Search
Now showing items 11-20 of 22
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ...
Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with Permission Structure
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2000-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A game with a permission structure describes a situation in which cooperation possibilities in a cooperative game with transferable utility are limited because there ...
A Value for Digraph-restricted Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Digraph-restricted games model situations where some of the players, due to the lack of communication among them, are unable to cooperate. A digraph-restricted game ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1989-07)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ...
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
Bargaining Sets with Thresholds
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1984-02)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new
coalition ...
Allocations to Discriminated Players in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1991-08)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for cooperative sidepayment games are notoriously difficult to find. This paper provides guidelines on how to find ...
On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1991-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. ...
Tennis, Geometric Progression, Probability and Basketball
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-03)
The following problem about a tennis match is well—known. See Halmos [1, 2]. Consider 2n tennis players playing a single elimination match. Ask the question: what are the number of games played? The answer can be obtained ...