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dc.contributor.authorWang, Xuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-17T23:34:52Z
dc.date.available2008-09-17T23:34:52Z
dc.date.issued2008-09-17T23:34:52Z
dc.date.submittedMarch 2008en_US
dc.identifier.otherDISS-2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10106/1013
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms. I find that firms are more likely to receive performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals when the firms have higher agency costs, stronger shareholder rights, or higher unexpected executive compensation. Shareholder executive-pay proposals gain more voting support from shareholders if the proposals are performance-oriented (than non-performance-oriented), sponsored by pension or union funds (than individual or religious groups and other institutions). In one year subsequent to the year of receiving performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals, proposal firms' executive pay-performance sensitivities in stock option grants, and cash and total compensation increase more than control firms'. In addition, CEOs' compensation structures shift more toward equity-based for the proposal firms than for control firms in the year subsequent to the proposal year.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSubramaniam, Chandraen_US
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.publisherAccountingen_US
dc.titleDoes Shareholder-sponsored Corporate Governance Proposal Matter? The Case Of Executive Compensationen_US
dc.typePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.committeeChairSubramaniam, Chandraen_US
dc.degree.departmentAccountingen_US
dc.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
dc.degree.grantorUniversity of Texas at Arlingtonen_US
dc.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.degree.namePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.externalLinkhttps://www.uta.edu/ra/real/editprofile.php?onlyview=1&pid=495
dc.identifier.externalLinkDescriptionLink to Research Profiles


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