dc.contributor.author | Dragan, Irinel C. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-09T16:21:20Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2010-06-09T16:21:20Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 1998-01 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2473 | en |
dc.description.abstract | **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the space of such games, which are consistent relative to a Hart/Mas Colell type of reduced game and weighted standard for two person games. The potential is also used to prove the validity of a recursive definition of semivalues, as well as the fact that the semivalues are Shapley values of the so called Power Game. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | University of Texas at Arlington | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Technical Report;330 | en |
dc.subject | TU games | en |
dc.subject | Shapley value | en |
dc.subject | Cooperative game | en |
dc.subject | Semivalues | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Game theory | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Mathematics Research | en |
dc.title | Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games | en |
dc.type | Technical Report | en |
dc.publisher.department | Department of Mathematics | en |