What Germany Taught the U.S. Army: Occupational Lessons in Postwar Germany, 1945-1946

Abstract

The study of the U.S.-occupation of Germany after the Second World War is not complete without understanding its role in changing the culture of the U.S. Army. Statesmen at the wartime conferences determined what policies the Army should implement in Germany, but these proved to be too impossible for the U.S. Army to carry out. The military directive, JCS 1067, emphasized denazification, democratization, and reeducation. U.S. policymakers in Washington envisioned U.S. troops executing these policies without hesitation. This expectation proved faulty as the occupation entered its first year. Denazification, democratization, and reeducation each failed due to a lack of communication, both within the Army command structure and between government agencies. Significantly, the troops themselves were dissatisfied with their role in the occupation. Additionally, GIs believed the Army’s demobilization was moving at too slow a pace. In response to increasing discontent, GIs protested, demonstrated, and resisted in a very loud, very public, very undisciplined manner. Non-fraternization policies greatly contributed to low morale. Instead of protesting this policy, soldiers overtly ignored it and interacted with Germans as they pleased. U.S. Army leaders appeared appalled at the behavior of their troops and leaders such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius D. Clay acted to regain control over the soldiers. Eisenhower sought ways to better understand the needs of the troops. Clay created morale-boosting programs to divert the GIs’ attention from their roles as occupiers. While the U.S. Army and Congress ultimately modified the non-fraternization policy. These changes reflected both the actions of the soldiers on the ground and the lack of communication that had prompted them to act. What may have appeared to be concessions to soldier dissatisfaction became the beginning of a larger cultural change within the U.S. Army.