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Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
New Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1995-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In a paper by P. Dubey and L.S. Shapley an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf value has been extracted from an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf power index (see ...
New Mathematical Properties of the Least Square Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1996-03)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Least Square Values for cooperative TU games (briefly, LS-values) represent a family of solutions of the following family of optimization
problems associated ...
Two Remarks on Totally Balanced Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1996)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Two results on totally balanced TU games are presented. It is first shown that the core of any subgame of a non-negative totally balanced game can be easily obtained ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...