Bargaining Sets with Thresholds

dc.contributor.author	Dragan, Irinel C.	en
dc.date.accessioned	2010-06-09T15:26:22Z	en
dc.date.available	2010-06-09T15:26:22Z	en
dc.date.issued	1984-02	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2437	en
dc.description.abstract	Please note that the full text is embargoed ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition only if his supplementary gain exceeds a fixed threshold and could reject a new coalition only if his loss exceeds another fixed threshold. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the objections with thresholds and for the existence of the counter objections with thresholds associated to couples consisting of a group of players and a coalition structure subjected to some conditions have been proved. These results enabled us to state a combinatorial algorithm for establishing whether a given payoff configuration belongs to the bargaining set with thresholds, or not.	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	University of Texas at Arlington	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Technical Report;212	en
dc.subject	n-person game	en
dc.subject	Cooperative games	en
dc.subject	Bargaining set	en
dc.subject	Algorithm	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Game theory	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Mathematics Research	en
dc.title	Bargaining Sets with Thresholds	en
dc.type	Technical Report	en
dc.publisher.department	Department of Mathematics	en