto.		
	many-thing		

S_4	Machi-no	sugu-ato-ni	yama-ga	semari,	
	town-of	immediate-behind-at	mountain	is close	
	sono	chūfuku-ni	ikutsumo	otera-ga	narande-imasu.
	its	mid-slope-at	many	temples	side by side-stand

S_{5a}	Soshite	keidai-wo	ojīsan	obāsanga	nonbiri
	And	precinct-in	grandpas	grandmas	leisurely
	sanpo-shiteite				
	stroll-ing				

S_{5b}	soboku-na	tokoro-dana-to	omotta	mono-desu.
	ingenuous	place-(it) is	(I) thought	thing-it is

S_{6a}	Roke-wa	ishigaki-no-aru	sakamichi-ga
	filming	stone walls-there is	sloping road
	chūsin-desita-ga,		
	primary-was-but		

S_{6b}	kono	sakamichi-no	fuzei-ga	jitsuni	iino-desu.
	its	sloping road-of	appearance	really	tasteful-is

S_7	Koke-mushita	ishidatami-wo	funde	imanimo
	moss-grown	stone pavement-on	step	at any moment
	Shiga Naoya	sensei-ga	tsue-wo	tsuite
		respected writer-	stick	using
	arawareru-nodewa-naika,	sonna	omoi-ni	saserareruno-desu.
	appear-is (it)-not?	such	imagination	cause (me)-is

S_{8a}	roku-nen	mae-nimo	Yomiuri	terebi	'Sakabe
	six-years	ago-again		television	
	Gin	san-wo	sagashite-kudasai'	no	roke-de,
		Mrs.	search for-please	of	filming-at
	michi-ga	meiro-no-yōni	iri-kunda	shinai-no	
	road-	labyrinth-of-like	complicated	in town-belonging	
	ryōshi-machi-ni	iki-mashita-ga,			
	fishermen-town-to	went-but			

S_{8b}	karatto-shita	shinsetsuna	hito-bakari.
	light-hearted	kind	person-only

S_9	ma-yonaka-no	roke-nimo	iyana	kawo-wo-sezu
	mid-night-of	filming-even	bad	face- -not

	kyōryoku-shite-kuremashita.
	cooperation-did-offered

S_{10}	To-iu-wakede,	Onomichi-to-iu-to	ii	inshō-bakari
	Accordingly	when it comes to	good	impression-only
	nano-desu-ga,	otozureta-nowa	roke-no	toki-dake.
	what-there is-but	(I) visited-when	filming-of	occasion-just

S_{11}	Itsuka,	shigoto-nuki-de	yukkuri	arukimawatte-mitai-to
	Someday	work-free from-being	leisurely	roam about-wish-that
	omotte-imasu.			
	think-I am			

C. English Literal Translation

"A town I want to visit again -- No. 70"

ONOMICHI -- Temples and sloping roads

by Michiko Hayashi (actress)

S_1 It was about twenty years ago when I went to Onomichi for the first time.

S_2 When I had a privilege of being assigned the named part of Mrs. Emiko Hayashi for a serial NHK television film based on a novel, 'Eddying Current', I went to this town which is noted in connection with Mrs. Emiko for the filming.

S_3 The thing that surprised me in the first place was a large number of Buddhist temples.

S_4 A mountain stands very close to the back side of the town, and many temples were observed on its mid-slope.

S_{5a} And in the precincts of the temples, there were many grandfathers and grandmothers who were strolling leisurely,

S_{5b} and I thought that the place was such an ingenuous place!

S_{6a} The filming was carried out primarily on a sloping road surrounded by stone walls,

S_{6b} and it had a really tasteful appearance!

S_7 I could almost imagine that at any moment a greatly respected writer, Naoya Shiga, might appear using a walking stick on its stone pavement!

S_{8a} Six years ago, on another occasion of film location for the film called, 'Please search for Mrs. Gin Sakabe', I went to the fishermen's settlement of the same town, where its roads were complicated like a labyrinth,

S_{8b} and every person whom I met was light-hearted and kind.

S_9 Even for a mid-night location, they kindly cooperated with us without making bad faces.

S_{10} Accordingly, when it comes to Onomichi, I have only good impressions, though I visited it only for the occasions of making those films.

S_{11} I am thinking that someday I want to roam about the town leisurely while free from my work.

APPENDIX TWO

A. United Bible Society Greek Text (Philemon)

ΠΡΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΜΟΝΑ

Philemon
vv.1-10a

Salutation

1 Παῦλος δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ Τιμόθεος ὁ
ἀδελφὸς Φιλήμονι τῷ ἀγαπητῷ καὶ συνεργῷ ἡμῶν 2 καὶ
Ἀπφίᾳ τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ Ἀρχίππῳ τῷ συστρατιώτῃ ἡμῶν
καὶ τῇ κατ᾽ οἶκόν σου ἐκκλησίᾳ· 3 χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ
εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Philemon's Love and Faith

4 Εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ μου πάντοτε μνείαν σου ποιού-
μενος ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου, 5 ἀκούων σου τὴν ἀγάπην
καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἣν ἔχεις πρὸς τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν καὶ εἰς
πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους, 6 ὅπως ἡ κοινωνία τῆς πίστεώς σου
ἐνεργὴς γένηται ἐν ἐπιγνώσει παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ ἐν
ἡμῖν[1] εἰς Χριστόν· 7 χαρὰν γὰρ πολλὴν ἔσχον καὶ
παράκλησιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου, ὅτι τὰ σπλάγχνα τῶν
ἁγίων ἀναπέπαυται διὰ σοῦ, ἀδελφέ.

Paul Pleads for Onesimus

8 Διό, πολλὴν ἐν Χριστῷ παρρησίαν ἔχων ἐπιτάσσειν
σοι τὸ ἀνῆκον, 9 διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην μᾶλλον παρακαλῶ,[a]
τοιοῦτος ὢν ὡς Παῦλος πρεσβύτης, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ δέσμιος
Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ —[a] 10 παρακαλῶ σε περὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ

---

[1] 6 {C} *ἐν ἡμῖν* A C D K Ψ 048? 81 88 326 330 436 614 630 1241 1877^{c} 1984^{*vid} 1985 2495 *Lect*^{m} it^{d,e,x*} syr^{hmg} Ambrosiaster Chrysostom^{txt} Pelagius$^{1/2}$ Euthalius Theodoret John-Damascus Ps-Oecumenius^{txt} // *ἐν ὑμῖν* p^{61} ℵ G P 33 104 451 1739 1877* 1881 1984^{cvid} 2492 *Byz* it^{ar,div,f,g,x} vg syr^{p,h} cop^{sa,bo} arm Chrysostom^{comm} Jerome Primasius Cassiodorus Ps-Oecumenius^{comm} Theophylact // *omit* 629 it$^{c,dem,gig,z^{c}}$ Pelagius$^{1/2}$ Ps-Jerome

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[a] [a] 9 *a* minor, *a* dash: WH // *a* minor, *a* major: AV RV ASV Zür Luth (Jer) // *a* major, *a* dash: NEB // *a* dash, *a* dash: RSV // *a* major, *a* minor: Nes Seg // *a* minor, *a* minor: TR Bov BF^{2}

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1 *δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* Eph 3.1; 4.1; Php 1.7, 13; Phm 9   2 *Ἀρχίππῳ* Col 4.17   3 Ro 1.7; Ga 1.3; Php 1.2   4 Ro 1.8–9   6 *ἡ κοινωνία...ἐπιγνώσει* Php 1.9; Col 1.9   7 *χαρὰν ...σου* 2 Cor 7.4   9 *δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* Eph 3.1; 4.1; Php 1.7, 13; Phm 1   10 *τοῦ ἐμοῦ τέκνου* 1 Cor 4.15; Ga 4.19

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τέκνου, ὃν ἐγέννησα ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς Ὀνήσιμον, [b]11 τόν
ποτέ σοι ἄχρηστον νυνὶ δὲ [καὶ] σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ εὔχρηστον,[b]
12[c] ὃν ἀνέπεμψά σοι, [c]αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ
σπλάγχνα·[2] 13 ὃν ἐγὼ ἐβουλόμην πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν κατέ-
χειν, ἵνα ὑπὲρ σοῦ μοι διακονῇ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς τοῦ
εὐαγγελίου, 14 χωρὶς δὲ τῆς σῆς γνώμης οὐδὲν ἠθέλησα
ποιῆσαι, ἵνα μὴ ὡς κατὰ ἀνάγκην τὸ ἀγαθόν σου ᾖ ἀλλὰ
κατὰ ἑκούσιον. 15 τάχα γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχωρίσθη πρὸς
ὥραν ἵνα αἰώνιον αὐτὸν ἀπέχῃς, 16 οὐκέτι ὡς δοῦλον
ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ δοῦλον, ἀδελφὸν ἀγαπητόν, μάλιστα ἐμοί,
πόσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον σοὶ καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ.
17 Εἰ οὖν με ἔχεις κοινωνόν, προσλαβοῦ αὐτὸν ὡς
ἐμέ. 18 εἰ δέ τι ἠδίκησέν σε ἢ ὀφείλει, τοῦτο ἐμοὶ
ἐλλόγα· 19 ἐγὼ Παῦλος ἔγραψα τῇ ἐμῇ χειρί, ἐγὼ
ἀποτίσω·[d] ἵνα μὴ λέγω σοι ὅτι καὶ σεαυτόν μοι προσ-

[2] 12 {B} ἀνέπεμψά σοι, αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα· ℵ* A 33 // ἀνέπεμψα, σὺ δὲ αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα· G[gr] // ἀνέπεμψά σοι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ σπλάγχνα τὰ ἐμὰ προσλαβοῦ· 629 // ἀνέπεμψά σοι αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα προσλαβοῦ· C* // ἀνέπεμψα, σὺ δὲ αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα προσλαβοῦ· ℵ[c] (D[c] 104 ἔπεμψα) K P (Ψ σοι δέ) 81 326 330* 436 614 630 1241 1739 1881 1984 1985 2495 *Byz Lect*[m] it[div,f,g*] vg[ww] syr[h] goth John-Damascus // ἔπεμψά σοι, σὺ δὲ αὐτόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα προσλαβοῦ· (C[2] ἀνέπεμψα) (D* ἔπενψα) 88 (1877 it[dem] ἀνέπεμψα πρὸς σέ) it[d,e] (it[ar,o,x,z°] vg[cl] ἀνέπεμψα) syr[p] (Chrysostom ἔπεμψα πρὸς σέ,) Jerome // ἀνέπεμψα· σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν προσλαβοῦ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα· 330[mg] 451 2492 (69 431 462 προσλαβοῦ αὐτόν) syr[pal] Theodoret // ἀνέπεμψά σοι, σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν προσλαβοῦ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα· (048 ἔπεμψα) it[g] (cop[sa,bo] προσλαβοῦ αὐτόν) (arm ἔπεμψα) (eth *omit* σὺ δέ)

[b b] 11 *b b* no parens: TR WH Bov Nes BF[2] AV RV ASV NEB Zür Luth Jer Seg // *b* parens, *b* parens: RSV
[c c] 11–12 *c* number 12, *c* no number: TR[ed] WH Bov Nes BF[2] AV RV ASV RSV NEB? Zür Luth Jer Seg // *c* no number, *c* number 12: TR[ed] NEB?
[d] 19 *d* major: TR WH Bov Nes BF[2] AV RV ASV Luth (Seg) // *d* dash: RSV NEB Zür // *d* ellipsis: Jer

10 Ὀνήσιμον Col 4.9 13 ὑπὲρ...διακονῇ Php 2.30 14 μὴ...ἑκούσιον 2 Cor 9.7; 1 Pe 5.2 16 οὐκέτι...ἀγαπητόν 1 Tm 6.2 19 ἐγὼ...χειρί Ga 6.11; 2 Th 3.17

ὀφείλεις. 20 ναί, ἀδελφέ, ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην ἐν κυρίῳ·
ἀνάπαυσόν μου τὰ σπλάγχνα ἐν Χριστῷ.
21 Πεποιθὼς τῇ ὑπακοῇ σου ἔγραψά σοι, εἰδὼς ὅτι
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἃ λέγω ποιήσεις. 22 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἑτοίμαζέ μοι
ξενίαν, ἐλπίζω γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τῶν προσευχῶν ὑμῶν χαρι-
σθήσομαι ὑμῖν.

Final Greetings

23 Ἀσπάζεταί σε Ἐπαφρᾶς ὁ συναιχμάλωτός μου ἐν
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, 24[e] Μᾶρκος, [e]Ἀρίσταρχος, Δημᾶς, Λου-
κᾶς, οἱ συνεργοί μου. 25 Ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου[3] Ἰησοῦ
Χριστοῦ μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν.[4]

[3] 25 {C} κυρίου ℵ P 33 81 104 451 1739 1881 2492 syr[h,pal] arm // κυρίου ἡμῶν A C D K Ψ 88 326 330 614 629 630 1241 1877 1984[c] 2495 *Byz Lect*[m] it[ar,c,d,dem,div,e,f,x,z] vg syr[p] cop[sa,bo] eth Chrysostom Theodore[lat] Euthalius

[4] 25 {B} ὑμῶν. A D* 048 33 81 1881 it[d,z*] cop[sa,bo mss] arm Ambrosiaster Jerome // ὑμῶν. ἀμήν. ℵ C D[c] K P Ψ 88 104 326 330 451 614 629 630 1241 1739 1877 1984 2492 2495 *Byz* *l*[1153am,1441m] it[ar,c,dem,div,e,f,x,z°] vg syr[p,h,pal] cop[bo] eth Ambrosiaster Chrysostom Theodore[lat] Euthalius Theodoret Primasius John-Damascus // σου. ἀμήν. it[gig]

[e e] 23–24 *e* number 24, *e* no number: TR[ed] WH? Bov Nes BF[2] AV RV ASV RSV NEB Zür Luth Jer Seg // *e* no number, *e* number 24: TR[ed] WH?

23 Ἐπαφρᾶς Col 1.7; 4.12 24 Μᾶρκος Ac 12.12, 25; 13.13; 15.37–39; Col 4.10; 2 Tm 4.11 Ἀρίσταρχος Ac 19.29; 27.2; Col 4.10 Δημᾶς Col 4.14; 2 Tm 4.10 Λουκᾶς Col 4.14; 2 Tm 4.11

Philemon
vv. 10b–25

B. Transliteration of Philemon with TEV (Today's English Version).

<u>Salutation</u> v. 1 - v. 3

v. 1

Paulos	desmios	Christou	Iēsou	kai
Paul	a prisoner	of Christ	of Jesus	and

Timotheos	ho	adelphos	Philēmoni	tō
Timothy	the	brother	Philemon	the one

agapētō	kai	sunergō	hēmōn
beloved	and	fellow worker	of us

TEV: From Paul, a prisoner for the sake of Christ Jesus,
and from our brother Timothy--
To our friend and fellow worker Philemon,

v. 2

kai	Apphia	tē	adelphē	kai	Archippō
and	Apphia	to the	sister	and	Archippus

tō	sustratiōtē	hēmōn	kai	tē
to the	fellow soldier	of us	and	to the

kat'	oikon	sou	ekklēsia.
at	house	you(s)	church

TEV: and the church that meets in your house, and
our sister Apphia, and our fellow soldier
Archippus:

v. 3

charis	humin	kai	eirēnē	apo	theou
grace	to you	and	peace	from	God

patros	hēmōn	kai	kuriou	Iēsou	Christou.
Father	of us	and	Lord	Jesus	Christ

TEV: May God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ
give you grace and peace.

<u>Philemon's Love and Faith</u> v. 4 - v. 7

v. 4

Eucharistō	tō	theō	mou	pantote	mneian
I thank	to	God	my	always	rememberance

sou	poioumenos	epi	tōn	proseuchōn	mou,
of you	making	on	the	prayer	my

TEV: Every time I pray, brother Philemon, I mention you and give thanks to my God.

v. 5

akouōn	sou	tēn	agapēn	kai	tēn	pistin
hearing	your	the	love	and	the	faith

hēn	echeis	pros	ton	kurion	Iēsoun
which	you have	towards	the	Lord	Jesus

kai	eis	pantas	tous	hagious,
and	for	all	the	saints

TEV: For I hear of your love for all God's people and the faith you have in the Lord Jesus.

v. 6

hopōs	hē	koinōnia	tēs	pisteōs	sou
that	the	fellowship	of	faith	your

energēs	genētai	en	epignōsei	pantos
mighty	become	by	knowledge	of all

agathou	tou	en	hēmin	eis	Christon·
the good	which	with	us	for	Christ

TEV: My prayer is that our fellowship with you as believers will bring about a deeper understanding of every blessing which we have in our life in Christ.

V. 7

charan	gar	pollēn	eschon	kai	paraklēsin
joy	for	much	I had	and	encouragement

epi	tē	agapē	sou,	hoti	ta
because of	the	love	your	that	the

splagchna	tōn	hagiōn	anapepautai
hearts	of the	saints	have been refreshed

dia	sou,	adelphe.
through	you	brother

TEV: Your love, dear brother, has brought me great joy and much encouragement! You have cheered the hearts of all God's people.

<u>Paul Pleads for Onesimus</u> v. 8 - v. 22

v. 8

Dio,	pollēn	en	Christō	parrēsian
Therefore	much	in	Christ	boldness

	echōn	epitassein	soi	to	anēkon ,
	having	to command	to you	what	is proper

TEV: For this reason I could be bold enough, as your brother in Christ, to order you to do what should be done.

v. 9	dia	tēn	agapēn	mallon	parakalō
	because of	the	love	rather	I appeal

toioutos	hōn	hōs	Paulos	presbutēs ,
such as this	being	as	Paul	an old man

nuni	de	kai	desmios	Christou	Iēsou
now	but	even	prisoner	of Christ	Jesus

TEV: But love compels me to make a request instead. I do this even though I am Paul, the ambassador of Christ Jesus and at present also a prisoner for his sake.

v.10	parakalō	se	peri	tou	emou	teknou,
	I appeal	you	concerning	the	my	child

hon	egennēsa	en	tois	desmois	Onēsmion,
whom	I begot	in	the	chains	Onesimus

TEV: So I make a request to you on behalf of Onesimus, who is my own son in Christ; for while in prison I have become his spiritual father.

v.11	ton	pote	soi	achrēston	nuni	de
	who	formerly	to you	useless	now	but

[kai]	soi	kai	emoi	euchrēston,
both	to you	and	to me	useful

TEV: At one time he was of no use to you, but now he is useful both to you and to me.

v.12	hon	anepempsa	soi ,	auton,	tout'
	whom	I sent	to you	he	this one

estin	ta	ema	splagchna.
is	the	my	heart

TEV: I am sending him back to you now, and with him goes my heart.

v.13	hon	egō	eboulomēn	pros	emauton
	whom	I	would have liked	to	myself

katechein ,	hina	huper	sou	moi
to hold back	so that	on behalf	of you	me

diakonē	en	tois	desmois	tou
he may serve	in	the	chains	for the

euaggeliou,
gospel

TEV: I would like to keep him here with me, while I am in prison for the gospel's sake, so that he could help me in your place.

v.14

chōris	de	tēs	sēs	gnōmēs	ouden
without	but	the	your	consent	nothing

ēthelēsa	poiēsai,	hina	mē	hōs	kata
I decided	to do	so that	not	as	by

anagkēn	to	agathon	sou	hē	alla
compulsion	the	good	your	may be	but

kata	ekousion .
by	free will

TEV: However, I do not want to force you to help me; rather, I would like for you to do it of your own free will. So I will not do a thing unless you agree.

v.15

tacha	gar	dia	touto	echōristhē
perhaps	for	because of	this	he was separated

pros	hōran	hina	aiōnion
for	a while	in order that	for eternity

auton	apechēs ,
him	you may receive

TEV: It may be that Onesimus was away from you for a short time so that you might have him back for all time.

v.16

ouketi	hōs	doulon	alla	huper	doulon,
no longer	as	a slave	but	more than	a slave

adelphon	agapēton,	malista	emoi ,	posō
a brother	beloved	especially	to me	how much

de	mallon	soi	kai	en	sarki	kai
and	more	to you	even	in	flesh	and

en	kuriō .
in	the Lord

TEV: And now he is not just a slave, but much more than a slave: he is a dear brother in Christ. How much he means to me! And how much more he will mean to you, both as a slave and as a brother in the Lord!

v.17	Ei	oun	me	echeis	koinōnon	proslabou
	if	therefore	me	you have	partner	receive

auton	hōs	eme .
him	as	myself

TEV: So, if you think of me as your partner, welcome him back just as you would welcome me.

v.18	ei	de	ti	ēdikēsen	se	ē
	if	and	something	did wrong	you	or

opheilei,	touto	emoi	elloga·
he owes	this	to me	charge

TEV: If he has done you any wrong, or owes you anything, charge it to my account.

v.19	egō	Paulos	egrapsa	tē	emē	cheiri,
	I	Paul	wrote	with the	my	hand

egō	apotisō	hina	mē	legō	soi
I	will pay	so that	not	I may say	to you

hoti	kai	seauton	moi	prosopheileis.
that	even	yourself	to me	you owe

TEV: Here, I will write this with my own hand: I, Paul, will pay you back. (I should not have to remind you, of course, that you owe your very life to me.)

v.20	nai,	adelphe,	egō	sou	onaimēn	en
	yes	brother	I	your	may have benefit	in

	kuriō	anapauson	mou	ta	splagchna	en
	the Lord	refresh	my	the	heart	in
	Christō .					
	the Lord					

TEV: So, my brother, please do me this favor, for the Lord's sake; cheer up my heart, as a brother in Christ!

v.21 Pepoithōs	tē	hupakoē	sou	egrapsa	
being confident	the	obedience	your	I wrote	
soi ,	eidōs	hoti	kai	huper	ha
to you	knowing	that	even	beyond	what
legō	poiēseis				
I say	you will do				

TEV: I am sure, as I write this, that you will do what I ask—in fact I know that you will do even more.

v.22 hama	de	kai	hetoimaze	moi	
at the same time	but	also	prepare	for me	
xenian ,	elpizō	gar	hoti	dia	tōn
a guest room	I hope	for	that	through	the
proseuchōn	humōn	charisthēsomai	humin .		
prayer	your	I will be restored	to you		

TEV: At the same time, get a room ready for me, because I hope that God will answer the prayers of all of you and give me back to you.

Final Greetings

v.23 Aspazetai	se	Epaphrās	ho	sunaichmalōtos
greets	you	Epaphras	the	fellow-prisoner
mou	en	Christō	Iēsou,	
my	for	Christ	Jesus	

TEV: Epaphras, who is in prison with me for the sake of Christ Jesus, sends you his greetings,

v.24 Markos,	Aristarchos,	Dēmas,	Loukas,	hoi
Mark	Aristarchus	Demas	Luke	the

sunergoi	mou.
co-workers	my

TEV: and so do my fellow workers Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, and Luke.

v.25

Hē	charis	tou	kuriou	Iēsou	Christou
the	grace	the	Lord	Jesus	Christ

meta	tou	pneumatos	humōn.
with	the	spirit	your

TEV: May the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you all.

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