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Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
New Mathematical Properties of the Least Square Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1996-03)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Least Square Values for cooperative TU games (briefly, LS-values) represent a family of solutions of the following family of optimization
problems associated ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...