BEYOND BRIBERY: AN EXPLORATION INTO LOBBYING AND INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

Qualitative evidence suggests that corporations lobby within countries with informal structures abroad. While political science research on Western lobbying is robust, it falls short in understanding how multinational businesses operate in countries that do not possess regulated lobbying arenas. Given this, my research findings help fill a theoretical gap in political science literature by identifying how multinationals lobby within informal (unregulated) structures the same as they do within formal (regulated) arenas, like the US and EU. I argue that US multinational companies who engage the American lobbying arena are more likely to lobby within informal structures to ensure strategic goals. I create a behavior index to identify lobbying within informal structures and operationalize both lobbying disclosure issue reports and newspaper article mentions of three Middle Eastern country case studies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to show how American companies lobby within both formal and informal structures. Overall, since we do not yet know much about lobbying in countries with unregulated structures, this thesis will help scholars begin to think about the variables that should be considered and the factors that might influence the occurrence of this activity.