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Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1990-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable
set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept
for cooperative games with ...
Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
A Value for Digraph-restricted Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Digraph-restricted games model situations where some of the players, due to the lack of communication among them, are unable to cooperate. A digraph-restricted game ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
Allocations to Discriminated Players in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1991-08)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for cooperative sidepayment games are notoriously difficult to find. This paper provides guidelines on how to find ...
On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1991-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. ...
Tennis, Geometric Progression, Probability and Basketball
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-03)
The following problem about a tennis match is well—known. See Halmos [1, 2]. Consider 2n tennis players playing a single elimination match. Ask the question: what are the number of games played? The answer can be obtained ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...