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Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1989-07)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ...
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
Bargaining Sets with Thresholds
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1984-02)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new
coalition ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1988-12)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...