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Now showing items 1-10 of 14

#### The Least Square Values and the Shapley Value for Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 2003-05)

The Least Square Values (briefly LS-values), represent a family of values for cooperative transferable utility games, introduced by L. Ruiz. F. Valenciano and J.Zarzuelo (1998). For a fixed set of players N, a set of weights ...

#### On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)

The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, and many other ...

#### Multiweighted Shapley Values and Random Order Values

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-03)

Recently, R. J. Weber introduced axiomatically in [14] the concept of random order value, an operator from [see pdf for notation], the space of TU games, to [see pdf for notation], satisfying linearity, dummy, efficiency ...

#### On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)

This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. The computational experience for the Shapley Value, the most ...

#### Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)

Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of all games with the set of players N, denoted below G(N), is ...

#### Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)

A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the ...

#### The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1988-12)

The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of ...

#### New Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Value

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1995-01)

In a paper by P. Dubey and L.S. Shapley an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf value has been extracted from an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf power index (see [6]). Briefly speaking, the Banzhaf value axioms can be ...

#### On The Inverse Problem for Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games

(University of Texas at Arlington, 2002-04)

In the present paper, we define a basis of [see pdf for notation] relative to a Semivalue, we compute the potentials of the subgames of a given game, to show that the basis is a potential basis, from which we get the ...

#### An Algorithm for Finding the Generalized Nucleolus of a Finite Set and the Multiobjective Discrete Programming Problems

(University of Texas at Arlington, 1982-03)