Search
Now showing items 1-10 of 13
An Algorithm for Finding the Generalized Nucleolus of a Finite Set and the Multiobjective Discrete Programming Problems
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1982-03)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed**
Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...
The Least Square Values and the Shapley Value for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2003-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Least Square Values (briefly LS-values), represent a family of values for cooperative transferable utility games, introduced by L. Ruiz. F. Valenciano and ...
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ...
On The Inverse Problem for Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2002-04)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In the present paper, we define a basis of [see pdf for notation] relative to a Semivalue, we compute the potentials of the subgames of a given game, to show that ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1989-07)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ...
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
Greedy and Optimal Paths in a Weighted Graph Without Circuits and Applications to a Class of Optimization Problems on Finite Posets
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1983-05)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In several recent papers B. Korte and L. Lovasz considered a mathematical structure called a simple language on which a greedy algorithm can operate (see [31,J41, ...
New Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1995-01)
**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: In a paper by P. Dubey and L.S. Shapley an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf value has been extracted from an axiomatic definition of the Banzhaf power index (see ...