The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

dc.contributor.author	Dragan, Irinel C.	en
dc.date.accessioned	2010-06-10T00:27:44Z	en
dc.date.available	2010-06-10T00:27:44Z	en
dc.date.issued	1988-12	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2477	en
dc.description.abstract	Please note that the full text is embargoed ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of solution for such games is due to R. J. Aumann and J. Dreze (1975). The Aumann/Maschler definition of a bargaining set relies upon a stability principle imposed to the payoffs in this set: an admissible payoff belongs to a bargaining set if for every objection against this payoff there is a counter objection. Two modification of the stability principle have been discussed in earlier papers of the author (Dragan,1985,1987,1988).	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	University of Texas at Arlington	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Technical Report;256	en
dc.subject	Cooperative games	en
dc.subject	Bargaining set	en
dc.subject	n-person game	en
dc.subject	Stability principle	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Game theory	en
dc.subject.lcsh	Mathematics Research	en
dc.title	The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments	en
dc.type	Technical Report	en
dc.publisher.department	Department of Mathematics	en