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Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ...
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...