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Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1990-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable
set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept
for cooperative games with ...
Bargaining Sets with Thresholds
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1984-02)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new
coalition ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1988-12)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ...