dc.contributor.author | Wang, Xu | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-09-17T23:34:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-09-17T23:34:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-09-17T23:34:52Z | |
dc.date.submitted | March 2008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | DISS-2008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10106/1013 | |
dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms.
I find that firms are more likely to receive performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals when the firms have higher agency costs, stronger shareholder rights, or higher unexpected executive compensation. Shareholder executive-pay proposals gain more voting support from shareholders if the proposals are performance-oriented (than non-performance-oriented), sponsored by pension or union funds (than individual or religious groups and other institutions). In one year subsequent to the year of receiving performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals, proposal firms' executive pay-performance sensitivities in stock option grants, and cash and total compensation increase more than control firms'. In addition, CEOs' compensation structures shift more toward equity-based for the proposal firms than for control firms in the year subsequent to the proposal year. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Subramaniam, Chandra | en_US |
dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
dc.publisher | Accounting | en_US |
dc.title | Does Shareholder-sponsored Corporate Governance Proposal Matter? The Case Of Executive Compensation | en_US |
dc.type | Ph.D. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeeChair | Subramaniam, Chandra | en_US |
dc.degree.department | Accounting | en_US |
dc.degree.discipline | Accounting | en_US |
dc.degree.grantor | University of Texas at Arlington | en_US |
dc.degree.level | doctoral | en_US |
dc.degree.name | Ph.D. | en_US |
dc.identifier.externalLink | https://www.uta.edu/ra/real/editprofile.php?onlyview=1&pid=495 | |
dc.identifier.externalLinkDescription | Link to Research Profiles | |