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Now showing items 11-14 of 14
On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1991-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. ...
Tennis, Geometric Progression, Probability and Basketball
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-03)
The following problem about a tennis match is well—known. See Halmos [1, 2]. Consider 2n tennis players playing a single elimination match. Ask the question: what are the number of games played? The answer can be obtained ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1988-12)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...