

PHILOSOPHY OF NORMATIVE DISCOURSE AND PERSUASION:  
A STUDY OF GA'DANG EXHORTATION AND ARGUMENTATION

by

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## PREFACE

A decade ago, Kenneth Pike impressed on me the need to study and describe modes of argumentation and persuasion which differ from those of our own culture. Since that time, I have spent several years with my family residing with the Ga'dang people of Paracelis municipality of Mountain Province, in the Philippines. In 1980, with the cooperation of all people involved, I was able to record a substantial corpus of data from actual dispute settlements in the Ga'dang community of Bananao. I am grateful for the kindness of all those who participated in these discussions and who allowed me to record them. Mr. Juan (Sidayaw) Domingo of Bananao assisted me with the transcriptions of the recordings. The Ga'dang texts provide ample evidence of the integrity and oratorical skills of the participants, and of the admirable fabric of their society.

This work describes normative or persuasive discourse in Ga'dang, and proposes tentative generalizations concerning the differences between normative discourse in oral versus literate societies.

I offer sincere thanks to the members of my committee, Donald Burquest, Ray Gordon, George Huttar, Lenore Langsdorf, and Robert E. Longacre. All have had an influence on me and my work, and I feel very privileged to have known and associated with each one. In addition to the members of my committee, there are two scholars in particular whose contributions to my education must be acknowledged. They are Kenneth Pike and Ilah Fleming, from whom I have learned important insights in linguistic theory.

There are many others to whom I owe thanks, far too many to mention individually. I thank all of my family and close friends who have made special efforts to give encouragement and tangible help.

Some of my friends helped me to purchase a microcomputer and printer. This equipment has been invaluable in the preparation of this work. I was able to print out several different displays of the large corpus of text for analysis, and the display of the text in the appendix was formatted by a computer program written by Ken Zook. Revisions and corrections were made throughout the writing process without the need of retyping the whole manuscript for each revised version. And a task which I will have the computer perform for me later today is to change all the names of the participants in the Ga'dang litigation of the appendix to pseudonyms, at every place where they occur.

I dedicate this work to my supervising professor, Robert E. Longacre. To call him simply "a scholar and a gentleman" is an understatement like calling Texas flat. He is able to point out the shortcomings in my work, and still leave me feeling encouraged to press on. I also dedicate it to my wife, Verna, and my sons, Marty and Toby --the most important people in my life, and my support team in this project.

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ABSTRACT

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This work applies the insights of textlinguistics to the study of normative or persuasive discourse. Although textlinguistics is already somewhat interdisciplinary in character, it was found to be too narrow to account for normative discourse, and had to be expanded to include further considerations of cultural phenomena, norms, and the relations of these to the theory of knowledge structures.

In addition to the above, there are five major contributions of this study:

(1) It shows how norms and knowledge structures play a part in the process of persuasion, and also redefines persuasion as including either the changing or the perpetuating of norms or knowledge structures.

(2) It clarifies the logic of normative discourse, and demonstrates that there is not a radical difference between normative and empirical reasoning.

(3) It explicates the often observed phenomenon of cultural differences in cognitive processes, since this has a bearing on cultural differences in modes of argumentation and persuasion. The cause of much of the observed difference has not been shown to be a genetic difference, or a 'pre-logical mentality', or an inherent inability to think analytically or abstractly. Rather, it appears to be the relative prevalence of an oral or a literate tradition, and the cognitive inclinations fostered by each.

(4) It describes the notional and surface structure of normative discourse in Ga'dang. This is a step toward a more general theory of normative discourse.

(5) It identifies a scale of normativity, along which discourse types and discourse features can be ranked according to their normative force or persuasive impact. Many of the persuasive strategies and surface structures of Ga'dang normative discourse were ranked on this scale.

This work is a step toward filling a major void in textlinguistics today, namely the lack of analysis of normative or persuasive texts. It is also a step toward understanding the apparently different logical or cognitive processes involved in persuasion in different cultural groups.

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## INTRODUCTION

This work is a study in textlinguistics or discourse analysis, focussing on the area of normative discourse and persuasion, and how the former is used to accomplish the latter. The theoretical framework of this study is the subject of the first five chapters. Then the focus shifts to the structure and function of normative discourse in Ga'dang.

Textlinguistics has become an interdisciplinary science. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the discipline of textlinguistics is still in its formative phase, and that the boundaries are still being defined, and that some of the boundaries necessarily overlap with those of other disciplines. Thus the first four chapters are taken up with explicating the relationships that this study has with other disciplines.

Chapters one and two place textlinguistics and normative discourse in a philosophical context. Textlinguistics is shown to be a phenomenological endeavor (ideally). The nature of the data is that of cultural objects (phenomena), and the researcher's approach to the data should be to suspend preconceptions and refrain from premature categorizations or reductions. Hasty gestalt formation can only result in imputing structure to the data other than what it really has.

Normative discourse is that which is primarily intended to influence the opinions; beliefs, or behavior of other people. This is done by uttering evaluations and prescriptions, and supporting them with valid reasons or justifications. This is the logic of normative discourse

in a nutshell. The unique feature of normative discourse is that the reasons given in support of the statements are the cultural values or norms of the community. Therefore chapter two is a discussion of normative discourse in the context of axiology, i.e. the philosophy of value.

Chapter three is crucial. It brings together concepts from cognitive science (knowledge structures), neuropsychology (brain hemisphere specialization), and the study of the consequences of literacy (analytic thought) to provide an explanation for the substantial differences between Ga'dang normative discourse and that of our Western society, especially our written normative texts.

The conciliatory nature of dispute settlement in Ga'dang is the essence of chapter four. This relates to the sociology or ethnology of law and social control. The normative discourse of dispute settlement aims to produce group harmony and consensus.

The first four chapters are highly interdisciplinary. The purpose of these chapters was to present those factors which are essential considerations in the study of normative discourse, and which contributed to my understanding of Ga'dang persuasive discourse. The section is also intended to present something more substantial than an annotated bibliography for those who might wish to work more intensively on some of the topics to which I have only been able to give brief attention.

In chapter five, the focus begins to narrow to those aspects of the theory of normative discourse that are central to the domain of textlinguistics. Normative monologue and dialogue texts are considered,

and normative discourse is placed within a taxonomy of text types. Four subtypes of normative discourse are identified.

Chapters six through nine narrow the focus still further, to a particular type of normative discourse in Ga'dang, the informal litigation. A large part of one litigation is presented in the appendix, and this text is the one which provides most of the examples throughout this work. Any example cited from the appendix is given with the sentence number, so the reader may also refer to it in its context in the appendix.

The notional constituents of the text are identified in chapter six, as well as the backbone and peak of the discourse, features of the social setting, and the mechanics of interaction. Chapter seven focusses on the surface structure of the text, describing the features of cohesion, paragraph, sentence, verb, pronominal reference and particles in normative discourse.

Strategies of persuasion are presented in chapter eight, and related to some of the categories presented in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Not all strategies of persuasion in Ga'dang are rhetorical strategies, even though this might seem contradictory if the broadest definition of rhetoric is employed.

A scale of normativity is presented in chapter nine, and the various grammatical features of Ga'dang normative discourse are ranked on this scale. Certain features have more normative or persuasive force than others, and at the peak of a normative discourse, there is a clustering of high ranking features. This is a part of the grammar of normative

discourse, and a speaker must control this as well as the other features in order to produce a persuasive discourse in Ga'dang.

Not all of these considerations can be given even a respectable treatment here. And to attempt to treat them all almost guarantees that one will be "jack of all trades, master of none". Nevertheless, the motivation for this study is strong enough to warrant that risk. And although the treatment of each consideration will be far from exhaustive or definitive, it is my hope that it will be credible and accurate as far as it goes, and that I will not have misinterpreted the authors cited from other disciplines.

## 1. PHILOSOPHY OF TEXTLINGUISTICS

### 1.1 Phenomenology and textlinguistics

TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES is an expression of the primary aim of phenomenology. Thus phenomenology is an empiricist theory, but not in the traditional sense of empiricism. The 'things' that phenomenology focusses on may be actual phenomena that appear to us in the 'here and now', or aspects of our previous experience that we reflect upon. In textlinguistics, the object of study is actual linguistic texts as they occur in actual human communicative experience. This is in contrast to a point of view in linguistics which focusses primarily on the sentence level and is equally satisfied with contrived or hypothetical sentences which are provided as objects for analysis apart from a context of actual communicative experience.

Phenomenology not only points us to the things, but tells us how we should look at the things. This kind of looking has been called "epoché", which means the suspension of preconceptions about the object of attention or investigation. In other words, we should not assume an initial hierarchy of "realities". Rather, we should attend to the phenomena as they appear, not imposing a preconceived notion of how they are structured.

At this point in the discussion of phenomenology, we are already faced with a difficult paradox, but it is not one that phenomenologists are unaware of. "The paradox consists in the fact that without some --at least general-- idea of what and how one is to look at a thing, how can anything be seen? Yet, if what is to be seen is to be seen without prejudice or preconception, how can it be circumscribed by definition?" (Ihde 1977:31). This is one way of describing the hermeneutic circle, which Ihde prefers to call the "dialectic of interpretation". It is understood that it is just not possible to approach any inquiry totally without preconceptions. Even the inclination to perform the inquiry is a sort of preconception. But the emphasis of phenomenology is to suspend bias as much as is possible, and give primary emphasis to observation initially. "Careful looking precedes classification and systematization, and systematization and classification are made to follow what the phenomenon shows" (Ihde 1977:32).

The approach of textlinguistics is (or should be) compatible with this philosophy. This is especially true when the inquiry involves analysis of a language radically different from one's own. As linguists, we do approach any language with some preconceptions of what we are likely to find. But these preconceptions should be suspended as much as possible in the initial investigation, to allow for the phenomena of the target language to be experienced as they are, rather than to be forced into the mold of the linguist's preconceptions, or the structure of his own native language.



The emphasis in phenomenology on actual lived experience is another tenet to which textlinguists adhere. Not only do textlinguists aim to pay scrupulous attention to the linguistic context of an utterance, but also to its situational or behavioral context (Longacre 1983:337). The whole situational milieu enters into the experiencing of any text utterance or text reception. Naturally, the whole of a text cannot be adequately described apart from a description of its parts and their relationships to each other and the whole text and its whole context. There are finite limitations which prevent us from doing this exhaustively (otherwise we would probably not finish the description of one text in one lifetime), but the point here is the emphasis on the WHOLE. Pike and Pike, who see texts as the most natural unit of linguistic behavior and therefore the appropriate initial focus in linguistics, point out that "no unit of purposive behavior can be identified or recognized in complete abstraction from other units; it exists only in reference to them" (1977:2). Phenomenology also recognizes that there are no things-by-themselves, but that "all items that appear do so in relation to a background and in strict relation with that background" (Ihde 1977:58), i.e. they are situated within a field. The initial experiencing of a phenomenon cannot be isolated from the experiencing of the field or situational milieu within which it appears.

However, although our initial direct experiencing of a phenomenon cannot be isolated from its contextual milieu, subsequent considerations can be. This is done by means of various reductions, especially in the analysis of oral texts. The very act of transcribing a text that the

linguist has already had an immediate, first hand experience of is a reduction. The text is reduced from the infinite detail and variability of its original form and situational context to a finite and manageable written form. Even if the textlinguist graphically encodes prosodic features of the phonology of the text in its transcription, it is still a quantum reduction from the actual experience of the text. Various charting procedures which are applied to texts may be still more substantial reductions, if any type of abbreviations are used in representing the text (e.g. NP, rather than the actual alphabetic characters or phonetic symbols representing the morphemes of the Noun Phrase). Even a chart on which all the morphemes are written may constitute a further reduction, if discourse level constituents are identified and somehow demarcated.

Reductions such as these are analytical methods of textlinguistics, not ultimate aims of the theory. A subsidiary aim would be to identify the macrostructure of a text and its constituent units, but this would be only a part of a larger accounting or description of a text. A full description of a text would include description of as many features of the situational milieu (at the initial experiencing of the text) as practical and analytically productive. There may have been 80% atmospheric humidity at the time of text reception, but this is a part of the milieu that is not significant if it has no effect on text production or reception, so it would not be included in the description. But the full description would include mention of background noise (e.g. strong wind, radio) if it had an effect on speaker or hearer (or reader). Thus

the description, no matter how nearly exhaustive, is a reduction. But this reduction is still not the ultimate aim of textlinguistics, but a step in the procedure.

Before defining the aim of textlinguistics, it would be helpful to compare the types of reduction practised by the textlinguist to the technical term PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION used by philosophers. If there is not identity between the two, there are at least some important similarities. Performing a phenomenological reduction requires a reflective move, "characterized as a move outside or above or distanced from straightforward experience" (Ihde 1977:45). In ordinary, first hand experiencing of a text (oral or written), the object of our experience is the content of the text, along with the total communicative experience, infinitely complex in light of the fact that we are simultaneously experiencing features of the situational milieu at the moment of our hearing or reading the text. To perform textlinguistic analysis, this complexity must be reduced. So by a reflective move we distance ourselves from straightforward experiencing of the text. In the straightforward experience, we (as text receptors) are in a hermeneutic relationship to the text, i.e. we are constantly construing meanings and anticipating what is likely to follow (cf. ch.3). By the reflective move, we distance ourselves from this function, and allow the text to appear to us in a form other than as immediate communication of meaning intended by the speaker or author. Having done so, we have done the first two steps of the phenomenological reduction, namely RETENTION and BRACKETING (Reeder ms.).

Retention is described as the presence in this moment of a living trace of the moment just past (ibid.). This is not identical to memory; it is more immediate and vivid. (It may be indistinguishable from 'short term memory' in psychology, cf. Neisser 1976:141.) It is impossible to retain a living trace of the entirety of any substantial text, so the textlinguist must assist his memory or imagination with tape recordings and transcriptions. It could be said of these tools that they recreate the experience so that we can hold some parts of it in retention again. But in fact they do not recreate the original experience just as it was; nothing could do so. Rather, these tools phase us into the bracketing step of the phenomenological reduction, i.e. they enable us to distance or detach ourselves from the experiencing of the text and attend to it apart from our preconceptions or knowledge structures. This could not be done at our initial experiencing of the text (unless we deliberately attempted not to attend to the meaning being communicated, i.e. not to understand it), because the knowledge structures we have are our means of construing meaning (Minsky 1980:12).

The third and final step in the phenomenological reduction is the EIDETIC REDUCTION, which is the determination of the essential or 'universal' features of the phenomenon, i.e. its ESSENCE. In light of the definition of phenomenological reduction, consider the aim of textlinguistics.

The aim of textlinguistics is to reduce texts to their phenomenological ESSENCES, i.e. to the structural features or invariants within the text phenomena (Ihde 1977:38). This involves the

identification and description of all emic units and their tactics or combinatorial possibilities. Texts with identical essences (at the text or discourse level of the grammatical hierarchy) group as a single text type (cf. ch.5), and the set of essences of all text types, as well as all the lower levels of structure in a language, is the grammar of the language. Textlinguistics aims to discover and describe this grammar, beginning with text level grammar and continuing through all 'lower' levels. A text grammar is the product of phenomenological reduction.

Textlinguistics as currently practised (e.g. by Pike, Longacre, and Fleming) departs from traditional phenomenology by explaining as well as describing. In discussions of such concepts as role, function, purpose, speaker's intention, and speech acts, we attempt to determine why things are the way we have described them to be. The primary reason for the interdisciplinary nature of textlinguistics is not just to describe the larger context in which a text is uttered, but to determine what it is about that context that affects the surface structure of the text itself, and why. Current practise of phenomenology also departs from the 'describe only' restriction, allowing the reintroduction of explanatory concepts such as motive and purpose (Ricoeur 1978:86) after preliminary phenomenological investigation has been done.

## 1.2 Cultural objects and reference in language

Phenomenology and textlinguistics are compatible because cultural objects (some of which are the objects of study in textlinguistics) may appear to us as surely as physical objects may. Cassirer (1961:157-8) observed that the "object of nature appears to lie immediately before our eyes", whereas the cultural object "lies in back of us, so to speak". The reason that cultural objects "lie in back of us" is that we cannot apprehend them with the physical senses. We can physically observe the objects of nature which are the "ground" of some of the cultural objects, and we can observe kinds of behavior which are the results of other cultural objects. But we do not directly observe the cultural objects. We know them through construal or abstraction, i.e. we apprehend them cognitively.

The objects of study in textlinguistics are cultural objects. Cultural objects are the cognitive objects or units which are to a great extent shared by the members of a given speech/cultural community. The units may be somewhat generic or comprehensive, such as knowledge of different broad types of text or discourse (e.g. narrative, expository), and the knowledge of the conditions of appropriateness for the use of each. There are also 'lower level' units such as the words of the language. A 'word level' cognitive unit includes knowledge of how to produce and recognize the sound (or graphic representation) which is a sign used by that cultural community, and the range of meaning or significance conventionally associated with that sign.

In the case of words that 'refer to physical objects', i.e. are conventionally associated with a class of phenomena that can be perceived with the physical senses, the cultural unit also includes the knowledge of the criteria for identifying any particular phenomenon as belonging to that class. (In a way it is redundant to say that the cultural unit includes knowledge of the criteria for determining membership in the class; the concept of a cognitive class includes this by definition.) Notice, however, that this explication of the function of reference in language could serve equally well for the relationship between words with no physical referents and the meanings conventionally associated with them. These words are also associated with a class of phenomena. The difference is that the phenomena referred to by these words are apprehended cognitively, rather than by the senses. These phenomena may be cognitive events such as thinking and knowing, or they may be abstract relationships such as ownership or attribution, agent or patient.

Some very early theories of reference in language viewed words as names of actual objects. This simple view fails to give any basis for the study of cultural objects in linguistics. A more accurate understanding of reference needs to include the distinctions between the actual world, the phenomenal world, the cognitive grid or 'native paradigm', and an explication of how language relates to these.

The ACTUAL WORLD is the real, existing universe in its totality. We do not have direct, exhaustive access to it, either actually or in principle, i.e. due to human limitations we cannot apprehend it as it

really is, either cognitively or by the physical senses. Therefore even to posit its existence is, admittedly, a step of faith.

The PHENOMENAL WORLD is that which appears to us, or that which we can in principle perceive or apprehend, including physical objects and cultural objects. All phenomena are included in the actual world, since the actual world is all inclusive. But only a subset of the actual world is included in the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world, then, is real and actual, not deceptive or illusory. But it differs from the actual world in that it is not exhaustive; it is not all that there is.

Our COGNITIVE GRID or NATIVE PARADIGM is our whole corpus of knowledge about the phenomenal world. But it is not identical to the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world does not contradict the actual world at any point, but our cognitive grid might. In other words, our cognitive grid is a less perfect reflection of the actual world than the limits of our perceptual abilities would require. This is because of further limitations imposed on our perception and cognition by the conventions of our culture.

Cultural conventions as 'stored' in one's cognitive grid make up a set of expectations which can be referred to as one's native paradigm. To a great extent, this paradigm governs the focus of our attention when something appears to us, and governs our interpretation of what we do attend to. Kuhn (1970:52) speaks of "paradigm-induced expectations", and although his discussion is referring to scientific observation, the concept holds true for ordinary looking. It is not true that we cannot see anything but what our paradigm has led us to expect, but it is true



that we have a strong tendency to see what we expect. To see things in other ways requires that we be confronted with obvious anomaly, or that we make a conscious effort to see more clearly or objectively by reflective analysis (Langsdorf and Reeder 1983:28).

The relation of LANGUAGE to the cognitive grid is the most difficult relationship to explicate. For on the one hand our cognitive grid includes knowledge that we have about our language. On the other hand, the surface structure units of language refer to cognitive concepts. And, (if only we had a third hand), the CONVENTIONAL RELATIONSHIP between the surface structure unit and the cognitive content it refers to is also a cognitive unit. It is the conventional relationship that supports the view of a form-meaning composite in language. If we examine the PHYSICAL PHENOMENA of speech sounds or ink marks apart from their function in a language system, they are not a part of any linguistic form-meaning composite. It is only as they function within a system of meaningful relationships, that must be perpetuated in the cognitive grids of language users, that they can be considered as form-meaning composites.

The physical phenomena of linguistic expressions are themselves a part of the actual world. That part of the sounds or marks which we can physically perceive are of the phenomenal world. And the conventional associations that we attach to certain sounds or marks are a part of the cognitive grid.

Notice that I use language to talk about all of these worlds or categories, illustrating the interdependency of language with all of the concepts.

The purpose of this discussion is to show that meaning in language is directly linked to cultural objects. One's Knowledge or set of expectations about what segment of the phenomenal world may conventionally be referred to by a given term is a cultural object. Meaning is not restricted to what can be empirically verified, as some extreme empiricist theories suggested. In fact, empirical verifiability does not even enter into the role of meaning in language. It is just a remnant of our scientific tradition (the western or Greek paradigm, cf. Van Doren 1981:205), which allowed for the possibility of an ideal observer, i.e. one who was not predisposed to see things according to paradigmatic expectations.

The meaning of units of language is what is communicated by the units, and that is a function of cultural conventions. These conventions are in a constant state of flux. "The contextual associations of meaning are continuously being sheared off as the units are being re-used in different contexts" (Bloch 1975:18). But the flux or semantic shift is generally so gradual that all the members of the speech community are kept up to date concerning the current relationships or referential conventions.

The meaning of words is not tied to sense data in a direct way. Thus language dealing with events, behavior, attitudes, emotions, and social interaction has conventional referents, circumscribed intersubjectively by the members of the cultural community, in the same way that language dealing with physical objects has.

### 1.3 Norms as cultural objects

The cultural objects or units within the cognitive grid of each member of a speech community are arranged or organized in a variety of ways. If not for systems of organizing knowledge, we could not cope with the quantity and complexity of knowledge that each member of a society is expected to control. The analysis of knowledge structures is a current frontier in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and will be discussed in chapter 3. The point to be made here is that knowledge structures are also cultural objects.

Each knowledge structure includes awareness of the attitudes shared by the society toward the things or events to which that knowledge structure pertains. Thus each member of the community knows how to evaluate things and events according to standards and rules. The conventional standards and rules comprise the norms of the cultural community. These are cultural objects, known by community members, which may be expressed in the form of a proposition (e.g. running is good). Norms are the operating rules of a society, without which it would disintegrate. "The values expressed by a given set of rules are thus the operating values of those who abide by them; and they are the public values of any social group whose members regard observing these rules as a condition of membership in the group" (Goodenough 1981:77). Norms or public values are invoked repeatedly in Ga'dang normative discourse, and they become discourse themes.

A phenomenological approach to the study of societal norms is warranted just as in any other type of inquiry. It is especially warranted in the case of a cross-cultural study. The textlinguist must suspend his own point of view as much as possible and detach himself from his own value system in order to be able to understand the value systems that are emic to the target speech community. If he fails to do so, he will impose his own values and normative logic on the text data, and will fail to see the structure and cultural objects which are there to be seen.

Normative or emotive language does not present a problem in this approach to discourse. It is not less referential or less meaningful than other uses of language. On the contrary, I contend that normative discourse is the primary function of language.

## 2. AXIOLOGY AND NORMATIVE DISCOURSE

Axiology is the philosophy of value. Normative discourse has to do with the application of public values or norms within a society. The two are integrally related, and may be subsumed under the heading of normative ethics. This ethics defines how people ought to act, according to the values or norms of a particular cultural community. Normative ethics, then, is a more restricted focus than that of ethics or moral philosophy, which defines how people ought to act in general. This work will be confined to the area of normative ethics. For treatments of the more comprehensive subject, see Frankena (1963) and Toulmin (1970).

### 2.1 Normative discourse: evaluation and prescription

Longacre (1983:3-6) has proposed four broad types of discourse: narrative, procedural, expository, and behavioral. Behavioral discourse includes eulogy, promissory speeches, and any type of hortatory discourse such as sermons, pep-talks, advice, or any discourse intended to bring about a change of conduct. Behavioral discourse is the primary linguistic component in social control.

In this work, I will refer to any discourse of this type as normative discourse. Normative is not a more specific term than behavioral. If anything, it is more generic. It includes all prescriptive discourse (commands, exhortations, etc.), but it also

includes evaluative discourse, and any discourse which has persuasion as a primary aim. Thus normative discourse is not only that which is intended to affect or bring about a change in behavior, but also that which is intended to influence, affect, or modify cognitive choices or beliefs. Normative discourse therefore includes argumentation, the primary function of which is to prove (illocution) in order to persuade (perlocution) (Walker 1983:12).

"We carry on normative discourse when we use language for the purposes of evaluating and prescribing and when we give reasons for or against our evaluations and prescriptions" (Taylor 1961:191). Taylor (p.223) makes a clear distinction between evaluation and prescription:

1. An act of prescribing is a linguistic act, whereas a value judgment is a mental disposition. 2. All prescribing is done for the purpose of guiding conduct, but most evaluating is not done for that purpose. 3. Prescribing an act is not giving a reason for doing it, while on the contrary evaluating an act is giving a reason for (or against) doing it.

It is clear that Taylor is discussing two kinds of things in this passage. One is the linguistic act of prescribing, the other is the psychological act of formulating an evaluation. By mixing the two kinds of things, Taylor obscures the logical and psychological relationship between the two, namely that an evaluation frequently leads to the uttering of a prescription, and a prescription always presupposes an evaluation.

Furthermore, in the study of normative discourse, our focus is on expressions of evaluations and prescriptions. And the act of uttering a prescription versus the act of uttering an evaluation cannot be

distinguished in the same way that prescribing and evaluating are distinguished. Both types of utterances are linguistic acts.

In psychological sequence, prescription may occur as a result of evaluation. But in normative discourse, the distinction loses significance. EXPRESSIONS of prescriptions or evaluations have a common purpose or function underlying them, a social-control or normative purpose. Thus we are not analyzing the intention in evaluating versus the intention in prescribing (a psychological consideration), but rather the intention or illocutionary speech act in uttering evaluations and prescriptions (a discourse consideration).

In the context of discourse, Taylor (1961:191) holds that the basic concepts of evaluative discourse are 'good' and 'right', whereas the basic concept of prescriptive discourse is 'ought'. I contend that the concept of 'ought' is a part of the connotative meaning of good and right. Thus the distinction between uttering prescriptions versus evaluations in normative discourse is not a difference in kind, but a difference in degree. The two have different ranks on a scale of normativity, i.e. they differ in the degree to which they are likely to influence or alter the beliefs or behavior of others (cf. ch.7 and 9).

Notice that all of the distinctions Taylor posited between evaluating and prescribing break down in the context of normative discourse. 1. In discourse, there is not the distinction between linguistic versus psychological act; uttering evaluations and uttering prescriptions are both linguistic acts. 2. It may be true that most evaluating is not done for the purpose of guiding conduct, but it is not

true that the uttering of evaluations is not done for the purpose of guiding conduct; it has that purpose, if to a lesser degree than the uttering of prescriptions. 3. In Ga'dang normative discourse, prescriptions are routinely accompanied by reasons for doing the prescribed act. It is true that the prescription per se is not the reason for doing it, but reasons are provided in Ga'dang evaluative and prescriptive discourse.

Another reason for emphasizing the similarity, or deemphasizing the difference, between evaluation and prescription in normative discourse is that the same logic holds for both. This is the subject of the following section.

## 2.2 The logic of normative discourse

Normative discourse consists of evaluations, prescriptions, and the justification of evaluations and prescriptions. All evaluation, prescription, and justification is done on the basis of norms.

### 2.2.1 Norms, standards, and rules

Norms may be either standards or rules (Taylor 1961:ch.1). If we evaluate something according to standards, we grade it as good or bad, clever or obtuse, pleasing or disgusting etc. If we evaluate according to rules, we grade the evaluatum as right or wrong, correct or incorrect. Behavior or thought is likely to be evaluated according to rules. That



which is obligatory or permissible is right behavior, and that which is prohibited is wrong behavior.

An evaluatum may be ranked rather than graded, i.e. determined to be better or worse than some other thing in the class of comparison. But this can only be done in the case of evaluating according to standards. The evaluatum is then determined to have more or less of the good-making or bad-making characteristics than the other object has, according to the particular standard being evaluated by. If the norms being applied to the evaluation are rules, the evaluatum may not be ranked. It can only be graded as right or wrong, i.e. whether it fulfills or does not fulfill the rule.

Figure 1 displays the two types of norms, and the types of evaluations that may be performed using each type.

Types of norms:	Types of evaluation:	Evaluation	
		positive:	negative:
rules	grading	right/correct	wrong/incorrect
standards	grading	good/pleasing etc.	bad/disgusting
standards	ranking	better	worse

Fig. 1. The role of norms in evaluation

### 2.2.2 Points of view or value systems

Taylor (1961:7) correctly points out that in evaluation, a class of comparison may remain constant while a point of view changes, and two different evaluations of the same object could result. For example, if our class of comparison were meat, a sirloin steak could be evaluated as good or bad depending on the point of view adopted. From an aesthetic point of view (taste), it might be evaluated as good, or as better than hamburger. But from an economic point of view (price), it might be evaluated as bad, or as worse than hamburger.

In discussing the notion of points of view, Taylor (1961 ch.4) makes more philosophical and psychological distinctions than are warranted, resulting in a proliferation of metalanguage. He distinguishes between points of view, value systems, canons of reasoning, rules of relevance, and rules of valid inference. The definitions of each depend much on the definitions of the others, and there is some circularity in this section of his work. I will try to explicate Taylor's schemata, and show why fewer categories are needed.

Firstly, adopting a point of view is defined as "nothing but adopting certain canons of reasoning as the framework within which value judgments are to be justified" (1961:109). Canons of reason are defined as being constituted of the two sets of rules, those of relevance and those of valid inference. The rules of relevance are defined as the criteria for determining relevance of a reason given. The rules of valid

inference are defined as the criteria for determining whether a relevant reason is also a good, warranted, or valid reason.

Taylor desires to maintain a distinction between value system and point of view. Point of view is a cross-cultural (universal) concept, while value system is culture-bound. This distinction is not tenable. Taylor suggests that points of view such as moral, aesthetic, and political are universal. The potential error in this (though probably not what Taylor intends) is similar to the error that would be made by saying that the categories of fruit and grain are universal, and assuming that the membership of these categories is identical across cultures. It may be true that in the case of very generic categories, every culture in the world has an approximate equivalent. But the Ga'dang people include coconut in their category which is the approximate equivalent of our 'fruit' (bunqa), and include yams in the category we would call 'grain' (baqqat). Just so with points of view. Behavior that is considered morally offensive in one culture might be considered aesthetically offensive or even inoffensive in another (e.g. eating with the left hand among Muslim groups of Mindanao; the left hand is used for dirty tasks according to the norms of their culture, and must not be used for eating).

If it were true that every possible point of view had an approximate equivalent in every culture of the world, there would be nothing more to say about the concept of point of view. However, it is conceivable that, although the existence of points of view is a cultural universal, the set

of points of view is not. For example, a small, close-knit, very egalitarian society might not have a political point of view.

Points of view therefore are not identical across cultures. Rather, a point of view is an emic cultural cognitive gestalt. To assume a particular point of view is to employ the whole value system of the point of view, as defined by the conventions of the cultural community. Thus to adopt a point of view is tantamount to adopting a value system. And the value system is simply the culture-specific knowledge frame (cf. ch.3) which defines the relative values assigned to the members of a particular set of cultural objects. For the purpose of the analysis of normative discourse within a particular cultural community, no conceptual distinction is required between point of view and value system.

The notion of canons of reason is needed only to have a category in which both rules of relevance and rules of valid inference are included. No such category is needed, since the two sets of rules, if they need to be distinguished at all, are simply some of the cultural objects or bits of knowledge which constitute the knowledge frame, i.e. the value system to which they belong.

The members of a cultural community 'possess' these value-system knowledge frames, i.e. they know what objects or actions are included in (and therefore relevant to) each value system respectively, and they know what segment of the spatiotemporal or behavioral universe falls within the boundaries of each. They also know the subsets of cultural norms, and to which value system each subset relates or 'belongs'. Since they share these knowledge frames, they all would have an intuitive

approximation of the set of standards or rules which could appropriately be invoked in a given (problematic) circumstance, or the point of view which should be adopted when presented with a particular evaluatum.

### 2.2.3 Justification of evaluations and prescriptions

Taylor (1961:223) asserts that "prescriptions are justified in the same way that value judgments are justified", and that justifying a prescription is tantamount to justifying a set of value judgments. Thus there is a common logic for all evaluative and prescriptive discourse.

The logical relationship between evaluations and prescriptions on the one hand and justification on the other is straightforward. Justification is related to an evaluation or prescription as its REASON (Taylor 1961:76) or WARRANT (van Dijk 1977:155), i.e. as the reason(s) for accepting or concurring with an evaluation, or for doing a prescribed act.

Justification, however, has a complex logical structure of its own. Taylor (1961:77) proposes that there is a unified pattern of thought for all justification, and that there are four general phases in the over-all process, namely verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice. All of these are referred to as "essential steps" in the entire process of justifying a value judgment.

We VERIFY value judgments by appeal either to standards or to rules which we have adopted. We VALIDATE standards or rules (i.e. we justify our adopting certain standards or rules) by appeal to higher standards or rules. The adoption of standards or rules which themselves cannot be validated by appeal to any

higher standards or rules results from our decision to accept a whole value system. We VINDICATE our accepting a whole value system by appeal to the way of life to which we are committed. Our commitment to a way of life can be justified in terms of RATIONAL CHOICE among different ways of life.

Taylor suggests that this is the logical structure of all normative discourse, but I believe that the only kind of normative discourse that would manifest this structure would be a philosophical, ethical treatise such as Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Pirsig 1974), or an extremely comprehensive sermon. In ordinary normative discourse, the logic is truncated. Verification and (optionally) validation are sufficient justification for evaluations and prescriptions in ordinary normative discourse. In fact, in a community that is a cultural isolate, such as the Ga'dang community was until very recently, it is questionable whether there was even the logical possibility of vindication and rational choice, since there were no known alternative value systems or ways of life to compare to or choose from.

#### 2.2.4 Normative versus empirical justification

Taylor claims that "the validation of standards and rules, which is essential to the justification of value judgments, is not a part of scientific reasoning" (1961:118). Apparently this claim is made because the application of standards and rules in the case of scientific reasoning is believed to be beyond questioning. Baier (1958:75) implies as much:

We have seen that value judgments can be verified just like factual claims, but that in value judgments we make claims that give rise to a further question, namely, whether the criteria employed are the right ones. Factual judgments are decisively confirmed if they are empirically verified. Value judgments, on the other hand, must be not only verified but also validated. It is not enough to show that, if certain criteria are employed, then a thing must be said to have a certain degree of 'goodness'; we must also show that the criteria ought to be employed..."

Taylor agrees with Baier with respect to the greater need for justification in the case of value judgments:

It is clear that we have not succeeded in justifying a value judgment merely by showing that the evaluatum does or does not fulfill certain standards or rules. Another question immediately arises. Are those standards or rules appropriate ones for judging an evaluatum of that sort? We must not only justify the claim that, given the standards or rules, the evaluatum has a certain value. We must also justify the application of those standards or rules in the given circumstances. This is where validation comes in (Taylor 1961:80).

But is it true that "another question immediately arises", and that the appropriateness of the standards and rules must be validated? I will argue that this is not necessarily the case.

I contend that the difference between justification of value judgments and factual/empirical judgments is the degree of sedimentation (Ihde 1977:147) of the standards or rules being applied. We have been led to believe that the standards and rules of the western scientific tradition are beyond questioning, because of their great degree of sedimentation or institutionalization. But as Kuhn (1978:43) has pointed out, the members of one interpretive or scientific community share a paradigm, and from this they abstract certain isolable elements and

deploy them as rules. The rules, and the paradigm from which they derive, are only beyond question during a period of 'normal science'. They are open to question when anomaly is discovered that shows the paradigm to be deficient.

Thus, during a period of scientific revolution, even the so-called factual judgments may require the full-blown process of justification, including verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice. On the other hand, in a thoroughly integrated and stable cultural community, a value judgment may require only verification to be fully justified, because the standards and rules that are appealed to in justifying the evaluation are fully sedimented and considered beyond question. In this case, no validation requirement is imposed, much less vindication or rational choice.

The distinction that was made between value judgments and empirical judgments is therefore not valid. Both are normative processes. The difference is in the degree of sedimentation or acceptability of the standards or rules applied. Normative discourse, within the context of an established paradigm (scientific or cultural), requires only verification of evaluations or prescriptions.

### 2.3 The logic of Ga'dang normative discourse

There is a three-part logic involved in Ga'dang normative discourse:

1. assume a point of view; 2. evaluate or prescribe; 3. justify. The justification constituent of the Ga'dang logic does not include



vindication and rational choice, which Taylor views as necessary for the complete justification of evaluations or prescriptions. The usual justification is a statement of a standard or rule which is a part of the system of norms known and accepted by the community.

The whole of chapters six through nine deals with the analysis of Ga'dang normative discourse. Thus the examples given in this chapter to illustrate the three-part logic will be brief.

### 2.3.1 Ga'dang points of view

A Ga'dang point of view is the set of values relevant to a certain class of evaluata. To assume a point of view is to evaluate according to the particular set of values. Taylor suggests that the concept of points of view is universal (1961:108), which is true; all cultural communities have points of view, such as moral, aesthetic, political, scientific, mathematical, and historical. But it is not necessarily the case that the set of points of view is identical across cultures, and certainly not the case that the membership of each normative category is identical. Thus, in the analysis of normative discourse, one must look for the points of view emic to the culture, and determine what objects or actions may appropriately be evaluated according to each point of view, as evidenced in the surface structure of text or lexicon.

This section includes all the Ga'dang points of view that have been identified on the basis of evaluative lexical pairs. These pairs denote the two opposite poles of an evaluative continuum. Each point of view has

its own continuum. In most points of view there are also other adjectives which express mid-points on the evaluative continuum. But there are cases when an evaluatum must be either one or the other of the opposite evaluative lexemes, as in the economic point of view (see below). In these cases, the lexemes may be modified to express different points on the continuum.

This is not claimed to be an exhaustive list. Nor is it necessarily true (though it may be) that each emic point of view has a corresponding evaluative lexical pair. It may be the case that the extremes of value and disvalue of a given point of view are expressed by propositions, e.g. in the case of a religious point of view, expressions such as 'that which pleases God' versus 'that which God abhors'. It is to be expected, however, that a point of view which is conventional in a cultural community will have lexical realizations as well, such as 'righteous' versus 'sinful' corresponding to the propositions cited above.

The normative points of view of a speech community are likely to be taxonomically arranged. A simple taxonomy is posited here of Ga'dang points of view. All points of view can be classified as moral, physical, or behavioral. These are types of points of view; specific points of view are subsumed under these categories. I give a name to each point of view simply to indicate the situations in which it is appropriately employed. Probably there is further taxonomic ordering of points of view, but an ethnocognitive survey (cf. Frake 1962) would be required to discover its structure.

The evidence for grouping certain points of view as moral ones has to do with whether or not the character of a person is involved in the evaluatum. If someone's character is involved, the evaluation is being done from a moral point of view. It is not necessary that the evaluatum is the person's character per se. It may be particular actions or attitudes. But whatever the evaluatum, if done from a moral point of view, a positive evaluation reflects well on the person involved, and a negative evaluation reflects badly. For example, if a person misrepresents his goods in bartering, that would be evaluated as narakKat, 'bad'. This would be a moral type of evaluation, because it would necessarily follow that the character of the person could also be evaluated as narakKat. However, if a person's ability in folk dancing is narakKat, it does not necessarily follow that the character of the person may be so evaluated. The person may be evaluated as unqKug, 'ignorant', but this is not a moral evaluation; it does not reflect on the person's moral character. It follows that no physical object can be evaluated from a moral point of view.

Figure 2 lists all of the points of view that have been identified, and the evaluative lexical pairs appropriate to each one.

Point of view	Positive extreme	Negative extreme
<b>MORAL:</b>		
ethical	nalawad, 'good'	narakkat, 'bad'
social	nannakam, 'kind'	natansit, 'cruel/antisocial'
<b>PHYSICAL:</b>		
artistic	Ka'anggam, 'lovely'	Kangngayangngag, 'repulsive'
economic	nangina, 'valuable'	nalaka, 'cheap'
attributional	nadammat, 'heavy'	nalampaw, 'light' (etc.)
<b>BEHAVIORAL:</b>		
intellectual	nala'ing, 'clever'	ungkug, 'ignorant'
linguistic	natunung, 'fluent/correct'	saliwad, 'awkward'
emotional	nasiyanak, 'peaceful'	nakungkul, 'confused/riled'
behavioral	annung/pangngat, 'proper/fitting/appropriate'	balyat, 'improper/awful'

Fig. 2. Ga'dang points of view and evaluative lexical pairs

Examples of Ga'dang evaluative lexical pairs: The most generic example is nalawad, 'good', and narakkat, 'bad'. This pair is so generic that it can be used for either moral evaluations or any other. Each specific point of view (except for the ethical) has its own more specific lexical pair, but nalawad and narakkat may always substitute for the more specific terminology in an evaluation.

Included in the moral class are the ethical and the social points of view. The ETHICAL point of view has only the generic lexical pair, nalawad, narakkat, 'good, bad', to encode the opposite poles of its evaluative continuum. The SOCIAL point of view has the lexical pair nannakam, natansit. The former means kind, courteous, and possessing desirable or admirable character traits. The latter means cruel, mean, hostile, or antisocial.

Adjectives such as na'allak, 'compassionate', na'ituk, 'selfish', and nalliwat, 'sinful' would belong with these moral continua, but an ethnocognitive survey would be needed to find out where these and others rank on the emic Ga'dang scale of good and evil.

The group of physical points of view, including the artistic, economic, and attributional, are points of view assumed when evaluating things, i.e. physical objects.

The ARTISTIC point of view has the lexical pair Ka'anggam, Kanngayangngag to express the evaluative extremes. The first of this pair means likeable or lovely, and the second means repulsive (literally, 'that which causes shuddering'). This pair relates to physical appearance. Either can be used to evaluate, e.g., the appearance of

clothing or of a young lady. In evaluation, Kanngayangngag is being used metaphorically. The literal sense (most typical collocation) of the term is to describe the feeling or shuddering which results from eating too much pork fat.

The lexical pair of nanqina, nalaka expresses the evaluative extremes of the ECONOMIC point of view. The first means valuable or expensive, the second means cheap. In this particular point of view, there are no other evaluative terms to express degrees of value or cheapness. However the two terms themselves may be mitigated, as in medyo nanqina, 'somewhat valuable'. Another unique aspect of this point of view is that each term may be a positive or a negative value, depending on whether the one who is evaluating is the owner or a prospective buyer. For an owner to evaluate an object as nanqina is to express value or esteem for the object, but for a buyer to describe the object in that way is a negative evaluation, namely that the object is overvalued.

The ATTRIBUTIONAL point of view includes several pairs of evaluative lexemes, all of which focus on the evaluation of some particular physical attribute of the evaluatum. Natuyag, nakafuy, 'strong, weak', or nadammat, nalampaw, 'heavy, light' or nabangog, nabansit, 'fragrant, stinking' are examples of such pairs. Of course, there are different emotive connotations or attitudes as part of the different value systems shared by members of the speech community. A person may be very emotionally detached or ambivalent in evaluating something as heavy or light, especially if one does not have to carry it. It is difficult for

one to be equally emotionally detached, however, in evaluating an object that is present to the senses as either fragrant or stinking.

The group of behavioral points of view includes all of those in which the evaluata necessarily involve some activity, whether cognitive, emotional, or more physical action. These points of view are the intellectual, linguistic, emotional, and behavioral (for lack of a distinct term).

The lexical pair of nala'ing, unqkuq, 'clever, ignorant', expresses the extremes of the INTELLECTUAL point of view. The word abul, used metaphorically, may substitute for unqkuq. The literal meaning of abul is 'deaf mute', but its metaphorical meaning is 'ignoramus'.

This point of view is called 'intellectual' for lack of a more generic term which would describe not just mental alacrity, but any kind of skill, e.g. cognitive, physical, or artistic. Because of the generic or inclusive nature of this point of view, I expect that it would occupy a higher node in a representation of the emic Ga'dang taxonomy of values or points of view than would others of the action-oriented (behavioral) points of view.

The evaluative extremes of the LINGUISTIC point of view are expressed as natunung, saliwad. The first means fluent, eloquent, or correct, and the second means awkward, contorted, or ungrammatical. These terms can be used only to evaluate linguistic acts, i.e. utterances.

There are so many evaluative terms and expressions relating to the EMOTIONAL point of view that it is difficult to be certain which ones express the extremes. However, the terms nasiyanak, 'peaceful', and

nakungkul, 'confused, riled' are at least close to the extremes of most and least desirable states of mind.

A fascinating feature of the emotional point of view is the proliferation of metaphorical expressions referring to the range of possible feelings or states of mind. Most of the metaphors are noun phrases with nakam, 'mind', as the head noun, and with modifiers that literally modify physical objects. Nadammat a nakam, 'heavy mind', means anxious. Malo nakam, 'hurt mind', means grieved or sorrowful. Nalampaw a nakam, 'light mind', means joyful or carefree. Some of the other metaphors concerning the mind, though these may relate more to character traits than to temporary states of mind, are nataggat a nakam, 'hard mind', which means obstinate or mean, and natattaddan si nakam, 'tamped-down mind', which means gracious or full of good character.

The BEHAVIORAL point of view is unique in several ways. For one thing, the evaluatum must be a physically observable action or segment of behavior. For another, there are very strong connotations of cultural expectations or rules of behavior when evaluation is done from this point of view. And if there is a point of view that is a 'hybrid' of moral and behavioral evaluation, this would be it. That is, a negative evaluation in this point of view would not necessarily imply that the person whose behavior is being evaluated is a bad person. However, if that person continually, wilfully performed actions that were assigned disvalue from this point of view, he probably would be evaluated as narakkat a tolay, 'a bad person'.



The lexical pair which expresses the extremes of the behavioral point of view is annung, 'fitting, proper', versus balyat, 'inappropriate, improper'. In this continuum, the positive pole may be expressed either by annung or by its synonym panngqat.

It is possible that a point of view may have more than one pair of terms to signal the extremes of value or disvalue, i.e. synonyms to express both poles of the evaluative continuum. It is also possible that one pole of the value continuum of a given point of view may have just one lexical realization, while the other has two or more, e.g. nala'ing versus abul/ungkuq, or balyat versus panngqat/annung.

### 2.3.2 Evaluation and prescription

A few examples will be presented in this section to illustrate the function of evaluation and prescription in Ga'dang. The examples cited will be from the text included in the appendix, and the number cited will be the sentence number as it appears in the appendix. This section will be deliberately brief, since the normative notional structure of the Ga'dang text, and the surface realizations, are the topics of chapters 7-9.

Evaluation in Ga'dang is performed within or according to the point of view which is relevant to the evaluatum. In sentence 53 of the appendix, there is an evaluation (of the speaker's past state of mind) according to the emotional point of view:

Odde nadammat-in angkwa-k sinoy...  
but heavy-cmp thing-my then...

'But my mind was heavy then...' i.e. I felt sad.

An evaluation from the ethical point of view was made in s.171:

On, kamali ta lud.  
yes erred we-2 really

'Yes, we both really erred (i.e. morally or ethically).'

An example of an evaluation according to the ethical point of view is found in s.354:

Kunna mat yan ino tuldu a nalawad allaye.  
like really that the teaching pl good man

'That is really good (i.e. ethically sound) teaching, man.'

Prescription is performed within the context of the point of view of an observed circumstance or a projected circumstance (this is the initial constituent of the notional 'schema of prescription', which will be discussed in ch. 3 and ch. 8). Justification of the prescription will appeal to standards and rules which are included in the point of view which is relevant to that circumstance.

An example of a prescription is found in s.312:

E kakkapan tam mallakad si na'inggud.  
and try we-inc walk in straight

'And let's try to do what is right.'

The projected circumstance in this case was found in the previous sentence, a hypothetical circumstance in which the participants were arguing and slandering. Although this was stated as a conditional or hypothetical circumstance, it was in fact a good description of the state of affairs which led to this discussion.

Another prescription is found in s.320:

nu palungo amma sikwam, ma'awag si dayawan nu...  
if first more to-you needed obj honor you...

'If he's older than you, it's necessary that you respect him'

In this example, the projected circumstance is stated in the conditional clause within the same sentence.

### 2.3.3 Justification in Ga'dang

The justification of the two prescriptions cited above is found in their immediate context. In the case of the prescription of s.312, 'let's try to do what is right', the justification follows in s.313, to the effect that we will be accountable to God for our actions.

In the case of s.320, the justification follows in the same sentence. The full schema of prescription is:

nu palungo amma sikwam, ma'awag si dayawan nu,  
if first more to-you needed obj honor you

gafuse palungo amma sikwam.  
because first more to-you

'If he is older than you, it's necessary that you respect him, because he is older than you.

Notice that the justification is the same as the projected circumstance. The only difference is nu, 'if', versus qafuse, 'because'. This is begging the question, but is not problematic because for the Ga'dang people, the rule is implied by the fact (at least in the case of such a thoroughly internalized social value as the age theme). As long as evaluation is being done according to the social point of view (which entails moral obligation), the very mention of the age-differential concept justifies the prescription. In fact, the prescription is the expression of the rule which is conventionally associated with the age-differential concept.

The justification in Ga'dang normative discourse consists of a statement of the warrant or reason for evaluating something or prescribing an action. However, it is often true that the evaluation or prescription does not logically follow (in the strict sense of logical implication) from the statement of justification. Thus the 'inform reason' appearance of the justification statement may really be the invoking of a theme or norm (cf. ch.3). The evaluation does not logically follow, but it conventionally follows, i.e. it follows because the conventions or expectations of the cultural community are that it should.

The logic of Ga'dang normative discourse is not syllogistic and not even very sound by strict standards of analytic logic. Sayers (1981) makes a similar observation concerning Wik-Munkan discourse. Huttar (1977:30) notes that "apparent differences in reasoning styles do hinder

cross-cultural communication". It is not the case that the prescriptive science of logic which we have inherited from the Greeks is descriptive of universal reasoning styles. This is not to say that the Ga'dang people are not capable of sound logic, but that analytic types of reasoning are not the norm; rather, they employ a dialogical or conventional logic.

Goody and Watt (1968) claim that emphasis on analytical, logical thought processes is a consequence of literacy (cf. ch.3). A close examination of Ga'dang normative discourse will reveal a great number of 'logical fallacies', according to western norms of sound logic. There are 'fallacies' of diversion, begging the question, unwarranted assumptions, and irrelevant appeals to pity, tradition, questionable authority, or public opinion (Damer 1980). But if the arguments offered as justification of evaluations and prescriptions are acceptable to the participants in the discourse, they are valid justifications (Brooks and Warren 1970:171). If the reasoning is accepted, the point can be said to be proved (McCrimmon 1976:209).

Taylor's schema of the logic of normative discourse does allow for appeal to standards and rules that are cultural conventions. But in his view, this does not constitute a complete justification of an evaluation or prescription. The further steps of validation, vindication, and rational choice are required. But not so for the Ga'dang community (at least in that major part of it which is still preliterate), for in their normative taxonomy, there is no (western) scientific point of view. And it is the western scientific point of view which assigns maximum value to

syillogistic logic and rationality. Goody and Watt (1968:53) see this as one of the consequences of literacy. Analytic or syllogistic thinking was not invented by the Greeks. But what they did invent was the point of view which made these to be the prescribed modes of thought.

Taylor defers to the norms of his society by continuing with further steps of justification in normative discourse until he reaches one (namely rational choice) that is compatible with this western value system. What really happens in western culture if justification becomes elaborate (as in Taylor's schema), is that we just continue to verify our judgments or prescriptions by appeal to higher and higher ranks of rules or norms, until the highest rank is reached. That highest rank, at least according to the conventions of some segments of western population, is rational (analytical, logical) or empirical verification. This is a requirement for many before a point can be said to be proved.

### 3. PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION

There have been many studies of persuasion in psychology and related disciplines, and almost as many definitions have emerged. But all of them have much in common. "The inescapable fundamental thesis of persuasion is that it is a process of influencing the behavior of the persons who are being addressed" (Oliver 1968:94).

Kelly (1982:64-5) discusses the area of persuasive (receptor/response-oriented) communication, which he asserts is concerned with effect, i.e. "the achievement of the desired response resulting in positive change." Kelly quotes several authors on this topic, one of whom is Bettinghaus (1973:10), who defines persuasive communication as "...a conscious attempt by one individual to change the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message."

All the above definitions imply a cognitive and/or behavioral change. This is an acceptable definition of persuasion with one proviso, namely that change be understood as not necessarily requiring the abandoning of a previously held opinion, attitude, or belief. In most cases, persuasion probably does require the abandoning of one opinion or behavior pattern and the adoption of another, since the two are not compatible. However, a study of normative discourse reveals that this is not a necessary component of persuasion. Persuasion may be employed concerning a subject that the addressee already believes. In this case,

the addressee may be required to change only by rearranging his cognitive taxonomy, i.e. assigning a higher degree of importance to a particular belief. The result of this taxonomic rearrangement would be that, when faced with behavior options, the individual's choice would be more likely to be governed by the 'elevated' belief than by other beliefs which would formerly have taken precedence.

Thompson (1975:2) offers a definition of persuasion that has no implication of a cognitive or behavioral 'about-face': "Persuasion as a minimum requires two persons with either the one intending to influence the second or each of the two attempting to affect the attitudes, beliefs, or actions of the other." Thompson uses the words 'influence' and 'affect' rather than 'change', thus avoiding any implication that a substitution or replacement is required. This is an important distinction, as will be made clear in the following discussion of Knowledge structures and normative frames.

### 3.1 Cognitive psychology and Knowledge structures

The notion of a system of knowledge organization called a 'schema' was developed within the discipline of cognitive psychology. Neisser (1976:55-6) defined a schema in this way:

A schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle which is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and somehow specific to what is being perceived. The schema accepts information as it becomes available at sensory surfaces and is changed by that information; it directs movements and exploratory activities that make more information available, by which it is further modified. ...In one sense, when it is



viewed as an information-accepting system, a schema is like a format in a computer-programming language. Formats specify that information must be of a certain sort if it is to be interpreted coherently.

The terminology of this definition seems to attribute to the schema a 'consciousness of its own', but I do not believe it is to be literally interpreted in that way. In any case, the notion of schema laid the groundwork for the development of a theory of knowledge structures.

Those who were interested in programming computers to interpret or produce texts developed a new discipline which is called Artificial Intelligence (AI). These people took note of the concept of a psychological unit of knowledge-organization (e.g. schema), realizing that the computer needed an information-accepting system which would simulate that of humans. Thus the notions of 'frames' and 'scripts' were developed (Metzing ed. 1980), referring to kinds of knowledge structures. The theory of knowledge structures was considered so significant by Schank and Abelson (1977) that they suggested still another discipline to deal exclusively with these considerations. They called it 'cognitive science', which they described as a field at the intersection of psychology, artificial intelligence, and linguistics. In artificial intelligence and in cognitive science, the psychological units of knowledge organization are referred to as frames or scripts.

The concept of 'frame' is explicated in the work of van Dijk (1977:159):

The notion of FRAME (is) a theoretical primitive, cited as one explanatory component of linear and global coherence. The concept, which has been coined in recent work in artificial

intelligence, belongs to cognitive theory. It denotes a conceptual structure in semantic memory and represents a part of our knowledge of the world. In this respect a frame is an ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE, relating a number of concepts which by CONVENTION and EXPERIENCE somehow form a 'unit' which may be actualized in various cognitive tasks, such as language production and comprehension, perception, action and problem solving.

Knowledge structures constitute a corpus of expectations that are activated in particular contexts. These expectations embody the function of the knowledge structure, namely to provide the information needed to interpret any input, and to know what, if anything, should be done in response. Knowledge structures include "the strong expectations which make reality understandable" (Schank and Abelson 1977:10). Lehnert (1980:83) defines this process as "expectation-driven understanding, ...a process of generating expectations and recognizing when an expectation has been substantiated or violated."

If there is a distinction to be observed in the literature between frames and scripts, it is that 'frame' is a generic designation for knowledge structures, whereas 'script' refers to knowledge structures related to stereotypical segments of human behavior, i.e. sequences of events or actions, verbal or non-verbal. Frames provide us with information about how to interpret stimuli, whether or not we perform any action as a result. Scripts provide us with information about what we should DO next in a given context (or what customarily occurs), whether the action be verbal or nonverbal.

### 3.2 Knowledge structures related to persuasion

People in society do not need to be persuaded of what has already become conventionalized. Frames and scripts are conventional knowledge structures, and are accepted by the members of a society. This is not to say that it is impossible to question the validity of the knowledge structures, but as a rule, people in society do not focus conscious attention on them. They are a priori assumptions which regulate the function of a society.

The function of knowledge structures is therefore very similar to that of norms (standards and rules). In fact, scripts are the cognitive organizational units by which we group our societal norms which relate to behavioral options. Scripts include the information we need to behave in the culturally acceptable way, i.e. to know what action is expected of us or what type of behavior is permissible or advisable in the given context.

Frames are conventionalized knowledge structures, each one including the knowledge of what value to place on the physical objects or actions which fall within its sphere of knowledge. Thus the evaluative points of view discussed in chapter two are culturally shared knowledge frames.

Persuasion relies on both kinds of knowledge structures. In any context in which one wants to persuade another, a script will provide the information of how to go about it. For example, if the Ga'dang informal litigation script is being activated or actuated, each community member involved will know how it is initiated, where to sit once the litigation

gets under way, who should speak first, who should speak next, who should not speak, how to get the floor, how to recognize when the purpose has been achieved, and when to leave, to mention just some of the known stereotypical sequence of actions of the litigation script (cf. 6.3).

The role of scripts in persuasion is to specify how the procedure is to be conducted. The person to be persuaded will recognize what is happening because of sharing the particular script with the communicator, and will know that acceptance or rejection, or a change of behavior, is being requested or expected. The role of frames, on the other hand, is to specify the types of propositions which may be cited (i.e. considered relevant) as reasons or warrants for particular evaluations or prescriptions.

Both frames and scripts are normative, because both have to do with societal expectations or conventions. Only frames, however, are inclusive of value systems or normative points of view.

Scripts do not provide us with all the information necessary to get the persuasive task done. Scripts are too general for that. There is also a corpus of cognitive units available to be selected from for the particular task at hand. Since the particular task is specific, the general script does not specify all the details. Thus in addition to scripts, Schank and Abelson (1977) posit the theoretical primitives of 'goal' and 'plan'.

The GOAL in normative discourse is to persuade someone of something. However, a prior goal or purpose may be inferred, if it is not made explicit in the discourse. This prior or higher goal would be something

like producing a certain type of behavior in the addressee, or contributing to social harmony. The process of persuasion must have its cognitive effect on the addressee, however, before the more tangible goals can be achieved. Thus we speak of persuasion as the goal of normative discourse.

The speaker may employ one of several known PLANS in pursuit of this goal, or any goal. "A plan is intended to be the repository for general information that will connect events that cannot be connected by use of an available script or by standard causal chain expansion. A plan is made up of general information about how actors achieve goals" (Schank and Abelson 1977:70).<sup>2</sup> When the goal is persuasion, one is likely to employ one of what Schank and Abelson call the "persuade package of planboxes" (ibid. p.83), which includes ASK, INVOKE THEME, INFORM REASON, BARGAIN OBJECT, BARGAIN FAVOR, and THREATEN. To this list, Walker (1983:22) adds the categories of INVOKE PRECEDENT and INVOKE EXPERIENCE. And I will add still another, namely INVOKE NORM. It is possible that there should be other plans included in this list, such as PREDICTING CONSEQUENCES (Rusher 1981:185). In any case, this should be regarded as an etic list, and the particular types of plans employed by any speech community need to be discovered or confirmed by analysis of normative texts. In the Ga'dang text included in the appendix, invoke theme and invoke norm are the plans employed in pursuit of the normative goal. Predicting consequences is also used, but the consequences predicted are so closely tied to norms or themes of high emotive content in the culture that this usage could be included in the norm or theme categories.

Sentences 208 and 209 of the appendix provide a clear example. The meaning of these sentences is "it will be shameful if we don't tidy up our way of life; it won't be just Busal or Sindat who will be made to look ridiculous, but all of us church members." The predicted consequence is being made to look ridiculous, but this is part of the 'shame' theme, which is the most powerful theme in the Ga'dang culture (cf. Noble 1975).

### 3.3 Persuasion as perpetuation of normative frames

It will now be made clear why a cognitive or behavioral about-face is not a necessary component or result of persuasion. But first, consider what happens when a radical change of opinion or behavior is required.

Belief is a closed or stable state of mind, and doubt is an open, unstable state of mind (Maranda and Maranda 1979:255). Human beings prefer the stable state of mind, and will always interpret or behave according to known frames and scripts, unless there is pressure not to. Persuasion which aims to effect change in the addressee must overcome the inertia of the stability of beliefs, i.e. it must first create doubt! It must force an interpretation that deviates from the current script/frame, and must force some modification if not rejection of that script/frame. The plans that are likely to be employed when a substantial cognitive or behavioral change is required are: ask, inform reason, bargain object, bargain favor, and threaten.

The typical use of persuasion in normative discourse, at least in the Ga'dang community, does not involve the rejection of the conventional

scripts or frames, but rather their perpetuation. This type of persuasion involves convincing someone that his or her behavior does not measure up to the conventional norms of the society, and that it ought to be modified to conform. The fact that the individual already knows the conventional beliefs or norms is attested to by the fact that in the normative discourse itself, the norms are cited as reasons or warrants for accepting evaluations or obeying prescriptions, and these are accepted as valid reasons. Their validity as facts is not questioned, nor is the appropriateness of applying them in the given context. In this type of normative behavior, beliefs stay constant, and behavior is urged to conform. Social pressure (i.e. weight of public opinion) is brought to bear on one who deviates from the behavioral scripts acceptable to the society.

### 3.4 Ethnopsychology and neuropsychology

Recent findings in neuropsychology, in particular the so-called 'split-brain theory' (i.e. research into hemispheric specialization in the brain), suggest some interesting possibilities for ethnopsychology and cognitive anthropology. These possibilities were outlined by Paredes and Hepburn (1976), and touched off a minor furor of discussion which was published in subsequent issues of *Current Anthropology*. This line of inquiry needs to be considered, to determine what, if anything, it can offer by way of explanation for the cultural differences in strategies of persuasion or the practice of normative discourse.

### 3.4.1 Neuropsychology and hemispheric specialization

It has only been three decades since the beginning of the pioneering work on split brains, i.e. those in which the two hemispheres have been surgically severed at the corpus callosum. The procedure, known as commissurotomy, was done (on only about two dozen patients) to relieve the symptoms of epilepsy, and it proved effective for that purpose. The earliest and perhaps the best known of those who have been involved in this research were Bogen, Gazzaniga, and Sperry. Sperry received the 1981 Nobel prize in medicine for his work, which has been described as "spawning a revolution in popular psychology and philosophy" (Naunton, Dallas Times Herald, March 26, 1983).

The treatment of epilepsy yielded an unanticipated result, namely the substantial amount of knowledge that has subsequently been gained about the differing functions (i.e. lateral specialization) of the two hemispheres of the brain. Once the productive area of inquiry was identified, many experimental procedures were devised to test the hemispheric functions in subjects who had not had brain surgery. Some of these were dichotic seeing or hearing (presenting visual or auditory stimuli only to the right or left side), thermistors (devices for measuring temperature increases in right and left hemispheres independently), and dye in the blood stream (which could be traced to determine if certain types of stimuli produced more activity in one or the other of the brain hemispheres). The research is far too voluminous to even survey here; Dingwall (1981) produced a bibliography of works on



language and the brain, which included 1,100 entries of works dealing with hemispheric specialization, most of them written in the 1970's. Surveying perhaps 100 of these works, I found only one dissenting voice, i.e. one who was skeptical of the fact of hemispheric specialization. The others all agreed to the principle, though the details of their findings differed and at times conflicted on minor points.

What I present here is a brief resumé of that for which a general consensus exists, i.e. certain broad categories of cognitive functions which are known to be centered predominantly in one hemisphere or the other.

Figure 3 lists the cognitive functions which have been identified as being predominantly performed on one or the other of the brain hemispheres. This list is a compilation from several such lists, from the work of Thompson (1975:70), Paredes and Hepburn (1976:125) Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish (1980:328), and McGee-Cooper (1982:6). These authors in turn were compiling the findings of many previous researchers. The far reaching influence of the brain hemisphere research is evident here; note that Thompson is a neuropsychologist, Paredes and Hepburn are cognitive anthropologists, Akmajian et al. are linguists, and McGee-Cooper is an educator.

Left hemisphere	Right hemisphere
symbolic or verbal logical or analytic sequential or linear rational and factual propositional language skills	visuospatial synthetic perceptual holistic or non-linear emotive and intuitive appositional or gestalt nonverbal ideation

Fig. 3. Cognitive functions related to brain hemispheres

There is some degree of synonymy between some of the terms in a single column. These are not intended to be discrete categories of cognitive function, but rather general areas. Nor is it intended that each hemisphere is capable only of the kinds of functions listed below it in figure 3, but rather that there is a strong tendency toward that type of localization, i.e. a hemispheric specialization.

While it is the right hemisphere that is viewed as uniquely specialized for holistic, synthetic processing, the left hemisphere must surely utilize such processing modes in extracting meaning from words, sentences, paragraphs, and the like. On the other hand, while it is the left hemisphere that is viewed as conceptual and logical, the right hemisphere has been shown to be capable of logical and conceptual operations (Gazzaniga 1978:48).

A vast amount of empirical research underlies the generalizations concerning hemispheric specialization which are presented above. The methods of dichotic listening and seeing, thermistors to measure brain hemisphere temperature differential, and dye in the blood stream to determine location of activity in the brain were mentioned earlier. Other

sources of empirical findings have been the patients with surgically split brains, and patients who have had brain damage on one side or the other. Nebes (1977:99) describes research which found that patients with right hemisphere brain damage were more likely to have difficulty perceiving spatial relationships and were prone to spatial disorientation, even becoming lost in familiar surroundings. They were baffled by mazes and maps, and unable to copy geometrical shapes. This research supported the visuospatial cognitive orientation of the right hemisphere.

Dr. Elliott Ross has demonstrated the involvement of the right hemisphere of the brain in emotive cognitive functions. He observed patients at Parkland hospital who had damage to the right hemisphere of the brain as a result of strokes, and were subsequently unable to communicate emotion via the prosodic features of speech, though vocabulary, grammar, and articulation remained normal (Ross and Mesulam 1979). The patients were also unable to communicate emotions through facial, limb, and body gesture (ibid. 148). It was not the case that the stroke victims did not have the emotional feelings; they did have them, and were frustrated at not being able to express them, but a part of the mechanism for the expression of the emotions had been damaged in the right hemisphere of the brain.

Krashen (1977:187) asserts that the left hemisphere has "been shown to process both linguistic and non-linguistic information in characteristic ways: It is analyzed, linearly arranged, temporally ordered (i.e. according to time of occurrence), and represented as

propositions". He adds that for most people, nearly all right-handers and many left-handers, the left hemisphere is dominant for language. He cites research that reported that there was more loss of speech from left hemisphere lesions than from right hemisphere, and that temporary loss of speech often resulted from anesthetizing the left hemisphere, but not the right. Describing the results of some dichotic listening experiments, Krashen reported that there was a reliable right-ear superiority in reaction time, accuracy, and recall when verbal stimuli were presented. This right-ear advantage is believed to be an evidence of greater left hemisphere involvement, since stimuli from the right ear and eye are transmitted to the left hemisphere of the brain. Krashen also cites the work of Zurif and Sait (1969) showing that grammatical structure of sentences is analyzed best by the left hemisphere, and the work of Gordon and Carmon (1976) with the following findings:

In their experiment, subjects identified symbols for which they had just learned verbal labels (digits), such as dots representing binary numbers. As the experiment progressed, subjects showed a shift from right-hemisphere processing (left visual field superiority) to left hemisphere processing (right visual field superiority). Gordon and Carmon suggest that the left hemisphere's advantage "for naming or codifying produced the reversal" (p.1097). As the subjects learned the names of the symbols they saw, the left hemisphere played a larger role in their identification.

The work of Ley and Bryden (1979:127-37) substantiates the findings concerning the localization of emotive cognitive functions in the right hemisphere of the brain. Drawings of faces expressing emotions were presented to twenty test subjects, and it was found that there was significant left visual field (therefore right brain hemisphere) superiority in the recognition of character and emotional expressions. Different experimental procedures were employed and these conclusions further substantiated in the work of DeKosky et al (1980) and that of McKeever and Dixon (1981).

Additional empirical research concerning hemispheric specialization will be presented in the following section.

### 3.4.2 Hemispheric specialization, culture and cognition

Paredes and Hepburn (1976:121) suggested that the research in hemispheric specialization might be "the Rosetta Stone by which such intriguing, yet troublesome, ethnographic curiosities as Trukese navigation and 'non-lineal codifications of reality' could be translated into general scientific terms." They call attention to the radical differences from culture to culture in cognition and problem solving, noting that "what is rational in one culture is not necessarily rational in another" (ibid. p.122). The essence of the Paredes and Hepburn article is that individuals may become habituated to right- or left-hemisphere-dominated cognitive strategies, and that it may become characteristic of the cultural community.

Whether or not it is true that different cultures (including class and occupational "cultures") differentially reinforce right- and left-hemisphere-dominated cognitive processes, it seems fairly obvious that the two kinds of processes are differentially evaluated in different societies. Perhaps the best example is the tendency of Westerners to regard only what appear to be manifestations of left-hemisphere functions as "real" intelligence (ibid. p.127).

An example of a culture that does not employ left-hemisphere-dominated cognitive processes to nearly the same degree that our Western culture does is the Wik-Munkan group of Australian aborigines. Sayers (1981) cites an example of a brief persuasive text given by a Wik-Munkan woman,

which has no explicit logical links. Sayers suggests that "the implicit information in this text needs to be supplied to make it a logical Western (Aristotelean) argument." As an explanation for the difference, Sayers claims that what is known by the Aboriginal comes from perception, not logical thinking.

The great danger in this consideration is in resurrecting the notion of the 'primitive mentality'. Fortunately, the value of right hemisphere oriented cognitive processes is just now beginning to get its due respect, as in the work of McGee-Cooper (1982), Ferguson (1976) and de Bono (1978). The right hemisphere is known to be more creative and artistic, although less logical, but there need be no pejorative implication in this.

Neither Sayers nor Paredes and Hepburn offer any explanation of why these differences in cognitive processes exist. Thus Chisholm (1976:319) responded to the work of Paredes and Hepburn in this way:

Their attempt to show how differences in hemispherical functioning may parallel cross-cultural (or individual) differences in cognitive styles may, however, be premature. My own feeling is that before this interesting question can be fruitfully explored, a number of problems must be squarely addressed. Among these problems is the paramount one of causality. Is there any a priori reason even to attempt to find similarities between the vague and nonquantifiable descriptions of supposed hemisphere-specific cognitive functions and the equally vague characterizations of cross-cultural differences in cognitive styles? Even if it were conclusively demonstrated that differences in hemispherical cognitive functioning exactly mirrored cross-cultural (or individual) differences in cognitive style, this would represent only a very mysterious and intriguing correlation --with the standard warning that no causal relationship should be inferred. Paredes and Hepburn seem to be more concerned to show that this correlation exists than to explain why it should, although the opposite strategy might prove more enlightening.

Chisholm's point is well taken. If the differences in hemispheric specialization exactly mirrored cross-cultural cognitive styles, it would be mysterious. I suggest that there is no exact mirroring, and that the causal explanation of the cross-cultural differences is this: the inclination to employ right-hemisphere cognitive functions is characteristic of orality, and the inclination toward predominantly left-hemisphere cognitive functions is a characteristic of textuality, i.e. a consequence of literacy (Goody and Watt 1968). Furthermore, the inclination to the right-hemisphere functions is somehow prior and more natural. It is a characteristic of children in literate societies, up to the time they become literate (McGee-Cooper 1982:28).

Empirical research is cited in *Brain/Mind Bulletin* (April 19, 1979), showing that of 52 children tested, the poorer readers and dyslexics showed an inclination to process visual information with a holistic and context-bound coding strategy, whereas good readers processed it analytically. It was found that even for poor readers, the left hemisphere was dominant in reading, but less so than for the good readers. In other words, the poor readers had a greater inclination to process visual stimuli in the right hemisphere of the brain, which, being less analytical and sequential, is less suited to the task.

More convincing evidence concerning the dominance of the left hemisphere in literateness is presented in two articles by Silverberg et al (1979, 1980). In the experiments of these authors, tests were administered to many students who were just making the transition to literateness. The text subjects were Israeli students, 24 in second grade

(age 7) and 24 in third grade (age 8). It was found that 23 out of 24 second graders responded faster to target words presented in their left visual field, in contrast to 20 out of 24 third graders who responded faster to the same stimuli in their right visual field (Silverberg et al 1980:102). The differences recorded in the response time was described as "highly significant". The left hemisphere of the brain appears to be clearly better suited for literate tasks, and literacy readily becomes a predominantly left hemisphere function. The authors report:

The switch in dominance was due to a dramatic reduction in response time (150 msec) to stimuli appearing in the right field contrasting to virtually no change in response time to stimuli in the left. Therefore, it is apparently not correct to describe the shift as a manifestation of some functional loss in the right hemisphere gained by the left, but rather a vast improvement in left hemisphere processing skills while those of the right hemisphere remained constant (ibid. 103).

### 3.4.3 Orality, literacy, cognitive orientation and persuasion

The Greek civilization is "the prime historical example of the transition to a really literate society. In all subsequent cases where the widespread introduction of an alphabetic script occurred, as in Rome for example, other cultural features were inevitably imported from the loan country along with the writing system; Greece thus offers not only the first instance of this change, but also the essential one for any attempt to isolate the cultural consequences of alphabetic literacy" (Goody and Watt 1968:42). The primary consequence is posited to be the change from mythical to logico-empirical modes of thought (ibid. p.43).



The authors are careful to point out that there is no absolute dichotomy relating mythical thought to a primitive mentality which is not capable of logical thought. Rather, they suggest that "writing establishes a different kind of relationship between the word and its referent, a relationship that is more general and more abstract, and less closely connected with the particularities of person, place and time, than obtains in oral communication. ...it was only in the days of the first widespread alphabetic culture that the idea of 'logic' --of an immutable and impersonal mode of discourse-- appears to have arisen" (ibid. p.44).

Plato and Aristotle are the founders of the prescriptive science of logic. They not only conceived of the possibility of a system of rules for thought, but they specified what these rules were (cf. The Rhetoric of Aristotle). "This logical procedure seems essentially literate" (ibid p.53), because writing liberates the mind from the immediacy of the present context and the limitations of memory. Long and complex logical argumentation is difficult to create and deliver orally, and even more difficult to assimilate or comprehend in oral communication.

The work of Goody and Watt establishes a link between literacy and logical modes of thought. The work of Tannen, on the other hand, asserts a relationship between orality and emotive cognitive processes. Tannen (1982:18) refers to writing as autonomous language, and oral communication as non-autonomous language. She contrasts the two in this way:

Autonomous language ...focuses on the content of communication, conventionally de-emphasizing the interpersonal involvement between communicator and audience. Ideally, the

audience is expected to suspend emotional responses, processing the discourse analytically and objectively. When relationships between propositions are explicit, the reader or hearer supplies minimal connective tissue from background knowledge and shared context. By contrast, non-autonomous language purposely builds on interpersonal involvement and triggers emotional subjective responses, demanding maximum contribution from the audience in supplying socio-cultural and contextual knowledge.

What these authors have written suggests a correlation between orality and right-hemisphere cognitive functions on the one hand, literacy and left-hemisphere functions on the other. The well-documented work of Ong (1982:36-56) lists several more contrasts between oral and literate societies, and the similarity of this list to the one presented in figure 3 (hemispheric specialization) is very revealing. Fig. 4 presents these contrasts.

literacy	orality
logical	emotive
subordinative	additive
analytic	aggregative
concise	redundant or copious
objectively distanced	empathetic or participatory
abstract	situational

Fig. 4. Characteristics of literate and oral traditions

The conclusion which may be drawn is that literacy versus orality is the causal explanation for the correlation between certain

cross-cultural differences in cognitive processing and the hemispheric specialization of the brain. Literacy promotes logical, analytic, objective, abstract thought, whereas orality promotes emotive, situational, holistic, subjective thought.

We can finally bring together the concepts from cognitive science, neuropsychology, and the orality/literacy contrast, and the product is an explanation of the crucial difference between Western and Ga'dang normative discourse (and, tentatively, between normative discourse which is characteristic of all literate societies versus all oral ones).

The conventional persuasive plan in 'Western-society' normative discourse is INFORM REASON, and the conventional plan in Ga'dang normative discourse is INVOKE THEME/NORM.

The essence of the inform reason plan is the logical relationship which exists between the evaluation or prescription and the reason which is offered as justification. This is compatible with left-hemisphere cognitive functions and with the characteristics of a literate tradition. The essence of the invoke theme or invoke norm plan is emotive and holistic, not necessarily related to the evaluation or prescription in a strict logical way, but rather related to the whole fabric of society (e.g. 'if you accept this evaluation/prescription, we will have group harmony'). This is compatible with right-hemisphere functions and oral traditions.

Neither society precludes the use of the atypical plan, but each is inclined to use the conventional plan. Much of normative discourse in Western society comes 'clothed in the surface structure' of expository

discourse, in which inform reason is the standard interpropositional relationship. But it is not unusual to encounter invoke theme/norm in the context of oral communication in Western society. Even in this context, however, inform reason is more likely to occur than it is in Ga'dang normative discourse, because of the permeation of the literate tradition in the west. The consequences of literacy, including a near reverence for rationality and logic, is our intellectual legacy from the Greeks, and is a firmly entrenched normative value (Samovar 1981:42) in Western society.

#### 4. SOCIOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY OF NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR AND PERSUASION

In the consideration of normative discourse and persuasion, the relevant contributions from one discipline overlap with those from another. We have already discussed some factors which are equally relevant to sociology and ethnology, such as cross-cultural differences in cognitive processes. But there are other factors which deserve attention also.

Normative discourse is likely to occur when a negative evaluation is assigned to the behavior of another person, or when there are evaluations in conflict. Depending on the social relationships between the people involved, the resulting discourse may be a rebuke or exhortation (monologue) or a dispute of some kind (dialogue). In this chapter we focus on dispute. The monologue normative discourse is discussed in chapter six.

##### 4.1 Conciliatory dispute settlement

Black and Mileski (1973:11) relate two kinds of dispute settlement, namely therapeutic and coercive.

Therapeutic dispute settlement is a conciliatory process in which an effort is made to restore relationships torn by conflict. Dispositions of this kind are especially common in tribal societies, where most social ties are intimate and permanent. On the other hand, coercive dispute settlement is adversarial, pitting one party against the other, declaring a winner and a loser, and thus is likely to harden the conflict

and destroy any future relationship between the parties. Such adversarial dispositions are most frequent where disputants are strangers to each other in an impersonal context; this type of disposition is characteristic of modern courts of law.

In the Ga'dang context, especially within a single village, there is no such thing as an impersonal context. And, true to Black and Mileski's generalization, dispute settlement among the Ga'dang is typically of the therapeutic (i.e. conciliatory) type, aimed at restoring relationships.

In a more recent work, Black (1976:5) presented a taxonomy of four styles of social control, in which therapeutic and conciliatory were distinguished, though both are subsumed under 'remedial' styles of social control. The remedial styles are contrasted with the accusatory, which include penal and compensatory styles. The following chart is reproduced from Black's work.

	Penal	Compensatory	Therapeutic	Conciliatory
Standard:	prohibition	obligation	normality	harmony
Problem:	guilt	debt	need	conflict
Initiation of case:	group	victim	deviant	disputants
Identity of deviant:	offender	debtor	victim	disputant
Solution:	punishment	payment	help	resolution

Fig. 5. Black's taxonomy of styles of social control

In this taxonomy, the Ga'dang informal litigation would clearly fall in the category of the conciliatory style of social control. Black says of this style that "the ideal is social harmony. In the pure case, the parties to a dispute initiate a meeting and seek to restore their relationship to its former condition. They may include a mediator or other third party in their discussion, together working out a compromise or other mutually acceptable resolution."

#### 4.2 Consensus as the goal of Ga'dang normative discourse

Black and Mileski view law as a system of behavior and means of social control, and note that legal systems ideally are founded on a principle of "social eudaemonism, the ethic of group happiness" (1973:2). However, as noted above, this type of conciliatory social control is typical of tribal societies where interpersonal relationships are close, and the perpetuation of these relationships may be vital to group survival. The group need not be a small one to hold this value, however. Christopher (1983:55) observes that "in their heart of hearts, the Japanese people as a whole have only one absolutely immutable goal, which is to insure the survival and maximum well-being of the tribe. ...Probably the single most important thing to know about the Japanese is that they instinctively operate on the principle of group consensus." Christopher draws a sharp contrast between this group affirmation and the values of our Western society, where individuality is valued highly. It is also true that the Japanese prefer mediation and conciliatory dispute

settlement, whereas the confrontational or adversarial is typical in the West.

Martin and Colburn (1972:171-2) offer the following list of criteria for determining the degree of pressure to conform or to seek consensus: size, the smaller the group, the stronger the pressure to conform; frequency of contact, the more the members of a group interact, the stronger the pressure to conform; time, the longer the period during which members of a group have known each other and worked together, the stronger the pressure to conform; participation in decisions, the more individuals participate in making decisions, the more likely they are to accept these decisions; group centeredness, group-centered groups (more egalitarian) compared with leader centered groups exert stronger pressures to conform; cohesiveness (sense of solidarity, feeling of 'we-ness'), the higher cohesiveness of the group, the stronger the pressure to conform; clarity of group norm, the less ambiguous the appropriate group norm, the greater the pressure to conform.

According to all of these criteria, the Ga'dang people have close to the greatest possible degree of pressure on them to conform. Thus the function of normative discourse in Ga'dang is to achieve or restore consensus. In fact, one of the strategies in the pursuit of this goal is to enhance the clarity of group norms by reiterating and reconfirming them. Note that the logical relationship of the norm to the issue at hand need not be particularly clear, as long as the norm itself is clear.

There will be more discussion of sociological and ethnographic



factors in Ga'dang normative discourse and persuasion, but this will be included in subsequent chapters, especially chapter 6.

## 5. NORMATIVE DISCOURSE

The following chapters are an exercise in discourse analysis, or textlinguistics as it has recently come to be known (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981, ch.2).

The text analysis presented in these chapters focusses primarily on a single text, that which is included in the Appendix. References to sections of the appendix will often be made by citing the appropriate sentence numbers (e.g. s.2-10). However, reference will occasionally be made to other texts which are considered similar in several respects. Relevant sections from other Ga'dang texts will be included in the text of these chapters, since they are not included in the appendix.

### 5.1 Classification of texts

The notion of similarity between the texts cited implies a classification of text types. Such a classifying is the logical and appropriate starting point for discourse analysis. True, it involves analysis inherently, so it is not strictly speaking the starting point, but it should be the first-priority analytical procedure. Longacre's analogy (1983:1-2) points out the importance of classification of texts if we are to optimize the fruitfulness of our analysis:

We can, if we wish, compare California oranges with Florida oranges, but it is less useful to compare California oranges with Washington apples. We may compare sentences from

narrative discourse in language A with sentences from narrative discourse in language B, but it is misleading to compare sentences from narrative discourse in language A with sentences from expository discourse in language B.

Longacre's concern here in comparing certain types of texts from two or more languages is to make generalizations (i.e. suggest universal features) of certain types of texts, which will be of use in further linguistic investigation. It should be noted that it is equally important within the domain of the analysis of an individual language to classify text types. It may even be more important, since any generalizations concerning higher order rules, i.e. rules which function on the discourse level and may override the rules of morphology or clause level grammar (Walrod 1979:44), are likely to be incorrect or too general to be useful if not identified within a particular discourse type. Furthermore, one of the aims of text linguistics is to determine and describe the grammar of a given discourse type, in contrast to the grammar of other discourse types.

#### 5.1.1 A taxonomy of text types

Thus it is necessary to classify or categorize texts. There is no single heuristic for this classification. At first it may rely somewhat on guesswork and intuition, which can be fairly accurate if close attention is paid to the situational context in which the text was uttered. This presupposes some knowledge of the kinds of things speakers

do with language, or of the types of discourses that have been observed in human languages.

Once texts have been intuitively and tentatively classified, comparisons may be made to determine the surface structure features which are characteristic of each. This in turn may lead to some reclassifying of texts. Longacre (1983:3-6) posits four broad notional types of discourse - narrative, procedural, behavioral, and expository - each of which may have several subtypes.

Few surface structure texts are purely one or the other of these discourse types, because of the occurrence of embedding or skewing. Skewing occurs when a speaker encodes his notional discourse type in an alternative surface type, e.g. exhorting or prescribing with a narrative. The social relationship between speaker and hearer is perhaps the most obvious reason for skewing of this type.

The four broad types of discourse prove useful in classifying texts in Ga'dang, though of course there are some texts which are problematic or borderline as to their classification. Three of the types in Ga'dang have already been described (Walrod 1979), though certainly not exhaustively. The fourth, behavioral discourse, was omitted from that work because of lack of data. It was a productive omission, since it necessitated further data collection, broader research in theory (cf. ch.1-4), more text analysis, and this presentation of the results.

Longacre distinguishes behavioral discourse from the other types by characterizing it as "minus in regard to contingent succession but plus in regard to agent orientation" (1983:3). It shares the feature of plus

agent orientation with narrative discourse, and it shares the feature of minus contingent succession with expository discourse. Exhortation, eulogy, and political speeches are cited as examples of behavioral discourse.

### 5.1.2 The normative discourse type

The label "behavioral" is quite appropriate to the kinds of texts I have been working with, but I am using the term "normative" in its place. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the term "normative" has a tradition of use in other disciplines such as axiology and logic (Taylor 1961), ethics (Frankena 1963:9-15), sociology and law (Donald Black 1976:ch.6), and political philosophy (Ryan 1980). Similar uses are found in psychology, cognitive anthropology, and communication theory. The second reason for choosing the term is that its traditional uses, while not identical from one discipline to another, tend to be very generic, potentially including all the kinds of texts which we would call behavioral, and perhaps more. Normative discourse, then, is any discourse of an evaluative, prescriptive, hortatory, imperative, or eristic (i.e. disputatious) type.

Normative discourse fills approximately the same notional space as behavioral discourse in Longacre's schema. It might be argued that a simple evaluative text such as the following is purely expository:

Running is good. It helps the body. It helps the soul.

However, if we examine the speaker's intention or the implicit performative, we would find that the thrust of the communication is "I am recommending to you that you should run." This underlying structure does have agent orientation, even though the surface structure does not. I am assuming that any evaluative utterance, though it may appear to be pure exposition, has a purpose of affecting, influencing, altering or modifying in some way the knowledge, beliefs or (more frequently) the behavior of another. Thus it is not distinct at the notional level from the other subtypes of normative discourse, which clearly have such a purpose. Again, a speaker's choice of encoding a recommendation to do physical exercise as an imperative, or an evaluation, or as a narrative about someone who benefitted from it may depend on the speaker's social rank or relationship to the audience.

### 5.1.3 Embedded normative discourse

Grimes (1976:55-6) has observed:

Some of the information in narratives is not part of the narratives themselves, but stands outside them and clarifies them. Events, participants, and settings are normally the primary components of narrative, while explanations and comments about what happens have a secondary role that may be reflected in the use of distinctive grammatical patterns, as in Munduruku. On the other hand, in nonsequential texts, explanatory information itself forms the backbone of the text, and narrative sequences may be used to illustrate it.

Grimes does not account for this phenomenon in terms of embedding or skewing between notional and surface structure text types, but it can be

described in this way. Longacre (1983:13) refers to this as the embedding of one discourse type within a different discourse type. Grimes points out correctly that a speaker's evaluations may be encoded by lexical choice within a narrative, e.g. in the choice of modifiers such as loyal versus traitorous (1976:62). In such cases, where the scope of the evaluation is probably just a noun or verb, it would be counterintuitive to posit the embedding of normative discourse within the narrative. However, when a narrator encodes an evaluation in the form of a sentence or paragraph, which can easily be bracketed off from the rest of the discourse (and may need to be in order to properly analyze the grammar of narrative in the language), then this should be viewed as embedded normative discourse. Supporting such an analysis is the fact that such evaluations are likely to have a broad scope, referring to a major section of the narrative, or to all that follows or precedes (especially if the evaluation is initial or final in the discourse). Furthermore, evaluative sentences or paragraphs can be seen to have distinctive grammatical patterns in the context in which they are embedded, but in fact conform closely to the grammatical patterns of the type of discourse to which they belong.

Jones (1983:ch.4) has observed some of these phenomena, and described them as author comments. Author comments necessarily involve "a temporary departure from the main train of thought in a text" (1983:77). Author comments are most frequently expository or normative ('behavioral' in Jones' work), because these discourse types are not arranged according to temporal succession, and neither are author comments as a rule. An

author "may suspend his argument temporarily to explain a certain part of the discourse" (ibid.). This would be an instance of an expository comment (explanation) embedded in a normative text (argument). It is also common to embed normative comments (particularly the evaluative type) in expository discourse, or any other type. Jones refers to this type of embedding as opinion comments (1983:79). All of Jones' examples of opinion comments are clearly evaluative, therefore normative. The sentence "canned tuna is expensive", toward the end of a Consumer Reports article comparing tuna, is assigning a somewhat negative value to the prices of tuna, since consumers would prefer that it not be expensive. It is not as bad an evaluation as "outrageous" or "exorbitant" would be, but it is on the negative side of center on the continuum of possible evaluations of prices.

Jones' typology of author comments also includes explanatory, incidental, and thematic comments. The following was cited as an example of an explanatory comment: "Bill Belden in the single was fortunate in that he foresaw the difficulty (evidently aware of the NAAO record of niqqardly supporting lightweights) and long before the trip arranged to use a shell that he was accustomed to, from the same women's team." The parenthetical clause is the author's comment according to Jones (1983:82), and he then makes his own explanatory comment about it:

Note the author-opinion overtones in this comment, which suggests the possibility of hybrid comments - comments which have more than one function.

His point is well taken. While the author's comment does serve to explain



the action of Bill Belden, it is clear too that the author is assigning disvalue to the behavior of the NAAO (niggardly), and the author is assuming that Belden acted as he did because he made the same evaluation. The assigning of value or disvalue to an evaluatum is a subjective thing. The accountant for the NAAO might have described the same behavior as 'astute'.

Incidental and thematic comments may also have a normative notional structure. In one of the incidental comments Jones cites (ibid. 84) we find the words "It is a sound scientific procedure...", and one suspects that the entire incidental comment was intended to serve as a vehicle for this evaluation. Thematic comments are a special case because of their importance in normative discourse, and will be examined below in the discussion of invoking themes as a strategy of persuasion.

It may not be the case that all author comments can be analyzed as the embedding of one discourse type in another, but many can be viewed in this way. Jones (87) points out that author comments are clearly marked in discourse. At least some of this distinctive marking can be explained in terms of embedding, which involves a sudden switch to the grammar of a different discourse type.

Illustrations of the embedding of one text type in another are found in many places in the text of the Appendix. The whole litigation unit is a normative discourse. However, the first speech of Andits (sentences 29-165) is predominantly narrative in structure, though thoroughly normative in content. The imperative of sentence 88 ("We should get rid of this kind of thing"), is a return to the normative discourse type

which characterizes the whole litigation. The notional normative discourse type is being directly realized in sentence 80, whereas in 69-79 there is a skewing between normative notional structure and narrative surface structure. The imperative of sentence 80 is followed immediately by the unmistakably normative paragraph, sentences 81-83.

An example of a second level of embedding, i.e. of normative discourse embedded within narrative, is found in the same section, sentences 75-6. This section is bracketed with a typical feature of the grammar of narrative discourse, namely the quotative formula at the beginning of 75 and at the end of 76, in simple past tense. But within those brackets is the reported speech of the speaker himself, and that speech is purely normative. There are three clauses, all of which are non-verbal: "It's his custom. He has no consideration because he is still a child." These clauses are clearly evaluative. They assign a negative value to the behavior which was narrated in 69-74, but mitigate the harsh evaluation by offering some excuse for the behavior on the basis of the youth of Buton (the agent of the narrated actions). The clause qaganqena, 'it's his custom', is frequently used to explain away and overlook the naughty behavior of a young child. The fact that it is used here referring to Buton is true mitigation, not a veiled insult (even though Buton is over 20), because it is Buton's age in comparison with Andits's (the speaker's) that is in focus. The pluralization of the word anak, 'child', in sentence 76, is apparently ungrammatical in any type of discourse, narrative or normative included, because it is in the second clause of the sentence, which is providing an argument in support of the

first clause, where the second person singular pronoun is the subject. Thus the second clause should read 'because he is still a child', and in fact that is the free translation I have given it. But Andits did use the plural form, and I interpret this as further mitigation of the harsh evaluation, namely by directing it at a class of people rather than an individual. A more literal translation will demonstrate the mitigation: 'He has no consideration, because they are still children' (and this is a characteristic of children in general).

#### 5.1.4 Reported speech in embedded normative discourse

There is a feature of the embedding in sentences 75-6 that warrants further explication. It has to do with reported speech, which often functions at the discourse level rather than sentence level, as Larson (1978) clearly demonstrated. When a normative comment is embedded in a narrative surface structure, which is indicated here by the quotative formulas, there is no truth requirement for the quotative formulas themselves. That is, the reported speech need not actually have been spoken out loud to anyone. It is often just the unarticulated conclusion or evaluation that the speaker had formerly come to, but it is given as a quote. It appears that in the Ga'dang oral society, a citation of what someone said (even if it was said by the same person who is citing it), functions to authenticate the utterance, just as a citation of a written work does in a literate society.

There is a clear example of this normative function of reported speech in sentence 16 of the appendix, in which Sanggoon prefaces a quoted sentence as a reported thought ('this is what I thought before'...) and finishes that same sentence with the reported speech formula ('I said'). There are other examples where speakers claim to have 'said' something, with no indication of who it was said to. In normal Ga'dang narrative discourse, the addressee of any reported speech is explicitly identified, or can readily be construed from context.

Thus in sentence 77, it is unclear whether Andits is claiming to have told Paregaru the words that are quoted in 75-6, or to have told Paregaru the whole anecdote of 72-74, or both. (It cannot include sentence 71, since Paregaru was a part of that discussion, and did not need to have it reported to him.) This distinctive function of reported speech (i.e. as a citation to authenticate) in normative discourse makes sentence 77 ambiguous. But the ambiguity is not problematic, since whether or not Andits said it to Paregaru or drew an unspoken conclusion would have no bearing on its use here as an evaluative comment embedded in narrative.

A shortage of verbs to describe states of mind might account for the use of the verb kun, 'to say', when the content of the quote was thought and not said. But there is no such shortage. There is the verb dandam, 'to think', used by Sanggoon in the example cited above (s.16). And there is the verb arig, 'mistakenly-think', which is used only when the opinion held proves to be erroneous. Andits used this word in s.120, and again in

124-5: 'I thought that we were to summarize all that we had studied. Not so.'

There are also numerous non-verbal expressions to describe states of mind or emotion. The word uray means will or volition. Using it in a prepositional phrase, 'in my will', means that I had it in mind to..., or I intended to... (cf. s.111). And the word nakam, which can be translated either as mind or heart, has a multitude of uses, most of which are metaphorical, to describe states of mind or emotion. Sentence 218 is one of very many examples of this usage: 'I really felt that (insulted) in my mind/heart'. Other common expressions are antu ino naqyan so nakam ku, 'that is what was in my mind', i.e. that's what I was thinking, and antu ino gakkad ino nakam ku, 'that was the purpose of my mind', i.e. that was my purpose.

Thus the use of the reported speech formula (with the verb kun, 'to say'), when the content of the reported speech is an evaluation which was not necessarily spoken to anyone prior to its being reported, is a feature of the grammar of normative discourse in Ga'dang. Its distribution in normative discourse will be discussed in a following section. This normative use of reported speech differs from that in narrative not only because no addressee is identifiable, but also because there is no specification of the time and place of the reported speech. Narrative discourse provides spatial and temporal settings and identifies participants, including the addressee of any reported speech.

## 5.2 Classification of dialogue

There will be more discussion about the theory of normative discourse and its application to the analysis of Ga'dang texts, but first it would be useful to determine where dialogue fits in to the classification of texts, and what effect it might have on our theory.

Surprisingly, what seems like a simple matter of definition turns out to be a substantial theoretical issue. Is dialogue a proper object of discourse analysis or textlinguistics? Or does it belong to the study of behavior? And does dialogue involve just two people, as the morphology of the word implies (in contrast to monologue), or does it include verbal interaction between any number of people? And if more than two participants are allowed (by definition) in dialogue, then what if people come and go during the course of a discussion? What would be the boundaries of the discourse or text in that case?

### 5.2.1 Two participant minimum in discourse

The answers to these questions should begin with an observation about monologue discourse that has perhaps been overlooked, namely that monologue discourse involves at least two people. Paul Ricoeur, in a lecture given at the University of Dallas (McDermott series, April 22, 1981), observed that books on a library shelf are potential texts. They become actual texts when somebody reads them. This is true for any kind of linguistic interaction, spoken or written, so it is a requirement by

definition for any datum which is to be identified as a discourse or text. There must always be a speaker-and-hearer, or writer-and-reader, or encoder-and-decoder. There may be more than one of each, but there must be at least one of each. It is theoretically possible that there is no other hearer/reader/decoder than the textlinguist himself (though this would be unusual), but there still must be one in order for the datum to qualify as a text. In other words, any text or discourse necessarily involves communication, which in turn logically implies an encoding of meaning and a construal of meaning (interpretation).

This is a fine distinction, and it might seem similar to the question of whether a tree falling in the forest makes noise if there is no one near enough to hear it. In fact, it is a similar question. The tree falling cannot be a datum for any analysis unless there is an observer, or some kind of instruments which record some aspects of the event and later provide an observer or analyst with the information. This brings up the question of whether one person can utter a monologue, and then analyze it as a text or discourse. He can only do so by recording it (if only in memory, though this is limited), and then bracketing the recorded text as an object of analysis. In this case it does in fact become a text, since the encoder has now become the decoder as well. This is a theoretical distinction with virtually no practical value, since few people are likely to analyze texts that they produce for no one but themselves. In such a case, the analyst is "being two people", being both encoder and decoder, i.e. assuming a position toward the text as though it were produced by another, and he were the receptor.

By definition then, any text or discourse, even monologue, necessarily involves at least two people.

### 5.2.2 Dialogue versus monologue

Since monologue necessarily involves two people, it cannot be distinguished from dialogue simply on the basis of one participant versus two or more participants. The difference is that in monologue discourse, one person does all the talking, and one or more people just listen, whereas in dialogue, two or more people take turns talking and listening. Pike (1967:442) posits the unit 'utterance-response' as the minimum unit in conversation, and says that "as its crucial component it would contain an exchange between two speakers." Since this is true of written (reported) dialogue as well as live conversation, I use the term dialogue to refer to either written or oral texts.

This definition suggests the possibility of treating dialogue as merely a concatenated string of monologues, but while the feature of taking turns to speak serves to distinguish the two, it is certainly not the only distinction. There are other features which are unique to dialogue, such as cataphoric or anaphoric reference to other utterances of the dialogue. This cannot be a feature of true monologue, since there are no other utterances in the immediate linguistic context to anticipate or refer back to. Furthermore, in dialogue we frequently find "fragmentary sentences", that would be unacceptable in monologue, but are



acceptable in the context of other utterances in dialogue. Longacre comments further on the relationship of monologue and dialogue (1983:44):

...the importance of dialogue is not just that it helps us explain a few apparent anomalies. Rather we must view dialogue as a basic function of language: viz., conversational interchange between people, communication. Seen from this point of view it is monologue that is the special development. Prolonged self expression in which one person speaks to a group of people who take the passive role of hearers is clearly a secondary development.

In the same context, Longacre posits the units of monologue to be morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, and discourse. The units of dialogue are utterance, exchange, dialogue paragraph, and dramatic discourse. However, the rule of thumb in the analysis of the Ga'dang text in the following chapters is that utterance is a unit between paragraph and discourse. That is, an utterance is composed of one or more paragraphs, and a discourse is composed of one or more utterances. Utterance is "the unit bounded by what a single speaker says" (Longacre 1983:43). Thus a monologue discourse is, ipso facto, a single utterance. If the speaker in his monologue reports a number of utterances spoken by a number of other people, these are reported utterances embedded within the utterance of the present speaker. In the context of the monologue, they are all being spoken (reported) by one person. Therefore, the monologue is a single utterance, although it has reported utterances embedded in it.

It is plausible, in fact not uncommon, for linguistic units to have embedded in them other units of the same level or a higher level of the

hierarchy. Thus a paragraph may embed within a sentence in reported speech, and an utterance or whole discourse may embed within a paragraph.

Dialogue discourse necessarily has two or more utterances spoken by two or more speakers.

Dialogue paragraphs in the Ga'dang text occur only in the context of reported speech. In this context, the reported dialogue is somewhat idealized or regularized, and some of the 'inter-utterance' cohesives are omitted. The reported dialogue is then made to cohere by use of the quotative formula, the verb kun, 'say', plus noun or pronoun. And the dialogue reported within the boundaries of a single paragraph has a conceptual unity.

In the actual dialogue of the Ga'dang informal litigation (i.e. not reported dialogue), all utterances manifest some surface characteristics of paragraph boundaries, indicating that they are not part of a paragraph which was begun in another utterance, except for seven of the briefest utterances (s.171, 182, 218, 315, 347, 362, and 367). These contain none of the features of paragraph boundary, so there is no evidence to support the claim that they are separate paragraphs. In fact, these utterances are 'back channel responses' (Hall 1983:ch.3). They are unique in that they are not considered to be a speech turn, because "the floor has not been relinquished during a back channel response". Examples of back channel responses are murmurs of assent, sentence completions, verbatim repetitions of a word or phrase, or brief paraphrase. These could be considered to be a continuation of the paragraph which was begun in the previous utterance. But since back channel responses are not

considered to be speech turns, such an utterance, paired with the preceding one, is not a real 'conversational exchange'.

Exchanges have notional structures such as question and answer, proposal-response, or remark-evaluation (Longacre 1983:49). In the text of the appendix, each constituent of such notional exchanges has some surface structure feature indicating that it is a paragraph in its own right. For example, the answer in s.170 begins with a preposed noun phrase, a paragraph initial structure (cf. 7.3.2), as does the response constituent of s.263, and the evaluation of s.354. Each of these examples is in an 'exchange' relationship with the previous sentence or sentences.

Thus an exchange necessarily involves two or more utterances, but each utterance in an exchange is also a paragraph in its own right, except in the case of a reported exchange.

The units of discourse which are necessary and sufficient to account for all data encountered in Ga'dang are morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, utterance, exchange, and dialogue. A dialogue discourse potentially makes use of all the levels of the hierarchy, whereas the monologue makes use of the levels up to the utterance level. As mentioned earlier, it is possible to embed the units of dialogue discourse within monologue discourse.

Longacre suggested the term 'dramatic discourse' as a unit or type of dialogue. While this term is appropriate for a certain type of dialogue, it is not appropriate for the particular type of dialogue in Ga'dang which is included in the appendix. This text is classified as a normative discourse.

The term 'normative discourse' will serve as well for dialogue as for monologue. This is because a whole dialogue unit can be seen to be of a particular notional discourse type (in this case, normative), and that the whole unit has a macrostructure, the constituents of which are marked in the surface structure. The individual utterances which make up the dialogue discourse are constrained by rules imposed by the grammar of the unit as a whole. Each utterance is not a discourse in itself, but is a part of the whole linguistic unit, the normative discourse.

It will be demonstrated that an entire, lengthy dialogue discourse in Ga'dang is normative in notional structure but is skewed at some points in surface structure, i.e. encoded in the surface structure of other discourse types. The explanation of why this skewing takes place is a part of the description of the structure of normative dialogue. Skewing and embedding are characteristic of dialogue (cf. 5.1.3). This makes dialogue to be (usually) a composite of text types.

### 5.2.3 Dialogue and the taxonomy of texts

It is true that dialogue is very different from monologue, especially in that the latter has less embedding and skewing, i.e. is more consistently one text type throughout. This is because there is a fixed social relationship between speaker and addressee(s) in monologue; thus if that relationship requires some skewing between notional structure the speaker intends and surface structure used to encode the intention, the skewing will be in effect through the whole monologue. In

dialogue, however, the surface structure of utterances can still be classified as narrative, procedural, expository, or normative (normative is more inclusive than Longacre's behavioral category, cf. 5.3). And the grammatical characteristics of the respective surface structure discourse types can be identified in dialogue, even when embedding or skewing occurs. The dialogue unit itself may be of a single notional discourse type (e.g. normative, as the text of the appendix), although some utterances or parts of utterances within it may have the surface structure of another type. These embedded or skewed surface structures are filling slots in the macrostructure of the normative discourse, or in one of its constituents.

There are ways of identifying when a particular surface discourse type is a skewed realization of a different notional type. At times the means of determining the skewing are surface features, such as the embedding or 'sandwiching' of one discourse type inside some grammatical features of another discourse type. At other times, the clues which indicate skewing are pragmatic, to be found in the situational context.

It has been pointed out that the crucial difference between monologue and dialogue (Pike 1967:442) is that more than one person speaks in dialogue (notwithstanding the unusual case - usually in written texts - of one person conducting a dialogue with himself; he is behaving metaphorically, i.e. "being two people" cf. 5.2.1).

#### 5.2.4 Dialogue in its broader context

Dialogue fits into the broader context of a theory of human action and behavior. Pike (1967:32) suggested that "language events and non-language events may constitute structurally equivalent members of classes of events which may constitute interchangeable parts within larger unit events." Any linguistic communication necessarily involves at least two people, speaker and hearer(s), and it is less natural for one to do all the talking and the other(s) to do all the listening. Dialogue is the most natural unit of linguistic communication, thus Pike (1978) views performative interaction (dialogue) as the appropriate starting point for the analysis of verbal behavior. Longacre elaborates (1983:337):

It is probably misleading to think of language as embedded in simple fashion within the still broader context of human behavior. Verbal activity does not embed in non-verbal activity like an egg in a paper bag. Rather, to a large degree man's verbal activity informs, interprets, and structures his non-verbal activity. Patterns of human activity are very complex and language can not be left out of account at any turn. At any event, however, any given stretch of verbal activity must be considered to be part of broader situational and behavioral patterns which are not exclusively and often not even primarily verbal.

The idea of developing a more comprehensive theory of actions of two or more people, which would hold equally well for verbal or non-verbal actions, has been explored and formalized by Nowakowska (1979). The primitive concepts of the theory are elementary actions, concatenated actions (strings of actions), duration, idling, outcomes of strings of

actions, and results of pairs of strings of actions. By assigning a symbol to each of these primitive concepts, Nowakowska is able to give an algebraic representation of any dialogue. There are some rules in the theory which idealize dialogue compared with normal conversation, e.g. one speaker is not allowed to interfere with another speaker. Each participant must be either acting or idling (i.e. speaking or listening). The theory also requires that for a string of utterances to constitute a dialogue, each subsequent utterance must be 'significantly' related to the preceding utterances. (Sequences of utterances not so related do not qualify as dialogues.) Overt signals of this type of relation between utterances are called dialogue markers, i.e. "those phrases which refer to earlier or subsequent parts of dialogue, announce the inference etc." (p.197).

Certainly this is not all there is to be said about dialogue and a theory of actions (cf. van Dijk 1977:ch.6), but it does demonstrate the possibility of viewing dialogue from the perspective of a more generic theory of human actions, - actions which may occur simultaneously or in sequence, which have beginnings and end points, and which have resulting states which differ from initial states. (In the case of dialogue, the differing end state is likely to be cognitive or behavioral, rather than a physical state.)

Some of these concepts proposed by Nowakowska (though not the algebraic formulation) will be employed in ch.7 in the discussion of the beginnings and endings of the litigation unit and the units of which it is comprised, also the duration of the units, the non-interference

feature (i.e. turn taking, cf. Hall 1983:ch.3), the initial state of anger and fragmentation, and the achievement of the end state - consensus.

The fact that this verbal behavior unit restores consensus, social order, and generally acceptable attitudes and behavior among the participants is seen as a verification of Longacre's statement that "to a large degree man's verbal activity informs, interprets, and structures his non-verbal activity" (1983:337). The normative function of the Ga'dang litigation is very clear. It helps to structure societal relationships and interactions. Indeed much of dialogue has a normative function, in structuring society, persuading people to conform to the already existing structure, or perpetuating the social status quo (cf. 5.3).

#### 5.2.5 Dialogue and normative discourse

Some theoretical considerations concerning dialogue have been discussed. It should now be noted that dialogue is the most natural vehicle of normative discourse. There are few situations, at least in an oral society, in which normative monologue is appropriate. And since orality is prior to literacy, logically and chronologically (Derrida et al notwithstanding), there is a sense in which dialogue is most natural for normative discourse. Hall (1983:23-5) demonstrates that for the Western Subanon, all 'judicial' behavior, accusation, or argumentation, is cognitively subsumed under the generic term of bintung, 'dialogue'.



And in the northern Philippines, Rosaldo (1980:188) reports that the usual way of "negotiating anger" (normative behavior) is through the purung, a public oratorical debate. Kawashima (1973:59,62) views rule by consensus and mediation (a particular type of dialogue) as the primary means of dispute settlement (normative behavior) in Japan. There, as in many countries where shame is a significant cultural value (Noble 1975:ch.11), mediation is a preferred mode of normative behavior:

Goody and Watt (1968:48-53) assert that in a non-literate (oral) society, "the cultural tradition functions as a series of interlocking face-to-face conversations," and that "the reasons which Plato, or his spokesman Socrates, gives for holding dialectic to be the true method of pursuing essential knowledge are very close to the picture [given by Goody and Watt] of the transmission of the cultural tradition in oral society." Thus we expect that in an oral society, normative discourse (one of the main functions of which is to transmit or perpetuate the cultural tradition) will typically be in the form of dialogue rather than monologue.

In a literate society, normative essays are not uncommon, and may in fact be the most common type of normative discourse. The 'sermon genre' is a normative monologue, but it is probably a consequence of literacy, and has more in common with literacy than with orality. Many sermons are "the speaking of what is written to be spoken as if not written" (Gregory and Carroll 1978:37-47). There is of course no such genre in a non-literate society, and there is no such genre in Ga'dang, which is just becoming a literate society. (There is a sermon genre developing,

but it has more in common with oral discourse than with written.) In the following section, it will be noted which of the subtypes of normative discourse may naturally be encoded in monologue form in Ga'dang.

### 5.3 Characteristics of normative discourse

This section describes primarily the notional characteristics of normative discourse. Surface structure features will be discussed in ch.7.

#### 5.3.1 The communication situation

Jones (1983:12-5) presents a taxonomy of communication situations, differentiating 16 types of language communication based on their distinctive features. He suggests four classificatory features, and posits a different type of communication for each of the 16 possible combinations of the presence or absence (+ or -) of the four features. The features are: face-to-face encounter (face), use of the vocal-auditory channel (voc), turn taking (turn), and spontaneity (spon). All of these features would be present (or 'plus') in the Ga'dang litigation, although it would be slightly less spontaneous than many casual conversations, i.e. the participants in the litigation arrived with some rough idea of what they might say, at least for their opening statements. So the Ga'dang litigation would be 4+, referring to Jones' criteria, but note that this would not serve to distinguish it from

almost every other type of linguistic behavior in Ga'dang. Two exceptions to the 4+ type that are natural within the culture are narrating folktales and an infrequent speech event which I will call "advising", (usually directed to young people about to be married). These are minus turn taking and at the low end of the scale with regard to spontaneity. Folklore is also at the low end of the scale with regard to a normative component. So monologue discourse plays a small role in Ga'dang normative behavior. (This has weighty implications for translation of normative texts.)

Almost all normative discourse in Ga'dang (and perhaps any oral society) would be of the 4+ type (face to face conversation/dialogue). Thus, other features of the communication situation would have to be referred to in order to distinguish litigation from less formal argumentation, and to distinguish any eristic discourse from non-conflict normative conversations. Designated versus non-designated turn taking (Hall 1983:ch.2) would be one possible distinguishing criterion. The presence of a community leader at the discussion (one not directly involved in the conflict) would be another.

In a literate and technological society, there are many possibilities for normative discourse other than the 4+ type, including lectures, sermons, moral or ethical books, essays, or monologues on radio or television.

What the above discussion suggests is that if a taxonomy of communication situations is to be a viable approach to discourse analysis, a separate one may be needed for an oral society. Perhaps more

likely, any taxonomy that we propose would function only as a limited etic grid, and the features of the communication situation which would be emically contrastive in a particular speech community (i.e. which would serve to distinguish types or subtypes of discourse for the speakers of the language) would have to be identified for each language studied.

### 5.3.2 Agent and addressee orientation

Normative discourse is oriented to the addressee. Furthermore, since some attitude or action is being recommended or commanded to the addressee, it is also agent oriented. The addressee is to be the agent of the commanded action, though the action may be only cognitive. 'Agent' is being used in a generic sense, since for example if the addressee were commanded to 'go to sleep', he would be an experiencer. Sleep is something that we passively experience, rather than actively do. Thus agent orientation is intended to include the roles of actor, knower, experiencer, and any of this type.

Addressee and agent orientation are notional structures. The usual surface realizations in normative discourse are second person pronouns. Other surface realizations are possible however, especially in the case of mitigation (cf. 7.5).

### 5.3.3 Contingent succession and projected time

Actions and agents are notional requirements of the command elements of normative discourse. But contingent succession is not a requirement. A number of commands can be strung together, with no requirement as to the order of performing the actions.

Projected time is a notional requirement, since it is not logically possible for a speaker to command someone to do something that the speaker knows is already done. He may utter a surface imperative in such a case, but he is doing something other than commanding, e.g. joking.

Even with a command such as 'continue what you are doing', there is plus projected time, because the temporal range of the action commanded is 'from this point in time forward'. In fact, in the absence of some explicit or pragmatic constraint on the time of performing the action, the default (i.e. assumed) time frame of a command is - starting now. The default end point would be at the end of the time that it takes to do the action. In the case of a command such as 'believe this', there is no terminus.

### 5.3.4 Normative component in all communication

Note that there is some normative component in all linguistic behavior, if only to maintain the social status quo, or effect minute cognitive change in the addressee. All linguistic communication could be ranked on a scale or cline of degree of normativity. Typically, narrative

would be the least normative, and procedural, expository, and normative would be respectively higher on the scale of normativity. Subtypes of normative discourse would fill out the high end of the scale, with direct command or imperative at the top. Folklore is at the low end of the scale with regard to a normative component. It is not used to command or exhort, but rather to reinforce cultural values implicitly or by inference.

Scientific papers, though idealized as expository ('it is true that...'), are in fact often normative ('you should believe that...'). So that although they have the surface structure of objective, expository statements of fact or observation, which would be mid-range on the scale of normativity, they may really be very near the top, especially in the context of a theoretical clash between separate schools of thought within a discipline. Of course it is also possible in such a context for the so-called scientific papers to become normative even in surface structure, e.g. as tirades against another point of view, rife with evaluative terminology.

Without a normative component, scientific papers would probably not be written. Writers want readers to see things from their point of view, and believe as they do. A curious paradox in science is the case of the advocates of biological determinism or mechanism, who hold that our cognition and behavior is determined by biological or environmental factors beyond our control. How do these people account for the fact that they write articles and books to influence other people to adopt their point of view? And surely these people would not defend their views

vigorously and persuasively to those who did not believe them, would they?

### 5.3.5 Mitigation of normative discourse

A discussion of mitigation necessarily involves some discussion of surface structure features, as well as social and political relationships (deference) which are the cause of mitigation. Some of these things will be mentioned here, and elaborated in following chapters.

Two methods of mitigation are frequently used: 1. the disguising of normative discourse in other text types, e.g. narrative or expository; 2. the disguising of the addressee, in something other than or more generic than a direct reference to the person.

The first of the two methods also includes the selection of a subtype of normative discourse (cf. 5.5) which is a less direct realization of the command or exhortation, i.e. a subtype which would directly realize an intention which is lower on the scale of normativity than what the speaker's intention actually is. For example, an evaluation ('it would be good if X') often encodes an implicit exhortation or command ('do X'). This type of realization (skewing to a less normative surface structure) could be a portmanteau realization of the normative intention and an attitude of deference (Martin and Colburn 1972:ch.8), if the speaker is inferior in social rank to the addressee.

The second type is also very common. It is near universal that the speaker believes himself to be right, and not in need of exhortation, so

that use of a first person dual or inclusive pronoun (e.g. 'we should do X') is a kind of mitigation in the interest of social eudaemonism or harmony. This pronominal usage may also be a realization of deference.

#### 5.4 Notional structure

The discussion of the notional structure of normative discourse includes not only semantic information, but also features of the communication situation such as speaker's intention and social relationships.

##### 5.4.1 Implicit performatives

Usually the performative in normative discourse (I command/order you...) is implicit. For the majority of people in any speech community, there are few communication situations in which it is socially appropriate to make the performative explicit.

There is also a range or scale of normativity for the performatives of normative discourse. To command is not the only possible speaker's intention. To recommend is another possibility. The generic term 'prescription' can be used to refer to any notional structure of the order/command/recommend group. Taylor (1961:191) suggests that the basic concept of normative discourse is ought. I believe that is adequate for the types already mentioned, but there is still more. Any discourse which realizes a speaker's intention which is primarily to affect or change the



beliefs or behavior of others, or to bring about or maintain a desired social structure, is a normative discourse. Other discourse types have normative components, so share some of these intentions, but not as the primary speaker's intention.

With this more comprehensive definition of normative discourse, some types of utterances are included which were formerly very hard to classify as to discourse type. These include utterances such as 'how ya doin', 'what's happenin, bro', and the Ga'dang wara tabbim 'do you have betel nut'. This is the category of social banter. Yawindo's comment, mabisin akun 'I'm hungry' (appendix s.265), when it appeared that the litigation was terminating, is in this category. It is the approximate equivalent of 'let's buzz off' in the American idiom. These comments are intended to maintain (or perhaps improve) the social status quo. They are lighthearted, and contribute to relaxed social interaction. If there is an implicit prescriptive element in such comments, it would be something like let's be friends, let's continue being friends, or (encoded by certain intonation patterns) let's get to be better friends.

#### 5.4.2 Prescribe or command versus recommend or suggest

Prescription and command are the notional structure of stronger normative discourse. Exhortation and imperative are their direct realizations. Other surface realizations are possible (cf. 5.5), due to portmanteau realizations of prescription plus some feature of social setting.

Prescription and command are at the high side of the normativity scale even within normative discourse. Recommend is mid-point. And speakers' intentions such as 'suggest' or 'advocate' would characterize some of the 'less tense' normative interactions, in which the degree of difference of attitude or opinion between communicator and addressee is perceived by the communicator to be little or none. Perpetuation of the social status quo is one thing that speakers implicitly advocate by means of the social subtype of normative discourse.

#### 5.4.3 Volition and purpose

Discourse expressing the notions of volition or purpose, choice or intention, is in a fuzzy area and difficult to classify. A statement such as 'I will be going to the library this afternoon' is narrative with plus projected time (as to notional classification), but a statement such as 'I intend to be involved in the peace rally' or 'I chose to boycott the lecture' appear to be normative. They imply an evaluation of possible courses of action at a given point in time, and selection of the one which was deemed best on some scale of values.

Most evaluative discourse has implicit prescription which is easy to recognize. 'Running is good' is a prescription or recommendation. It is more difficult to recognize any prescriptive element in 'I chose to boycott the lecture', but it may involve a prescription to believe as I do or behave as I did, given similar circumstances. Thus, explicit

statements of volition or purpose are tentatively classified as normative.

### 5.5 Surface subtypes of normative discourse

The following surface subtypes are presented in the order of least normative to most normative. This is not to say that the speaker's intentions that they are realizing in any given instance are necessarily so ranked. But given no interference from social setting or social relationships, the order would hold.

Since these are surface types, they could as well be numbered as named. In a sense that would be more accurate, since their names (social, evaluative, prescriptive, and eristic) refer to their notional structure. However, as with most other surface structure units, it is a useful mnemonic to give them names which reflect the notional structure that they typically realize.

#### 5.5.1 Social

This surface subtype is social banter and any utterance of a purely social, stereotypical nature. It typically has a question and answer or utterance-response structure, and it occurs in the context of dialogue or it initiates dialogue.

### 5.5.2 Evaluative

Evaluative discourse may be monologue, but in Ga'dang, it is customarily dialogue. The evaluative type leans toward the surface structure of expository discourse, since it is characterized by non-verbal clauses such as 'it is good that...'. But while the clause itself is non-verbal, the evaluatum is likely to be realized in an embedded relative clause which is verbal in structure, since the beliefs and behavior of others are the expected evaluata of normative discourse, e.g. 'it is good that he agrees with me', or 'it is good that he mowed the lawn'.

This subtype is typically minus projected time, but not necessarily so. 'It would be good if he would mow the lawn' is also evaluative surface structure.

If there is a parallel of this subtype in Doležel's schema of narrative modalities, it would be the axiological modality, discourse focussing on goodness, badness, or indifference (1975:95).

### 5.5.3 Prescriptive

Prescriptive discourse may also be monologue. Of the four subtypes it is perhaps the most likely to be monologue, or rather one-sided dialogue. But in the Ga'dang oral culture, it is still typically dialogue. Prescriptive discourse is the most clearly agent and addressee oriented, minus contingent succession, and plus projected time. Verbal

transitive and intransitive clauses, imperative in form, are typical of this subtype. There is a sense in which this is the purest form (the standard) of normative discourse.

Doležel's deontic modality, the notions of obligation, prohibition, and permission (must, must not, may), would be realized by prescriptive discourse. The epistemic modality might also be subsumed here (knowledge, belief), but only when combined with the normative component, i.e. 'should know, should believe'.

#### 5.5.4 Eristic

Eristic discourse is necessarily dialogue. It involves evaluations and prescriptions in conflict, i.e. differences of opinion about what has been done or what ought to be done. Argument, dispute, and any type of dialogue dispute resolution fall within this classification. The appended text is an eristic discourse, and its surface structure will be examined in detail in ch.7.

#### 5.6 Litigation as normative discourse

Pike has pioneered in the analysis of units of behavior, including units of verbal behavior beyond the sentence. Vygotsky (1962:4) defines a unit as "a product of analysis which, unlike elements, retains all the basic properties of the whole." Hwang (1981:23) has elaborated on the

importance of focus on wholes, since the parts cannot be adequately analyzed or described apart from reference to the whole.

The Ga'dang litigation is viewed as one unit of behavior because it has an identifiable beginning, nucleus, and end. The beginning occurs when the people assemble at a prearranged place and begin to speak. The ending is when they stop speaking and disperse. This is a somewhat loose description, since the assembling and dispersing happens in a relaxed fashion over a period of several minutes, and there is some casual conversation going on during those periods which is not a part of the litigation. But this is not problematic. As with any unit of behavior, there is some indeterminacy as to the exact point in time when one activity ends and another begins (Pike 1967:77), and since there are several participants, there is some overlap as to exact arrival times etc.

In addition to this unit of behavior, there is also a more clearly defined unit of language, the eristic discourse itself. This has linguistic signals marking the beginning and end, so that these can be identified quite precisely (cf. ch.7)

Whether we focus on the unit of behavior or the unit of language, we are dealing with a normative unit. The litigation is a unit of normative behavior. Within that unit, the linguistic unit is a normative discourse. At a still lower level, there are utterances within the normative discourse, and there are segments of narrative and expository discourse embedded within these utterances. But the whole unit is normative, and

the embedded segments fill slots in the normative discourse, or in the units which make up the normative discourse.

Since we are dealing with a behavioral unit and a linguistic unit, the following chapter examines social and political structures as well as linguistic structures. The extra-linguistic structures which are a part of the situational context exert some pressures on the form of the linguistic unit and its component parts. Thus the notion of higher order rules, which we observed to be influencing the morphology and syntax within a discourse, is seen to be in effect across the boundary of verbal and non-verbal behavior. We are forced to examine the larger, non-verbal context of the discourse in order to find explanations for the phenomena within the text, and the whole endeavor has become interdisciplinary.

## 6. THE GA'DANG TEXT: NOTIONAL STRUCTURE

The text which is analyzed here and included in the appendix is an instance of Ga'dang folk litigation. From a corpus of several recorded folk litigations (recorded with the permission of persons involved), I have selected one discussion to focus on. Other texts will be referred to at times to give additional evidence for a conclusion, or to show contrastive features of other discourse types.

### 6.1 Units of normative discourse

Two types of discourse are described in the following two subsections. The first is called tarabbag, which is of the eristic subtype of normative discourse. The text of the appendix is of this type. The second is called tuldu, and is of the prescriptive subtype.

#### 6.1.1 Formal versus informal litigation

The text of the appendix was referred to by the participants as tarabbag, 'discussion', or often as mattatarabbag, which literally means 'reciprocally answer'. Buton, the younger of the two litigants, occasionally referred to it as a Kasu, 'case', which is the term for a formal litigation. But this tarabbag lacked at least one feature of a Kasu, namely that the litigants did not have designated advocates,



mallalat, to represent their interests and do most of the talking for them. Another feature which distinguishes this tarabbag from a Kasu is that there was never any consideration of a multa, 'fine/penalty', to be levied against one litigant and awarded to the other.

It may even be misleading to describe Andits and Buton, the two that had the grievances or misunderstandings with each other, as litigants, since this was not a formal case. Nevertheless, the term is used for them, to distinguish them from the other participants in the tarabbag.

The main thing that this discussion has in common with formal litigation (Kasu) is that a local official is moderator (barrio councilman Sanggoon). In a similar discussion on another subject and on another occasion, with different participants, Sanggoon was again the moderator, and he rendered a decision including a multa; one litigant was to give one water buffalo to the other. The decision was considered binding, and as an afterthought, was written on a piece of paper. This case was considered a Kasu, even though the litigants did not have designated advocates, which indicates that the multa is a more crucial distinctive feature between the tarabbag and the Kasu than is the mallalat, 'designated advocate'.

To make it clear that the discussion (in the Appendix) was not a Kasu, Sanggoon cited his position as president of the church leaders (sentence 4), and reminded everyone before rendering his decision and exhortation that the discussion was "according to faith, not according to Ga'dang customs" (s.191-3).

### 6.1.2 The informal litigation unit

The boundaries of the unit are signalled in the situational context and in the surface structure. One indication of unit boundaries is any change of activity (Pike 1967:77) or change of actor. From the situational context, the indication of a unit boundary (marking the beginning of the litigation) is the change of activity of the people involved. They all walked to a prearranged meeting place and sat down. It is true that the prearrangement involved some activity related to the unit being studied, but this is true of any activity we focus on, i.e. we could always find it to be related to some larger behavioral context. Thus the prearrangement is just one of several features leading up to and bringing about the litigation unit. The disagreement itself would be another; it is also a logical prerequisite to the litigation.

The linguistic surface structure also signals the boundaries of the unit. The verbal signal of the beginning of a litigation is a statement by the moderator (the one who regulates the discussion, renders a decision, and tries to effect a consensus agreement about the decision). The statement includes the purpose of the discussion or statement of the problem that brought it about, and the names of the principals involved (any aggrieved, accused, or directly involved). This is often in the form of a vocative, addressing the principals directly and articulating the problem succinctly.

Sentence one of the appendix is an example: "Now then, Buton, whatever is the misunderstanding between the two of you, discuss it...".

Another instance of litigation began: "Our coming here was to talk about...", and the sentence went on to summarize virtually all the publicly known facts about the case, naming all people involved and telling how they were involved, requiring a sentence of fourteen clauses!

This straightforwardness is highly unusual among the Ga'dang and in the Philippines in general, where smooth interpersonal relationships are sought, at almost any cost, and where great care is taken not to cause anyone to lose face. One expects a good deal of circumlocution, as is common when addressing issues of a problematic nature or where individuals' feelings are at stake. But instead the opening statement is directly to the point. This is another clear indication that this is the beginning of a particular behavioral and linguistic unit.

In the interest of preserving smooth relationships, no blame is directed at anyone in the opening statements. Negative evaluations are studiously avoided at this point and in the early going, and creep in gradually as the discussion progresses. Impartiality is stressed by anyone who can conceivably claim it; the moderator himself MUST be impartial, or be able to convince the other participants that he is.

#### 6.1.3 The normative monologue

This type of discourse is not the main focus here, but it is worth commenting on, because certain features of normative discourse were more clearly identifiable in this text type. This type of normative discourse is called tuldu, 'to teach/advise'. It can be given only by a speaker who

has considerably more social rank than the potential addressees. A father, grandfather, or a patriarch in the clan (e.g. a somewhat close relative who is of a generation prior to that of most other surviving clan members), are the ones who typically have such rank. The age difference requirement and the 'immediate kin' requirement may be diluted if the person to advise has achieved greater prominence or social clout for some other reason, such as wealth or political alliances. But the advisor must still be older.

The occasion for this type of discourse is that the person to be advised is facing some major event in life, such as going away to school or getting married. The content of the discourse revolves around what is acceptable or expected behavior in the new situation. The constituents of the discourse are: ADDRESS; GLOBAL THEME; PRESCRIPTION; CLOSURE.

The address and global theme are always encoded in the first sentence of the discourse, and almost always in noun phrases or subordinate clauses preposed before the main verb of the sentence. This is a marked sentence order in Ga'dang, since the main verb is usually the first constituent.

The address usually consists of a pronoun and a common noun or name, such as ikkayu abbing 'you-pl. child' (you children), or ikka Tabbagon 'you Tabbagon'. This pronominal and nominal reference to the addressee initial in the sentence results in a triple reference in one sentence, since the addressee will also be referred to pronominally as a suffix to the main verb of the sentence (which will be the prescription, or the first of a series of commands which comprise the prescription). There may

be even more than three references to the addressee in the first sentence, as in the following example (references capitalized):

IKKAYU ABBING, gafu se nadatang ino kadokal DAW,  
you-pl. child because arrived the bigness yours

e umang KAYU miskwela,  
and go you-pl. school

amme YU mangayoyung so mesturu,  
not you-pl. be-disrespectful to teacher,

se antu ino kakkungkul so piskwela'an.  
for that the disruption of school.

'You children, now that you have grown up and are going away to school, don't be disrespectful to the teacher, because that disrupts the school.'

In addition to the ADDRESS, 'you children', and the GLOBAL THEME or advice topic (your going away to school), the above example gives the first of several exhortations which make up the PRESCRIPTION constituent. This first exhortation displays the structure of the typical 'schema of prescription,' which has three constituents: PROJECTED CIRCUMSTANCE; PRESCRIPTION; and JUSTIFICATION (cf. the hortatory point, Bricoux and Hale 1977:76). In the case of the first prescription in an 'advice' discourse, the projected circumstance is often the global theme or advice topic of the whole discourse. (The projected circumstance is any situation that the advisor anticipates and wants to give some advice about.) If the prescription constituent has additional command elements (prescriptions), the projected circumstance for these may be the global theme, but usually is some more specific circumstance such as 'concerning

your behavior at your boarding place' or 'as you enter the classroom'. If it is the global theme, it is optionally reiterated preceding post-initial prescriptions.

In the few texts of this type that I collected, without exception there was a justification constituent (a supporting argument) following each prescription. If the command was given in the negative, e.g. don't do X, then the justification may be just a negative evaluation of doing X (e.g. se narakKat inay 'because that is bad'), or it may cite the expected undesirable result of doing X as a reason for not doing it (e.g. se kaKkatawa ka 'because you will be ridiculed'). However if the command was a positive one, e.g. do X, then the justification may be a positive evaluation (e.g. se antu ino nalawad a aqqanqwa, 'because that is good doing/behavior'), or it may cite the expected desirable result (e.g. takesi kunna, mali'nawan a masinqqud, 'in order that it will be cleaned away and orderly').

The advice discourse proceeds with a series of prescription schema, not necessarily in any sequence of generic to specific or vice versa, but linked together in a coherent text by virtue of the fact that they are all related to the initial global theme or advice topic. However, there may be some taxonomy of order of importance of the exhortations in the speaker's mind. Two texts given to young men considering marriage (given by two speakers to two different addressees) provide some evidence of an emic order of importance arrangement. One young man was exhorted to be industrious and build a house. The other was exhorted to be industrious, build a house, and not to cheat on his wife.

The closure of this advice discourse may be antwen inoy 'that's all', which is often used at the end of monologue discourse or of utterances within a formal or semi-formal dialogue. Or it may be a sentence which makes explicit the normative intention of the monologue just uttered, as in the following example:

Antwen yaw ino anggam ku a isapit sikwam ikkallay,  
that this the want I to say to-you you-man

ta dingngaggan nu ammin yo sapitan ku.  
so listen you all this say I

'This is all I want to say to you man, so heed all I said.'

The three-part schema of prescription is the unmarked mode of prescription in Ga'dang. It is very standardized in monologue advice texts, which are relatively free of contextual or situational modifying influences. In the eristic discourse of the appendix, the schema is not always fully realized in the surface structure. There are frequent marked realizations, in which the justification is deleted, and the projected circumstance is provided by prior context. These will be discussed in more detail below. There are some examples of unmarked (complete) realizations of the three-part schema in the appendix, as in sentences 189-90, 320, and 343-6.

## 6.2 Multiple structures of social organization

The participants in the informal litigation were related to each other in several distinct but partially overlapping organizational structures. First the participants will be introduced below, then their relationships to each other will be explicated respectively according to each type of structure.

### 6.2.1 The people involved

The litigation was a semi-formal attempt to settle a grievance between two Ga'dang men that was causing some social turbulence. The older of the two litigants, Andits, felt that he had been slandered and slighted by the younger one, Buton. Buton contended that he had been unjustly accused and maligned in public (i.e. the brunt of malicious gossip), and that he was innocent of wrong attitude or action toward Andits. The problem had been heating up as it made its rounds via the village "grapevine", and finally a third party, Baggit, took the initiative which led to the recorded discussion, the hearing of the case before a local official.

In addition to the three men already mentioned, there were four others involved in the discussion: Sanggoon, Laka, Yawindo, and Bayombong. Sanggoon was the closest thing to a magistrate in the proceedings. Laka was a sort of "magistrate emeritus", being the eldest man present, but not personally conducting the hearing for reasons




explained in section 7.2.4. Yawindo and Bayombong were pseudo-jurists, who through their kibitzing contributed to the process of reaching a (consensus) decision in the case and effecting that decision (i.e. persuading all parties to endorse or accept it).

The various relationships between these people who were involved in the discussion, and others who were involved in the case but not present, are explained in the following subsections.

#### 6.2.2 Structure of Kinship relationships

The participants in the recorded discussion were related to each other by at least three partially overlapping and sometimes conflicting structures of social organization, namely kinship, political, and ecclesiastical structures. Each structure has its own hierarchy which can be represented in something like an organizational flow chart.

The traditional Ga'dang social organization was a mixture of kinship and chiefdom structures. Many extended family units inhabited remote areas of the forest where they practised slash and burn farming methods. These groups had pure kinship organization, in which the patriarch of the group was the leader. According to this kind of structure, LaKa would be at the top of the flow chart, being the oldest, and being related to most if not all of the other participants. Figure 6 displays the kinship relationships between the people involved in the case.



## Key:

- LAKA. Husband of Grasima, former boyfriend of BaKatnay, father of Sanggoon and Buton, distant relative of all others. age:64.  
 ANDITS. Father of Baggit, cousin of Bayombong, uncle of TukKaklak and therefore Buton's uncle-in-law (a close relation). age:51.  
 YAWINDO. Distant relative of all others. age:45.  
 BAYOMBONG. Father of TukKaklak, father-in-law of Buton. age:40.  
 SANGGOON. Son of LaKa and Grasima, half brother of Buton, related to Andits but +1 generation, so sees him as an uncle. age:37.  
 BUTON. Son of LaKa and BaKatnay, half brother of Sanggoon. age:26.  
 BAGGIT. Son of Andits, "brother-in-law" of Buton. age:22.

(names in parentheses are those not involved in the actual hearing of the case, but needed to show relevant relationships; lines have been drawn on the chart only to show relationships of direct descent.)

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Fig. 6. Kinship relations of people involved in the case

### 6.2.3 Political structure

Existing simultaneously with the kinship groups were Ga'dang chiefdoms. These existed in a few areas with very good water supply and good available land, where large numbers of families (about 50 or 100) would aggregate. With this many families, there would be two or more men with approximately equal claim to leadership by the criteria of age and kinship relations, so other criteria were used to determine or select a patul, 'chief'. The patul would be the one with the optimum combination of verbal and physical prowess, the latter being measured by one's ability as a warrior/headhunter.

In this structure, Laka was the village chief about thirty years ago, when he was in his prime. If the pure chiefdom structure were in effect, Laka might still be at the top, at least within this group of participants, but hanging on very tenuously by virtue of verbal prowess and past accomplishments. His leadership would be on the wane, and Yawindo would be the most likely successor. He lacks the verbal prowess of Sanggoon or Andits, but in the area of physical strength, only the youngster Buton might challenge him.

There is a vestige of this type of structure still remaining among the Ga'dang people, and it is evident very occasionally when men like Yawindo flex their muscle, figuratively and literally. And because it does still surface occasionally, Yawindo is treated with a little more respect than would otherwise be due to him. Figure 7 displays this structure, but reflects some guesswork on my part. Whereas I am very

confident of figures 6, 8, and 9, figure 7 relies to some extent on intuition.




Fig. 7. Hypothetical authority hierarchy by traditional Ga'dang criteria, premium on physical prowess

The other criterion of leadership potential in the traditional Ga'dang chiefdom, that of verbal prowess, has now become more important because of the transition currently taking place in their political structure, a transition from chiefdom to state. In the structure that the Ga'dangs are moving toward, Sanggoon is definitely at the top of the hierarchical chart, due to natural verbal prowess and highest educational achievement. Because of these qualifications, he was coerced to run for municipal councilman in recent local elections, and won easily. There are one or two councilmen elected in each barrio of the municipality, and they serve on the council of the municipal mayor. They have authority to settle civil cases in their own barrio.

Figure 8 displays the ranking of the seven discussants in the recorded case, according to their present-day political clout. Sanggoon is at the top, even though he is one of the younger men, and probably has the least physical strength of any, being the smallest man in the group. Yawindo ranks high in this structure because of his friendships with men who hold public office in the municipality. Laka is high for similar reasons, and because of his position of leadership in the past. The two very young men, Buton and Baggit, have virtually no political clout.




Fig. 8. Ranking of discussants according to present-day political clout in the municipality

#### 6.2.4 The church organizational structure

Finally, the participants are socially related to each other in a church organization. Structure of the church organization is quite loose, but there are several appointed leaders or elders (Andits and Buton are two of them), and a president chosen by the elders from among their own number (Sanggoon). So Sanggoon is also at the top of this organizational chart. And although he is also qualified to hear a case by virtue of his political position as a municipal councilman, the particular case I describe here was billed as a function of the church organization, and Sanggoon officiated by virtue of the fact that he had been appointed the president of the elders. The structure of the proceedings was near identical (except for the multa feature, cf. 6.1.1) to that of two or three other recorded cases, not involving church members, in which Sanggoon was acting purely as councilman.

The overlap of traditional Ga'dang, recent political, and church structure is evident in the text of the appendix. Thus Sanggoon felt obliged to explain (s.193) why he was the one officiating instead of his father, Laka, who should have been according to traditional Ga'dang structure. The occasional references to operating according to church structure (s.4, 192, 267) also distinguishes the present discussion from those that would be purely under the jurisdiction of the present-day political structure. It was important to make this distinction, since the situational context left it ambiguous. Sanggoon was qualified to officiate in either church or political structure, but had the

discussion been a function of the latter, there likely would have been some multa imposed (settlement of money or goods).

Figure 9 displays the organizational structure of the church as it relates to the ranking of the seven participants in the tarabbaq.

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Sanggoon: president of the elders.

Andits, Buton: two of the elders.

Laka, Yawindo, Baggit: church members.

Bayombong: not a church member.

---

Fig. 9. Ranking according to church organizational structure

According to any church structure which has been articulated, Laka would be at the bottom, as would Baggit. But because of the fact of overlapping structures of social organization, Laka is treated with more respect even in purely church-related functions. This can be readily observed in the recorded case, in which monologues by Baggit come early in the case, are not very long, and are primarily narrative though with an explanatory and evaluative intention. Baggit does inject a few brief remarks of the hortatory type, but these are largely ignored by the other discussants. Laka, on the other hand, reserves his contributions for near

the end, and then he articulates what is already obvious and not likely to be refuted. Laka's comments and exhortations (his speech is the closest to pure hortatory discourse) are heard carefully, and they elicit considerable response. The only person who treats Laka's comments in a somewhat cavalier manner is Andits (who occasionally interrupts with a very audible yawn, hoping to encourage all to bring the case to a close), and he is the only one present who is of Laka's generation, though a few years younger.

What all this shows is that the members of a community cannot totally divorce themselves from the influence of one structure of social organization, even when involved in a function which is predominantly organized by another structure. And this is extremely important in text analysis! It accounts for the appropriateness of Laka's exhortations, and response to them, and accounts for why it would be inappropriate for Baggit to utter a discourse of the pure hortatory type in this context. Whatever exhorting or persuading that Baggit hopes to do needs to be veiled in expository or narrative discourse types, without explicit exhortations and imperatives.

### 6.3 Constituents of the normative discourse

This section focusses on the unit as a whole, with discussion of the function of the unit in its larger context of social interaction. The discourse level constituents will also be presented, both notional and



surface structure, as well as the function of each constituent in the context of the discourse.

### 6.3.1 Initial state and final state

The initial state (the social situation immediately preceding and including the beginning of the discussion) was one of social fragmentation or lack of harmony. The greatest disharmony existed between the two litigants, Andits and Buton. However, in this small, close-knit, oral society, in which virtually everyone is related to everyone else, disharmony between two individuals results in general disharmony. Such disagreements are not infrequent, yet the society abhors the disharmony and strives for social eudaemonism - the ethic of group happiness - (Black and Mileski 1973:2) or consensus (Christopher 1983:55).

The tarabbaq, 'discussion, informal litigation', is the mechanism employed to get from the undesirable initial state of disharmony to the desirable end state of consensus. The end state of the tarabbaq of the appendix was ostensibly consensus. Ideally, the consensus is the state or social situation which has been achieved at the end of the discussion, and which lasts from that point forward (at least with respect to the issues of the discussion). However, this ideal is seldom if ever achieved. Notice that in the discussion, the younger litigant Buton does not speak in the last 24 out of the total 39 utterances (cf. Fig. 10). Thus he fails to explicitly endorse the consensus that is reached late in the discussion. This raises some question as to whether the consensus is

unanimous, and likely to last. On the other hand, his non-participation toward the end may be explained by his youth (neither Buton nor Baggit, the two youngest, participate toward the end), or by the fact that he was somewhat cowed, having borne the brunt of the negative evaluations. Buton had included some conciliatory 'statements of good faith' in his earlier utterances, especially in UT15, in which he was somewhat self-deprecating and expressed remorse over the situation. These comments indicated that he was willing to accept reprimand, and augured well for a lasting consensus.

#### 6.3.2 The medial notional constituents

Initial state and final state were the first and last constituents of the litigation unit (cf. 5.2.5). These are realized in the surface structure by opening and closure, and will be discussed in chapter 8. The initial state includes the fact of the disharmony as well as the reason for it, which surfaces as a statement of the problem in capsule form. It also includes the notion of what is to be done about it, which surfaces as a statement of purpose such as 'we are here to discuss this matter'.

The medial constituents which have been identified in this and other eristic normative dialogues are: GRIEVANCE; CONCILIATION; EVALUATION; PRESCRIPTION; CONSENSUS.

The larger-context function of each constituent within the discourse was to contribute to the formation and longevity of the consensus, i.e.

persuade participants so thoroughly of the evaluations and prescriptions that the problem and disharmony would not resurface. Often this purpose is not achieved, and a subsequent tarabbag is required to rehash the issues and try to lay them to rest.

Each medial constituent is described below, with some explanation of its contribution to the normative purpose of the whole unit, namely consensus formation.

The first post-initial constituent is GRIEVANCE. The essential feature of grievance is negative evaluation. Accusation is certainly included, being a type of negative evaluation in which the evaluation may be left implicit, e.g. 'he did/said X', with no author comment to the effect that it was bad to do/say X. The speaker assumes that all others will also evaluate X negatively. The incidents or problems referred to will function as the topics of evaluation and prescription in following constituents, so the grievance constituent could be defined as a presentation of evaluata.

The grievance constituent also includes any answer to the grievance in the form of counter-accusations or rebuttal/defense. The defense is not so much calculated to defuse the disagreement, but to counter what has been said. At this stage there is still confrontation rather than conciliation. However, the grievance constituent is prerequisite to consensus. This seems paradoxical, since grievances or accusations appear to work against consensus and harmony. But if the litigants themselves are to join with the ultimate consensus, they must be given opportunity to try to shape that consensus. This they do by relating

incidents, utterances, and feelings that led to their own actions or present attitude. The content of the grievance constituent is thoroughly normative, consisting of evaluations of attitudes and actions of the speaker and others, and justification of those evaluations. Each litigant hopes that his evaluations of others and his justifications of himself will figure prominently in the shaping of the consensus.

The second medial constituent is CONCILIATION. This is something of an about face, immediately following the grievance constituent. (The text constituents will be displayed in figures 10 and 11, below.) Utterances six to nine (appendix s.166-71) form a conciliation cluster, immediately following the grievance of UT4 and 5 (s.29-165). Show of good faith (UT13 and 15) is subsumed under conciliation, but it is of a more social nature. The conciliation cluster of UT6-9 expresses personal good will, whereas the show of good faith is an expression of willingness to be evaluated, and to suppress personal feelings or evaluations if they conflict with the evaluations of others. Personal conciliation paves the way for the litigants to agree with each other, whereas show of good faith paves the way for the litigants to agree with everyone else. Both are vital to achieving consensus.

The third medial constituent is EVALUATION. The topics of the grievance constituent are the evaluata in the Ga'dang informal litigation. The content of the accusations or explanations is evaluated. Evaluation is always done on the basis of norms. Norms may be standards by which things can be graded (good or bad) or ranked (better or worse), or they may be rules by which the evaluata are judged to be right or

wrong, correct or incorrect (Taylor 1961:5-33). In either case, the norms employed in the Ga'dang litigation are those emic to the Ga'dang society, or to the subset of that society to which these participants belonged.

The fourth medial constituent is PRESCRIPTION. If an attitude or action has been evaluated and found to have disvalue, a prescription will be made. Numerous prescriptions may be included in this constituent, along with justifications. But in contrast to the normative monologue (cf. 6.1.3), in the dialogue text prescriptions are frequently given without justifications immediately following. There are two possible reasons for such omissions. One is that the justification of each prescription is to be found in context, in the form of the evaluations (in the previous constituent) which prompted the prescriptions. The second possible reason is that maximum deletion is in effect at the prescriptive (normative) peak of the discourse. This feature, and the variety of surface realizations of evaluations and prescriptions, will be discussed in 7.4 and following.

Note that the evaluations and prescriptions were a necessary prerequisite to consensus in the Ga'dang litigation. Since the initial state of disharmony consisted of evaluations in conflict, there must be some adjudication of these, and some statement by the society (represented by the participants in the discussion) as to which evaluations were correct, i.e. were in keeping with public values or norms, and had the best chance of preserving or contributing to group happiness.

The fifth medial constituent, and the last constituent before closure, is CONSENSUS. This consists of general agreement with the evaluations and prescriptions that have gone before, and statements to the effect that the initial problem or disharmony no longer exists.

### 6.3.3 Turn taking as utterance boundaries

Designated turn taking (Hall 1983:ch.3) and non-interference (Nowakowska 1979:196) are features of the communication situation structure of this type of eristic discourse. These rules are not observed without exception, but far more so than in casual dialogue. The net effect is to give order to the proceedings, minimize friction, and expedite the achievement of the end state (consensus).

Hall (1983:58) observed that in structured types of dialogue or litigation, there is someone who has the responsibility of directing people to speak at the appropriate times. In the Ga'dang litigation, the moderator (Sanggoon) does this more than anyone else, but he is not the only one to designate when another should speak. For example, at the end of utterance 4, litigant Andits designated that litigant Buton should respond. Frequently there was no explicit designation, but the participants had a clear idea of who should speak and when.

There were even times when individuals designated themselves to speak. Yawindo did so in UT3, (not included in the appendix), saying Antwen inoy yo sapitan nu? Matubburan ku pay, 'Is that all you will say? I'll just add on.' Then Andits, in UT4 (s.29), designates himself, saying

Ana ino daretchu a assapitan ku, 'I have something straightforward to say.' Another example is s.266, in which Sanggoon says Antu ino masapit ku ke, 'I'll just say this.' Still another example is Laka's self-designation (s.331-2), Kallay. Tubburan ku si bisang lamang, 'Man. I'll just add a little.'

The features of turn taking and non-interference made the transcription of the discourse and the identification of the utterance boundaries much simpler than that of casual conversation. The utterances are displayed below in Fig. 10.





Notice that the length of each utterance is also displayed in Fig. 10 in the form of a graph, with approximately one X for each 4 sentences. Frequently, however, a single X represents an utterance of just one sentence length.

#### 6.3.4 Turn taking related to notional constituents

Utterances and notional constituents are not co-terminous. Nor can one constituent be defined as ending and another one beginning between any two particular UT's. There is overlap, but a gradual progression from one to the next constituent. This is accounted for primarily by the different perceptions of the different individuals of where they were in the process of litigation at that point. Some would try to go on to the next constituent, then others would go back to the previous one. But as a general rule, there are no two-constituent jumps.

There may also be constituent transitions within one utterance.

Fig. 11 displays the text again, this time with a capsule statement of the discourse function of each utterance. Immediately following that is Fig. 12, which displays the constituents of the macrostructure of the litigation, and shows which utterances realize each constituent.

UT	S	Location	Discourse function
1	2	1-2	false start, statement of purpose
2	26	3-28	M. purpose, evaluation, impartiality, start
3	13	*	paraphrase of purpose, evaluation, impartiality
4	137	29-165	L. grievances, evaluation
5	141	*	L2. rebuttal attempt (defense), grievance
6	1	166	M. progression signal
7	3	167-9	L2. conciliation
8	1	170	L. conciliation
9	1	171	L2. conciliation, agreement
10	92	*	L. reject defense, refocus grievance
11	10	172-81	M. evaluate, begin to focus blame
12	1	182	evaluation endorsed
13	8	183-90	L. endorsement, show of good faith
14	1	*	extraneous
15	34	*	L2. plea of innocence, show of good faith
16	16	*	evaluation, exhortation
17	27	191-217	M. judicial evaluation, prescription
18	1	218	L. press advantage
19	24	219-43	M. decision and supporting arguments (persuade)
20	1	*	L. motion to close
21	48	*	reiterate, conciliate, in defense of L2
22	19	244-62	L. refocus the evaluation, citing public values
23	2	263-4	motion to close
24	1	265	social banter
25	64	266-329	M. prescriptive peak, decision elaborated, argued
26	1	330	L. motion to close
27	16	331-46	P. evaluation, prescription
28	1	347	paraphrase, toward consensus
29	1	348	P. evaluation, consensus
30	1	349	M. amplification paraphrase, consensus
31	4	350-3	P. amplification, prescription, consensus
32	1	354	strong endorsement, consensus
33	4	355-8	L. reiterate grievance, put it to rest
34	3	359-61	P. positive evaluation of state of harmony
35	1	362	L. agreement, consensus
36	4	363-6	P. positive evaluation, closure, elicit consensus
37	1	367	L. confirm consensus, closure
38	2	368-9	closure, social banter
39	1	370	M. closure, social banter

UT = Utterance number (actual sequential order).

S = Number of sentences in the utterance.

Location = sentence number in the appendix. \* = omitted.

M = moderator, L = litigants, P = patriarch

Fig. 11. Discourse function of each utterance

Notional constituent	Realizations of the constituent
Opening	UT 1,2,3
Grievance	UT 4,5,10,(15)
Conciliation	UT 6,7,8,9,13,15,(21)
Evaluation	UT 11,12,16,17,18,(19),(21),22,27,(34)
Prescription	UT (17) 19,25,27,(31)
Consensus	UT 28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37
Closure	UT 20,23,24,26,(37),38,39

Fig. 12. Utterances realizing notional constituents

The utterance numbers in parentheses indicate UT's that contain elements of more than one notional constituent. Notice how the litigation slides from one constituent to the next, with considerable overlap at the borders. The reason for the overlap is the differing perceptions of the participants in the discussion concerning how far along in the whole litigation they were. In particular, utterances 20, 23, and 24 were untimely motions to close. The participants had misinterpreted UT 19 as Sangsoon's complete prescription and decision. In fact, he had a lot more to say, the content of UT 25, and LaKa had several things on his mind to say before the discussion closed.

There are significant observations to be made concerning the relation of the notional structure to the utterances of the litigation. These observations provide insight into the process of persuasion and consensus formation in Ga'dang. The graph in Fig. 10 shows that the long utterances are early in the discourse. In fact, the first five utterances (out of the total of 39) contain 319 sentences, almost half the total (715) of the whole discourse. Furthermore, the total of the sentences that function as realizations of the GRIEVANCE constituent (though in discontinuous UT's) is 404, more than half the total. This is an indication of the importance accorded to giving each litigant his chance to shape the developing consensus, as much as he is able. It is also an indication of the therapeutic and conciliatory nature of getting the facts and evaluations out in the open. The 'facts' can be evaluated according to the norms of the community, and prescriptions can then be imposed if they are in order. This is much more satisfactory or pacifying to the litigants than dealing with the indeterminacies of suspicion, innuendo, and rumor. These contribute to uncertainty and doubt, which is an open, unstable state of mind (Maranda and Maranda 1979), abhorred by human beings. On the other hand, knowledge and belief are closed, stable states of mind, comfortable and satisfying. This explains the therapeutic value of laying out the facts of the case, and explains why so much of the exercise of pursuing a consensus is devoted to the grievance constituent.

Evaluation and prescription have a much more balanced share of the total number of sentences (about 146 and 108 respectively; there is some

uncertainty since some utterances make a constituent transition). But notice that evaluation is realized by 10 UT's, whereas prescription is realized by only five. This is a feature of the social structure of which the participants are members, namely that only Sanggoon and Laka are qualified or privileged to prescribe. Sanggoon speaks 88 sentences or more as realizations of the prescription constituent, and Laka speaks about 20. Sanggoon also speaks the majority of the sentences of the evaluation constituent, but the remainder are divided up between five other participants. It appears to be anyone's prerogative to evaluate, though the evaluations of some are taken much more seriously than those of others. Baggit's evaluations are almost completely disregarded. He is the youngest participant, and his comments are not referred to in other utterances, nor are they followed by any endorsement by others.

The consensus constituent, which intuition indicates is the most important, actually occupies a very brief section of the surface structure. It is realized by only 20 sentences, but these are distributed within 10 UT's. All the older participants except Bayombong are vocal at this stage. (Bayombong may be somewhat miffed because his attempts to function as moderator or co-moderator were thwarted earlier.) But once consensus has been reached, on the basis of evaluations and prescriptions eloquently supported earlier, the purpose has been achieved, and little more needs to be said. Simply endorse the consensus, 'have your affirmative vote counted, and move to adjourn'.

The closure constituent is the briefest of all, once everyone has reached a point of satisfaction with the consensus. It really consists of

only four sentences, the final four, since earlier motions to close (UT's 20, 23, 24, 26) were futile attempts. Participants had apparently misread the degree of satisfaction of some other participants. Or they may have made the motions to adjourn to prompt Laka to make his contribution, so the discussion could be completed.

There is a further observation which should be made concerning the opening and closure constituents. This concerns cohesive elements, i.e. those parts of the discourse which function primarily to make what follows cohere with what has preceded. While the surface structure realizations of the medial constituents include cohesive elements which tie in with preceding and following linguistic context, the opening has no immediately preceding linguistic context, and the closure has no immediately following one. Thus in the opening, any initial cohesive element must form a bridge between the immediately following linguistic context and the immediately preceding non-linguistic (social or situational) context. And if there are such elements in the closure, they must form a bridge with the following non-linguistic context.

A cohesive initial in the discourse realizes the transition from the non-linguistic onset of the behavioral unit of litigation (dispute settlement) into its nucleus, which is the linguistic unit of normative discourse, tarabbaq subtype. And a discourse final cohesive element realizes the transition from the linguistic nucleus to the non-linguistic coda or closure of the behavioral unit.

We expect to find such cohesives initial and final in discourse, since not only must discourses be studied in their behavioral/

sociological/ cultural/ psychological context (Longacre 1983a:338), they must also be uttered meaningfully in this larger context.

Chapter seven presents the analysis of discourse level surface structures, beginning with these cohesives.

#### 6.4 The backbone of normative discourse

The backbone of narrative discourse is the event line, and the events narrated are related to each other by chronological linkage. In normative discourse, the backbone is thematic, and the linkage is logical. The themes around which normative discourses are organized are the topics of evaluation and prescription. And the backbone, which is the main thread of development of the theme(s) throughout the discourse, consists of evaluations and prescriptions.

In the informal litigation of the appendix, the global theme of the discourse is 'the misunderstanding' between Andits and Buton. Misunderstanding (literally, not reciprocally-cause-to-understand) is the Ga'dang euphemism for strife, contention, or serious conflict. The word 'misunderstanding' is used in sentences 1, 3, 10, and 15 of the opening constituent of the discourse, the function of which is to articulate the global theme. There are secondary themes presented in the following constituents, some of which are the specific causes of the misunderstanding. But since the global theme is inclusive of the specifics, the global theme is the first topic of evaluation and prescription when the litigation reaches that point. Thus the general

principles of what should be done in case of misunderstandings are presented, first in sentences 172-80 and again in s.194-202.

Following the initial articulation of the global theme in the opening constituent, the secondary themes are presented in the grievance constituent, i.e. the presentation of evaluata. The litigant's personal evaluation of the information he is presenting is always unambiguous, either because it is stated, or communicated by intonation and manner of presentation. In any case, whether or not an evaluation can be immediately construed, any normative theme, whether it is the global theme or another, is a part of the backbone of normative discourse.

#### 6.5 The normative peak

The normative themes are not developed in random order in the evaluation and prescription constituents of the discourse. Just as in the preceding constituents, they occur in the order of most generic to most specific topics of evaluation and prescription, then return again to the most generic.

The most generic theme is the least delicate of the normative topics, since it is the one on which there is the greatest (in most cases unanimous) agreement. Thus any articulation or discussion of such a theme is a low tension point in the discourse. On the other hand, the most specific or most focal normative topic is that which involves the greatest degree of disagreement, the greatest disparity of evaluations. This point of greatest conflict of evaluations is of course the point of



highest tension in the discourse. It is also the normative peak, since it is the point at which the greatest effort is being made to persuade someone to change opinions or behavior. In other words, it is the point at which the greatest effort is being made to persuade someone, whose opinion or behavior has been evaluated as deviant or unacceptable, to subscribe or conform to the particular norms that are being advocated.

In the text of the appendix, there is a normative peak for the discourse as a whole, found in s.300-4. There are also normative peaks within other utterances, functioning as the peak of that particular UT, but not the peak of the discourse as a whole. One such secondary peak is s.210-3, and another is s.80-5. Fig. 13 is a rough approximation of the profile of the text.




Fig. 13. Profile of the text

Seven peaks are identified in the Ga'dang litigation. Three of these are in the grievance constituent (peaks 1-3 in Fig. 13). Peaks 1 and 3 are in utterances 4 and 10 of the text, spoken by Andits, and peak 2 is in utterance 5, spoken by Buton. (Peak 1 is included in the appendix, s.80-100.) Peak 4 of Fig. 13 is in utterance 17 of the discourse, spoken by Sanggoon; the peak section of this utterance is s.210-3 of the appendix. Peak 5 is spoken by Andits, and is virtually the whole of utterance 22 (s.244-62). Peak 6 is spoken by Sanggoon, utterance 25, s.300-4. Peak 7 is spoken by Laka, and is a part of utterance 27 (s.341-6).

Note that Peak 6 is the highest in Fig. 13. It is the normative peak of the whole discourse unit. The other peaks are the peaks of the utterances of which they are a part. As such, they may also function as

the peaks of the normative discourse constituent of which that utterance is a part.

In a normative discourse, the peaks are not necessarily the points of greatest excitement, tension, or emotion. To some extent, the tension and emotion has abated before the normative peak. The litigants released a good deal of emotion in the grievance constituent, early in the discourse. They are already somewhat more relaxed and pacified before the normative peaks. If they were not, they would probably not be receptive to the evaluations and prescriptions of the normative peaks uttered by the moderator.

Furthermore, whereas a climactic narrative builds up tension and excitement as it approaches its peak, in normative discourse the speaker tries to mitigate and assuage tension prior to the normative peak. Nevertheless, there is a decrease in mitigation in the vicinity of the normative peaks. This is not to increase tension, which would be counterproductive, but to increase persuasiveness or normative force.

## 7. THE GA'DANG TEXT: SURFACE STRUCTURE

Most of the discourse level surface structures are discussed in this chapter. Some will be reexamined from other perspectives in the following chapters, and some additional ones will be introduced there.

### 7.1 The discourse unit in its behavioral context

The subject of cohesion between the whole discourse unit and its behavioral context was introduced at the end of ch.6. Cohesion is achieved initially in the discourse by the first sentence of the first utterance (s.1).

Ara antu Buton, e nu sanna ino amme yu  
oKay then Buton and if what the not you-pl

paKkinnawatan a adwa, antu ino pattatarabbag daw  
understand r1 two that the cause-discuss you-pl

ta baKkan a Kunna sitan, a wara Kad madingngadingngag  
so not r1 like that r1 exist perhaps being-heard

daw so tolayira.  
you-pl from people

'Now then, Buton, whatever is the misunderstanding between the two of you, discuss it, so that it won't be like that (hearsay/slander), what you may have heard from other people.'

There are several features working together in this sentence to effect the transition from the non-verbal context into the normative

dialogue. The first is the vocative phrase ara antu, Buton, 'now then, Buton'. The words ara antu always signal a major discourse level transition, either initiating a discourse, or making a transition between major constituents of a discourse. Either of the two words in isolation can also function as a discourse level cohesive, but not signalling such a major transition, as in s.170,173,178: Antu ino kun ku so da'bu, 'This is what I said a while ago' (<antu is usually translated 'this' or 'that', cf. also s.166,188). Most of these examples show antu in a phrase or clause which is functioning as cohesion between utterances. However in the case of the example above (s.1), ara antu initiates the dialogue.

The first complete clause of sentence 1 also functions as transition from the non-linguistic context to the normative dialogue. "Whatever is the misunderstanding between the two of you..." is a CIRCUMSTANCE which will be immediately followed by a PRESCRIPTION (cf. 'schema of prescription', ch.8). The circumstance functions as anaphoric cohesion. It refers to the whole situation which led to the litigation, up to and including the initial state. Thus cohesion with the relevant behavioral context up to that point in time is effected.

On the other hand, the prescription ("discuss it") functions as cataphoric cohesion. It announces and anticipates the following dialogue. Thus the transition into the normative dialogue is effected. But this is not all. There is a JUSTIFICATION constituent of the schema of prescription realized by sentence 1, which justifies the giving of the prescription: "so that it won't be like that (hearsay), what you may have heard from other people." This is both anaphoric and cataphoric. It

refers to what has gone on before, implying that the initial state of the litigation (rumor, slander, hurt) is unsatisfactory, and that a different end state is to be achieved by following the prescription. Thus the purpose of the entire behavioral unit is alluded to, and the entire unit is made to cohere with its larger social context and the ethic of group harmony.

At the end of the normative dialogue, cohesion between the dialogue and the following non-linguistic context is achieved in the final two sentences, 369 and 370. A few previous utterances had made it clear that the desired end state of consensus had been achieved (s.348-368), and in s.369, Yawindo announces that the discussion is finished and it is time to go. And in s.370, Sanggoon recommends some non-linguistic behavior which should immediately follow the end of the structured dialogue, namely cooking coffee and washing hands. This not only makes the transition out of the structured dialogue, but also effects coherence with the larger context, since washing hands together and drinking coffee together are symbolic of harmony or social eudaemonism.

## 7.2 Cohesion between larger units of normative discourse

This section is concerned primarily with the surface structures which effect cohesion between the largest units within the whole dialogue unit, namely the utterances. "Between utterances" rules out the beginning of the first UT and the end of the last one, but these were treated in the previous section. The cohesives in focus here are those

internal in the dialogue, at or near the beginnings or ends of utterances. Almost all the sentences which have this inter-UT cohesive function are first or last in an utterance. Occasionally, they are second or penultimate in the UT.

### 7.2.1 Designated turn taking and cohesion

The term "designated turn taking" is being used in a looser sense here than was intended by Hall (1983:ch.3). Hall included in designated turn taking any formal dialogue situation in which one individual had the responsibility of directing others to speak, and also the situation in a dialogue in which any participant would designate who should speak next (a "passing on of the floor"). I expand the definition of the term to include any clear designation of the beginning or ending of an utterance, whether preceding or following, or the one the speaker is uttering at that moment. This definition is now so general in comparison to Hall's that it might seem of little use, but it does serve to contrast the discrete turn taking of the tarabbag from the quite unstructured and undesignated turn taking of casual conversation. If the tarabbag were contrasted with more formal litigation, finer distinctions would probably need to be made.

Four types of turn taking cohesives can be identified, depending on whether the cohesive points forward or backward, and whether it points to the utterance of which it is a part or to another one. The four can be given these names, listed in the order of presentation below: cataphoric,

different UT; anaphoric, different UT; cataphoric, same UT; and anaphoric, same UT.

The first type is the cataphoric, different UT. This type occurs at the end of the utterance of which it is a part, and it anticipates or designates the following UT. These cohesives occur early in the normative dialogue, in the opening and grievance constituents. In UT1, s.1, the designation is '(the two of you) discuss it', and in s.2 (the final sentence of UT1) it is 'just hear each other out'. At the end of UT2, virtually a whole paragraph (s.23-8) is devoted to this type of designation. In sentence 23, Andits is designated, and told to speak in a certain way, i.e. to speak his grievances, whatever they were. In sentence 24, Buton is designated and given similar instructions. And finally in sentence 28, the two of them are designated to tell and discuss it. The two of them respond, following the order of designation in s.23 and s.24. Andits's response is UT4, s.29-165. A further example of the cataphoric different UT cohesive is found at the end of Andits's speech in UT4. In s.163, Andits designates Buton with a second person pronoun:

Ara sigi sapitan nu pay nu anya pay anggam nu sassapitan.  
okay go say you just if what just want you say

'Okay, go ahead, just say whatever you want to say.'

And in s.164, Andits repeats the designation almost verbatim. Buton responds in UT5, not included in the appendix due to length and problems with the recording.



The UT which follows such a designation automatically coheres with its linguistic context in the dialogue. It has been designated or predicted, and is the 'default' (i.e. expected) continuance. In all instances of cataphoric different UT designations, the content of the following UT also cohered with what went before. (Occasionally there is a UT the content of which is only marginally coherent with the whole dialogue unit, but none of these are responses to cataphoric turn designations. UT14 was such an utterance, characterized as extraneous in Fig. 6.)

The second designated-turn-cohesive is anaphoric, different UT. This type is not uncommon in the normative dialogues studied, but there does not happen to be one in the appendix. In this type the speaker refers back to the utterance just completed, often by simply asking if the speaker has finished what he wanted to say (another evidence that these are communication-situation oriented rather than content oriented cohesives). In UT3 of the tarabbaq (not included in appendix), Yawindo asks the previous speaker, Antu-in inoy o sapitan nu?, 'Is that all you will say?' In another discussion, one speaker asks another Awanin sapitan daw? 'Do you have no more to say?' Still another speaker asked simply Awanin? 'No more?' The speaker seldom waits for an audible answer to his question, since he is virtually certain before he asks that the other is in fact finished.

The third type of designated-turn-cohesive is cataphoric, same UT. (This type may occur immediately following the second type, the anaphoric-different-UT.) Referring again to UT3, after Yawindo asks 'Is

that all you will say?' he immediately follows with Matubburan ku pay, 'I'll just add-on'. However this third type of cohesive need not be preceded by another one in the same UT. In UT27, s.331-2, LaKa begins his utterance with Kallay. Tubburan ku si bisang lamang, 'Man. I'll just add on a little'.

This third type of cohesive points forward to the remainder of the utterance of which it is a part. There is a particular form of this type of cohesive which has a very significant function in the normative dialogue. This form begins with the words antu or antu yaw, both of which can be translated as 'this'. Together they mean something like 'this very thing'. This form of the cataphoric same UT cohesive is used only twice in the normative dialogue of the appendix, once at the beginning of the evaluation constituent, and once at the beginning of the prescription constituent! The evaluation constituent begins with s.191:

Antu yaw ino dama-k pelang Kappay a masapit.  
this this the able-I only also rl say

'This is what I am able also to say.'

Sentences 192 and 193 are somewhat parenthetical, so the cohesive above is paraphrased in s.194, E Kunna yaw yo masapit ku, 'And this is what I have to say'. The prescription constituent of the discourse begins with a similar sentence, s.266, Antu ino masapit ku ke, 'This is what I say'. The words antu and yaw, or the two together, are used in cohesives in other parts of the discourse, but only in these two places as cataphoric same UT cohesives. Other recorded normative dialogues have similar

sentences leading into the evaluation and prescription constituents. In all instances observed they were spoken by the moderator, the one who officiates and mediates the litigation. Clearly this form of the cataphoric same UT cohesive marks the beginning of important constituents of the normative discourse.

The fourth of this group of cohesives is the anaphoric, same UT. This type of cohesive announces the termination of the utterance of which it is a part. Thus it has the least overall cohesive effect in the dialogue. It simply provides the cue for others to begin to speak if they wish to. Examples of this type of cohesive are in UT4 s.165 and UT36 s.366 of the appendix, and also in UT10, not included. In UT10, Andits concludes by saying Antu-in inoy o sapitan ku, 'that's all I have to say'. The completive suffix -in is always a part of this cohesive, usually in the phrase antu-in inoy, 'that's all'.

### 7.2.2 Content oriented cohesives

The turn-taking-cohesives tend to be person oriented or speech act oriented, i.e. more explicitly related to who is speaking rather than to what is being said. All the following types of cohesives, including paraphrase and flashback, are more oriented to semantic content.

The more common type of the content oriented cohesive is the 'summarize content' type. An example of this is found in UT5 s.166, in which Sanggoon sums up in a sentence the whole previous utterance of Buton (not included). The sentence begins with antu ino, an anaphoric

reference to what has immediately preceded, and is followed by a capsule statement of the content or an abstraction of the main theme of what preceded: 'That is what you know about the hurt your uncle felt toward you, man'. A similar content summary cohesive is found in the last sentence of UT25, s.329. It begins with the words ira inay, 'plural that', i.e. those things (that have just been said). In this case the cohesive does not refer to a previous UT, but to the content of all that preceded in the same UT.

The content summary cohesives are necessarily anaphoric. However there is also a content oriented cohesive which is cataphoric. Its nature is to elicit content rather than summarize content. It is similar to the cataphoric different UT cohesive of the turn taking type, in that it designates the following speaker, but it is different in that it focusses on what is to be said. The whole of UT6 (s.167-9) functions as this type of cohesive: 'What in fact was my sin, uncle? Tell me...'

### 7.2.3 Paraphrase and endorsement as cohesion

The paraphrase cohesive is similar to the content summary cohesive. The difference is that the paraphrase does not, as a rule, summarize a large segment of preceding text in capsule form. Rather, it paraphrases the content of the immediately preceding proposition or proposition cluster, or simply endorses it (e.g. 'yes/true/good/I like that'). Furthermore, the paraphrase cohesive tends to be the only sentence in its utterance. Thus it is not functioning to make its own utterance cohere

with what preceded or what follows. Rather, it has a function of effecting cohesion at the level of the purpose of the whole litigation unit. It contributes to the achievement of the desired end state, consensus, by endorsing the evaluations or prescriptions of others.

There are 13 paraphrase cohesives in the litigation of the appendix. None of these are in the first 170 sentences, and nine of them are in the last 25 sentences. This distribution, along with the content of the paraphrases, clearly shows the function of this type of cohesive to be that of advancing the discussion toward consensus or unanimity.

The first example of this type of cohesive in the text is sentence 171 (spoken by Buton), which paraphrases s.170 (spoken by Andits):

170. Antu ino kun ku so da'bu inoy, a nu kamali na tata,  
that the said I at while then r1 if error of one

Kamali ta adwa.  
error we- two

171. On, kamali ta lud.  
yes error we-2 really

170. 'That's what I said a while ago, that if one of us erred,  
we both erred. 171. Yes, we really both erred.'

The simple endorsement is an even more common form of this type of cohesive. Sentences 182 and 183 are good examples, spoken by Yawindo and Andits respectively. Both sentences consist of just one word, qakkuruq, 'true'. The other examples of this type of cohesive are found in the appendix, s.218, 347, 348, 349, 350, 354, 359, 362, 365, and 367.

#### 7.2.4 The flashback cohesive

This type of cohesive is also anaphoric, but it does more than simply refer to what immediately preceded. In fact, it necessarily skips what immediately preceded, and refers back to something earlier in the linguistic context. The key words in this type of cohesive are so da'bu, 'a while ago'. The particle so is the marker of temporal or spatial location, and da'bu means 'earlier'. This type is usually at the beginning of a utterance. In sentence 170 (see the example above), Andits used the flashback cohesive Antu ino kun ku so da'bu inoy, 'that's what I said a while ago'. Sanggoon used the exact words in s.173, and again in s.178, referring to some of his own earlier utterances.

It is very likely that this type of cohesive is being used not only for the purpose of cohesion in the discourse, but as a 'citation to authenticate' (cf. 5.1.4).

#### 7.3 Paragraph boundaries and the normative coda

Paragraph boundaries are of special significance in normative discourse. There are several types of surface structures which occur initial or final in paragraphs, and the distribution of the types plays an important role in the realization of the macrostructure of the whole discourse.

The rule of thumb concerning unit boundaries is that any boundary of a 'larger' unit (i.e. of greater hierarchical ranking) is also, ipso

facto, a boundary of all smaller or lower ranking units. Thus an utterance boundary is also the boundary of a paragraph, sentence, word, etc. Therefore, the turn-taking cohesives discussed in the previous section will not be prominent in this discussion, even though they also signal paragraph boundaries. (This illustrates the economy and advantage, if not the necessity, of the discourse-oriented approach.)

Notwithstanding the general rule, the notion of a 'dialogue paragraph' is a useful one. In the context of reported speech, a speaker or writer may report a dialogue within his own utterance. When the content of the reported dialogue is conceptually unified, the surface structure realization is likely to be a dialogue paragraph, as in s.136-40 of the appendix.

The following subsections discuss the types of surface structures which occur at paragraph boundaries, their function as cohesives, and their function in the discourse as a whole.

### 7.3.1 Narrative paragraph markers in normative discourse

The most common type of narrative paragraph marker occurs initially in a narrative paragraph, and signals the beginning of some event or sequence of events which are notionally related in that they occur at a common place, or in a relatively uninterrupted period of time, and usually involve the same participants throughout.

The key words which signal the beginning of a narrative paragraph are wara sin or wara so (existential plus temporal or spatial location

marker). A free translation of these words would be 'at the time of...' or 'it happened that...' or it could be translated 'after that had happened' if the definite past tense temporal location sin is used. There are many examples in the text of the appendix, as in s.51, Wara sin gafu na yawe, 'at the beginning of this', or Wara sin maraqadi, 'at the time of cutting wood' in s.69. Other examples, including the abbreviated forms waso and wasin, are in s.103, 105, 109, 117, 119, and 141. At least 15 paragraphs in the text open with a narrative paragraph marker.

The question is, what are these narrative paragraph markers, and the very narrative-looking paragraphs of which they are a part, doing in a normative discourse? Their function as cohesives between paragraphs is not in question, but why this type of cohesive in a normative text?

The answer is to be found in the content of the paragraphs they introduce, and in their distribution in the whole discourse. They occur early in the discourse, almost exclusively in the grievance constituent (prior to UT11, sentence 172). And the semantic content of the paragraphs is made up of events, utterances, reactions and feelings which will serve as the items to be evaluated in the overall normative exercise. Thus the grievance constituent might also appropriately be called 'PRESENTATION OF EVALUATA'. Narrative surface structures are embedded within the realization of the grievance constituent of the discourse.

There is evidence that these narrative segments are embedded within normative discourse. It is not simply a case of some narrative discourse followed by some normative discourse. The evidence is the feature of the normative coda (cf. 7.3.3 below).



### 7.3.2 Preposed noun phrases at paragraph boundaries

The normal order of clause level constituents in Ga'dang is Verb, Subject, Object. One method of introducing a new paragraph topic is to put the subject noun phrase first in the initial clause. Whereas the narrative type of paragraph cohesive (wara so, etc.) provides orientation concerning time, place, and events of the remainder of the paragraph, the preposed noun phrase tends to highlight a particular topic or theme which is to be developed. The preposed noun phrase is characteristic of expository discourse, but is not uncommon in narrative also, especially when the narrator wishes to switch the focus of attention to a different participant.

In the normative discourse, the regular use of the preposed noun phrase is to focus attention on an evaluatum that is about to be evaluated. As such, it is often an anaphoric cohesive, referring to a topic that was mentioned in the grievance or 'presentation of evaluata' constituent. One example is in s.148:

E ira yaw allay si gakkurug ino kalowan ino nakam ku...  
and pl this man in truth the hurt the mind my

'And these things are really what grieved my heart, man...'

This example is a part of the grievance constituent, so no extensive evaluation of 'these things' is given, other than that it grieved the speaker. In s.222, a preposed noun phrase introduces one of the major topics to be evaluated: E ino daffug ira kanu inoy a nasapit, 'and that

water buffalo that was spoken of...'. The following three paragraphs are concerned with the evaluation of the buffalo incident, in which Buton offended the neighbors by letting his buffalo wander loose and do some damage. Again in s.282, the normative topic is introduced in a preposed NP, E anda iyo paraparal ke, 'and about this slander'. This is the focal evaluatum from the moderator's point of view, and it is repeated in another preposed NP in s.295, as well as evaluated at great length.

### 7.3.3 The normative coda as paragraph closure

The normative coda is an evaluation or prescription which signals the end of a paragraph in normative discourse. There is typically some thematic reorientation immediately following it and opening the new paragraph, such as the preposed noun phrase announcing another evaluatum to be considered, or a new slant that the evaluation should take. The coda followed by a thematic statement is a clear indication of paragraph boundaries.

The normative coda is perhaps the most distinctive surface structure feature of normative discourse. The embedded narrative segments discussed earlier are distinguished from paragraphs in typical narrative discourse by the normative coda at the end.

Not all of the paragraphs which have normative codas contain embedded narrative structures. Nor do all paragraphs in the discourse have a normative coda, but there are at least 28 in the informal litigation of the appendix.

The normative codas are of two types, evaluative and prescriptive. The evaluative coda expresses concisely a judgment concerning an evaluatum (usually an action or behavior pattern). Evaluata may be judged good or bad, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, or ranked better or worse. Of course, there are many ways to paraphrase each type of evaluation.

Sentence 21 of the appendix is the normative coda of the paragraph s.17-21. The paragraph revolves around the fact that the two litigants did not take the initiative to bring about a solution to the problem, and ends with s.21:

Amme na ira inoy allay nad.  
reject it pl that man should

'It should not be like that, man.'

The word ammay (or amme when followed by a consonant) means rejection, disfavor, dislike, or refusal. Without affixation, as in s.21 above, it is not a verbal form. Non-verbal equative sentences, cleft sentences (Jones 1977:195), or predicate-adjective sentences are characteristic of expository discourse in Ga'dang. However, if the particle nad, 'should/ought' occurs in such structures, they are normative sentences, not expository.

The above example is an evaluative coda, since no prescription is explicitly given. A prescription is clearly implied, i.e. 'don't behave like that'. But being a non-verbal sentence, it is an evaluative coda rather than a prescriptive one.

The relationship between the two types of normative codas, evaluative and prescriptive, is that an evaluative coda implies a prescription, and conversely, every prescriptive coda necessarily presupposes an evaluation. However, despite this dependency relationship, the two are definitely not in free variation with respect to distribution in the normative discourse.

There are some evaluative codas in every constituent of the discourse. However, although a prescription is implied in every evaluative coda (and perhaps in every evaluation), the distribution of the prescriptive codas in the dialogue is restricted. There are few places in normative discourse where a prescriptive coda is appropriate!

Prescriptive codas occur only in normative discourse peaks! A prescriptive coda is a verbal sentence expressing an imperative. Like the evaluative coda, these often occur with the particle nad, as in s.213:

Ino ammu yu a makadaral so annggurug tam,  
the know you-pl rl able-ruin at faith ours-inc

amme tam-un nad a pakakwan-in allay.  
not we-cmp ought rl to-do-cmp man

'That which you know ruins our faith, we should not do it, man.'

However, whereas nad increases the NORMATIVE FORCE (cf. ch.9) of a non-verbal sentence, it decreases the normative force of a prescription or imperative. In other words, the prescriptive coda with nad is a mitigated one, a prescription somewhat disguised as an evaluation. The

example above occurs near the transition into the prescription constituent of the whole discourse. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly where this transition occurs, but is clearly in the vicinity of s.213.

The peak of the prescription constituent is the peak of the normative discourse. In this context, there is an unmitigated prescriptive coda Kakkapan tam, 'try!' (s.384).

There is another unmitigated prescriptive coda in s.80. This is in the middle of the grievance constituent, which is not the peak of the normative discourse. However, the immediate context of s.80 is certainly a secondary peak of the discourse as a whole, and clearly the peak of Andits's presentation of *evaluata*. Sentences 73-7 manifest the surface structure of a narrative peak (Walrod 1979:25-8). In this section, Andits presents (narrates) an account of an incident in which the behavior of Buton was very offensive to him. This is followed by the prescriptive coda of s.80: Aran tam ira inay ira a banag, 'Get rid of that kind of thing.'

The two short paragraphs which follow s.80 (s.81-5) can be interpreted as amplifications of the prescription. These are immediately followed by the narration of another offensive incident in s.86-100, a section which is even more clearly marked with the surface structure of a narrative peak. Maximum deletion is in effect throughout this section, with virtually all surface structure cohesives and non-nuclear elements of sentences omitted. To observe the net effect of the maximum deletion in truncated sentences, notice that in the first four pages of the appended text, there are about four sentences per page, but sentences

86-100 are so short that they all fit in approximately one page (cf. grammatical features of peak, ch.9).

In addition to the unmitigated prescriptive coda (s.80) in the peak of Andits's presentation of evaluata, there is an evaluative coda at the end of the peak section which is as unmitigated as an evaluation can be. It is s.100, Inanmek, a single word in Ga'dang which means 'I rejected/disliked it', but would be better given a free translation of the strongest type, e.g. 'infuriating'. The word was uttered with laryngealization or tense constriction of the throat, and conveys more intense emotion than any other surface structure of the whole dialogue discourse.

Other evaluative codas are found in s.37, 50, 57-8, 68, 243, 294, and other examples of prescriptive codas are s. 262, 281, and 326.

#### 7.3.4 Hypothetical circumstances as thematic cohesives

There is another type of cohesive which may mark the beginning of a paragraph. This is a conditional clause expressing a hypothetical circumstance. In addition to functioning as a cohesive between paragraphs, this type of clause may also function as the initial constituent of the notional 'schema of prescription' unit (cf. 6.1.3). This constituent is called the PROJECTED CIRCUMSTANCE. The nuclear and final constituents of the schema are PRESCRIPTION and JUSTIFICATION:

The clearest example in the appendix of a hypothetical circumstance

which functions both as a paragraph initial cohesive and a projected circumstance is found in s.235:

E nu gangngariyan si makkamali etam se tolay etam...  
and if for-example obj err we-inc for people we-inc...

'And if for example we err, for we are just people...'

The remainder of the paragraph consists of a sequence of three prescriptions and a justification or supporting reason. The prescriptions are 1. don't be ashamed, 2. get a companion to go with you, and 3. go talk over the problem with the other party. And the justification is: 'so that you won't forget about it, because if you allow it to go on, the problem will get worse'.

Other examples of the hypothetical circumstance as paragraph cohesive, but not as a part of a schema of prescription, are s.201, 202, 207.

### 7.3.5 Change of addressee

A paragraph boundary may be signalled by an explicit switch of addressee within an utterance. These switches are of two types. One is a switch from non-specific addressee to a specific addressee. The second type is a switch from a specific addressee previously mentioned to a different addressee. The first type involves a switch from addressing everybody in general and nobody in particular, to addressing one or more people specifically, as in s.319, Mampe sikwam Buton, 'as for you Buton'.

Another example is found in s.59. In the previous paragraph, Buton was being talked about, referred to by name in s.51, and by third person pronoun na in s.52, 57, and 58. Then in s.59, Buton becomes the addressee, being addressed with the second person pronoun nu, which becomes -m when suffixed to a vowel-final stem.

The second type of addressee switch is encoded in a phrase preposed to the initial position of the sentence, as in s.328, 'E ikKa pay Andits, 'and 'you Andits'. The addressee was Buton since s. 319, and referred to by name again in s.327. In s.328, the addressee is Andits.

### 7.3.6 The cohesive cluster at paragraph boundaries

There are a few paragraphs that are introduced by a cluster of cohesive elements. These clusters begin with a conjunction which normally functions as a cohesive relating clauses within a sentence, such as odde, 'but' in s.7, 63, and 337, e, 'and' in s.225, 229, and 318, or gampade, 'however' in s.229 and 230.

Following the lower level conjunction is the paragraph level cohesive of the narrative type, wara so, 'it happened that'. And typically following the narrative cohesive is the preposed-noun-phrase type of paragraph level cohesive. Examples of all three cohesives initial in a paragraph are found in s.225, 229, 318, and 337. Sentence 229, in fact, has two of the lower level conjunctions preceding the two paragraph level cohesives:



E gampade wara pay o Buton...  
and however exist just np Buton...

The use of these cohesive clusters is very significant in normative discourse. They are used to signal departure from the current script, i.e. what would normally be expected to follow. The frequency of the conjunctions odde, 'but', and gampade, 'however' in the cohesive clusters is one evidence of the departure from script or norm. And since some departure from norms is involved, there is something in the immediate context which is being 'contraindicated' (to borrow a term from medical practice). Whatever that deviant or abnormal behavior is, it is disapproved of, and the implicit evaluation is 'this ought not to be done'. The cultural norms relating to behavior are scripts of proper conduct prescribed (i.e. expected, required) by the society.

#### 7.4 Sentence, clause, and verb in normative discourse

Longacre (1982) has demonstrated that the tense, aspect, and mood of verbs can be related to a ranking scale in discourse. Each type of discourse has its own ranking scale, and surface structures which are higher on the scale are more prominent in the discourse. However, what is high on the scale for one type of discourse may be low for another. Thus a non-verbal clause may rank as the most prominent or important type of surface structure in expository discourse, but rank very low in narrative discourse.

Fig. 14 displays the ranking of clause level surface structures in Ga'dang normative discourse. The numbers listed opposite each type of structure refer to sentences in the appendix; the column under 'negated' gives examples of the construction with negating morphemes.

Normative rank	Surface structure	Examples	Negated
imperative			
direct	non-past verb, 2nd prs	168,257,323	108,349
cohortative	n-p verb, 1st prs inc	80,300-4,325	213,326
bihortative	n-p verb, 1st prs dual	235,319	
causative	same options as imper. +paC--an caus vb affix	none in appendix	
compulsory	same options as imper. +ma'awag, 'necessary'	274,320	
obligatory	same options as imper. +nad 'ought'	116,231,259	129,199
contrafactual	cond.cl, past vb +nad	57,58,175	
volitional	verbs of volition: anggam, ammay	100,115,181,201	243,338
epistemic	vbs of cognition: ammu, awat, arig, dandam	16,120-5,196,269	39,40,84
evaluative	same options as expos. +nad 'ought'	21,113,358	129,329
expository	non-verbal w/ embedded participle or clause, or pure non-verbal cl.	148,179 37,79,159,348,354	209,229 232

Fig. 14. Ranking of clause and verb in normative discourse

The ranks identified in Ga'dang normative discourse (see Fig. 14) are imperative, causative, compulsory, obligatory, volitional, epistemic, evaluative, and expository. These are listed in order of greatest to least normative force. Examples of each construction will be given below, following some discussion of the significance of the obligatory rank.

Intuitively, the direct imperative is selected as the structure with the greatest normative force, and thus the focal structure or 'standard' of normative discourse. However, there are some good reasons to focus attention on the mid-point in the normative scale, the obligatory construction. This construction consists of any form of imperative plus the particle nad, 'ought'. This particle does not indicate that there is no option but to do what is commanded. Rather, it indicates that there is a moral obligation to do it. Normative discourse is saturated with the particle nad. There are 44 occurrences in the text of the appendix, far more than there are direct imperatives. In a society in which consensus, group harmony, and moral obligation are of paramount importance, the concept of 'ought' is almost on the level of coercion.

In addition to the frequency of the particle nad, and the explanation offered for its importance, there are three more features which draw attention to the obligatory rank in Ga'dang normative discourse: 1. The obligatory rank is a significant boundary. All higher ranks are prescriptive, and all lower ranks are evaluative. 2. The obligatory particle nad exerts a 'middling influence', i.e. when it is used in lower ranking constructions, the normative force of these is elevated, but when it is used with the higher ranks, the normative force

is mitigated. Thus it causes other constructions to move toward its own level. 3. The order of the normative ranking of pronouns changes at this point. At the obligatory and higher levels, use of the second person pronouns outranks use of first person inclusive, which in turn outranks first person dual. However below the obligatory rank, the order changes to first person singular as having the greatest normative force, followed by first person exclusive, inclusive, and dual respectively, followed by second and third person. Note that it is logically impossible to use the first person exclusive above the obligatory rank, since all ranks above are prescriptive, and it is impossible to utter a prescription which excludes the people being addressed. The first person exclusive means 'me and my sidekicks, not including you who I am speaking to'. Examples of this pronoun ranking will be included in 7.5, following.

Notwithstanding the significance of the obligatory rank in the grammar of normative discourse, the direct IMPERATIVE is still ranked as having the greatest normative force. There is an implicit moral obligation (an implicit nad) to obey any direct imperative, since these are uttered in normative discourse only by those who have the appropriate social status. An example of the direct imperative is s.168, tuldwan n-ak, 'teach you-me' i.e. 'tell me'. There may be pronouns in the clause other than the second person, but the second person pronoun is the addressee, and the one expected to do what is being commanded.

The cohortative is like the direct imperative except that the addressee is 'all of us', i.e. the first person inclusive pronoun. An example is s.302:

KakKapan tam      tangngallan ino bifig tam...  
 try      we-inc control      the lips ours...

'Let's try to control our speech...'

This type of construction is given a ranking below that of the direct imperative because the use of the first person inclusive is a kind of mitigation. As a rule, the speaker is not including himself as one needing the exhortation, but on the surface he includes himself to mitigate the command. The bihortative, the imperative directed at the first person dual, (i.e. we two) is slightly more mitigated. The first person dual is very often used in as a non-specific reference to people in general, as in s.235: ...e in-ta makitatabbag..., 'and go-we-2 discuss' i.e. 'let's go discuss it'.

The verb of the imperatives is minimally affixed for tense or mood. Frequently it is completely without affixation, a rare form in Ga'dang, in which verb morphology is the most complex part of the grammar. In the above examples, the verbs 'try' and 'go' are without affixation. However, any of the case or 'focus' marking affixes may be used in an imperative. In s.108, amme-m mad-damit, 'not-you nominative-case-speak' ('don't speak'), the nominative case prefix maC- is used. (Upper case C final on a prefix signals doubling of the first consonant of the following stem.) And in s.168, tuldu-an n-ak, 'teach-accusative you-me', i.e. 'tell me', the accusative suffix -an is used. And the positional prefix i- may be used with the imperative, as in i-qamwang nu taw, 'positional-bring you here', i.e. 'bring (it) here'. Aspectual affixes may also be used, as in

s.25, the prefix makka encodes reciprocal action, and in s.41, the reduplication of the stem of 'example' encodes continuative action.

The CAUSATIVE construction is ranked just below the imperatives in Fig. 14. Not all causative constructions are imperatives. But if the clause is imperative in form, with the addition of the causative affixation to the verb and the reference to the person(s) to be caused to do something, they are causative imperatives, and rank high on the scale. There is no example in the appendix, but an example from a Ga'dang folklore narrative with an imperative in reported speech is this:

Pak-kanan nu ino abbing si u'git.  
cause-eat you the child obj worms

'Feed the child some worms.'

The COMPULSORY construction ranks next. It has the form of a normal imperative, but is preceded by the words ma'awaq si, 'necessary', as in s.274 and 328.

The OBLIGATORY construction also has the form of an imperative, with the simple addition of the particle nad, 'ought'. The position of the particle in the clause is not fixed, but it is never far from the imperative verb, and usually follows the subject, which immediately follows the verb. An example is s.116:

Lawad-an tam nad iyo madal...  
 good-accus. we-inc ought this study...

'We should improve this study...'

There is a subtype of the obligatory, namely the contrafactual, i.e. the unfulfilled obligation. The difference in the surface structure is that the verb is in the past tense, as in s.58:

Onnu in-ang na nad sinapit sikwak...  
 or past-come he ought said to-me...

'Or he should have come and said to me...'

The VOLITIONAL construction involves the verbs anqqam, 'like, accept' and ammay, 'dislike, reject', but only when they are used as verbs. Both lexemes have common non-verbal uses which have a lower normative rank. The verb ammay must have some verbal affixation to be used as a verb, as in s.100, in-amme-k, past-tense-accusative-prefix + reject + first-person-sg. pronoun, 'I hated that' (cf. s.201, 226). When ammay is unaffixed (other than a suffixed pronoun), it has a non-verbal function as a simple negative, negating whatever verb it is juxtaposed to, as in s.243:



Se amme-k pay anggam o manata'wig...  
for not-I just like the favoritism...

'For I just don't like favoritism...'

Similar to s.243 is s.338. It happens that in both these examples the verb anqqam is the one being negated, thus both of these sentences are also volitional constructions, but not by virtue of the word ammay. Notice that anqqam does not require verbal affixation to function as a verb (cf. s.115).

The EPISTEMIC construction is also a verbal clause, but with verbs of cognition. The verbs of volition (the next higher rank) are not highly dynamic verbs, but the verbs of cognition are near to the least dynamic. These verbs are ammu, 'know', awat, 'understand', dandam, 'think', and ariq, 'mistakenly-think'. These verbs are used to make strong evaluations, i.e. to elevate the normative force of evaluations, as in s.269:

Ma'awatan si abbing ka, se abbing ka kepay lud.  
understood obj child you for child you still really

'It's understood that you are a child, for you are still a child.'

The EVALUATIVE construction is a non-verbal clause with the particle nad, 'ought'. As with any non-verbal clause, this construction may have a participle or verbal clause embedded within one or both of its nominal constituents. Evaluative clauses with embedded verbal structures rank

higher in normative force than those with no verbal element. An evaluative construction with an embedded verbal clause is s.129:

Ira inay allay ino amme tam ira nad a pakakwan.  
 pl that man the not we-inc pl ought r1 cause-do

'Those things are what we should not do, man.'

An example of an evaluative construction without an embedded verbal element is s.21:

Amme na ira inoy allay nad.  
 not it pl that man ought

'It should not be like that, man.'

The EXPOSITORY rank is encoded in surface structure which appears to be pure expository discourse. But the normative function of such sentences in the text is clear because of evaluative lexemes in the constructions, e.g. 'that is good/bad' is evaluative, whereas 'that is big/little' is expository that is value-neutral; there is no value or disvalue inherent in the conventional meanings of the lexemes. Value-neutral expository sentences are not a part of normative discourse. If they do occur in a normative text, they must be embedded, possibly as an explanatory author comment.

An example in the appendix of an expository structure with an embedded verbal clause is s.179:

E mepangngat ikkallaye a balawan dakayu...  
and fitting you-man r1 rebuke I-you-pl...

'And it's fitting that I rebuke you both...'

An example of the expository construction without an embedded verbal element is s.354. Note that the English translation includes a noun that was formed by adding -ing to a verbal stem, but not so in Ga'dang. Tuldu is the stem, and without verbal affixation, it is a noun.

Kunna mat yan ino tuldu a nalawad allaye.  
like sure that the teaching r1 good man

'That is really good teaching, man.'

The expository construction is the lowest ranked clause type with respect to normative force. It is also the most static of all the constructions, a non-verbal clause.

Sentences are ranked according to the clauses and verbs in them, particularly those in the main clause. Non-nuclear clauses in normative discourse sentences may function as projected circumstance or justification of the main clause(s). High ranking verbs/clauses with these peripheral clauses make up sentences which are mainline in normative discourse. High ranking clauses without these peripherals (i.e. one-clause sentences) may signal a normative peak (cf. ch.9). On the other hand, low ranking clauses with no peripherals are low in normative ranking in the discourse and low in normative force.

### 7.5 Pronominal reference and mitigation

Normative discourse is addressee oriented. Thus the unmarked form of pronominal reference is second person. It is the norm that the commands or prescriptions of normative discourse are addressed to the people being spoken to. This unmarked form of prescription would be that of the highest rank in Fig. 14, the direct imperative. However, although this is the unmarked form, it is rarely used in the informal litigation. Few commands are addressed to the second person, and even fewer to the second person singular.

The explanation for this is in the social setting. The social relationships between speakers and hearers make it inappropriate for most speakers to command using the second person singular, which is the most direct and most unmitigated form of command. It may seem strange to call a form which is rarely used the 'unmarked' form, but the evidence for doing so is found in the advice type of normative discourse, in which the speaker must have social status that is clearly superior to the addressee(s). In the advice discourse, the second person is used exclusively.

The second person is used in the litigation, but only at the appropriate places. One of the uses of second person is initial in the discourse, when the litigants are addressed and the problem stated. In s.2, the pronoun kayu, 'you-pl', is used. This is the nominative case pronoun. Also, in s.1 and 2, the genitive second person plural is used, daw, (in s.1 it is yu, the form which follows a vowel-final stem). Then

in s.4, the emphatic second person plural is used, ikkayu. The second person pronouns of this pronouns set are always used as vocatives. Thus for the initial address of the litigants, and throughout the opening constituent in the informal litigation, the second person is appropriate.

Once the grievance constituent begins, the litigants refer to each other with third person, even though at times their remarks may be intended as direct accusation or exhortation to the other individual. At highly charged points in the discourse there may be a sudden switch to second person, as in s.59. In the sentences preceding and following 59, Buton has been referred to with the third person pronoun. In 59, suddenly he is directly addressed with the second person singular pronoun. Then again in s.72-100, which is clearly the peak of Andits's grievance speech, Buton is referred to by the second person singular throughout.

In the evaluation and prescription constituents of the discourse, even in some normative peaks, the prescriptions are directed to the first person inclusive etam, as in s.300-4, the peak of the whole discourse. Here we would expect second person, but in the interest of group harmony, the prescriptions are made somewhat more general, and directed to everyone. The deliberate avoidance of giving prescriptions addressed to the second person is illustrated in s.213, in which the projected circumstance is addressed to the second person ('whatever you know that ruins our faith'), but the command element related to and immediately following this clause, in the same sentence, is addressed to first person inclusive ('we should not do'). A similar example is s.235, in which the projected circumstance is directed to first person inclusive, and

followed by a series of prescriptions followed by first person dual, which is still more mitigated. The only instances in the discourse in which prescriptions directed to the second person are prominent occur in the prescription constituent (s.268-75 and 319-23), and are addressed to Buton, who is much younger than Sanggoon. Even some of these are immediately paraphrased and addressed to first person inclusive (s.325-6), to mitigate the heaviness of the direct prescription to Buton.

In the same section, when the focus is turned to Andits's fault in the matter, there is no prescription directed to the second person. Rather, there are very low ranking normative constructions used: an epistemic with second person pronoun in s.328, and an evaluative in which a second person plural reference (to Buton and Andits) is made in an embedded clause (s.329).

#### 7.6 Particles, conjunctions, and marking of the backbone

There are several particles which have more significant roles in normative discourse than in any other type. For example, the particle nad, 'ought', marks any sentence that it occurs in as a normative sentence. Furthermore, within a normative text, any sentence with the particle nad is mainline or high ranking in the discourse. Some of the other particles also mark their immediate context as very prominent, e.g. lud, mat, ma'lud, kad, gampade, gampama'de. Other particles do not in themselves mark mainline or prominent sentences, but any sentence in which there is a cluster of particles definitely has high prominence in

the whole discourse or significant function in one of the discourse constituents.

Figure 15 lists the particles common in normative discourse, with a rough attempt to translate them (particles are notoriously difficult to translate, partly because their meaning is so context sensitive).

PARTICLES		CONJUNCTIONS ETC.	
nad	ought	gampade	however
Kad	perhaps, indeed	gampama'de	however indeed
lud	surely		
mat	in fact	gakKurug	truly
lang	only	gakKuruwingke	truly indeed
ke	just, still		
pay	just	pelamang	not too significant
man	again, more	kepay	still, yet
allay	man, friend	ma'lud	surely, surprisingly

Fig. 15. Normative particles and conjunctions

A few combinations of particles are given in the lower right in Fig. 15. These are only a small subset of the possible combinations of the particles, and the meanings of the combinations is often quite different from the combined meanings of the morphemes of which they are made up.

The evaluative/normative particles are useful in classifying texts or units within texts. Especially within normative dialogue, utterances or parts of utterances which appear to be narrative or expository are in

fact filling slots in the normative discourse, and the normative particles are the proofs.

The distribution and function of the particles, as well as their normative ranking, will be discussed in ch.9.



## 8. STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION AND THEIR REALIZATIONS

The strategies of persuasion which are relevant to Ga'dang informal litigation are the focus of attention in this chapter. No doubt there are other strategies emic to the Ga'dang culture which are appropriate in other contexts. In the context of the litigation, persuasion is the mechanism for getting from the initial state of disharmony or conflict to the final state of harmony or consensus.

The term 'strategies' is not being used in any technical sense here, but as a catch-all term to include any means of persuasion, including features of the speech situation, psychological processes, and rhetorical devices. Some might wish to include all of these areas under the heading of 'rhetoric', and this would seem warranted according to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion" (Cooper 1932:7). But there is a distinction between what I am calling rhetorical devices and the other means of persuasion. The difference is not that rhetorical devices are verbal and the others are not, for all of the strategies have verbal realizations in the discourse itself. (There are non-verbal features which contribute to persuasion, such as body position or seating arrangement [cf. Bloch 1975:5-10], not included in this work.) Rather, the difference is in whether the means of persuasion is purely the verbal craft itself (i.e. the skillful use of the conventional/ grammatical structures of normative discourse), or is drawn from some structures of

the larger behavioral context which are in a sense external to the verbal art. The former is the set of means of persuasion called rhetorical devices, and the latter is made up of all others.

The distinction between rhetorical devices and other means of persuasion is similar to the distinction Aristotle made between artistic and non-artistic proofs (i.e. means of persuasion).

By 'non-artistic' proofs are meant all such as are not supplied by our own efforts, but existed beforehand, such as witnesses, admissions under torture, written contracts, and the like. By 'artistic' proofs are meant those that may be furnished by the method of Rhetoric through our own efforts. The first sort have only to be used; the second have to be found. (Cooper 1932:8).

The similarity between Aristotle's formulation and my usage here is that the means of persuasion other than rhetorical devices 'existed beforehand', in the form of structures of social relationships and societal norms. These 'have only to be used', albeit in the context of the structure of normative discourse. However, there is somewhat less compatibility between 'artistic proofs' and 'rhetorical devices'. Aristotle said that artistic proofs have to be found. This has to do with creativity or invention in rhetoric. Rhetorical devices do not have to be found. They are features of the grammar of normative discourse, not just stylistic nuances available only to those creative enough to find them.

As with any linguistic structure, there are degrees of proficiency in the use of rhetorical devices, and normative discourse in general. The artistic ability or oratorical prowess is the ability to employ all means

of persuasion, and to express them in the form of a well-structured normative discourse.

### 8.1 Communication situation factors

Communication situation factors which relate to strategies of persuasion include social relationships between participants, social setting (i.e. the type of dispute settlement), as well as the mechanics of interaction, and how they are used in the persuasive process.

#### 8.1.1 Conciliation as social control

Black and Mileski (1973:11) relate two kinds of dispute settlement, namely therapeutic and coercive (see discussion in ch.4). Therapeutic dispute settlement is a conciliatory process.

The importance of conciliation in Ga'dang informal litigation is clear. It is integrally related to the purpose underlying the whole behavioral unit. But is it a strategy of persuasion, or is it just the opposite of persuasion (i.e. being persuaded, or a willingness to be persuaded)?

It is a little of both. Since the ideal in this type of informal litigation is social harmony, each disputant must subscribe to that ideal at least overtly. Thus to have one's own evaluations given serious consideration in the formation of the consensus, one must express willingness to accept or conform to the evaluations of others. In a

Ga'dang eristic discourse, to be persuasive one must show a willingness to be persuaded. Thus there is a conciliation constituent in the Ga'dang eristic discourse, and this is realized in the exchange between Andits and Buton (s.167-71), in which they both admit to having erred, and again in Andits's speech (s.183-90) in which he expresses willingness to be rebuked for wrong behavior.

The whole notion of the conciliatory type of social control implies persuasion to the same if not a greater extent than the accusatory types. In both types, the litigants or disputants are likely to present their grievance (or rebuttal) as persuasively as possible. But in the conciliatory type in the Ga'dang context, the evaluations and prescriptions must also be argued for, in order that all involved will be persuaded to accept them and consensus will be achieved. In the accusatory type of social control, social harmony or consensus is not the ultimate aim. A decision is imposed and enforced, but some of the participants are very likely not to be persuaded of the validity or correctness of the decision, and there need not be any persuasive effort to make the loser accept and agree to the decision.

### 8.1.2 Impartiality

Conciliation was considered to be a strategy of persuasion in Ga'dang, because to be persuasive, one must show a willingness to be persuaded. A demonstration of impartiality is a similar concept or strategy. However, whereas conciliation is a strategy which is

appropriate for the litigants in a dispute, impartiality is a strategy for the moderator or mediator. He must convince the disputants that he is equally willing to give credence to the evaluations (grievances or rebuttals) of either of them. If his claim to impartiality is genuine or convincing, he is well on the way to persuading all parties involved to accept his evaluations and prescriptions, and therefore to reach a consensus.

Sanggoon, the moderator of the litigation of the appendix, made two very explicit efforts to establish his impartiality. The first is in s.14-6, in which he points out that the reason he did not initiate the tarabbag, 'discussion' was to avoid any appearance of favoring one or the other of the litigants. An implicit show of impartiality follows in s.23-4, in which Sanggoon gives balanced instructions to the litigants to air their grievances.

The second explicit claim to impartiality is even more noteworthy because of its position in the whole discourse. It occurs in s.240-3, which follows soon after Sanggoon's focussing blame on Buton, the younger litigant. Beginning in s.190, Sanggoon had been expressing his evaluation of the grievances, and being very reserved about expressing any strong negative evaluation. There is very mild negative evaluation focussed on Buton in s.201, on Andits in s.207, on both of them in s.210, followed by prescriptions not explicitly addressed to anyone in particular (s.211-3). After a few more innocuous remarks, finally a strong negative evaluation is directed at Buton in s.229. This is immediately followed by more evaluations and prescriptions addressed to everyone in general, and then

the explicit statement of impartiality in s.240-3. It is clear that if Buton is to be persuaded to endorse the consensus that is beginning to form at that point, he must be convinced that he is not being discriminated against personally, and that the consensus represents a fair and impartial application of the norms of the society.

### 8.1.3 Deference

Impartiality or objectivity is one criterion of credibility. Other criteria are social status, educational achievement, and upstanding character (cf. Aristotle's 'ethos', Cooper 1932:8). One who has one or more of these characteristics is more persuasive than one who does not. The reason for this is DEFERENCE. "Deference may be defined as a listener's inclination to accept the speaker's position because he considers the speaker to be superior in position, ability, or attainment, rather than because of the merits of his argument" (Martin and Colburn 1972:189).

Three types of deference are identified in ch.8 of Martin and Colburn. These are instrumental, personal, and social deference. When someone accepts the position of another in order to attain personal goals, this is instrumental deference. Personal goals may be acquiring something desirable (e.g. praise or reward) or avoiding something undesirable (e.g. punishment). Secondly, personal deference is accepting the position of another because of admiration for the individual or desire to make a favorable impression on the individual. Finally, social

deference is accepting the position of another because of the social role or status possessed by the other.

Social deference is the type which obviously occurs in the Ga'dang informal litigation. It surfaces in several ways. The most immediately apparent is in the role of the moderator. The one who functions as moderator must have an appropriate social role or status. Sanggoon has more than enough credentials for this office. He is a municipal councilman, has achieved the highest educational attainment of those involved, and he holds the highest office in the loose organizational structure of the church, of which the disputants are also officers. However, according to one criterion (that of social status on the basis of age in the traditional Ga'dang kinship structure), Sanggoon should defer to his father who is also present. Thus he explains in s.193 why he is the one who will do a lot of talking (i.e. present the evaluation and prescription) rather than his father.

Sanggoon's evaluations and prescriptions are accepted and endorsed as a statement of the consensus of the group. This is the expected culmination of the normative dialogue, and is an evidence of social deference at work.

Not only do people defer to a credible source (one who is impartial, of good character, and has high social status or role), they also defer to one who employs the normative discourse type, especially the prescriptive form. Since this is rightly used only by people who have the appropriate status, a part of the meaning conveyed by the discourse type itself (i.e. conventionally associated with it) is that the speaker is

one who deserves deference. Thus, a way of managing deference is to speak in this way, i.e. authoritatively.

Sanggoon effectively managed deference by taking control of the discussion at the beginning. Bayombong tried to capitalize on the deference phenomenon by seizing the floor initially and uttering a standard opening of a tarabbaq (s.1,2), including instructions to the litigants to discuss the problem. But his effort to manage deference and figure prominently in the eventual shaping of the consensus failed because he was outranked and outperformed by Sanggoon. Sanggoon took over the floor in s.3, and gave more detailed instructions to the litigants in s.22-8. He continued to manage deference effectively with an explanation of why he should be the one to do most of the talking (s.193), and with occasional authoritative pronouncements prefacing his evaluations and prescriptions, such as 'This is what I have to say' (s.191, 194, 266).

Features of normative discourse that rank high on the scale of normativity (cf. ch.9) are also means of managing deference. These evoke deference by the same token as the use of normative discourse, but more so. Vocatives (s.319, 328) and direct imperatives (s.343-6) are examples of such high ranking features.

#### 8.1.4 Cooperation and blocking

Cooperation and blocking are strategies of a somewhat mechanical nature in dialogue. As strategies of persuasion, they can be used to promote one's own evaluations and have them shape the developing



consensus, or to thwart attempts of others to steer the consensus in an unacceptable direction. If the consensus is taking shape in an agreeable way, cooperation is employed. This may be done through the use of back channel responses such as murmurs of assent, words of agreement such as 'yes' or 'true' (s.182-3, 362, 367), a statement of positive evaluation (s.354, 359-60), or endorsement by repetition or paraphrase of a clause or sentence (s.347, 349).

Blocking is done when the direction of the discussion or the developing consensus is unsatisfactory. Utterance 22 (s.244-62), is a blocking speech spoken by Andits. It followed immediately after Baggit's utterance (UT21, not included in the appendix) which was in defense of Buton's actions. Just prior to Baggit's defense of Buton, Buton's actions had been the target of a strong negative evaluation by Sanggoon (UT19, s.229). Thus Andits, who had a strong vested interest in perpetuating Sanggoon's negative evaluation of Buton's actions, blocked Baggit's effort to cast Buton in a better light. The sequence was as follows:

UT19. Sanggoon gives his evaluation and prescription, critical of Buton in s.229.

UT20. Andits, satisfied, moves to close.

UT21. Baggit speaks in defense of Buton (a rambling, mostly narrative utterance of 48 sentences).

UT22. Andits utters a blocking speech.

The content of Andits's blocking speech is a somewhat impassioned

recitation of public values or norms. The connection between this utterance and the preceding utterance is not explicit. It is only when UT22 is viewed as a blocking speech that it coheres well in its context. It refocusses attention on the norms which Buton's behavior fell short of, as evaluated back in s.229, and blocks Baggit's attempt to assign a more neutral evaluation to Buton's behavior.

## 8.2 Psychological strategies: Knowledge structures

Psychological strategies of persuasion are not necessarily conscious schemes to convince others. Rather, they have to do with the form of argumentation that is emic to Ga'dang and with the knowledge structures (frames, scripts, and especially plans) employed in the persuasive process.

The most frequent strategy is to employ the cognitive plan of invoke theme or norm (cf. ch.3). These are offered as reasons in support of evaluations and prescriptions, but the logical connection between them is sometimes difficult to ascertain. From an etic perspective, we can subjectively provide the missing premises on which conclusions, evaluations, or prescriptions appear to be founded, in order to translate them into a form more compatible with our Western value which idealizes deductive or syllogistic logic. And this may be productive analytically, but it should not be confused with the Ga'dang emic cognitive orientation.

Invoke theme and invoke norm are the plans most frequently used in Ga'dang persuasion (cf. 3.4.3). The two are very closely related conceptually. Invoke theme is the more generic. Without making too much of this distinction, I suggest that a theme is more generic than a norm, but more specific than a point of view or value system. For example, within the social point of view, one of the themes would be the age-differential theme. And within that theme, one of the norms would be that the younger person must respect the older (cf. appendix, s.320), and another would be that the behavior of older people can be excused because of the onset of senility (s.220-1). To invoke a theme is to bring a set of norms or rules to bear on the discussion, and is a powerful strategy. Most of the following examples are of invoking themes.

Perhaps the most often repeated theme, probably because it has special bearing in the text of the appendix, is that of youth versus age. There is a great disparity in the ages of the two litigants. Andits is twice as old as Buton. The theme is invoked in a number of ways, most often by the use of the terms laKay, 'old man', or abbing, 'child', even though Buton is about twice the age at which one usually stops being called abbing. It is not really insulting to refer to Buton as abbing in this context, since it is being used here as a relative term, in order to focus on the difference in age.

The age theme is invoked repeatedly in sentences 216-21 of the appendix. In sentence 217, speaking of Andits, Sanggoon says that he was insulted because it was his son-in-law (therefore younger) who said those things, and the LAKAY (old man) was insulted. In sentence 218, Andits

applauds the invoking of the age theme, saying that he really did feel insulted, because he was in fact an old man. Then in s.228-1, Sanggoon again refers to Andits's age and attendant senility, "Kabaw". In fact, Andits was in no way senile, but this is a part of the age theme. When older people do something which might be offensive, they are often excused on the grounds of "Kabaw", whether or not their mental faculties have waned. Here Sanggoon, after having directed a balanced rebuke to both litigants, is providing an excuse for the older one based on the age theme. He is beginning to subtly direct more of the blame at Buton, the younger one. In the following example, Sanggoon again invokes the age theme, but here with a novel and persuasive twist. He shows how the greater responsibility for getting the problem settled rested with Buton for two reasons, both of which invoke the age theme, but in opposite ways: 1) because he was physically younger, he should go to Andits out of respect for the older, to try to settle the problem by discussion, and 2) because Buton was in fact older as a church member, therefore presumably more mature or advanced in the practise of his faith, he should for that reason as well take the initiative. The example is presented in Fig. 16, and is from s.268-74 of the appendix.

Massiki ikka Buton, abbing ka Kepay si urem. Ma'awatan si  
 even you Buton child you still in mind understood that

abbings Ka, se abbing Ka Kepay lud. I Andits, laKayin.  
 child you for child you still really pm Andits, old-man

'As for you, Buton, you are still a child/immature in mind.  
 It's understood that you are immature, because you really are  
 still a young person. As for Andits, he's already an old man.'

Ammem tonan si i Andits, umara'ni sikwam, se i Andits abbing,  
 not-you wait for Andits come-near to-you for Andits child

laKay si angngetatam, odde si tata'dag, ammek inammu sikwana,  
 old-man in life-ours but in stand not-I know to-him

se laKay lud, nabbalin me'anak. Se nu' si  
 for old-man really finished be-child for as to

angngurug, abbing Kepay.  
 faith child still

'Don't wait for Andits to come to you, for Andits is a  
 child. He's an old man in real life, but as to his stand,  
 what shall we say? He really is an old man, he's finished  
 being a child, but as to faith, he's still a child.'

E ma'awag si ikka a laKay si angngurug ino umara'ni,  
 and needed that you old-man in faith the come-near

gangngariyan si nu wara duma'nga a buruburung.  
 for-example obj if exist meet r1 problem/worry

'And it's necessary that you (Buton) who are mature in faith  
 be the one to go to him, if for example a problem arises.'

Fig. 16. Invoking the age theme in Ga'dang persuasion

Another very important theme is that of SOLIDARITY or social cohesion. This theme is frequently invoked with the words Ga'dang or tolay, 'person'. In the Ga'dang world, the two words are almost synonymous. There is one utterance of Andits's that is saturated with this theme (utterance 19, s.244-62 of the appendix). This is an eloquent, impassioned, and persuasive speech. The key words in the utterance are those which invoke the solidarity theme: 'we Ga'dangs', s.244; 'us-inclusive', s.245,6; 'in/among-us-incl.', s.248; 'we Ga'dangs', s.259; and 'person', s.261. Also, the first-person-inclusive pronoun is used in other sentences, and reinforces the theme. A free translation of Andits's solidarity speech follows:

244. How many of us Ga'dangs are there now? 245. We are few now! 246. We are few now! 247. I don't want there to be strife among us, but rather we should put our minds in proper order. 248. Let's throw out our customs of vindictiveness or jealousy or evil. 249. Let's throw them out! 250. Let's get rid of that anger thing, for what's the use of anger?

251. When I've been removed, who will see me then? 252. I just won't be around then.

253. That is why if you err, or if I err, man, just scold me. 254. If I err, come and tell me. 255. I won't say that it is slander. 256. But if I'm bad or angry, bury my bones! 257. Kill me! 258. What good am I, man? 259. And I request that we Ga'dangs behave well, however if I really hate you, just remove me, in order that there will be none to lead you into bad things. 260. That's what I'm telling you. 261. I'm not even a person if I hate others. 262. It's you children who should do what is good.

The solidarity theme may also be invoked by means of an idiom. The following two sentences were uttered by Baggit and Buton respectively, but are not included in the appendix. (There is a similar expression in the appendix, s.169.) Baggit had just finished saying that they should

feel free to exhort each other because of their close relationship. He emphasizes this point with the solidarity idiom, the first sentence in the following example:

Ma allay, korokorwan ak kad a tolay?  
 why man other/different I rhet.Q. rl person

'Why, man, am I an outsider?'

Ma, sanna da iyatal da ulitag a mattuldu sikwak?  
 why what ashamed uncle to teach me

Korokorwan inman ke tolay?  
 other/different again just person

'Why should uncle hesitate to exhort me? Am I an outsider?'

In the previous example, still another theme is invoked by the mention of the word ATAL, 'shame', which is perhaps the strongest possible theme or value that can be invoked by a Ga'dang. Various forms of the word are used to indicate shame, embarrassment, shyness, humiliation, respect, reserve, or shamefulness. The theme common to most of the uses, if not all, is that of a proper sense of reserve, a sense of propriety. To say to a person awan a atal nu, 'you have no shame', is the strongest of rebukes. It suggests forwardness, brashness, pushiness, immodesty, and a general lack of reserve or decency toward other people, particularly toward those who most deserve it by virtue of greater age or social position. A person without shame is one who lacks the decency to feel remorseful or embarrassed for doing what is wrong, or for failing to live up to societal expectations (i.e. shameless). To "have shame" seems

like convoluted terminology in our Western vernacular, but it naturally follows that this denotes the opposite of shameless (i.e. decent, proper, reserved). This is a very desirable and person-oriented virtue (Noble, 1975). The following are two sentences from different contexts (the first is from s.208), in which the shame theme is invoked:

Ka'atatal etam nu ammetam ma'inggud o annggurug tam.  
shameful we-in. if not-we order/tidy faith ours

'We are shameful if we do not keep our faith in order.'

Amme nad ma'atal i litag a mattuldu sikwak, se abbing dak ke.  
not should ashamed uncle to exhort to-me for child his-I just

'Uncle should not be ashamed/reticent to exhort me, for I am really his child (younger relative).'

It should be noted that Ga'dang discourse is not entirely without an INFORM REASON persuasive plan. This is also frequently employed, but very often it is employed in form only, and not in content. That is to say, the form is that which would be used to present a logical supporting argument, but instead a theme is invoked, as in the following example (from s.320 in the appendix). It is a pseudo-inform-reason, which again invokes the age theme.



Nu palungo amma sikwam, ma'awag si dayawan nu, gafu se  
if first more to-you needed that respect you because

palungo amma sikwam.  
first more to-you

'If he was first before you, it's necessary that you respect  
him, because he was first before you (i.e. older).'

Baggit used a similar construction, an inform reason form which  
actually invokes a theme. This example also introduces the next major  
theme which was often invoked in the litigation, the KINSHIP theme,  
invoked with the word kolak, 'sibling'.

E kunna pe sikwayu allaye, paparefu etam pe nad a awan  
and like just you-pl man same we-in. should rl none

a pattatarukyan gafu-se ikkanetam, makkakarolaketam.  
rl strife because we-all are-siblings-we

'And just like you, we should likewise not argue, because we  
are all siblings.'

Nu wara pakkamalyan na tata sikwatam, se makkolak eta,  
if exist error of one of-us-all for siblings we

makkatutuldu eta.  
reciprocal-teach we

'If one of us makes a mistake, because we are siblings, we  
should just teach/exhort each other.'

There are other themes with strong emotive associations which are  
frequently invoked, such as allak, 'pity, benevolence' (s.253), nakam,  
'character' (s.247), kakkatawa, 'ridicule' (s.337), and napatata, 'unity'

(s.333-4). There are many other words which invoke very negative emotive themes or values, such as bungot 'anger', kamali 'error', Kalussaw 'hatred', rakkat 'badness', apal 'jealousy', and maral 'ruin, evil, slander'. All of these can be found in Andits's one utterance, s.244-62, and throughout the text of the appendix.

There is one further strategy or plan which may belong in the invoke theme group. It is the VOLITIONAL strategy, and it at least contributes to the desired group harmony or consensus, though not invoking it explicitly. It is the strategy of saying 'I like that' or 'I don't like that'. It appears that not everyone has the privilege of making this kind of statement; only the older participants do so in the text of the appendix (cf. s.243, 247, 348, 368).

The text of the appendix illustrates well the use of the invoke theme and invoke norm plans in Ga'dang argumentation and persuasion. In one way however, it is atypical, because the set of rules being applied to verify or validate evaluations and prescriptions is made explicit. These are the rules of angngurug, 'faith', and at certain points they are explicitly contrasted with another set, those of the past tradition (gaqangay tam si'in, 'our customs of long ago'), as in sentences 173 and 192 of the appendix. Where there is no incompatibility between the two sets, the rules are not explicitly mentioned.

In other recorded texts, which do not reflect the borrowing of sets of rules external to Ga'dang tradition, no reference is ever made to the set of rules that is being applied. Rules are cited (cf. 7.4), but there

is no requirement that they be validated in any way. They are the a priori rules which are assumed to govern all Ga'dang behavior.

Even in the case of applying the rules of faith, no justification of the rules is requested or offered. There is no appeal to higher sets of rules or to a rational way of life, as Taylor (1961) indicates is inherent to justification in normative discourse. There is simply clarification of which rules are being applied. Thus the process of justification of evaluations and prescriptions is short-circuited in the Ga'dang oral society. Any evaluation or prescription which is based on the norms or rules of the society needs no justification. In the traditional Ga'dang view, there are no other sets of norms and rules to choose from. Thus, invoke theme or invoke norm is sufficient justification for any evaluation or prescription.

There is a parallel here to the findings of Bloch (1975:16-28), who notes that when political oratory (social control discourse) is used, the possibility of contradiction is minimized or nullified by the fact that the participants made one fundamental choice ab initio. Just choosing to take part in such a discourse binds the participants to accept what follows, because of the social relationships of the people involved, and the unquestionable nature of the conventional subject matter. Thus he concludes that such a discourse cannot proceed as a logical exercise:

Logic implies that one postulated connection between units is more right than another because of the innate relation between the parts of the logical argument. One can therefore say that to be logical, an argument must be couched in a form within which contradictory or alternative arguments are

possible but excluded, not because of the way they are said, but because they are untrue: to be logical an argument must be formally contradictable in order to show its logical nature. Normally any statement is open to contradiction and replacement and since this is so in ordinary situations argument and reason are possible. By contrast, formalised language rules out the two prerequisites for logic, the potential of one statement to be followed by a large number of others and the possibility of contradiction (ibid. p.21).

Bloch suggests that highly formalized discourse of social control is "beyond logic, its force being traditional authority" (ibid.). This is the case with the themes and norms invoked in Ga'dang normative discourse. This discourse is not as rigidly standardized as that which Bloch describes, but the themes and norms which may be invoked are highly conventionalized, and beyond the possibility of contradiction.

### 8.3 Rhetorical devices

Rhetorical devices are surface features which have some conventional markedness, thus they are more prominent and more forceful. All rhetorical devices elevate normative force. Several that have been identified in Ga'dang normative discourse are schema of prescription, parallel structures, chiasmus, and synthesis or summary.

#### 8.3.1 Schema of prescription

Schema of prescription is a persuasive strategy. This is a three-part construction (introduced in 6.1.3) which has the constituents of PROJECTED CIRCUMSTANCE, PRESCRIPTION, and JUSTIFICATION. These

constituents are typically each realized by a single clause, but any constituent may be realized by more than one clause (cf. s.343-6). A brief example of this schema is found in s.189-90, 'If I speak falsely, scold me, because I am (like) the devil if I do not obey'. In this instance, the speaker's real persuasive intent was to convince everyone to speak in an acceptable way, but he used himself as the hypothetical example in order to establish a general principle.

### 8.3.2 Parallel structures

The use of parallel structures is a persuasive strategy in which the same idea is repeated or paraphrased. The second half of the structure is more forceful than the first, if for no other reason than that it doubles the emphasis given to the proposition. This is the case in s.245-6, in which the latter is a verbatim repetition of the former, 'There are few of us now!'

There is also the positive and negative paraphrase (in either order), as in s.343-4: 'don't just wait; get up and go'. (cf. Hall 1983:149).

Another parallel structure could be described as a prescriptive one-two punch, i.e. a pair of prescriptions (or evaluations) in which the first would be mitigated and the second would be unmitigated or more direct. In the following example (from s.300-4 of the appendix) there is a double one-two punch, a flurry of exhortations. In the first pair (reform), the second is obviously less mitigated than the first. In the

second pair (try), the second is at least more concise than the first, so somewhat stronger.

Nu dama na nad, reforma. Mareforma.  
if possible should reform reform

'If possible we should reform. Reform!'

Kakkapantam tanggallan ino bifiqtam, aggangwatam. Kakkapantam.  
try we-inc control the lips-ours doings-ours try we-inc

'Let us try to control our speech and doings. Try!'

There are many examples of this ascending structure, the second being less mitigated than the first. The most subtle one observed was spoken by Baggit, the youngest discussant, and although the tone of the whole is very subdued, the intention seems to have been to point a finger of blame:

Massiki tan nu awan a sinapit nu, e pakoman taka.  
even that if none r1 said you forgive I-you

Kunna na tan nu sinapit nu, ammena bali.  
although that if said you not-it matter

'Even if you said nothing, I forgive you. Even though you may have said something, it doesn't matter.'

This strategy may be used to soften the blow, and to avoid shaming anyone with too abrupt or harsh an approach. Thus it has a better chance of persuading, not to mention its more substantial effect as a verbal "one-two punch".

### 8.3.3 Chiasmus

The structure of chiasmus is described by Hall (1983:166ff.) as being made up of at least a four-part organization. A simple form of chiasmus would involve four consecutive clauses, the fourth being closely related to the first (e.g. paraphrase) and the third being similarly related to the second. Complex chiastic structure was discovered in a Balangaw normative text (Shetler and Walrod 1983), in which the most general topic was named first, followed by a series of propositions in descending generality (i.e. more and more specific) until the normative peak was reached, and then the process was reversed, reiterating the paraphrased propositions in reverse order until the most generic was reached again.

An example of chiastic structure is found in s.225-8 of the appendix. There are not four consecutive propositions in this chiasmus, but at the beginning and the end of this section the state of mind of Andits and Galat is described ('affected', Ga'dang idiom for disturbed, and 'ashamed'). Following the initial description of their being 'affected' is the reason for their state of mind, namely that it would appear that they 'were not able to teach or control' their child (younger relative). This proposition is paraphrased in s.227, just before the paraphrase of their state of mind in s.228.

There is a great deal of chiastic structure, or something similar to it, in s.244-62. This section lacks the symmetrical ordering of propositions, but the topic of bangKirit, 'strife, hostility' is

mentioned early (s.247), and is paraphrased near the end of the utterance as Kallussaw, 'hate'. Between these two statements of the general topic of exhortation are several statements about getting rid of those feelings, getting rid of people who behave in that way, and doing what is good. Each of these statements is paraphrased at least once before the speaker returns to the primary topic, but there is not a symmetrical ordering in this case.

#### 8.3.4 Synthesis

Nowakowska (1979:282) suggests that the strength of connectedness between utterances in a dialogue is proportional to the extent of multiple connections of that utterance with others. I suggest that an utterance that can summarize or synthesize what has preceded (or explicate the global theme of what is to follow) has the greatest cohesive effect.

In normative discourse, especially in a culture in which the aim of such discourse is to achieve consensus, such a statement has a great deal of normative force, and is a good strategy of persuasion. Being able to articulate a consensus is a stepping stone to having unanimous agreement on it.

Sentence 243 of the appendix is a synthesis statement of several preceding sentences (starting at s.236). A more significant summary statement is found in s.327-9, in which Sanggoon sums up all that has gone on up to that point in the informal litigation, namely that each



party had heard the other out, and that the problem had been put behind them, and that as a result, there should be nothing further to trouble their minds. This summary statement served as a claim to success for the discourse, a notice that group harmony had been restored.

## 9. RANKING ON A SCALE OF NORMATIVITY

All of the notional and surface features described in previous chapters may be ranked on a scale of normativity. That is, there are certain features which have more normative force. Normative force is the degree of probability of influencing, affecting, or producing a cognitive or behavioral change in another. Note again that influence and affect are included in the definition, as well as change, to allow for normative discourse which is to perpetuate frames or values, as is the case in the Ga'dang informal litigation. An example in our culture would be the high school football coach at the pre-game team pep-talk uttering a prescription with great intensity, "Get in there and hit those guys." It was already the intention of the players to do so, but the coach's prescription is not without normative force. It perpetuates the frame and reinforces the players' resolve.

My ranking of the features of Ga'dang normative discourse is somewhat intuitive, but supported by substantial evidence from the text. Since the ranking is somewhat subjective, there is room for question. The question, however, is not whether these surface structures can be given a normative ranking relative to each other, but whether I have determined the order which is emic to Ga'dang. My conclusions are drawn from the written text, the audio recording, remembered features of the communication situation, and knowledge of the Ga'dang cognitive grid and public values. However, a more certain determination of the emic order

could be obtained through a scientific survey in which the Ga'dang people themselves would be asked to rank written or recorded texts or text parts as to their persuasiveness or coerciveness. In the Ga'dang oral culture, it would probably not be feasible to have test subjects give a numerical ranking to each normative structure in a large set. But it would be possible to present such structures in pairs, and ask the subject which one seemed to be "the heaviest". If audio recordings were used, there would need to be some controls on intonation and on test subjects' perceptions of the status of the speaker, especially if the segments being compared were spoken by different people. (This suggests another, more sociolinguistic type of survey, to determine the effect of social status on persuasiveness.)

But no such survey has been done in Ga'dang, and the following rankings are based primarily on evidence from the text itself, and comparisons with other texts.

### 9.1 Ranking of discourse types

All linguistic communication has some normative component (cf. 5.3.4). There is always some degree of intention to influence, affect or change. In normative discourse, it is the primary intention, thus normative texts would rank highest on a scale of normativity. Expository discourse would be near the middle, followed by procedural, and narrative discourse typically has the least normative force.

The normative scale is almost the inverse of the information scale (Walker 1983:12-6), in which normative discourse ranks very low, and expository discourse ranks high. It is also very different from the 'most dynamic to most static' scale (Longacre 1982:177) which ranks narrative as most dynamic and expository as most static. Normative discourse would occupy a mid-point on this scale.

## 9.2 Ranking of grammatical features within normative

Clause types, pronominal reference, and particles or conjunctions were shown to have a significant role in normative ranking (cf. 7.4, 7.5, 7.6). A ranking of clause types was presented in Fig. 14 (section 7.4). The pronominal reference ranking interacts with the clause type ranking to multiply the possible normative ranks. The top four ranks of clause types are the imperative, causative, compulsory, and obligatory. Each of these realizes its strongest normative force if a second person pronoun is used with it. The normative force of each is somewhat mitigated if a first person inclusive pronoun is used, and is even more mitigated by a first person dual pronoun.

Prescription always outranks evaluation in normative force. Therefore a prescriptive coda outranks an evaluative coda at paragraph boundaries (cf. 7.3.3). However social relationships between speaker and hearer may require that the speaker use nothing more forceful than evaluation, in the paragraph coda or any other feature of discourse, including text type.

The particles and conjunctions that were listed in Fig. 15 also have normative ranking. The particles lud 'surely', mat 'in fact', nad 'ought', and Kad 'perhaps' (the rhetorical question marker) rank very high, and tend to elevate the normative force of any construction in which they occur. The adverbs gakKuruq 'true' and gakKuruwingke 'very true' also elevate normative force. The conjunction gampade 'however', or its more emphatic form gampama'de are extremely high in normative force. They signal the hearer that what is to follow is a radical departure from what is expected, i.e. from the current frame or script. Thus when used in normative discourse describing someone's behavior which is being evaluated (cf. s.152, 229, 316), it is pejorative, since behavior should conform to the norms or expectations of the society, not depart from them. Implicit in the use of this conjunction in normative discourse is the bringing to bear of the weight of public opinion (expectations) on the evaluatum.

In contrast to the particles just mentioned, there are others used in normative discourse which have a low ranking of normative force. These tend to mitigate the force of any construction in which they occur. They are pay 'just', Ke 'just, still', lang 'only', and allay 'man, friend'. While these rank low in normative or persuasive force, they do contribute significantly to achieving consensus and social harmony, by defusing tensions. The word allay in particular is a way of expressing or reinforcing group solidarity. The closer the social relationship between speakers and hearers, the more likely that the word will be used very frequently. And the use of the word is an implicit assertion of close

relationship. The word may be uttered with laryngealization and lengthening, and as such may be a mild rebuke or lighthearted chiding, very mitigated and inoffensive.

### 9.3 Ranking of pairs of evaluative lexemes

The pairs of evaluative lexemes were presented in Fig. 2, section 2.3.1, in the discussion of Ga'dang points of view. The pairs presented were not necessarily the only evaluative lexemes within the point of view, but represented the positive and negative extremes. I make no claim that there is a difference in normative force between, on the one hand, uttering a positive evaluation of an object or action, and on the other hand, uttering a negative evaluation of its opposite. It may well be that there is a difference (positive reinforcement of good behavior is believed by some to be more effective than rebuke of bad behavior), but the evidence from the Ga'dang text is thin. The only evidence to cite is that the discussion ends with several very positive evaluations, but these are not evaluations of the behavior that brought about the litigation. Rather, they are evaluations of the consensus that had been reached and articulated.

However, to utter a parallel, positive-negative pair of evaluations does increase the normative force (cf. 8.3.2), even though neither the positive nor the negative statement could be determined to be stronger in isolation.

What can be ranked, however, is the pairs themselves in relation to other pairs of evaluative lexemes. What this presupposes is a hierarchical ranking of value systems per se, i.e. the points of view realized by the pairs of lexemes.

The statement we can make quite certainly is that all moral evaluations (ethical or social points of view) outrank all aesthetic ones with respect to normative force. Note that narakKat, 'bad', which may function as the negative extreme in the ethical point of view, is potentially much worse than saliwad, 'awkward speech' (the linguistic aesthetic point of view). Anything that is described as saliwad could also be described as narakKat, but not vice versa.

Within the moral points of view are included all considerations of group survival, solidarity, and harmony, as well as the social infrastructures of the group, and the norms governing social interaction (e.g. the age theme).

Within the aesthetic points of view there is also hierarchical ordering. The behavioral point of view, which is borderline moral, would rank the highest. Thus the evaluation of an action as annung, 'fitting, proper' or balyat, 'improper', would have greater normative force than an evaluation of that same action as nala'ing, 'clever' or unqKug, 'ignorant'. If a Ga'dang boy playing basketball were told that his playing was unqKug, he might be offended, but would probably keep playing. If he were told that his playing was balyat, he would probably stop, understanding that it would be inappropriate to continue (e.g. if someone in the nearby house were critically ill).

The ranking of the relative normative force of the aesthetic points of view, and therefore the pairs of lexemes associated with them, would be this: the behavioral and the emotional would be at the high end of the scale; the intellectual and the artistic would be near the mid point; and the economic, linguistic, and attributional would be at the low end.

#### 9.4 Schema of prescription and normative ranking

The schema of prescription is high in normative force even in its unmarked form, namely with one clause realizing each of its three notional constituents, projected circumstance, prescription, and justification, as in s.189-90. The normative force is elevated, however, when the nucleus is expanded, i.e. when there is more than one prescription, as in s.235 which has four prescriptions in the nuclear constituent.

Still higher in normative force is a prescription by itself, without an explicit projected circumstance or justification (cf. s.211-2). Since the schema of prescription is considered the unmarked or standard form of prescription (cf. 6.1.3), such prescriptions in isolation are considered to be the result of deletion, which is common at a discourse peak in Ga'dang normative as well as narrative discourse. Maximum deletion, which is the deletion of all non-nuclear constituents of the schema of prescription, as well as the deletion of all non-nuclear elements of the clause realizing the prescription, signals the highest degree of normative force (e.g. s.211-2: 'Reform, change! Reform, change!').



### 9.5 Grouping of high ranking features at normative peaks

The feature of maximum deletion is a way of achieving maximum normative force. Maximum deletion in the context of a prescription results in an unmitigated, direct imperative. Another way of achieving very near the maximum normative force is a clustering of the highest ranking normative features at or around the normative peak. In a normative discourse, the clustering is to be expected, although there may be focal points at normative peaks where the 'stripped down' imperatives occur, as in s.211-2, 301, 304.

The feature of maximum deletion contiguous with one of the rare prescriptive codas was discussed in 7.3.3. The prescriptive coda is in s.80. The context immediately preceding and following s.80 has clearly marked narrative discourse peak surface structure embedded in this normative discourse secondary peak. Thus the section of s.73-100 is extremely high in normative force, only exceeded by the primary peak of the whole dialogue, in which direct prescriptions (highest ranking surface structures) are uttered by the moderator (highest ranking in the social context).

The following graph compares the discourse peak in s.86-100 with the first 16 sentences of the discourse, to illustrate the grammatical feature of maximum deletion in Ga'dang discourse peaks. The first 16 sentences average 25 words each, with three sentences of 40 or more words. Sentences 86-100 average less than six words each, with five sentences of three words or less. It is interesting to note that the one

sentence that skews the average sentence length upward in the peak section, namely s.95, is an author comment of an explanatory nature, embedded within this embedded narrative section (a second level of embedding). Without this one sentence, the average for the whole section would be exactly five words per sentence.

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S.    Number of words per sentence

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1.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
2.	xxxxxxxxxxx
3.	xx
4.	xx
5.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
6.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
7.	xxxxxxxxxxx
8.	xx
9.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
10.	xx
11.	xx
12.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
13.	xxxxxxxxxxx
14.	xx
15.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
16.	xx
86.	xxx
87.	xxxxxxx
88.	xx
89.	xxxxxxxxxxx
90.	xxxxxxx
91.	xxxxx
92.	xxxxxxx
93.	xxxxxxxxxxx
94.	xx
95.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
96.	xx
97.	xxxxxxx
98.	xxxxx
99.	xxxxxxx
100.	x

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Fig. 17. Sentence length in non-peak and peak sections

As mentioned above, in addition to the feature of deletion which elevates normative force, there may be clusters of high ranking normative features. In one sense deletion works against the realization of other features, so that where deletion is most prominent, the clustering is somewhat minimized. However, most of the other features can still be realized in combination with deletion.

The strongest cluster of surface features would be: 1. deletion (deletion in normative discourse removes all low ranking particles, which would tend to mitigate; high ranking ones may remain); 2. imperative; 3. second person pronominal reference (if explicit reference is needed; usually it will also be deleted, since context disambiguates); 4. high ranking evaluative lexemes; 5. location in highly normative discourse constituent, e.g. prescription, signalled by Kunnantu, 'therefore', or antu yaw ino sapit Ku, 'this is what I have to say'; 6. location at the peak of such a constituent.

The greatest concentration of these high ranking normative features are at the peak of the Ga'dang litigation (peaks 5 and 6 in Fig. 13). Utterance 22 (s.244-62), spoken by Andits, and s.300-4 in utterance 25, spoken by Sanggoon, manifest every feature in the above list. The one exception is that Sanggoon does not use second person in s.300-4, but he does use it in other places when directly addressing Buton, who is younger. Andits and Laka, the oldest participants in the discussion, are more free with the use of second person in their prescriptions.

Clusters of high ranking features are not squandered. They are reserved for the crucial peaks of normative discourse, when the

participants sense that consensus is within reach. The effect is dramatic, and the litigation moves quickly to a close. Anger<sup>2</sup> is abated, fellowship is restored, norms are perpetuated, and at least for the moment, life in the Ga'dang community is as it should be.

## CONCLUSION

Textlinguistics has been placed within its philosophical context. Normative discourse has been defined, as has its place in the study of textlinguistics and its relationships to philosophy, psychology, and sociology.

Normative discourse is integrally related to the notion of social control. It is the most desirable means of effecting social control, i.e. by verbally perpetuating the norms or operational rules which are some of the cultural objects shared by the society. People may be persuaded to behave in ways acceptable to the community, rather than coerced to conform, or harmed in some way for not conforming.

The most important contributions of this work are:

1. Explication of the nature of the relationships between cultural objects, norms, and knowledge structures, and the way in which persuasion relates to these. Persuasion often requires that they be changed, but it may also serve to perpetuate them.

2. Clarification of the logic of normative discourse. There is not a radical difference in kind between normative and empirical reasoning. The difference is in the degree of sedimentation of the 'facts' which may be cited as supporting arguments. As long as the degree of sedimentation is great enough, statements or arguments justifying statements will be accepted and not challenged, thus for all practical purposes the point is proved.

3. Explanation of the cultural differences in cognitive processes combined with the causal explanation for these differences. The lateral specialization of brain hemispheres has been discussed by many authors (e.g. Thompson 1975), and the correlation of the difference between cognitive processes on either side of the brain and difference between patterns of reasoning from one culture to another had been observed by Paredes and Hepburn (1976). The differences between oral and literate cultures had also been well researched (Goody and Watt 1968; Ong 1982). What had not been proposed was the causal connection between these findings. Literacy results in thought processes which are more abstract, analytical, and logical, while less holistic, intuitive, and artistic. Thus literate people become habituated to thought processes which are predominantly functions of the left hemisphere of the brain. The people of oral societies do not have the same stimulus to develop this type of cognitive habits. Furthermore, the people in literate societies tend to develop a high value for logical and analytic thought processes, and thus are more susceptible to persuasion which appeals to this inclination. On the other hand oral societies (or oral contexts within our own society) lean toward persuasion which appeals to the emotive, intuitive, and holistic cognitive functions.

4. Description of the notional and surface structure of Ga'dang normative discourse. The notional and surface structure of several Ga'dang texts was analyzed, and some features of the grammar of normative discourse were identified, beginning with the level of the constituent structure of the discourse as a whole. The aim of normative discourse of

the informal litigation type in Ga'dang was identified as being to achieve or restore consensus and social harmony. The ways in which the text coheres internally and with its larger context were made clear, and the strategies of persuasion and their surface realizations were described. Thus the 'route' was traced from the initial point of disharmony to the end point of consensus.

5. Identification of a scale of normativity. Certain strategies and surface structures in Ga'dang were identified as having greater normative force than others, i.e. greater persuasive impact. These were ranked on a scale of normativity, although further research would need to be done to determine if all the rankings I have suggested reflect exactly the emic ranking in the Ga'dang mind.

One must have an internalized grasp of the structure of normative discourse in a language, and of the ranking of surface features on the scale of normativity, and of the points of view or value systems of the cultural community, in order to produce a persuasive text. If a text is produced which eloquently employs all of these features of normative discourse, it is virtually impossible for any member of that cultural community to hear it and not be persuaded. If he is able to resist being persuaded, it is because he has made an a priori choice not to accept the basic assumptions on which the normative discourse is founded. No text, no matter how nearly perfect, can overrule an individual's free will and right to make such an a priori choice.



APPENDIX

TARABBAG

Ga'dang informal litigation

## ABBREVIATIONS:

cmp = completive aspect

emph = emphatic

exc = exclusive

fut = future

inc = inclusive

obj = object marker

p = particle

pl = plural

pm = person marker

recipr = reciprocally

rl = relative clause marker

sg = singular

2 = dual

TARABBAG: GA'DANG INFORMAL LITIGATIONBayombong

1. Ara antu Buton, e nu sanna ino  
 okay then Buton and if what the  
 amme yu pakkinnawatan a adwa, antu ino  
 not you-pl understand r1 two that the  
 pattatarabbag daw, ta bakkan a kunna  
 cause-discuss you-pl so not r1 like  
 sitan, a wara kad madingngadingngag  
 that r1 exist perhaps being-heard  
 daw so tolayira. 2. Ay kadidingngag  
 you-pl from people well hear-each-other  
 Kayu-n kelamang, kunna na tan nu gakkurug  
 you-pl-cm just like it that if true  
 onnu awan.  
 or not

Sanggoon

3. Kunnamantu, se ana etam si  
 like-this because be we-inc at  
 baggaw a bakkan a tumuk, akwan tam si  
 light r1 not r1 dark do we-inc obj  
 nalawad, se antu ino sapit na Dios, a  
 good " because this the say of God r1  
 "Nu wara amme yu pakkinnawatan a  
 if exist not you-pl understand r1  
 makkakarolak si anngurug sikwak,  
 be-siblings in faith to-me  
 mattatarabbag kayu, ta makkapakapakoli  
 discuss you-pl so reciprocally-forgive

1. Now then,  
 Buton, whatever is  
 the misunderstanding  
 between the two of  
 you, discuss it, so  
 that it won't be  
 like hearsay, what  
 you may have heard  
 from other people. 2.  
 Just hear each other  
 out, whether true or  
 not.

3. It's like this  
 therefore, because  
 we are in light and  
 not in dark, we  
 should do good,  
 because God's word  
 says, "If there is a  
 misunderstanding  
 between you siblings  
 in faith, discuss  
 it, so that you will  
 forgive each other's  
 faults.

kayu, so nalliwatan ino tinaggitata.  
you-pl obj committed-fault the each-one

4. Ino kun i Bayombong, inoy, ikkayu  
the said pm Bayombong, that you-pl

Buton, anni Andits, nabayin nad yaw a  
Buton and Andits long-time should this rl

nebanag ku, se ikkanak pay ino neyekwa  
told me because me just the placed

yu a kunnangke presidente yu a  
you-pl rl as-if president yours rl

mamangngal sitaw a iglesia tam onnu  
to-lead this rl church ours or

Kapilya. 5. Odde inappa-k ino atal ku  
chapel but took-I the shame mine

allay, se amme-ta Kappe-lamang dama  
man because not-we-2 also-only able

pamepittanan a itakkub ino gagangay tam  
cause-stop rl throw-away the customs ours

a ginaga'dang. 6. E aggataron ak  
rl of-Ga'dang and continuous-wait I

sikwayu allay, nu inya nad sikwayu ino  
for-you-pl man if who should of-you the

umang makitatabbag sikwak mape'afu ira sitaw  
come discuss to-me about pl this

a problema.  
rl problem

7. Odde wara allay so awan, kunnangke  
but exist man lm none as-if

nadang ira yaw a aw. 8. On se  
arrived pl this rl day yes because

4. About what  
Bayombong said, you,  
Buton and Andits,  
you should have told  
me about this long  
ago, because I am  
the one you have  
appointed to be like  
your president, to  
lead our church. 5.  
But I was ashamed,  
because we are just  
not able to stop or  
throw off our  
Ga'dang-ways. 6. And  
I just waited, to  
see which of you  
would come to  
discuss this problem  
with me.

7. But when none  
came, this day  
arrived. 8. Yes,  
because I was  
ashamed to be the  
one to initiate this

atallan ku enin mamabwat si tatarabbag,  
ashamed I the-one to-start obj discussion

a bakkan kayu-in in makan nakam, se  
r1 not you-pl-cmp the whose mind because

amme-rak anggam a bibbiyan a kunnangke  
not-they-I like r1 rebuke r1 as-if

afu yu, kun ku-n ke lud allaye.  
leader yours said I-cmp just sure man

9. I Teklanon pelang ino sinatabbag ku  
pm Teklanon only the discussed me

si'in a nappakabebutan nu ansanna ira ino  
before r1 questioning if how pl the

akkakokwa yu. 10. Odde awan a dama na  
welfare you-pl but none r1 ability his

nasapit mape'afu sikwayu, a kunna payo  
to-say about you-pl r1 like just

ikkanak allay, se nagan ak lud sey  
myself man because was I sure at

Bagabag sin ikkayu a amme pakKinnawatan a  
Bagabag when you-pl r1 not understood r1

matama. 11. E sinapit ke i Teklanon  
father-son and said just pm Teklanon

sikwak si "Ino nad nalawad nu wara kunna  
to-me obj the should good if exist like

sitan a problema, ikka pe-nad ino  
that r1 problem you just-should the

kunnangke pikampattan da, se ikka  
as-if mediator theirs because you

pe lud o kunnangke ama ra sitaw  
just sure the as-if father theirs here

discussion, because  
I really thought  
that some might  
object to my  
rebuking someone, as  
though I were your  
master.

9. It was just  
Teklanon who  
discussed this with  
me before, asking  
about your welfare.

10. But he was not  
able to tell about  
your situation, and  
neither was I of  
course, because I  
was at Bagabag when  
the two of you,  
older and younger  
relative, had the  
misunderstanding.

11. And Teklanon  
said to me, "What  
would be good when  
there is a problem  
like that would be  
for you to be their  
mediator, rather  
than myself, because  
it's you who is like  
their father in this  
chapel. 12. Because  
as for myself, I am  
a Balangaw, and I do  
not know your  
Ga'dang customs. 13.  
It would be better  
if they were  
Balangaws like me,"

a Kapilya, a bakkan nad o ikkanak.  
 r1 chapel r1 not should the myself

he also said.

12. Se ikkanak namat, Balangaw ak, e  
 because myself really Balangaw I and

amme-k inammu ino gagangay yu a  
 not-I know the custom you-pl r1

Ginaga'dang. 13. Napapya nad nu kaparefu-k  
 of-Ga'dang better should if same-I

ira a Balangaw," kun na mat pay.  
 they r1 Balangaw said he really just

14. Ammu yu allay nu sanna gafu  
 know you-pl man if what source

na a bakkan ak o namagabaggi a  
 its r1 not I the whose-body r1

nappa'ayag sikwayu allay, se tantaro  
 cause-call you-pl man because perhaps

lang nu wara masapit daw sikwak nu wara  
 only if exist say you-pl to-me if exist

kada'nan na ino tatarabbag, e nganan  
 start fut the discussion and depict

daw na lang si wara tata'wiyen ku  
 you-pl fut only obj exist favoritism my

sikwayu. 15. Kolak takayu adwa si  
 to-you-pl sibling I-you-pl two in

binaba'lag, anda bangngag ak ke so gafugafu  
 flesh and deaf I just at sources

na ira yan a amme yu pakKinnawatan a  
 its pl that r1 not you-pl understand r1

matama.  
 father-son

14. You know the reason why I was not the one to call you together man, because one of you might say to me that I started the discussion, and you might just claim that I have favoritism between you. 15. I am a blood relative of both of you, and I have just been deaf about the causes of the misunderstanding between you, father and son.

16. Antu gafu na a kinapakapan na  
 this source its r1 arrival its  
 ira yaw a aw, se antu ino dinandam ku  
 pl this r1 day because this the thought I  
 si'in, "Nalawad nu wara i Maik na a  
 before good if exist pm Maik fut r1  
 aggadingngag so ira a mattatabbag na a  
 listening to them r1 discuss fut r1  
 matama, se antu mat americano, e  
 father-son because this really american and  
 tantaro iyatal da, anda ammu-k si awan a  
 perhaps respect they and know-I obj none r1  
 tata'wiyana na na sikwara a adwa," nekun ku.  
 favoritism his fut to-them r1 two said I

17. Nu sanna ira ma'lud iyan a amme  
 if what pl sure that r1 not  
 yu langin dama pattatabban a adwa,  
 you-pl just able cause-discuss r1 two  
 takenasi si'in, ta amme na nad  
 in-order-that before, so not it should  
 lang-in nappa'oddu, si'in kayu-n  
 just became-much before you-pl-cmp  
 kenad-in, paddambalan takayu. 18.  
 just-should-cmp cause-meeting I-you-pl  
 Odde oddu ira-in in agoman ku, se awan  
 but much pl-cmp the waiting my because none  
 lud umang maddanug sikwak nu ansanna ino  
 sure come inform to-me if how the  
 gafugafu na. 19. Se "madyat ino kunna  
 source its because hard the like

16. That's why  
 this day has  
 arrived, because I  
 had been thinking,  
 "It would be good if  
 Maik were here to  
 listen to the father  
 and son discuss,  
 because he is an  
 American, and they  
 might respect him,  
 and I know that he  
 has no favoritism  
 between the two of  
 them," I said.

17. Whatever it  
 was that the two of  
 you were not able to  
 discuss, you should  
 have arranged a  
 meeting with me  
 about it long ago,  
 in order that it  
 would not just  
 increase. 18. But I  
 just waited long,  
 because nobody came  
 to inform me about  
 the reason for it.  
 19. And I just said,  
 "This is an  
 intolerable  
 situation." 20.  
 However, it was not  
 the initiative of  
 you two. 21. Man, it  
 should not be like  
 that.

yaw<sup>n</sup> Kun ku ira-n Kelamang. 20. Gampade  
this said I pl-cmp just-only however

bakkan a naggabwat so nakam daw a adwa.  
not r1 came from mind yours r1 two

21. Amme na ira inoy allay nad.  
reject it pl that man should

22. Antu gafu na a malla amme  
this source its r1 like not

Kad Kayu nepabburuburung so awira a  
perhaps you-pl caused-worry at days r1

inoy, e ayo etam to tangnanaw ya nu  
that and here we-inc this midday pt if

sanna ira yan allay. 23. E sapitan nu  
what pl those man and say you

Andits, nu "I Buton ma'lud Kunnera ma'lud yo  
Andits if pm Buton sure like-pl really the

diningngag ku sikwana alle." 24. Mampe  
heard I of-him man likewise

sikwam Buton, nu "I litag ma'lud Kunnayaw  
for-you Buton if pm uncle sure like-this

a Kunnayaw ino nadingngag ku sikwana allay,  
r1 like-this the heard I of-him man

e nekalussa-k si gakkurug," Kun daw.  
and hate-it-I in truth say you-pl

25. Amme yu makka'atatal a adwa  
not you-pl reciprocally-ashamed r1 two

se bakkan-in a kunna si'in a dama  
because not-cmp r1 like before r1 able

ta a makkapulipulitika a massisiri.  
we-2 r1 recipr-politic r1 to-lie

22. Since you were not concerned about it in the past, here we are this midday to look into those things, man. 23. So, Andits, you say, "This is what I really heard about Buton, man." 24. The same for you, Buton, say "Like this and this is what I really heard about uncle, man, and I really hated it," you say. 25. The two of you, don't be reticent, because it's not like before when we would scheme and lie. 26. And if you are not afraid to lie to God, and not afraid to slander, even though in the past you could say bad things that were offensive to hear, get rid of that at this time so you can forgive each other. 27. Because we really err when we do those things. 28.



26. E nu amme yu matalaw a massiri ki And tell it  
and if not you-pl fear r1 to-lie to therefore, discuss  
it, you father and  
Dios, anda amme yu matalaw a son, for here we are  
God and not you-pl fear r1 listening.

mamalapanday si sapit, Kunnanatan nu  
slander in speech even-though if

nakasapit kayu si narakkat a mekontra so  
able-say you-pl obj bad r1 against at

layag daw si'in, ibukkat daw to  
ears yours before remove you-pl here

ingke'in ta makkapakapakoli kayu. 27.  
now so reciprocal-forgive you-pl

Se ira inoy mat, kamali ira na nanu  
because pl those really mistake pl fut when

kunna. 28. E istorya kunnantu,  
like-it and story-it therefore

mattatabbag kayu a matama, ta ayo  
discuss you-pl r1 father-son for here

kami a aggadingngag.  
we r1 listening

### Andits

29. Ana ino daretchu a assapitan ku.  
be the direct r1 speech my

30. Odde antu mat kun ku, nu maga'naddan  
but this really say I if hindered

kad pay yo korwan a sapite nepalawad  
perhaps just the other r1 words made-good

tam-un na lang-in allay. 31. E amme  
we-inc-cmp fut only-cmp man and not

na ra na langin payin a ma'ari inoy  
it they fut only-cmp just-cmp r1 remove that

29. I have  
something  
straightforward to  
say. 30. But this I  
say, if some other  
words caused  
difficulty, let's  
just make it good,  
man. 31. And don't  
let it ruin what  
we've been thinking  
about. 32. However I  
really did make an  
assertion. 33.  
However it was

a aggadandamman tam. 32. Gampama'de  
 rl thinking ours however

nebuyawut ku ira mat na. 33. Gampama'de  
 asserted I pl really fut however

wara ira na dalidaliwangkit na. 34. E nu  
 exist pl fut ignoring it and if

sin binaba'lag si gakkurug, amme-k ira-n  
 since fleshy in truth not-I pl-cmp

Kelang anggam si ikkanetam ira-n Kelang  
 just like obj we-inc pl-cmp just

yaw a naraletung si gakkurug alle. 35. Awan  
 this rl gathered in truth man none

a ammu-k si ituldu-k onnu abbe'bek ku si  
 rl know-I obj teach-I or blaming I obj

abbing ku alle.  
 child my man

36. Odde antu-in gakkurug yaw o  
 but this-cmp truly this the

pappa'itan ku nad so abbe'bek ku si  
 cause-see I should of blaming my obj

abbing ku si gakkurug<sup>2</sup> alle, se amme na  
 child my in truth man because not it

ira nad mapapatta si gakkurug o iyaw  
 pl should made-known in truth the this

ira a tarabafu. 37. Gakkuruwingke yaw  
 pl rl work true-really this

allay.  
 man

38. Sapitan da allay nu sanna ino ammu  
 say they man if what the know

ignored. 34. And by  
 the former customs,  
 I just would not  
 want for us to have  
 this meeting, and  
 that's the truth,  
 man. 35. I don't  
 know of anything  
 that I instructed  
 or blamed my child  
 about, man.

36. But in fact  
 that's all I should  
 divulge about my  
 blaming my child,  
 truly, man, because  
 this kind of thing  
 should really not be  
 broadcast. 37. This  
 is really true, man.

38. They can say  
 whatever they know  
 about me, man. 39. I

ra a sapitan gumafu sikwak. 39. Awan a  
they r1 say about me none r1

ammu-k si sinapasapit ku yaw. 40. Amme-k  
Know-I obj said I this not-I

pe ammu alle.  
just know man

41. Ma'annararig etam nad si sapit  
use-examples we-inc should in speech

allaye, odde malo lang nu wara sumalofu,  
man but hurt just if exist lengthen

se amme na naggagarimpa yo nakam.  
because not fut come-together the mood/sensus.

42. Se ikkanak mat allaye,  
because myself really man,

naminlima-k a nangatawa. 43. Namidwa-k a  
fifth-I r1 married twice-I r1

nangabbing a nangatawa. 44. Antu ino  
had-child r1 married this the

nispirensyan ku so nakam ku inoy allay,  
experienced I in mind my that man

se waso bakkan allay a nappaparefu ino  
because upon not man r1 caused-same the

nakam o affunan ke alle.  
mind the elder-younger just man

45. Awaningke allay. 46. Amme-k napasa'bal  
none-emph man not-I encountered

yaw.  
this

47. Odde, anta! 48. Amme-k ira  
but, who-knows not-I pl

don't know that I  
said any of this.  
40. I just don't  
know of it, man.

41. We should  
circumlocute  
somewhat (i.e. use  
examples), but we  
should not stretch  
it out too much,  
because then we  
won't reach

42. As for me, I  
was married five  
times. 43. Twice I  
had a child in  
marriage. 44. This  
is what I was  
feeling in my mind,  
man, when there was  
not agreement  
between me and my  
younger relative,  
man. 45. None at  
all, man. 46. I  
never encountered  
this before.

47. But, who  
knows? 48. I won't  
repress those

Kelang mebuyawut. 49. IKkayu Kallaye, nu  
 just-only dam-up you-pl man, if  
 anna pay ino makasapit sikwayu se iyaw,  
 what just the able-say you-pl because this,  
 naraletungan tam a iyaw awan a baggat  
 gathered we-inc rl this none rl grain  
 na, nu amme ta pelang a massingguyang  
 its if not we-2 just-only rl reach-point  
 a massimpakoli lullamang, se nara'lang  
 rl forgiving really-only because facing  
 etam. 50. Nabalín-in nad yaw.  
 we-inc finished-cmp should this

51. Wara sin gafu na yawe allaye,  
 exist when source its this-p man-p

one init yu allay Teklanon,  
 yes-p reheat-food you-pl man Teklanon  
 agyan taw allay ira anni Anto, a medyu  
 stayed here man them and Anto rl medium  
 nadammat-in kena-in sapit i Buton toya a  
 heavy-cmp just-cmp words of Buton here-p rl  
 "Fuffutan nangke ki Teklanon, nu  
 prompt fut-really pm Teklanon if  
 sannanganna ino pangwa so elder onnu  
 what-depict the cause-do to elder or  
 laKay to Kapilya a mamaraparal". 52.  
 old-man this chapel rl slanders  
 Sabagay, amme-k sapitan si ikkanak ino  
 Maybe, not-I say obj I the  
 asipan na. 53. Odde nadammat-in angkwa-k  
 refer-to he but heavy-cmp thing-my

things. 49. You all,  
 say whatever you are  
 able to, because  
 this meeting of ours  
 will have no value  
 or result if we  
 don't reach the  
 point of forgiving  
 each other, because  
 we are here facing  
 each other. 50. This  
 should be finished.

51. When this all  
 began, man, you and  
 (Anto) Teklanon were  
 reheating some food,  
 for Anto and the  
 others were here  
 then, and Buton  
 spoke somewhat  
 sharply, saying  
 "Let's get Teklanon  
 to tell us what to  
 do to an elder of  
 the church who  
 slanders." 52. I  
 don't insist that he  
 was referring to me.  
 53. But I felt heavy  
 hearted then,  
 saying, "Please  
 let's not do that  
 because we should go  
 to our place of  
 study." 54. What I  
 had said was "Wow,  
 man!" 55. He really  
 requested that  
 again. 56. "Let's

sinoy a "Bakkan abbu yan o angkwan  
 then rl not please that the do  
 daw se ang tam abbu to adal  
 you-pl because go we-inc please here study  
 tam," kun ku sinoy. 54. Ino nepassapit ku  
 ours said I then the cause-say I  
 so "Nakoy alle." 55. Arangnan na lang-in  
 obj wow man request-it he only-cmp

mappaye. 56. "Amme tam-un na  
 really-just-p not we-inc-cmp fut

lang-in disisyonan nu sannanganna inoy,"  
 only-cmp decide if what-depict that

kun ku. 57. E. gini'na na nad sikwak  
 said I and felt he should of-me

inoy nu bakkan nak. 58. Onnu inang na nad  
 then if not he-I or came he should

sinapit sikwak si "O, nafektaran i ulitag  
 said to-me obj oh affected pm uncle

so sinapit ku."  
 by said I

59. Kunsesa'ay amme-m abbu sikwak  
 why reject-you please me  
 a nekun nu si matotaw ak gafu-so elder  
 rl said you obj lost I concerning elder

onnu lakay to kapilya? 60. Antu ino  
 or old-man this chapel this the

idaying na so nakam na nu ansanna  
 desire his in mind his if how

kanu mattuldu so tolay a mamaraparal.  
 it-is-said to-teach to person rl slanders

not decide what to  
 do about that," I  
 said. 57. And he  
 should have realized  
 that I felt  
 offended. 58. Or he  
 should have come and  
 said to me, "Were  
 you offended by what  
 I said, Uncle?"

59. Why did you  
 reject me, saying  
 that I was washed up  
 as an elder or  
 leader of this  
 chapel? 60. That was  
 the motive in his  
 mind when he asked  
 how to instruct  
 people who  
 slandered. 61. Why  
 didn't he just say  
 to me, "Uncle was  
 affected and I'm  
 coming to discuss

61. Kunsesa'ay se amme na lang-in  
 why because not he only-cmp

sinapit sikwak si "Nafektaran i litag e  
 said to-me obj affected pm uncle and

ang ku tatabban"? 62. Amme na lang-in kun  
 go I discuss-it not he only-cmp said

nu bakkan ak o target na ino sapit na.  
 if not I the target its the words his

63. Odde wara alle so awan, antu  
 but exist man at none, this-is

inay! 64. Ifungal ku kad kelamang,  
 that root/base I perhaps just-only,

allaye akwan ku-n yo massapit yaw.  
 man-p do I-cmp the say this

65. Ifungal ku kad kelang allay.  
 root/base I perhaps just-only man

66. Se i Buton kadde tatabban nak  
 for pm Buton perhaps discussed he-me

gakkurug. 67. Passig pelang  
 truly entirely just-only

nelangalangngi allay, makkiyad sin  
 glanced-around man until when

naragadiyan tam. 68. E ipakoli-k ira yaw  
 plowing-time ours and forgive-I pl this

Buton, e awan nad rakkat na ira yaw  
 Buton and none should bad its pl this

allay.  
 man

69. Wara sin maragadi kun dawé,  
 exist when to-plow say you-pl-p

it?" 62. He just  
 didn't say it, but  
 rather made me the  
 target of what he  
 said.

63. But when he  
 did not come, that  
 was it! 64. I  
 attribute it to  
 that, to what I am  
 saying. 65. I  
 attribute it to  
 that, man. 66.  
 Because Buton  
 actually did discuss  
 it with me. 67. But  
 he just glanced  
 around  
 disinterestedly man;  
 it was at plowing  
 time. 68. And I  
 forgive these  
 things, Buton, and  
 there should be no  
 remaining malice  
 about this, man.

69. When you said  
 it was plowing time,  
 we went looking for

inang etam nangita si sassapan tam.  
went we-inc looked obj wood-to-trim ours

70. E naletotaw etam si angan, e  
and lost we-inc in going and

nepadat etam sey Kapitan, e nakatarak  
ended-up we-inc at Kapitan and able-truck

etam sinoy si Kayu.  
we-inc then obj wood

71. E gafu-se amme tam  
and result not we-inc

natupak-in sinassapan tam sinoy,  
completed-cmp trimming-it ours then

nantataratu etam anda Paregaru si  
contracted we-inc and Paregaru obj

maddadarambal etam na kappay sinay, ta  
meet we-inc fut also there so

itupak tam nad ino sassap na. 72.  
complete we-inc should the trimming his

Odde sin kadaramatan na inoy a antu ino  
but when next-day of that rl this the

taratu tam, e nepakifut ku sikwam nu  
contract ours and asked I to-you if

umang etam kappay sinoy. 73. Odde massapit  
go we-inc also there but say

ka allay sinoye, "Nu umang kayu, mang  
you man then-p if go you-pl, go

kayu," nekun nu allay. 74. E talekkud  
you-pl said you man and turn-the-back

nu-n a inanaw. 75. E nekun ku si  
you-cmp rl left and said I obj

some wood to trim  
for plowing. 70. And  
we got lost on the  
way, and came out at  
Kapitan, and brought  
our wood from there  
by truck.

71. And because  
we did not finish  
our wood trimming  
then, we contracted  
with Paregaru to  
meet him there again  
to finish the  
trimming. 72. But on  
the day after we  
made the contract, I  
asked you if we were  
going there again.  
73. But you said  
then, man, "If you  
want to go, go  
ahead," you said,  
man. 74. And you  
wheeled around and  
left. 75. And I  
said, "That's his  
custom. 76. He has  
no consideration  
because he is still  
a child," I just  
said. 77. I told it  
to Paregaru.

"Gagange-na. 76. Awan a aggatotakkan na  
 custom-his none r1 consideration his

se a'anakira kepay," nekun ku pelamang.  
 because child-pl still said I just-only

77. Netuldu-k ki Paregaru.  
 informed-I pm Paregaru

78. Ara kunna sinoy, dingngaggang ku so  
 now like that heard I at

tolay-ira. 79. "Iyaw awan a surbi na inay,  
 person-pl this none r1 use its there

se kunna kappe kena si awan a  
 because like also just obj none r1

Korakorwan si tolai, e nu anya na ino  
 other of person and if who fut the

kada'nan na na yo tatarabban tam ya, e  
 dropped it fut the discussion ours p and

kakallak na si uliwan" nekun ku si gakkurug  
 pitiful him in blame said I in truth

allay, "e amme tam ira lang uditan allay  
 man and not we-inc pl only check man

ammin, se antu kappe na allay, se  
 all because this also fut man because

sanna na ino mammulta sikwata allay?"  
 who fut the judges we-2 man

80. Aran tam ira inay ira a banag.  
 remove we-inc pl that pl r1 thing

81. Antu gafu na, ino nad busang a  
 this source its the should little r1

Kamali tame, pakoman tam. 82. Massiki  
 mistake ours-p forgive we-inc even

78. Now when that  
 had happened, I  
 heard things from  
 people. 79. And I  
 truly said, man,  
 "This is useless,  
 because it's as if  
 there are no other  
 people involved, and  
 whoever arranges  
 this discussion,  
 he'll be blamed, and  
 we can't check up on  
 everybody, because  
 who would judge  
 between us man?" 80.  
 We should get rid of  
 this kind of thing.

81. For this  
 reason, if we make a  
 little mistake, we  
 should forgive it.  
 82. Even if we were  
 still in the dark,



tan nu ana etam kepe si lammuk, talaga  
that if be we-inc still in dark maybe

awan sikwami iyaw a makkakarolak onnu  
none ours this rl recipr-siblings or

tawayan si gakkurug. 83. Awan sikwami.  
clan in truth none ours-exc

84. Iyo na nu wara kad busang  
this fut if exist perhaps small

ye nadamat, tata-in ke si gakkurug iyo  
rl-p heavy one-cmp just in truth this

amme-k ma'awatan, se bakkan kad si  
not-I understand because not perhaps obj

antu ino adalan tam. 85. Nu wara  
this the studied we-inc if exist

pakkamaliyan ino tata sikwatam,  
cause-mistake the one of-us-inc

makkapakapakoli etam, ta awan nad  
recipr-forgive we-inc so none should

pakapakaliwatan tam.  
cause-blame us

86. Nangwa-k si kansyon. 87. Nang ku  
made-I obj song went I

nepadda kwara Sanggoon anni Maik.  
showed pm-pl Sanggoon and Maik

88. Inaprobaran da.  
approved they

89. Antu inoy o nassapitan nu si  
this that the said you obj

"Amme na yan alle." 90. E pinersonal akun  
not it that man and personalled I

perhaps there would  
really be none of  
this among our  
brotherhood or clan.  
83. There would be  
none among us.

84. Now if there  
is some of this  
heaviness or  
disharmony, it's one  
thing I really don't  
understand, because  
it is not consistent  
with what we have  
studied. 85. If one  
of us makes a  
mistake, we should  
forgive each other,  
so that we would not  
be blameworthy.

86. I wrote a  
song. 87. I went and  
showed it to  
Sanggoon and Maik.  
88. They approved  
it.

89. That's when  
you said, "That's no  
good, man." 90. And  
I was personally  
insulted by that.  
91. I didn't speak

ke a ininsolto sinoye. 91. Amme-k  
just rl insulted then-p not-I

pelang naddamit sinoy. 92. Makkiyad sinoy  
just-only spoke then since then

amme ku-n nangwa si Kansyon. 93. Ituldu-m  
not I-cmp made obj song tell-you

Ki Maik nu wara-in na'da-k sikwana-in si  
pm Maik if exist-cmp gave-I to-him-cmp obj

Kansyon. 94. Ma'atal ak-un.  
song ashamed I

95. Antu inoy nasulisug ak sinoy,  
this the tempted I then

se "ana ira kanu ino sapit o  
because exist pl reported the word the

abbing inaya," kun ku ira sinoy.  
child that-p said I pl then

96. Naprobaran da. 97. "Dama na yan,"  
approved they okay it that

kun da kena.  
said they just

98. Odde "Amme na yan. 99. Ka'atatal so  
but reject it that shameful to

dilod ira," nekun nu.  
downstream pl said you

100. Inamme-k.  
rejected-I

101. Itan daw ino pakKakampattan ku  
look you-pl the cause-kept I

then. 92. From that  
time on I haven't  
written any songs.  
93. Just ask Maik if  
I have given him any  
more songs. 94. I  
was ashamed.

95. And I found  
that very trying,  
because- "Here are  
these things that  
child has said," I  
said then.

96. They approved  
it. 97. "That's  
okay," they said.

98. But "That's  
no good. 99. It's  
shameful to those  
downstream," you  
said.

100. I hated  
that!

101. Just look  
how I have truly  
held a grudge

ira a pallussawan sikwam si gakkurug.  
pl rl cause-hate you in truth

102. Awan Kepay inangwa-k si kansyon yaw.  
none yet made-I obj song this

103. Waso in-tam pa'adalan, ay,  
upon went-we-inc study-place oh

bakkan abbu.  
not please

104. Iyaw, ipakoli-k lamang,  
this, forgive-I only

takesi dingngagan i Maik, ta, nu  
in-order-that hear-it . pm Maik so if

ikkanak o nalliwat, dama rak a  
I the did-fault okay they-me rl

sultukan nu kayarak a sultukan,  
punch if as-much-as rl punch

takesi amme-k pe akwan no  
in-order-that not-I just do the

mamaraparal.  
slander

105. Wara sin madal etam anda  
exist when study we-inc and

matatarabbag etam mape'afu so da bunga,  
discuss we-inc about at pl fruit

antu yan no fungallan man yan, a nu amme  
this that the root again that rl if not

ra aprobaran a bunga-k ino tulduwan ku a  
they approve rl fruit-my the teach I rl

tolay, massiki madaral iyo angnurug ku,  
person even destroy the faith my

against you. 102. I  
have not yet written  
any more songs.

103. When we went  
to study, oh, excuse  
me.

104. This I just  
forgive, so that  
Maik will hear that  
if I was the one at  
fault, you can beat  
me up as much as you  
like, so that I will  
not slander.

105. At our  
study, when we were  
discussing about  
fruit bearing, that  
was the source of  
it, namely that if  
they did not approve  
of the fruit of my  
teaching, then even  
if my faith would be  
ruined, I would  
disrupt this chapel.  
106. There was one  
who spoke, it was  
Baskelo in fact.

kungkulan ku yo kapilya. 106. Ana kanu  
confuse I this chapel be reported

ino nassapitan na, kallaye i Baskelo ingke.  
the said he man-p pm Baskelo really

107. "Amme-m pelang aggedamadamit," nekun  
not-you just-only speaking said

ku. 108. "Amme-m pelang maddamit sinay."  
I not-you just-only speak there

109. Wasin iKKami a madal, sinalangan  
upon we-exc rl study scolded

nak i Kolakkan sitan yi, se  
she-me pm Kolakkan then p because

makwestion da Yawindo. 110. Antu-in in  
asked they Yawindo this-cmp the

oddu parikut na-in in aggadai mi.  
much tension it-cmp the study ours

111. Solbaran ku nad-in aggadai mi  
solve I should-cmp study ours

so uray-k pay. 112. Odde nallangngan nak  
at mind-my just but scolded she-me

i Kolakkan, se sinakaw tam-un ino  
pm Kolakkan because stole we-inc-cmp the

aw i Dios. 113. "Amme na nad Kunna yan,"  
day pm God not it should like that

kun i Kolakkan. 114. "Despensaran dak  
said pm Kolakkan excuse you-me

se pare'garu ira yo assapitan ku ya.  
because crooked pl the saying my p

115. Anggam ku nad lang si awan a  
like I should only obj none rl

107. "Just don't  
speak," I said. 108.  
"Just don't speak  
there."

109. When we were  
studying, Kolakkan  
scolded me, because  
Yawindo had a  
question. 110. And  
that was the start  
of much tension in  
our studies.

111. I intended  
to resolve our  
study. 112. But  
Kolakkan scolded me,  
because we had  
stolen God's day.  
113. "It shouldn't  
be like that,"  
Kolakkan said. 114.  
"Pardon me, because  
what I said was  
misguided. 115. I  
desire that there  
should be no wrong  
among us. 116. Let's  
make our study  
good," I said.

narakkat sikwatam. 116. Lawaran tam  
bad to-us-inc make-good we-inc

nad iyo madal, nekun ku.  
should this study said I

117. Wasin ikkanetam-un nang a madal  
upon we-inc-cmp went rl study

inoy, mallang a nadammat ira-in in  
then like rl heavy pl-cmp the

assapitan daw. 118. Tuttud nu nakuy  
saying yours-pl seat your maybe

iyane. 119. Treining pay inaya.  
there-p Treining just that-p

120. Wasin ikkami a madal, arig ku  
upon we-exc rl study thought I

si isamarays pay ammin in binasa tam.  
obj summarize just all the read we-inc

121. Odde nattuttud akun sitawwi.  
but sat I-cmp here-p

122. "Tawwara sikwara se medyu inammu  
better them because medium know

ra," kun ku.  
they said I

123. Iyaw, amme-k iyimad sikwayu  
this not-I hide from-you-pl

yaw, se i Dios aggatulangngan nak.  
this because pm God looking he-me

124. Arig ku si isamarays tam ammin a  
thought I obj summarize we-inc all rl

nadalan tam. 125. Awan.  
studied we-inc none

117. When we all  
went to study then,  
it was like your  
words were heavy.

118. You were  
sitting there. 119.  
Treining was over  
there.

120. When we were  
studying, I thought  
that we were to  
summarize all that  
we had read. 121.  
But I was sitting  
here. 122. "It's  
better for them (to  
do it) because they  
are somewhat  
Knowledgeable," I  
said.

123. I'm not  
concealing any of  
this from you,  
because God is  
looking at me. 124.  
I thought that we  
were to summarize  
all that we had  
studied. 125. Not  
so.

126. "Sigi, makkansyon etam-un," kun go-ahead sing we-inc-cmp said  
 126. "Okay, let's sing," you said.
- nu-n.  
 you-cmp
127. "Ma, awan-in allay?" Kun Ku. why none-cmp man said I  
 127. "What, no more, man?" I said.
128. "Makkansyon etam-un." sing we-inc-cmp  
 128. "Let's sing."
129. Ira inay allay ino amme tam ira pl that man the not we-inc pl  
 129. Those are the things we should not do, man. 130. If that is-your mindset, (you should just say) "What else are you others thinking of, that we should do?"
- nad a pakakwan. 130. Nu antu-in so should rl cause-do if this-cmp at  
 uray-m, "Sanna Kepay ino ammu yu pay mind-your what still the know you-pl just  
 o Korwan, ta akwan tam pay?" the others so do we-inc just
131. Sinoye, inita yu mat nu then-p saw you-pl really if  
 131. Back then, did any one of you witness me saying anything? 132. Not at all, but rather you actually asked again about disciplining elders or leaders of the church. 133. "How do we discipline elders or leaders of this chapel?" 134. Yes, and what did you tell me? 135. I don't know of anyone telling me about that.
- wara sapitan ku? 132. Awan, nu bakkan ka exist said I none if not you  
 imman kelud o mangidayadayang so cmp-again just-sure the requested to  
 elder onnu pangulu sito Kapilya a disiplina. elder or leader this chapel rl discipline  
 133. Ansan ta naddisiplina so elder onnu how we-2 discipline to elder or  
 laKay sito Kapilya? 134. One, sanna ino old-man this chapel yes-p what the

netuldu-m sikwak? 135. Awan a ammu-k si  
told-you to-me none rl know-I obj

sapitan daw sikwak yan.  
said you-pl to-me that

136. Wara ino daffug daw a  
exist the buffalo yours rl

aggalubbak pelang sinoye, na'allang i  
untethered just-only then-p scolded pm

Toyun. 137. "Sakay iyo balay. 138.  
Toyun hey this house

Lullungnan da yo kalawatan," kun i  
mess-up they this yard said pm

Toyun. 139. "Kadde," kun nu. 140. Malow-in  
Toyun so-what said you pain-cmp

kuyung ku a naddingngag.  
stomach my rl heard

141. Wasin i TukKaklak pelang-in  
upon pm TukKaklak just-only-cmp

manaladandan sinoye, ginamwang ka a  
follow there-p arrived you rl

aggagafuk ka si lufid. 142. "To angan  
holding you obj rope where go

nu?" kun ku. 143. "Do'man ku nad ino  
you said I catch I should the

daffug mi ya. 144. Anto ginan na allay?  
buffalo ours p where reside it man

145. Se amme lullungan yan daffug yan  
because not mess-up that buffalo that

kalawatan da, se i'bu ammin yan  
yard theirs because urine all that

136. When your  
buffalo was just  
running loose there,  
Toyun scolded you.  
137. "Hey, our  
house! 138. They're  
messing up the  
yard," said Toyun.  
139. "So what," you  
said. 140. Hearing  
that, my stomach  
hurt. - ,

141. Then when  
TukKaklak went over  
there, you arrived  
carrying a rope.  
142. "Where are you  
going?" I said. 143.  
"I should catch our  
buffalo. 144. Where  
is it, man? 145.  
That buffalo can't  
really mess up their  
yard, because it's  
just urine under  
their house." 146.  
Oh, those words  
hurt. 147. Take pity  
on me.

gukab." 146. Ay, malaw inay a sapit.  
under-house oh painful that pl word

147. Allakkan dak.  
pity you-me

148. E ira yaw allay si gakkurug ino  
and pl this man in truth the  
Kalowan ino nakam ku si gakkurug. 149. Ira  
cause-hurt the mind my in truth pl  
inoy allay ino pakkakampattan so nakam ku  
that man the cause-kept in mind my  
allay.  
man

150. Odde one, wara ikkallay ang ku  
but yes-p exist you-man go I  
sinassapit allay? 151. Awan. 152. Gampade,  
mediator man none however,  
antu kalowan ino nakam ku. 153. Se inay  
this cause-hurt the mind my for that  
a tarabafu a amme ta pakkinnawatan,  
pl work pl not we-2 cause-understand  
nattul ka sito kapilya. 154. Tata  
affronted you this chapel one  
im-man a nallowan ino nakam ku.  
cmp-again pl hurt the mind my

155. Pakawanan nak nu wara narakkat  
forgive you-I if exist bad  
a sapit ku sikwam. 156. Pakawanan nak pay  
pl word my to-you forgive he-I just  
i afu Dios nu wara ira nakkamaliyan ku  
pm lord God if exist pl mistake my

148. And truly,  
man, these things  
are what really hurt  
my heart. 149. Those  
are the things I've  
harbored in my  
heart, man.

150. But anyway,  
did I go and talk  
about this man? 151.  
Not at all. 152.  
However, that is  
what grieved my  
heart. 153. Because  
of those things  
about which we had a  
misunderstanding,  
you were miffed at  
this chapel. 154.  
That was another  
thing that hurt my  
heart.

155. Forgive me  
if I said something  
bad to you. 156. And  
may God forgive me  
if I erred or sinned  
against you, man.  
157. And I forgive  
you likewise, if you  
found my admission



onnu nassubarang ku allay sikwam.  
or excess my man to-you

157. Mampay so ammapakawan ku sikwam nu fustu  
also at forgiveness my to-you if okay

inay a diningngag nu a pabasul ku sikwam.  
that r1 heard you r1 blamed I to-you

158. Mampay sikwayu ammin, agyaman ak  
likewise to-you-pl all, thank I

se ayaw etam ammin a nara'lang sitaw.  
because here we-inc all r1 facing here

159. E awan-in sikwak iyan a banag.  
and none-cmp in-me that r1 thing

160. IKumpesar ku ki afu Dios ino  
confess I pm lord God the

panangpakawan ku sitan a idanug ku ira  
cause-forgive my that r1 reported I pl

ammin to naraletungan tam ammin,  
all this gathering us-inc all

Kamali-m onnu annanganna a amme ta  
mistake-your or whatever r1 not we-2

pakKinnawatan. 161. Antu-in inoy yo ana  
understand this-cmp that the be

sikwak yaw. 162. Awan-in sikwak yan.  
to-me this none-cmp to-me that

163. Ara sigi sapitan nu pay nu  
okay go-ahead say you just if

anya pay anggam nu sassapitan. 164. Sapitan  
what just want you say say

nu pay onnu sobaran nu pay ino anggam nu  
you just or add you just the want you

of guilt acceptable.  
158. And as for all  
of you, I'm thankful  
that we are all here  
face to face. 159.  
And those things are  
all gone from me  
now.

160. I confess to  
God that for which I  
need forgiveness,  
which I make known  
to our whole  
gathering about your  
mistake or whatever  
it was that the two  
of us had a  
misunderstanding  
about. 161. That's  
all of this that is  
in me. 162. There is  
no more of it in me  
now.

162. Okay, go  
ahead, just say  
whatever you want to  
say. 164. Just say  
or add on whatever  
it is you want to  
say to me. 165.  
That's all.

sapitan sikwak. 165. Antu-in inoy.  
say to-me this-cmp that

Sangqoon

166. Antu ino nakasalaman nu a  
this the able-think you r1

Kalolowan o nakam i litag nu Andits  
cause-hurt the mind pm uncle your Andits

sikwam alle.  
to-you man

166. This is what  
you have learned  
about how your  
uncle's heart was  
hurt by you, man.

Buton

167. Sanna Kad ino kaliwatan ku na,  
what perhaps the fault my fut

litaggi? 168. Tuldwan nak. 169. Sanna  
uncle-p teach you-me what

ikkallay iyatal daw na mattuldu sikwak  
you-man ashamed you-pl fut teach to-me

timma wara-in man ke korokorwan si  
so-why exist-cmp again just other of

tolay?  
person

Andits

170. Antu ino kun ku so da'bu inoy, a  
this the said I at while then r1

nu kamali na tata, kamali ta adwa.  
if mistake of one mistake we two

170. This is what  
I said a while ago,  
that if one of us  
erred, both of us  
erred.

Buton

171. On kamali ta lud.  
yes mistake we-2 sure

171. Yes, both of  
us really erred.

Sanggoon

172. Anda iyan ke, awan a ida'nag ku  
and that just none rl drop I  
si "liwat nu Andits," onnu awan ke  
obj fault yours Andits or none just  
sapitan ku si liwat i Buton.  
say I obj fault pm Buton

173. Antu ino kun ku so da'bu inoy a  
this the said I at while then rl  
wara allay so mangurug eta, e madyat  
exist man at believe we-2 and hard  
nad a ibbattan ta ino gagangay ta a  
should rl stop we-2 the custom ours rl  
tolay, odde malliwat eta talaga.  
person but do-fault we-2 perhaps

174. Siguro amme na ke nakkamali i Buton,  
maybe not he just did-err pm Buton  
odde ino ka'atallan onnu ke'atatallan nu.  
but the respect or deference your

175. E kunnera pelang inoy,  
and like-that just-only then  
gampade, "maku kunna," kun na nad nu  
however why like-it said he should of  
inammu na a attalan. 176. Kunna kappay  
know he rl respect like-it also  
angngidamit nu ki Buton, so akkawayi onnu  
saying yours pm Buton at relatives or  
so akkakaluma pelamang. 177. Amme-k inammu  
at neighbors just-only not-I know

172. And about  
that, I'm not going  
to say that it's  
your fault, Andits,  
or that it is  
Buton's fault.

173. This is what  
I said a while ago,  
that when we  
believe, it is hard  
for us to stop our  
typically human  
ways, and sometimes  
we may sin. 174.  
Perhaps Buton did  
not err, but (what  
about) your respect  
or deference.

175. And things  
were like that,  
however he should  
have said "Hey,  
something's wrong  
here," if he had  
shown proper  
respect. 176.  
Likewise concerning  
what you said about  
Buton to the  
relatives or  
neighbors. 177. I  
don't know about  
that, because I was

yan, se amme-k lud mapuntusan nu  
that because not-I sure aware if

sannanganna yan amme-yu pakKinnawatan.  
what-depict that not-you-pl understand

178. Antu ino kun ku so da'bu inoy, a  
this the said I at while then r1

tantaro lang nu ino ugali ira. 179. E  
maybe only if the custom theirs and

mepangngat ikKallaye a balawan dakayu  
fitting you-man r1 rebuke I-you-pl

se manat daw ira lud. 180. E anggam  
because did you-pl pl sure and like

nu mappe nu ira inoy a banag-e daggera nu  
you also if pl that r1 thing-p add-pl if

inoye, appan ta ira ino gagangay si'in  
that-p take we-2 pl the custom long-ago

e daggera. 181. Anggam na nad si  
and add-pl like he should obj

naggaddang ino ammin ira a mepa'ita ta, ta  
straight the all pl r1 show we-2 so

ira ammin inoy o tata a mangalalim onnu  
pl all that the one r1 please or

metata'nap so dayaw o tolay a nannakam.  
satisfy at admire the people r1 kindly

not aware of what it  
was that your  
misunderstanding was  
about.

178. This is what  
I said a while ago,  
that perhaps it can  
be attributed to  
their customs or  
habits. 179. And  
it's fitting that I  
rebuke you both,  
because you really  
did these things.  
180. And do you want  
those kind of things  
to increase, for if  
we practise our old  
customs they will  
increase. 181. It's  
preferable that we  
show only right  
behavior, so that  
even the finest  
people will be  
pleased and  
satisfied with it.

### Yawindo

182. Gakkurug.  
true

182. That's true.

Andits

183. Gakkurug. 184. Arangngan ku  
 true request I
- sikwayu, massiki tan abbing, nu massapit ak  
 to-you-pl even that child if say I
- si falsu, allangngan dak, sito lawum.  
 obj false scold you-me here inside
185. Massiki sintaw.  
 even where
186. Nu mabbungut ak, pa'lungan dak.  
 if get-angry I beat you-me
187. Kunsa'ay se amme-k mangngurug so  
 why because not-I believe at
- nalawara sapit?  
 good word
188. Antu yaw yo daretchu a sapitan  
 this this the direct pl speech
- ku. 189. Massiki abbing, nu kamali sapitan  
 my even child if mistake speech
- ku, allangngan dak. 190. Se nu amme-k  
 my scold you-me because if not-i
- mangngurug, Satanas ak-un, nu amme-k  
 believe Satan I-cmp if not-I
- mangngurug so nalawad.  
 believe at good
183. That's true.  
 184. I request of you, even children, that if I speak falsely, scold me, right here inside.  
 185. Wherever.  
 186. If I'm angry, beat me. 187. Why would I not obey good words?  
 188. This is what I say directly. 189. Even children, if I speak mistakenly, scold me. 190. For if I don't believe, I am Satan, if I don't believe the good.

Sanggoon

191. Antu yaw ino dama-k pelang  
 this this the able-I just-only

Kappay a masapit. 192. Iyaw appan tam si  
 also r1 say this take we-inc obj

angngurug a attatarabbag, a bakkan a ino  
 faith r1 discussion r1 not r1 the

gagangay a ginaga'dang tam a  
 custom r1 Ga'dang ours-inc r1

attatarabbag. 193. Gafuse ikkanak pay o  
 discussion because I just the

ne'ekwa yu a kunnangke ama yu, ayaw  
 placed you-pl r1 as-if father yours here

i ama toya a ama tam ammin, odde  
 pm father here r1 father ours all but

gumafu-se ikkanak pay o kunnangke  
 because I just the as-if

presidente yu sitaw a Kapilya tam, allaye  
 president yours here r1 chapel ours man-p

ikkanak o kunnangke maKa'oddu a maddamit.  
 I the as-if make-much r1 speaking

194. E kunna yaw yo masapit ku. 195.  
 and like this the say I

Aliwan nu pande-k pelang yaw, e aliwan  
 bad if making-my just-only this and bad

nu ikkanak pelang o makabasa to sapit  
 if I just-only the able-read the word

na Dios a to Biblia. 196. E ammu-k,  
 of God r1 the Bible and know-I

191. This is what I am able to say further. 192. This discussion is according to faith, not according to our Ga'dang customs. 193. Since I am the one you have appointed to be like your father, here is father right here who is the father of us all, but since I am the one who is like the president of our chapel, well, I am the one who will speak much (i.e. judge the case).

194. And this is what I say. 195. It would be bad if this were just my doing (my decision), and it would be bad if I were the only one who could read the words of God in the Bible. 196. And I know that you have likely read them, or

sempre nabasa yu na yan, onnu bakkan  
perhaps read you-pl fut that or not

neyadalin sikwatam-un inay a kunna si "Awan  
studied we-inc-cmp that r1 say obj none

nad makkakwa. 197. Makkakatuldu etam  
should fight reciprocal-teach we-inc

nu wara pakkamalyan ino ikkanetam a  
if exist mistake the we-inc r1

makkakarolak. 198. In-tam-ungke tatabban inay  
siblings go-we-emph discuss that

a nakkamali, onnu maye-ta so lakay na  
r1 mistake or call-we-2 to old-man of

Kapilya". 199. Amme yu nad mabababang  
chapel not you-pl should worry

a makimawid si duffun so lallakayira nu  
r1 ask obj help to old-men if

inoye ka'awan daw, tantaro lang nu  
that need you-pl perhaps only if

sipangngan dak na lang nu ikimawiggu yo  
scold they-I fut only if ask-about this

problema-k kun daw. 200. Awan.  
problem-my say you none

201. E nu kun i Buton a "Sanggoon,  
and if say pm Buton r1 Sanggoon

inta abbu ikkallay so akwi litag, ta  
go-we-2 please man to place-of uncle so

bulunan nak, se ana ino amme mi  
accompany you-me because be the not we-ex

mallanga pakka'awatan allaye; nalawad o ana  
like understand man-p good the be

if not, we all  
studied there where  
it says "There  
should be no  
fighting. 197. we  
should teach each  
other if there are  
those among us  
siblings who err.  
198. We should go  
and discuss that  
mistake, or call the  
leaders of the  
chapel." 199. You  
should not be afraid  
to ask help from the  
elders when you need  
it, saying, "Perhaps  
they will, scold me  
if I ask about my  
problem." 200. Not  
at all.

201. And if Buton  
would say,

"Sanggoon, man,  
let's go to uncle's  
place, and you come  
with me, because we  
have a  
misunderstanding,  
man; it would be  
good if you were  
there to listen,"  
man, why in the

Ka pay a aggadingngag," nu kun na  
you just rl listening if say he

ikkalaye, sannera dikKallay o nammay?  
you-man-p what you-man the rejected

202. E namat nanu umang-ak-e samer  
and really when go-I-p sum-up

ino ang ku sapitan, odde aggadingngag ak  
the go I say but hearing I

pelang nad sikwayu, e nu wara  
just-only should to-you-pl and if exist

dama-k a iyasab na, asafan takayu na.  
able-I rl help fut help I-you-pl fut

203. E nu bakkan ak o iyawit daw, e  
and if not I the call you then

Treining, mampe ki Andits.  
Treining likewise pm Andits

204. Allaye wara allay so napatu ino  
man-p exist man at hot the

ulu i Buton ya'e, se ana inay high  
head pm Buton emph because be that high

blood nakuy allay ya'e'e. 205. Amme-k ira na  
blood maybe man emph not-I pl fut

lang nakattam ta siniwa'wattan ku na nu  
only endured so spanked I he if

pakakwan na pelang o assapitan na inay  
force he just-only the saying he then

a passig pelang pinapa'lat a inoy!  
rl full just-only sudden rl then

206. Antu lang nappa'afunan ku sikwana.  
this only observed I to-him

world would that be  
rejected?

202. And if I  
really go just to  
sum up, but I hear  
you talk, and if I  
am able to be of  
help, I'll just help  
you. 203. Or if it's  
not me that you  
call, then Treining,  
or even Andits.

204. But as for  
Buton, man, he has a  
hot head, because  
maybe he has high  
blood pressure, man!  
205. I could not  
endure it and I  
might spank him if  
he speaks in his  
usual abrupt way.  
206. This is what I  
have observed about  
him.



207. Nu kun pena i Andits, allaye  
if said just pm Andits man-p

Kunnenoy o tubbun na ino adal tam inoy  
like-that the add-on fut the study ours then

ta amme na nad umoddu. 208. Kunna  
so not it should get-much like-it

mappay o kun i Bayombong so da'bu inoy,  
also the said pm Bayombong at while then

a Ka'atatal etam nu amme tam ma'ingud o  
rl shameful we-inc if not we tidy the

angngurug tam. 209. Bakkan pelang i  
faith ours not just-only pm

Buton, onnu i Andits, ino kakkatawa sinay,  
Buton of pm Andits the laughable there

nu bakkan etam ammin a mangngurug sitaw a  
if not we-inc all rl believe here rl

Kapilya.  
chapel

210. Kunnantu, se sito fuwab  
therefore because this afternoon

e nadingngag pay ino kalussaw ira i  
then heard just the hate pl pm

Andits pay sikwam Buton, e nu masapit ira  
Andits just to-you Buton and if say pl

pay-in i Andits o kalusso-m ira pay  
just-cmp pm Andits the hate-you pl just

sikwana, sigi, sanna ino number one a  
to-him go-ahead what the number one rl

in-tam inada'adal? 211. Reforma,  
go-we-inc study reform

207. When Andits said it, man, that should have been added on to our study then, so that (the problem) would not increase. 208. It's like what Bayombong said a while ago, that we are shameful if we do not have our faith in order. 209. It's not just Buton or Andits who is laughable in that case, but rather all of us believers in this chapel.

210. Therefore, because this afternoon you heard Andits's grievances to you, Buton, and you said your grievances, Andits, okay, what is the primary thing we should learn? 211. Reform, change. 212. Reform, change. 213. And from this time on, whatever you know of that ruins our faith, we should not do it, man.

mangangkakwa. 212. Reforma, mangangkakwa.  
change reform change

213. E makkiyad sitaw-in ya, ino ammu  
and until here-cmp p the know

yu a makadarai so annggurug tam,  
you-pl rl able-ruin at faith ours-inc

amme tam-un nad a pakakwan-in allay.  
not we-cmp should rl fight-cmp man

214. Agyan-in tata si fuwab a  
was-cmp one of afternoon rl

nappakabebutan ku sikwam Buton, e nekun nu  
asked I to-you Buton and said you

sikwak si ino angkwa so angkwa kun nu, e  
to-me obj the thing of thing said you and

amme-k ira pelang na'awatan inoy.  
not-I pl just-only understood that

215. Se ammu-yu lud o assapitan i  
for know-you-pl sure the speech pm

Buton, a passig pelang angkwa so angkwa  
Buton rl full just-only thing of thing

Kunna kun na nu korwan.  
like says he when other

216. Mampe ki Andits, nu sanna ira  
likewise pm Andits if what pl

pelang pay nekalussasaw na so "ayay  
just-only just hated he of hey

amme na yo kakkatawa". 217. E siguro,  
reject it this laughable and maybe

so abbafa pay a pannaKa'awat, allaye  
at short just rl able-understand man-p

214. There was one afternoon when I questioned you, Buton, and you said "the thingummy, you know", and I just didn't understand that. 215. For you know the speech of Buton, which is often full of "you know, you know."

216. And as for Andits, what he just hated was this being made to seem ridiculous. 217. And perhaps, because he did not completely understand, he hated it man, because it was as if he was insulted, because of course it was just

Kalussaw na ikkallaye, se kunnangke  
hate he you-man-p because as-if

insolto mappe sikwana, se tuddung  
insult really to-him because of-course

manuwang na pelamang allay e nainsolto  
son-in-law his just-only man and insulted

a lakay ikkalaye.  
r1 old-man you-man-p

his son-in-law, man,  
who insulted the old  
man, man!

### Andits

218. Ma'inay, magi'na-k-ungke gakkurug  
don't-know felt-I-really true

yo nakam ku se lakay-ak-un si  
this mind my because old-man-I-cmp in

gakkurug allay.  
truth man

218. I don't  
know, I really felt  
that in-my heart,  
because I really am  
an old man, man.

### Sangqoon

219. Para so ikkanak allay, para inay  
for to me man for that

ino ka'iyutan ku inay allay, mangwa ka  
the cause-irked me that man do - you

pay nu umapal ka ikkallaye kun ku  
just if envy you you-man-p said I

ma'nayan. 220. Odde amme-k paliwatan i  
really but not-I blame pm

Andits sinay, se waso  
Andits that because upon

mallaKay-in pay, pakkabawan  
becoming-old-man-cmp just cause-senility

219. As for me,  
man, that is what  
irked me, man,  
because that is just  
being jealous, man,  
I really said. 220.  
But I don't blame  
Andits for that,  
because when one  
gets old, doesn't  
that cause senility?  
221. It causes  
senility.

bakkan. 221. Pakkabaw.  
not cause-senility

222. E ino daffug ira kanu inoy  
and the buffalo pl reported that

a nassapit, sabagay, nu appan ta ino sapit  
rl said perhaps if take we-2 the words

a binaba'lag, anda waso masapit ira a  
rl flesh and upon words pl rl

mapparanak, e sanna ino mapalungu a  
parents and what the first rl

mafektaran? 223. I Bakatnay kun ta nad  
affected pm Bakatnay say we-2 should

nu nadingngag na ira inay a allang.  
if heard she pl that rl scold

224. Odde awan.  
but none

225. E waraso da Andits anni Galat  
and upon them Andits and Galat

ino nakadingngag allaye, e ira lang-in  
the able-hear man-p then they only-cmp

ino kunnangke nafektaran allay, se anak  
the as-if affected man because child

dera lud, anda dandamman kad i Andits  
theirs sure and think perhaps pm Andits

si mallanga amme ta mappay makatuldu so  
obj like not we-2 just able-teach to

da a'anak e massapit kad na lang  
pl children and say perhaps fut only

da tolaye "Nu amme lang-in ma'imut ino  
they person-p if not only-cmp care-for the

222. And that buffalo that we spoke of, perhaps if we follow the ways of people, which were told us by our parents, then who would be the first to be affected? 223. Bakatnay, we should say, if she hears of that scolding. 224. But not so.

225. And when Andits and Galat heard of it, man, it's like they were the ones affected, because he is really their child, and Andits may have thought that it's as if we can't teach our children, and people might say, "If their children can't look after their buffalo, what is it really that they taught them there?" 226. They may not just blame Andits and Galat. 227. However, they

anak dera so daffug dera ya, sanna ira  
child theirs at buffalo theirs p what pl

ma'lud na'dan dera sinay?" 226. Ammay-in  
sure gave them there not-cmp

pelang-in appan da Andits anni Galat.  
just-only-cmp take they Andits and Galat.

227. Gampama'de amme ra Kena maka'imut  
however not they just able-control

ino a'anak dera a mappasapasapat ira lang  
the child theirs rl involved they only

a dumakkut sito bumaryo. 228. Kunna nakuy  
rl dirtying this village like perhaps

ino nakan da, e antu ino yo atallan  
the mind theirs and this the this ashamed

da.  
they

229. E gampade wara pay o Buton  
and however exist just the Buton

allay, e nakkiyad pelang sinoy nu wara  
man and since just-only then if exist

madingngag na, puraman ira-n Kelang  
hear he allow pl-cmp just-only

mallalattu onnu mamaruntut, e ira ikkalay  
to-jump or play-games and pl you-man

inoye ino amme ta pakkinnawatan a  
that-p the not we-2 understand rl

matatama.  
father-son

230. Gampama'de ino sapit na bible, awan  
however the word of bible none

cannot control  
their children who  
are involved in  
dirtying this  
village. 228. They  
might think that,  
and that is what  
(Andits) is ashamed  
about.

229. However as  
for Buton, man, from  
that time whenever  
he heard something,  
he just ignored it  
and kept on jumping  
and playing games,  
and that's what  
caused the  
misunderstanding  
between the father  
and son.

230. However  
according to the  
Bible, there should

nad a ilefalefang, madakkut, nalawad a  
should rl cover-up dirt good rl

sapit si paran tan. 231. Iya'lang  
words in place ours-cmp bring-before

tam ke nad so kasittole ta,  
we-inc just should at fellow-person our-2

ka'atatal onnu amme na ka'atatal, sapitan nu.  
shameful or not it shameful, say-it you

232. Se i Dios, amme na ka'imaddan.  
because pm God not he be-hidden-from

233. Se massiki kun ta si "amme-k  
because even say we-2 obj not-I

sinapit" kun nu, i Dios, dingngag na.  
said-it say you pm God hears he

234. E anda masasonan nu ino baggi-m so  
and then hide you the body-your at

Kaparefu-m a tolai, odde ki Dios, amme-m  
same-yours rl person but pm God not-you

malefangngan.  
hide-from-view

235. E nu gangngariyan si makKamali  
and if for-example obj err

etam se tolai etam pelang lud,  
we-inc because people we-inc just-only sure

inoy-in kun ku inoy a amme tam me'attam  
that-cmp said I that rl not we-inc endure

onnu ma'atal etam gafuse ino pakKamaliyan  
or ashamed we-inc because the error

tam e lakay onnu diyadal onnu manuwang  
ours p old-man or youth or son-in-law

be no covering up of  
dirt or wrong, but  
we should discuss it  
well. 231. We  
should bring it  
before our fellow  
people and say it,  
shameful or not. ^  
232. Because nothing  
can be hidden from  
God. 233. For even  
if we say that we  
never said it, God  
heard. 234. And you  
can hide yourself  
from your fellow  
man, but you can't  
hide from God.

235. And if for  
example we err, for  
we are people after  
all, then it's like  
I said a while ago,  
that we should not  
just tolerate it or  
be ashamed because  
of our mistake; old  
man or youth,  
son-in-law or  
parent-in-law, we  
should get a  
companion and go and  
discuss it, not just

ta onnu Katuwangan ta, e may-eta  
our-2 or parent-in-law our then call-we-2

ikkallay si bulun ta e in-ta  
you-man obj companion our-2 and go-we-2

makitatabbag ta amme ta palalyawan se  
discuss so not we-2 forget because

nu purayan ta inay, dumokal onnu umoddu  
if permit we-2 that get-big or get-much

inoy a problema.  
that r1 problem

236. Aggataronan takayu mally umang  
was-waiting I-you-pl man come

makitatabbag a makimawid. 237. Sapitan  
discuss r1 request say

dawe nu sanna ino inang dappadda sikwak  
you-pl-p if what the came show to-me

e amme-k nepabbebeng. 238. Awan a kun  
and not-I concerned none r1 say

daw yan. 239. Amme takayu nepabburung  
you-pl that not I-you-pl concerned-for

se awan pe kimawid daw sikwak  
because none just request you-pl to-me

allay, e amme-k inammu yan a amme yu  
man and not-I knew that r1 not you-pl

pakkinnawatan a adwa.  
understand r1 two

240. E nu menomorek takayu a  
and if approach I-you-pl r1

pattalabban na sinoy, ana na makKun  
discuss r1 that be fut who-says

forget it, because  
if we allow it to go  
on, that problem  
just gets bigger or  
increases.

236. I waited for  
you, man, to come  
and ask-to discuss  
it. 237. You tell me  
if anyone came to  
inform me and I was  
unconcerned. 238.  
You can't say that.  
239. I did not  
concern myself about  
it because you did  
not come and ask me,  
man, and I did not  
know about that  
misunderstanding  
between the two of  
you.

240. And if I  
approached you to  
discuss that, there  
would be someone who  
would say "He  
approached him, man,

sikwayu allay si "ina'ling na allaye  
to-you-pl man obj faced he man-p

se kolak nangke," kun pe na i  
because sibling really say just fut pm

Andits.

Andits.

241. Onnu kun pe na i Buton si "on  
or say just fut pm Buton obj yes

se kaparefu na kalillakay, e antu ino  
because same his old-man and this the

netayang na se atallan na," kun  
approached his because respect he say

daw-in na.  
you-pl-cmp fut

242. Antu ino pinurayan takayun  
this the permitted I-you-pl

pelang kiyad si amme yu nad umang  
just-only until to not you-pl should come

makimawid allay. 243. Se amme-k pay  
request man because not-I just

anggam o manata'wig nad nu dama na,  
like the favoritism should if able it

se amme anggam i Dios ino kunna inoy.  
because not like pm God the like that

because he is really  
his sibling," Andits  
might say.

241. Or Buton  
might say, "Yes  
because he is an old  
man like (Andits),  
and that is who he  
approached because  
he respects him,"  
you might say.

242. This is why  
I just waited until  
one of you would  
come and ask me,  
man. 243. For I  
don't like  
favoritism if it can  
be avoided, for God  
does not like that.



Andits

244. Pidya etam-un ke'in a  
 how-many we-inc-cmp just-cmp pl  
 Ga'dang? 245. Busang etam ke'in.  
 Ga'dang few we-inc just-cmp
244. How many of us Ga'dangs are there now? 245. We are few now! 246. We are few now! 247. I don't want there to be strife among us, but rather we should put our minds in proper order. 248. Let's throw out our customs of vindictiveness or jealousy or evil. 249. Let's throw them out! 250. Let's get rid of that anger thing, for what's the use of anger?
246. Busang etam ke'in. 247. Amme-k nad  
 few we just not-I should  
 anggam si wara mabbabangkirit sikwatam, nu  
 like obj exist strife to-us-inc if  
 amme tam lud ingguran ino nakam tam.  
 not we-inc sure order the mind ours
248. Itakkud tam ino gagangay tam inoy a  
 throw we-inc the custom our that pl  
 massisiblat onnu apalapai onnu naral.  
 vindictive or jealous or evil
249. Itakkud tam-un. 250. Aryan tam ira  
 throw we-cmp remove we-inc pl  
 a intremente a bungot, se sanna ino  
 pl instrument pl anger because what the  
 surbi na ino bungot?  
 use its the anger
251. Nanu inattak nak-e, sanna  
 when brushed-off you-I-p what  
 Kappay na ino melaw sikwak? 252. Sempere  
 also fut the look at-me maybe
251. When I've been removed, who will see me then? 252. I just won't be around then.
- awan ak Kappe lang pay na.  
 none I also only just fut
253. Antu inay a nu wara  
 this that pl if exist
253. That is why if you err, or if I err, man, just scold

pakkamaliyan daw, onnu kamali-k, laye  
cause-mistake-it yours or mistake-my man-p

allakkan dak pe na. 254. Nu wara  
scold you-me just fut if exist

kamali-k, ang ka sapitan sikwak. 255. Antu  
mistake-my go you say-it to-me this

mat maral-e me-k siguran sapitan abbu  
really slander-p not-I sure say-it please

inay. 256. Odde nu da rakkat anna bungot,  
that but if pl bad and anger

tanamman dak a gatulang. 257. Patayan  
bury you-I rl bony kill

dak. 258. Sanna ino surbi ikkallay? 259. E  
you-I what the use you-man and

iyara'arang ku si mallawad etam nad a  
request I obj make-good we-inc should rl

Ga'dang, gampade kalussaw ak-un mangke lang  
Ga'dang however hate I-cmp really only

sikwayu, aran dak-un lang-in, takesi  
to-you-pl remove you-I-cmp only-cmp so

Kunna, awan a panuntulan daw si  
that none rl lead you-pl obj

tarabafu-k a narakkat. 260. Kunna inoy  
work-my rl bad like that

itulun ku lang sikwayu. 261. Bakkan a  
tell I only to-you-pl not rl

tolay ak kepelang nu ikalusso-ya.  
person I just-only if hate-p

262. Ikkayu mat nad a anak a mangwa  
you-pl really should rl child rl do

si napyu.  
obj good

me. 254. If I err,  
come and tell me.  
255. I won't say  
that it is slander.  
256. But if I'm bad  
or angry, bury my  
bones! 257. Kill me!  
258. What good am I,  
man? 259. And I  
request that we  
Ga'dangs behave  
well, however if I  
really hate you,  
just remove me, in  
order that there  
will be none to lead  
you into bad things.  
260. That's what I'm  
telling-you. 261.  
I'm not even a  
person if I hate  
others. 262. It's  
you children who  
should do what is  
good.

Baggit

263. Antu lud, inangguwet ku ammin ino  
 this sure scrubbed-off I all the  
 mepanggip sitan ira a banag. 264. Odde  
 about that pl rl thing but  
 waraso sinapit mi ira-n inoy,  
 upon said we-exc pl-cmp that  
 nalluwat-in e nabalín-in.  
 washed-cmp and cone-cmp

263. That's for  
 sure, I have got rid  
 of everything about  
 that. 264. Having  
 said what has been  
 said, it is washed  
 away and finished.

Yawindo

265. Mabisin-in ak-un.  
 hungry-cmp I-cmp

265. I'm hungry.

Sanggoon

266. Antu ino masapit ku ke.  
 this the say I just  
 267. Gagangay, e nang etam pe sitaw a  
 customary and came we-inc just here rl  
 mangngurug. 268. Massiki ikKa Buton, abbing  
 believe even you Buton child  
 ka kepay si uray-m. 269. Ma'awatan si  
 you still in mind-your understood obj  
 abbing ka, se abbing ka kepay lud. 270.  
 child you because child you still sure  
 I Andits, lakay-in. 271. Amme-m tonan si  
 pm Andits old-man-cmp not-you wait obj  
 i Andits, umara'ni sikwam se i Andits  
 pm Andits approach you because pm Andits

266. I'll just  
 say this. 267. It's  
 customary, and  
 (that's why) we who  
 believe have come  
 here. 268. As for  
 you, Buton, you're  
 still a child in  
 your mind. 269. It's  
 understood that you  
 are a child, because  
 you really are still  
 a child. 270.  
 Andits, he is an old  
 man. 271. Don't you  
 wait for Andits to  
 approach you, for  
 Andits is a child.  
 272. He is an old  
 man in our life, but  
 as for his stand, I

abbing. 272. LaKay si angngeta tam, odde si  
child old-man in life ours but in

tata'dag, amme-k inammu sikwana, se  
stand not-I know of-him because

lakay lud, nabbalin me'anak. 273. Se  
old-man sure finished born because

nu si angnurug, abbing kepay. 274. E  
if in faith child still and

ma'awag si ikka a lakay si angnurug ino  
needed obj you rl old-man in faith the

umara'ni, gangngariyan si nu wara duma'nga  
approach for-example obj if exist drop

a buruburung. 275. Kunnatan nu wara amme-m  
rl worry even if exist not-you

pakkinawatan allay-e, ing ka e'e.  
understand man-p go you p

276. Amme-k sapitan si "I Baggit, umang  
not-I say obj pm Baggit go

sikwam," se tantaro nu amme kepay ma'addang  
to-you for perhaps if not yet reached

ino kata'naggan no lintig na Dios.  
the most-difficult the law of God

277. E ikkanak kallay-e, kunnatan nu  
and I man-p although if

liwat i Baggit, massiki liwat na, umang ak  
fault pm Baggit even fault his go I

pelang sikwana'e, kesi palapalawan  
just-only to-him-p so-that remove

mi pelang adwa nu sanna ino amme-mi  
we-exc just-only two if what the not-we

don't know about  
him, because he  
really is an old  
man, but recently  
born. 273. Because  
as for his faith, he  
is still a child.  
274. And it's  
necessary that you,  
being mature in  
faith, be the one to  
approach, if for  
example there is  
some source of  
concern. 275. Even  
if there is  
something you do not  
understand, man, you  
just go. 276. I  
don't say that  
Baggit should come  
to you, because he  
may not yet have  
grasped the most  
profound laws of  
God.

277. And as for  
me, man, even though  
it were Baggit's  
fault, even if his  
fault, I would just  
go to him, so that  
the two of us might  
remove whatever it  
is that we have a  
misunderstanding  
about.

pakkinnawatan mi adwa.  
understand we two

278. E nu amme-na dingngaggan, antu  
and if not-he listens this  
ino sapit na Bible, a adalan tam-ya, a nu  
the word of Bible r1 study we-inc-p r1 if  
amme na kuruwan, mayag ka lang-in si  
not he believe call you only-cmp obj  
korwan, kun na kappay. 279. E nu amme na  
other say it also and if not he  
kappay kuruwan, mayag ka-n si elder, ta  
also believe call you-cmp obj elder so  
nu amme na kappay kuruwan, sanna kappay ino  
if not he also believe what also the  
akwan ta? 280. Umang so kun i Buton inoy,  
do we-2 goes to said pm Buton that  
a pallalasinan-in, ta i Dios pelang-in  
r1 put-out-cmp so pm God just-only-cmp  
ino makammu. 281. Ta aran tam ino  
the know so remove we-inc the  
gagangay tam-un a Ga'dang.  
custom our-cmp r1 Ga'dang

282. E anda iyo parapara! ke,  
and and this slander just  
se antu yan o number one ingke a  
because this that the number one really r1  
antu ingke ammu-k ya. 283. Se massiki  
the really know-I p because even  
ikkanak, oddu pe dingngaggan ku sikwayu  
I much just heard I from-you-pl

278. And if he  
does not listen,  
this is what the  
Bible refers to,  
what we have  
studied, that if he  
does not believe or  
obey, just call  
another person, it  
says. 279. And if he  
still does not obey,  
call an elder, and  
so if he still does  
not obey, then what  
will we-do? 280.  
It's like what Buton  
said, we'll put them  
out, and they will  
then be God's  
responsibility. 281.  
So then let's get  
rid of our Ga'dang  
tradition (of  
retribution).

282. And now  
about this slander,  
for that is really  
the number one  
(problem) that I  
know about. 283. For  
I myself even heard  
a lot from all of  
you. 284. I'm not  
going to say that it  
was just Galat. 285.  
It was all of this

ammin. 284. Awan ke sapitan ku si "I in this church. 286.  
 all none just say I obj pm I heard a lot of  
 Galat", kun ku pelamang. 285. IKkanetam ammin 287. It is all the  
 Galat say I just-only we-inc all speech of  
 to Iglesia a iyaw-e. 286. Oddu dingngaggan thoughtless people,  
 this church rl here-p much heard and it serves no  
 ku a paraparaI sikwak. 287. Total ino sapit purpose. 288. It  
 I rl slander to-me total the word will just pass by.  
 na tolay a bayakakaw, awan a surbi na. 289. For if you  
 of person rl thoughtless none rl use its start a fire, man,  
 288. Malla'wut pe na lang inay. it increases. 290.  
 pass just fut only that There is none that  
 289. Se nu pa'afuyan nu, alle, umoddu-e. does not. 291. Our  
 for if set-fire you man increase-p studying serves no  
 290. Awan a amme na. 291. Awan surbi na ino purpose in that  
 none rl not it none use its the case. 292. So let's  
 adal tam sinoy. 292. E passan tam just quit fueling  
 study ours-inc then and leave we-inc arguments. 293.  
 pelang mararintungu a mattatarukki. After a while,  
 just-only fueling rl arguing strife will be our  
 293. Danadanoy, antu-in pelang a dalan way of life. 294.  
 later this-cmp just-only rl path God's word says no  
 tam o marrarariri. 294. Sapit na Dios, strife.  
 our-inc the strife word of God  
 awan a riri.  
 none rl strife

295. Se ino paraparaI ya a 295. For the  
 because the slander p rl slander which comes  
 maggabwat si dila pakasikkulan, a kunna from the tongue  
 springs from tongue cause-fire rl like starts a fire, as we  
 learned in our  
 study. 296. It's

ino inadal tam. 296. Kunna pay o fego,  
the studied we-inc like just the match

taggat ke, odde nu sigiyan nu, sikkulan na  
one just but if start-it you burns it

ammin a padanadanak. 297. Kunna inoy ino  
all pl grassland like that the

Ke'ampariyan na dila. 298. Kunna ira inoy  
example of tongue like pl that

o kedalanan na ira ino binungobungot.  
the way its pl the anger

299. E ino kun ku ki Baggit inoy,  
and the said I pm Baggit then

mampe ki Buton, a me na se  
likewise pm Buton pl not it because

pe'napa'lat yo dadamit ku mat lud.  
sudden the speech my really sure

300. Nu damana nad, reforma. 301. Mareforma.  
if able ought reform reform

302. Kakkapan tam tangngallan ino bifig  
try we-inc control the lips

tam, nakam tam, aggangwa tam.  
ours-inc mind ours doings ours

303. Mampe ki Baggit, massapit kadde,  
likewise pm Baggit say okay

me na se wara kad dingngaggan ku  
not it because exist perhaps heard I

ya'e allay, me-k makattam si gakkurug.  
p man not-I endure in truth

304. Kakkapan tam.  
try we-inc

like a match, it's  
just one, but if you  
strike it, it can  
burn a whole  
grassland. 297. That  
is an example of the  
tongue. 298. That is  
the way that anger  
goes.

299. And what I  
said to Baggit then,  
likewise to Buton,  
it was not (good)  
because I really  
spoke abruptly. 300.  
If possible, we  
should reform. 301.  
Reform! 302. Let's  
try to control our  
lips, minds, and  
actions.

303. Likewise  
Baggit, he talked,  
and it was bad  
because I really  
heard of it, man,  
and really could not  
put up with it. 304.  
Let's try.

305. Me-k anggam sapitan si "Nanu  
not-I like say obj when  
linggu, narriforma Kayu-n," odde  
Sunday reformed you-pl-cmp but  
mangararanan etam si aggabusang. 306. Kun  
remove we-inc by little said  
i Elena, a nadalan mi so dilod ya,  
pm Elena rl studied we-exc at downstream p  
"Garsifan a aggabusang". 307. Me-k anggam  
scissor-it rl little not-I like  
a sapitan a ino tansit nu, ga'ungan  
rl say rl the hostility your cut-off  
nu, nu me na lud ararananan nu si  
you if not it sure remove you by  
aggabusang. 308. Nanu daramat, garsib nu.  
little when tomorrow scissor you  
309. Nanu daramat imman, ino gagange-m a  
when tomorrow again the custom-your rl  
narakkat, ginarsib nu man ke inay.  
bad scissor you again just that  
310. E nanu ngkwa, awan-in! 311. Se nu  
and when what none-cmp for if  
passan tam pelang inoy mattatarukki  
leave we-inc just-only that arguing  
anda mamaraparal, allay.  
and slander man

312. E kakkapan tam mallakad si  
and try we-inc walk in  
na'inggud. 313. Tantarome tam inammu nu  
straight maybe not we-inc know if

305. I don't want  
to say "By Sunday,  
you be reformed,"  
but let's remove  
(the bad) little by  
little. 306. As  
Elena said in our  
study downstream,  
"Cut off little by  
little." 307. I  
don't want to say  
that you must just  
cut off your  
malevolence, but  
rather remove it  
little by little.  
308. Then tomorrow,  
cut some off. 309.  
Then the following  
day, cut off some  
more again of your  
bad habits. 310. And  
later on, it's all  
gone. 311. For if we  
just allow that  
arguing and slander  
to continue, oh man!

312. And let's  
try to behave in an  
orderly way. 313.  
For we may not know  
when Christ will  
return. 314. Do you



na'ansa na ino gamwang i Kristo.  
when fut the coming pm Christ

want to be left  
behind?

314. Anggam daw kad o mabattang?  
want you-pl perhaps the left

### Andits

315. La'ay!  
man

315. Man!

### Sangqoon

316. Nassalaservi kayu si tarun,  
served you-pl for one-year  
tallurun, limarun, gampama'de nanu  
three-years five-years however when  
gumwang i Kristo, ana na ra Andits, anni  
come pm Christ be fut pl Andits and  
Buton a "Alay, anto mat da Baggit,  
Buton r1 man where really pl Baggit  
Yawindo anda Maik inoy?" Kun daw nanu  
Yawindo and Maik there say you-pl when  
metullu ira-n na sey langit nanu gumwang  
ascend they-cmp fut at sky when come  
i Kristu, gampama'de ana etam na sinay  
pm Christ however be we-inc fut there  
Kepay a madatangngan a mattatarukki,  
still r1 arrived r1 arguing  
makkakwa. 317. Allaye!  
fighting man-p

316. You worked  
for one, three, or  
five years, however  
when Christ comes,  
there will be Andits  
and Buton saying  
"Man, where are  
Baggit, Yawindo, and  
Maik?" you will say  
when they ascend to  
the sky when Christ  
comes, however when  
that arrives we will  
still be there  
arguing and  
fighting. 317. Oh  
man!

318. E wara lud lang o bawu ira  
and exist sure only the new pl

318. And there  
may be those who  
have just believed,

nangngurug a akwan da ingke si nanya ino  
believed r1 do they really obj good the

panggamman na Dios, allaye, ira lud lang  
pleases of God man-p they sure only

o netullu allay, amma sikwatam a  
the ascend man rather-than we-inc r1

napalungu a nangngurug.  
first r1 believed

319. Mampe sikwam Buton, massiki  
likewise you Buton even

mangurug etam a kun tam, appan ta  
believe we-inc r1 say we-inc take we-2

Kappay lang o gagange tam, nu ansanna  
also only the custom our if how

tuldu na Dios sito biblia gafuso da  
teaching of God this bible about pl

addayaw so da mapparanak. 320. Massiki  
honoring to pl parents even

amme-m Katuwangan, nu palungo amma sikwam,  
not-you in-law if first more you

ma'awag si dayawan nu, gafuse palungo amma  
needed obj honor you because first more

sikwam. 321. Me na gafuse i Yawindo,  
you not it because pm Yawindo

mekapitu pelamang e ikkanak high school.  
seventh just-only and I high school

322. Amme-k kurukuruwan no sapitan na ya,  
not-I believe the saying it p

Ia'ay. 323. Kuruwan nu se palungo  
man believe you because first

who do what pleases  
God well, man, they  
will be the ones who  
ascend, man, rather  
than we who believed  
first.

319. As for you,  
Buton, even if we  
have believed as we  
say, let's also  
observe our custom,  
like the teaching of  
God in the Bible  
about honoring one's  
parents. 320. Even  
if you dislike your  
in-law, if he  
preceded you, it's  
necessary that you  
honor him, because  
he preceded you.  
321. Not because  
Yawindo finished  
seventh grade and I,  
high school. 322. I  
don't believe in  
that kind of talk,  
man. 323. You obey  
him because he  
preceded you. 324.  
Except if he speaks  
incorrectly, man,  
even if it's my  
father, if he speaks  
mistakenly, contrary  
to the word of God,  
I don't obey it,  
man. 325. But if he  
speaks correctly,

Kappelang amma sikwam. 324. Malaksid nu wara  
also-only more you except if exist

sapitan na si falsu, allay, massiki nu i  
say he obj false man even if pm

ama, nu wara sapitan na si Kamali,  
father if exist say he obj mistake

Kontara so sapit na Dios, me-k Kuruwan  
contrary to word of God not-I believe

allaye. 325. Odde nu wara sapitan na si  
man-p but if exist say he obj

fustu, maningngag etam. 326. Amme tam  
correct listen we-inc not we-inc

andalan ino sapit na Dios, se inay, tata  
ignore the word of God because that one

a pakada'nan ta si annggurug.  
r1 cause-drop we-2 obj faith

327. E nalawar-in se  
and good-cmp because

napalawan-in, e ammu-m-un pay Buton ino  
removed-cmp and know-you-cmp just Buton the

Kalussaw ira i litag nu sikwam.  
hate pl pm uncle your to-you

328. E ikka pay Andits, ammu-m-un  
and you just Andits know-you-cmp

pay ino galad pay i Buton. 329. Ira inay,  
just the way just pm Buton pl that

a bakkan nad a makadarai so nakam daw  
r1 not should r1 able-ruin to mind your

adwa.  
two

let's listen. 326.  
Let's not ignore the  
word of God, because  
that is one cause of  
downfall of our  
faith.

327. It's good  
that this has been  
taken care of, and  
you know, Buton, the  
grudges that your  
uncle had toward  
you.

328. And you,  
Andits, you know the  
way of Buton. 329.  
That's how it is,  
and this should not  
be allowed to  
agitate the two of  
you.

Andits

330. Awan-in yan sikwak alle.  
 none-cmp that to-me man it, man.

330. As for me,  
 that takes care of

Laka

331. Kallay. 332. Tubburan ku si  
 man add-on I obj

331. Man. 332.  
 I'll add just a  
 little.

bisang, lamang.  
 little only

333. Iyaw a amme yu pakKinnawatan  
 this r1 not you-pl understand

333.-This  
 misunderstanding of  
 yours or confusion  
 of all of us, this  
 lack of unity is why  
 we came here to  
 contemplate, for I  
 heard you forgive  
 each other, if it is  
 sincere. 334. And  
 it's fortunate if  
 you are now of one  
 mind about the  
 misunderstanding  
 between you siblings  
 or father and son,  
 and you just  
 arranged for us to  
 come discuss it.  
 335. I do not know  
 how to teach, for  
 even if you teach,  
 what if your faith  
 falters, so perhaps  
 you say that you  
 have many mistakes,  
 and you'll cite that  
 as your reason for  
 not teaching. 336.  
 In our studying

onnu akwatam ammin kungkuil lang-in, bakkan  
 or ours-inc all confuse only-cmp not

allay a napatata sito in-tam adalan,  
 man r1 cause-one here go-we-inc study

se iyo anningngag ku so appakapakoli  
 because this heard I at recipr-forgive

yu, nu amme na nallallamud. 334. E  
 you-pl if not it mixed and

naggannad nu napatata si ino amme yu  
 fortunate if caused-one obj the not you-pl

pakKinnawatan makKakarolak onnu matatama,  
 understand siblings or father-son

e nangapangwa kayu pelamang si  
 and caused you-pl just-only obj

in-tam pattatarabban. 335. Amme-k ammu a  
 go-we-inc discuss not-I know r1

mattuldu, se massiki nu tulduwan nu, nu  
 teach because even if teach you if

aggedada'nan na ino annggurug nu, odde  
dropping fut the faith your but

nu "oh! oddu a kamali-k, e sapitan ku ta  
if oh much rl mistake-my and say I so

amme-k-un a akwan," sempre kun nu na inoy.  
not-I-cmp rl do perhaps say you fut that

336. So aggiskwela so annggurug tam ki  
at learning at faith our-inc pm

Dios, inay a nakkamaliyan.  
God that rl mistake

337. Odde waraso nallallamud iyo  
but upon mixed-up this

diferensya yu a makkakolak anna  
difference yours rl siblings and

matatama, waraso kunna yoya, ammin a ayo  
father-son upon like this-p all rl be

taw a makkakaluma, akwatam ammin yan a  
here rl stirred-up ours all that rl

kakkatawa, se kakkatawa retam e.  
laughable because laughable they-us-inc p

338. Nu wara kunna yaw, nanu wara  
if exist like this when exist

dingngag nu si sapit i Buton, ikka Dayaw  
hear you obj word pm Buton you Dayaw

si, allay amme-k anggam allay. 339. Assapitan  
p man not-I like man saying

da litag inay. 340. Amme-k inay alle.  
pl uncle that reject-I that man

341. Nu kunna, gampade dingngaggan ku  
if like-it however hear-it I

about our faith in  
God, that is a  
mistake.

337. But when you  
siblings and father  
and son-got mixed up  
in this difference  
of opinion, when it  
was like that, all  
of us here got mixed  
in, and the ridicule  
belongs to all of  
us, for they will  
ridicule us.

338. If there is  
something like this,  
if you, Sanggoon,  
might hear something  
that Buton said,  
man, I just don't  
like that. 339. That  
is speaking to an  
uncle. 340. I  
dislike that, man.

341. If it's like  
that, however I hear  
it from Andits, and

na ki Andits e, nu gakkurug ira Kunna ira  
fut pm Andits p if true pl like-it pl

Kepay na, gampade mewaragaw ira inoy, le'e'e  
yet fut however observed pl that man-p-p

gampade naddang ira yo naddingngaggan ino  
however arrived pl this heard the

Kabangibang tam ira ya, e Kanayun a  
strife our-inc pl p and always rl

Kunna yaw, allaye, inoy "in-daw Kad  
like this man-p that go-you-pl perhaps

itan ino bible ira ya, makKapalapaletwera  
look the bible pl p fighting

Kappelang maku?" Kun da Kad.  
still-only why say they perhaps

342. Naral.  
ruin

343. Amme na kun ino kun ku inoy, a nu  
not it like the say I that rl if

wara iyasu i Andits, amme-m Kepay tonan si  
exist case pm Andits not-you still wait in

gakkurug, me-m Kun. 344. Gabwat Kun nu.  
truth not-you do get-up do you

345. Umang ka se ino sinapit i Andits  
go you because the said pm Andits

a "Kunna yaw allay ino amme-k anggam," Kun  
rl like this man the not-I like said

na. 346. Takesi Kunna mali'nawan a masinggud.  
he so-that like cleaned rl ordered

if those things are  
true and observed,  
man, and if others  
hear about our  
strife, man, that it  
is always like this,  
man, that might  
prompt them to say,  
"Just go look at  
those Bible  
believers, they are  
still fighting, if  
you please!" 342.  
Disrepute!

343. Don't do it,  
as I said before, if  
you have a case with  
Andits, don't just  
wait around, really,  
don't do it. 344.  
Get up. 345. Go and  
talk about it, about  
what Andits said, "I  
don't like this,  
man!" 346. And thus  
it will be cleaned  
away and put in  
order.

Yawindo

347. Mali'nawan, amma so  
cleaned more than

makkarupangpang.  
disordered

347. It will be  
cleaned up, rather  
than in disorder.

Laka

348. On, antu inay ino anggam ku,  
yes this that the like I

348. Yes, that is  
what I like.

Sangqoon

349. Amme-m indaggan a sumallap i  
not-you wait r1 setting pm

sinag so bungot nu Kunna mallay.  
sun on anger if like-it man

349. He's saying  
that we should not  
tolerate our anger  
past the setting of  
the sun, man.

Laka

350. On, se nanu kun Kanu i  
yes because when said reported pm

Buton a kun yo tolal ira, nu kun i  
Buton r1 said this people pl if say pm

Andits, "Inya na ino ang ku ibanag sinay?"  
Andits who fut the go I inform that

amme-m kun gafuse "tolalira" kun nu Kepay  
not-you do because people say you still

alle. 351. Ang ka ki Buton, nu pani'nikan  
man go you pm Buton if confirm

350. Yes, because  
if Buton says that  
the people said it,  
if Andits said "Who  
should I go tell  
this to?" don't say  
because of people,  
man. 351. You go to  
Buton, to confirm  
whether or not  
people really said  
that, likewise to  
Andits. 352. And  
thus it will be  
properly cleaned up.

nu inay onnu me na a pakawanan na inay a  
you that or not it r1 done fut that r1

sapit na tolay, mampe ki Andits.  
word of person likewise pm Andits

352. Takesi Kunna, mali'nawan ingke si  
so-that like-it cleaned really in

fustu. 353. Se ino kun tam ira a  
right because the say we-inc pl r1

makka'a'appetang kepe si dinandam si  
remain still in thought in

gakkurug, a passiyang tam kepay ino  
truth r1 fill we-inc still the

dingngaggan kun na ki angkwa kun tam, ay  
heard said he pm what say we-inc well

antu inoy o kada'anan kepay a dinandam  
this that the drop still r1 thought

tam inoy.  
our-inc that

### Yawindo

354. Kunna mat yan ino tuldu a  
like really that the teaching r1

nalawad allaye.  
good man-p

354. Now that is  
good teaching, man.

### Andits

355. Amme-k ira nad anggama  
not-I pl should like r1

addangan na yaw. 356. Odde, na akwan nu,  
arrived fut this but what do you

355. I didn't  
want it to come to  
this. 356. But what  
can you do, for he  
is still a child?  
357. And I called



se antu abbing? 357. E nepa'ayag ku  
because this child and called I

mallay, odde inanaw sey dilod e amme  
man but left at downstream and not

na inang. 358. Nabalín nad yan.  
he came finished should this

him, man, but he  
went downstream and  
did not come. 358.  
This should be  
finished now.

### Laka

359. Napapya. 360. Kunna yaw ino anggám  
good like this the like

Ku. 361. Napapya nu i Andits e wara  
I good if pm Andits then exist

dingngag na Ki Buton, kinupikup na yan,  
heard he pm Buton accept he that

imfunan na.  
Keep he

359. Good. 360.  
This is what I like.  
361. It's good if  
Andits hears  
something from  
Buton, and just  
accepts it and keeps  
it in.

### Andits

362. On.  
yes

362. Yes.

### Laka

363. Odde nu amme ta makupikup, riri  
but if not we-2 accept ruin

a matama inay. 364. Napapya nu dingngag  
rl father-son that good if hear

pay i Buton Ki ama na, e atalan na,  
just pm Buton pm father his and respect he

Kinupikup na inay, e awan a kada'luwan na.  
accepted he that and none rl smell he

363. But if we do  
not accept it, that  
ruins the father and  
son relationship.  
364. It's good if  
Buton hears his  
father, and respects  
him, and accepts it,  
and does not make a  
fuss. 365. That's  
good.

365. Nalawar-in inay.  
good-cmp that

366. Antu-in pay inoy dama-k  
this-cmp just that able-I

ikontribusyong sikwayu nu inay a sinapit  
contribute to-you-pl if that rl said

Ku e fustu.  
I p correct

### Andits

367. Allay, fustu.  
man correct

367. Right on,  
man.

### Yawindo

368. Alla'ay. 369. Antu-in inoy  
man this-cmp that

naramamungan sapit-in inoy alle, a  
meeting say-cmp that man rl

nabukallan na.  
flee fut

368. Man. 369.  
That's what we came  
to say, man, so  
let's take off.

### Sanggoon

370. Allay ing-kayu-n antu mallutu  
man go-you-pl-cmp then cook

si kafe ta pamagwan daw.  
obj coffee so wash-hands you-pl

370. Man, you go  
and cook some  
coffee, so you can  
wash your hands.

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