On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game

dc.contributor.author	Censor, Yair	en
dc.contributor.author	Butnariu, Dan	en
dc.date.accessioned	2010-06-08T17:25:25Z	en
dc.date.available	2010-06-08T17:25:25Z	en
dc.date.issued	1991-05	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2388	en
dc.description.abstract	Please note that the full text is embargoed ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. Each such bargaining scheme is by itself a mathematical model of "rational behavior" describing a specific way of achieving "equilibrated" payoff vectors. We show that many of these bargaining schemes are "stable"' and have meaningful heuristic interpretations.	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	University of Texas at Arlington	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Technical Report;280	en
dc.subject	n-person game	en
dc.subject	Bargaining scheme	en
dc.subject	cooperative n-person games	en
dc.subject	Mathematical models	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Game theory	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Mathematics Research	en
dc.title	On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game	en
dc.type	Technical Report	en
dc.publisher.department	Department of Mathematics	en