

PERCEPTION TOWARDS AIRPORT SECURITY AS IT
RELATES TO TERRORISM: AN ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINOLOGY/CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MAJORS AND NON-MAJORS

by

BRITTANY MICHELLE RODRIGUEZ

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON

May 2008

Copyright © by Brittany Michelle Rodriguez 2008

All Rights Reserved

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people that helped make this thesis possible. First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Alejandro del Carmen for meeting with me at the drop of a hat and motivating me to continue Graduate School and my thesis. There were many days that I did not think I could finish my thesis but he always knew what to say to keep me going.

I would like to thank Dr. Rhonda Dobbs for being so patient with me throughout the last few years. Your support and understanding has been greatly appreciated. I want to thank Dr. John Rodriguez who was always willing to stop whatever he was doing to answer any questions I had about my thesis. I do not know what I would have done without him reminding me every day about how little time I had left! Thank you for keeping me motivated! Without the help (mental and emotional) from Cathy, Lindy, and Pam, I do not know if I could have made it through some days. Thank you for listening to me!

Most importantly, I would like to thank my husband for his patience and understanding. Not only did he support my decision to go back to school while he was already in school, he continued to support me after the birth of our child. Thank you for supporting me and I love you!

This thesis is dedicated to my son-Joaquin. Everything I do is for you.

April 15, 2008

ABSTRACT

PERCEPTION TOWARDS AIRPORT SECURITY AS IT RELATES TO TERRORISM: A STUDY OF CRIMINOLOGY/CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAJORS AND NON-MAJORS

Brittany Michelle Rodriguez, M.A.

The University of Texas at Arlington, 2008

Supervising Professor: Alejandro del Carmen

The purpose of this study is to examine the knowledge and perception of airline security and safety post September 11, 2001 by Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors and Non-Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors at The University of Texas at Arlington. The data for this study was obtained from a sample of Criminal Justice majors and Non-Criminal Justice majors enrolled at The University of Texas at Arlington. Questions were asked pertaining to the students' knowledge of TSA (The Transportation Security Administration) and the Air Marshals Program to determine if students were aware what security measures were in place since September 11, 2001. Furthermore, the surveys included questions regarding individuals' views on traveling by airplane since September 11, 2001.

The findings suggest that the students that were not Criminology and Criminal Justice majors were more knowledgeable of TSA and its purpose. However, there was no significant relationship between that knowledge and the respondents' perception of airline safety.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..... | iii |
| ABSTRACT..... | iv |
| LIST OF TABLES..... | vi |
| Chapter | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Purpose of Study..... | 1 |
| 1.2 Terrorism..... | 2 |
| 1.3 Presentation | 4 |
| 2. LITERATURE REVIEW | 6 |
| 2.1 Terrorism in the United States..... | 6 |
| 2.2 September 11, 2001 | 8 |
| 2.3 The Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act | 12 |
| 2.4 Airport Security..... | 17 |
| 2.5 Fear of Crime and Terrorism..... | 24 |
| 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..... | 29 |
| 3.1 Survey..... | 29 |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| 3.2 Sample..... | 30 |
| 3.3 Data..... | 31 |
| 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS | 33 |
| 4.1 Introduction..... | 33 |
| 4.2 Demographics..... | 33 |
| 4.3 Knowledge and Perception..... | 35 |
| 4.3 Cross Tabulations..... | 39 |
| 5. CONCLUSION..... | 42 |
| 5.1 Overview..... | 42 |
| 5.2 Results..... | 42 |
| 5.3 Perceptions..... | 45 |
| 5.4 Limitations..... | 46 |
| 5.5 Policy Implications | 47 |
| Appendix | |
| A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT | 52 |
| REFERENCES..... | 58 |
| BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION..... | 63 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | | Page |
|-------|---|------|
| 4.1 | Demographics | 34 |
| 4.2 | Non-CRCJ and CRCJ Majors Knowledge & Perception of Terr.&AS | 38 |
| 4.3 | Cross tabulations..... | 41 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of Study

After the events of September 11, 2001, the airline industry experienced a dramatic decrease in the number of individuals traveling by airplane (Blunk, Clark, & McGibany, 2006). According to the authors, the “events of 9/11 pushed the airline industry into financial crisis after air travel dropped 20% between September-December 2001” (p. 363). It could be argued that this decline was a result of many individuals’ fear of future terrorist attacks.

The purpose of this study is to examine the knowledge and perception of airline security and safety post September 11, 2001 by Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors and Non-Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors at The University of Texas at Arlington. Furthermore, the researcher will evaluate whether or not there is a correlation between the respondents knowledge of airport security and their perception of safety on airplanes.

1.2 Terrorism

“Chaos, and the fear that accompanies it, are exactly what terrorists hope to create when they launch attacks” (Cohen, 2004, p. 3). Over the past decade, the United Nations Security Council has defined and redefined the definition of terrorism and terrorist attacks (Saul, 2005).

In 1937, at the League of Nations Convention, terrorism was described as: “Criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public” (retrieved from www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html on October 16, 2007). In 1999 the UN Resolution stated that terrorism was: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (retrieved from www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html on October 16, 2007).

Since the 1990s, one could argue that it has become quite common to turn on the television and see terrorist attacks happening in other countries around the world. One could also argue that it is of little surprise that another suicide bomber has blown himself or herself and others up in countries halfway around the world. It is quite possible that many people have become resistant to this type of news and pictures that the media has displayed over the years. To experience a terrorist attack within The

United States of America seems almost unheard of to most people. However, reviewing the most common definitions of terrorism, one could possibly argue that there have been many terrorist attacks in the United States within the last century.

Since the end of World War II there have been hundreds of terrorist attacks within the United States. These range from the Ku Klux Klan during the civil rights movement to anti abortionists to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda (Hewitt, 2003). Most people may not think that all of these events are considered terrorist attacks. However, the very definition of terrorism tells us that its purpose is to create terror and fear within a group of people whether it is for political, religious, or ethnic reasons. However, it was the “attacks of September 11, 2001, which did more than destroy buildings and kill thousands of innocent people. They shattered our sense of security and interrupted the rhythm and social fabric of our country” (Silver, 2004, p. 61).

September 11, 2001 was a pivotal point for the airline industry and airport security in the United States of America (Russell & Preston, 2004). On September 11, 2001, four airplanes were hijacked and flown into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in rural Pennsylvania killing thousands of people (Kosova & Gerlach, 2006). Immediately following this devastation, airports were ordered to close for several days (CNN, 2001). When they did reopen, there were far fewer travelers willing to fly (Blunk, Clark, & McGibany, 2006). One could contend that it has taken several years for individuals to feel safe to travel by plane again and still some do not fly due to the fear of terrorism.

1.3 Presentation

One may infer that there has been a substantial increase in the interest of airport security and individuals' perception of flying since September 11, 2001. Although there have been many other terrorist attacks and foiled terrorist plots before September 11, one may propose that it was this event that led to this interest.

In Chapter two the author will provide a discussion of existing literature pertaining to airport security pre and post September 11, 2001. This will include terrorist activities that have occurred within the United States of America. The author will also review the events of September 11, 2001 along with the Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act that followed this disaster. The main focus will be on airport security and how this has changed over the past few years. In addition, the author will also include current problems with the Transportation Security Administration and issues with behavioral profiling in airports. Lastly, fear of crime and terrorism will be explored as described by previous researchers in this field.

In Chapter three, the research methodology will be explained and the steps that led to the findings of this research. The researcher will discuss how the survey was created, the sample of students that were chosen to complete the survey, and what was done with the data once it was collected. The results of this research will be discussed in chapter four along with any other findings that may be relevant to this topic. In chapter five, the author will conclude with a discussion of the findings and how they affect

academia, the airline industry, and individuals who travel by airplane. Also, the overall effect of policies will be discussed by the author.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Terrorism in the United States

One could contend that most citizens of The United States of America would agree that it was the events of September 11, 2001 which changed their perception of terrorism and their sense of security. However, according to the definition of terrorism, there have been many incidents that have occurred in the past century that could be considered to be terrorist assaults against this country. As discussed in Chapter one, terrorism is defined as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (retrieved from www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html on October 16, 2007).

In 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama, a bomb detonated and destroyed a church killing 4 African American girls. On November 3, 1979 in Greensboro, North Carolina, five members of the Communist Workers Party were killed by Klansman and Nazis during an anti Ku Klux Klan rally (Becker, Jipson, &Katz, 2001). On February 26, 1993, a massive explosion at the World Trade Center garage killed six people and injured a thousand more. At the time, many people in law enforcement thought that this

was the “case of the century” (Martin, 1999). As this case was investigated, it was soon discovered that a more deadly plot was intended. The group of terrorists had originally planned to strike out against the United States and intended to destroy the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the United Nations Headquarters, and the federal buildings that housed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When the safe house of this group was raided, members were in the process of fabricating bombs (Martin, 1999).

In July of 1993, eight supremacists were arrested in Los Angeles after an investigation found that the group planned bombings and assassinations in an attempt to start a race war (Becker, Jipson, & Katz, 2001). On April 19, 1995, the Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed and 169 people were killed (Jackson, 1996). In 1996, the Olympic Games were held in Atlanta, Georgia where a bomb exploded killing 1 person and injuring over 100 (Matathia & Salzam, 2001). On February 23, 1997, a Palestinian man opened fire on the observation deck of the Empire State Building. He killed one person, injured seven others, and then killed himself (Martin, 1999). These incidents, and others, were greeted with a sense of fear but the average American continued to live life at usual (Matathia & Salzam, 2001). Hamm (2005) states that terrorism, in the past, has been understudied in criminology but goes on to say that since September 11, 2001, the available literature has grown.

One may argue that before September 11, 2001, the majority of people living in the United States did not fear terroristic assaults. Possibly their main fear of crime came from criminals committing property crimes or violent crimes against individuals. During the 1990s, the United States had only 3 skyjackings while there were 182

throughout the world (Young, 2002). According to Young (2002), thirty percent of these 182 skyjackings were in China and Russia. During this period almost half of the skyjackings were in Middle Eastern countries. The Federal Aviation Agency, FAA, believes that most hijackers act for personal reasons such as looking to escape conditions of their homeland while a smaller number are for political reasons (Young, 2002). Again, one may argue that since September 11, 2001, this view has changed and now there is more of a fear of planes being skyjacked and bombed, or used as a weapon, by individuals for political reasons.

Before September 11, people may have feared flying outside of the country but more or less felt safe travelling within America. Probably, the most significant fear of flying was that a plane may crash due to mechanical problems, not terrorist. However, according to Silver (2004), the psychological consequences of September 11 may have extended for months and for many individuals, the remainder of their lives.

2.2 September 11, 2001

On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men affiliated with a terrorist group by the name al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger airlines (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com> on December 18, 2007). At 7:58 am United Airlines Flight 175 left Boston for Los Angeles and was carrying 56 passengers. There were two pilots and seven flight attendants on this flight. After takeoff the plane was hijacked and taken to New York. At 7:59 am American Airlines Flight 11 was also leaving Boston

for Los Angeles when it was hijacked and diverted to New York. The Boeing 767 was carrying 81 passengers, two pilots, and nine flight attendants. At 8:01 am United Airlines Flight 93 was leaving New Jersey for San Francisco and was hijacked with 38 passengers, two pilots, and five flight attendants aboard. Lastly, American Airlines Flight 77 was departing from Washington's Dulles Airport for Los Angeles and was carrying 58 passengers, two pilots, and four flight attendants when hijacked (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com> on December 18, 2007).

At 8:45 am American Airlines Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center ("Twin Terrors", 2001). Possibly many people across the country were arriving at work that morning and hearing this for the first time on the radio or television. Originally this was believed by many to have been an "accident". It was 21 minutes later when United Flight 175 collided into the South Tower of the World Trade Center and the realization of what was happening became evident ("Twin Terrors", 2001). As American Airlines Flight 77 was crashing into the Pentagon at 9:45 am, many government buildings around the country were closing and people around the world were intensely watching the horror unfold on television. At 10:10 am United Flight 93 plummeted into a rural field in Pennsylvania. The hijackers of this flight were met with resistance from the passengers and were not able to destroy their original target, believed to have been the White House (<http://www.september11news.com>).

All of this unfolded on television for the world to see over the next few hours. Many citizens in the United States of America witnessed the towers fall, people jumping from top stories trying to escape the flames, and the overall destruction that

was caused by the terrorists (Silver, 2004). In fact, according to Silver (2004) “more than 60% of a nationally representative sample of adults watched the attacks on television as they occurred” (p.61). It was not long before the media had a name of the responsible party: al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Immediately following the attacks, The President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, had an overwhelming amount of support from the people of the country to put an end to terrorism (Willer, 2004).

It was estimated that approximately 3000 people died on that day: 2605 at the World Trade Center in New York; 92 people on American flight 11 in New York; 65 people on United flight 175 in New York; 124 individuals in the Pentagon at the time of the attack; 64 people on American Flight 77; and 40 people on United Flight 93 that crashed into the field in Pennsylvania. Of the thousands that died at the World Trade Center, almost 400 were emergency personnel or First Responders who were sent to help the individuals trapped inside the burning towers (retrieved from <http://www.september11news.com> on December 18, 2007).

One of the major industries affected on September 11 were the airlines (Blunk, Clark, & McGibany, 2006). Within an hour of the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) closed airports in New York and throughout the country (National Geographic, n.d.). According to National Geographic (n.d.), the following is a timeline of events that occurred on September 11 as associated with the closing of airports:

9:04 am—Boston and New York shut down all departures

9:08 am—The FAA bans all flights going to New York

9:26 am—The FAA grounds all domestic flights

12:15 pm—Airspace over the United States is closed except emergency and
Military aircraft

2:30 pm—FAA announces there will be no commercial air traffic until
September 12 at the earliest

According to CNN (2001), the airports officially re-opened September 13, 2001. However, very few flights actually carried passengers. It was at this time that the rules had changed for all airplane travel: all knives were banned; the curbside drop-off of passengers was eliminated; Federal Air Marshals were now on flights; and only ticket holders could go to the gates (CNN, 2001).

Following the attacks of September 11, one could argue that responses to ordinary events were unpredictable. No one knew if a coat left in an airport lounge was a bomb and a plane trip could create immense anxiety (Zimmerman, 2005). According to Willer, (2004), the approval of President George W. Bush increased greatly. “Following the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, all polls of President Bush’s approval rating showed a huge and relatively upward spike”(p.2). Willer (2004) said that “the percentage of Americans reporting approval of Bush’s performance climbed from 51% in the Gallup poll of September 10, 2001 to a

remarkable 86% in the next poll released on September 15. This was the largest change between consecutive presidential approval polls ever reported by Gallup in more than 65 years” (p.2).

2.3 The Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act

Until September 11, 2001, many people might concur that American citizens felt safe and secure within The United States of America when it came to the threat of terrorist attacks. Americans have always been exposed to numerous tragedies with detailed images of the disaster through the media (Wayment, 2004). However, this was something that most citizens of the United States of America probably did not fear or expect to happen to them. That view changed once they had been attacked on their own soil. According to Greco (2006) the American people expect the government to protect them against threats posed by terrorists. The President of the United States has an obligation to protect the nation’s safety and it’s constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. His failure to do so compromises the principles and ideals that the United States is fighting to protect (Greco, 2006).

As a response to September 11, President Bush signed into law the *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act*, or the PATRIOT Act, in October 2001 (Anonymous, Crime and Justice International, 2003; Platt and O’Leary, 2003; Devanney and Devanney,

2003). Devanney and Devanney (2003) stated that the purpose of this act was to provide law enforcement with better means to defend against terrorists. The act was intended to help reduce constraints on the government's ability to conduct searches, deport suspects, eavesdrop on Internet communications, monitor financial transactions, and crack down on immigrant violations (Platt & O'Leary, 2003). This bill would also make it easier for the United States to deport suspected terrorists (Anderson, 2001).

According to Devanney and Devanney (2003) one provision of the Patriot Act was to authorize the federal government to share information and funds with state and local police in order to combat terrorism. After September 11, federal officers realized the importance of local officers in defending the country against terrorist attacks (Devanney & Devanney, 2003). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Robert Muller, told police chiefs that federal agents would share intelligence with state and local law enforcement. He also stated that the FBI was undergoing changes that would make the agency more forthcoming with information than it had been in the past (Anonymous, Crime Control Digest, 2001).

When the Patriot Act was first signed into law, there were few citizens and members of Congress that objected to the amount of leverage the President had in protecting the country against another terrorist attack. However, as time passed and the country began to heal, more individuals started to realize that provisions in the act led to violations in the areas of privacy, free speech, and human rights (Carter, 2005). The bill included several controversial provisions including wiretapping phone conversations and interception of suspicious activity on computers (Carter, 2005).

Although the new anti-terrorism provisions were welcomed by the public and viewed as “necessary” in order to protect the country against terrorists, it did not take long before they started to be challenged by some of the public and the government. At the time of this study, these bills and provisions are still being challenged by several interest groups as to where the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure, stops (Ciarelli, 2003). At what cost were the citizens of the United States willing to pay for security?

One year after the Patriot Act was signed, the United States Senate approved the creation of the Department of Homeland Security which according to Platt and O’Leary (2003) was the most significant change to the federal bureaucracy since President Truman created the Department of Defense to fight the Cold War in 1947. The key concept behind the Homeland Security Act was to reorganize 170,000 federal employees from 22 agencies and coordinate them to defend against terrorist attacks (Devanney & Devanney, 2003).

“Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (retrieved from www.whitehouse.gov on August 3, 2007). Like the Patriot Act, the Department of Homeland Security appeared to have full support in the beginning and accepted by most people as a necessary component to the government. It appeared that this would be the start of all agencies working together, sharing information, in an attempt to stop further destruction

by terrorists. However, it was soon discovered that there were a lot of problems to work out within the department.

The four sections of the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, are as follows:

1. Border and Transportation Security

- The U.S. Customs Service
- The Immigration and Naturalization service
- The Federal Protective Service
- The Transportation Security Administration, TSA
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
- Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
- Office for Domestic Preparedness

2. Emergency Preparedness and Response

- The Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA
- Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster Medical System, HNS
- Nuclear Incident Response Team
- Domestic Emergency Support Teams
- National Domestic Preparedness Office

3. Science and Technology

- CBRN Countermeasures Programs
- Environmental Measurements Laboratory
- National BW Defense Analysis Center
- Plum Island Animal Disease Center

4. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

- Federal Computer Incident Response Center
- National Communications System
- National Infrastructure Protection Center
- Energy Security and Assurance Program

-Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov> on August 3, 2007.

In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security awarded \$1.7 billion for three homeland security grant programs: The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, the State Homeland Security Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative. These grants “are designed to enhance the abilities of states and urban areas to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters” (Anonymous, 2007, p. 3).

2.4 Airport Security

Prior to September 11, 2001, Pantankar and Holscher (2000) researched airport security in the United States and described it as being compromised due to technical and legal limitations. On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Scotland killing all 259 people on board. A single plastic explosive weighing less than one pound was placed in a suitcase and loaded onto the plane. The person who checked in the suitcase did not board the plane. At the time of Patankar and Holscher's (2002) research, they explain that even ten years after the Pan American Flight 103 explosion, the same explosives were still a threat to most commercial airports. They went on to say that in order to combat the potential threats (passengers, baggage, and cargo) to airlines, the federal government planned to target specific areas but at the cost of American's civil liberties.

The Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) was viewed by the Justice Department as being non-discriminatory and was in place at most airports as of 2000. CAPPS was kept under close wrap by the federal government in the beginning but over the past several years information about the system is emerging due to congressional hearings, investigative reports, and civil suits filed by angry passengers who claimed that they were unjustly targeted (Maier, 2004; Patankar, & Holscher, 2000).

CAPPS works by providing a risk assessment analysis with travelers' itineraries with historical records pertaining to terrorist activities. When a traveler checks in, their name is entered into the CAPPS program which is linked to a government database. A threat index is assigned to the passenger and these passengers are divided into two groups: those who fit the profile and those who are too high of a security risk and are denied a boarding pass. Passengers can find out if they triggered an alert as an "S" is placed on their boarding pass. Many experts believe that the terrorists of September 11 sent test subjects to the airport to determine what would trigger the system and the CAPPS system became predictable.

According to the 911 Commission Report (Retrieved from www.9-11commission.gov/report/911 on February 13, 2008) many of the hijackers were selected by CAPPS for extra screening. However, only their bags were screened and were held off the plane until they (the hijackers) were boarded. Once they boarded the plane, their bags were put on the plane. In Washington DC, three of the hijackers were flagged by CAPPS due to not having a photo ID and not understanding English. Also, the airline agent found the three to be "suspicious". All three were allowed to board the plane and their bags were not put on the plane until they had boarded. In Newark, New Jersey, one of the hijackers was selected by CAPPS and his bag was checked for explosives (www.9-11commision.gov/report/911).

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed on November 19, 2001 as a result of the events of September 11. The act established the Transportation Security Administration, referred to as TSA. TSA is responsible for the security of all

modes of transportation; recruiting and training security officers; and providing all screening of checked in luggage (retrieved from <http://www.tsa.gov> on December 18, 2007). In March of 2003 TSA was moved from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security.

The Air Marshals Program began before the events of September 11, 2001 originating in 1970 and ending in 1974 when x-ray equipment was introduced in airports (retrieved from <http://www.tsa.gov> on December 18, 2007). The program was revived again in 1985 when TWA Flight 847 was hijacked and consisted of about 50 marshals until September 11, 2001. Today the air marshal is responsible for not only protecting passengers, but also for working closely with other law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorist activities (<http://www.tsa.gov>). Besides the Air Marshals, there are other changes that have been made to help thwart skyjackings. The National Explosives Detection Canine Team are trained dogs that are used in airports to sniff out bombs. TSA has made available self defense classes for all crew members and developed the Federal Flight Deck Officer program in which eligible flight crew members are trained to use firearms to defend against anyone trying to gain control of the plane (<http://www.tsa.gov>).

After September 11, the FAA and TSA realized the vulnerability of airplanes and that steps needed to be taken in order to prevent another attack. According to McCrie (2001), changes in airport security and management were being announced daily. One major change was that cockpits were now going to be sealed during flights. In all four skyjackings on September 11 the terrorists were able to take control of the

plane by entering the cockpits. This would no longer be possible. There would be no more curbside check-in of luggage. There would be physical pat-downs during secondary screening. (Doyle, 2005; McCrie, 2001).

Another fear of terrorist attack is not only the bombing or hijacking of an airplane, but also using the ventilation systems to spread chemical or biological agents. According to Michael Gips (2006) there are currently no strategies for defending against such attacks. The National Research Council's Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies for Transportation offers four recommendations for improving this situation. First, it calls for TSA to integrate chemical and biological defense strategies into its broader security plan. Second, it suggests that TSA study the models of airflow and dispersal of simulated agents within an airplane. Third, it recommends that TSA study chemical and biological research programs of other agencies. Finally, it suggests that TSA develop a defensive strategy to protect against such attacks (Gips, 2006).

Raffel (2003) states that as of 2003 the FBI, FEMA, and the Department of Defense were starting to assess threats of biological weapons through civil aviation. Raffel (2003) says that local police and firefighters are trained at handling biological responses and these would be the individuals to immediately respond if a biological incident occurs on an airplane. However, Raffel (2003) also agrees that civil aviation is ill-prepared to deal with these types of events. He suggests that FAA (The Federal Aviation Administration) and TSA (Transportation Security Administration) should establish preventive measures against these types of attacks.

In the past, one might argue that airline passengers and pilots have been complacent when a skyjacking occurred. Even federal agents aboard the plane were taught that the wisest thing to do during an attack was to cooperate and lay low. However, according to McCrie (2001) it is reasonable to believe that everyone aboard the flight is less likely to accommodate the terrorists as the world has now seen that many terrorists are not interested in “making a deal”. Instead, they are extremist who have no problem committing suicide and taking everyone else with them. Because of this, passengers know that this plane ride could be their last if they do not attempt to defend themselves (McCrie, 2001).

During the days that followed September 11, 2001, the skies were eerily calm as no planes were allowed to fly. For years after these terrorist attacks, airline travel decreased throughout the United States. Airlines continued to reduce fares in order to entice people to travel (Kalette, 2005). Kalette (2005) stated that the Thanksgiving weekend in 2005 was the busiest the Miami International Airport had been since September 11, 2001. Furthermore, according to Carolyn Fennel, spokeswoman for the airport, that people have come to terms with the new environment of travel such as the time required to board an aircraft and the increase in security measures (Kalette, 2005). Andrew Niero, the acting federal security director of the Southern Oregon Region of TSA insisted in 2003 that airport security and airport travel were much safer than before the attacks (Mann, 2003). Former FAA security director, Billie Vincent, says that there are “many weaknesses in the world’s aviation security systems, but a rising number of

skyjackings is directly related to increased political instability” (as quoted by Young, 2002, p.5).

On August 10, 2006 the world had another scare concerning airline security and terrorism. British officials foiled a plot by 24 men and women who had planned to destroy 10 United State bound airplanes (Ripley, 2006). The terrorist suspects were believed to be British born Muslims and militants from Pakistan and Afghanistan. What made this bomb threat more terrifying was that they planned to use liquid explosives to take down the aircraft over the Atlantic Ocean (Ripley, 2006).

Although terrorists have been trying to bomb airplanes with liquid bombs for 20 years, most citizens viewed this as a new threat to their security. According to Ripley (2006), in 1987 two North Korean agents packed plastic explosives and a whiskey bottle full of liquid explosives in a South Korean airliner. The explosion brought down the plane and killed all 115 people on board.

The main fear with the liquid explosives is that the detection machines that are used in the airports are not able to detect liquid explosives in sealed containers. There are currently private companies working on devices to detect these bombs (Ripley, 2006). However, the problem is that explosives can appear in any form---from paper to liquids to gases. The explosive can be made using normal everyday ingredients. The al-Qaeda cell that intended to take down nine aircraft in August 2006 planned to use peroxide based explosives that cost as little as \$15 a bomb (Whitlock, 2007). “European and U.S. counterterrorism officials said terrorist cells are increasingly turning to peroxide-based explosives, which can be made in much smaller quantities from

materials available and drugstores” (Whitlock, 2007, p. 2). A company in California, which makes a large number of x-ray machines used in airports, has added quadruple resonance imaging to its x-ray devices. This technology can identify specific molecules that may indicate the presence of explosives (Biever, 2006). However, it is more difficult to detect the components of a bomb before it has been assembled, especially if it is surrounded by a metal object (Whitlock, 2007).

The first reaction from airport security after the foiled attack on August 10, 2006 was to not allow anyone to carry liquids or gels on flights (Ripley, 2006). Many flights were cancelled and the check-in line at airports were long as every passenger had to be searched. Once again airlines lost millions of dollars and many people canceled their trips as they worried about another possible terrorist attack. Even baby formula and bottles were restricted from airplanes.

With all the security, training, machines, pat downs, luggage searches, and restrictions, one would think that everyone would feel safer flying and would appreciate the extra security. However, over the years TSA has received a bad name and many people do not fly anymore as they do not want to have to deal with airport security. According to Eileen Sullivan (2007) of the Associated Press, “Complaints and other frustrations make the nation’s airport security agency as popular as the IRS”. An AP poll in December 2007 found that the more people traveled by plane, the less they liked TSA (Sullivan, 2007). Many complaints include long lines at the airports and unnecessary pat-downs. The public wants to feel safe flying, but they do not want to be inconvenienced in the process (Sullivan).

2.5 The Future of the Airline Industry

So what is the government doing to help protect its citizens against another terrorist attack? Criminologists are studying terrorism and homeland security and how to prevent future terrorist attacks. According to Gordon Woo (quoted by Theil, 2004), “terrorist are entirely rational in optimizing their own particular objectives”. He goes on to say that mathematical risk assessment models are important policy tools in the war on terror, because they provide an understanding of how terrorist select targets and the chances of disrupting a terrorist network. Turk (2002) states that “America’s dilemma is that terrorism cannot be stopped permanently by either legal or violent tactics. It can over time be ended through prevention if its roots are eliminated, which means removing the deprivation and injustices that create the environments in which people’s fears and hopelessness make terrorism appear to be their only option” (p. 346).

As to the problem of airport security, it is something that is being dealt with on a daily basis. As of March 2006, TSA screeners failed to spot homemade materials used to make a bomb hidden in luggage at 21 airports (Doyle, 2006). Doyle (2006) says that Edmund Hawley, the head of TSA believes that the main threat to airline security is explosives and not sharp tools such as fingernail clippers. Since the failed tests, TSA screeners have been retrained on how to identify explosives. Sturgeon (2002) also believes that searchers are inconsistent with their methods on searching passengers. He suggests that the Department of Corrections Officers and Sheriffs Officers would be

more effective in searching people and luggage that boarded the planes. He states that these officers understand the importance of confiscating contraband and have experience in recognizing hiding places (Sturgeon, 2002).

In the months following September 11, 2001 it was suggested that the CAPPs system be expanded (Ahren, 2001). Richard A. Ahren (2001), a pilot and faculty member at John Jay College, believes that a simple numerical score can identify passengers that require greater scrutiny throughout the check in process. He says that some risk factors include being male with a foreign accent and born in countries of previous terrorism. He goes on to say that two or more of such persons traveling on the same flight is a greater risk and if the ticket is paid with cash. Over the years this system is continuously being upgraded and approved (Ahren, 2001).

TSA as recently as March 2006 admitted to problems with the passenger identification and “watch list” databases (Zalud, 2006). However, security video and software is emerging and improving for the future. This type of system would automatically analyze video input and identify possible security breaches and react to suspicious activity with a preprogrammed set up alarm behaviors (Zalud, 2006).

Many travelers have frustrations with TSA and say that their system needs improving (McCrie, 2004). In April 2004, the ACLU sued TSA on behalf of seven airline passengers that were denied flights because their names were wrongly placed on no-fly lists or had been refused because their names were similar to suspected terrorists (McCrie, 2004). Senator Edward M. Kennedy was denied flights five times as his name resembled an alias used by a suspected terrorist who had been barred from flying on

United States flights. In 2004, the name Osama Bin Laden was cleared to fly within the United States (Maier, 2004). Kathleen Sweet, author of *Aviation and Airport Security; Terrorism and Safety Concerns*, told Maier that the system often fails to detect terrorists until they have boarded the plane. TSA spokesman Mark Hatfield said in 2004 that it had been almost 10 years since CAPPS began and that there is not a lot of consistency between the airlines. He went on to say that some airlines may flag some passengers while other airlines may end up clearing them to fly (Maier, 2004).

Another application that may be used in the future at airports is behavioral profiling. “We’re now looking at behavioral pattern recognition as a way of increasing the tools that our screeners have”, Department of Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff said in a recent speech (Lawrence, 2006; p. 36). According to Lawrence (2006), this procedure involves asking passengers questions. Examples of these questions would be: what is the purpose of your visit; their mother’s maiden name; or their birthplace. The purpose is to detect inconsistencies that may be a sign that the passenger is not who they say they are (Lawrence, 2006). According to Lawrence, some critics of the system are debating whether or not it is effective and worth using in American airports. Douglas Laird, former security director for Northwest Airlines, says that behavioral profiling may serve as a deterrent but there are so many variables in behavior that it is difficult not to get a lot of false positives (Lawrence, 2006).

Patrick Lucci (2001), a marketing consultant for RTI Securaex, suggests that the events of September 11 did not have to take place. He believes that if the technology we had available was properly used the events on that day would have been different. Lucci

(2001) asks why surveillance cameras are in malls, gas stations, ATM machines but not on airplanes. He believes that if all passenger cabins had surveillance cameras, then the pilots could have seen what was happening and landed the planes safely. Lucci (2001) says that many other countries have technology that the United States does not have within their airports. The reason for this is cost. “Until now, the airlines saved money by providing a minimal amount of security and hope that what happened would not”, (Lucci, 2001, p. 7).

According to the Bureau of National Affairs (2006), once a person initially submits to the screening process at an airport security checkpoint, they are not protected under the Fourth Amendment and cannot choose not to fly rather than be screened. What this means is that if an individual passes through the first screening but is stopped at the second, he cannot leave the airport without being screened. According to the Bureau of National Affairs, he will be searched at this point (*United States v. Aukai*, 9th Cir. No. 04-10226, 3/17/06). This will help prevent any potential terrorists from leaving the airport and attempting to skyjack an airplane at a later time (Bureau of National Affairs, n.d.).

In a study by Dugan, Lafree, and Piuro (2005), their results showed that certain apprehension methods (metal detectors and law enforcement at every checkpoint) significantly reduced the rate of new hijacking attempts. Also, the severity of punishment that made hijacking a crime in Cuba was significantly related to a drop in the hazard that a hijacked flight would be diverted there. Similarly, a study by Landes (1978) almost 27 years earlier showed that combined effects of a treaty with Cuba, sky

marshals, and passenger screening led to an 82% decline in terrorist attacks within the United States.

Since September 11, 2001 airport security has increased significantly and the government has stepped in to help with this process. One might argue that some individuals feel that their civil liberties are being violated due to the laws that are now in effect regarding safety and defending against terrorists. Others do not mind the government knowing more about them in exchange for what they perceive as security. When people leave their home they rarely fear getting into a car accident or being carjacked at a stop sign. However, when the same people board an airplane, the thought of a viable terrorist situation possibly crosses their mind. Is this fear of terrorism keeping them from flying? Is it keeping them from traveling to certain destinations? Or does this fear have no effect on them at all? And, if it does affect them, what can the government and the airlines do to help people feel more secure and safe?

The airlines have come a long way in the past few years and unfortunately it took the attacks on September 11 to initiate that change. Cockpits are now sealed off from the rest of the cabin, federal air marshals are now on most flights, and TSA is completing more intense searches. Airport security still has a long way to go and only time will tell how successful the current changes are.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Survey

The purpose of this study is to examine the knowledge and perception of airline security and safety post September 11, 2001 by Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors and Non-Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors at The University of Texas at Arlington. Furthermore, the study examines different types of responses between Criminal Justice Majors and Non-Criminal Justice Majors at The University of Texas at Arlington. Data was collected using a self-administered survey.

The survey was created using the 5 point Likert scale with 1= agree strongly; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4=disagree; 5=disagree strongly. The first six questions pertained to the participants' knowledge of September 11, 2001, airplane hijackings prior to September 11, terrorism in general, TSA, and the Air Marshals Program. The next eight questions asked the participant how they felt about traveling by airplane since September 11, if they felt that it was safe to fly, and if they feared another terrorist attack within the United States involving aircraft. The next three questions related to the participants' age, gender, and, major. The final six questions asked if the participant had flown prior to September 11, 2001, since September 11, 2001, how many times they have flown, why they travel by airplane and with whom they travel.

The questions were utilized to compare and correlate the participants' knowledge with their feelings about different areas. The researcher was also interested if being a Criminal Justice Major had any impact on this knowledge and perception of terrorism.

The survey was created during the summer of 2007 and was sent to the Institutional Review Board, IRB, in September 2007. It was approved in October 2007. (See Appendix A).

3.2 Sample

The next step was to decide how many surveys to distribute and to which classes to distribute them. It was decided that 200 copies would be distributed to five different classes within the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department. Since the researcher was interested in criminal justice versus non criminal justice majors, three of the classes chosen were Introduction to Criminology in which most students were not criminal justice majors. The other classes were Community Corrections and Terrorism and Mass Violence. These classes were chosen due to the number of students registered for each of these classes and the availability of the researcher to distribute the surveys.

The researcher obtained permission from each professor to distribute the surveys in the classes chosen. In two of the classes, the professors chose to distribute the surveys themselves. They explained to the students that the surveys were voluntary

and confidential. The researcher met with each professor at a later date to gather all completed surveys.

Regarding the other three classes chosen, the professors agreed and set dates and times for the researcher to attend those classes. This took place within a period of two weeks during November 2007. The students were informed that the surveys were optional. They were also told that the surveys were anonymous and that there would be no identifying factors within the survey. Unfortunately, attendance in the classes was lower than expected. Most classes had an average of 55 on the enrollment form but only about 30 in attendance. The total number of participants in this study was 150.

Cohen's Power Sampling states that the minimum respondents for an adequate sample is 44 (Cohen, 1988). Because the author was able to obtain 150 completed surveys, the sample size was sufficient.

3.3 Data

Once all the surveys were returned, the researcher utilized SPSS, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, which is the most widely used computer software for analyzing data in the social and behavioral science (Miethe, 2007). The researcher was able to generate frequencies once all data was entered and determined that the number of Criminal Justice Majors and the number of Non-Criminal Justice Majors respondents were extremely close, with a total of 49% non-CRCJ majors, 50% CRCJ majors, and

1% non declared. Although the researcher did not have as many as surveys as originally planned, there were enough to achieve statistically significant results.

Once frequencies were displayed, the researcher was able to generate other demographics to determine the overall number of females versus males and the average age of the participants. Secondly, T-Tests were run using questions 1-14, which were knowledge and perception questions. T-Tests are “statistical tests of population parameters from sample data that use the t-distribution as the comparative basis for parameter estimation and hypothesis testing” (Miethe, 2007, p. 333). Lastly, descriptives were run using Cross Tabulation. This shows the difference in how the Criminal Justice Majors answered questions compared to the Non-Criminal Justice Majors. These questions pertained to the respondents’ history of traveling by airplane, why they fly, and with whom they travel. In chapter 4, the findings of the surveys will be presented and analyzed.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 4, the results of the surveys will be presented in three tables. The first table will be made up of the demographics of the respondents. This will include gender, age, and major of each respondent. In the second table, the knowledge and perception of airport security of each respondent will be displayed. The means of each non-CRCJ major and CRCJ major will be charted and a t-test performed in order to show the p-value. This will show if there is any statistical significance in each item. The questions used in table three were not conducive for t-tests. Therefore, a cross tabulation was performed on each question to distinguish how the non-CRCJ majors answered versus the CRCJ majors.

4.2 Demographics

In Table 1, the demographics of all respondents are displayed. There were three questions included in the survey that pertained to demographics. The majority of subjects were male (55%) while females made up 43% of the sample. There were 2% that did not respond. The 17-22 year age group consisted of 57% of the subjects, with 31% being 23-28 years of age. Only 4% of subjects were 29-34 and another 4% were

35-40. There was only 1% age 41-46 and there were no subjects between the ages of 47-52. There was 1% age 53 and up. Again, there were 2% that did not identify their age. Of all respondents, 49% were Non-criminology and Criminal Justice majors and 50% were Criminology and Criminal Justice majors with 1% of respondents undeclared. Please refer to Table 1 below.

Table 4.1 Demographics

| Variables | Attributes | Percentage |
|------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Gender | Male | 55 |
| | Female | 43 |
| | Undeclared | 2 |
| Age | 17-22 | 57 |
| | 23-28 | 31 |
| | 29-34 | 4 |
| | 35-40 | 4 |
| | 41-46 | 1 |
| | 47-52 | 0 |
| | 53 and up | 1 |
| | Undeclared | 2 |
| Major | Non Criminal Justice | 49 |
| | Criminal Justice | 50 |
| | Undeclared | 1 |

In Table 2, the reader will find questions relating to the respondents knowledge and perception of airport security, the Transportation Security Administration, and the events surrounding September 11, 2001.

4.3 Knowledge and Perception

In table 2, the author included questions which were related to the respondents' knowledge and perceptions of terrorism and the airline industry. The questions will be discussed in the order that they appeared in the survey and not by importance.

In question 1, the author asked respondents if they were familiar with the airplane hijackings that occurred on September 11, 2001. The results were extremely close as the mean for non- CRCJ students was 1.44 and the mean for CRCJ students was 1.43. In fact, 52 non-majors responded with agree strongly and 52 majors responded with agree strongly. Because of the similarity, the P-Value was .873 and was not significant. In question 2, the author wanted to know if respondents were familiar with airplane hijackings that occurred prior to September 11, 2001. The mean for non-CRCJ students was 2.96 while the mean for CRCJ students was 3.17 with a p-value of 1.72. This was not significant.

The third question was "I am familiar with terrorism and the terrorist group responsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States". The mean for non-CRCJ majors was 1.63 and 1.89 for CRCJ majors. The p-value was not significant at .060. In question four the author looked for respondents' knowledge by asking "I know what

TSA stands for”. The mean for non-CRCJ students was 2.58 while the mean for CRCJ students was 3.28. The p-value was statistically significant at .000.

The fifth question, “I know the purpose of TSA” was also statistically significant. The mean for non-CRCJ majors was 2.82 while the mean for CRCJ majors was 3.24. The p-value was .029. In question six, respondents were asked if they were aware of the air marshals program. Non-CRCJ majors had a means of 2.34 while CRCJ majors had a mean score of 2.51. The p-value was .339 and not significant. In question seven the respondents were asked if they felt that TSA has been successful in their duties. The mean for non-CRCJ students was 2.99 while the means for CRCJ students was 3.04. The p-value was .678 and was not significant.

The eighth perception question, “Do you feel safer flying since September 11, 2001” showed little difference in the mean as the means for non-CRCJ students was 2.23 and the mean for CRCJ students was 2.28. The p-value was not significant at .709. In question nine, respondents were asked to rate the following statement, “I feel that the government is doing all they can to keep hijackers from succeeding in taking over airplanes. The mean for non-CRCJ majors was 2.32 while the mean for CRCJ majors was 2.51. The p-value was .224 and was not significant.

In question ten, respondents were asked if they considered destination when planning a vacation (high risk versus low risk locations as it pertains to terrorist). The mean for non-CRCJ majors was 3.08 while the mean for CRCJ majors was 3.21. In question 11 the respondents were asked, “I feel that the skies are safer since September 11, 2001”. The non-CRCJ mean was 2.56 and the CRCJ mean was 2.43. Question 12

was extremely close with mean scores of 2.88 (non-CRCJ) and 2.89 (CRCJ) when asked if respondents feared another terrorist attack involving planes.

Question 13 was also close with mean scores of 4.36 (non-CRCJ) and 4.34 (CRCJ) when asked if respondents did not fly anymore due to fear of terrorism and September 11, 2001. The final question asked, "I feel that flying within the United States is safer than flying outside the country". The mean for non-CRCJ students was 2.53 and the mean for CRCJ students was 2.51. Please refer to Table 2 on the following page.

Table 4.2 Non-CRCJ and CRCJ Majors Knowledge and Perception of Terrorism and Airport Security

| Variable | Means Non CRCJ | Means CRCJ | P Values |
|---|-------------------|---------------|----------|
| I am familiar with the airplane hijackings that occurred on September 11, 2001 | 1.44 | 1.43 | .873 |
| I am familiar with the airplane hijackings that occurred prior to September 11, 2001 | 2.96 | 3.17 | 1.72 |
| I am familiar with terrorism and the terrorist group responsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States | 1.63 | 1.89 | .060 |
| I know what TSA stands for | 2.58 | 3.28 | .000** |
| I know the purpose of TSA | 2.82 | 3.24 | .029* |
| I am aware of the Air Marshals Program | 2.34 | 2.51 | .339 |
| I feel that TSA has been successful in their duties | 2.99 | 3.04 | .678 |
| I feel safe flying since September 11, 2001 | 2.23 | 2.28 | .709 |
| I feel that the government is doing all they can to keep hijackers from succeeding in taking over airplanes | 2.32 | 2.51 | .224 |
| When planning a vacation, I consider location as to where I will fly (such as high risk versus low risk locations as it pertains to terrorist | 3.08 | 3.21 | .430 |
| I feel that the skies are safer since September 11, 2001 | 2.56 | 2.43 | .327 |
| I fear another terrorist attack involving airplanes will occur in the United States | 2.88 | 2.89 | .925 |
| I do not fly anymore because of fear of terrorism and September 11, 2001 | 4.36 | 4.34 | .870 |
| I feel that flying within the United States is safer than flying outside the country | 2.53 | 2.51 | .906 |

*Statistically significant at the .05 level

**Statistically significant at the .01 level

4.4 Cross Tabulations

The last six questions of the survey focused on the subjects' history of airline travel, the reasons why they fly, and with whom they travel. Cross tabulation was used to determine how non-CRCJ students and CRCJ students' answers differed.

In question 17 the author asked students if they had traveled on an airplane before September 11, 2001. Of the CRCJ majors, 87% said yes while only 13% said no. The answers for non-CRCJ majors were similar with 81% answering yes and 19% answering no. When asked if the respondents had flown since September 11, 2001, the answers were similar to the previous question with 83% CRCJ majors answering yes and 17% answering no. Again, the answers between majors were close as 81% non-CRCJ majors said yes and 19% said no.

In question 19 respondents were asked how many times they had flown from 1996 to September 11, 2001. Of the CRCJ students, 16% said none, 32% said between 1-3 times, 26% said between 4-6 times, 8% said between 7-9, and 18% said that they had flown 10 or more times. Of the non-CRCJ students, 18% said that they had not flown during that time, 36% between 1-3 times, 17% between 4-6, 14% between 7-9, and 15% said that they had flown 10 or more times between 1996 and September 11, 2001.

The author wanted to know how many times the students had flown from September 12, 2001 to the present in question 20. Of the CRCJ students, 19% had not flown during this time, 40% between 1-3 times, 20% between 4-6 times, 5% had flown 7-9 times, and 16% had flown 10 or more times since September 12, 2001. Of the non-

CRCJ students, 19% had not flown since September 12, 2001, while 37% had flown 1-3 times, 29% between 4-6 times, 3% between 7-9 times, and 12% had flown 10 or more times since September 12, 2001.

In question 21 respondents were asked if they traveled by airplane for business, pleasure, or other reasons. 11% of the respondents, who were CRCJ majors, said that they flew for business purposes while 13% non-CRCJ majors said that they flew for business purposes. Of the CRCJ students, 71% said that they flew for pleasure while 61% of the non-CRCJ majors said that they flew for pleasure. The remaining 18% of CRCJ majors said that they flew for other reasons while 25% of non-CRCJ majors responded that they fly for other reasons besides business or pleasure.

The final question of the survey asked respondents if they flew alone, with co-workers, or with family and friends. The CRCJ majors answered with 25% flying alone, 3% flying with co-workers, and 72% flying with family and friends. The non-CRCJ majors answered with 30% flying alone, 6% flying with co-workers, and 64% flying with family and friends. Please refer to Table 3 on the following page.

Table 4.3 Cross Tabulations

| Variable | Totals | Criminal Justice Major | Non Criminal Justice Major |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Have You traveled on an airplane before September 11, 2001? | YES | 87% | 81% |
| | NO | 13% | 19% |
| Have you flown on an airplane since September 11, 2001? | YES | 83% | 81% |
| | NO | 17% | 19% |
| Number of times flown from 1996-September 11, 2001: | 0 | 16% | 18% |
| | 1-3 | 32% | 36% |
| | 4-6 | 26% | 17% |
| | 7-9 | 8% | 14% |
| | 10 or more | 18% | 15% |
| Number of times flown from September 12, 2001 to current: | 0 | 19% | 19% |
| | 1-3 | 40% | 37% |
| | 4-6 | 20% | 29% |
| | 7-9 | 5% | 3% |
| | 10 or more | 16% | 12% |
| Reasons you fly: | Business | 11% | 13% |
| | Pleasure | 71% | 61% |
| | Other | 18% | 25% |
| Do you usually fly: | Alone | 25% | 30% |
| | With co-workers | 3% | 6% |
| | With family or friends | 72% | 64% |

In the final chapter, the author will discuss the findings of the surveys. The author will also discuss what they mean and how they effect this study. Furthermore, what do these results mean to the airline industry, academia, and individuals who travel by airplane will be considered.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Overview

As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of this study is to examine the knowledge and perception of airline security and safety between Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors and Non-Criminology and Criminal Justice Majors post September 11, 2001. In chapter 2 the author discussed terrorism, the events of September 11, 2001 and the effect it has had on the airline industry, airline security, and policies implemented by the government in order to ensure public safety from terrorists. How the surveys were implemented, how the respondents were chosen, and how each test was run is discussed in chapter 3. In chapter 4, the findings of the survey were discussed and tables were added to show the results of these findings. In this chapter, the author will conclude with what these results mean and why they may or may not be important to future research.

5.2 Results

The results of the t-tests in Chapter 4 showed that only 2 variables were statistically significant. These both pertained to the knowledge of TSA. When comparing cross tabulations on both of these questions with CRCJ majors and non-

majors, the results showed that the non-CRCJ majors were more aware of TSA than the CRCJ majors. When respondents were asked if they knew what TSA stands for, 28 non-CRCJ majors strongly agreed while only 20 CRCJ majors strongly agreed. Regarding the same question, 14 non-CRCJ majors agreed while only 5 CRCJ majors agreed. Of the disagree and strongly disagree, there were 22 non-CRCJ majors and 39 CRCJ majors. There were 9 non-CRCJ majors that answered “neutral” while 11 CRCJ majors answered “neutral”.

In the second question that was statistically significant, “I know the purpose of TSA”, the results were not what the researcher expected. A total of 36 non-CRCJ majors either strongly agreed (21) or agreed (15) with this statement. On the other hand, 32 CRCJ majors strongly agreed (16) or agreed (16). A total of 26 non-CRCJ majors disagreed (8) or strongly disagreed (18) and 38 CRCJ majors disagreed (10) or strongly disagreed (28). There were 11 non-CRCJ majors that answered “neutral” and 5 CRCJ majors that answered “neutral”.

While trying to determine why the non-CRCJ majors were more aware of TSA and their duties than the CRCJ majors, it is necessary to look at a few different factors. First of all, the researcher can look at which classes were chosen for the surveys. The researcher stayed within the CRCJ field but chose Introduction to Criminology and Criminal Justice in order to include non-CRCJ majors as respondents. The other classes chosen were upper level courses and almost all students enrolled in those courses were CRCJ majors. So why would the non majors in an Introduction class know more about TSA? One possibility could be that they really do not know about TSA but answered

that they do. Possibly they saw the question, knew that they had heard of TSA, knew what it was, and thought that they knew what it stood for.

Another possible reason why non-majors may have known more about TSA is because of their current class. The author was not aware of what they were discussing in class that semester. Because it is Introduction to Criminal Justice, it may have included terrorism, September 11, and security. Possibly by the time the students reach the upper level classes, they forget the meaning of TSA and its purposes. Whatever the reason, it is important for CRCJ majors to know what TSA stands for and what its purpose is if they intend to pursue a career Homeland Security, the FBI, CIA, policing, or work as a TSA agent.

Regarding the question, “I am familiar with airplane hijackings prior to September 11, 2001”, the results were as follows: a total of 33 non-CRCJ majors either agreed strongly or agreed with this statement. Only 23 CRCJ majors agreed strongly or agreed. This is another area where one may assume that CRCJ majors would be more knowledgeable. Regarding the other knowledge based questions, “I am familiar with the terrorist groups responsible for September 11, 2001” and “I know what the Air Marshals Program is”, more non-CRCJ students agreed than the CRCJ students. These responses were very similar, but one could possibly argue that the CRCJ students should be more knowledgeable in these areas.

5.3 Perceptions

If an individual is familiar with TSA, the terrorist group responsible for September 11, and the Air Marshals Program, does that change their perception of travelling by plane? By comparing the overall number of subjects who responded that they felt safe flying since September 11, 2001, the numbers were very similar. Non-CRCJ majors (who appear to know more about TSA) strongly agreed (25) and agreed (21) that they felt safe flying since September 11. While only 9 did not feel safe, leaving 18 “neutral”. Of the CRCJ majors (who appear to not know as much about TSA) strongly agreed (24) and agreed (20) that they felt safer flying since September 11, 2001. Only 10 did not feel safe, with 21 “neutral”. Similarly, a total of 37 non-CRCJ majors and 38 CRCJ majors felt that the skies were safer since September 11, 2001. Only 14 and 13, respectively, did not feel that it is now safer to fly since September 11, 2001.

Although so many respondents felt that it was safe to fly, it was surprising to see the number of people who believed there would be another terrorist attack within the United States. There were a total of 49 subjects who agreed that another attack would happen. Sixty subjects were not sure if another attack would take place and 37 did not think another attack would happen.

The good news for the airline industry is that only 9 subjects out of 146 do not fly anymore due to terrorism and September 11. Twenty-two subjects are unsure and 115 still travel by airplane even after the events of September 11. When planning a

vacation, only 58 subjects consider location as it pertains to terrorism while 66 do not. The difference between the CRCJ majors and non-CRCJ majors was very insignificant as both groups answered almost the same way. Another area where CRCJ and non-CRCJ students agreed was that flying within the United States was safer than flying outside the country (73 either strongly agreed or agreed while only 34 strongly disagreed or disagreed).

5.4 Limitations

The main limitation of this study would be the subject population. The ideal subject pool would have been individuals at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. Students between the ages of 18-23 usually feel invincible and are less fearful of things that a mature adult might fear. If you ask a 21 year old male if he is afraid of a terrorist attack versus a 40 year old male about to board an airplane with his wife and children, the answers would probably be dramatically different. Unfortunately, for this study the author was not able to subject travelers about to board an airplane to a survey about terrorism.

For future researchers it may be necessary to change the questions in the survey. Instead of asking respondents if they are aware of what TSA stands for and its purpose, the results would possibly be more accurate if the question was submitted in the form of multiple choice. This way, the researcher will know if the respondent is

actually knowledgeable of TSA, previous skyjackings, and terrorism, or just believes that they are.

5.5 Policy Implications

The results suggested that the CRCJ majors and non-CRCJ majors at The University of Texas at Arlington differed in their knowledge of TSA, terrorism, and airport security. However, they did not differ in their perception. One area in which policy should be addressed is with the airline industry. The research could have an impact on the airline industry and how they are viewed by the public. A second area for policy implication is applicable at the university level. This information could possibly impact future coursework at the university as what should be covered in more detail for CRCJ majors as these are the individuals who may pursue a career in security and anti-terrorism.

Since September 11, 2001, the airline industry has increased their security and has made changes in how to protect travelers from terrorists. The Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) was viewed by the Justice Department as being non-discriminatory and was in place at most airports as of 2000. (Maier, 2004; Patankar, & Holscher, 2000). CAPPS works by providing a risk assessment analysis with travelers' itineraries with historical records pertaining to terrorist activities. This system has been evolving over the past eight years and continues to change as terrorism changes. According to several scholars CAPPS still has a number of problems that need

to be remedied (Maier, 2004; Patankar, & Holscher, 2000). For example, the federal government, for a short period, kept the project covert and under close wrap due to its discriminatory impact (Maier, 2004; Patankar, & Holscher, 2000). Due to congressional hearings, investigative reports, and civil suits filed by angry passengers who claimed that they were unjustly targeted, the system is beginning to take on new directives (Maier, 2004; Patankar, & Holscher, 2000). Policies must address these new initiatives in order to cease the civil rights violations of ethnic minorities, specifically Middle Eastern men, women, and children. The federal government should also inform the public about such systems to ease the already tension between the citizens and its government. These policies are imperative in improving the relations and safety of passengers of the airline industry.

Another program that the airline is incorporating is The Air Marshal Program which is responsible for not only protecting passengers, but also for working closely with other law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorist activities (<http://www.tsa.gov>). Although the results of this study indicated that only a minute percent of participants feared to fly after the attacks of 9/11, policy for informing the public about programs such as The Air Marshals should be a top priority. In order for passengers of the airline industry to feel safe while flying, the industry must constantly advertise to its passengers that air marshal's are in fact consistently flying in their particular airlines. These types of messages, even if only symbolic, have a great impact on the general public. Airlines must be made to stress the additive safety of possibly flying in company with a United States Air Marshal.

A different method for airlines to help the public feel safe about flying since September 11, 2001, there is a need for them to educate the public on what changes they have made and inform them of the security measures currently in place. One way that they can do this is through the media. Every time there is a foiled terrorist attack due to the airlines security measures, this information needs to be reported to the public. According to Silver (2004), “more than 60% of a nationally representative sample of adults watched the attacks [September 11, 2001] on television as they occurred” (p.61). When the airlines take an active part to prevent a terrorist attack, the public is quick to view such headlines as indicated by Silver (2004).

As many of the respondents felt that another terrorist attack might occur within the United States, over 90% said that they did not stop travelling by airplane. As stated in the literature, many travelers have frustrations with TSA and say that their system needs improving (McCrie, 2004). However, according to the survey, most respondents felt that TSA was successful in their duties. Again, this would suggest that the sample population for the survey has different opinions about traveling by airplane. The sample population felt that another terrorist attack may occur but also believed that TSA and the government were doing everything possible to protect the citizens of the United States against an attack.

The results of this survey suggested that the non-CRCJ students at the University of Texas at Arlington were more knowledgeable about TSA than the CRCJ majors at the same university. One recommendation would be to offer more courses regarding terrorism and airport security within the CRCJ curriculum. In addition,

offering seminars and workshops regarding what security measures are in place within the airports would educate the students on the purposes of TSA and other agencies working to prevent terrorist activities. By implementing such options through policy you may have a two-fold positive effect on students. First, offering these types of options to CRCJ students will enhance the knowledge of terrorism, terrorist, and the different types of preventative programs are currently in place. Second, these options may also decrease the fear of flying by CRCJ students.

As terrorists continue to plot against our country and attempt to destroy our security, we must continue to be vigilant in our powers to protect ourselves from this terror. Many Criminology and Criminal Justice students go on to work with the FBI, TSA, Homeland Security, or the local police. Their understanding of airport security is vital in protecting the public against future terrorist attacks. The results of this study suggest a strong need to educate CRCJ students on issues of terrorism and airport security. As Homeland Security continues to evolve, information is being shared between agencies now more than ever. They must be knowledgeable in all components of this system and how each entity works with the other in order to be successful in their duties.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

STUDENT SURVEY

This study is being conducted through the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department at The University of Texas at Arlington. This study is about your perception of airport security as it relates to terrorism. This survey is voluntary and all answers are confidential. You are not required to participate in this survey. If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Brittany Rodriguez at _817-272-3318.

Please leave this section blank! Begin the survey on page 2.

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| ① | ① | ① |
| ② | ② | ② |
| ③ | ③ | ③ |
| ④ | ④ | ④ |
| ⑤ | ⑤ | ⑤ |
| ⑥ | ⑥ | ⑥ |
| ⑦ | ⑦ | ⑦ |
| ⑧ | ⑧ | ⑧ |
| ⑨ | ⑨ | ⑨ |
-

1. I am very familiar with the airplane hijackings that occurred on September 11, 2001:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

2. I am familiar with airplane hijackings that have occurred PRIOR to September 11, 2001:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

3. I am familiar with terrorism and the terrorist group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

4. I know what TSA stands for:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

5. I know the purpose of TSA:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

6. I am aware of the Air Marshals Program:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

7. I feel that TSA has been successful in their duties:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

8. I feel safe flying since September 11, 2001:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

9. I feel that the government is doing all that they can to keep hijackers from succeeding in taking over airplanes:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

10. When planning a vacation, I consider location as to where I will be flying (such as high risk versus low risk locations as it pertains to terrorist):

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

11. I feel that the skies are safer since September 11, 2001:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

12. I fear that another terrorist attack involving airplanes will occur in the United States:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

13. I do not fly anymore because of fear of terrorism and September 11, 2001:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

14. I feel that flying within the United States is safer then flying outside the country:

Agree Strongly

Disagree Strongly

①

②

③

④

⑤

Please circle the appropriate answer

14. Gender:

Male

Female

①

①

15. Age:

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 17-22 | 23-28 | 29-34 | 35-40 | 41-46 | 47-52 | 53 and up |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

| | | |
|------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 16. Major: | Criminal Justice | Non Criminal Justice |
| | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

17. Have you traveled on an airplane *before* September 11, 2001?

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| No | Yes |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

18. Have you flown on an airplane *since* September 11, 2001:

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| No | Yes |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

19. Number of times flown from **1996-September 11, 2001:**

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 | 1-3 | 4-6 | 7-9 | 10 or more |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

20. Number of times flown from **September 12, 2001 to current:**

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 | 1-3 | 4-6 | 7-9 | 10 or more |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

21. Reasons that you mostly fly: (please circle appropriate answer)

| | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Business | Pleasure | Other |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

22. Do you usually fly :

Alone
①

With co-workers
①

With family or friends
②

REFERENCES

- Ahern, R. A. (2001). Aviation Security: CAPPS profiling system should be expanded now. *Security Letter*, 31(18), 2-4.
- Anderson, T. (2001). Congressional legislation. *Security Management*, 45(11), 98-100.
- Anonymous (2001). FBI chief pledges to fulfill both spirit and letter of information sharing law. *Crime Control Digest*, 35(44), 1-2.
- Anonymous (2003). The USA Patriot Act. *Crime and Justice International*, 19, 27.
- Anonymous (2007, July 16). Government Awards \$1.7 Billion in Homeland Security Grants. *Criminal Justice Newsletter*, 3.
- Becker, P. J., Jipson, A. J., & Katz, R. (2001). A Timeline of the Racialist Movement in the United States: A Teaching Tool. *Journal of Criminal Justice Education*, 12, 427-453.
- Blunk, S. S., Clark, D.E., & McGibany, J.M.(2006. Evaluating the long-run impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US domestic airline travel. *Applied Economics*, 38, 363-370.
- Bureau of National Affairs (2006). Air travelers can't revoke implied consent to security checks after initially submitting. *Criminal Law Reporter*, 78(25), 712.
- Carter, T. (2005). Two sides to the story. *ABA Journal*, 91, 64.
- Ciarelli, S. (2003). Pre-arrest silence: Minding the gap between the fourth amendment stops and the Fifth Amendment custody. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 93(2/3), 651.

- CNN. *Flights Resume but situation remains tense*. (2001, September 14). Retrieved July 11, 2006, from CNN Web Site:
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/travel/news/09/13/faa.airport>.
- Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Cohen, L. (2004). Keeping chaos under control. *Security Management*, 48(3), 80-87. Department of Homeland Security. (n.d). Retrieved January 7, 2008, from
<http://www.dhs.gov>.
- Devanney, J., & Devanney, D. (2003). Homeland security and the patriot acts. *Law and Order*, 51(8), 10.
- Doyle, J. M. (2005, December 5). Sharp Differences. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 163, 47-48.
- Doyle, J. M. (2006). Bomb, Paper, Scissors. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 164(4), 44.
- Dugan, L., LaFree, G., & Piquero, A. R. (2005). Testing a rational choice model of airline hijackings. *Criminology*, 43(4), 1031-1066.
- Gips, M. (2006). The air up there. *Security Management*, 50(6), 31.
- Greco, M. S. (2006). A False Choice. *ABA Journal*, 92, 6.
- Hamm, M. S. (2005). After September 11: Terrorism research and the crisis in criminology. *Theoretical Criminology*, 9(2), 237-251.
- Hewitt, C. (2003). *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda*. New York: Routledge.
- Jackson, J. (1996). Tragedy in the Heartland: It couldn't happen in Oklahoma City—but it did! *Corrections Today*, 58, 1.

- Kalette, D. (05, November 27). Retrieved July 11, 2006, from <http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/topstories/news-article.aspx?storid=48014>.
- Kosova, W., & Gerlach, D. (2006, August 28). Terror in our Time. *Newsweek*, 148, 54-55.
- Landes, W. (1978). An Economic Study of US Aircraft Hijackings, 1961-1976. *Journal of Law*, 21(1), 1-32.
- Lawrence, M. (2006). Behaving like a terrorist. *Security Management*, 50(3), 36-38.
- Lucci, P. (2001). Sept. 11th...maybe it didn't have to happen. *Security Systems News*, 4(12), 7.
- Maier, T. W. (2004). Cracks in system open to terrorist. *Insight on the News*, 20(6), 26.
- Mann, D. (2003 September 11). Most welcome post - 9/11 security. *Mail Tribune*.
- Martin, R. A. (1999). The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A concept that works. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 68, 23-28.
- Matathia, I., & Salzam, M. (2001). The impact of Shaken Confidence. *Advertising Age*, 72(38), 15.
- McCrie, R. (2004). Proof that TSA needs improving: Senator Kennedy repeatedly banned. *Security Letter*, 34(14).
- McCrie, R. D. (2001, October 2). Twelve reasons why it will soon be safe to fly again...and one reason why it isn't. *Security Letter*, 31, 16-18.
- National Geographic-911 Timeline*. (n.d.). Retrieved July 11, 06, from National Geographic Web Site:
<http://channel.national.geographic.com/channel/inside911/timeline.html>.
- 911 Commission Report. (n.d.). Retrieved on October 16, 2007 from <http://www.911Commissionreport.gov>.

- Patankar, M. S., & Holscher, L. (2000). Accessibility vs. Security: The Challenge to Airport Security Systems. *Security Journal*, 13(2), 7-19.
- Platt, T., & O'Leary, C. (2003). Patriot Acts. *Social Justice*, 30(1), 5-16.
- Raffel, R. (2003). Weapons of mass destruction and civil aviation preparedness. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72(5), 1.
- Ripley, A. (2006, August 13). How much risk will we take? *Time in Partnership with CNN*. Retrieved on February 27, 2008 from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,0171,1226170,00.html>.
- Russell, P. A., & Preston, F. W. (2004). Airline security after the event. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 47(11), 1419-1427.
- Saul, B. (2005). Definitions of "Terrorism" in the UN Security Council: 1985-2004. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 4 (1), 141-166.
- September 11 News. (n.d.). Retrieved on December 18, 2007 from <http://www.september11news.com>.
- Silver, R.C. (2004). The Myths of Healing. *Families, Systems, and Health*, 22, 61-63.
- Sturgeon, W. (2002). Filling our nations' security gap. *Corrections Today*, 64(1), 22.
- Sullivan, E. (2007, December 31). U.S. airport security agency unpopular. Retrieved on January 3, 2008 from http://news.yahoo.com/s/as_travel/20071221/ap_tr_ge/travel_brief_airport_complaints.com.
- Theil, S. (2004, July 12). Gordon Woo: Calculus for catastrophe. *Newsweek*.
- Transportation Security Administration. (n.d.). Retrieved December 18, 2007 from <http://www.tsa.gov>.
- Turk, A. (2002). Confronting enemies foreign and domestic: an American dilemma? *Criminology and Public Policy*, 1(3), 345-350.

- Twin Terrors. (2001, September 14). *Time*, 158 (11), 32-34.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (n.d.). Retrieved on October 16, 2007 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html.
- Wayment, H. A. (2004). It could have been me: Vicarious Victims and Disaster-Focused Distress. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, 30(4), 515-528.
- The White House. (2002). Retrieved on December 7, 2006 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.
- Whitlock, C. (2007, July 5).Homemade, cheap, and dangerous; terror cells favor simple ingredients in building bombs. *The Washington Post*, pp. A01.
- Willer, R. (2004). The effects of government-issued terror warnings on presidential approval ratings. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 10 (1), p. 2-11.
- Young, R. (2002, January). Skyjacking becomes major focus in U.S. and abroad. *Crime and Justice International*, 18, 5-6.
- Zalud, B. (2006). When strategies converge: Networked and smart, too. *Security*, 43(3), 54-56.
- Zimmerman, D. L. (2005). Review Essay/ Exactly Why is the Crowd Naked? Are we strippers or were we robbed. *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 24(2), 47-53.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Brittany Rodriguez graduated with her Bachelor's degree in Parks, Recreation, and Tourism Sciences from Texas A&M University in 1996. She went on to work in the criminal justice field for ten years as a caseworker for the Texas Youth Commission and as a state probation officer. She worked with drug addicts and sex offenders before deciding to continue her education at The University of Texas at Arlington. Mrs. Rodriguez lives in Arlington, Texas with her husband and son.