Browsing Technical Papers - DO NOT EDIT by Author "Dragan, Irinel C."
Now showing items 1-14 of 14
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An Algorithm for Finding the Generalized Nucleolus of a Finite Set and the Multiobjective Discrete Programming Problems
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1982-03)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** -
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1992-09)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ... -
Bargaining Sets with Thresholds
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1984-02)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition ... -
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
Gambarelli, Gianfranco; Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1989-07)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ... -
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1988-12)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ... -
Greedy and Optimal Paths in a Weighted Graph Without Circuits and Applications to a Class of Optimization Problems on Finite Posets
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1983-05)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In several recent papers B. Korte and L. Lovasz considered a mathematical structure called a simple language on which a greedy algorithm can operate (see [31,J41, ... -
The Least Square Values and the Shapley Value for Cooperative TU Games
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2003-05)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Least Square Values (briefly LS-values), represent a family of values for cooperative transferable utility games, introduced by L. Ruiz. F. Valenciano and ... -
Multiweighted Shapley Values and Random Order Values
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1992-03)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Recently, R. J. Weber introduced axiomatically in [14] the concept of random order value, an operator from [see pdf for notation], the space of TU games, to [see ... -
New Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Value
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1995-01)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In a paper by P. Dubey and L.S. Shapley an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf value has been extracted from an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf power index (see ... -
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2008)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ... -
On The Inverse Problem for Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2002-04)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In the present paper, we define a basis of [see pdf for notation] relative to a Semivalue, we compute the potentials of the subgames of a given game, to show that ... -
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
Martínez-Legaz, Juan-Enrique; Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1999-09)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ... -
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1998-01)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ... -
Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1997)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...