

HOMELAND INSECURITY: THE EMOTIONAL RESPONSE THAT EXPANDED
THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND ITS EFFORTS TO PREVENT
ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

by

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September 11, 2005

ABSTRACT

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This study will examine the emotional response that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy of the U.S. Government in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The federal bureaucracy was expanded in order to prevent future acts of terrorism on the U.S. homeland and execute policies related to the War on Terror. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had an immediate and overwhelming emotional effect upon the American public and

prompted countless memorials and services across the United States and around the world. Gratitude towards uniformed public-safety workers (notably firefighters and police officers) was widely expressed in light of both the drama of the risks taken on the scene at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as the high death toll among their ranks in New York City on that day. The number of casualties among the emergency services was exceptional compared to routine disasters, with an unprecedented number of the emergency personnel responding to the attacks losing their lives.

The media, in print, in radio, on the internet, and on television proceeded immediately to provide continuous live coverage that continued unabated and focused on the attacks for months. From the moment of the attacks, there was a framing of events that focused narrowly on reaction from high-profile leaders. These reports, at times, offered speculation on the anticipated actions and statements of President George W. Bush and of New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Across the media, President Bush was characterized as "facing his greatest test," and there was conjecture as to what Bush should do "politically." Anecdotally, the media conducted polls and surveys that attempted to measure the reaction of the American public. Many of those surveyed demanded a direct military response against those responsible for the attacks.

The media repeatedly televised images of the attacks, official responses by the local and federal government, images of firefighters and police officers on the scene, as well as images of suffering and personal grief (such as the countless "missing" flyers and signs of lost loved ones. Moreover, the print media circulated U.S. newspapers with bold and large font-type headlines on

September 12, 2001, that read “Acts of Mass Murder” (New York Newsday), “It’s War” (New York Daily News), “A Day of Infamy” (Tulsa World), “Freedom Under Siege” (Albany Times Union), “America’s Darkest Day” (Detroit Free Press), and “Beyond Belief” (St. Paul Pioneer Press). It was against this emotional backdrop and its response that the federal bureaucracy began to expand.

Federal government officials (members of the United States Congress, Cabinet Officers, and President George W. Bush) reacted to the emotional climate by proposing and passing legislation and signing Presidential Executive Orders whose objectives were the prevention of future terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, but whose result was an expanded federal bureaucracy that perhaps, has yielded no tangible or quantifiable results in the prevention of future terrorist attacks, not provided a mechanism for accountability, not improved coordination between federal agencies, or disallowed innovation or imagination in its policy directives.

Both President Bush and numerous members of the U.S. Congress delivered numerous impassioned speeches appealing to the emotions of the American public, employed patriotic language and themes, and sought to rally the nation in a manner akin to that of the efforts by President Lincoln during the Civil War and President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II. Without much public discourse or dissent, the federal government in the emotional climate following the 9/11 terrorist attacks began the process of augmenting the existing federal bureaucracy with additional layers of bureaucracy.

The U.S. political leadership held that the emotional trauma endured by the American public was motive enough to expand the scope of the federal government and bureaucratize even further the intelligence, law enforcement, and national security infrastructure. It may be said that the increased federal bureaucracy with its multiple layers of authority and inability to foster coordination and communication between agencies may be responsible for providing terrorists a means by which to stage another attack against the United States at some future date. America has been warned against a “failure of imagination”, yet the expansive bureaucracy is leading the nation along the same path.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Today, we are taking historic action to defend the United States of America and protect our citizens against the dangers of a new era. With my signature, this act of Congress will create a new Department of Homeland Security, ensuring that our efforts to defend this country are comprehensive and united. The new department will analyze threats, will guard our borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for future emergencies. The Department of Homeland Security will focus the full resources of the American government on the safety of the American people. This essential reform was carefully considered by Congress and enacted with strong bipartisan majorities. In the last 14 months, every level of our government has taken steps to be better prepared against a terrorist attack. Dozens of agencies charged with homeland security will now be located within one Cabinet department with the mandate and legal authority to protect our people.

Remarks by President Bush upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security – 11/25/2002

Terrorism Defined and a Blueprint for Bureaucracy

Terrorism is broadly defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1998) as, “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.” Terrorism is a phenomenon that faces not only the United States of America, but also other nations around the world. A terrorist attack does not have to necessarily be spectacular or inflict mass casualties. A terrorist attack may be executed by both international and domestic terror networks. It can include one (1) person or twenty (20) individuals as in the case of the September 11th hijackers. It can be a simple act of suicide bombing that have become commonplace in Iraq or Israel (Bunker & Sullivan, 2005), the release of the poison gas serin, as in the case of the Tokyo, Japan subway attack in 1995 by a Japanese domestic terror group, Aum

Shinrikyo (Carter, et al., 1998), or the coordinated terrorist bombings of the transportation systems in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 and London, England on July 7, 2005.

However, terrorists share a common denominator in their desire for their acts to play out on the world stage, not unlike a theatrical production. They often employ low-technology to achieve maximum public impact. Their desire is to create fear, anxiety, and panic among victims and the general public. Whatever their cause, whatever their motivations, terrorists are acutely aware of the publicity they attract as a result of the global media coverage. The attacks against the United States on 9/11 proved no less effective in the terrorist goals. During and after the attacks, a climate of fear, panic, and anxiety enveloped the American public. In the weeks and months following 9/11, the same climate fostered the emotional response by the media, the public, and government officials that led to the expanded federal bureaucracy of the U.S. Government. The emotional response to 9/11, the subject of this study, may be illustrated by the words and speeches of government officials, including President Bush, the images shown by the broadcast and print media, and the personal and collective reactions of the American public.

This study will strive to exemplify the emotional response to the September 11th terror attacks that is behind the creation of the expansive federal bureaucracy that has developed within the U.S. Government. The cornerstone of this same bureaucracy is the prevention of future terrorist attacks domestically, and the prosecution of the War on Terror internationally. The attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. may have been a result of flawed and imperfect intelligence, as well as the lack of coordination among the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Hillyard, 2004). The U.S. Government asserts that additional bureaucracy

and more legislation is an effective manner to combat terrorism. However, it may remain difficult to quantify success against terrorism when one employs intangible policies and the machinery of government. This study provides the reader with an assessment of the emotional response to the 9/11 attacks that expanded the federal bureaucracy. This study provides a historical background to terrorism, a concise summary of some of the legislation and departmental reorganization that allowed for bureaucratic expansion. In order to examine the emotional response to 9/11, speeches and rhetoric of government officials, as well as media reports and images of 9/11. Historical examples of previous national emergencies in American history are cited in an effort to illustrate previous presidential action during said crisis. Each chapter and its component sections endeavor to provide the reader with a narrative that illustrates the emotional response that led to the expanded federal bureaucracy.

The Impact of the Post-9/11 Emotional and Traumatic Climate upon Bureaucratization

The emotional response to the 9/11 terror attacks produced the necessary legislative climate that expanded the federal bureaucracy. Both the media and the political leadership of the United States of America engendered and stimulated the emotional response across the United States with images, speeches, constant news coverage, and patriotic themes, symbols, and language (retrieved from www.september11news.com, on July 16, 2005). Examples of these instruments are found in speeches given on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives on September 11, 2001, hours after the attack (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, on August 1, 2005). U.S. Representative Todd Tiahrt (R-Kansas) declared that “President Bush, Congress, and the American people are

resolved to take on and defeat the forces of evil that attempt to disrupt our way of life.” He added that “the principles of democracy in a free and open society are at stake...all peaceful nations should band together in a unified force against those that wreak hatred and terror.” Rep. Tiahrt concluded that “the light of freedom shines bright and we move forward as the greatest nation in the world.” California Representative Darrell Issa reminded the American public to remember that “We are Americans. Throughout history, Americans have shown the world what freedom is, and more importantly, what freedom costs. While we share this planet with evil, we will not let evil triumph.”

Representative Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) referred to the terrorist attacks as “cowardly acts against the American people.” Rep. Bonilla added, “Those who have declared war on the American people must now face the full might and power of the United States. Americans will stand strong and will not let these terrorists take our freedom (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, on August 1, 2005).” Such political and patriotic rhetoric was commonplace in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The same rhetoric may have stoked the flames of patriotism and support of the U.S. Government as it prepared to respond legislatively and militarily to the attacks. Perhaps one of the more memorable images was that of dozens of Members of Congress standing side-by-side, arms locked, and singing “God Bless America.” The image of the congressional representatives was to demonstrate unity in a time of grief, steadfastness of purpose, and invocation of patriotism and duty irrespective of political ideology (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com/DailyTimeline.htm>, on August 1, 2005).

President Bush also echoed the same themes on the evening of September 11, 2001 in an address to the nation (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBush.htm>, on August 1, 2005). President Bush also appealed to the emotions and patriotic sentiments of U.S. citizens. He began by stating, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks.” He further characterized the attacks as “evil, despicable acts of terror.” President Bush then proclaimed that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” Such language may imply that terrorists carried out the attacks against the United States for no other reason than hatred of democracy and liberty. Perhaps in a time of sorrow and sadness, such eloquence of speech motivates individuals to rally around and support their government in a time of crisis. Additionally, such support for the government may imply a certain level of confidence in legislators and the president to take all measures necessary to defend the nation against an unknown threat. It is this faith and trust in the political leadership in the midst of an emotional climate that served as the genesis for the expanded federal bureaucracy.

*The Failure of Bureaucracy to Coordinate, Cooperate,
Innovate and Hold Itself Accountable*

Ostensibly, the additional federal bureaucracy is believed by government officials to aid in the prevention of further terrorist attacks upon the U.S. homeland after 9/11. It is not known whether or not the expansion of bureaucracy is responsible for the prevention of additional terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Thus, it remains difficult to quantify whether or not additional bureaucracy yields tangible results. Yet, the federal government has remained

determined since the 9/11 attacks to incrementally bureaucratize and reorganize (Wettering, 2003). This has led to perceived encroachments on power, interagency rivalry, and professional jealousy between the CIA, FBI, and State and Defense Departments (Wettering, 2003). Notable examples of bureaucratization after 9/11 are passage of the controversial USA Patriot Act in October 2001, the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the appointment of an “intelligence czar”, or Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the wake of the September 11th Commission Report and its recommendations issued in July 2004.

The DNI itself, as the DHS, will add yet another layer of bureaucracy to the already burdensome superstructure of review and approval (Coffman, 2004). Coffman (2004) argues that the 9/11 Commission, which was composed of veteran Washington insiders gravitated towards a common political remedy that is found in a highly centralized bureaucracy. Moreover, Coffman (2004) concluded that bureaucracy in an organization does not effect change, rather it stifles it. It remains determined to hold to its accepted paradigm of policies and procedures. The merger of various federal agencies under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security has only served to expand the multiple layers of management and authority within the agency. Moreover, it has created a climate of frustration in the eyes of the American public, as well as other federal agencies whose jurisdiction and objectives may overlap with the Department of Homeland Security.

Bureaucracy, as it expands and self-perpetuates, disallows accountability of its civil functionaries at any level, given its impersonal nature, and established policies and procedures

(Schoenfeld, 2005). There is no single one person that is responsible for the execution of departmental policy (Abramowitz & Gelb, 2005). Indeed, no one at the Pentagon, U.S. Department of Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, or U.S. Department of State has been held accountable for allowing the attacks of September 11th to take place. The absence of accountability is a product of inability of the federal bureaucracy to innovate and contemplate scenarios outside the established policy framework of bureaucratic guidelines (Abramowitz & Gelb, 2005).

The federal bureaucracy has remained centralized, hierarchical, emotionally grounded and thus, consequently fails to address the “failure of imagination” that the September 11th Commission concluded was, in part, the reason for the attacks (9-11commission.gov, 2004). Bureaucracy disallows independent judgment, innovation, and imagination in the prediction of terrorist methodology and psychology (Schoenfeld, 2005). It does not permit its employees to stray from established departmental paradigms (Abramowitz & Gelb, 2005). This failure to innovate or use independent judgment stifles and prevents groundbreaking thought and action that would place law enforcement and intelligence on an equal footing with, or perhaps at a competitive advantage against the terrorists.

The federal bureaucracy has continued to limit potential targets to those that are considered hard targets such as landmarks, military installations, shopping centers, sporting events, nuclear and electrical plants, and airports, for example. Again, it demonstrates the unwillingness or inability of bureaucracy to innovate beyond its own guidelines (Abramowitz & Gelb, 2005). Soft targets such as schools, churches and synagogues, small office buildings, and

non-metropolitan areas are given negligible attention. It is somehow believed that terrorists will only consider “mainstream” or high-profile targets for attack. The post-9/11 bureaucracy exemplifies this official response which disallows imaginative innovation in the level of vigilance that is required for national security. To narrow the scope of potential targets is to believe that terrorists themselves would also narrow their potential targets to the most obvious and “mainstream.” Moreover, it allows the United States to remain vulnerable to attack in one area while full attention is given to high-profile targets that may or not be considered by terrorists.

Prior to September 11th, a traditional response to terrorism was in place. That is, during the administrations of President Ronald Reagan and his successors, a non-negotiation policy with terrorists and rapid military response to attacks was the policy (Russell, 2004). It also included routine intelligence analysis and human intelligence operations worldwide (Russell, 2004). Since September 2001, federal initiatives have not moved away entirely from those early policies (Russell, 2004). Instead, the federal government has increased the amount of bureaucracy and moved to reorganize within its various departments with the objective to prevent terrorism. However, at the same macro-social level, there remains a failure of intelligence sharing and lack of coordination among the federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Hillyard, 2004). At the micro-social level, local law enforcement agencies remain at a disadvantage given the inability to coordinate with other local departments and federal agencies (Hillyard, 2004). It is also important to remember that with respect to acts of terrorism, the actions of law enforcement,

as in their efforts to thwart criminal activity in their communities, remains responsive. That is, the response is reactive rather than proactive. Action is based on a response to terrorism and crime.

Definition of Terms

For purposes of this research, the following definitions are provided:

Terrorism

Terrorism is defined as “...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (FBI *Code of Federal Regulations* 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85, 1998).

Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States of America or its territories without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> on May 12, 2005).

International Terrorism

International terrorism involves “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States of America or any state, or that would be a

criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States of America or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” Acts of international terrorism take place outside the political boundaries of the United States, its territories, or possessions (retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> on May 12, 2005).

Suicide Terrorism

Suicide terrorism is defined as the readiness and willingness to sacrifice one’s own life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political objective (Gunaratna, 2000).

Terrorist Incident

A terrorist incident is a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States of America, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> on May 12, 2005).

Suspected Terrorist Incident

A suspected terrorist incident is a potential act of terrorism for which responsibility cannot be attributed to a known or suspected group. Assessment of the circumstances surrounding the act determines its inclusion in this category (retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> on May 12, 2005).

Terrorism Prevention

Terrorism prevention is a documented instance in which a violent act by a known or suspected terrorist group or individual with the means and a proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted through investigative activity (retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> on May 12, 2005).

September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are those which by definition, include, in whole or in part, the coordinated suicide bombings within the territorial boundaries of the United States of America of America by commercial aircraft in New York City that destroyed the World Trade Center complex and adjacent buildings and structures, severely damaged the Pentagon military headquarters building in Washington, D.C., and resulted in the crash of a commercial aircraft in a vacant field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. It is estimated that three thousand (3000) individuals perished as a result of the attacks on that day. Throughout this study, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are also referred to as “the attacks”, “9/11 attacks”, “the terror attacks”, “the terrorist attacks”, “9/11”, “September 11th”, and “9/11/2001.”

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (also spelled al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, al-Quaida, Qaida, Qaeda). The term in Arabic means *the base*, or *the foundation*). It is a guerrilla terrorist organization established by Osama Bin Laden in 1987 to expand the resistance movement against the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan into a pan-Islamic resistance movement. Although Al-Qaeda is the name of the organization used in popular culture, as of 2003 its official name was changed to "Qaeda-al-

Jihad" - the base of the jihad. Al-Qaeda is believed to have carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States of America that claimed 3000 lives. It has also claimed responsibility for bombings in Madrid, London, Casablanca, Bali, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen. In October 2001, the United States along with its allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began a coordinated military response against the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban government of Afghanistan. The Taliban government provided Al-Qaeda safe harbor within Afghanistan. The government was overthrown in December 2001 and the leadership of Al-Qaeda fled Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. As of July 2005, Osama Bin Laden and his deputies remain at large. They are believed to be in hiding somewhere in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan or Pakistan. (Source: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/al/Al-Qaida.html>)

(Federal) Bureaucracy

(Federal) bureaucracy is defined as the administration of a government chiefly through bureaus or departments staffed with non-elected officials. The administrative structure of a large or complex organization. Management or administration marked by hierarchical authority among numerous offices and by fixed procedures. An administrative system in which the need or inclination to follow rigid or complex procedures impedes effective action. (*The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA. Published by the Houghton Mifflin Company).

American(s), United States

For the purpose of this study, the terms ‘American’, ‘Americans’, ‘American public’, and ‘American people’ refer to inhabitants of the United States of America. The terms, collectively,

refer to individuals who reside within the political borders and geographic boundaries of the fifty (50) states of the Union. The terms draw no distinction on individuals based on race, color, creed, language, culture, religion, or national origin. Moreover, the terms draw no distinction based on legal status such as native-born, legal immigrant, illegal immigrant, or resident alien. The terms ‘United States’, ‘United States of America’, ‘USA’, ‘U.S.’, and ‘America’ refer collectively to the North American nation of the United States. The definition includes the fifty (50) states of the Union and their political subdivisions, its national government, and its residents.

The Use of Visual Images, Emotional Rhetoric and Language

Emotion is defined as any strong feeling, as of joy, sorrow, or fear. Emotional is defined as of, characteristic of, or expressive of emotion. (Something) caused or determined by emotion rather than reason. (*The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA. Published by the Houghton Mifflin Company). The visual images used in this study are of the media coverage of the terrorist attacks in New York City on 9/11 and the days that followed, President Bush at several 9/11 memorials, and other public officials at events related to 9/11. Throughout this study the author has analyzed the content of academic, professional, and scholarly literature, visual images, speeches, rhetoric, and discourse by government officials, the print and broadcast media, and the American public. The author has sought to extract value-laden and emotionally-defined images and words from such research. “God Bless America”, “evil”, “good versus evil”, “Crusade”, “our way of life”, “face of evil”, “American freedom”, and “democracy” all provide a list, though not exhaustive, of emotional terms included in this study.

Definition of Other Terms

The terms ‘examine’, ‘analyze’, ‘investigate’, ‘scrutinize’, and ‘evaluate’ all refer to research conducted on publications, reference material, internet sources, speeches/rhetoric, and academic literature by the author of this study (relevant to the examination of the emotional response by the American public, the media, and government officials that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy) and thus leading to the development of conclusions on the emotional response from within the context of sources.

The term ‘understanding’ signifies the acquisition of knowledge on factors directly and/or indirectly relevant to the emotional response that led to the emergence of an expanded federal bureaucracy after 9/11. Moreover, the term also is employed within the body of this study to permit the reader to gain an insight into the historical background of international terrorism and its motivations. The act of terrorism on 9/11 engendered the emotional response that directly contributed to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Lastly, the term is not meant to suggest, imply, or otherwise indicate any form of sympathy, compassion, or approval of any and all acts of terrorism irrespective of motivation or reason.

Purpose

This study examines the emotional response to the September 11th terror attacks that is behind the creation of the expansive federal bureaucracy that has developed within the U.S. Government. This study also examines how the federal government has formalized and institutionalized the response to terrorism in its bureaucratic expansion. This study relies exclusively upon the content analysis of existing scholarly, academic literature as written by academics, attorneys, experts in the fields of international relations and terrorism, and various government officials. The study also cites emotional speeches and rhetoric employed by government officials (President George W. Bush and Members of the U.S. Congress) in the days and weeks following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The speeches and rhetoric were obtained from professional/academic journals, the internet, the print media, and the resources of the academic library of the University of Texas at Arlington. The emotional discourse by the political leadership of the federal government provides the framework through which the reader of this study may better understand the emotional climate of the nation and its population after the 9/11 attacks that led to creation and expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Lastly, the study provides examples of the emotional response by the American public to the 9/11 attacks and historical examples of the emotional responses by the American public to previous national emergencies, notably World War II, the Civil War, and the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy.

In order to better understand the emotional response that resulted from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, one must approach this study prepared to examine acts of terrorism in their historical and geopolitical context. Terrorist incidents do not occur in a vacuum. Terrorism is a phenomenon that is a product of the forces of history, religion, and politics. The reader will have a more comprehensive understanding of what terrorism is and why it is a phenomenon that dominates geopolitical discourse and interstate relations. In addition, the reader of this study will have an understanding of how the expanded federal bureaucracy impedes coordination and cooperation among the various federal agencies charged with homeland security and intelligence collection. Moreover, the reader will discover that the expanded federal bureaucracy grew out of the emotional and traumatic climate that followed the 9/11 attacks. It did not originate out of reasoned arguments and sound logic. Rather, it resulted from the collective emotions and passions of the American public, the media, and the political leadership. For several months after September 11, 2001, the attacks dominated political and social discourse, as well as media coverage in various its formats.

The failure of the federal bureaucracy to coordinate and share intelligence among its own federal agencies, and the subsequent “failure of imagination” led to the attacks of September 11, 2001 according to the September 11th Commission (retrieved from www.9-11commission.gov, on December 12, 2004). However, the federal bureaucracy has expanded exponentially since 9/11 under the belief that more bureaucracy will neither encumber nor obstruct efforts to prevent terrorism. The expansion was the result of the emotional response by the American public to the 9/11 attacks. Central to the arguments in favor of more federal bureaucracy was that more bureaucracy was the equivalent of enhanced national security, thus the prevention of additional

terrorist attacks. In the midst of an emotional and traumatic climate, the American public was prepared to willingly or unwillingly permit their elected government officials to expand the federal bureaucracy in the name of security.

The emotional and traumatic origins of the expanded federal bureaucracy after 9/11 are an area that has not been explored at great length. Yet, it merits the attention of anyone interested in the study of public administration and international terrorism. The author strives to illustrate the emotional response of the American public that is the foundational framework of the post-9/11 federal bureaucracy. The author also strives to reveal it to current and future students of international terrorism. Historical and contemporary examples of emotional responses by the American public to a national emergency are provided in an effort to present patterns of governmental action and bureaucratic expansion resulting from such emotional responses.

If the federal government is the primary agent responsible for national security, then its bureaucracy is the machinery that carries out its directives. Therefore, it is important to understand how the federal bureaucracy expanded in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. This study asserts that future studies of terrorism and public administration should reflect the federal bureaucratic expansion during the post 9-11 emotional climate and its impact as a component of any measurement instrument that evaluates success or failure against international terrorism. The author believes that this research conducted in the early years of the War on Terror will assist students of international terrorism in the future to appreciate the manner in which the federal government evolved into a massive and expansive bureaucracy determined to succeed in

the War on Terror. Hopefully, more effective policies and strategies will have been drafted, proposed, and executed by then.

Chapter two contains a review of relevant publications, literature, and resources that relate to both the emotional origins of the federal national security and intelligence bureaucracy. This chapter will also provide historical background to modern Islamic terrorism. It also concisely charts the evolution of modern terrorism during the period of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. It briefly examines Islam, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the USA Patriot Act of 2001, law enforcement, the national security bureaucracy, and homeland security. The literature review provides a necessary background to comprehend the federal bureaucracy that has evolved due to the emotional response of the American public post-9/11 and its traumatic aftermath.

Chapter three includes the methodology that is employed in the course of this research. It is an austere content analysis of existing scholarly literature, internet resources, library resources, and the words of government officials. Theories and concepts extracted from the broad spectrum of literature and resources will buttress many of the arguments advanced in this study.

Chapters four and five include the findings and discussions, respectively. The author will present said findings along with considerations and suggestions that relate to the objectives of this study as a discussion. The author will demonstrate that the federal bureaucracy had its expansive origins in the emotional response of the American public that followed the attacks of 9/11. To support the conclusions of the author, speeches and rhetoric employed by President Bush and Members of the U.S. Congress, as well as examples of the emotional response by the

American public post-9/11 are included. Previous national emergencies in American history are cited in order to illustrate the manner in which an emotional response by the American public permitted the expansion of the federal bureaucracy during those crises.

Moreover, the author will reveal the policy implications, perceived negative impact and immeasurable success of the massive federal bureaucracy given its origins as an emotional response. Evidence to support this conclusion is found in sources that illustrate how the expanded federal bureaucracy fails to share intelligence and information among its agencies, is resistant to change, fails to act innovatively, and infringes upon civil liberties. Additionally, the author employs visual images from 9/11 in the form of archived newspaper headlines. The images are employed to recreate the emotional climate from the week of 9/11 and the military response to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Given that the expansive federal bureaucracy is founded on an emotional response, it is either unwilling or unable to innovatively adapt to the threat of international terrorism. Moreover, its authority and policies have become the subject of both ridicule and criticism by those who believe that the federal bureaucracy at best, accomplishes nothing substantively in its efforts at terrorism prevention, and at worst is itself a threat to civil liberties. The author will conclude that the expanded federal bureaucracy is thus, ineffective and nothing more than a massive organization founded on the emotions and trauma of the American public rather than sound reason and logic, and that it remains paralyzed in a “failure of imagination.”

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

We understand the nature of the enemy. We understand they hate us because of what we love.

Remarks by President Bush upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security – 11/25/2002

Introduction of Literature Review as Historical Background Information to Provide Context for Understanding the Emotional Response of the American Public and Government Officials

This literature review examines the emotional response of American public that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy in the weeks and months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It also provides historical examples of terrorist acts, examines the emerging federal bureaucracy and its efforts alongside local governments to thwart terrorist acts, and offers examples of government and media contributions to the emotional and traumatic climate after 9/11. Such information attempts to recreate the emotional response and illustrate the subsequent climate of suffering and fear that gripped the United States. The emotional response by the American public, media, and government officials led to the growth and expansion of the federal bureaucracy of the Government of the United States of America in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Although the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 devastated the American public, the attacks themselves did not take place without motive. It is possible to chart world history and geopolitics and discover that the 9/11 attacks were products of events that occurred decades and

centuries ago. For some Americans, the motives behind the 9/11 attacks were not of import. An important question facing the American public and its elected officials remains one of prevention of future terrorist attacks. The mechanism to defend the U.S. homeland became an expanded federal bureaucracy born out of the emotional reaction by the American public to the attacks of 9/11.

It may be argued that international terrorism, specifically, fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, is the greatest threat facing the United States and its allies around the world today in the year 2005. Long before September 11th, 2001, terrorism had shown itself to strike anywhere and at any time with impunity. Since the September 11th terror attacks upon the United States of America; state, local, and federal governments have attempted to thwart acts of terrorism upon the U.S. homeland. This study examines how the emotional response by the American public to the 9/11 attacks led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy as a means to thwart terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. The time, place, and manner of such attacks is part of the decision matrix for the terrorists and is not known to the American public or the federal bureaucratic establishment.

Nonetheless, the nature of terrorism is such that success is required of the federal bureaucracy each time. Failure to prevent an act of terrorism may result in the loss of life and/or destruction of property. At a minimum, a terrorist attack, regardless of the success or failure in its objectives, instills fear and chaos in a given society. As the former National Security Advisor to President Bush, Condoleeza Rice, succinctly stated, terrorists need only be successful once, whereas intelligence and law enforcement must be successful one hundred percent of the time.

*The Emotional and Traumatic Climate that Led
to the Expanded Federal Bureaucracy after 9/11*

In order to illustrate the emotional and traumatic climate that existed in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks one may consider the following speech given by President Bush in Atlanta, Georgia on November 8, 2001 to an audience of police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and postal workers (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushAtlanta.htm> on July 16, 2005). The speech contains rhetoric and language that conveys a sense of patriotism, civic duty, familial obligations, American pride, religion, and trust in government for national security. President Bush referred to the terror attacks as “evil”, he described the America as a “great nation” who “faces a threat to our freedoms.” He added that “this new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it.” President Bush then declared that “we wage war to save civilization itself.” President Bush added that “the best way to defend our homeland, the best way to make sure our children can live in peace, is to take the battle to the enemy and to stop them.” Lastly, President Bush offered a strategy to defeat terrorism by stating, “One way to defeat terrorism is to show the world the true values of America through the gathering momentum of a million acts of responsibility and decency and service.” President Bush, in his use of patriotic and religious words, further engendered the already emotional climate within which an expanded bureaucracy could begin to take form.

Historical Background and Information Regarding International Terrorism

In order to better understand the threat of international terrorism to the United States of America, it is important to examine and understand the origins of terrorism as a political strategy and ideology. There is a tendency to believe that terrorism did not begin on the morning of September 11, 2001 with the attack upon the United States by suicide terrorists of Al-Qaeda. Indeed, it is a phenomenon that has been employed by individuals and groups around the world throughout history. Notable examples include the use of decaying corpses catapulted into cities under siege by Genghis Khan in Eastern Europe in the 1200s (Garrison, 2003). Other examples include Jewish resistance groups that carried out terrorist attacks against Roman legionnaires occupying Judea, Shiite Muslim hashashins (assassins) would attack European Crusaders throughout the Crusades (1095-1291), the Reign of Terror in France, and the Anarchists who terrorized Europe from 1871-1914 (Garrison, 2003). Acts of terrorism have a long and illustrious history. Some acts of terrorism reflect a grievance held by those committing the acts. The grievance is sufficient grounds for individuals or a movement to carry out asymmetric warfare against their perceived enemies. In certain cases, such as those cited above, during the Crusades or the Roman occupation of Judea, reveal a resistance to a foreign occupation or rebellion against a perceived tyranny. Thus, it is often said as a cliché that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. It is also important to note that the use of terrorism, in all its forms, has not been limited to the realm of Islam. For example, the Irish, French, Spanish Basques, Italians, Germans, Serbians, Russians, Greeks, Polish, and Japanese have all employed terrorist tactics at different times from the period of World War II through September 11, 2001.

Terrorism against the United States began in earnest in October 1983 with the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in which 241 Marines were killed (Nash, 1998). Over the next twenty years, fundamentalist Islamic terrorists and affiliated groups would continue to strike the United States and its allies around the world in suicide attacks, airline hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, as well as carry out terror attacks in the lands of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Terrorists carried out attacks on nations that were perceived to be friendly or sympathetic to the United States and its allies. Their targets included perceived “moderate” Islamic regimes in the Muslim world.

In October 1981, terrorists supported by the future Al-Qaeda network, assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (Garrison, 2003). It was their express desire to not only create chaos and instability, but also create an atmosphere that would recruit Muslims to 1) rebel against the perceived “moderate” (American/Israeli-sympathetic) Egyptian government, and 2) join worldwide greater cause (Garrison, 2003). Thus, their struggle existed both within Islam, and without. No one, neither civilian nor soldier, was safe and secure from the emerging global reach of terrorism (Canady, 2003).

Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations represent the Wahabbi fundamentalist segment of the Islamic religion. Wahabbism was born in the Saudi Arabian peninsula in the 1700s (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). It continues to thrive in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States and is sermonized in local mosques by many *imam* (clerics) and taught in local *madrasas* (schools) (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Its basic tenets include the indivisible union of Islamic religion with the state, offensive *jihad*, or holy war to propagate Islam, defensive *jihad* to expel

infidels from Islamic lands, and strict adherence to Islamic doctrine (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). During the 13th century, Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyaa would write of a monumental struggle at the hands of the Mongols who occupied much of Asia Minor during the last millennium. Moreover, ibn Taymiyaa envisioned a return to the Islamic Golden Age where prior to the Shia-Sunni schism, there was one God, one people, and one ruler (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). He proposed that *jihad* would not only be taken to the lands of infidels, but also apostates, heterodox Muslims, and their regimes within the greater realm of Islam (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). This ideology espoused in the *opus magnum* of ibn Taymiyaa would influence terrorist networks, especially Osama bin Laden of Al-Qaeda during the latter half of the twentieth century (Rathborne & Rowley, 2002).

As previously noted, Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups have targeted Americans, Europeans, Jews, Christians, and “moderate” Islamic governments for elimination. To Islamic fundamentalists, the attacks of September 11th were a direct strike against the World Trade Center and its civilization, both of which represented an unforgivable challenge to the sovereignty of heaven (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Their destruction is a sacramental restoration of the moral order that liberal democracy and Western Civilization have sought to annihilate. Thus, such objectives illustrate to the *jihadists* that there indeed is an ongoing global conspiracy by the West led by the United States and Israel to oppress Muslims politically, economically, and culturally, as well as to dilute the Islamic faith with falsehoods, relativism, and corruption (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Al-Qaeda and other terrorists become the vanguard of true believers that strive to avenge their brethren. Religious dogmatism, as the passion and fervor of the *jihadist*, is one with which there is appears to be neither negotiation nor armistice.

Terrorists struck the United States with precision and sophistication that led to catastrophic results on September 11th. However, it may not be likely that the terrorists will again utilize hijacked airliners to strike at the U.S. homeland. Since 9/11, there has been heightened awareness at U.S. airports nationwide. Moreover, some believe that airline passengers would prevent another hijacking by revolting against the terrorists onboard the aircraft. Additionally, the President of the United States has authorized the United States Air Force to intercept and destroy any aircraft that may be used as a terrorist weapon (Cleveland, 2003). Thus, it is more likely that terrorists will make use of more conventional, asymmetric warfare. It is not inconceivable that they will employ pedestrian attackers or suicide bombers, and nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical explosive devices (Cameron, 2001; Bunker & Sullivan, 2005). Suicide bombers, according to Scotland Yard, appeared to be those responsible for the transportation system bombings in London, England on July 7, 2005 (retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/13/london.attacks0500/index.html>, July 10, 2005).

This is the threat that the federal bureaucracy confronts in the American cities. It is not without merit to suggest that Al-Qaeda is planning and preparing for the execution of terror attacks against the United States or its allies at any given moment. While a terrorist attack may appear random and even fortunate in its success, it is often the product of planning, training, and coordination. That is the earnest belief since September 11th of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Even a small-scale conventional attack against an American city could incur casualties, disrupt the local and greater American economy, and impart a sense of fear, panic, and chaos. Yet, perhaps the greatest fear of the federal bureaucratic establishment

since 9/11 remains one that employs any nuclear, biological, radiological, or chemical devices (Levin & Amster, 2003; Maerli, et al., 2003).

With a vast nation to defend, we can neither predict nor prevent every conceivable attack. And in a free and open society, no department of government can completely guarantee our safety against ruthless killers, who move and plot in shadows. Yet our government will take every possible measure to safeguard our country and our people.

Remarks by President Bush upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security – 11/25/2002

Law Enforcement Considerations for Anti-Terrorism Measurements

It may be said that the American public is not only concerned about the prevention of and response to acts of terrorism, but also the real or perceived erosion of civil liberties that is a consequence of intelligence-gathering and deterrence against terrorism (Hardin, 2003). Some have argued that the War on Terror suffers not from a lack of police power, rather the accumulation of and misapplication of those powers (Lyons, 2002). Community policing, as a tool in crime prevention, requires police departments to observe and maintain law and order in communities that are already susceptible to crime (Haarr, 2001). In the Age of Terror, police officers are should be evermore vigilant of those individuals deemed to be suspicious or “persons of interest.”

A possible consequence is one where residents both native-born, as well as immigrants are less likely to cooperate with law enforcement. Ironically, it is within these same communities that terrorists and criminals are able to live insulated from police observation and surveillance. Thus, at its most basic level, community policing must build lasting mutual trust and confidence within these communities (Lyons, 2002). Tragically, local law enforcement

agencies carry with them decades of mutual mistrust and suspicion that may be pragmatically (and bureaucratically) impossible to overcome (Bayley, 2002). Such mutual mistrust makes intelligence gathering increasingly difficult.

In the year 2005, it appears that the law enforcement and intelligence efforts to prevent terrorism and crime are responses to electoral calculations, bureaucratic inertia, racial bias, and the neglect and disregard for due process (Whidden, 2001). As a result, the residents of these communities may be unwilling and possibly far less likely to cooperate with authorities in providing potentially useful information. For law enforcement, the consequences may be devastating and enduring (Lyons, 2002). Morale may suffer, as perhaps the effectiveness in their policing objectives, and police-community relations may be further strained and damaged by perpetuating the long-held mistrust. Police departments should continue to train their personnel in the needs of, as well as to better understand the culture and languages of immigrants and residents of the communities they serve (Bayley, 2002).

Moreover, recruitment should focus on individuals whose provenance is from those same communities (Haar, 2001). It does not matter whether the ethnic communities are Arabs in Dearborn, Michigan, Mexicans in Dallas, Russians in New York City, or Koreans in Los Angeles. The long-term legacy perhaps will be one of increased trust and communication, and a cooperative multi-lateral approach to fighting the War on Terror in the homeland. Such closer police-community ties may remedy the paradigm paralysis of public policy that currently afflicts local, state, and federal government in each of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.

Within the Arab-American community, particular attention may be warranted (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). This is due to the heightened scrutiny given them since the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001. For that reason, they remain under increased surveillance by federal and local law enforcement. In the name of gathering intelligence, Arab-Americans have been subjected to harassment, interrogation, detention, surveillance, deportation, and even physical assault (Salyer, 2002). The federal government has asserted its right under the USA Patriot Act of 2001, to hold Americans, Arab-Americans, and other foreigners *incommunicado*, without legal representation, circumvent due process, and conduct court proceedings in secret (Salyer, 2002). Yet, given the “get tough on crime” position that politicians have espoused over the past three decades, it may not be likely that criminal justice or public policy will easily change. After all, the perception must be one of an effort by government and its surrogates acting proactively to prevent terrorism as a common vision. Moreover, the notion that rights for criminals and terrorists may be curtailed, is one that appears to be acceptable to some Americans since it is the “other” that engages in this behavior (Hardin, 2004).

Immigrant detainees are stigmatized within the criminal justice system in the same manner as criminals (Salyer, 2002; Welch, 2003). Additionally, the message that detainees receive is one that question their integrity as a person and may lead them to not question the legitimacy of their treatment and detention (Salyer, 2002). At the root of this increasing problem in law enforcement and human intelligence gathering is racial profiling (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). After September 11th, law enforcement has exacerbated its association of race and ethnicity with criminality (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). Individual suspicion has yielded to a broad categorization of entire groups of people as likely or probable perpetrators of a criminal act or act

of terrorism (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). The adversarial relationship between police and urban, low-income, ethnic communities does not appear likely to improve in the near future or possibly for the duration of the War on Terror.

Intelligence-led policing is another phenomenon that local law enforcement has adopted (Henry, 2002; Lyons, 2002). Information gathering and analysis by modern policing methodology includes the use of surveillance devices, closed circuit television, financial tracking, undercover officers (human intelligence), and registered or unregistered confidential informants (Ratcliffe, 2002). Ever-improving technology, such as forensic, satellite, scanning, and imaging technologies provide law enforcement personnel enhanced sensory capabilities to uncover hidden articles and identify individuals planning terrorist attacks (Nunn, 2003). It is believed that the proliferation of such intrusive technologies leads some civil libertarians to argue that privacy is diminished under the illusion of greater security (Lyons, 2002). Moreover, civil libertarians hold that individuals may be selected, interrogated, and detained based on race, ethnicity, and social status (Rackow, 2002). Government officials, law enforcement, and other interested parties counter that it is the price of security in an age where terrorists are increasingly astute and innovate in their own methodology (Treverton, 2003).

Proactive policing has required a greater cooperation among state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as within the bureaucracy of the intelligence services (Donohue, 2002). The September 11th Commission concluded that federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as intelligence agencies all require better coordination in their efforts to thwart future terrorist attacks (retrieved from www.9-11commission.gov, December 9, 2004).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination in 2001 (retrieved from www.fbi.gov, December 9, 2004). Additionally, the FBI provides law enforcement nationwide with a weekly unclassified Intelligence Bulletin. Yet, one of the complaints by local chiefs of police is that the information provided is often vague and not specific, as well as generalized to the nation as a whole (Henry, 2002). The apparent problem is that intelligence is always evolving (Henry, 2002). Also, intelligence is often dependent on hearsay by informants both in the United States and worldwide. Intelligence is only as good as the credibility and reliability of its source. Thus, authentication, verification, and prioritization of information remain difficult (Bennett, 2004).

At the local law enforcement level, police departments are believed to be preparing for the possibility of terrorist attacks (Clark, et al, 2000). The trend towards specialized training began during the 1990s prior to 9/11 (Clark, et al, 2000). This was a direct response to increased drug trafficking, apocalyptic religious groups anticipating the year 2000, militia groups, and the 1993, 1995 bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, respectively (Clark, et al, 2000). Given the on-going threat of terrorism since 9/11, law enforcement is now taking proactive measures in the prevention of different forms of terrorist attacks (Herzog, 2001). Training is essential to their success in a real-world environment. Law enforcement training now includes anti-terrorism components as a response to hostage situations, chemical, or biological attacks (Herzog, 2001). This development mirrors that of the evolution of training by the Israeli National Police. For Israel, such preparation is the common social necessity of both offense and defense (Herzog, 2001). The argument is that the reality of living with terrorism has forced civilian law enforcement in the

United States to accept greater militarization in its policing strategy, bureaucracy, culture, and community relations (Herzog, 2001). Police in the United States, as in Israel, recognizes that it must take unique steps to respond to the asymmetrical nature of terrorism.

Municipal Government Efforts at Terrorism Preparedness

Alongside the police departments, municipal governments are also taking steps to respond to the threat of terror attacks. Some cities have constructed metropolitan medical response systems (MMRS). The model, which has been tested through drills and exercises, is designed to provide threat monitoring, detection, and incident response (Perry, 2003). In each city, the MMRS is a comprehensive, inter-governmental structure that integrates the functions and resources of various agencies. For each MMRS, emergency medical services, law enforcement, and executive government functions serve as the triumvirate of emergency response. Moreover, the MMRS is now designed to address an attack that generates mass fatalities/casualties (Perry, 2003). This reflects a change from its original intent in 1997 to address one thousand (1000) casualties from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident (Perry, 2003). Apart from the municipal governments, American businesses are also developing strategic responses to terrorist attacks (Kennedy, et al, 2003).

The problem that faces MMRS systems is one of communication and coordination. Inevitably, bureaucratic inertia manifests itself in the centralization of command and a top-down hierarchy of the institutional structure (Perry, 2003). Despite the drills and exercises, the only test that is of importance is the one that comes in the aftermath of an attack. Currently, the

Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia is developing and supporting numerous strategies for emergency bio-terrorism preparedness and response (Swain, et al, 2004). The CDC has established an electronic reference library with material related to WMD, diseases, containment, and responses (Swain, et al, 2004). The database is intended as an information clearinghouse for municipalities across the nation. Emergency preparedness relies upon game scenarios developed by government officials in charge of homeland security defense (Alexander, 2002). However, those same game scenarios should not suffer from a “failure of imagination” as described in the September 11th Commission Report released in July 2004 (retrieved from www.9-11comission.gov, December 13, 2004). That is, the response to an attack must be as innovative and anticipatory as the terrorist methodology in the execution of an attack.

In order to successfully combat and prevent terrorism, the federal and municipal governments and their agencies should continue to contemplate terrorist attacks in a manner consistent with Al-Qaeda and other terror networks (Fischer III, 2002). Officials charged with the defense of the nation should evaluate threats based on innovative thought and independent judgment. Anticipated are terrorist attacks that involve symbolic landmarks, transportation systems, shopping malls, public events, office buildings, and airports. However, a terrorist attack need not be either spectacular or inflict mass fatalities. Rather, a simple, conventional attack upon a church, day care center, an individual wedding or funeral, or even against the individual families of American military forces serving in the War on Terror, with minimal casualties could possibly instill fear and panic on a scale not seen since September 11th. Such an event could possibly undermine the credibility and efforts of homeland security and law enforcement. Public outrage may challenge the accepted paradigm of terrorism as put forth by

the government officials and public announcements of terror alerts and intended targets. The accepted paradigm appears to be the equivalent of a “failure of imagination” against which Americans have been warned.

We're doing everything we can to enhance security at our airports and power plants and border crossings. We've deployed detection equipment to look for weapons of mass destruction. We've given law enforcement better tools to detect and disrupt terrorist cells which might be hiding in our own country.

Remarks by President Bush upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security – 11/25/2002

Terrorist Use of a Nuclear Explosive Device against the United States of America

Of the numerous terrorist attack scenarios that instill fear in the federal bureaucracy is one that involves the deployment of a nuclear device. It has been reported by government officials that terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, may have adopted a nuclear strategy (Dolnik, 2003). Execution of such a strategy would require the obtainment of nuclear material (plutonium or uranium) and/or seizure of nuclear waste material to construct an explosive device, common known as a “dirty bomb.” (Ballard & Mullendore, 2003; Snowden, 2003). Nuclear and radioactive material is vulnerable to theft in places such as Russia and the former Soviet republics (Harris, 2003). Moreover, there is anecdotal, unverifiable evidence to suggest that nuclear weapons grade material may be sold to terrorists by North Korea, China, Pakistan, and possibly India. Additionally, it is not inconceivable for a terror network to execute a plan that involves an attack upon a nuclear facility, whereby the attack would result in the destruction of the facility. Theft from an American facility may not be likely, however, an attack upon a nuclear facility or laboratory remains a possibility.

It may be possible that the effects of a nuclear attack upon an American city could inflict mass casualties that may far exceed those of September 11th attacks. There is also the possibility of simultaneous attacks upon the U.S. homeland and its allies. It may not be difficult to predict the psychological effect of such an attack on the American public. The spectacle of a mushroom cloud rising over an American city could, at a minimum, alter the dynamics of foreign policy and inter-state relations, the global economy, international conflict, national security, and personal safety. It could conceivably also terrorize the American public in a manner not unlike that of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan during the August 1945 atomic bombings of those cities in the closing days of World War II (Stuart, 2003). Given the opportunity, Al-Qaeda or an affiliate organization could strike the U.S. homeland with this level of ferocity. Suicide terrorism that employs nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons gives tactical advantage to the terrorists in the ongoing War on Terror (Dolnik, 2003).

During the Cold War Era (1945-1992), a nuclear attack against the United States of America would have signified two things. First, the attack would have originated from within the Soviet Union or one of the Warsaw Pact nations (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Second, a massive retaliation by the United States of America would have ensued within the thirty (30) minute window prior to incoming, inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) detonation over targets (Benjamin & Simon, 2003). The Doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), indicated retaliation against a state actor (Stuart, 2003). The War on Terror is a new paradigm of conflict. There are non-state actors operating as terrorist groups, perhaps without the permission or knowledge of a host nation. A nuclear attack upon the United States at present, would not necessarily originate from within another state. The nuclear device could conceivably be

delivered in a suitcase, backpack, or vehicle (Soibelman, 2004). Thus, in the aftermath of the attack, it may not be possible for the U.S. Government to respond by conventional or nuclear retaliatory strike against an unknown assailant of undetermined origin. Moreover, a nuclear retaliatory strike (even low-yield) could inflict mass casualties on a nation whose civilian population possibly had nothing to do with or supported the safe harbor of terrorist groups within its borders.

Despite the attempts at collaboration by state, local, and federal government bureaucracies, the immediate aftermath and ensuing chaos could preclude any effective response by the same agencies to investigate and provide search-and-rescue efforts, as well as emergency medical care (Waugh, 2003). First responders could also weigh the cost of placing themselves in danger of chemical, radiation, or biological contamination and psychological trauma (Kennedy, 2003). Their immediate concerns may lie with the safety and well-being of themselves and their families and friends (Kennedy, 2003). One cannot question the dedication of first-responders and officials to assist the victims, yet a tragedy on such a scale could create a climate of fear, chaos, and breakdown of communication.

To add more confusion to the incident, the military could be deployed to the affected areas by order of the President of the United States of America under authority of the Stafford Act (Banks, 2002). It has been invoked during national emergencies such as September 11th, the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995, and the attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (Banks, 2002). Coordination and cooperation among the military, federal, state, and local officials could be tenuous at best. Each level of

government represents yet another layer of bureaucratic institutionalization that may create a climate of miscommunication, mistrust, territorialism, inability to coordinate, and inability to determine chains of command and operational authority.

Considerations for Terrorist Recruitment of Non-Middle Easterners and Non-Muslims

In the year 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced that terrorist groups are actively seeking to recruit Westerners and non-Muslims for terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland and its allies. Such a change in recruitment practices adds another dimension to the overall threat of terrorism. To enlist Americans and Europeans as potential *jihadists* confers upon terrorists the advantage of terror networks and their members to possibly move freely and without much suspicion within Western societies. It may allow their members to carry out surveillance against potential targets in a manner that disallows immediate detection by authorities. Law enforcement may remain more likely to coordinate their intelligence and operational efforts against ethnic Middle Eastern or Southwest Asian individuals rather than Europeans and European-Americans. This approach is the consequence of certain stereotypical expectations by federal, state, and local government bureaucracies that anticipate Arab/Asian Muslim involvement in the execution of a terrorist attack.

*USA Patriot Act of 2001: Its Purpose and Execution
in Thwarting Potential Acts of Terrorism*

The USA Patriot Act (Act) was passed as a result of the emotional response by the American public during the weeks after the terror attacks. The Act grants law enforcement greater authority in surveillance, wiretapping, financial assets tracking, and detention of suspected terrorists and their activities (Frank, 2002; Preston, 2002). Civil libertarians have complained and expressed their concerns that there are no checks and balances with respect to this expansion of police power and surveillance. Perhaps one of the most visible restrictions on civil liberties is seen at airports. Screening of passengers is largely random, and in part, based on race and ethnicity in contrast to a systematic approach (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003). Both the former U.S. Attorney General, John Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller voiced their opposition to selection of passengers for screening based on race or ethnicity (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003). Yet, neither excluded race and ethnicity as factors in screening, rather the sole basis may not be race and ethnicity.

Given the possibility of an international component to terrorism, it is plausible to foresee the greater use of race and ethnicity in proactive intelligence gathering and terrorism prevention. However, there are those who assert that the most effective tool to prevent terrorism is to address the motives behind acts of terrorism (Turk, 2002). It is held that deprivations and injustices that create the environment of despair and resentment must be addressed (Turk, 2002). Individuals, who believe that martyrdom is a noble objective, are those who must be convinced that there are alternatives. Although the federal government must respond to the threat and execution of terror

attacks, legal maneuvering or military strategy may prove ultimately futile against an ideology and political strategy such as international terrorism (Sarbin, 2003).

The internet and cyberspace may prove themselves as an effective vehicle for terrorists to propagandize, correspond amongst their kindred spirits, exchange information and ideas, and transfer monetary funds. Terrorist networks can deliver an equally devastating attack against the economic and energy infrastructure of a nation (Foltz, 2004). The intended effect would be to disrupt the command and control systems of financial institutions, governments, electrical grids, and other natural resources industries (Foltz, 2004). The internet may become a virtual weapon of choice for modern *ihadists*. It also facilitates communication and coordination among the various terror groups. It remains extremely difficult to monitor, intercept, and interdict cyber-communication. To illustrate the ease with which a global terror network may coordinate a terrorist operation, one may imagine a terrorist in Jakarta, Indonesia sending an e-mail to a compatriot in Karachi, Pakistan, who in turn could request money by coded cell phone communication from a friend in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, who could deliver the encrypted message and instructions to a terror cell in London or Los Angeles.

The USA Patriot Act of 2001 granted law enforcement agencies greater tools to monitor cyberspace. Although controversial, cyberspace is now patrolled by the federal government and the governments of its allies worldwide searching for key words, encrypted messages, and other suspicious behavior (Armstrong & Forde, 2003). However, as technology evolves, hackers and terrorists alike, may attempt to discover new methods to infiltrate computer networks (Foltz, 2004). Wireless networks are a perfect medium. The government should remain vigilant and

utilize proactive measures to prevent cyber-terrorism. Reactive measures would take place at in the aftermath of an attack. At that point, it is too late. It has become a cliché, however, that the government must be right 100% of the time, a terrorist need only succeed once. The blackout of the northeastern United States in August 2003 illustrated how a disruption in electrical service over a one-week period disrupted the lives and infrastructure of the economic nerve center of the United States (New York Times, August 2003).

The Act also strives to interrupt the flow of money between terrorist groups and their sponsors across the globe (Preston, 2002). It is possible to freeze the financial assets of those terrorist organizations and state sponsors within the borders of the United States (Preston, 2002). That presupposes those same groups and nations utilize conventional means of safekeeping money in traditional financial institutions. However, it may be difficult to achieve the desired level of cooperation from other nations such as Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and other nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in this enterprise (Looney, 2002). The problem may be compounded with nations hostile to the United States and its perceived unilateral foreign policy or favoritism towards Israel and the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. The international laws regarding banking activities are not uniform across the globe. Yet, efforts have been partly successful in curbing the financial activities of terror networks. After September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government froze the assets of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Tracking the movement of terrorist financing remains difficult in light of the fact that money is often moved from one nation to another without the use of financial institutions.

A common method within the Muslim world for money transfers is known as *hawala* in Arabic (Looney, 2002). The system exists in the United States and Europe (among Arab immigrants), and across the Muslim world. It also exists beyond the reach of the Act, intelligence services, law enforcement, and the U.S. Treasury Department Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center. Within the United States, *hawala* is largely free to thrive in Arab-American communities. Given that the financial transactions are informal and leave no paper trail, their origins and destinations remain, in large part, unknown at any given time to law enforcement unless an informant steps forward and provides detailed information. Of course, they may do so at their own peril within the community and face the possibility of detention by U.S. Government authorities (Welch, 2003). One of the more notable cases involving financial support of terrorists involves the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development in Texas and other states.

In December 2001, the FBI and Treasury Department agents raided the offices of the organization in Richardson, Texas and seized records and computer equipment, as well as detained several employees (retrieved from http://www.wfaa.com/s/dws/spe/2002/attack/dmn/stories/freeze_05nat.ART0.ce683.html, on May 11, 2005). They were accused of laundering money and supporting the terrorist group Hamas. In June 2003, a federal appeals court upheld the freezing of their assets (retrieved from <http://www.wfaa.com/s/dws/news/nation/stories/111104dnnatcharities.4e4e1.html>, on May 11, 2005). Success in the War on Terror may often be found in piecemeal victories on the financial front, as well as the battlefield. However, if terrorism, as defined, is inspired by political, religious, or nationalistic motives, and is more

ideology and strategy, than person or nation, then tangible success may be more difficult to achieve.

Emotional Response as a Means to Bureaucratize in the Name of National Security

This study examines the emotional response that produced the expansive federal bureaucracy following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The author has made reference during this study to speeches and rhetoric by U.S. Government officials, as well as visual images from the print media related to the 9/11 attacks, and the emotional response to the 9/11 attacks by the American public. The bureaucracy of the federal government of the United States is resolved to prevent future acts of terrorism on the U.S. homeland and execute policies related to the War on Terror. The result has largely been one that has expanded the same bureaucracy and augmented the number of policies and procedures dedicated to the endeavor of counterterrorism. It remains difficult to measure the success or failure of the expanded bureaucracy since 9/11. This study demonstrates that much of the bureaucracy and its policies were instituted as a result of an emotional reaction by the American public to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in contrast to more sound, reasoned and well-articulated arguments supporting bureaucratic expansion.

The political leadership of the federal government appealed to the emotions of an already traumatized and emotional American public in the aftermath of 9/11. President Bush repeatedly employed religious and patriotic language that described the terrorist attacks as “evil”, he referred to the War on Terror as a “Crusade”, he described the terrorists as belonging to a “cult of evil” and added, “the terrorists have no true home in any country, or culture, or faith...they

dwell in dark corners of the earth (retrieved from www.september11news.com, on July 17, 2005).” Members of the U.S. Congress spoke with even more passion about the 9/11 attacks. U.S. Representative Cliff Stearns of Florida referred to the terrorists as “cowards” and described the “barbarism” has led to “life in America, as we know it, will change. (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, July 17, 2005)” Lastly, Rep. Stearns referred to September 11, 2001 as “a date which will live in infamy.” With those statements he invoked the history and images of December 7, 1941 when the Japanese naval and air forces attacked the U.S. Naval Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Rep. James Maloney of Connecticut described the terrorists as “violent enemies of our freedom and liberty.” Rep. Dana Rohrabacher of California declared that “anyone with a hand or even a finger in this mass slaughter of innocent Americans will pay the ultimate price. We do this because it is our duty, and nothing will deter us. (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, July 17, 2005)”

The images and words of numerous government officials and “terrorism experts” were in heavy rotation on local and national media. In addition, the print and television media repeatedly portrayed images of the World Trade Center under attack, scenes of emergency response personnel at the scene, survivors of the attacks wearing torn clothes and covered in dust, and even images of individuals falling from the heights of the World Trade Center. Words and images in continuous print and telecast contributed to the emotional and traumatized state of the nation, which in turn fostered a climate ripe for expansion of government authority and bureaucracy. The Orwellian use of religious and patriotic themes stirred the American public to offer their support to the U.S Government in the passage of legislation of national security measures and the use of military action against those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The emerging bureaucracy began to take shape in the form of presidential executive orders, legislation that enacted the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

This study will also illustrate the institutionalization of the bureaucratic terrorism response and how it has formalized and expanded the federal bureaucracy. Moreover, public accountability of the expansive bureaucracy is practically non-existent and goes largely unchallenged. The failure of accountability is evident in that no government official, appointed or elected, or any civil servant has been held accountable for the failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus, the author strives to exemplify the emotional response of the American public and government officials that led to the expanded federal bureaucracy. The author will employ speeches, rhetoric, and images of President George W. Bush, members of the U.S. Congress, and the media in its several formats. Lastly, the author will demonstrate that the federal bureaucracy may only impede the efforts against the War on Terror and may have resulted in additional layers of unaccountable civil functionaries.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This study examines the emotional response by the American public that led to the expanded federal bureaucracy in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Numerous speeches, as well as political and social discourse by government officials, including President George W. Bush and Members of the U.S. Congress include language that appeals to the emotions, anger, and desire for justice. Additionally, much of the same rhetoric contains religious, patriotic, nationalistic, and historical words and phrases. In an effort to further recreate the emotional and traumatic climate of that day, visual images of the attacks in New York City as provided by the print media are found in Appendix B. The author believes that the images, speeches, symbolism, and rhetoric from that day may collectively allow the reader to better understand the emotional response of the American public and government officials that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the manner in which that same emotional response led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy.

With respect to the use of visual images as a device to convey the emotional response, the author believes that the images provided by the print media and found in Appendix B convey the fear, anxiety, panic, shock, and anger of the American public and U.S. Government officials. These visual instruments attempt to demonstrate to the reader what took place on that day as reported by the media. Although it is difficult to characterize the experiences of individuals who

lived through the attacks and recreate the chaos and pandemonium of that day; the images, at a minimum, may relate to the reader a sense of the range of emotions felt by the American public, U.S. Government officials, and the media as a purveyor of news and information.

The research involved in this study is a qualitative content-analysis of a population of existing academic and scholarly literature, speeches by government officials, and print media articles published since the 1980s in the English language that attempts to fulfill the objective of this study. The author of this study conducts the research in a manner consistent with the archaeological and genealogical methodology advanced by the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984). In 1969, Foucault writes the *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. The premise of the archaeological method is that systems of thought and knowledge are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects. It also defines a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period (retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#3.2>, November 24, 2005). That is to say, an intellectual exegesis of articles written in the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 may be reinterpreted outside the context of the period of time of authorship. As such, a student or author may, in his or her research, analyze the content of the same articles and synthesize their content to support his or her conclusion.

Archaeology remained an essential method for Foucault given that it supported a historiography that did not rest on the primacy of the consciousness of individual subjects. It allowed the historian of thought to operate at an unconscious level that displaced the primacy of

the subject found in both phenomenology and in traditional historiography (retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#3.2>, November 24, 2005). The archaeological model provides the author subjective latitude to conduct research from a population of sources, extract a representative sample from the population and sustain arguments advanced in a thesis. A genealogical analysis attempts to show that a given system of thought, itself uncovered in its essential structures by archaeology, is the result of contingent turns of history, not the outcome of rationally inevitable trends.

In this study, the author has selected a sample of existing academic and scholarly literature, visual images, speeches by government officials, and print media articles related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Words and images were selected from the population of sources that were described in the *definition of terms* component of this study. Subsequently, the visual images and words extracted from the population samples were cited to sustain the hypothesis that an emotional response by the American public and government officials expanded the federal bureaucracy. To illustrate this point, one may consider the phrases “our way of life”, “American freedom”, “democracy”, “evil”, and “Crusade.” The author found the repeated use of such language in the print and broadcast media, speeches by President Bush, Members of Congress, and other government officials, and in interviews with samples of the American public. A litany of emotionally-defined words and language is found in the *definition of terms* component of this study.

Moreover, this study provides a chronological review of events in the history of terrorism in order to afford the reader a better understanding of the character, evolution, and causes of the

phenomenon of terrorism (international and domestic). This background historical information is designed only to more accurately frame terrorism in a historical context and provide the reader with an introductory level of knowledge of the phenomenon of terrorism. This historical information is found principally in the literature review, but also elsewhere in the study.

The methodology of qualitative content-analysis allows the author to scrutinize and examine literature and resources related to the emotional and traumatic climate of the American public in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, terrorism, intelligence, homeland security, bureaucracy, and terrorist psychology. The speeches and language used by President Bush, Members of the U.S. Congress, and other government officials is examined to illustrate the emotional climate that existed at the time of the 9/11 attacks. The visual images of the 9/11 attacks from the print media strive to capture the surrealism of the shock and trauma. The images, symbolism, speeches, and rhetoric are measurement instruments that assist the author to illustrate the emotional response that led to the increased federal bureaucracy. The analysis further reveals how the same speeches, rhetoric, symbolism, and images fostered the environment for the expansion of the federal bureaucracy in the weeks and months following the 9/11 attacks. The research provides the necessary background to conclude that the federal bureaucracy was expanded as a result of the emotional response of the American public after the 9/11 attacks and moreover, may impede the efforts at homeland security and counterterrorism.

The study involves a thorough reading of the literature by extracting historical and current data, as well as a comparison of different authors along with their respective ideologies and perspectives. This research methodology permits the author to apply the thoughts of experts

in their respective fields and the words of government officials to the paradigm and accepted wisdom of the new federal bureaucracy. It also permits the author to postulate that the very existence of the current federal bureaucracy in the year 2005 is owed not to well-reasoned and sound arguments of federal legislators in the U.S. Congress. Rather, the existence of the bureaucracy is owed to the emotional response of the American public found in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The author draws his conclusion in a manner that reflects a careful consideration of the critique and opinions of scholars and experts, as well as the opinions, speeches, words, thoughts, formal statements, and policies of the federal government and its civil functionaries. Any pre-existing public bias and the personal opinions or bias of the author towards government, its agencies, and its employees are not considered relevant to the research undertaken. Rather, the reality of the bureaucracy as it exists within the federal government in the year 2005 is analyzed and carefully scrutinized. Its policies and procedures as set forth by the President of the United States and the U.S. Congress are reviewed for their efficacy. The overall objective of the research is to examine the emotional response by the American public that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. This is the central theme of this study.

The emotional response may be measured by analysis of the visual images, speeches, rhetoric, and patriotic symbolism that followed the 9/11 attacks. The expanded bureaucracy may ultimately hinder progress in the War on Terror and in the prevention of new terror attacks against the United States and its interests. The content analysis of the existing body of knowledge provides the framework for the author to reach his conclusions. Federal government

sources, academic and professional literature, the media, and the internet, were all utilized in the preparation of this study. The historical context of terrorism and the emotional response by the American public to a national emergency is included in this study in an effort to advance a better understanding of the challenges of terrorism that face the world today. It allows the reader to trace the evolution of terrorism from ancient history to the present. It also provides a more thorough understanding of the emotional response by the American public and its government officials that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Fundamental Objective of this Research Study

The federal bureaucracy was expanded and its authority augmented through legislation passed in the U.S. Congress with the support of President Bush. To illustrate this conclusion, one need look no further than the language and speeches of President Bush, the words of the Members of the U.S. Congress, various government officials, the broadcast media, and public responses by the American public. Furthermore, the images of the 9/11 attacks captured by professional and amateur photographers provide a visual record of the attacks that freeze in time the emotions and trauma collectively experienced by the American public. Such images may serve to illustrate, in part, the emotional response leading to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Moreover, the print media images included in Appendix B provide the reader with a graphic account of what took place on September 11, 2001. The images of the 9/11 photographic record is akin to that of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963 and the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in December 1941.

The conclusions drawn in this study may contribute to the existing academic body of knowledge. The author has sought to describe the manner in which the federal bureaucracy expanded since 9/11. The research has demonstrated that an emotional response by the

American public following the 9/11 attacks led to the expanded federal bureaucracy in the form of legislation, namely the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, and the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence. The emotional response was encapsulated in the rhetoric and symbolism repeatedly employed by President Bush, Members of the U.S. Congress, government officials, the visual images repeatedly shown by the broadcast media, and public displays of grief and fear by Americans. Each of the aforementioned emotional response measurement instruments has been cited in this study to allow the author to draw the conclusion that an emotional response and not logical and sound arguments advanced the expansion of the federal bureaucracy.

Emotional Reactions, Patriotism, and the Development of an Expanded Bureaucracy

It may be argued that in the days and weeks following 9/11, the United States of America came together as a nation. Across the United States, Americans of all ages, ethnic groups, social classes, and backgrounds mourned the tragedy and loss of 9/11 together (New York Times, September 2001). Often, the mourning took place spontaneously or as an organized event. In the days and weeks following 9/11, images of President George W. Bush standing atop the rubble of the World Trade Center in New York remained in heavy rotation in the media. His now famous words include the response to firefighters who could not hear him. President Bush exclaimed, “I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear from all of us soon (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBush.htm>, on June 20, 2005).” Across the United

States, chants of “USA! USA!” could be heard at sporting events, and at numerous locations extemporaneously (retrieved from www.cnn.com on June 20, 2005). On the afternoon of 9/11, Republican and Democrat members of the United States House of Representatives gathered on the steps of the U.S. Capitol building, joined hands and sang “God Bless America (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com/DailyTimeline.htm>, on June 20, 2005). During the first several weeks after the terror attacks it was practically impossible to purchase a U.S. flag at many retail locations. Countless Americans wanted one to display outside their homes as a symbol of unity and a show of support to the victims of 9/11, their families, emergency personnel, and the federal government.

The Members of the U.S. Congress also contributed to an overwhelming sense of loss and emotional distress in the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks in passionate speeches. The rhetoric was more heated as the federal legislators took to the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Representative Robert Brady of Pennsylvania declared that “the murderers behind this will find out what Americans are made of...they will learn that our democracy is stronger than murder (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, on June 20, 2005).” U.S. Rep. Benjamin Gilman of New York called upon “our American citizenry to raise up the flag of our Nation as a symbolic gesture of the solidarity of our Nation and as a proclamation to the cowards who perpetrated these heinous attacks that we, as a Nation, continue to stand as the beacon of freedom in this world. Their attempt to bring chaos and terror to the hearts of Americans has only brought forth the great sense of patriotism, liberty, and kindness which stands as the cornerstone of our Nation (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, June 21, 2005).” In the U.S. Senate, Senator

Fred Thompson of Tennessee spoke about the concerns of young people who must “wonder why the United States who they are taught is the beacon of hope and liberty for the world, why we of all countries, should be the world’s main target of such savagery.” I suggest it is because those teachings to our young people are true (retrieved from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/01crpgs.html>, on June 21, 2005).” The above speeches by Members of the U.S. Congress are a brief sample of the passion, emotion, trauma, anger, and disbelief that dominated the social and political discourse. It is also demonstrative of the traumatic climate that led to the emotional response by the American public and government officials alike that expanded the federal bureaucracy.

*President Bush as Chief Executive Defines the War on Terrorism
and Readies the Nation for Action Against Terrorists Everywhere*

On the evening of September 20, 2001, President Bush arrived at the U.S. Capitol to deliver a nationally televised address before a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress (retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, June 21, 2005). The 41-minute speech characterized the state of the nation as strong. The tenor of the address invoked images of heroism, sacrifice, patriotism, courage, unity, and strength. President Bush, in his opening statement stated, “We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers -- in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.” Shortly thereafter, he strengthened his oratory by declaring, “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we

bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” The language perhaps implies military action in the pursuit of justice. Regardless, it is a call to action for the military services and an appeal for their support from family and friends, as well as the nation as a whole.

In a reference to the symbolic unity by Members of Congress on September 11th, President Bush stated, “I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering \$40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.” President Bush praised the U.S. Congress for its unity and fiscal appropriations. The image of the U.S. Congress as a chorus and acting swiftly to provide funding invokes the image of a government in action and taking the necessary steps to defend the United States. The appeal to emotions continues to build in the speech. The President then said, “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars - - but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war -- but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks -- but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day -- and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.” Here, President Bush invokes history as a means to mobilize the American public and its Armed Forces to action against the terrorist menace to the United States.

Referring to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, President Bush declared, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” The declaration is one of open-ended military action and counterintelligence against terrorist networks worldwide. That is to say, the full resources of the federal bureaucracy are to be employed against terrorists. In defining a motive for the 9/11 attacks, the President said, “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other...These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful...” Since the 9/11 attacks, scholars (some cited in this study), have opined that U.S. foreign policy led to the 9/11 attacks, not an exclusive Islamic hatred of democracy and freedom.

In outlining his vision for the expansion of the federal bureaucracy, President Bush remarked, “Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network... Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me -- the Office of Homeland Security.” With these words, President Bush

began the process of augmenting and expanding the federal bureaucracy on the grounds of an emotional response to the 9/11 attacks. Following his remarks on the expansion of the federal bureaucracy, President Bush turned to civic responsibility. He rhetorically asked, “Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.” President Bush framed his remarks in language that defined the War on Terror as one of terrorism versus American principles and values (retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, on June 21, 2005).

Referring to the U.S. Congress, President Bush announced, “Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency... We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike. We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.” With those words, President Bush asked the U.S. Congress to continue the process of federal bureaucratic expansion. The President outlined the necessity of additional bureaucracy given the task of waging war against terrorism worldwide and within the borders of the United States.

President Bush concluded his emotional address to the U.S. Congress and the nation with these words, “Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news came -- where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.”

President Bush added, “And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice -- assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.”

Careful scrutiny of the address given by President Bush on the evening of September 20, 2001, reveals passion and emotion to the reader. One may see how, in the nine (9) days following the 9/11 attacks, the President defined the War on Terror, outlined a strategy for the war against terrorism, appealed to the civic duty, patriotism, and familial obligations of the American public, and employed symbolic, religious, nationalistic, and emotional language that sought to galvanize support for military action and the federal bureaucracy as it prepared to expand. In addition to the words of President Bush and other government officials, the broadcast media provided live, continuous coverage of the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath, as well as maintaining visual images of the attacks in heavy rotation. The effect of the terrorist attacks and the continuous media exposure, images, public emotion by victims and their families, and political speeches may have adversely impacted the emotional state of the American public. That is to say that an unspecified number of American citizens suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety in the weeks and months following the attacks (Gershoff & Aber, 2004). Some Americans also felt the desire for revenge and military retaliation. Thus the U.S. Government became the instrument of justice. The emotional climate, coinciding with the desire for justice and security following the attacks allowed for the emotional response to engender the expansion of the federal bureaucracy.

The national mood in the weeks and months following the 9/11 attacks was one of insecurity and fear, tempered with anger and patriotism. It was perhaps one of the few times in American history where it appeared that all Americans came together as a nation. Given the climate of anger, patriotism, war fever, and desire for revenge against the terrorists, it is no surprise that federal legislation directed at expanding the federal bureaucracy was able to pass

through the U.S. Congress without much public discourse or political resistance. The genesis of the expanded federal bureaucracy lay in the grief and emotions of the American public that day.

*Additional Commentary by Government Officials Supporting the Emotional Response
Leading to the Expansion of the Federal Bureaucracy*

In an interview with ABC News This Week on September 16, 2001 (retrieved from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09162001_t0916sd.html, on June 28, 2005), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the 9/11 terrorist attacks as “The terrorist activity that we experienced this week, and that others have experienced over the years, is something that strikes just directly at our way of life -- the way of life of a free people.” He added, “Therefore, the only thing we can do is what the president said: We have to wage a war, and it has to be taken to them, where they are. And it will be a broadly based sustained effort, not in a matter of days and weeks but over years... and that means that we will have to use the full weight of the United States government -- political, diplomatic, financial, economic, military, and unconventional -- and I would underline that.” When asked about the prospect of losing more American lives on the battlefield against terrorism, Secretary Rumsfeld replied, “That what this war is about is our way of life, and our way of life is worth losing lives for.”

Responding to another question regarding the possibility of future terrorist attacks, Secretary Rumsfeld responded, “The threat we saw recently was from a person in our country in one of our airplanes filled with our citizens. This is a law enforcement job. It is a job for the FBI. It is a job for the police...and we have a whole set of arrangements and rules that have existed since decades. And what we need to do, and what we are doing is to review those and ask ourselves how we have to shift our arrangements. With his answer, Secretary Rumsfeld

acknowledged the position of the Bush Administration that the federal bureaucracy required reorganization and expansion to meet the new threat of terrorism that the United States of America faced. It is important to recognize that Secretary Rumsfeld not only suggested that the federal bureaucracy needed expansion and reorganization, but also characterized the terrorist attacks as an “attack on our way of life.” The comments by Secretary Rumsfeld are another example by a government official that buttresses the conclusion of the author that the expansion of the federal bureaucracy was due to an emotional response of government officials, the American public, and the media.

Director of the Office of Homeland Security Tom Ridge similarly spoke of the 9/11 attacks in patriotic fashion (retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020610-7.html>, on June 28, 2005). In prepared remarks to the National Association of Broadcasters Education Foundation, in June 2002, he stated, “The nine months since the terrorist attacks have been a great time to be an American, in spite of the horror and the tragedy associated with the attacks. We have learned so much about what this country and its people are all about. And most of what we have learned, we have learned through you. Through your unblinking eyes and ears, the entire human drama was brought into our living rooms -- the heartbreaking losses, the heroic responses, the heartfelt prayers and words of comfort from a concerned nation. Many of your stations offered 24-hour coverage in the days following the attacks. And in doing so, you accepted the reality of lost ad revenues at a time when advertising was already scarce. No matter the cost, you continued to get the news out...but it is one of the most important, if not the most important, story of our lifetimes. It's the story of how we protect American lives and the American way of life, the most important job of government.”

In describing the proposed Department of Homeland Security, he added, “Last week, President Bush announced a major change in how we will do that job. The President has proposed a new Department of Homeland Security. The new department will be commissioned and tasked to protect our borders and airports and seaports and to monitor visitors to this country; to overseas preparedness and to help train and equip first-responders; address the threat from weapons of mass destruction, and turn policies into action through regional drills; to map our nation's critical infrastructure so we can learn where the great vulnerabilities lie and take action to reduce them; to synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources, so we can separate fact from fiction and identify trends that help us deter and catch terrorists; and finally, to communicate threats and actions to those who need to know -- governors, mayors, law enforcement officials, business owners and the public. Director Ridge concluded, “Today, no single agency calls homeland security its sole or even its primary mission. Instead, responsibility is scattered among more than 100 separate government organizations. Currently -- excuse me. Consequently, despite the best efforts of the best public servants, our response is often ad hoc. We don't always have the kind of alignment of authority and responsibility with accountability that gets things done. This creates situations that would be comical if the threat were not so serious.”

The Office of Homeland Security, precursor to the Department of Homeland Security was initially created on October 8, 2001 by Presidential Executive Order and President Bush selected Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as its Director the following day (retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=308>, on June 28, 2005). On October 9, 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice spoke of the new Office of Homeland Security

alongside Director tom Ridge (retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=309>, on June 28, 2005). Dr. Rice briefly described the reorganization of the federal bureaucracy. She grimly stated, “It was a day when the dark and impossible became a horrific reality for our country and for the world. We commonly hear the refrain that everything changed on September 11th. In many ways, that is true. And one of the things that has changed is how we are going to organize the United States government to defend against, and ultimately defeat, the threat of terrorism, how we are going to organize to win the war on terrorism about which the President has talked for the last several days. Yesterday, as you know, the President signed an executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. This organization will coordinate federal, state and local efforts to strengthen protections against terrorist attacks here in the United States.”

In both speeches, Dr. Rice and Director Ridge reflected upon the 9/11 attacks in the same manner as President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Members of Congress, and in reporting by the broadcast media. In each speech given by the aforementioned government officials, and in images and discourse from the broadcast media, many of the same recurring themes are found. Those themes are patriotism, heroism, religion, sacrifice, “American values”, family, democracy, freedom, and liberty. The 9/11 attacks against the United States created a climate of fear, anxiety, emotion, and trauma that traumatized the American people. Research of the psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks upon the American public supports this conclusion (Wadsworth, et al., 2004). Wadsworth, et al. (2004) concluded that apart from the acute symptoms of psychological stress and anxiety, many Americans attempted to cope with the aftermath in a variety of ways that included counseling, positive thinking, impulsive action,

grief, anger, escapism, rumination, avoidance, denial, and a desire for revenge. Wadsworth, et al. (2004) also found that majorities of those surveyed wore patriotic t-shirts, attended religious services, attended vigils, and displayed the U.S. flag as a means to cope with the 9/11 attacks. Given that individuals could not directly respond to Al-Qaeda and their terrorist affiliates, the only alternative for military retaliation against the responsible parties lay in the hands of the U.S. Government. The author of this study concludes that the repeated use of speeches, symbolism, language, religion, a good vs. evil dichotomy, visual images by government officials and the broadcast media in the weeks and months after the 9/11 attacks serve as measurement instruments that contributed to the emotional response that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy.

*Historical Precedents of Emotional Response by the
American Public in Times of National Emergencies*

It may be said that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States created a climate of fear, grief, panic, anxiety, and anger among the American public. Across the United States, countless memorials, vigils, religious services, and public gatherings took place in the hours, days and weeks following the attacks. Debates about the motives behind the attacks took place between strangers in public forums. Americans purchased not only U.S. flags, but also emergency supplies, handguns, survival equipment, and literature about the Middle East and Islam. The broadcast and print media provided continuous, uninterrupted coverage of not only the terrorist attacks, but also the emotional response by the American public and government officials. The major television networks (ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC, CNN, and FOX) dispatched correspondents to the sites of the attacks, as well as across the United States to

interview and observe the public reaction to the terrorist attacks. Images of grieving relatives, friends, government officials, and the general public were provided to the television audience live and direct from the scene. The major television networks, along with the print media, sought to convey the sense of trauma and fear from not only the sites of the attacks, but also throughout the United States. The emotional outpouring by the American public as portrayed by the media images fostered the climate that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. This is however, not the first time that such an event has brought the American public together and united in common cause, to support the President of the United States and the federal government during a national emergency. It is also not the first time during a national emergency that the federal bureaucracy and authority were expanded as a reaction to the public emotional response to a national crisis.

Historically, one may consider the actions of the federal government during the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), the Great Depression (1929-1942), and the Second World War (1939-1945). History reveals a pattern of action by the U.S. Government during times of crisis. During the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) appealed to the citizens of the United States to support the federal military action against the Southern states in an effort to preserve the Union (Lorant, 1941). Time and again throughout the war, President Lincoln spoke to the American public striving to enlist their support. After the initial attack by Southern military forces against the federal military installation at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, many Americans in the Northern states attended vigils, public and political gatherings, religious services, and prepared to enlist in the U.S. military (Donald, 1952). The print media such as the New York Times and Harper's Weekly, carried images (drawings and photographic) of

Northerners coming together in support of the President and the impending war (Catton, 1960). The print media also provided the texts of speeches by President Lincoln, his military commanders, and members of the administration (Catton, 1960).

President Lincoln, having achieved a large measure of Northern public support moved to expand the federal bureaucracy (Catton, 1961). Initially, he began to expand federal authority over the secessionist Southern states by declaring martial law over them (Donald, 1952). He then instituted federal conscription of “able-bodied men” into the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Later, Lincoln would permit the enlistment of both Northern and freed Southern Blacks into the U.S. military (Catton, 1961). During the course of the war, Lincoln suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, permitting the detention of enemy combatants (Donald, 1952). His decision was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court (*Ex Parte Milligan, 1866*). President Lincoln and his successors, Johnson and Grant, invoked martial law in those areas of occupation in the Southern states until 1878 (Catton, 1960).

Throughout the course of the U.S. Civil War, a large percentage of the population of the Northern states remained supportive of the U.S. Government military action. Northern Americans demonstrated their patriotism by displaying the U.S. flag outside their homes, attending public gatherings in support of or opposition to the war, or enlisting in the U.S. military. Patriotic themes were also to be found in memorial architecture commemorating the sacrifices by U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines during the war (Catton, 1960). In large part, Americans did not waiver in their support of the U.S. Government and the Lincoln Administration. Nonetheless, historical and legal precedents were established by the

aforementioned actions taken by the Lincoln Administration. During World War II and the War on Terror (2001-), Presidents Roosevelt and Bush, respectively, would use the military and federal law enforcement to detain “community leaders”, “enemy combatants”, and persons of interest.” Presidents Harry Truman (1945-1953), John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), and Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) all appealed to the memory of President Lincoln and the Civil War in their respective struggles for military and social integration of the races in the United States.

During the Great Depression and the Second World War, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945) moved swiftly to expand the federal bureaucracy. During the presidential campaign of 1932, then-candidate Roosevelt appealed to the American public in his political speeches that he would use the power of the federal government to address the financial crisis that had beset the United States three years earlier. He pledged to provide economic assistance to impoverished Americans in the form of employment, strengthen the national infrastructure (roads, highways, dams, bridges), and create federal agencies dedicated to serving the public interest and addressing the priorities of the Great Depression. As a presidential candidate, Governor Roosevelt employed in his public speeches the inability and unwillingness of the incumbent, President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) to address the national crisis of the Great Depression. He pledged himself to a “New Deal for the American people” and promised to the “forgotten man”, financial aid (Lorant, 1950). He spoke of the “rugged individualism” of the Hoover Administration and how that had no appeal to the starving and unemployed. Across the United States, the populist speeches of Roosevelt resounded with the American public who believed that for the first time in American history, government could be used as an agency for human welfare (Lorant, 1950).

During his inauguration as President in March 1933, Roosevelt delivered one of the most memorable political speeches in American history. He stated that the “nation asks for action, and action now.” Roosevelt firmly stated that “our great primary task is to put people to work.” He asserted his “firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself (Graff & Ginna, 1963).” Presidential biographer Stefan Lorant best captures the emotional response and consent to expanded federal bureaucracy by the American public when he writes of the one hundred thousand people attending the inaugural address. Lorant writes, “Heads nodded in agreement. As his words echoed through America, hope stirred in many hearts, for in this dark moment he held out the promise of a brighter future.” As with President Lincoln seventy years earlier, and with President Bush seventy years later, the American electorate in 1932 placed their faith and confidence in the hands of the federal government for security, relief, assistance, and sanctuary during a time of crisis.

With the consent of the U.S. Congress, President Roosevelt swiftly enacted legislation that directly addressed the financial crisis by expanding the federal bureaucracy. In his first one hundred days in office, President Roosevelt signed the following legislative bills, among many others, into law: the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Reforestation Unemployment Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the National Banking Act, the Emergency Banking Act, the Home Owner’s Loan Act, and the Federal Employment Relief Act (Lorant, 1950). Each measure of legislation sought to remedy directly one individual aspect of the economic crisis of the Great Depression. Moreover, each measure of legislation expanded the federal bureaucracy in an unprecedented manner. The expansion of the federal bureaucracy thus, took place not in a vacuum, rather, as a result of the emotional response of the

American electorate on election day in the belief that more government and more bureaucracy were the solution to the national emergency. Additionally, Lorant (1950) suggests that President Roosevelt, as President Lincoln had before during the Civil War (and President Bush after September 2001), viewed the electoral results and popular opinion as a mandate to employ federal bureaucracy as an instrument to confront a national crisis.

President Roosevelt would face another national emergency as the decade of the 1940s began. World War II had begun in September 1939 with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany. Initially, Roosevelt had declared that the United States would remain neutral during worldwide hostilities. In August 1940, Nazi Germany attacked Great Britain and Roosevelt responded by providing military arms to the British. On December 7, 1941, in simultaneous and coordinated attacks, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, destroying most of the U.S. Naval Pacific Fleet, and attacked U.S. military outposts in Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway. The attacks brought the United States into World War II (Sulzberger, 1966). The following day, December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt declared war on Japan. Immediately, President Roosevelt sought to further expand the federal bureaucracy once more to face another crisis.

Americans across the United States were enraged at the surprise attacks by the Japanese armed forces. Some expressed shock, fear, despair, and anger in the days and weeks following the attacks. Some Americans were interviewed in a “man-on-the-street” format by the print media and academia in an effort to gauge the emotional climate following the “day of infamy (Fjell, 2002).” Much of the language that is used to describe the Japanese is laced with racial

prejudice. Thus, Americans condemned not only the attacks against the United States, but also the entire Japanese race (Fjell, 2002). Vigils, religious services, and public gatherings were held across the United States to honor the 3,500 military and civilian casualties in Hawaii. Once more, the American public turned to the President of the United States for guidance, leadership, and security.

To illustrate the expansion of federal bureaucracy, one need only look to the actions taken by President Roosevelt. Within hours of the attack at Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt declares martial law over Hawaii. Within forty-eight (48) hours of the attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrests 1,300 Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans identified as “community leaders” who allegedly may pass or may have passed information to the Japanese military. Many of the detainees would be held for the duration of the war (Sulzberger, 1966). The FBI would expand its search and seizure authority to include the West Coast states of Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska during the year 1942 (Sulzberger, 1966). In December 1941, Roosevelt creates the Western Defense Command. Its purpose is to protect the western United States from a Japanese invasion. On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9066 that authorizes the military to detain civilians without trial or proceedings, and without assistance of legal counsel (Sulzberger, 1966). The majority of the detainees are of Japanese ancestry.

In March 1942, the commander of the Western Defense Command issues Public Proclamation No. 1 in an effort to forcibly remove all persons of Japanese ancestry from the western United States (Sulzberger, 1966). A curfew for persons of Japanese That same month,

the newly-created Wartime Civil Control Administration opens 16 Assembly Centers for the housing of approximately 100,000 detainees. In June 1943, the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the California curfew in *Hirabayashi v. U.S.* and *Yasui v. U.S.* Sulzberger (1966) suggests that much of the federal action taken against persons of Japanese ancestry was a response by the U.S. Government to the emotional climate that pervaded the American psychology in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. In addition, President Roosevelt, during the early months of American involvement in World War II, moved to federalize, in part, the national industrial capacity (Lorant, 1950). Roosevelt ordered that airplane production be increased to 60,000 per year, tanks be increased to 45,000 annually, and six million tons of merchant ships be manufactured per year (Lorant, 1950). Almost immediately, American men and women entered the workforce in large numbers. Roosevelt also ordered precious metals (copper, gold, silver, aluminum, brass) be used exclusively for the war effort and that oil, rubber, gasoline, coal, and other natural resources be rationed and used sparingly (Sulzberger, 1966).

President Roosevelt did not live to see the victory of the Allies over the Axis Powers in 1945. However, President Roosevelt successfully prosecuted the military campaigns of World War II and the federal campaigns against the Great Depression during the 1930s. His success on these two continuous crises is due to the art of politics that is, selling a timely message to the electorate, as well as reacting to the emotional climate of desperation and forlorn hope during the Great Depression and anger and fear following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. Sulzberger (1966) writes that “Remember Pearl Harbor” was the national battle cry, and that eager citizens everywhere volunteered to do whatever bit they could to help win the war.” Military action

abroad and an expansive federal bureaucracy domestically grew out of the emotional response by government officials and the American public during the difficult era of the 1930s and 1940s.

*The Emotional Response of the American
Public to the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks*

It may be argued that history demonstrates the American public has responded emotionally during times of national emergencies and has repeatedly placed its faith and confidence in the U.S. Government. The American public has, in such times, acknowledged the federal bureaucracy as the purveyor of security, leadership, and solutions to the crisis that befalls the United States at that given time in history. It has been shown to be true during the U.S. Civil War, the Great Depression, World War II, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the Hurricane Katrina natural disaster of August/September 2005 that devastated New Orleans, Louisiana, and parts of Mississippi and Alabama. For purposes of this study, the emotional response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the federal bureaucratic expansion that ensued is analyzed.

In the hours, days, and weeks following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the American public reacted with shock, disbelief, anger, and fear to the uncertainty of the event that transpired. Some Americans found solace in their religion, their friends and families, their fellow colleagues, and with perfect strangers (TAJ Books, 2003). Some Americans attempted to cope and understand what had taken place by examining possible motives for the attacks (Wadsworth, et al., 2004). As in previous national crises, Americans immediately turned their attention to the President of the United States, George W. Bush and the U.S. Government. Some Americans

sought a military response, while others sought peace and dialogue in an international diplomatic context. To honor the victims of the terrorist attacks, some Americans found solidarity and common ground in vigil services, religious services, and public gatherings (TAJ Books, 2003). The broadcast and print media began at the moment of the attacks to provide continuous, live coverage of the disaster (TAJ Books, 2003). Images of the attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C. and Shanksville, Pennsylvania were aired and printed repeatedly. As provided in Appendix B, newspapers (and other publications) printed large banner headlines for weeks following the attacks as new developments became available daily. Survivors of the attacks and residents of New York City in close proximity to the World Trade Center described in detail their survival and escape to journalists (New York Times, September 2001).

Some Americans purchased special edition newspapers and watched television continually as the attacks unfolded and during the aftermath (New York Times, September 2001). Impromptu vigils took place across the United States. Churches, mosques, temples, and synagogues opened their places of worship to anyone who sought comfort and refuge. Police officers and firefighters emerged as heroes and figures of mythological reverence across the United States. Americans purchased U.S. flags to place outside their homes as symbol of patriotism and unity. U.S. flags as a commodity remained scarce in the weeks following 9/11. Some merchants remained sold out of U.S. flags for weeks. Political discord came to an abrupt halt following the attacks as the American public sought leadership from President Bush and government officials. In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, fear and shock became anger and rage that demanded justice.

It is important to emphasize the tenor of the speeches and commentary delivered by President Bush as he confronted the challenge of responding to the attacks. Time and again he appealed to the American people collectively to remain vigilant, united, and determined in their resolve as the U.S. Government prepared for war. His remarks reflected the emotional state of the United States. That is to say, his words invoked images of patriotism, religion, solace, sacrifice, bravery, democracy, and justice. His remarks also related to a course of action that would seek justice and vengeance against the perpetrators responsible for the 9/11 attacks. President Bush also stated that the War on Terror could be a war that may endure for generations. It could be argued that a large federal bureaucracy and massive military organization would be required to sustain a prolonged military, legal, and political engagement in the War on Terror through its duration. Apart from his words, it may be also said that President Bush also demonstrated in his actions his role as someone who grieved publicly with survivors and families of victims. His grieving was public, as was the grieving of countless Americans across the United States. President Bush directed the full resources of the U.S. Government to not only respond to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, but also to prevent further attacks from taking place. The nexus between the expansion of the federal bureaucracy and the emotional state of the American public lay in the actions President Bush took in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

President Bush, as his predecessors Lincoln and Roosevelt, crafted his messages and personal image to reflect authority and steadfastness of purpose during the crisis of 9/11. President Bush publicly displayed emotion when making reference to the victims of the attacks and the magnitude of the devastation (New York Times, September 2001). The tenor of his

speeches captured and coincided with the emotional climate of the United States. As Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson before him, President Bush consoled the American public in its darkest hours during a national emergency. As Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson before him, he availed himself of the emotional climate in the aftermath of a national emergency and expanded the federal bureaucracy to confront the timely challenges of the War on Terror. It is a bureaucracy that may remain in place for generations to come, in a manner not unlike the bureaucratic expansions under Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Considerations of Bureaucracy as it Expands and Self-Perpetuates

It may be asserted that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks fostered an emotional and traumatic climate across the United States. In the midst of the grief and sorrow found in that climate, the federal bureaucratic establishment began to expand. President Bush and federal legislators alike appealed to the emotions and desires of the American public for justice and security. Government officials and the media also repeatedly employed themes of patriotism, civic duty, American history, and emphasized a strong sense of family and responsibility. Both the government and the media asserted that by such comportment and support of the counterterrorist initiatives by the federal government, it would somehow make the nation safer and more secure. However, such rhetoric cannot produce measurable or tangible results. The speeches by President Bush that spoke of “Crusades” or “evildoers”, “civilization”, and “hatred of American freedom” or that employ religion may only have served to, at best, reassure the nation that an emotional and passionate man is the Chief Executive of the federal government. It is not meant to ridicule President Bush or other government officials. Indeed, the United States itself was gripped by fear, emotion, trauma, and shock in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Yet, the passionate and emotional rhetoric by government officials that is referred to throughout this study, along with the emotional response by the American public may have led to the affirmative expansion of the federal bureaucracy after 9/11. Arguments in favor of expanded federal authority appealed to patriotism, nationalism, and at times, referred to the victims of the 9/11 terror attacks as justification for more legislation and more bureaucracy. It has been suggested that bureaucracy, as previously discussed, may be resistant to and slow to accept change within its system. Of even more concern is the passionate origin of this bureaucracy. The U.S. Government, without much consultation from the American public, swiftly and passionately moved to enact legislation such as the controversial USA Patriot Act of 2001, create the Department of Homeland Security, and reorganize several federal agencies. What is not known is whether or not such measures within bureaucracy may ever be known to positively affect the War on Terror. The negative impact of an expanded bureaucracy may be easily measured when another terrorist attack takes place on the U.S. homeland, or as in the case of the Hurricane Katrina natural disaster of 2005. During that national crisis in New Orleans, Louisiana in September 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were criticized as slow to respond and incompetent in their crisis management (New York Times, 2005, September 2). Additionally, to some Americans, bureaucracy is impervious to reform and resistant to change as it relates to matters of policy.

Impact of Bureaucracy on the War on Terror: More is Less

At the federal governmental level, an expanded bureaucracy may ill serve the War on Terror. Bureaucracy may impede coordination and communication between federal agencies, may stoke the flames of departmental territorialism, may stifle independent thought and judgment, and may disallow information sharing. Moreover, it may advance an adherence to the *status quo* paradigm of public policy, thus leading to an inability to advance innovative ideas and proposals for fighting terrorism (Jehl, 2004). Betts (2002) proposes that bureaucratic reform is more than departmental reorganization. Reform begins with policy overhaul espoused to genuine departmental reorganization. Betts (2002) asserts that only then will “red tape” resistance to change truly be broken. Lastly, bureaucracy creates a climate of lack of accountability among its officials and civil servants (Betts, 2002). To date, no one has been publicly held accountable for the intelligence failure leading up to the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Condoleezza Rice was elevated to the post of U.S. Secretary of State from National Security Advisor in 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was allowed to remain in his position through the first four (4) years of the Bush Administration and into the second term, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet remained on duty until his resignation in July 2004, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and Secretary of State Colin Powell served out four years of service ending January 2005, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert Mueller remains in his position into the second Bush Administration term of four (4) years.

To illustrate bureaucracy in action, one may look no further than to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which was created in the months following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The principal directive of the new agency is to protect the U.S. homeland from further terrorist attacks (Lehrer, 2004). The agency is now the umbrella organization for the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (Lehrer, 2004). However, much criticism has been leveled at the agency for its color-coded terror alert system and its execution of new airport screening policies. The unknown question is whether or not such procedures have served to better protect the nation from a terrorist attack. Despite its massive bureaucracy, DHS is only a small part of the greater national law enforcement and disaster mitigation continuum (Lehrer, 2004). As an example of bureaucratic territorialism, major federal agencies charged, in part, with terrorism prevention, remain outside the DHS authority. The FBI, which directs intelligence gathering, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which monitors a key source of terrorist financing, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE), which plays a major role in contingencies involving explosives or chemical weapons, all remain independent of DHS (Lehrer, 2004). The scope of DHS is not as considerable as the enormous task of homeland security.

Additional criticism was leveled at DHS in its inability to respond to the city of New Orleans, Louisiana in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (New York Times, 2005, September 2). The agency, along with FEMA, was unable to marshal the resources to respond to the natural disaster crisis. It appeared that DHS and FEMA, did not communicate and coordinate

with state and local officials in the planning, evacuation, and response to the hurricane. In that disaster, over one thousand (1,000) individuals lost their lives, civil disobedience ensued, and law and order collapsed. Moreover, relief and medical supplies, along with food and water were absent for days following the initial hurricane landfall (New York Times, 2005, September 8). Critics of the federal response have charged that not only was bureaucracy culpable for the inadequacy of the response, but also that the federal government may not be prepared to respond to a catastrophic or small-scale terrorist attack against a major U.S. metropolitan area (New York Times, 2005, September 8). At best, the Hurricane Katrina disaster exposed the weakness of the federal bureaucracy to foresee and effectively coordinate a response to a national emergency.

It may be asserted that it is not possible to receive praise and recognition for the prevention of an attack that never took place. Yet, the Bush Administration has repeatedly stated that no terrorist attacks since 9/11 confirms that the policies implemented and governmental reorganization do serve their purpose. One should question the belief that by merely reorganizing various federal agencies under the authority of a new one truly supports any tangible effort at terrorism prevention. Also, given the nature of bureaucracy, it may not be plausible that civil servants will display any reformed, proactive comportment by a simple reconfiguration of an organizational chart (Schoenfeld, 2005). Thus, the absence of terrorist attacks upon the U.S. homeland is an insufficient measurement instrument to gauge the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of additional federal bureaucracy and an expansive budget.

Also, the appointment of the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI), John Negroponte, serves to illustrate yet another bureaucratic expansion of the Executive Branch. It is

asserted that this new directorship will serve as the one-stop clearinghouse for intelligence gathering and dissemination for the federal government (Congressional Digest, December 2004). Moreover, the DNI will serve to provide the President with the latest intelligence gathered from all federal intelligence agencies (Chambliss, 2005). One response to such an assertion is what then, heretofore were the roles of the Director of Central Intelligence, U.S. Attorney General, National Security Advisor, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and their deputies, to say nothing of other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Is it to be believed that if information was not distributed in a timely and professional manner among the agencies prior to 9/11, then somehow due to the appointment of a DNI it will flow in a less bureaucratic and territorial manner?

Historically, bureaucracy has often begun with honorable intentions in the U.S. Government. Two recent examples are the War on Poverty and the War on Drugs. Each began in the 1960s as a noble experiment to eradicate poverty and narcotics trafficking. After four decades and untold billions of dollars, drugs and poverty remain a major crisis in American society in 2005 (Sarbin, 2003). The examples illustrate good policies that may have been improperly executed, and possibly rife with fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer revenue. Naturally, the propaganda arm of the bureaucracy would have the American public believe in incremental success that is neither discernable nor tangible. The post-9/11 federal bureaucracy is glacially moving in the direction of past federal bureaucracies that have been roundly criticized in some quarters for their own failures of imagination and inefficiency. Ultimately, the original objectives yield to self-serving agencies whose main task is self-preservation through expansive growth and consumption of the federal budget. Those agencies may be often led by a politically

appointed individual or group of individuals whose policy speeches may contain little more than self-aggrandizing monologue masquerading as profundity and efficacy.

Historical Parallels Regarding Bureaucracy and Emotional Responses to a National Emergency

President Bush, not unlike his predecessors Lincoln and Roosevelt during their crises, synthesized his response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks with the emotional response of the American public. While the nation was in shock, grief, and anger over the attacks, President Bush employed language that sought to unite the American public around patriotic, democratic, and religious themes. He offered solace to those directly and indirectly affected by the terrorist attacks. He promised justice for the victims of the attacks, as well as a reorganization of the U.S. Government as it prepared to confront the challenges of the War on Terror. As the American public began to turn shock and fear into anger and vengeance, President Bush initiated military action against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. The tenor of the speeches delivered by President Bush captured the emotions that permeated the collective American conscience in the weeks and months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

As the American public sought leadership and military action against those responsible for the attacks, President Bush proposed legislation aimed at expanding the federal bureaucracy as a means to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States. The American public consented to his proposals which included the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, reorganization of the intelligence bureaucracy, and expansion of law enforcement countermeasures as a means to thwart terrorism domestically. The broadcast and print media

continued to exacerbate the emotions of the American public and government officials by providing continuous, hourly news coverage and images regarding the latest developments related to the 9/11 attacks and the military response against Afghanistan. As the television and print media coverage continued, President Bush and his appointed government officials repeatedly addressed the tragedy, often with language that included the same patriotic, religious, democratic, and nationalistic themes employed in the hours and days following the attacks on the morning of September 11th. Fundamentally, the U.S. Government had charted a course from which it would not stray. It would remain steadfast in its determination to prosecute the War on Terror by way of expanding the federal bureaucracy. It would also construct a definition of the War on Terror, and utilize the emotional response of the American public as a justification for more federal bureaucracy in the name of security.

The historical parallels are compelling. As previously noted, Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt gauged the emotional climate of the American public in their responses to national emergencies. However, their responses and subsequent expansion of federal bureaucracy set forth precedents that President Bush during the War on Terror may have, consciously or unconsciously, followed. A notable example is the detention of enemy combatants and civilians during the Civil War and World War II (Lorant, 1950; Donald, 1952). Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt also employed a rich, dramatic prose that related to the morale and emotional condition of the American public during their respective crises. President Lincoln frequently spoke of God, Providence, and religion in speeches to audiences, notably during the Emancipation Proclamation and Gettysburg Address in 1863 (Lorant, 1941). President Roosevelt often in his speeches and famous “fireside chats” during World War II spoke of

American democracy, values, freedom, and a determination to vanquish tyranny (Sulzberger, 1966).

President Bush followed the historical precedents set forth by his predecessors during their national crises. He moved to respond forthrightly against the terrorists in Afghanistan. He initiated proposals to reorganize the federal bureaucracy and drafted measures to prosecute the War on Terror. He sought common ground with his political adversaries in the U.S. Congress to pass federal legislation that addressed the issues of terrorism and terrorism prevention. Lastly, the speeches and rhetoric of President Bush abided by his historical antecedents. The emotional climate that took hold across the United States was reflected in his actions and words. President Bush did not hesitate to make reference to God, Providence, democracy, liberty, tyranny, and religion as had his predecessors. As Americans sought solace, President Bush offered words of comfort designed to reassure the grieving and emotional public and to pledge to them that the full resources of the U.S. Government would be brought to bear in this new war (retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, on September 18, 2005).

*Emotional Response as a Means to Expand the Federal
Bureaucracy and its Policy Implications*

Throughout this research study, the author has sought to provide the reader with evidence that exemplifies the emotional response by government officials, the American public, and the broadcast media that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy of the U.S. Government after the 9/11 attacks. The growth of the federal government since 9/11 is not without controversy. Much criticism has been directed at the federal bureaucracy over the exponential

increases in the federal budget. Additionally, the federal bureaucracy has been the subject of condemnation for its perceived inability to coordinate the exchange of information among its agencies, as well as foster a climate that promoted cooperation among the same agencies. At times, it has been the object of ridicule over the execution of its own policies, as in the case of the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) or TSA airport screening personnel subjecting children and elderly flight passengers to intrusive searches.

This study has focused on one principal objective, the emotional response of government officials, the American public, and the broadcast media that led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. The use of patriotic and religious symbolism, for example, appealed to Americans and their sense of civic duty, traditional values, and family. Government officials made extensive use of emotional language and connected September 11th to an assault against American values, freedom, and “our way of life.” The broadcast media did not refrain in its use of visual images from the 9/11 attacks. Media outlets maintained continuous, 24-hour live coverage of the 9/11 attacks including the weeks and months that followed. The American people in return, placed their faith in the U.S. Government to exact a measure of justice against those responsible for the attacks. However, legislation that followed 9/11 was not a product of careful consideration or debate.

Public policy, as the progeny of the legislative process, should incorporate sound, well-reasoned arguments. The legislative and executive branches of the federal government have a responsibility to the American public with respect to the legislation that is enacted. That is, legislation should not be framed around emotional considerations and responses. Legislation

should be open to discussion and dissent. In the aftermath of an emotional and tragic event such as 9/11, any discussion about the proposed expansion of the federal bureaucracy was absent. Federal legislation and presidential executive orders moved swiftly to expand federal authority and the federal bureaucratic establishment. President Bush and the U.S. Congress, believed that increased legislation, such as the USA Patriot Act, and further bureaucratization of the federal government in the form of the Department of Homeland Security would lead to the prevent of future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Legislation and a federal bureaucracy that are founded on an emotional response may reflect undue passion and emotion in its language and in the execution of public policy respectively. It is also possible for legislation, regulations, and procedures to be subject to current political trends and calculus. This may lead to the overestimation or underestimation by the federal bureaucracy as to what specifically is required to prevent acts of terrorism upon the U.S. homeland and, if necessary, the most effective manner with which to respond. An emotional response may ultimately disallow the federal bureaucracy to innovate and ultimately suffer from an another “failure of imagination.”

Future research in terrorism may benefit from continued attention on the subject of the post-9/11 federal bureaucracy and its origins based on emotional response. Such research may allow further refinement of the understanding of the manner in which the emotional response to the 9/11 attacks led to the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Moreover, future students of terrorism, international relations, and public administration may have the ability to measure the success or failure of the efforts of the U.S. Government in the War on Terror. Perhaps at some


date in the future, this study may provide an insight into the origins of the expansive federal bureaucracy that began on the morning of September 11, 2001. Perhaps the massive, expansive federal bureaucracy that grew out of the emotional response of the American public, government officials, and the media will have successfully prevented further acts of terrorism upon the United States. The success or failure of the expanded federal bureaucracy, borne of the emotional response to 9/11 by the American public, may take years to fully measure and analyze.

APPENDIX A

GRAPHICS ILLUSTRATING FEDERAL HOMELAND
SECURITY BUREAUCRACY

“America will be better able to respond to any future attacks, to reduce our vulnerability and, most important, prevent the terrorists from taking innocent American lives.”

Remarks by President Bush upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security – 11/25/2002



Source: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/homeland.html>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security


Number of Employees in 2004: 183,000

2005 Discretionary Budget Authority: \$33.8 billion

Key Components: Five Directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science and Technology, and Management; Three Mission Agencies: Coast Guard, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Secret Service.

Source: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/homeland.html>

DHS Total Funding



Department of Homeland Security

(In millions of dollars)

	Actual		Estimate	
	2001	2003	2004	2005
Spending				
Discretionary and BioShield Budget Authority:				
Border and Transportation Security	5,864	13,245	13,238	14,496
U.S. Coast Guard	3,816	5,156	5,780	6,250
Emergency Preparedness and Response (gross)	2,881	3,520	3,774	5,585
<i>Project BioShield (non-add)</i>			(885)	(2,528)
Science and Technology	110	553	913	1,039
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection	108	185	834	864
Office for Domestic Preparedness	217	1,961	4,366	3,561
Other Department of Homeland Security	1,256	1,408	1,854	2,036

Total (gross)	14,252	26,028		30,759	33,831
Less Fee-Funded Activities	-258	-2,681		-2,811	-2,988
Less Project BioShield				-885	-2,528
Total (net)	13,994	23,347		27,063	28,315
Total, Discretionary outlays (net)	15,030	27,477		29,219	30,782
Mandatory Spending:					
Total, Mandatory budget authority (gross)	5,492	5,154		5,782	6,336
Less Mandatory receipts and Flood Insurance Collections	-5,725	-5,072		-5,263	-5,765
Total, Mandatory budget authority (net)	-233	82		519	571
Total, Mandatory outlays (gross)	5,370	3,950		5,207	6,007
Less Mandatory receipts and Flood Insurance Collections	-5,725	-5,072		-5,263	-5,765
Total, Mandatory outlays (net)	-355	-1,122		-56	242
Total, Budget Authority (gross) ¹	19,744	31,182		36,541	40,167
Total, Outlays (net)	14,675	26,355		29,163	31,024
Credit activity					
Direct Loan Disbursements:					
Disaster Assistance	2	—		25	25

¹2003 excludes funding provided in P.L. 108-11, the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003; 2004 excludes funding provided in P.L.108-106, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2004.

Source: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/homeland.html>

APPENDIX B


U.S. NEWSPAPER HEADLINES FROM THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
AND OF OCTOBER 8, 2001 UPON THE ALLIED MILITARY RESPONSE
AGAINST AFGHANISTAN

U.S. newspapers from the week of September 11, 2001 that describe the emotional and traumatic climate that had begun to take form across the United States of America:

Source: <http://www.september11news.com/USANewspapers.htm>



New York Newsday 09/11/2001



New York Newsday 09/12/2001



Tulsa World 09/15/2001



New York Daily News 09/15/2001



New York Newsday 09/16/2001



Albany Times Union 09/12/2001



New York Daily News 09/12/2001

New York Daily News 09/13/2001



Albuquerque Journal 09/12/2001



New York Daily News 09/14/2001




San Jose Mercury News 09/12/2001



Tulsa World 09/12/2001




Arizona Daily Star 09/11/2001 Austin American-Statesman 09/12/2001 Boston Globe 09/12/2001



Cleveland Plain Dealer 09/16/2001 Dallas Morning News 09/12/2001 Detroit Free Press 09/12/2001




Florida Today 09/12/2001



Hartford Courant 09/11/2001



Kansas City Star 09/11/2001




Newark Star Ledger 09/12/2001



Omaha World Extra 09/12/2001



San Francisco Examiner 09/11/2001



San Francisco Chronicle 09/12/2001 San Jose Mercury News 09/15/2001 St. Louis Post-Dispatch 09/12/2001



Atlanta Journal-Constitution 10/08/2001

New York Times 10/08/2001

New York Daily News 10/08/2001

200 YEARS **NEW YORK POST** **25 CENTS**
LATE CITY FINAL

America strikes back

TALI-BAM!

Three waves of attacks:
 1. **First wave:** Several airplanes and tanks hit Taliban air defenses along 11 borders. 20 cruise missiles, 20 Tomahawk missiles.
 2. **Second wave:** Continued missile attacks.
 3. **Third wave:** Several Tomahawk missiles striking Taliban air defenses.

Afghan terror targets bombed
FULL COVERAGE BEGINS ON PAGES 2 & 3

New York Post 10/08/2001

The Washington Post
Monday, October 8, 2001

U.S., Britain Launch Airstrikes At Taliban Sites in Afghanistan
‘We Will Not Falter. And We Will Not Fail,’ Bush Pledges

Initial Aim Is Hitting Taliban’s Defenses
U.S. Missiles Strike in Two Waves

Kabul and Kandahar Hit In Attacks Through Night
Operation Prepares To Move on Capital

Dual Strategy of Assault, Reward

Bin Laden Hails Attacks on Trade Center

Bin Laden Hails Attacks on Trade Center
Bin Laden Hails Attacks on Trade Center

Washington Post 10/08/2001

BONDS HITS 73RD IN FINALE/AD **AMERICA RESPONDS**

San Jose Mercury News

U.S. STRIKES BACK, VOWS LONG WAR
U.K. JOINS ATTACK IN AFGHANISTAN

DEFIANT BIN LADEN WARNS AMERICA OF MORE TERROR

Bin Laden: ‘Not for America nor the people who live in it will I surrender security before we free this Palestine!’

RETRIBUTION IN AFGHANISTAN

U.S. DROPS MISSILES TO HIDE FROM ENEMIES

NEW ENEMY, NEW STRATEGY

LOCAL OFFICIALS FEAR SECURITY

IN MANAGEMENT VIEWERS
In widely seen broadcast, bin Laden praises hijackers, accuses U.S. of infidelity

REBELS RISE
Afghan opposition will try to turn U.S., British attacks to its advantage

San Jose Mercury News 10/08/2001

14 PAGES OF COVERAGE INSIDE

The Miami Herald

U.S. STRIKES

PRESIDENT BUSH: ‘NOW, THE TALIBAN WILL PAY A PRICE’
TALIBAN OFFICIAL: ‘THIS ATTACK BY AMERICA IS A TERRORIST ACT’
MISSION: ACTION UNLEASHES MISSILES, BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN

Muslim nations want Bush to ‘finish the job’

Strategy aims to dominate Afghan skies

Where kin against kin is fact of life

Security increased; FBI issues its highest alert

In bin Laden words, danger for Arab and Muslim worlds

Miami Herald 10/08/2001

The Philadelphia Inquirer
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2001

U.S. STRIKES BACK
Bush Launches ‘Relentless’ Campaign; Defiant Bin Laden Makes New Threat

British forces join in attacks

U.S., British Forces Target Taliban Bases

Military mission will have no pattern

Security increased; FBI issues its highest alert

In bin Laden words, danger for Arab and Muslim worlds

Philadelphia Inquirer 10/08/2001

Seattle Post-Intelligencer

U.S. strikes terror targets

U.S. strikes terror targets

Seattle Post-Intelligencer 10/08/2001

APPENDIX C


VARIOUS IMAGES OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AND MEMBERS
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THEIR RESPONSE TO THE 9/11
SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACKS

In an effort to provide a dramatization of the trauma, fear, and emotions of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the author now presents visual images of President George W. Bush, members of the United States House of Representatives, and the suicide attacks against the World Trade Center:

Source: <http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBush.htm>




On the morning of Sept. 11, while at a school in Sarasota Florida, President George W. Bush is told of the 2nd attack on New York City.



President Bush asks for a moment of silence for the victims of the attacks.



President Bush prepares to address the nation on the evening of September 11, 2001.



President Bush gets emotional as responds to questions from journalists regarding the victims and the terrorists.



President Bush at the site of the World Trade Center ruins (aka, Ground Zero) alongside Fireman Bob Beck where President Bush gives his famous “I can hear you!” speech. September 14, 2001



Congressional leaders hold a news conference in Washington, D.C. on the morning of September 12, 2001, and then proceed to join arms and sing “God Bless America.”



White House photo by Paul Morse

President Bush shortly after he delivers his famous “I can hear you!” remarks at Ground Zero.



White House photo by Paul Morse

President Bush hugs and consoles survivors during the same visit to New York City on September 14, 2001.



The Bush and Clinton families at the national memorial service at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. on the evening of September 14, 2001. Former 42nd President of the United States William J. Clinton (1993-2001) is third from right.




White House photo by Eric Draper

President George W. Bush and his father, the former 41st President of the United States, George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) clasp hands after the current President Bush gives an emotional speech to assembled guests and the nation.



President Bush tours the destruction at the Pentagon alongside Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on September 12, 2001.



White House photo by Moreen Ishikawa

President Bush delivers his memorial service remarks to the assembled guests and the nation on September 14, 2001.



White House photo by Eric Draper

President Bush greets military and rescue personnel at the Pentagon on September 12, 2001.



President Bush at a memorial service at the Pentagon on October 11, 2001.



President Bush at the same memorial service at the Pentagon.



President Bush delivers an emotional speech at the memorial service at the Pentagon on October 11, 2001.



Flag unfurled at the Pentagon on September 12, 2001.

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Retrieved May 15, 2005 from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf>.
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

The author of this study, Thomas James Herrera, was born and raised in Austin, Texas and the surrounding Hill Country. He graduated from high school and entered service in the United States Air Force and served for three years. Upon leaving the military, he went to work for the United States Census Bureau as a Computer Operator. He then worked for four years at the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs in Austin as a Human Resources Specialist. In 1996, he moved to Dallas where he enrolled in the Dallas Community College. He received his associate degree in December 1998, and transferred to the University of Texas at Dallas in May 1999. In May 2001, he graduated with a Baccalaureate degree in Government and Politics. Immediately following his graduation he enrolled in the Master of Liberal Arts program at the Southern Methodist University where he graduated one year later in May 2002. In August 2003, he began the final journey of his academic career in the Criminology and Criminal Justice graduate program at the University of Texas at Arlington. He anticipates graduation in December 2005, thus concluding a nine-year odyssey.

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